Five Themes Impacting Collaboration in a Joint Interagency Multinational Public Operational Context

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Abstract

This literature review was conducted in support of two Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto applied research projects examining civil-military relations. In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) are expected to work closely with a number of diverse organizations, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), Other Governmental Departments (OGDs), local populations, and the media. However, the CF’s history of working with these diverse organizations has been limited and may pose challenges to collaboration (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008). Previous exploratory research conducted for DRDC Toronto revealed a number of organizational, social and psychological issues impacting on civil-military collaboration in operations (Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010). Five broad themes helped categorize these challenges, including negotiation, power, identity, stereotypes and prejudice, and trust. The purpose of this paper was to further elaborate the themes by reviewing the most pertinent academic and scientific literature to provide a greater understanding of the process of collaboration.
Résumé

L’analyse documentaire dont il est ici question sert à appuyer deux projets de recherche appliquée de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) Toronto portant sur les relations civilo-militaires. Dans le cadre des opérations actuelles (p. ex., en Afghanistan et à Haïti), les Forces canadiennes (FC) sont appelées à collaborer étroitement avec un certain nombre d’organisations variées, c’est-à-dire avec des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), des organisations internationales (OI), d’autres ministères, la population locale et les médias. Toutefois, les antécédents des FC en matière de collaboration avec ces organisations sont plutôt limités, ce qui peut poser certaines difficultés lorsque vient le temps de travailler ensemble (Leslie, Gizewski et Rostek, 2008). Une étude exploratoire antérieure menée par RDDC Toronto a révélé un certain nombre de facteurs organisationnels, sociaux et psychologiques influençant la collaboration civilo-militaire en contexte IIMP (Thomson, Adams, Hall et Flear, 2010). Afin de mieux cerner les difficultés auxquelles font face les divers acteurs de la collaboration civilo-militaire, on les a regroupés en cinq grands thèmes : la négociation, le pouvoir, l’identité, les stéréotypes et les préjugés, et la confiance. L’analyse décrite dans le présent document avait pour objet d’approfondir ces thèmes dans le but de mieux comprendre le processus de la collaboration.
Executive Summary

Five Themes Impacting Collaboration in a Joint Interagency Multinational Public Operational Context

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This literature review was conducted in support of two Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto applied research projects examining civil-military relations in Canadian Forces (CF) operations. In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the CF are expected to work closely with a number of diverse organizations, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), Other Governmental Departments (OGDs), local populations, and the media. Referred to as a Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP) operating environment, the need to be "JIMP-capable" has been cited by the Director of Land Concepts and Designs as an important enabler for the Army of Tomorrow operating concept of adaptive dispersed operations (ADO). "JIMP-capable" is further seen as a key means to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex land environment (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). However, the “public” and “interagency” dimensions of the JIMP framework pose significant challenges to effective collaboration outcomes (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008).

Previous exploratory research conducted for DRDC Toronto revealed a number of organizational, social and psychological issues impacting on civil-military collaboration in the JIMP context (Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010). Subject matter experts (SMEs) with operational experience working within a JIMP context recalled that power struggles, ambiguous roles and responsibilities, conflicting goals, lack of respect, and distrust impacted their ability to effectively collaborate in theatre (Thomson et al., 2010). Five broad themes helped categorize these challenges facing diverse actors in civil-military collaboration. These include negotiation, power, identity, stereotypes and prejudice, and trust.

The purpose of this paper was to further elaborate the themes to provide a greater understanding of the process of collaboration. Following a preliminary examination of the scientific and academic literature pertaining to negotiation, power, identity, stereotypes and prejudice and trust, we identified the five most pertinent articles for each topic.

The first section of the literature review (Section 1.1) provides a brief introduction, describing the current CF operational environment and some of the potential challenges the CF faces in interacting with a number of civilian actors. The next section (Section 1.2) reviews some of the most relevant literature on negotiation as this was understood as a core activity in collaboration (Thomson et al., 2010). The literature highlights two negotiation outcomes, integrated (all parties’ needs are met) versus distributed (a concern for one party’s outcomes), and argues in favour of the former as it is believed to invoke cooperation and creative problem solving (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). This section also identifies five approaches/styles to negotiating, including competing, cooperating, compromising, accommodating, and avoiding, as well as motivational frameworks for negotiation. Within a JIMP context, there will be a number of diverse individuals who approach negotiation differently. Understanding the impacts of these diverse negotiation styles will be important for maximizing civil-military collaboration. We conclude the section by
describing a model of negotiation that emphasizes the importance of relationships and expected cooperation to negotiated outcomes (Halpert, Stuhlmacher, Crenshaw, Litcher, & Bortel, 2010).

Section 1.3 examines the impact of power on collaboration. Given the size of the CF in comparison to many civil actors in theatre (e.g., NGOs), an imbalance of resources may impact collaboration. This chapter examines different theories of power and discusses the bases of power. According to French and Raven’s (1959, cited in Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005) classification model, power derives from the perceived legitimacy to exercise power; the ability to allocate rewards and elicit positive evaluation; expertise; and coercion. Influence tactics are also detailed. Research has shown that some influence tactics (e.g., consultation and rational persuasion) are more effective tactics than others for influencing negotiation counterparts (Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005). Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale’s model examining power and negotiation is presented at the end of the section.

Section 1.4 describes social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987), before considering their influence on group identity. Individuals gain social capital by integrating into groups and adopting group norms and practices. Ashforth and Mael (1989) describe the antecedents and the consequences of social identification. The former include distinctiveness of the group’s values/practices, prestige of the group, and salience of the outgroup. Group factors impact the consequences, which include increased commitment to the group, increased consequences of group attitudes/behaviours, increased self-stereotyping and depersonalization, and internalized values/norms. Brewer (1991) developed the optimal distinctiveness model to illustrate an individual’s motivation to join groups, which identifies two opposing processes: the need to assimilate and the need for differentiation. Multiple identity theory is also briefly described (Brewer, 1999). Identity has been flagged as a core issue in civil-military collaboration efforts (Meharg, 2007), which also has empirical support (Thomson et al., 2010).

Section 1.5 examines the stereotype and prejudice literature. Theories of stereotype formation and maintenance are presented, before discussing some of the impacts of stereotypes on the target groups. This section also considers stereotype reduction. The literature suggests that contact with the stereotyped group may diminish preconceptions. Contact includes processes such as learning about one another, changing behaviour toward stereotyped groups, generating positive feelings about one another, and reappraising (Pettigrew, 1998). Contact is also believed to decrease a target’s negative behaviour (i.e., anxiety derived from the belief that one is stereotyped) and subsequently increase performance (Crisp & Abrams, 2008).

Section 1.6 examines trust. This literature suggests that interpersonal trust dimensions include competency, predictability, benevolence and integrity (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Interorganizational trust emerges from well-established institutional frameworks, such as common beliefs, shared values, norms and practices, and structures (Bachmann, 2001; Koeszegi, 2004; Wehmeyer, Reimer, & Schneider, 2001), as well as from reputation (Dollinger, Golden, & Saxton, 1997; cited in Sydow, 1998). As trust is known to develop over time, institutionally based trust is also posited as an antecedent to initial interorganizational trust (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). It is also believed that those individuals who represent the organization in the field, boundary spanners, will be influential in developing interorganizational trust (Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009). In JIMP contexts, this is especially relevant as judgements of trustworthiness will likely emerge from the institutional level as well as the interpersonal level.

Because the literature investigating these five themes is scant in the civil-military domain, recommendations for future work close out the review. It is suggested that discussions with SMEs who have recent experience operating in a JIMP context should be consulted to elicit from them first-hand experiences. The discussions should centre on those five themes reviewed in this report.
Sommaire

Five Themes Impacting Collaboration in a Joint Interagency Multinational Public Operational Context

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Courtney D. Hall, Craig Flear and Andrea L. Brown, Humansystems® Incorporated; DRDC Toronto CR 2011-072; R&D pour la defense Canada – Toronto; Mars 2011

La présente analyse documentaire sert à appuyer deux projets de recherche appliquée de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) Toronto portant sur les relations civilo-militaires lors d’opérations des Forces canadiennes (FC). Dans le cadre des opérations actuelles (p. ex., en Afghanistan et à Haïti), les FC sont appelées à collaborer étroitement avec un certain nombre d’organisations variées, c’est-à-dire avec des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), des organisations internationales (OI), d’autres ministères, la population locale et les médias. Selon le Directeur - Concepts et schémas de la Force terrestre, l’aptitude à évoluer dans un contexte opérationnel interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public (IIMP) constitue un élément clé pour la réalisation du concept d’opérations adaptables et dispersées (OAD) pour l’Armée de demain. Par ailleurs, cette aptitude est essentielle à la réussite des missions dans des environnements terrestres de plus en plus complexes (Gizewski et Rostek, 2007). Cependant, les aspects « public » et « interorganisationnel » du contexte IIMP rendent particulièremen dificile la tenue d’une collaboration efficace (Leslie, Gizewski et Rostek, 2008).

Une étude exploratoire antérieure menée par RDDC Toronto a révélé un certain nombre de facteurs organisationnels, sociaux et psychologiques influençant la collaboration civilo-militaire en contexte IIMP (Thomson, Adams, Hall et Flear, 2010). Des spécialistes ayant de l’expérience en contexte IIMP ont identifié les luttes de pouvoir, l’ambiguïté des rôles et des responsabilités, les objectifs conflictuels, le manque de respect et la défiance comme des facteurs influant sur leur capacité de collaborer efficacement dans le théâtre (Thomson et coll., 2010). Ainsi, afin de mieux cerner les difficultés auxquelles font face les divers acteurs de la collaboration civilo-militaire, on les a regroupés en cinq grands thèmes : la négociation, le pouvoir, l’identité, les stéréotypes et les préjugés, et la confiance.

L’analyse décrite dans le présent document avait pour objet d’approfondir ces thèmes dans le but de mieux comprendre le processus de la collaboration. L’analyse préliminaire des ouvrages scientifiques et universitaires portant sur les cinq thèmes nous a permis de cerner les cinq articles les plus pertinents se rapportant à chacun de ces thèmes.

La première partie de l’analyse (partie 1.1) se veut une brève introduction dans laquelle nous décrivons le contexte opérationnel actuel des FC ainsi que certains obstacles auxquels font face les FC lorsqu’elles interagissent avec des intervenants civils. Dans la partie suivante (partie 1.2), nous examinons les ouvrages les plus pertinents traitant de la négociation, qui est considérée comme une activité jouant un rôle déterminant en contexte collaboratif (Thomson et coll., 2010). Les ouvrages en question distinguent deux modèles de négociation : la négociation intégrative (les intérêts de chacune des parties sont satisfaits) et la négociation distributive (chaque partie se soucie uniquement de ses propres intérêts). Les auteurs de ces ouvrages tendent à privilégier le premier
modèle, puisque, selon eux, il suscite davantage la coopération et la résolution créative de problèmes (Thompson, Wang et Gunia, 2010). Toujours dans la même partie, nous présentons cinq façons d’aborder la négociation : la rivalité, la coopération, la recherche de compromis, l’accommodement et la fuite. Nous y proposons également des moyens d’encouragement à la négociation. Le contexte IIMP met en scène des personnes qui négocient de manière différente. Il est donc important de comprendre les effets de chacun des styles de négociation pour obtenir une collaboration civilo-militaire optimale. Nous concluons cette partie en décrivant un modèle de négociation qui accentue l’importance d’entretenir des relations axées sur la coopération pour que les négociations portent leurs fruits (Halpert, Stuhlmacher, Crenshaw, Litcher et Bortel, 2010).

La partie 1.3 porte sur l’influence du pouvoir sur la collaboration. Étant donné l’ampleur des FC comparativement à celle de la plupart des organisations civiles présentes dans le théâtre (p. ex., les ONG), il se peut que le déséquilibre des ressources affecte la collaboration. Dans cette partie, nous examinons différentes théories sur le pouvoir et nous traitons des fondements du pouvoir. Selon le modèle de classification de French et Raven (publié en 1959 et cité dans Kim, Pinkley et Fragale, 2005), le pouvoir d’une organisation découle de sa légitimité perçue d’exercer le pouvoir, de sa capacité d’accorder des récompenses et de susciter des éloges, de son expertise et de son pouvoir de coercition. Nous y décrivons également des tactiques d’influence. La recherche a révélé que certaines tactiques (p. ex., la consultation et la persuasion rationnelle) sont plus efficaces que d’autres pour influencer ses homologues (Kim, Pinkley et Fragale, 2005). Le modèle de pouvoir et de négociation de Kim, Pinkley et Fragale est présenté à la fin de cette partie.


Dans la partie 1.5, nous nous intéressons aux ouvrages portant sur les stéréotypes et les préjugés. Nous y présentons des théories sur la naissance et la perpétuation des stéréotypes, puis nous abordons certaines des répercussions qu’ont les stéréotypes sur les groupes concernés. Nous y traitons aussi de lutte contre les stéréotypes. Les ouvrages étudiés suggèrent que le fait d’entrer en relation avec des membres du groupe stéréotypé peut contribuer à atténuer les idées préconçues. Cela peut se faire en apprenant à connaître l’autre, en modifiant son attitude à l’égard des groupes stéréotypés, en agissant de manière à donner aux autres une impression positive de nous et en remettant en question nos idées préconçues (Petitgrew, 1998). Il semble aussi que l’entretien de relations favoriserait l’atténuation des réactions négatives de la personne concernée (p. ex., l’anxiété d’une personne se croyant stéréotypée), ce qui, par le fait même, contribuerait à accroître l’efficacité de la collaboration (Crisp et Abrams, 2008).
La partie 1.6 porte sur la confiance. Selon la documentation sur ce sujet, les aspects de la confiance relationnelle sont la compétence, la prévisibilité, la bienveillance et l’intégrité (Mayer, Davis et Schoorman, 1995). La confiance entre différentes organisations se fonde sur des cadres institutionnels bien établis tels que des croyances, des valeurs, des normes, des méthodes et des structures communes (Bachmann, 2001; Koeszegi, 2004; Wehmeyer, Reimer et Schneider, 2001), ainsi que sur la réputation (Dollinger, Golden et Saxton, 1997; repris dans Sydow, 1998). Puisque la confiance se développe avec le temps, la confiance en une même institution se veut le point de départ de toute confiance interorganisationnelle (McKnight, Cummings et Chervany, 1998). On croit aussi que les gens travaillent sur le terrain, ceux qui veillent à l’expansion de l’organisation, ont une grande influence lorsqu’il s’agit de tisser des liens de confiance entre les organisations (Janowicz-Panjaitan et Krishnan, 2009). Cela est tout particulièrement vrai dans un contexte IIMO, puisque le degré de confiance se fondera probablement tant sur le plan institutionnel qu’interpersonnel.

Vu la rareté des ouvrages traitant de ces cinq thèmes dans le domaine des relations civilo-militaires, nous concluons notre analyse en formulant des recommandations en vue de recherches ultérieures. Nous suggérons qu’il serait utile de consulter des experts en la matière ayant déjà travaillé en contexte IIMP pour qu’ils racontent leur expérience acquise sur le terrain. Les discussions devraient s’articuler autour des cinq thèmes examinés dans le présent rapport.
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1. Five Themes Impacting Collaboration in a JIMP Operational Context

1.1 Introduction

One of the greatest challenges that the Canadian Forces (CF) faces in its current approach to operations is working effectively with a number of diverse organizations, each with their own unique cultures, systems, and mandates, in order to help secure the Government of Canada’s particular mission priorities and objectives. Because today’s conflicts are driven by material, ethnic, religious, and ideological demands and require “winning the hearts and minds” (or the support and confidence) of the local population, the “ability to bear all instruments of national and coalition power and influence upon a problem in a timely, coordinated fashion (i.e., diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) is increasingly essential to achieving effective results” (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008, p. 11). The CF, therefore, must adopt a more “comprehensive” approach to operations, and collaborate and cooperate with a number of different actors (such as diplomats, development officers, corrections officials, police officers and local populations) who are simultaneously working toward the same broad goals of peace and political and economic stability. Such broad or superordinate goals, however, will require the CF to participate in activities that are both traditional (e.g., defence and security) as well as non-traditional (e.g., development and diplomacy).

