PREPARING GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH ARMIES FOR COUNTERINSURGENT OPERATIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History,

by

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B.A., Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia, 1992

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2010-02

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Preparing General Purpose Forces in the United States and British Armies for Counterinsurgent Operations

Historical study and oral history interviews of the experiences of the British and American Armies in the Malayan Emergency, the Vietnam War and Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom illustrate that the general purpose forces of these organizations can conduct successful counterinsurgency operations. This same study also highlights that while these forces are adaptable at the tactical and operational level, their ability to adjust to changing conditions in the contemporary operating environment is due primarily to personal study and initiative.

In order to develop true full spectrum capabilities, the United States Army must develop an institutional educational program that provides leaders with solid foundations in conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and/or civil support operations. The doctrinal basis for this system should include input from the recent and current operational theaters as well as in depth historical study in order to both keep it relevant to current events and to provide the breadth and depth that will ensure leaders do not “cherry pick” tactics, techniques or procedures. Educating leaders in all aspects of Full Spectrum Operations will allow them to tailor properly the training of their units for the missions they will face in the contemporary operating environment.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

PREPARING GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH ARMIES FOR COUNTERINSURGENT OPERATIONS, by MAJ Brian E. McCarthy, 202 pages.

The U.S. Army has directed that its entire force must be capable of conducting what it terms Full Spectrum Operations, which is being able to conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and/or civil support operations, simultaneously in the 21st Century.

Historical study and oral history interviews of the experiences of the British and American Armies in the Malayan Emergency, the Vietnam War and Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom illustrate that the general purpose forces of these organizations can conduct successful counterinsurgency operations. This same study also highlights that while these forces are adaptable at the tactical and operational level, their ability to adjust to changing conditions in the contemporary operating environment is due primarily to personal study and initiative. In order to develop true full spectrum capabilities, the United States Army must develop an institutional educational program that provides leaders with solid foundations in conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations. The doctrinal basis for this system should include input from the recent and current operational theaters as well as in depth historical study in order to both keep it relevant to current events and to provide the breadth and depth that will ensure leaders do not “cherry pick” tactics, techniques or procedures. Educating leaders in all aspects of Full Spectrum Operations will allow them to tailor properly the training of their units for the missions they will face in the contemporary operating environment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis, like most any military or educational venture, results from the input of many. Thanks are due to many, the first being Majors Ken Gleiman, Matt Marbella, Carrie Przelski, Mike Dinesman, Travis Moliere, Jesse Stewart and Karsten Haake; thank you for your patience, candor, input and support. Along with my classmates, thanks go to Dr. Daniel Marston who formed and led this group and Dr. Mark Hull, whose support and encouragement have been invaluable. Thanks are also due to Arish Turle and Major Bruce Radbourne whose assistance was invaluable in conducting much of this research. Thanks are also due to all of the units that hosted us and made their members available to us, as well as to the National Defense University, United States Institute for Peace, Center for New American Security, Oxford University, and the British Army’s Afghan COIN Centre. Special thanks to Drs. Raymond Callahan and Peter Mansoor for their comments and assistance. Last but certainly not least are my wife, Adhana, and daughter, Caitlin, whose patience and understanding with me are trumped only by their support for me; thank you.
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<td>After Action Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>Armored Cavalry Regiment</td>
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<td>AFM</td>
<td>British Army Field Manual</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Force</td>
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<td>ARVN</td>
<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
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<td>ATOM</td>
<td><em>The Conduct of Anti-Terrorism Operations in Malaya</em> manual</td>
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<td>BA</td>
<td>British Army</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Combined Action Platoons</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>United States Central Command</td>
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<td>CFC-A</td>
<td>Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CFE</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence</td>
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<td>CFLCC</td>
<td>Coalition Forces Land Component Command</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CIDG</td>
<td>Civilian Irregular Defense Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>CORDS</td>
<td>Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support program</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Communist Terrorist</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
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<td>DGDP</td>
<td>Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>United States Department of Defense</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWEC</td>
<td>District War Executive Committee</td>
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<td>ETT</td>
<td>Embedded Transition Team</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSO</td>
<td>Full Spectrum Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTC</td>
<td>Far East Land Forces Training Center; also known as the Jungle Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPF</td>
<td>General Purpose Forces</td>
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<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of South Vietnam</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>Iraqi Army</td>
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<td>ILAC</td>
<td>Institutional Learning And Change</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Iraqi Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command Vietnam</td>
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<td>MCP</td>
<td>Malayan Communist Party</td>
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<td>MiTT</td>
<td>Military Transition Team</td>
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<td>MNC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Corps Iraq</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Forces Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPAJP</td>
<td>Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRX</td>
<td>Mission Rehearsal Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTT</td>
<td>Mobile Training Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPD</td>
<td>Officer Professional Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORHA</td>
<td>Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>PF</td>
<td>Popular Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>PROVN</td>
<td>Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>Regional Force</td>
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<td>SAS</td>
<td>Special Air Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
<td>Special Boat Service</td>
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<td>SERTS</td>
<td>Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<td>SFA</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
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<td>SGA</td>
<td>Small Group Advisor</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SoI</td>
<td>Sons of Iraq</td>
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<td>SWEC</td>
<td>State War Executive Committee</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSF</td>
<td>United States Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>VCI</td>
<td>Viet Cong infrastructure</td>
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The lesson from the Afghan campaign is not that the U.S. Army should start stockpiling saddles. Rather it is that preparing for the future will require new ways of thinking and the development of forces and abilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected circumstances.