Referred to as a Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP) operating environment, the capacity to be "JIMP-capable" is now cited by the Director of Land Concepts and Designs as an important enabler for the Army of Tomorrow operating concept of adaptive dispersed operations (ADO), and a key means to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex land environment (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007). According to this approach, the CF is in Afghanistan not only to establish security with the help of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other allied or coalition forces, but also to help other organizations promote development and political and economic stabilization. The most recent CF Doctrine Manual (2009) explicitly addresses this approach to operations, stating that:

“In complex contemporary crises, activities and effects from a wide range of government participants need to be coordinated. The CF contribution to this Canadian ‘Whole of Government’ (WoG) approach identifies an effects-based philosophy in seeking to stimulate, wherever possible, a cooperative culture and collaborative working environment between government departments and agencies. Within this philosophy, participants work proactively and share their understanding of situations and conduct planning and activities on the basis of shared favourable outcomes in the short, medium, and long term.”

(Canadian Forces Joint Publication: Canadian Military Doctrine, 2009, pp. 6-4 – 6-5)

As Leslie et al. (2008, p. 13) point out, the CF must have the “ability to connect all relevant organizations and agencies with CF architecture and provide liaison to support these agencies in the execution of the mission.”

The benefits expected to incur from JIMP-enabled operations include increasing the coordinated action on behalf of the CF and other players to secure mission goals and objectives; socializing the CF and other organizations to the challenges that each confront in the security environment and to
how their unique contributions can serve to collaboratively address these challenges; increasing awareness of and respect for the resources and contribution of diverse players; generating the desire to work collaboratively to achieve goals in a non-hierarchical manner; and ultimately fostering more strategic decision-making and action (Leslie et al., 2008). Therefore, effectively operating within the JIMP environment demands the collaboration, or at minimum, the coordination, of a number of diverse actors, including (but not limited to) the CF, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecines sans Frontières (MSF), and a variety of other actors, in order to ensure superordinate mission goals and objectives are met and sustained over the long term.

Although CF training and prior deployments have familiarized personnel with “joint” (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force) and “multinational” (e.g., United Nations, coalition, or NATO) operational environments, operating within an “interagency” and “public” context is relatively new (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008). For example, much of the professional development programmes for both non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and commissioned officers (COs) centre around preparing CF members to work in a multinational and/or joint capacity. And yet, the interagency and public components of the JIMP framework are just recently gaining more prominence in current CF operations (most notably in Afghanistan). Though this has led to some changes in CF professional development curriculum and CF pre-deployment training (for a review see Thomson, Hall, & Adams, 2010), greater effort could be made to understand the process of collaboration in a JIMP framework more thoroughly in order to 1) highlight the factors that make it work and make it fail, and 2) design training and education that can help advance this capacity.

Examining the literature on interprofessional collaboration and analysing data received from subject matter experts (SMEs) who had recent collaboration experiences in the field, we constructed a framework that highlighted a number of conditions for effective collaboration, including shared goals, shared values, shared risk, shared power and mutual trust (Thomson, Adams, & Flear, 2010). We found that the literature also identifies mutual respect as a facilitator of collaboration, and that this requires knowledge of another organization and its unique contribution to fulfilling collaborative objectives (San Martin-Rodriguez, Beaulieu, D’Amour, & Ferrada-Videla, 2005). Moreover, clearly established roles and responsibilities are important for fostering effective collaboration, and this clarity may be furthered through institutional systems and processes, such as standards, policies, documentation, and so on, which are communicated among collaborative partners through contact and interaction (San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005). It is believed that if these conditions are met, then there is a high probability that collaboration will be effective. However, a number of studies examining collaboration between military and non-military actors have shown that these conditions are not always being met, and this often stems from differences at the organizational level.

For example, research examining collaboration between non-military and military actors has found challenges arising from incompatible objectives and goals; organizational structure disparities (hierarchical and centralized vs. flat and decentralized); incompatible financial, knowledge management and communication systems; little or no corporate memory; few formal lessons learned mechanisms; poor funding and personnel shortfalls; and “competition for resources and agency profile” (Olsen & Gregorich, 2007, p. 13; see also DeConing, 2008; Morcos, 2005; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Spence, 2002; Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006). Research also highlighted a number of tensions between militaries and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that hindered collaboration, including differences in organizational structure and culture; tasks and ways of accomplishing them; the control of resources; definitions of success and time frames; and
information control and sharing (Winslow, 2002). In terms of approaches to the accomplishment of tasks, for example, militaries tend to emphasize efficient planning, whereas NGOs tend to emphasize the importance of community participation. Further, militaries tend to establish short-term goals and definitions of success (e.g., civil security), whereas NGOs tend to define success in terms of long-term social and economic development (Holton, Febbraro, Filardo, Barnes, Fraser, & Spiece, 2010; Thomson et al., 2010).

Research has also found that many NGO personnel maintain an a priori reluctance to collaborate with military actors in the field because it may compromise their neutrality in the eyes of the local population. Specifically, humanitarian organizations risk being perceived as partners in winning the hearts and minds of local host populations, which are construed by many humanitarian organizations as “psychological, effects-based operations,” something to be avoided (Meharg, 2007, p. 127). Holton and colleagues (2010) found that managing optics was a core issue for the NGO community when considering collaboration with the CF in theatre because the use of military resources and contact with the military may compromise NGOs’ neutrality, thereby placing them at risk of even physical harm.

Stereotypes held by military personnel and humanitarian workers also hinder collaboration. For instance, research by Meharg (2007) showed that “military professionals do not consider humanitarians as resembling a profession, and thereby do not consider them to be their professional equals” (p. 130). Furthermore, humanitarians are seen as having a “lack of training, accountability and understanding, especially within the context of contemporary armed conflicts” (Meharg, 2007, p. 130). Indeed, NGO personnel have been described as “permissive; unpunctual; obstructionist; anarchic; undisciplined; self-righteous; anti-military” (Steihm, 1998; Dworken, 1993; as cited in Winslow, 2002). We also found that participants from the NGO community believed that the CF maintains an out-dated stereotype of them, including being “a bunch of do-gooders,” “lazy,” “tree huggers,” “Birkenstock wearing,” and “peacenik[s]” (Thomson et al., 2010, p. 20). Furthermore, NGO personnel felt that the military failed to leverage the NGO communities’ knowledge and experience of any given operational environment. This prejudice may stem from stereotypes. On the other hand, some NGOs refer to military personnel as “rigid; authoritarian; conservative; impatient; arrogant; civilian phobic; homophobic; excessively security focussed” (Steihm, 1998; Dearfield, 1998; Bruno, 1999; as cited in Winslow, 2002). These stereotypes then could potentially lead to antagonistic interactions (Winslow, 2002).

These findings have led researchers to conclude that although individual successes have occurred, consistent, effective collaboration remains an elusive goal, despite strategic-level endorsement (Patrick & Brown, 2007). Similarly, Rietjens (2008) noted that successes in these sorts of collaborations have often appeared to be ad hoc rather than systematic in nature. Olson and Gregorian (2007, p. 32) concluded that “[b]y all accounts, the consensus … at the policy level often bears little relationship to the messy reality of coordination efforts and practices” in theatre. Indeed, research with Canadian SMEs operating in a WoG and/or JIMP context noted that power struggles, ambiguous roles and responsibilities, conflicting goals, lack of respect, and distrust negatively impacted their ability to effectively collaborate in theatre (Thomson et al., 2010). Given that these speak to some of the conditions believed to support effective collaboration, it is not surprising then that SMEs also reported challenges with activities associated with collaboration, namely communicating, developing rapport, negotiating, planning and decision-making.

We were able to categorize the challenges facing operators in a WoG/JIMP context into five broad themes that impacted collaboration, including negotiation, power, identity, stereotypes and prejudice, and trust (Thomson et al., 2010). Further elaboration of the broad themes will provide a
greater understanding of the process of collaboration, which can then be used to inform CF training and education. It is believed that a critical role for developing interprofessional collaboration is through the implementation of professional education programs, as “collaborative practice requires the mastery of new competencies (skills, knowledge, and attitudes),” and understanding “all of the key characteristics of organizations that foster collaboration,” like structure and culture, is important for understanding collaboration among diverse organizations (San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005, p. 144). Moreover, some believe that fostering a culture of collaboration within the organization helps to promote such a collaborative culture vis-à-vis other organizations. Specifically, organizations that espouse the values of participation, fairness, freedom of expression and interdependence (Evans, 1994; Henneman et al., 1995; both cited in San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005), and promote a climate of openness, integrity and trust (Stichler, 1995; as cited in San Martin-Rodriguez et al., 2005), will likely produce the appropriate attitudes and values for successful collaboration with external organizations. The following sections of this report, therefore, provide an overview of each of these critical themes and how they relate to collaboration in a WoG or JIMP operational environment.

1.2 Negotiation

During our discussions with SMEs who had recently been deployed in operations requiring collaboration with a number of individuals from different organizations, negotiation was identified as probably the core collaboration activity (Thomson et al., 2010). Defined as “an interpersonal decision-making process necessary whenever we cannot achieve our objectives single-handedly” (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010, p. 493), SMEs often discussed how they negotiated resources with others in an effort to achieve their goals and objectives (Thomson et al., 2010). These first-hand accounts made salient the diverse styles and approaches that individuals employ when negotiating. For example, some non-military SMEs accused their military counterparts of failing to negotiate with a quid pro quo (“give and take”) attitude. Some analysts argue that having consensus-building abilities is desirable in a JIMP operational context (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). This section examines some of the literature pertaining to negotiation, including negotiation outcomes, motivation, and predictors.

1.2.1 Negotiation Outcomes

In the literature, negotiation outcomes have been classified as either integrative or distributive. Integrative outcomes are described as “win-win” because both parties are satisfied with the negotiation and have worked collaboratively (or cooperatively) to ensure all parties’ needs are met (Thompson et al., 2010). As Thompson, Wang, and Gunia (2010, p. 493) state, “negotiations are integrative when all creative opportunities are leveraged and no resources are left on the table.” Importantly, integrative negotiation behaviour involves logrolling (i.e., gaining on a priority issue by conceding on an unimportant issue – Froman & Cohen, 1970; as cited in Lowenstein & Thompson, 2006), communicating preferences and priorities, and employing creative problem solving in order to reconcile and integrate the interests of all the parties (De Dreu, 2004).

Integrative outcomes create value because individuals do not enter negotiations expecting conflict, but rather approach the situation constructively and cooperatively to determine the interests and needs of the parties involved in the negotiation, thereby seeking an improved situation from the status quo (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; as cited in Goodwin, 2005). By examining interests (needs, desires, concerns, fears – Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991) more thoroughly, and by not fixating merely on negotiator positions, negotiating partners can locate compatible interests as well as create
solutions to meet those interests. Fisher, Ury, and Patton (1991) maintain that focusing on interests and creative problem solving shifts negotiators’ focus from the other’s differences to problem solving strategies (“hard on the problem, soft on each other” p. 11). Research showed that negotiators seeking integrative outcomes demonstrated greater information sharing, more accurate judgments about their counterparts, and convergence of resolution (Thompson, 1998). Research also suggests that individuals are more cooperative when they believe that their negotiation partners are cooperative as opposed to competitive or non-cooperative (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; as cited in De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004). Integrative outcomes occur, therefore, because parties recognize the creative potential of shared interests, wants and needs, and because parties employ a cooperative problem solving approach (Goodwin, 2005). The new developments emerging from the negotiation are viewed as improvements (greater value) gained by engaging in negotiation.

In contrast, Thompson et al. (2010, p. 494) explain that “a negotiation is distributive when negotiators are mainly concerned about their own economic outcomes and not the joint outcomes of all negotiating parties,” and as such focus on simply apportioning scarce resources. In other words, negotiators see the subject of negotiation and want to get as much of “the pie” as possible. Because resources tend to be limited, the distributive outcomes are considered a “win-lose” situation, where only one party comes out ahead (Thompson et al., 2010). Negotiators invoke competitive behaviours such as using persuasion, bluffs, threats, power plays, and commitments in order to obtain limited resources (De Dreu, 2004). In turn, when people believe that their counterpart is competitive, they are likely to view them as a potential threat, invoking caution, selective information processing, and conservative judgements (Vonk, 1998; as cited in De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004). According to Goodwin (2005), too often negotiations are viewed as a power struggle, where parties hold fast to their position, failing to understand their counterpart’s interests and needs. And yet, as San Martin-Rodriguez et al. (2005) explain, collaboration requires that the parties forego a competitive approach and adopt an approach based on cooperation.

On the surface, to produce either an integrative outcome or a distributive outcome suggests employing either a cooperative or competitive style, respectively. However, negotiations often require a degree of both styles (Goodwin, 2005), or an entirely different approach depending on the context. The next section highlights additional approaches to negotiation.

### 1.2.2 Negotiation Approaches/Styles

Not every negotiating approach can be construed as either competitive or cooperative. Other negotiation styles include avoiding (i.e., choosing not to negotiate), compromising (i.e., both parties accept a number of concessions to meet halfway), and accommodating (i.e., giving in to another’s wants or needs often by relinquishing one’s own; Kilmann & Thomas, 1975). Choosing the appropriate style depends largely on the circumstances of the negotiation. For example, one may choose to accommodate because he or she has violated the trust of his or her negotiation counterpart in the past and accommodating will help to restore the relationship. On the other hand, one may choose to compromise because there is little time to negotiate and there exists a high degree of trust between the negotiators. Or one may simply choose to avoid negotiating altogether because he or she is unprepared to take alternative action at the time of negotiation. In such cases, stepping away from the negotiation may help one to gain some knowledge of the situation and reconsider the various options.

The approach that one adopts to negotiation is also partly determined by culture (e.g., national, organizational, etc.). There is evidence, for example, that Westerners tend to focus on gain when negotiating (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Neale & Bazerman, 1992; both cited in Thompson et al.,
2010), whereas non-Westerners focus on the trust, knowledge, and commitment that can develop through negotiating (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O’Brien, 2006; as cited in Thompson et al., 2010). Because cooperating, compromising, and accommodating are relationship-preserving negotiation styles (Thomson et al., 2010), these may be more readily exercised by non-Westerners. Alternately, Westerners may adopt a more competitive approach to ensure maximum gain. An organizational culture can also impact negotiation, shaping the approach one takes. Certainly in the case of some organizations, the organizational culture, with its structure, policies and normative procedures, can explicitly or implicitly prevent negotiations (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002; as cited in Thompson et al., 2010). Indeed, as Thomson et al. (2010) found, organizations collaborating within a JIMP context have had many conflicts as a result of conflicting systems (e.g., procedures, norms) and structures (e.g., hierarchical vs. flat), as well as preconceived cultural stereotypes. At best, these differences and stereotypes have resulted in tensions that were resolved. At worse, these differences and stereotypes have resulted in a total avoidance or breakdown of collaboration. When groups with different cultures negotiate, the goals, motivations, and outcomes of the parties involved necessarily will differ. This can be taxing when one party is pushing for a tangible outcome such as profit whereas the other party is trying to maintain the relationship. Understanding how culture influences negotiation style will be an important aspect of CF training and education in order to ensure effective negotiations in operations taking place in culturally diverse regions of the world with a number of diverse organizations.

The approach to negotiation is also determined by one’s negotiation counterpart. For instance, reputation has an impact on negotiation style. Glick and Croson (2001; as cited in Thompson et al., 2010) were interested in the impact of a negotiator’s reputation on negotiations. For their study, they constructed four kinds (or styles) of negotiators: liar-manipulator, tough but honest, nice and reasonable, and the cream puff. Once participants learned the reputation of their negotiation counterpart, they changed their negotiating tactics accordingly. Specifically, people acted tougher when negotiating with a liar-manipulator. Moreover, those who were perceived as liars had a harder time winning their counterpart’s trust in subsequent negotiations. Negotiation style has an impact on how one behaves and on perceptions of prospective partners.

1.2.3 Motivational Frameworks for Negotiation

Motivation is also a key factor in negotiation. Specifically, one’s motivation influences how information is processed during the negotiation (e.g., level of information processing, decision rules and heuristics used; De Dreu, 2004). For example, if one is biased toward gaining respect during a negotiation, then the information that would impact one’s respect will be attended to and recalled. Alternately, if a person is only concerned with negotiating personal gain, then he or she will favour competitive over cooperative heuristics.

De Dreu (2004) conducted a review of recent research to better understand the role of motivation in negotiation. Specifically, De Dreu reviewed three broad classes of motivation – social, epistemic, and impression – and considered how these shape negotiators’ information processing and strategic choices during negotiations. These three classes of motivation form the motivational framework within which negotiators think and act (De Dreu, 2004).

Social motivation is the need to achieve certain outcomes for oneself and another other party (De Dreu, 2004). Social motives can be altruistic, competitive, individualistic, or cooperative (McClintock, 1977; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). Selfish (i.e., competitive and individualistic) motives occur when negotiators are only concerned with maximizing their own outcome without real consideration to the other party’s outcome. Individuals motivated by selfish interest view
negotiation as a competitive game in which power and personal success are highly valued (De Dreu, 2004). Prosocial (i.e., cooperative and altruistic) motives direct the negotiator’s focus toward fair distribution of resources. In such negotiations, harmony, fairness and joint welfare are key aspects of the negotiation (De Dreu, 2004). Research shows that if even just one negotiation partner is driven by selfish motives, then all parties in the negotiation will shift the negotiation toward selfish motives. This will occur even in circumstances in which taking a prosocial approach would lead to mutually beneficial, integrative outcomes (Weingart, Brett, & Olekalns, 2001; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). Though social motives are sometimes associated with individual differences (Carnevale, Probst, & Triandis, 1998; as cited in De Dreu, 2004), research has shown that social motives can be shaped by a superior’s instruction in either direction (Deutsch, 1958; as cited in De Dreu, 2004).

De Dreu (2004) was also interested in the influence of social motivation on strategic choice during negotiations. Specifically, De Dreu (2004) explains that two core theories are particularly relevant: the theory of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1949, 1973; as cited in De Dreu) and the dual concern theory (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). According to the theory of cooperation and competition, selfish negotiators develop distrust, hostile attitudes, and negative interpersonal perceptions, whereas prosocial negotiators develop trust, positive attitudes and perceptions, engage in constructive information exchange, and listen and locate one another’s interests, thereby reaching more integrative outcomes (Deutsch, 1949, 1973; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). Particular to negotiation strategies, research has shown that those with prosocial motives are willing to make concessions, make lenient openings to negotiations, and end with high gains (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996; both cited in De Dreu, 2004). Moreover, prosocial negotiators are flexible and open-minded irrespective of whether the social context was competitive or cooperative (Carnevale & Probst, 1998; as cited in De Dreu, 2004).

The dual concern theory considers the concern one has for oneself and the other, and ranges in strength from weak to strong (Figure 1).

![Dual concern model](image)

**Figure 1. Dual concern model (adapted from De Dreu, 2004, p. 119)**

Specifically, selfish negotiators have a low concern for others while prosocial negotiators have a high concern for others (Pruitt, 1998; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). Research has shown that those with a high concern for the self (selfish negotiators) demonstrate a resistance to yield to others’
requests (Kelley, Beckman, & Fischer, 1967; as cited in De Dreu, 2004) and are uncompromising about concession making (Druckman, 1994; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). Further research has shown that negotiators yield less when there is little time pressure and when they are accountable to constituents and not to their negotiation counterpart (Druckman, 1994; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). Given the nature of negotiating in a JIMP context, these research findings hint that individuals from various organizations will be accountable to their own stakeholders and may be less likely to make concessions. On the other hand, if time pressure is high, which it may be in a humanitarian crisis, for example, there may be a greater probability of yielding to another party’s interests. It will be important to further understand the impact of these variables on collaboration in a JIMP environment.

The second class of motivation is epistemic motivation, that is, the need to accurately and holistically comprehend one’s environment. Negotiators who are high in epistemic motivation will take the time and effort to deeply and systematically process information, including a search for more information regarding the particular negotiation tasks and their negotiation counterpart. On the other hand, negotiators who are low on epistemic motivation use heuristics and process information quickly. Epistemic motivation is related to the need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 1989; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). For example, negotiators with a low need for cognitive closure will process information more thoroughly (i.e., high epistemic motivation), whereas negotiators with a high need for cognitive closure will process information at a more shallow level (i.e., low epistemic motivation). Interestingly, research shows that negotiators with low levels of power have higher epistemic motivation (Fiske, 1992; as cited in De Dreu, 2004) than negotiators with higher levels of power. This suggests that in order to regain power, people pay attention to powerful others in order to predict and anticipate their intentions and behaviours. Epistemic motivation also goes up when individuals are held accountable for the results of negotiation (Tetlock, 1992; as cited in De Dreu, 2004).

The final aspect of the motivational framework detailed by De Dreu (2004) is impression motivation, that is, the need to develop and maintain an appearance of oneself and the other negotiating party. Previous research suggests that impression motivation is typically related to making a good impression and getting along (e.g., Snyder, 1992; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). However, negotiators may want to appear tough and strong-willed during a negotiation (Wall, 1991; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). For example, when a cooperative negotiator is paired with a competitive negotiator (i.e., “good cop, bad cop”), a high number of concessions can be achieved from the other party (Hilty & Carnevale, 1993; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). Impression management is also associated with self-monitoring. Individuals who are high self-monitors have more impression management concerns than low self-monitors (Snyder, 1992; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). This research suggests that the motivation to be seen in a particular light during a negotiation can influence the outcome of that negotiation.

It should be pointed out that these aspects of the motivational framework are not mutually exclusive. An individual who is driven by a prosocial motive to negotiation also may have a high or low need for knowledge (high epistemic motivation) and little regard for their impression. However, the relationship between these motives is not well established in the literature (De Dreu, 2004). It is likely, though, that one motivational aspect may be more pronounced than another, driving the conduct during negotiation in a particular way. It is also important to keep in mind that a negotiation is dynamic and social, and thus, motivations can change (Weingart et al., 2001; as cited in De Dreu, 2004). It is likely that people often enter negotiations hoping to secure their own interests without much consideration for the other party’s interests. However, over the course of the negotiation, one may switch from a selfish motive to a prosocial motive to match their experience.
Though profit is probably one of the key outcomes to a negotiation, as Halpert, Stuhlmacher, Crenshaw, Litcher, and Bortel (2010) show, relationships and the perception of the other party are also very important, which might shift one’s motivational framework throughout the negotiation.

### 1.2.4 Modeling Negotiation

Following an extensive review of 40 years of negotiation literature, Halpert and colleagues (2010) developed a model of negotiation that was both comprehensive and testable (Figure 2).

![Hypothesized negotiation model (adapted from Halpert et al., 2010, p. 92)](image)

**Figure 2. Hypothesized negotiation model (adapted from Halpert et al., 2010, p. 92)**

Halpert and colleagues’ (2010) negotiation model depicts four predictor constructs and three outcomes of negotiation. They suggest that goals, relationships, expected cooperation, and actual cooperation are the core predictors of negotiation outcomes. Negotiation goals are the objectives in a negotiation and represent that for which we strive. Having goals helps produce outcomes compared to having no goals (Neale & Norther, 1986; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010). Zetik and Stuhlmacher (2002) found that negotiators with optimal (or specific) goals obtained higher profits compared to negotiators with suboptimal (or vague) or no goals. Likewise, negotiators who had more difficult goals achieved higher outcomes than negotiators with easy goals. These effects were more prominent when the opponent did not have a strong goal, performance was rewarded, the negotiation was not in person, and the negotiator had previous task experience (Zetik & Stuhlmacher, 2002). On the other hand, according to Halpert and colleagues (2010), the relationship between goals and negotiation approach or style is not well understood. Some suggest that easy goals default to competitive approaches (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; both cited in Halpert et al., 2010), whereas difficult goals require creativity to explore options and cooperation (Polzer & Neale, 1995; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010) and may result in greater outcomes.

Relationships, another predictor of negotiation outcomes, are “a consistent pattern of ongoing interaction between people” (Halpert et al., 2010, p. 94), including previous and future interactions. Halpert and colleagues explained that because negative relationships have not been studied in the literature, the model assumes relationships are either positive or neutral. They share a number of advantages in negotiations that arise from real or anticipated long-term positive relationships. For example, research has shown that long-term relationships inhibit exploitive behaviour (Marlowe, Gergen, & Doob, 1966; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010), allow for more influence attempts by negotiation counterparts (Pallak & Heller, 1971; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010), and result in more accommodating (Ben Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010) and cooperative
(Sondak & Moore, 1993; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010) negotiation approaches. Anticipating future interactions with negotiation counterparts may diminish the desire to win in the current situation (Greenhalgh, 1987; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010) and instead invoke the norm of reciprocity, expecting something in return at a later date (Halpert et al., 2010). However, long-term positive relationships can also prevent negotiators from seeking relevant information during negotiation or from being unaware of personal goals or outcomes (Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, Moag, & Bazerman, 1999; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010). Moreover, negotiators may be detrimentally less assertive, less demanding or conflict avoiding (Thompson & Kim, 2000; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010). In any event, Halpert and colleagues argue that relationships will influence the expected cooperation, which will then impact the actual cooperation behaviour (e.g., competing, cooperating, accommodating, compromising, or avoiding). They cite research that shows the link between expected cooperation and actual cooperation behaviour. Specifically, expected cooperation increases information exchange (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; De Dreu, Giebels, & Van d Vliert, 1998; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010), cooperative verbal behaviour (Sheffield, 1995; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010), and problem solving attempts (Watson & Hoffman, 1996; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010). These four constructs (goals, relationships, expected cooperation, and cooperation) are suggested to predict the outcomes of a negotiation.

The outcomes of negotiation (i.e., profit, perception of others, and satisfaction) are considered the endpoints in the negotiation cycle (Halpert et al., 2010). The most popular construct, negotiator profit, is the negotiated settlement value. Halpert et al. (2010) suggests, however, that perceptions of others can be more long term than profit, and, as such, this is also an important outcome of the process. Satisfaction has been shown to relate to profit, fairness, the negotiation task, and performance (e.g., Watson & Hoffman, 1996; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010).

Performing a series of meta-analyses and a path analysis, Halpert et al. (2010) tested the model using 73 studies. After the analysis, their original model was adjusted slightly (in red) to properly fit the data (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3. Final negotiation model (adapted from Halpert et al., 2010, p. 105)**

Halpert et al. (2010) correctly predicted that having profit goals will increase negotiation profit, compared to having easy or no goals. The original model predicted that expected cooperation

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1 The participant sample size ranged from 72 to 2247 with a harmonic mean of 312. This calculation was taken from Johnson, Carter, Davison, and Oliver (2001; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010).

2 All path coefficients significant at $p < .05$. 

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would mediate the relationship between goals and cooperation. However, the meta-analysis showed that goals and cooperation were directly linked, such that goals promoted a cooperative negotiation process. Also, an unexpected link emerged between goals and satisfaction. Results showed that goals and satisfaction had a positive relationship (i.e., negotiators with goals were more satisfied than those without goals). Halpert et al.’s findings underscore the benefits of having established goals before entering into a negotiation. Moreover, aligning different goals may actually help to promote integrative outcomes as negotiators need to creatively and cooperatively search for alternatives to satisfy all parties’ interests.

With respect to relationships, the meta-analysis supported Halpert and colleagues’ (2010) hypothesis that prior relationships or anticipated future relationships led to a higher expectation of cooperation during the negotiation process than did one-time interactions. Indeed, research showed that building strong, lasting relationships in theatre mitigated the challenges that people faced in collaborating in a JIMP context (Thomson et al., 2010). Results from Halpert et al.’s study (2010) supported the prediction that higher expected cooperation led to more actual cooperation. This, they argue, is based on the notion that when negotiators negatively frame a negotiation, this leads them to expect competition (and some consequent negative outcome), whereas those who positively frame the negotiation leads them to expect cooperation (self-fulfilling prophecy – Deutsch, 2000; as cited in Halpert et al., 2010). Results also showed that expected cooperation was directly linked to the perception of the other (i.e., expecting a cooperative negotiation led to a positive perception of the other).

Halpert and colleagues (2010) predicted that cooperation would be linked to all three outcomes: profit, satisfaction, and the perception of the other. However, only two of the three predictions were confirmed by the meta-analysis. Results showed that more cooperative negotiators received higher profit outcomes than competitive negotiators. Cooperative negotiators were also more likely to be perceived positively by their counterparts. Moreover, cooperation, profit, and perception of others had a linked relationship such that negotiators perceived the other party more positively when the negotiation was more cooperative, which ultimately resulted in a higher profit. Although cooperation was predicted to be directly linked to satisfaction, the prediction was not supported. Rather, results showed that more cooperation led to lower levels of satisfaction, rather than higher levels. Halpert and colleagues suggest that the time it takes to cooperate and seek out options may result in less satisfaction (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; both cited in Halpert et al., 2010). They also point out that the path between cooperation and satisfaction is part of a complex of variables, and as such, “cooperation may only lead to lower satisfaction when these other variables are held constant” (p. 107). Profit was correctly predicted to relate to satisfaction and perception of the other. The meta-analysis also showed that perceptions of the other party directly linked to satisfaction. These three constructs (i.e., profit, satisfaction, and perception of other) were related to each other. Specifically, negotiators who receive better profits report higher satisfaction and more positive perceptions of their counterpart. Positive perceptions of their counterpart led to higher levels of satisfaction.

The negotiation model developed by Halpert and colleagues (2010) is pivotal for research examining negotiation as it moves beyond thinking of negotiation in terms of the approaches people take to negotiation (construed as degree of cooperation on their model) and includes other relevant variables as predictors of negotiation (goals, relationships, expected cooperation). Their model also identifies three potential outcomes (i.e., profit, perception of the other, and satisfaction) with the process of negotiation itself. Their model would benefit from feedback loops from outcomes back to predictors. Though they identify three outcomes of the process, Halpert and colleagues do not consider how these will influence subsequent negotiations. There is research
showing the impact of past negotiations on future negotiations. Specifically, negotiators who reached an impasse during a negotiation are more likely to reach an impasse in their next negotiation compared to those who reach an agreement, even when negotiation partners change (O’Connor, Arnold, & Burris, 2005; as cited in Thompson et al., 2010).

In order to operationalize satisfaction with the negotiation process, it may be necessary to determine what subjective value looks like to negotiators. Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu (2006) looked specifically at subjective value in negotiation outcomes compared to economic outcomes. Researching the question “what do people value when they negotiate,” they developed a framework for understanding subjectively valued negotiation outcomes, which they called the Subjective Value Inventory. To create the framework, they first asked people to list all the aspects they personally valued following recent business and personal negotiations. Participants identified 20 categories (e.g., respect, fairness, trust, saving face, listening, winning, quantifiable terms of the agreement, morality/ethics/religious, etc.) that were then classified under four broad subconstructs, including Feelings About the Instrumental Outcome, Feelings About the Self, Feelings About the Negotiation Process, and Feelings About the Relationship. According to Curhan et al. (2006), the framework categories were consistent with earlier theoretical efforts to categorize negotiation outcomes. For example, Thompson’s (1990; as cited in Curhan et al., 2006) negotiation outcomes included perceptions of the negotiation situation (Process), perceptions of the other party (Relationships), and perceptions of the self (Self). More importantly, however, was Curhan and colleagues’ finding that subjective value was a greater predictor of the decision to engage in subsequent negotiations than was economic outcome. Thus, those who subjectively valued the negotiation process are more likely to engage in further negotiations. This is especially important for the CF working in a JIMP environment. That is, negotiation counterparts who are more satisfied with the subjective results (i.e., more subjective valuations) are more likely to readily engage in further negotiations. The relationships that are developed throughout the negotiation, therefore, might be a critical element for determining its success.

1.2.5 Summary

The preceding section highlighted a number of ways in which individuals can choose to negotiate. For example, individuals can choose to compete, cooperate, accommodate, compromise, or avoid (Kilmann & Thomas, 1975), and this selection will largely be dependent on situational factors (e.g., time pressure) and individual factors (e.g., need for closure). Indeed, De Dreu (2004) identified three broad aspects to a motivational framework that drives negotiators’ thoughts and actions, which are linked to individual differences (e.g., high impression motivation is associated with high self-monitoring). As shown above, negotiators’ motivations will also shape how we negotiate (e.g., a selfish motivated negotiator approaches the negotiation competitively and makes few concessions). The motivational framework of a negotiator can greatly influence the result and process of a negotiation. This section also described Halpert et al.’s (2010) model of negotiation that included a number of predictors (goals, relationships, expected and actual cooperation) and outcomes (profit, perception of other, and satisfaction). We also introduced Curhan et al.’s (2006) Subjective Value Inventory for negotiation outcomes, revealing outcomes important to negotiators that were not delineated in Halpert and colleagues’ model.