― Donald Rumsfeld, *Foreign Affairs*

Introduction and Research Questions

The United States and Great Britain have been involved with insurgencies throughout the world in one form or another for much of the past 250 years. However, when faced with a new insurgency, these nations, and their militaries often fail to either recognize it as such, or are not prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations. This phenomena is not limited to just the US and Great Britain, and in addition to the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have seen it happen to the US in the Philippines, the British in Northern Ireland and Malaya, and to the United States again in Vietnam.\(^1\) This causes the nations to cede valuable time to the insurgent, time that offers the insurgent the opportunity to galvanize his organization, garner popular support, and gain momentum for his cause.

Given that nations around the globe have a long history with conducting counterinsurgency operations and the number of histories and post-mortems collected, why are governments and their militaries often surprised to find themselves faced with the prospect of conducting counterinsurgency operations? It seems inexcusable that any government would be unprepared, at least on an intellectual level, to implement a counterinsurgency campaign. However, history offers enough examples of the
counterinsurgent either not recognizing the nature of the conflict he is about to become embroiled in, or recognizing it, yet not having the apparatus in place to counter it on all levels. The 20th and 21st centuries have been no exception to this.

Insurgencies aim to change the status quo; while the counterinsurgent does not necessarily want to maintain the status quo, he most likely aims to maintain the government that is in power. To be successful, both sides will need and seek support from the general populace in the region where the insurgency is taking place. Insurgents conduct their operations by legal and illegal means. These illegal means may include actions such as force, subversion, and coercion. The counterinsurgent force includes the government and forces of the nation where the insurgency is occurring, the host nation, as well as the forces of the nations that are supporting it. In order to fight an insurgency, the counterinsurgent must be able to counter both the insurgent, or enemy, forces and must be able to get the populace to maintain or increase their support for the duly constituted government. To be successful, the counterinsurgent forces must be led by intelligent, adaptive and thinking leaders, who also meet the ethical standards of their day and culture. To be successful in a large insurgency, such as those in Malaya, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, the counterinsurgent must often be willing and able to commit a larger amount of manpower, the bulk of which the host nation and its indigenous population should eventually provide, and resources potentially for a long period.

In counterinsurgency, such as in any endeavor, some military organizations, meaning units from the platoon echelon of 20 to 40 men up to the corps or field army comprising tens and hundreds of thousands of men, are more successful than others. This thesis seeks to determine what organizations have done to prepare for counterinsurgency
operations and what aspects of their preparation formed the foundation for their success or failure. It is a fair assumption that the nature of mankind is not going to change fundamentally, and that wars, in one form or another, will continue to be fought over the course of the 21st century and beyond. Given this, how can a nation balance its forces to combat the realm of conflicts that it might face? Specifically, how does a counterinsurgent prepare the bulk of his military, his general purpose, or conventional, forces which are organized to defeat enemy armies in major combat operations, to conduct counterinsurgency operations; how does he conduct full spectrum education for full spectrum operators? It will do this by first defining what war and counterinsurgency are, and then using the United States and the United Kingdom as the foundation, the paper will look to determine how the militaries of these two experienced nations train, educate, and organize their forces to carry out counterinsurgency campaigns. Have these two nations learned from previous conflicts and if so, how are they incorporating those lessons learned in their current organization and preparation, as well as how are they planning to do so in the future?