It is necessary to provide a broad outline of negotiation. Here negotiation is a central activity in the overall process of collaboration. Given that the CF must work with a number of diverse individuals from a broad range of organizations in a JIMP operational environment, it is important to consider how this can be done effectively. Negotiators within this kind of operational environment will
undoubtedly wish to achieve two objectives: a better outcome and a more positive relationship with
the other party. Being cooperative and achieving integrative outcomes can result in better
outcomes, a more positive relationship, and the likelihood of positive future negotiations. However,
there exist a number of issues that might thwart negotiations, thereby negatively impacting the
collaboration process itself. As mentioned above, it is not unusual for people to view negotiation in
terms of a power struggle, which naturally leads to a competitive style of negotiating. Further,
competitive approaches to negotiation often end in distributive outcomes as opposed to integrative
outcomes. The next section looks at how power influences negotiation and collaboration, and
describes some of the most pertinent psychological literature on power.

1.3 Power

According to San Martin-Rodriguez and colleagues (2005), inequality among professionals arising
from power differences constitutes a major barrier to effective interprofessional collaboration.
Indeed, research examining interprofessional collaboration in a JIMP context identified power
struggles as a critical issue (Thomson et al., 2010). However, SMEs described poorly defined roles
and responsibilities and perceived gaps in organizational capacity as facilitators of power struggles
rather than actual inequalities between counterparts. Specifically, other government department
(OGD) personnel thought that the CF overstepped their jurisdiction, adopting roles and
responsibilities and making decisions that were typically assigned to development officers and
diplomats, and that this led to confrontation and “turf” wars. Effective collaborative outcomes in a
JIMP environment, therefore, requires greater understanding of the nuances of power struggles,
how these may manifest themselves in the field (e.g., during negotiation), and how they can be
overcome to achieve integrative outcomes and strong relationships.

1.3.1 Theories of Power

Because power has been examined from a number of academic viewpoints (e.g., psychology,
sociology, political science, etc.), there is no overarching consensual definition. Traditional social
psychological theories of power have, for the most part, drawn on ideas that support a quantitative
capacity perspective of power, usually in the form known as dependence-based theories of power
(e.g., resource dependence perspective – Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; see also Emerson, 1962; as
cited in Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005). According to these theories, the relative dependence of two
or more parties on one another drives power differences (i.e., A’s dependence on B is compared to
B’s dependence on A) such that the party having a lower net-dependence is said to have power
over the other. Emphasizing the quantity or amount of power an individual has available is a
balance between one’s resources and characteristics that others value or desire. In what has become
a classic definition, Weber (1946, p. 152; as cited in Overbeck, 2010) viewed power as “the
probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will
despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.” Such a definition
emphasizes the notion that a powerful individual has the capacity to exert their will, regardless of
resistance shown by the other.

Early dependence-based views of power included Thibaut and Kelly’s (1959; as cited in Kelley et
al., 1983) concepts of fate and behaviour control (which view power as the ability to control
another’s outcomes and/or actions), and French and Raven’s (1959; as cited in Raven, 1992)
classic bases of power classification model. According to French and Raven’s original
classification system, an actor’s ability to exercise influence is drawn from five (and later six;
Raven, 1965) sources or bases of power: (1) legitimacy (i.e., formal power, or authority) is based
on the target’s belief in the actor’s right to exercise power, afforded through a target’s sense of
task-related obligation and responsibility; (2) reward power refers to the actor’s ability to assign
rewards to the target (e.g., a salary increase); (3) coercive power is based on the actor’s ability to
assign the target negative outcomes, potentially forcing compliance through the use of threat,
confrontation, or by other punitive means; (4) referent power refers to the actor’s characteristics,
and the target’s positive evaluation of or attraction to these characteristics; consequent
identification supplies the actor the ability to convey feelings of personal acceptance or approval
important to the target; (5) expert power refers to knowledge or expertise in a given area attributed
to the actor by the target; and finally, (6) informational power refers to the role that logic or
information can play in an actor’s attempt to influence a target’s values, beliefs, and attitudes (both

Yukl and Tracey (1992) advanced Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson’s (1980) typology of nine
influence tactics that influence power, including pressure (exerting influence through demands,
threats, or intimidation), legitimation (exerting influence by referring to existing policy, position, or
tradition), exchange (exerting influence by reciprocation following compliance), coalition (exerting
influence by using others to help persuade), ingratiating (exerting influence by making a favourable
impression and improving the target’s mood before making a request), rational persuasion (exerting
influence by logical argumentation), inspirational appeal (exerting influence by appealing to the
target’s values and ideals), consultation (exerting influence by seeking the target’s participation in
the decision making process), and personal appeal (exerting influence by appealing to loyalty and
friendship between the actor and target) (both cited in Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005). Some of
these can be aligned with French and Raven’s (1959) power classification model (e.g., coercive
power and pressure, legitimate power and legitimation, reward power and exchange, referent power
and personal appeal; as cited in Raven, 1992).

The strongest criticism, however, against dependence-based theories of social power is that they
consider only quantitative effects on power (Overbeck, 2010). That is, they suggest that one’s
power is determined solely by their own balance of resources and characteristics, which fails to
account for other pertinent factors, such as another’s resources and characteristics (Overbeck,
2010). These theories also do not take into account the ability to wield power effectively, the
situational constraints, and the scope of one’s power (i.e., power is relative).

The approach-avoidance theory of power, introduced by Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003),
helped explain the broader effects of power by investigating the effects of power on self-regulation
(which subsequently affects cognition, affect, and behaviour). According to their theory, power
activates the behavioural approach system associated with regulating enterprising behaviours,
making individuals holding high power more responsive to “rewards, action facilitation, approach-
related affect, and heuristic social cognition” (Vesico & Guinote, 2010, p. 436). Powerlessness, on
the other hand, activates the behavioural inhibition system (a response to threat) which is
associated with “behaviour inhibition, avoidance-related affect, and systematic social cognitions”
(Vesico & Guinote, p.436). Though Keltner et al.’s theory explains a wide range of power-related
effects and has stimulated much research, criticism has centred on its lack of specificity and a
tendency for competing interpretations of predictions. For example, some have argued that
approach orientation leads to impulsive, poorly regulated behaviours (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, &
Magee, 2003; as cited in Vesico & Guinote, 2010), whereas others have argued that approach
orientation can lead to increases in controlled behaviours, such as goal pursuit (Gruenfeld, Inesi,
Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; as cited in Vesico & Guinote, 2010).
Power can also be conceived from the point of view of a subordinates’ consent, that is, “as a function of the consent of subordinates” (Hindess, 1996; as cited in Overbeck, 2010). According to this definition, subordinates are governed by powerful individuals who have a legitimate right to do so—as granted by god, through exercise of force, by tradition, or by the blessing of the church, state, or the organization. In this definition of power, the General would gain consent from subordinates on the basis of his or her legitimate position within the CF organizational command structure. However, the General may not gain consent from those outside the CF. Power construed this way exists only so long as those who are subordinate support the power holder’s right to act on it (influence). As Zeldtich (2001; as cited in Overbeck, 2010) explains, this reflects a general acceptance of a system and its hierarchies as a morally preferred exercise of power and resources. Consent is an operational step that provides a means to legitimately hold power.

Another conceptualization of power emphasizes the role of identity instead of dependence or subordinate consent. Turner’s (2005) Three Process Theory holds that a shared group identity creates power through the mobilization of social influence. According to this view, when individuals coordinate themselves and form a group, members’ self-interests tend to align. This unity provides the group with a purpose and sets a direction for action. In effect, the group begins to act with agency as it becomes an entity of its own. As a part of this group, members are able to act on and influence the environment in accordance with group values and goals. For this reason, rather than social power affording individuals the means to influence others, in identity-based theories, it is the group’s possession of influence that imparts social power upon its members. For Turner, power becomes increasingly more formidable as group members internalize the group’s values, beliefs, and culture.

Simon and Oakes (2006; as cited in Overbeck, 2010, p. 26) extend Turner’s theory and consider important questions such as what resources are valued, when and by whom? Power, in their view, is not absolute, but relative. Possession of power over another is only constituted when it is relevant to one’s identity. If the resource is not highly valued (i.e., has little weight), then power is diminished. They argue that this is a product of identity.

Another conception of power, perhaps particularly relevant to a JIMP context, is Guinote’s (2007; as cited in Guinote, 2010) situated focus theory of power. This theory considers why and when a more powerful individual will systematically process information about (or individuate) a subordinate. Guinote’s theory (Figure 4) examines the ways power affects cognition, judgment, and behaviour, while also addressing behavioural variability and accounting for contradictory research findings.
The theory assumes that those with power have fewer cognitive constraints (flexibility) and a greater sense of agency (selectivity). The nature of one’s motivations and cognitions originating from such an environment are shaped accordingly, such that powerful individuals are able to focus their attention on what is driving their cognitions in their current situation. That is, power impacts one’s ability to achieve desired outcomes (one’s goal system), which, in turn, affects one’s motivation and information processing in ways that encourage more situated judgment and behaviour. Guinote (2010) reasons that because power allows individuals to achieve their desired outcomes more easily, they are better able to focus their attention on the most important aspects of a situation (e.g., needs, expectancies, goals, affordances). Being powerless, the same environment presents more constraints and offers less freedom to act on will. In contrast, it is more difficult for individuals to obtain their desired outcomes because they must divide their attention between a wider range of situational aspects (reducing their ability to ignore irrelevant information) in an attempt to gather information to better enable them to make predictions and to control future outcomes (Fiske, 1993; cited in Guinote, 2010). Thus, when compared to more powerful others, the powerless endure more excessive demands on their attention system, a constraint that has been associated with a number of negative consequences (e.g., poor control of attention; controlled information processing when it is not necessary; and poor goal performance, Guinote, 2007; cited in Guinote, 2010).

Moreover, being in a powerful (or powerless) position affects an individual’s choice of strategies used to navigate their environment. These tendencies lead to mind-sets or biases in the way powerful (versus powerless) individuals process information. According to Guinote (2010), power promotes three types of biased mind-sets. First, there is a preference for more selective allocation of attention that is in line with activated constructs, such that when a powerful individual processes information and acts, it is more explicitly aligned with the influences that “operate on a moment-to-moment basis” (e.g., to serve their needs, expectancies, goals, affordances). Second, there is a tendency to use default processes to drive judgment and behaviour (e.g., associative, intuitive, or
rule-driven processes) as compared with powerless individuals who tend to rely more on controlled processes. Lastly, powerful individuals have a sensitivity to particular contents, or types of stimuli (e.g., a preference for rewards and opportunities), versus the powerless’ sensitivity to threats (p. 143).

Finally, the depicted model proposes three major behavioural signatures of power, which come as a result of the greater attentional focus displayed by powerful individuals: increased speed of responses (i.e., power facilitates action; powerful individuals’ focused attention can increase the speed of responses); prioritization (i.e., focused behaviour targeted at attaining an end state, among various possibilities); and more extensive behavioural variability across different situations.

1.3.2 Function of Power

The study of what power is ought to be distinguished from the function of power—or how it is used and for what purposes. Classically, there have been two perspectives: dominance and functionalist. The dominance perspective focuses on the malevolent uses of power. Acts such as domination, coercion, and exploitation are seen as inevitable outcomes originating from the corrupt and disdainful nature of human beings (e.g., see Lenski, 1966; Russel, 1938; both cited in Overbeck, 2010). This view holds power as negative, irrespective of how it is exercised, and as sought for its own sake. The dominance view can be contrasted with a functionalist view of power, which views power as a means to an end. According to this perspective, human beings live in groups that require organization and coordination. Groups require direction, so as not to waste resources and opportunities. These conditions provide fertile grounds for the emergence of power, in the form of leadership; that is, groups entrust power (and impose responsibilities) on a few individuals to lead them in hopes that the group will benefit from so doing (Overbeck, 2010).

Given the number of theories of power, to help simplify the power domain, Winter (2010) suggests that the many different power-related concepts can be thought of as occupying a common three-dimensional semantic space (depicted in Figure 5).
Winter suggests that power-related constructs can be placed along three-dimensions: the relative status or strength of actor and target; the legitimacy or morality of the action; and whether the target complies or resists. Winter provides further structure to the domain by grouping research efforts according to the level of analysis (i.e., those referring to structures or institutions, direct interpersonal relations, and processes within an individual; see Table 1).
Table 1. Social Science Concepts Involving Power (Winter, 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disciplinary focus</th>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology, sociology, political science</td>
<td>Occupying a position of power; Status</td>
<td>• Power structure analysis (e.g., Domhoff, 2002)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Decision-making studies (e.g., Dahl, 1961)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Power behaviors in specific situations; Dominance</td>
<td>• Observation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ratings (self and others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Experimentation (e.g., Gruenfeld et al., 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skills at using power</td>
<td>• Observation (e.g., Machiavelli, 1515/1992)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Informants' reports</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Literature (e.g., Wolfe, 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conscious goals or choices of power</td>
<td>• Scales (e.g., “dominance”) of personality inventories (e.g., Jackson, 1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implicit desire for power (“power motivation”)</td>
<td>Fantasy, implicit verbal behavior (Winter, 1973, 1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>Feeling powerful</td>
<td>Self-report questionnaires—for example,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Internal–external control of reinforcement (Rotter, 1966)</td>
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<td>• Political efficacy (Campbell, Gurin, &amp; Miller, 1954)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Values and beliefs about the use of power</td>
<td>Questionnaires, operational codes—for example:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Social dominance orientation (Sidanius &amp; Pratto, 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Gandhi's code for the use of power, (Bondurant, 1988, pp. 38–41; Erikson, 1969, pp. 410–440)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Machiavellianism (Christie &amp; Geis, 1970)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As depicted in the table, anthropology, sociology, and political science focus on the macro-context (e.g., within institutions and patterned relationships) and focus on concepts such as status (i.e., crystallized power due to the individual’s position in the system), dominance, and skills. At the other end of the continuum is psychology, which focuses on the micro-context, or the situational and individual antecedents and consequences of power-related behaviours in particular settings (Winter, 2010). Psychology investigates concepts such as feelings, values, and beliefs.

1.3.3 Power and Negotiation

Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale (2005) developed a comprehensive theoretical model of power specifically in the context of negotiation, by integrating the ideas of power developed by French and Raven’s (1959; see above; as cited in Raven, 1992), Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson’s (1980; and later Yukl & Tracey, 1992; as cited in Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005), and Emerson’s (1962;
as cited in Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005) power-dependence theory. Their efforts lead them to decouple power into four distinct components—potential power; perceived power; power tactics; and realized power—and to assess their implications for those wanting to manage power in the context of a negotiation (see Figure 6).

Kim et al. (2005, p. 803) define potential power as “the underlying capacity of negotiators to obtain benefits from their agreement.” Potential power is dependent on one’s counterpart to the extent that the counterpart values the negotiation (i.e., the implications of rewards, punishments, knowledge, legitimacy, and identification) and the extent to which the counterpart has other options and means to obtain benefits if the negotiation should fail. Perceived power represents a negotiator’s

**Figure 6. A dynamic model of negotiator power**
*Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005, p. 802*
assessment of their counterpart’s potential power as well as their own potential power within any given situation. Kim et al. (2005) explain that valuations of contributions and outcomes will depend on the quantity (amount of resources), the weight (importance of resources), and the probability (likelihood of obtainment). According to Lawler (1992; as cited in Kim et al.), power tactics can be either power-use tactics (how people leverage existing power capabilities) or power-change tactics (how people try to change the power relationship to shift their own power more favourably in relation to that of the other party). Kim et al. present four power-change tactics: improving one’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA— Fisher & Ury, 1981; as cited in Kim & Fragale, 2005), decreasing the quality of the other’s BATNA, decreasing the valuation of the other’s contribution, and increasing the other’s valuation of one’s contribution. Realizing power, then, “depends on negotiators’ perceptions of this potential (i.e., perceived power), their efforts to change these perceptions (i.e., power change tactics), and both the manner and extent to which they attempt to extract benefits from the negotiation (i.e., power-use tactics)” (pp. 806-807). The outcome, realized power, is the extent to which each negotiator benefited from the interaction. As outlined in the model, the determination of potential power is based on the two-dimensional mutual dependence configuration (developed in power-dependence theory; Emerson, 1962; as cited in Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005), informed in part by perceptions of the bases of power (French & Raven, 1959; as cited in Raven, 1992). The model also accounts for the fact that negotiators’ perceptions of own and others’ power is inaccurate (due to imperfect information and negotiators’ bounded rationality), which will influence the choice of tactical decisions made during the negotiation, ultimately affecting “negotiators’ mutual dependence and mediat(ing) the relationship between potential and realized power” (Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005, p. 803). The degree to which negotiators realize power during an interaction will affect their potential power in future interactions. Overall, this model consolidates a number of characteristics, properties, strategies and descriptions from the academic literature on power, captures the dynamic (rather than static) nature of power relations, and outlines important implications for managing power in negotiation. Though there is limited research examining Kim et al.’s (2005) model, other studies have examined how power affects one’s performance in negotiations. For example, Bacharach and Lawler (1981; as cited in Kim et al., 2005) found that when power differences exist (either actual or perceived), there is a high probability that negotiators will disagree with the legitimacy of power and with how these inequalities will impact outcomes, resulting in more hostile influence tactics (e.g., pressure, ingratiating) among negotiators. On the other hand, they found that when power is more equally distributed, there is a high probability that negotiators will employ more conciliatory influence tactics (e.g., rational persuasion, consultation). De Dreu and Van Kleef (2004) found that power differences influence information search strategies during negotiation. Specifically, they found that when facing a competitive partner (as opposed to a cooperative partner), less powerful negotiators asked more diagnostic rather than leading questions, as well as more belief-congruent questions than belief-incongruent questions. De Dreu and Van Kleef (2004) concluded that these findings are a sign of negotiators trying to make good impressions on their partners, particularly when they are in a position of lower power.

1.3.4 Summary

Because JIMP-enabled operations necessarily entail collaboration between the CF and other organizations (e.g., OGDs, NGOs), power will need to be construed broadly, taking into account a range of disciplinary focus, if we are to successfully operationalize and capture the intricacies of power-related issues emerging in an operational setting. Winter’s (2010) conception of power
draws from a number of social sciences (including anthropology, sociology, political science, and psychology). Moreover, the classic construal of a power struggle argues that these stem from inequalities between parties (Overbeck, 2010). However, we found that power struggles were located in turf wars (i.e., overstepping one’s jurisdiction) or in determining who is in charge (i.e., clearly demarcated roles and responsibilities) rather than stemming from inequalities between collaborating counterparts in the JIMP context (Thomson et al., 2010). In fact, participants representing a number of OGDs, NGOs, International Organizations (IOs), and the CF were self-assured in their own position, but were angered when others attempted to assume their role or speak with authority on an issue outside of their expertise. There was little indication of relinquishing their position. Rather, it led to confrontation with mixed outcomes.

1.4 Identity

Closely associated with power and also impacting collaboration (and its central activities such as negotiation) is identity. In the context of integrated missions, historically distinct and independent organizations (e.g., the CF, OGDs, and NGOs) are positioned to work together as part of a collaborative effort to achieve a common superordinate goal (e.g., world peace and stability). This requires individuals with differing (in some cases conflicting) philosophies to align in operations and navigate a shared space, where space refers to “socially constructed environments created and manipulated through political, legal, economic, and cultural means” (Lefebvre, 1991; Sack, 1986; Tuan, 1977; all cited in Meharg, 2007). This often leads to conflict.

Where traditional military and humanitarian efforts were distinct and separate in the past, JIMP-enabled operations contain elements of both (among others). Such juxtaposition of operation type carried out within the same geographical space can impact on identity – especially that of humanitarian workers, many of whom have tried to avoid overt connections to the military (for pragmatic as well as philosophical reasons), though are finding this more and more difficult as the comprehensive approach encourages relief and development projects through integration (Thomson et al., 2010). According to Meharg, values such as neutrality, impartiality, and independence that have traditionally formed the core of the humanitarians’ identity are challenged by “military counter-narratives that formerly occupied the periphery but are now moving to the centre of humanitarian space” (p. 120). In other words, the very nature of aid workers’ identities (as a member of a humanitarian group) is called into question as a consequence of either their military involvement or the militarization of aid, affecting the way they see themselves, their environment, and the people around them. Indeed, “the issue of identity in contested jurisdictions is considered to be a central issue” in collaboration, and as such, “a clear professional identity is needed to ensure that people know who they are dealing with and do not confuse one for another” (Meharg, 2007, p. 102).

When different identities are required to work together or work within the same area of operations, demarcating a particular space may be requisite to ensure effective collaboration. Indeed, previous research has underscored the territorial struggles that individuals from diverse organizations had when operating within a shared space and how this was partly a result of challenges to identity, for example, the CF overstepping their role and function (Thomson et al., 2010). However, once these territorial struggles were resolved, research found that collaboration was achievable (Thomson et al., 2010). The following section examines theories of social identity to shed light on the challenges to professional identities in a JIMP context.
1.4.1 Social Identity Theory

The social identity approach – encompassing Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner, 1987) – focuses on how the social context affects group processes and intergroup relations, as well as how one’s perceptual, affective, and behavioral responses are impacted by the situational context (as cited in Hornsey, 2008). According to SIT, one’s self-concept (or one’s answer to the question “Who am I?”) can be thought of as a composite of one’s idiosyncratic personal identity – a collective consisting of one’s knowledge, traits, abilities, and other unique characteristics – as well as one’s social identity, comprised of salient classifications, based on one’s membership in various groups. It was argued by Tajfel and Turner (1979; as cited in Hornsey, 2008) that all human interaction could be placed along a continuum from purely interpersonal (a rare form, typified by people interacting as individuals without awareness of social categories) to purely intergroup (where individuals interface entirely as representatives of their groups, and membership salience overwhelms individual qualities). They argued further that the nature of a given interaction could be shifted, for instance, from interpersonal to intergroup by making “us and them” distinctions more salient to participants and affecting change in their perceptions of themselves and of the other. Specifically, when one becomes aware of category distinctions, perceived similarities within and differences between groups are magnified. Such category-based distinctions tend to activate different parts of one’s self-concept, altering and potentially broadening the way one sees oneself. The idiosyncratic attitudes, behaviours, and other aspects of one’s personal identity are to some extent subsumed by the increasing salience of aspects of one’s social identity (derived from one’s perceived membership in a group, to which the other participant does not belong).

According to SIT, individuals are motivated to favour their own group relative to another group based on their desire for a positive and secure self-concept. That is, people have a desire to see their groups as good in comparison to other relevant groups, and so are motivated to think and behave in ways that increase their group’s distinctiveness. In fact, negotiators who considered their opponents part of their group focused more on integrative outcomes, rather than distributive outcomes (Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996). In the JIMP environment, identifying with the other party as being on the same team may help produce integrative and cooperative negotiations (see Kramer & Brewer, 1984).

However, one obvious question that needed to be addressed in SIT was how it was possible for an individual in a low-status group to achieve and maintain a positive social identity? Researchers (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Brown, 1978; as cited in Hornsey, 2008) have outlined ways this can be accomplished. For example, one option suggests leaving the group (either physically and/or psychologically). Another option suggests exaggerating group virtues by celebrating aspects that make one’s group look good during comparisons, while devaluing those aspects that do not. The choice of strategy to employ depends on circumstantial factors, such as the extent to which group boundaries are seen as permeable and the degree to which status differences are seen as stable and legitimate (Hornsey, 2008).

According to Hornsey (2008), the SIT was the first social psychological theory to recognize that groups occupy a status/power hierarchy and that from within each group members gain the ability to criticize and produce alternatives to the status quo, which motivates intergroup behaviour.

1.4.2 Self-Categorization Theory

Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) is essentially an expansion and redefinition of the cognitive component of SIT and can be used to explain intergroup as well as intragroup phenomena. The major
difference between the two theories is that, rather than conceiving of interactions as falling on a bipolar continuum (interpersonal-to-intergroup identity), SCT proposes three levels of categorization as necessary for identity. According to Turner (1987; as cited in Hornsey, 2008), levels of categorization include the self as a human being (i.e., human identity); the self as a member of an ingroup distinct from and in reference to other social groups (social identity); and the self as an individual, based on interpersonal comparisons (personal identity). The relations between the levels of one’s self-concept are described as “functionally antagonistic,” such that as one level increases in salience the other levels decrease. Previous research (Thomson et al., 2010) indicates that the diplomatic balancing of levels of categorization (i.e., social vs. personal identities) may have led to successful collaboration in a JIMP operational environment. Indeed, many participants suggested that once they cut through the social identities, “personalities” and personal relationships often served to promote effective collaboration.

SCT proposes that categorization occurs as a function of two variables. The first variable is accessibility, which is the likelihood of a category forming the basis for self-definition either because of temporal salience (brought about by aspects of the present situation) or chronic salience (owing to one’s motivation to use it or regular activation by others; Oakes, 1987; as cited in Hornsey, 2008). The second variable is fit, the extent to which a category is seen to be diagnostic of real-world differences by maximizing perceived inter-category differences and minimizing intra-category differences, and when social behavior and group membership are in line with stereotypical expectations (Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991; as cited in Hornsey, 2008).

One of SCT’s most important contributions to identity research is its ability to explain people’s tendency to depersonalize through categorization. According to SCT, people cognitively represent their social groups in terms of prototypes (i.e., one’s subjective representation of a social category’s defining attributes in a particular context; Hornsey, 2008). As categories become more salient, people tend to see themselves and others more as “interchangeable exemplars of the group prototype” (Hornsey, 2008, p. 209) and less as individuals. This group-member prototype serves as a model for group identity and helps explain what it is to be a group member, along with the types of attitudes, emotions and behaviours that are appropriate given the situation (Hornsey, 2008). Proponents of the social identity approach hold depersonalization as the fundamental process from which a range of group phenomena find their source and offer a new perspective on the concepts of group cohesion, social influence, conformity, leadership, power, status, and stereotyping.

1.4.3 Group Identities

The social identity approach has been applied in a wide range of contexts. One of note was Ashforth and Mael’s (1989) examination of social identification in the context of organizations. In their study, they explored the antecedents and consequences of social identification (see Figure 7), and then used the SIT framework to re-examine the constructs of organizational socialization, role conflict, and intergroup relations.
Ashforth and Mael (1989) defined social identification as “the perception of oneness with or belongingness to some human aggregate” (p. 21), and organizational identification as a specific organizational form of that identification. The extent to which organizational identification will occur depends on the distinctiveness of the group’s values and practices in relation to comparable groups (Oakes & Turner, 1986; as cited in Ashforth & Meal, 1989); the prestige of the group (Mael, 1988; as cited in Ashforth & Meal, 1989); the salience of the out-group (Turner, 1981; as cited in Ashforth & Meal, 1989); and group formation factors, such as interpersonal interaction, similarity, liking, proximity, shared goals or threat, common history, and so on (Turner, 1984; as cited in Ashforth & Meal, 1989). If identification with the group (organization, department, team, etc.) is successful, then group members are expected to show enhanced support for and commitment to the group; to display some degree of internalization of group values and norms; to share in a stronger consensus of attitudes and behaviours; and to increase self-stereotyping and depersonalization.

Individuals will likely belong to a number of different groups that have a number of different demands (values, beliefs, norms). These demands may sometimes compete with one another. As such, an individual’s loyalties to any given group may be in conflict. According to Ashforth and Mael (1989, p. 31), role conflict rarely occurs because “individuals slide fairly easily from one identity to another.” One’s various identities are cued or activated in response to particular and relevant social settings (Turner, 1985; as cited in Ashforth & Meal, 1989). Rather, Ashforth and Mael argue that “only when individuals are forced to simultaneously don different hats does their facility for cognitively managing conflict break down.” In a JIMP context, there may be some degree of conflict for CF personnel if they are expected to be a soldier but also assist with development efforts (destruction vs. construction, respectively). Within their own organization, CF members may encounter role conflict, for example, between being a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) officer and...
a Company Line Officer. So, although the literature suggests that individuals move fluidly between roles, these conflicts do lie, according to Ashforth and Mael, “latent” and are worth examination.

What Ashforth and Mael offer the identity literature is a reconceptualization of well-established workplace constructs (e.g., organizational socialization process) that help examine an organization’s attempt to symbolically manage a new employee’s identity “by defining the organization or subunit in terms of distinctive and enduring central characteristics” (p. 35).

Brewer (1991) also used the social identity approach and its focus on cognitive and contextual determinants of social identity to explain why individuals are motivated toward group identity. In accordance with her theory of optimal distinctiveness, social identity forms out of a “fundamental tension between human needs for validation and similarity to others and a countervailing need for uniqueness and individuation” (p. 477). Shown in Figure 8, social identity can be viewed as a compromise between deindividuation (satisfied within in-groups) and distinctiveness (accomplished by intergroup comparisons).

Figure 8. The optimal distinctiveness model (Brewer, 1991, p. 477)

Brewer (1991) depicts this as a variant of an opposing processes model, where the need for assimilation and for differentiation are represented as opposing forces situated within a context-dependent frame of reference. The x-axis represents a social distinctiveness-inclusiveness dimension, along which an individual (depending on the context) can be categorized as wholly unique from the group (i.e., features maximally distinguish an individual from the group or low inclusion) to totally submersed in the group (i.e., deindividuated or high inclusion). As Brewer put it, “the higher the level of inclusiveness at which self-categorization is made, the more depersonalized the self-concept becomes” (p. 477). In addition, each point on the inclusiveness dimension is associated with some level of the opposing needs of assimilation and differentiation, which are inversely related. As one categorizes herself as falling on the right half of the figure, for example, the need for assimilation is satisfied, meanwhile her need for differentiation grows more intense (and vice versa on the left side). Brewer holds that identifying oneself at either extreme (too distinct or too indistinct) threatens a person’s security and self-worth (e.g., isolation and stigmatization vs. depersonalization,
respectively). Instead, an ideal state – one of optimal distinctiveness and where social identification will be the strongest – can be reached by identifying with categories at a level of inclusiveness that satisfy equal levels of need for assimilation and differentiation. Thus, by joining a distinctive group one can meet his or her assimilative needs and at the same time differentiate by making distinctions between ingroups and outgroups. Optimal distinctiveness theory implies that distinctiveness is a very important feature of a group (beyond affective evaluations and status). That is, an effective group needs to maintain distinctiveness to survive. To become overly inclusive, Brewer suggests, risks the loyalty of group membership.

Rather than trying to achieve equilibrium through the adoption of a single social identity, some researchers (e.g., Brewer, 1999) have considered multiple group identities, which are held simultaneously and combined in order to satisfy assimilation and differentiation needs. According to Brewer (1999), when multiple identities are activated, there are a variety of ways these might be subjectively represented by the individual (Figure 9).

![Figure 9. Alternative representations of individuals’ social identities (Brewer, 1999 p. 191)](image)

For example, as shown in relationship a) at the top of figure 9, two identities are experienced as separate aspects of the self that are not engaged in concurrently, and as such serve as a basis for categorization in different contexts at different times. In contrast, relationships b) and c) reflect dual identities, where identities are held simultaneously. Relationship b) is known as a compound group identity, having joint membership in both groups. In this case, ingroup members are limited to those who share membership in both groups. Relationship c) is referred to as nested identities, where one identity is superordinate and the other is a differentiated subgroup or unit. In cases like this, identities can be complementary and together serve both assimilation and differentiation needs. That is, membership in the superordinate group (e.g., Team Canada) “satisfies the need for secure inclusion in a large collective” (Brewer, 1999, p.190), whereas inclusion in the subgroup (e.g. NGO, CF) provides distinctiveness within the larger category. Within the nested identity perspective, all members in the superordinate group are considered ingroup members, though only members of the subgroup who are
also members of the superordinate group are thought of as such. Which identity takes precedence depends on the context and the social identity that has been activated.