General Sir Frank Kitson of the British Army writes in Low Intensity Operations that an army must be able to train, organize and equip itself appropriately to carry out the types of mission it will be asked to do, and at the same time to properly educate its commanders and staff officers to not only carry out these operations, but to advise others on the best use of the military in them. An ardent supporter of education, General Kitson devotes a chapter of this book to training and education providing a framework aimed at “attuning men’s minds to cope with the environment of this sort of war.” Comprising four elements, General Kitson’s educational framework begins with the attuning; that is
using the study of prior insurgencies to illustrate commonalities and how the principles of war are just as applicable as they are in any other form of warfare. The second element of education harkens back to Clausewitz as it seeks to teach officers how to create a campaign plan that uses a combination of civil and military actions to meet the government’s objectives. Significantly, it also includes the application of influence and other non-kinetic efforts. General Kitson’s third element centers on teaching officers how to employ their own forces as well as police and indigenous forces paying special attention to the development of intelligence and intelligence-driven operations. Finally, the fourth aspect of education is covers teaching commanders and staff officers how to best educate and train their forces in order to provide a foundation for success in counterinsurgency.  

This thesis seeks to determine how we, as militaries in the United States and Great Britain, have trained and organized our general purpose forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations? Specifically it will seek to determine the role and value of education in preparing a general purpose force and its leadership for counterinsurgency operations. It will do this by looking at the two historical case studies of Malaya and Vietnam and the performance and feedback from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will show that those adaptive leaders who have exercised their initiative to study previous counterinsurgency campaigns, both historically and militarily, have been better able to prepare their units and themselves for combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to maintain their capability to conduct major combat operations. Answering this question should also assist in defining what these nations can do to best prepare their general purpose forces to operate across the full spectrum of operations. Inherent in
determining the answer to these questions will be determining what is the impact or role of education have in the preparation of general purpose forces and their leaders for counterinsurgency operations? How do the militaries educate their members for counterinsurgency, and have organizations incorporated lessons learned from theatre into their institutional preparation for counterinsurgency operations? This question is specifically looking at the value of academic education, and while it uses counterinsurgency as the lens through which to conduct the study, it is concerned with preparation for the full spectrum of operations.

**Research Methodology**

To answer the thesis research question and the different sub-questions the study comprises four sections. The first step consists of a literature review to define counterinsurgency in order to provide a common understanding of the key elements and common themes found in insurgencies and in counterinsurgency campaigns. It will also provide a common definition for war and full spectrum operations in order to provide context for the hierarchy of conflict currently in use.

The second section will discuss these common themes using two historical case studies. This section uses the experiences of the British in Malaya from 1948 to 1960, and the United States in Vietnam to illustrate the presence of common themes and to show how these two nations conducted planned and conducted their campaigns. These case studies will also seek to highlight factors that led to their success and failure respectively.

The third section will investigate the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The intent is to determine how the United States and Great Britain have applied the
lessons learned in previous conflicts to the current ones. Of specific interest is to
determine how these militaries have adapted and adjusted their procedures over the
course of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, and how leaders have looked to
historical examples to educate their formations and increase their efficacy.

The fourth and final section will draw conclusions and answer the research
questions. In addition to the literature available, a key element of the second and third
steps will be oral history interviews conducted by the members of the Command and
General Staff College Counterinsurgency Scholars research team with professionals who
have served in these and other counterinsurgency theatres worldwide. The research team
conducted over 80 interviews for this study. The interviewees were members of the
military as well as professionals from the US Departments of State and Defense, the US
Institute for Peace, as well as academics and other policy makers from both the United
States and the United Kingdom. Each of the interviewees was chosen based upon the
simple criteria that they have served in some capacity, either military or civilian, in a
counterinsurgency effort, and were available for face to face or telephone interviews
during the research period of August thru October 2010.

The interviews were conducted in accordance with US Army Center for Military
History guidelines, and were conducted solely for the purpose of oral history. The
informed consent process was explained to each potential interviewee, and the
interviewees were all offered three levels of attribution. These were labeled as full,
partial, and no personal attribution, and interviewees were asked to sign the informed
consent form and provide a contact email address. For the purposes of these oral
interviews no personal attribution meant that the names and organizations of those interviewed would not be published. Only contextual criteria will be included for clarity of information (e.g., Commanding Officer of a heavy brigade; company-grade staff officer for a battalion-sized element,) and the data provided will be identified by a code number. Partial personal attribution meant that while the names and organizations of those interviewed would be published, no quotes or excerpts of the interviews would be used that could lead to identification of who provided or said it. Finally, full personal attribution meant that the names and organizations of those interviewed would be published and that quotes would be attributed to the participant personally, by name and by organization. A copy of the informed consent form is found in Appendix C.