1.4.4 Summary

Given that tensions may arise when diverse social groups must interact and collaborate in a shared operational theatre, it is important to consider the identity literature and ways to mitigate these potential tensions. Tensions do not only arise from intergroup differences. They also may arise from trying to sustain two or more identities simultaneously. For example, one can be a soldier, a Canadian, a parent, a spouse, with each identity demanding unique cognitive, emotional, and behavioural expectations. Sliding back and forth between these identities has been said to be fairly simple (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), but we would argue that this occurs under “normal” circumstances. The stressors and risks associated with deployments may invoke role conflict as CF members have said that they maintained their readiness by remaining firmly fixed on their “job” (Flear, Adams, Thomson, & Hall, 2010). For our purposes, it is important to consider how individuals from different organizations work together while maintaining their identities. Strong affiliation to a particular group (i.e., NGO) and the prototypical attitude and conduct demanded of group members serves as a useful guide during interactions. However, one of the potentially negative consequences of strong group affiliation and distinctiveness is stereotyping.

As depersonalization occurs through categorization, the individual is supplanted by the prototypical model of the group, along with the expected attitudes, emotions and behaviours. Stereotypes and prejudice were identified by Thomson et al. (2010) as barriers to collaboration within a JIMP environment. Because people from different organizations are required to work together in JIMP environments, there will be situations in which individuals do not have a prior history or contact with their collaboration counterpart. As such, individuals may base their initial perceptions and expectations on preconceived notions of what the representative will be like given their association with or membership in a particular social group. This, of course, can have negative consequences for collaboration if those preconceived notions are inaccurate or fail to acknowledge the unique contributions that individuals bring to the collaboration. Being aware of the stereotypes that exist within a JIMP environment can be important during collaboration. The next section, therefore, looks at the literature on stereotyping, including how stereotypes are formed and how they can be overcome.

1.5 Stereotypes and Prejudice

One potential challenge facing individuals who belong to diverse organizations or groups and must operate in a JIMP context are stereotypes and prejudice. The literature examining the relationship between humanitarian workers and the military makes salient the issue surrounding negative stereotyping and its impact on collaboration. For example, Eide and colleagues (2005; as cited in Olson & Gregorian, 2007, p. 16) claimed that:

“Aid workers may consider the military arrogant or dominant and they may blame soldiers for a lack of true commitment and argue they should establish closer contact with the people rather than staying in the camp…The military, on the other hand, may blame aid workers for being an uncoordinated, self-interested group of arrogant money-spenders that drive around in expensive cars and send impressive pictures to their constituencies without actually accomplishing much.”
These a priori expectations are likely to have very negative implications for potential collaborations between military personnel and NGOs.

A study conducted by Stewart, Wright, and Proud (2004) suggests that members of NGOs and of military systems have different perceptions and stereotypes about their own organizations versus other organizations. The researchers had military and NGO participants write 10 statements describing their perceptions of NGOs and of the United Kingdom (UK) armed forces. When asked to provide statements describing their perceptions of NGOs, NGO respondents listed features related to the moral roots of their organization, funding issues, or primary means for working in other countries. Military respondents, on the other hand, described NGOs as being “well-meaning,” and focused on the political elements of NGOs, as well as the moral drivers of the organization. When asked to provide statements describing their perceptions of the UK armed forces, military respondents described themselves as being professional and well respected, and discussed the structure and processes of the armed forces. NGOs described military personnel as being professional and well respected, but they also emphasized the limited scope of the mandate of military personnel, and their relative lack of training and experience in humanitarian areas. Thus, these groups had differing views about the same organizations.

Moreover, recent research found that individuals representing diverse organizations in the field were negatively stereotyped in a JIMP operating environment. People from the NGO community believed that the CF referred to them as “a bunch of do-gooders,” “lazy,” “tree hugger[s],” “Birkenstock wearing,” and “peacenik[s]” (Thomson et al., 2010, p. 20). On the other hand, some NGOs refer to military personnel as “rigid; authoritarian; conservative; impatient; arrogant; civilian phobic; homophobic; excessively security focussed” (Steihm, 1998; Dearfield, 1998; Bruno, 1999; as cited in Winslow, 2002). These negative expectations, attitudes, and beliefs about other potential partners, particularly those that are inaccurate, may hinder collaboration. Indeed, they may potentially lead to antagonistic interactions (Winslow, 2002).

### 1.5.1 Stereotype Formation

Introduced by Lippman in 1922 (as cited in Kunda, 1999), stereotypes are the generalizations we may have about groups of people. Specifically, stereotypes represent our beliefs regarding the characteristics, attributes, and behaviours of others (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996), and are based on the knowledge, beliefs, and expectations we hold about a group (Kunda, 1999). Stereotypes can guide our expectations about group membership and can colour how we interpret group members’ behaviours and traits (Kunda, 1999). To this end, stereotypes can be accurate, operating as object schemas (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996), or inaccurate, based on characteristics of a person (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Prejudice is the dislike one holds based on the erroneous generalizations (Allport, 1954; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996) and the negative evaluations of and emotional responses to other people associated with a particular group (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996).

Before stereotypes can influence our cognitions, behaviour, and motivations, however, they first have to be formed. Hilton and von Hippel (1996) examined the representation and formation of stereotypes. These authors note five commonly cited representational models in the literature. First, the prototype model explains that one can store abstract representations of a group (i.e., a prototype) that will be used to compare an individual of that group (Cantor & Mischel, 1978; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). The exemplar model suggests that groups are stored as concrete (as opposed to abstract) exemplars, such as an African-American athlete stored as Michael Jordan (e.g., Anderson & Cole, 1990; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Hilton and von
Hippel explain that activation of the exemplar stereotype is determined by the context, implying that the stereotype is not always activated and applied to other members of the group. This approach suggests stereotypes can change following an interaction with a counter-stereotypic exemplar (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). The associative networks model considers the representation as a linked network of attributes (Carlston, 1992; Manis, Nelson, & Shedler, 1988; Stephan & Stephan, 1993; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Hilton and von Hippel explain that, though researchers view attributes differently (e.g., traits, beliefs, behaviours), they all hold that these links are automatically activated and can be outside our conscious awareness. Moreover, stereotypes construed as associative networks are robust because the networks are complex and interconnected. Schemas, the fourth model, note that stereotypes can be thought of as generalized and abstract beliefs about groups and their members (cf. Fiske & Taylor, 1991; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). As Hilton and von Hippel explain, one might think men are aggressive without any reference to a particular instantiation or organizational structure for holding that stereotype. They further suggest that this model supports the notion that assimilation for newly acquired information on a group should be quite high. The final model is concerned with applying base rates to stereotypes (Beckett & Park, 1995; Judd & Park, 1993; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996), and assumes that individuating information should negate stereotypes. These five models serve as theories regarding how stereotypes are represented in the mind.

There are other theories that attempt to explain how stereotypes are formed. For example, Hilton and von Hippel suggest that the formation of stereotypes can be explained by the self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton, 1968). Self-fulfilling prophecies can be thought of as cyclic. A self-fulfilling prophecy begins when a person expects certain behaviours from a target individual or group. This expectancy can alter the person’s behaviour. This behaviour change can lead to the target performing the expected behaviour, thus, confirming the expectation in the first place. For example, a CF member may assume that their collaboration counterpart may be uncooperative during a meeting. This assumption causes the CF member to be distant and closed off or competitive. Because the CF member is acting distant and closed off or competitive, the counterpart is no longer cooperative, thus fulfilling the CF member’s expectation. Recall that negotiation research shows that if negotiators expect their counterparts to be cooperative, the negotiations end up being more cooperative (De Dreu, 2004; Halpert et al., 2010).

Correlation detection is another possible way of explaining how stereotypes are formed (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). A person may generalize the behaviour of an individual to a whole group. The initial stereotype may form after encountering one individual and, although the correlation can be erroneous, it can be strengthened despite a lack of supportive evidence (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Within the JIMP context, there are opportunities to meet and collaborate with individuals from other organizations. A person who has one negative experience with an individual from another organization may generalize that behaviour to all members of the organization, in turn creating a negative stereotype.

The theory of out-group homogeneity can also shed light on how stereotypes are formed. This theory explains that members of another group (out-group) are seen as more homogeneous, as well as having less desirable traits than members of one’s own group (in-group; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Hamilton & Hewstone, 2007). The effect of out-group homogeneity is the belief that individual out-group members all share the out-group attributes (Park & Hastie, 1987; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996) and can be described by stereotypes (Park, Judd, & Ryan, 1991; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Similarly, the notion of perceived “entitativity” (coined by Campbell, 1958; as cited in Hamilton & Hewstone, 2007) can explain how stereotypes are formed. Entitativity refers to the extent that a group is perceived as an entity. Groups that are perceived as
an entity have high levels of social interaction, membership is important to the group, members experience shared goals and outcomes, and members are similar to one another (Lickel, Hamilton, Wieczorkowska, Lewis, Sherman, & Uhles, 2000; as cited in Hamilton & Hewstone, 2007). Groups that are perceived as high in entitativity (i.e., high in all four categories) are more likely to be stereotyped (e.g., Hamilton, Sherman, & Rodgers, 2004; as cited in Hamilton & Hewstone, 2007) than groups low in entitativity. Members of the CF, for example, have frequent briefings (social interaction), value their membership, experience shared goals and outcomes, and are mostly men (Forces, 2010). Groups such as the CF then could have a high probability of being stereotyped by people who have had little contact with them, but who have preconceived ideas regarding soldiers. Moreover, this stereotyping may occur automatically, without one’s conscious awareness.

1.5.2 Stereotype Maintenance and Application

Research has found that stereotypes are applied automatically. Devine (1989; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996) argued that people have a personal and a culture wide belief about a group. Stereotypes get passed down in a culture by parents, friends, and the media. A culture wide stereotype is known to everyone in a specific society and may be used frequently throughout the course of someone’s life. According to Kunda (1999), stereotypes may be the result of deep personal needs, such as group belonging, the need for superiority, or the need for social order. Research has found that stereotype automaticity occurs when people have a reason to stereotype, such as a threat to their self-esteem (Spencer & Fein, 1994; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Similarly, when stigmatized people receive negative feedback about their performance (i.e., a threat to their self-esteem), they may attribute this feedback to an evaluator’s prejudice. Conversely, when this feedback is positive, it can be attributed to the evaluator trying not to be prejudiced. Thus, ambiguous situations can buffer or undermine one’s self-esteem (Crocker, Voelkl, & Testa, 1991; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Though this stereotype is automatically activated, Devine argues that one’s personal belief about a group can override the culture wide stereotype.

On the other hand, there are a number of processes that maintain stereotypes. For example, priming someone, even subconsciously, can influence later information processing, such as when interpreting the behaviour of another person (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Random priming (e.g., daily experiences, media stories) can also maintain stereotypes by causing the person to interpret only stereotyped behaviour. Stereotypes can also be maintained through assimilation and attribution. Assimilation occurs when people are seen as more like their stereotype than they actually are (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Research has shown that an individual’s behaviour must fall within the range of accepted stereotype behaviours or the person will not be identified as a member of the group (e.g., Wilder & Thompson, 1988; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). For example, a CF member who works for peace and who is cooperative and giving may appear as nonconforming to their group and will be construed as an atypical member, which ironically reinforces the stereotype. To maintain the stereotype, this stereotype-incongruent behaviour is likely to be attributed to something other than the person’s disposition (e.g., Jackson, Sullivan, & Hodge, 1993; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). So despite the conscious control that we may have in dismantling stereotypes, there are also processes that work to maintain them. In fact, the assumption is that stereotypes are easier to maintain than change (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996).

1.5.3 Impact of Stereotypes

Research has been conducted to understand how stereotypes impact the targets. For instance, Wheeler and Petty (2001) sought to understand how stereotype activation impacts on a target’s
Activated stereotypes can be positive (e.g., wise) or negative (e.g., senile) and can concern one’s own group (i.e., self-stereotypes) or another group (i.e., other-stereotypes). Wheeler and Petty looked at the role of ideomotor theory and stereotype threat theory to understand the impact of stereotype activation.

Ideomotor theory suggests that behaviour, such as poor test performance, immediately follows stereotype activation (Wheeler & Petty, 2001). Wheeler and Petty (2001) created a possible meditational path showing stereotype activation on behaviour grounded in ideomotor theory (see Figure 11).

As shown in the figure, the stereotype activates a trait, in this case, a negative trait, such as laziness. The behaviour is cognitively represented and then actively performed. Empirical research supports the idea that action thoughts and action behaviour have similar patterns in brain activity (e.g., Roland, Larsen, Larsen, & Skinhoj, 1980; as cited in Wheeler & Petty, 2001) as well as similar physical sensations (e.g., Arnold, 1946; as cited in Wheeler & Petty, 2001). Thus, cognitively activating a thought can lead to performing a related action. The ideomotor theory’s cognitive approach is considered “cold,” whereas stereotype threat is considered “hot,” as it focuses on feelings and motivation (Wheeler & Petty, 2001).

According to Spencer, Steele, and Quinn (1999; as cited in Crisp & Abrams, 2008), stereotype threat occurs in situations where a person may be judged, treated, or self-fulfil according to a negative stereotype. For example, women had lower test scores than men when told their test produced gender differences, but had similar scores to men when told their test was gender-neutral (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999; as cited in Kunda, 1999). Stereotype threat theory suggests that the activation of negative self-stereotypes produces feelings of threat and hinders performance (see Steele, 1997; as cited in Wheeler & Petty, 2001). Wheeler and Petty (2001) created a possible meditational path showing stereotype activation on behaviour grounded in stereotype threat theory (see Figure 12).

As shown in the figure, the stereotype activates a trait, which produces anxiety, leading to a poor test performance. It has been argued by others that the stereotype threat effect is due to the anxiety of being evaluated according to one’s stereotyped group, rather than on an individual basis (Steele, 1997; as cited in Crisp & Abrams, 2008).
As previously discussed, contact is the most common intervention for reducing stereotypes and prejudice. Crisp and Abrams (2008) created a basic model of stereotype threat using intergroup contact shown in Figure 13.

![Figure 13. Intergroup contact model of stereotype threats (adapted from Crisp & Abrams, 2008, p. 250)](image)

As shown in the figure, Crisp and Abrams (2008) argue that intergroup contact influences self-stereotyping, which in turn impacts anxiety and test performance. During contact, if the stereotype threat is imminent, anxiety can increase and test performance may suffer. To this end, Crisp and Abrams (2008) suggest that reducing performance anxiety may reduce stereotype threat. These researchers suggest that increasing contact can decrease performance anxiety because individuals will become confident in their ability to interact with an outgroup. Unlike Allport’s and Pettigrew’s contact theories, Crisp and Abrams (2008) focus on the impact of stereotypes on the individual. Moreover, this model suggests contact as an intervention to reduce the target’s negative behaviour (e.g., anxiety) and increase positive behaviour (e.g., performance).

There has been stereotype research that shows that individuals of the stereotyped group can overcome the stereotype when the stereotype has been explicitly primed. For example, considering negotiation approaches, there is a stereotype that men are more assertive than women (Thompson et al., 2010). Kray, Thompson, and Galinsky (2001; as cited in Thompson et al., 2010) found that when the stereotype was subtly activated, men achieved better negotiation outcomes than women. However, when the stereotype was more explicitly activated, women defied the stereotype (resulting, in the researchers’ words, in a “stereotype-reactance effect”) and achieved better negotiation outcomes than men. Within a JIMP environment, this will be important because there is a clear gender difference between the NGO community (more often women) and the CF (most often men). As this research shows, explicitly invoked stereotypes might work in a woman’s favour if she finds herself negotiating with men as stereotype activation may entice people to defy it.