1The US, led by General ES Otis, deployed to the Philippines in February 1899, with a poor assessment of the situation and poorly prepared for it. Though General Otis brought a colonial mindset to the job, his soldiers often treated the local population poorly and committed multiple war crimes and other criminal acts. Additionally, he misread the situation, believing early on that he was not dealing with an insurrection, only banditry. Brian Linn The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 6 and 206. In 1919, the British Army responded to an insurgency in Northern Ireland. The British also misunderstood the situation, expressing bafflement as it began, and reacted poorly, attempting to quell the insurgency using a force comprised primarily of World War I veterans trained for war as a civil police force in a time of relative peace. It took over a year, and the occurrence of the Bloody Sunday Massacre in November 1920, for the government to fully recognize its errors. Charles Townshend, “In Aid of the Civil Power,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2010), 21-27.


3While full spectrum operations by definition include combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations, this thesis will address the efficacy of preparing a force for FSO through the prism of counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency was chosen as its operations may be conducted in all of the four levels of FSO.

5Ibid., 165.

6Ibid.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to examine the case studies, there must be a common understanding of what war, insurgency and counterinsurgency are. Additionally, this chapter will define the concept of Full Spectrum Operations as it is used by the United States Army. This framework will also establish the perspective from which the case studies will be examined. The newest version of the United States Army’s Field Manual 3-0, Operations, was published in 2008 in part to redefine the spectrum of conflict in which the Army would operate in both the current operating environment and in the future. FM 3-0 was written with the understanding that conflicts could not be won in either the purely military or purely political arenas and that to be successful the nation would have to use all aspects of its power; diplomatic, informational, military and economic. FM 3-0 defines the spectrum of conflict as having four levels ranging from stable peace through unstable peace to insurgency before culminating in general war.\(^1\) The manual also recognizes that the transition between one level and another is not rote, stable or always chronological in its progression and that a conflict can move back and forth between stages. Within the spectrum of conflict there also exist five operational themes which include, in increasing levels of violence, Peacetime Military Engagement, Limited Intervention, Peace Operations, Irregular Warfare, and Major Combat Operations.\(^2\) The United States Army is expected to be able to operate in each of the environments found within the spectrum of conflict, and defining the spectrum enables leaders to not only describe the level of violence expected, but to frame the nature of a conflict they are
about to encounter. In all cases however, the endstate remains the same, and that is not merely to win the nation’s ground wars, as was the mantra in the past, but to “create conditions that advance U.S. goals.³ The manner, or rather the types of operations that the Army is expected to undertake across the spectrum of conflict is called Full Spectrum Operations and is defined as

Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized operations—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces.⁴

Under the concept of Full Spectrum Operations (FSO), the Army will conduct offensive operations, such as movements to contact or attacks, defensive operations, such as a mobile or area defense, and stability operations, such as civil security and control, support to local governance and restoration of essential services overseas, while potentially conducting offensive, defensive and civil support operations, such as disaster relief, within the United States. In each of these the underlying theme is that the Army, and the military, are but one instrument of the nation’s power, and it is only through working with the rest of the government that the nation can fully achieve its aims.

In addition to emphasizing the harmonization of efforts between the Army and the rest of the government, the value of FSO for the Army is that it applies a framework to conflicts that leaders can use to prepare their units.⁵ Understanding that there are different levels of war or violence enables a Soldier or leader to exercise the initiative afforded
him and prepare himself and his unit through education, training and organizing to address the challenges of whatever type of operation he might be about to embark upon.

While insurgency is a specific level on the spectrum of conflict, aspects of it occur across the spectrum and as such, so do counterinsurgencies. Current military thought regarding counterinsurgency in the United States centers upon Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. While the themes and concepts presented in FM 3-24, draw strongly from Colonel David Galula of the French Army and are echoed in the writings of the popular authors, Drs. John Nagl and David Kilcullen, there are a number of other theorists and practitioners whose thoughts and opinions must be taken into consideration.6 Many students and practitioners of counterinsurgency fail to study other points of view, and the history of insurgencies and their causes worldwide. This leaves him with a very shallow understanding of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, which can lead the student and practitioner to believe that a template can be taken from one successful counterinsurgency campaign and applied blindly to any other campaign. Increased study and critical analysis of historical campaigns can help to prevent this misunderstanding and one-size fits all approach to conducting counterinsurgency.