### 1.5.4 Stereotype Change or Reduction

Hilton and von Hippel (1996) discuss four models of stereotype change in the literature. First, the bookkeeping model holds that there is a slight change in the stereotype when an inconsistency is processed (Rothbart, 1981; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). In a similar vein, but with more intensity, the conversion model speculates that there is a dramatic change in the stereotype when a critical level of inconsistency is perceived and processed (Rothbart, 1981; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). The exemplar-based model suggests that stereotypes change when new exemplars are not only added, but also retrieved (Smith & Zarate, 1992; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). Lastly, the subtyping model holds that stereotype inconsistencies are categorized under a new classification (Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). However, as Kunda (1999) points out, by re-categorizing stereotyped individuals, it is assumed that they are in fact different from their stereotyped group, rather than simply inconsistent with the stereotype. As such, this seems to be the least viable explanation for stereotype change.
Empirical work has focused on the effectiveness of reducing stereotype dependency, rather than fully changing a stereotype. For example, Levy, Paluck and Green (2009) examined hundreds of experiments regarding prejudice reduction interventions. Overall, they reported that the results of the numerous interventions were unknown, though some, such as cooperative learning and intergroup contact, were found to have promising effects. Other research showed that when a person becomes personally involved or is held accountable for a stereotype, reliance on that stereotype decreases (e.g., Tetlock, 1992; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). However, stereotype suppression may not reduce stereotypic thinking. As Bodenhausen and Macrae (1996; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996) suggest, attempting to suppress a stereotype may in fact act as a prime, leading to increased stereotypic thoughts and interpretations. Moreover, activating one stereotype (e.g., gender) may inhibit the activation of another stereotype (e.g., race) (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995; as cited in Kunda, 1999). Thus, stereotype reduction interventions include cooperative learning and contact, as well as becoming personally involved or being held accountable for a stereotype.

In relation to JIMP operations, the effectiveness of stereotype reduction is dependent on positive and unbiased interactions among a number of people representing various organizations working together or at least within the same shared space. Understanding just how to reduce prejudice can be important to promote maximal collaboration. Allport’s contact hypothesis (1954; as cited in Pettigrew, 1998) suggests that the key to reducing prejudiced attitudes and behaviour is simply bringing people together. Indeed, as mentioned above, one successful intervention for reducing stereotypes was cooperative learning and contact. However, a number of specific situational conditions must be met to effectively reduce prejudice through mere contact. These include:

- **Equal status.** Both groups must feel that they have equal status.
- **Common goals.** Groups must come into contact to engage in an active, goal-oriented effort.
- **Intergroup cooperation.** Working together to attain common goals must be an interdependent effort without intergroup competition.
- **Support of authorities, law, or custom.** Contact will have more positive effects and be more readily accepted if it is socially sanctioned.

Under these conditions, Allport argues that contact will yield positive benefits for both attitudes and behaviour. Pettigrew and Tropp (2000; as cited in Hamilton & Hewstone, 2007) provided support for the effectiveness of contact in reducing stereotypes. After conducting a meta-analysis on 500 contact studies, the overall results suggested that contact had “beneficial effects in reducing prejudice” (as cited in Hamilton & Hewstone, 2007, p. 95).

Although there is empirical support for intergroup contact theory, there has been much criticism. One of the most prominent criticisms is that Allport’s original theory does not discuss the processes by which contact with other groups actually changes attitudes and behaviour (Pettigrew, 1998). The original theory also does not specify how effects generalize beyond the immediate contact situation. To this end, Pettigrew (1998) proposed four interrelated processes that can promote attitude change during contact:

- **Learning about the outgroup.** Learning about the outgroup should correct negative views (i.e., improve intergroup attitudes and stereotypes).
- **Changing behaviour.** Behaviour change is often a precursor for attitude change. If people engaging in new situations are required to behave positively and cooperatively (despite their negative attitudes), exercising such behaviour may result in attitude change.
Generating affective ties. Anxious encounters between groups can spark negative reactions, whereas positive encounters can spark positive reactions.

Ingroup reappraisal. Contact can provide insights about an ingroup, which can reshape one’s view.

Furthermore, Pettigrew identified the processes underlying changes in perceptions as the result of intergroup contact, as shown in Figure 10.

At the point of initial contact, Pettigrew argues that the first step is decategorization. This involves minimizing the salience of the differing categories to which individuals belong (e.g., DFAIT) and focusing instead on liking the individual. Once contact has been established, the parties should then view each other as representatives of outgroups. The goal is then to have people categorize the other members of the “team” as different from them (i.e., salient categorization), but to begin to have more positive attitudes toward them. After extended contact, group members recategorize themselves as part of a common larger group. Their broader view includes an inclusive category that highlights similarities, obscuring the boundaries of “us” versus “them.”

Empirically, a meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) showed that greater intergroup contact (i.e., experienced face-to-face interaction with members of clearly defined groups) was generally associated with lower levels of prejudice. Specifically, attitudes were more positive toward the group members in direct contact, toward the outgroup members across situations (even in the absence of direct contact), and toward the outgroups as a whole. These effects were evident even when Allport’s ideal conditions were not met (e.g., equal status, common goals).

Intergroup contact theory, therefore, offers a relevant theoretical framework for understanding the JIMP context. The theory suggests that collaboration will be most successful under certain conditions (e.g., equal status, the presence of common goals, etc.) and that contact with members of other groups helps alleviate potential prejudices. Reducing stereotypes and prejudice is especially important when considering the negative impacts of stereotypes on individuals.
1.5.5 Summary

Without full disclosure of one’s collaboration counterpart, there is a high probability that JIMP actors will have preconceived ideas of one another. Indeed, previous research investigating civil-military collaboration showed that civilians think they are stereotyped as “overpaid,” “unprofessional,” “tree huggers” or “peaceniks” by their CF counterparts, whereas, military personnel were characterized by civilian counterparts as arrogant know-it-alls (Thomson et al., 2010). There are a number of models that explain stereotype formation, such as the schemata model, which holds that these are generalized and abstract beliefs about groups and their members (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; as cited in Hilton & von Hippel, 1996), as well as models that show the negative impacts of stereotypes on the target (Wheeler & Petty, 2001; Crisp & Abrams, 2008).

However, for our purposes, it may be more important to consider how these stereotypes are maintained and how they can be overcome in order to support respect and value in civil-military collaboration. For example, stereotype maintenance may occur through a number of mechanisms, including self-fulfilling prophesy, correlation detection, and out-group homogeneity. But this may be countered by intergroup contact (Levy, Paluck, & Green, 2009), where individuals learn about one another, change their behaviour toward them, generate positive feelings about one another, and reappraise (Pettigrew, 1998). Research did suggest that contact with JIMP counterparts and greater understanding of their expertise and organizational objectives could lessen stereotypes (Thomson et al., 2010). Contact is also believed to decrease a target’s negative behaviour (i.e., anxiety derived from the belief that one is stereotyped) and subsequently increase their performance (Crisp & Abrams, 2008). Intergroup contact theory may provide a basis for understanding the JIMP context and may suggest ways in which stereotypes and prejudice can be overcome.

1.6 Trust

Within the JIMP or WoG approach to operations, trust is a necessary part of the collaborative process. Indeed, trust has been identified as a condition of effective collaboration (Thomson et al., 2010) at both the interpersonal level as well as the interorganizational level. According to Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and Camerer (1998, p. 395) trust can be understood as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another.” The “other” within this definition denotes an individual, but can also refer to a group or an abstract entity (such as an organization). Hosmer’s (1995, p. 399) definition also notes the role of expectations, but expands the scope of these, arguing that “trust is the expectation by one person, group or firm of ethical behaviour -- that is, morally correct decisions and actions based upon ethical principles of analysis -- on the part of the other person, group, or firm in a joint endeavour or economic exchange.” These and other definitions consistently argue that trust involves positive expectations about another person, group or abstract entity such as an organization. Trust as a psychological state is also commonly linked with choice behaviour or decisions to be vulnerable to another person even if this person’s behaviour cannot be directly observed or controlled (Aubert & Kelsey, 2003; Bachmann, 2001; Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). Trust then can be understood as a psychological state, where we willingly choose to become vulnerable to another’s conduct as a result of our positive belief that they will act in accordance with our expectations.

Obviously, collaborating in a WoG context will require not only trust in a representative from another organization (interpersonal trust) but also trust in that organization itself (interorganizational trust). Operational decisions will be based on the expectations of the other governmental departments. For example, if the CF seeks to clear, hold, and secure an area for potential development, then they have to trust that once this is accomplished, CIDA (as the development agency) will fulfil their part of the
plan. At the same time, CIDA has to believe that the CF has the capacity to fulfil their end of the bargain in the first place. As will be shown in the sections that follow, this trust may emerge from what is referred to as institutionally based trust, that is, we trust an organization from the get-go because we understand that the organization has the relevant systems and structures in place to secure successful endeavours (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998). But trust will also emerge at the interpersonal level in such situations. So those CF and CIDA representatives (i.e., boundary spanners) have to convey trust to their collaboration counterparts by demonstrating, at the very least, a degree of competency and predictability. Examining some of the most pertinent trust literature, we further delineate the concepts of interpersonal and interorganizational trust in an effort to clarify how these concepts may play out in a JIMP or WoG operational context. We begin by looking at interpersonal trust.

1.6.1 Interpersonal trust

Our everyday understanding of the word “trust” typically involves the notion of relationships with other people and the positive expectations and beliefs that develop as we come to know and trust others (Adams, Bryant & Webb, 2001). Because it takes time to establish the knowledge and experience necessary to trust another person, interpersonal trust is said to develop historically (Adams et al., 2001). Building trust requires not only prolonged interactions with others but also direct and personal contact that allows for the sharing of life experiences, values, and beliefs.

A number of factors have been found to influence judgments of trustworthiness and the likelihood of engaging in trusting behaviour. For instance, the degree to which a person will trust another is in part reflection of the trustor’s propensity to trust, trust history (i.e., outcome of previous trust relationships), and on-going trust experiences and values (Adams et al., 2001). An individual who has been betrayed (e.g., cheated, lied to, etc.) by others in the past may have little propensity to trust, preferring rather to default to distrust of others and exercising a high degree of caution. On the other hand, someone who has had secure relationships with others based on care may have a high propensity to trust. What is important is that propensity to trust varies in degrees and any given individual, irrespective of their propensity, will likely base judgements of trustworthiness on the trustee’s conduct over time. As such, factors of the trustee are also vital for judgements of trustworthiness.

A careful examination by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) identified four core trustee factors (or trust dimensions) that indicate trustworthiness, including competence, predictability, benevolence, and integrity. Competence is a key factor in determining the degree to which trust will be conferred on another person. That is, a person is more likely to be trusted if he or she is seen to possess the skills, characteristics, and capacity to meet the demands of a given situation (Mayer et al., 1995). From the perspective of the trustor, partners who have a high level of ability are more likely to be able to use their skills and abilities to lessen the risk of negative outcomes and vulnerability to negative outcomes for both parties. This then should promote interpersonal trust. But trust is also established when one can predict what the trustee will do in a given situation. As Adams and Webb (2003) argue, people whose actions are predictable promote trust, as this consistency helps lessen the risk of unknown or unanticipated outcomes. However, this dimension may arise at a later point in a relationship as instances of the particular trusting behaviour must be repeated a number of times in order to establish consistency. Benevolence is also a dimension of trust. It is defined as “the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive” (Mayer et al., 1995). In other words, we come to trust another because the trustee has genuine concern for our well-being, independent of their own self-
interests. Judgements of benevolence are closely related to the interpretation of another’s actions as being motivated by positive intentions. Finally, integrity was identified as a core dimension of trust. According to Mayer et al., it can be understood as a perception that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that a trustor finds acceptable. Actions and attitudes typically associated with integrity include credible communications, consistency of word and action, and a strong sense of justice (Mayer et al., 1995).

As Mayer et al. (1995) explain, judgements of trustworthiness based on the competence, predictability, benevolence, and integrity of others are not static, but are constantly updated by the outcomes derived from trusting others. For example, after having placed trust in another person, continuing to assume that this person is competent is dependent on receiving confirming information (Adams et al., 2001). Judgments of trustworthiness are constantly altered in response to ongoing feedback about the trustor. There may be a point at which one has increasingly high levels of trust in an individual based on this ongoing feedback and personal history with the trustee. But this in itself will still be variable.

1.6.2 Organizational trust

Although there are unique nuances, researchers have generally argued that organizational trust and interpersonal trust have similar core dimensions. For example, regardless of whether the referent is an individual or an organization, willingness to trust is based on the expectation that the recipients of one’s trust will act benevolently toward the trustor. As Baird and St-Amand (1995, p. 6; quoting Heimovics, 1984) state, trust is “an expectancy held by an individual that the behaviour of another person or a group…[will] be altruistic and personally beneficial.” Benevolence, often identified as a key antecedent of interpersonal trust, is commonly argued to be based on common goals or a sense of community. Other organizational scholars have also included a sense of justice and integrity as components of trust. For example, Dyer and Chu (2003, p. 58) characterize interfirm trust as a construct based on three related components: reliability, fairness, and goodwill/benevolence. Sydow (1998) emphasizes the dimensions of competence, benevolence, and integrity as critical to interorganizational trust, but only when these are representative of the organization and not a specific person.

Beyond this, the trustworthiness of an organization can also be signalled by its reputation. As Blomqvist and Stahle (2000, p. 4) have argued:

“organizations have reputations and images and they develop routines, processes and culture, which unify the behaviour of their employees and the responses to external contacts.”

According to Dollinger, Golden, and Saxton (1997; cited in Sydow, 1998), a good reputation makes an organization a more desirable partner. Reputation can also transfer among organizations, as organizations seek established similar relationships with other organizations that have proven themselves to be trustworthy (Sydow, 1998). In the case where a reputation is tarnished, Koeszegi (2004) believes that displaying cooperation and trusting behaviour can help people and organizations to recover trust. In any event, reputation is very important for interorganizational trust.

Organizational trust is also predicated on common beliefs and shared values evident within an organizational context. Wehmeyer, Reimer, and Schneider (2001) believe that trust in an abstract system emerges from common beliefs, shared values and adherence to certain basic rules. In other words, organizational trust emerges from an established institutional framework that includes
common beliefs and shared values regarding how organizations should conduct their business practices. An institutional framework may provide norms for the specific behaviour of its members, which are sanctioned by law or based on social or cultural assumptions. Economic, legal, or cultural norms and expectations embedded in systems enhance the predictability of people belonging to common “networks” within the system, and this enhances both intraorganizational and interorganizational trust.

The social norms that operate within an organizational or institutional framework also help establish the conditions for organizational trust. For instance, reciprocity norms can be important for establishing mutual trust among organizations, at least initially, because they signal information relevant to the amount of control that people are likely to have over others’ behaviour (Koeszegi, 2004). As such, “the norm of reciprocity provides a normative framework, within which trust is embedded” (p. 650). In interactions, participants may incrementally share information, signalling to others their trustworthiness. Fulfilment of the normative dimension of trust signals one’s own trustworthiness to others (Koeszegi, 2004). Moreover, these reciprocity norms also have a self-perpetuating quality as research has demonstrated that people who perceive themselves to be trustworthy also tend to believe that others are trustworthy (e.g., Rotter, 1980).

In addition to socialization and training, established practices and procedures are important aspects of organizational trust. Within organizational settings, existing structures and business practices help inform trust judgements (Bachmann, 2001). For example, a legal contract, established merely to provide recourse if a trustor has been betrayed, can work to promote predictability and standards for appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. This enhanced predictability may provide the assurance necessary to enter into a trusting relationship with an organization (Luhmann, 1979; as cited in Bachmann, 2001). In addition to legalistic structures, Bachmann (2001) argues that several structures that make up an institutional framework, such as financial systems, trade associations, and economic policies, enable organizational trust because such structures promote shared understanding of acceptable business practices and norms. Instead of strict sanctions, “a tightly knit framework of institutions can be seen as minimizing the risk of trust,” because it orients “the expectations and (re-)actions of social actors toward specific patterns of behaviour” in a “non-deterministic manner” (Bachmann, 2001, pp. 344-345).

A recent update of the influential model from Mayer et al. (1995) argues that, similar to interpersonal trust development (Adams et al., 2001), the emergence of trust in organizational contexts depends on time (Schoorman, Mayer & Davis, 2007). Dispositional trust is argued (as it has consistently been) to be an issue at the very beginning of a relationship. Judgements of ability and integrity, however, are believed to form relatively quickly, but benevolence is said to become more of an issue as the relationship progresses. This explanation is advanced to explain the common finding in laboratory studies (with relationships typically of short duration) of a high correlation between benevolence and integrity. On the other hand, when relationships become more established over time, integrity and benevolence emerge as increasingly distinct entities. However, McKnight, Cummings, and Chervany (1998) argue that today’s work environment does not necessarily allow for trust to develop over time. As such, research has shown that trust levels can be quite high when parties meet or interact for the first time (e.g., Kramer, 1994; as cited in McKnight et al., 1998). McKnight et al. argue that such situations involve initial trust, and have created a model to explain this initial formation (see Figure 14).
As can be seen in Figure 14, there are three antecedents to initial trust: disposition to trust, institution-based trust, and cognitive processes. Disposition to trust is a willingness to depend on others. McKnight et al. (1998) include two types of disposition to trust in their model: faith in humanity and trusting stance. The former means that one believes that others are generally well-meaning and reliable, whereas the latter refers to a belief that dealing with people as though they are well-meaning and reliable will result in better interpersonal outcomes, regardless of whether the person is reliable or not. McKnight et al. argue that disposition to trust will have a significant effect on a person’s trust levels in new organizational relationships.

Institution-based trust means that “one believes the necessary impersonal structures are in place to enable one to act in anticipation of a successful future endeavour” (McKnight et al., 1998, p. 478). Trusting intention at the beginning of a relationship may be high, they argue, because of the situational normalcy (the belief that success is likely because the situation is normal) and structural assurance (the belief that success is likely because contextual conditions like contracts are in place).

The two cognitive processes described by McKnight et al. (1998) are categorization processes and illusion of control. McKnight et al. argue that people develop trusting beliefs by categorizing others
by unit grouping (putting another person in the same category as oneself), reputation categorization (using second-hand information to assign attributes to another person), and stereotyping (placing a person into a general category of persons). An illusion of control occurs when people in a novel situation engage in small actions to assure themselves that things are under their control. McKnight et al. explain that illusions of control interact with categorization processes, faith in humanity, and structural assurance belief to produce high trusting beliefs.

A notable linkage in the interorganizational trust literature is made between the emergence of trust and the progressive development of collaborative alliances. Child, Dietz, Gillespie, Saunders, and Skinner (2007) argue that at the alliance formation stage, calculative trust is required. As the alliance progresses to the implementation stage, mutual understanding and getting to know the other partner is necessary. As the alliance evolves further, bonding and identification is required to build trust. Although this mapping is somewhat undifferentiated given the complex nature of trust (and alliances), this research shows the increasing sophistication about how trust evolves as collaborative relationships are formed.

Research by Daellenback and Davenport (2004) defines two stages of alliance formation, including searching for a partner and conducting negotiations (see Figure 15). They argue that trust is initially undeveloped at the start of alliances. At the stage of searching for an alliance partner, three factors are said to contribute to this partner’s perceived trustworthiness, including prior experience with the partner and the partner’s reputation within known networks of trusted others as well as conditional trust. With prior experience (presumably only successful experience), they argue that procedural norms would have been created, and that knowledge-based trust would have developed. Reputation is also an influence on early perceptions of trustworthiness. Daellenback and Davenport argue that “a firm’s reputation for trustworthiness acts as a proxy for shared collaborative history” (p. 192). Conditional trust is said to be an influence on perceived trustworthiness and is particularly important when other information is not available. This trust is described as a presumptive form of trust for “a completely unknown but capable potential partner, that is, a favourable enough assessment for negotiation of the potential alliance to take place” (Daellenback & Davenport, p. 193). This stage of trust, they argue, is based primarily on perceptions of the partner’s ability, or the skill set or competencies that the partner has in a particular area.
The negotiation stage requires further refinement in perceptions of trustworthiness in one’s alliance partner. At this stage, the impact of reputation relates to perceptions of distributive and procedural justice in the prospective alliance’s system. Procedural justice has to do with assessing whether a process was fair. Distributive justice has to do with assessing whether an outcome was fair. They propose that procedural justice will have a major impact on initial assessments of trustworthiness and therefore on the creation of new alliances. As alliances develop, considerations about procedural justice shift the focus from competencies and skills to integrity, benevolence and affect. Procedural justice has a strong influence on commitment, trust, and social harmony, and has been found to be very important during the creation of new organizations. Distributive justice was also said to play a role, but a less critical one, and Daellenback and Davenport (2004) argue that distributive justice is primarily influenced by perceptions of competence of the alliance partner.

The model also argues that the use of power during alliances can play a key role in shaping perceptions of justice. By definition, they argue that power is a non-cooperative activity. When working to define the terms of the alliance, it is clear that each member of the alliance must push to ensure that their own interests are likely to be met (i.e., that they ultimately have a sense of distributive justice). Using power in this context, then, is not posited to adversely affect distributive justice. On the other hand, using power when working to determine control procedures could damage the perceived legitimacy of the relationship and lower levels of perceived procedural justice.
Organizational trust also has the same situational antecedents as other forms of trust (namely, interdependence, risk, vulnerability, and uncertainty). Currall and Epstein (2003, p. 193) state that “trust is the decision to rely on another party under a condition of risk.” Bestowing trust upon someone or some entity, such as an organization, will not guarantee that expectations regarding the outcome will be fulfilled. This uncertainty induces the level of risk inherent in trusting behaviour. Therefore, like descriptions of interpersonal trust, organizational trust implies a degree of risk, vulnerability, uncertainty, and the need for interdependence, as well as acceptance of risk in order to resolve trust issues (Adams et al., 2001; Albrecht, 2002; Mayer & Davis, 1999).

Theorists have also argued that risks associated with trusting others and the reasons for doing so are somewhat similar in interpersonal and organizational contexts. It is clear that in both domains, for example, initiating trusting behaviour puts the trustor at risk, because though there is an expectation that giving trust to other people makes them more likely to reciprocate in kind, fulfilment can never be guaranteed (Bachmann, 2001). However, in complex collaborative environments, it can be adaptive to attempt to reduce the uncertainty and to simplify the decisions that need to be made. Bachmann (2001) argues that within organizational contexts, this simplification process is aided by the established organizational framework (e.g., the roles in play, organizational procedures that guide behaviour) that provides information about the probability of the trustee behaving in positively predictable ways.

1.6.3 Boundary spanners

Daellenbach and Davenport (2004) argue that trust is initially underdeveloped at the start of alliances between organizations. As such, an initial assessment of trustworthiness of the prospective organization may be based on the boundary spanners who interact personally with members of other organizations. Janowicz and Noorderhaven (2006) note that organizations have boundary spanners at the operational level and at the strategic level, and that boundary spanners at each level have different implications for interorganizational collaboration. Boundary spanners who work at the strategic level determine which alliances should be made, whereas boundary-spanners who work at the operational level are the ones who work to implement the alliance. Boundary spanners at each level will have different causes and consequences for interorganizational trust.

According to Sydow (1998) and Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009), because boundary spanners primarily represent the organization and have contact with members of the partnering organization, they are particularly important in the process of developing and maintaining interorganizational trust. This will be especially relevant to those individuals who operate in a WoG context in the field on behalf of their organization. Research showed that, at the organizational level, trust in WoG partners was not well established as a result of organizational systems and structures (Thomson et al., 2010). A way around this may be through developing trust at the interpersonal level with boundary spanners.

When working with others from different organizations, however, establishing interpersonal trust may only go so far. Interorganizational trust will also influence judgements of trustworthiness. One may concede the well intentions and competency of one’s collaboration partner at the individual level, but know expectations simply cannot be fulfilled at the organizational level. Within a WoG context, it will be critical to determine just how much influence each level of trust has on individuals’ judgements of trustworthiness, as this will likely impact their willingness to collaborate with those representing different organizations.
1.6.4 Trust violations

Violations of trust are also relevant within the WoG and JIMP context. Schweitzer, Hershey, and Bradlow (2006) believe that once trust has been violated, it may never be fully restored, despite fulfilled promises and apologies. On the other hand, Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) argued that alliances can continue productively even after trust has been violated and can be repaired by the use of legalistic measures, which decrease the likelihood of future violations.

Many different factors have been found to influence trust violations. For instance, the relationship between the victim and violator has been shown to influence both perceived violations (Kramer, 1996; Moreland & McMinn, 1999), as well as willingness to reconcile after violations occur (Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2004). The nature of the violation is also influential. Theoretical work by Lewicki and Bunker (1996) argues that some violations are simply more problematic to the long-term health of the relationship. For example, violations that attack the perceived “core” of a relationship (e.g., common values, etc.) may cause the complete dissolution of a relationship, and this is influenced by the victim’s attribution about why the violation occurred and whether the person (violator) or the situation is to be blamed. Other research by Kim (e.g., Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Kirks, 2004; cited in Kim et al., 2005) has explored the impact of competence and integrity violations, and has argued that apologies are likely to be more successful after competence violations, but that denial is a more effective strategy after integrity violations.

Trust violations can also result in the use of defensive monitoring. Defensive monitoring refers to observing others’ actions in order to assess whether they are matching one’s expectations (Currall & Judge, 1995). Defensive monitoring behaviours include making requests for help before it is needed or drawing upon multiple sources of redundant information (Currall & Judge, 1995). Defensive monitoring is thought to impact on task performance because it directs attention away from the task at hand, leaving fewer resources available to accomplish primary work objectives (McAllister, 1995). However, once trust has been established, predictability in behaviour (McAllister, 1995) and motivations (Holmes, 1991) lessens the need for defensive monitoring.

Previous research (Thomson et al., 2010) found trust violations to be a potential issue between NGOs and the CF. Specifically, some NGO personnel reported that they distrusted sharing information with the CF because they were uncertain what the CF would do with such information. One NGO worker stated that NGOs worry that the military will disclose what the NGO reports about a community, which could tarnish or destroy the NGO’s relationship with the community. The distrust felt by the NGO community for the CF could lead to ineffective collaboration and, even worse, could terminate all collaboration between the NGOs and the CF.

When working to execute the comprehensive approach, trust violations may occur when civilians operate in a predominantly military environment (e.g., forward operating base) because they may inadvertently act outside the particular standard operating procedures. For example, a civilian may show up to a patrol inadequately dressed (e.g., without protective gear) or speak out of turn during an official commander’s brief. It will be incumbent on civilians to maintain a level of situational awareness to operate effectively within a military context. Similarly, CF personnel may offend their civilian partners if they address them in ways that are suitable within a military context (e.g., tone of voice, orders), but inappropriate for a civilian context. Civil-military operations, therefore, will require careful attention to conduct in order to avoid trust violations.
1.6.5 Summary

As noted above, trust is a necessary aspect of the collaborative process in a WoG/JIMP context. This section has provided a brief summary of the different types of trust (i.e., interpersonal and interorganizational) and factors that can impact on trust. Interpersonal trust is the most conventional form of trust and judgements of trustworthiness are determined by a number of dimensions, including the perceived competence, predictability, benevolence, and integrity of the trustee. Organizational trust and interpersonal trust have been said to have similar core dimensions. However, there are a number of additional factors that influence organizational trust, such as the general reputation of an organization, its institutional framework (e.g., practices and procedures, structure, etc.), and individuals representing the organization (i.e., boundary spanners). Trust violations are also particularly important in the WoG/JIMP context because, as Schweitzer, Hershey and Bradlow (2006) argue, trust that has been violated may never be fully restored.

Within the WoG context, in particular, trust issues may arise that impact collaborative efforts. For example, interorganizational alliances within business contexts are typically voluntary. Within the WoG context, alliances are more forced than chosen. The Canadian government’s WoG strategy mandates personnel from various governmental departments to work collaboratively in Afghanistan, but the actual “buy-in” of government personnel required to work within this context may vary. Some departments may fully embrace the approach, and believe that it provides them with the resources necessary to accomplish valued tasks. Other departments, on the other hand, may see view the approach as akin to being pushed to work collaboratively when they believe themselves to be more effective individually. The forced nature of relationships, then, could impact on perceptions of trust within the WoG context.

1.7 Conclusion

There are numerous factors that must be considered when trying to enhance collaboration in a comprehensive approach to military missions. Many individuals, representing diverse organizations, will have unique claims and interests with respect to the theatre of operation. Following an initial exploratory study aimed at identifying key themes associated with collaboration among diverse actors in a JIMP framework (Thomson et al., 2010), we propose investigating further the core themes detailed in this review with a broader range of SMEs who have recent operational experience. The goal then is to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the core themes that emerged from the previous work in order to potentially inform CF training and education for effective collaboration in operations with diverse actors. Unlike the previous study (Thomson et al., 2010), which used an open-ended discussion protocol to encourage participants to raise any themes that came to mind, we suggest developing a semi-structured discussion protocol this time to focus participants’ discussion to positive and negative examples regarding negotiation, identity, power, stereotypes and prejudice, and trust. The method should not prevent participants from freely disclosing personal experience or discussing other topics that come to mind, but questions should help focus discussion on the particular topics of interest.

Given the two Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) applied research projects (ARPs) that this work is meant to support, the discussion protocol should reflect the unique focus of these two projects. The work being conducted under “JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain” will consider, broadly, collaboration between the CF and the Public domain (including NGOs, IOs, host nation public, and media), with particular attention to styles and approaches to negotiation, the impact of power in these collaboration efforts, the potential threat to identity as diverse actors
produce ways to support one another in operations, and the impact of first impressions or stereotypes on collaboration. On the other hand, the work being conducted for “Interagency Trust” should examine more closely interagency trust (or interorganizational trust) between WoG partners (i.e., CF, CIDA, DFAIT, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and Correctional Service of Canada (CSC)), specifically how it is developed and maintained for effective collaboration.
References


# List of Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADO</td>
<td>Adaptive Dispersed Operations</td>
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<td>ARP</td>
<td>Applied Research Project</td>
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<td>BATNA</td>
<td>Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Forces</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Commissioned Officer</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Correctional Service of Canada</td>
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<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<td>DRDC</td>
<td>Defence Research and Development Canada</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IOs</td>
<td>International Organizations</td>
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<td>JIMP</td>
<td>Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecines sans Frontières</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCOs</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officers</td>
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<td>OGDs</td>
<td>Other Governmental Departments</td>
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<td>Public Works Goods and Services Canada</td>
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<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<td>SCT</td>
<td>Self-Categorization Theory</td>
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<td>Subject Matter Experts</td>
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<td>UK</td>
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<td>WoG</td>
<td>Whole of Government</td>
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**Five Themes Impacting Collaboration in a Joint Interagency Multinational Public Operational Context (U)**

Les cinq facteurs influençant la collaboration en contexte opérationnel interarmées, interorganisationnel, multinational et public (U)

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Unlimited announcement
(U) This literature review was conducted in support of two Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Toronto applied research projects examining civil–military relations. In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) are expected to work closely with a number of diverse organizations, including Non–Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), Other Governmental Departments (OGDs), local populations, and the media. However, the CF’s history of working with these diverse organizations has been limited and may pose challenges to collaboration (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008). Previous exploratory research conducted for DRDC Toronto revealed a number of organizational, social and psychological issues impacting on civil–military collaboration in operations (Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010). Five broad themes helped categorize these challenges, including negotiation, power, identity, stereotypes and prejudice, and trust. The purpose of this paper was to further elaborate the themes by reviewing the most pertinent academic and scientific literature to provide a greater understanding of the process of collaboration.

(U) L’analyse documentaire dont il est ici question sert à appuyer deux projets de recherche appliquée de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) Toronto portant sur les relations civilo militaires. Dans le cadre des opérations actuelles (p. ex., en Afghanistan et à Haïti), les Forces canadiennes (FC) sont appelées à collaborer étroitement avec un certain nombre d’organisations variées, c’est à dire avec des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG), des organisations internationales (OI), d’autres ministères, la population locale et les médias. Toutefois, les antécédents des FC en matière de collaboration avec ces organisations sont plutôt limités, ce qui peut poser certaines difficultés lorsque vient le temps de travailler ensemble (Leslie, Gizewski et Rostek, 2008). Une étude exploratoire antérieure menée par RDDC Toronto a révélé un certain nombre de facteurs organisationnels, sociaux et psychologiques influençant la collaboration civilo militaire en contexte IIMP (Thomson, Adams, Hall et Flear, 2010). Afin de mieux cerner les difficultés auxquelles font face les divers acteurs de la collaboration civilo militaire, on les a regroupés en cinq grands thèmes : la négociation, le pouvoir, l’identité, les stéréotypes et les préjugés, et la confiance. L’analyse décrite dans le présent document avait pour objet d’approfondir ces thèmes dans le but de mieux comprendre le processus de la collaboration.

(U) Civil–military collaboration; comprehensive approach; JIMP
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