To begin studying counterinsurgency, one must first have a working definition of it, as well as one of insurgency. The United States Department of Defense (DOD) defines insurgency as “An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”7 In its capstone manual on counterinsurgency operations, Field Manual 3-24, the United States Army defines counterinsurgency as “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological,
and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”8 The British definition uses much the same verbiage, but as the title of their manual, *Countering Insurgency*, implies, it goes deeper in that they seek to address the root causes of the conflict in the first place. Their manual defines it as “Those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while addressing the root causes”9. While these definitions do not fully explain the intricacies of insurgency and counterinsurgency, they provide a starting point and highlight some of the aspects of counterinsurgency operations that make them complex.

Bard O’Neill provides an excellent summary in *Insurgency in the Modern World* writing that an insurgency is a “struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the former consciously employs political resources and instruments of violence” with the point being that insurgencies aim to change the status quo.10 That is, a group that desires to change the balance of power leads them. An insurgency is not the preferred method of doing this, and is often borne of desperation. There are most likely as many definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency as there are theorists studying it. For example, Mark O’Neill, in *Confronting the Hydra*, defines insurgency as an organized violent and politically motivated activity conducted by non-state actors and sustained over a protracted period that typically utilizes a number of methods, such as subversion, guerrilla warfare and terrorism, in an attempt to achieve change within a state.11 This definition expounds on the types of methods that may be included in an insurgency. In addition to using violent means, it emphasizes that an insurgency is by nature political. O’Neill also says that as insurgencies are political and about human and
social concerns. As such, while the ideas behind them are important, it is the narrative that truly counts. Another aspect of the definition not found in the US government’s definition is that an insurgency is not a conflict that normally ends quickly. Galula, who defined insurgency in *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, highlights this aspect, defining an insurgency as a “protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.” The key elements of both of these definitions are that an insurgency is a long-term conflict and that its final aim must be to change the status quo, to overthrow the state. Here Galula emphasizes that an insurgency is primarily a political struggle. As such, the insurgent must at some point in the struggle gain support, or at least acquiescence of the public in order to conduct his campaign. Galula addresses this as well as the length of an insurgency when he describes cold and hot revolutionary wars as being two periods of the same struggle. The cold revolutionary war is that period of time when the insurgency is legal and nonviolent, while as its name suggests, the hot revolutionary war is when the insurgency is violent and conducting illegal activities openly. It is during the cold revolutionary war period that the insurgent must define his idea and refine his narrative in order to gain the support that he needs to be victorious in this period or to elevate his struggle to a hot revolutionary war. The importance of this narrative cannot be overstated for is the key to garnering popular support.

When discussing insurgency in the 20th and 21st centuries, the basis for conducting an insurgency remains the model of Mao Tse-Tung. Mao writes in his seminal work, *Guerrilla Warfare*, that as an organization is attempting to change or seize
power it is most likely weaker than the government in power. In order to challenge the government, the insurgent must conduct guerrilla war. For Mao, guerrilla war is a “weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation.”\textsuperscript{16} Mao refers to guerrilla warfare as being between nations, as his struggle was first against the Japanese and then the Chinese Nationalists. In a mix of Jominian methodology and Clausewitzian theory, Mao lays out his seven-step method for conducting an insurgency as well.\textsuperscript{17} These seven steps have been applied and modified throughout the world over the last century, and remain as relevant today as they were when Mao was leading Communists to victory. These steps have worked, not because they are based on an ideology, or dogmatic, but because he expected revolutionary leader to modify them to fit their local situation and wrote them to be. The first step is to arouse and organize the people, step two is to achieve internal unification politically, step three is to establish bases, step four is the equipping of forces, step five is to recover national strength, step six is to destroy the enemy’s national strength and step seven is to regain lost territories.\textsuperscript{18}

In these seven steps, Mao presents a template for building a power base and then using it to achieve military and political aims and then consolidate those gains. He writes of territory as both a geographical entity, but also as a reference to the masses, to the population in which the insurgent and counterinsurgent are battling. The key ingredient for Mao, and for insurgencies both claiming to be Maoist and those not, is that their success is tied directly to the support of the population.
As mentioned previously, Galula’s writings, specifically, *Counterinsurgency: Theory and Practice*, have been very influential on the composition of current counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. In this book, Galula lays out four laws of counterinsurgency. These laws are: first, that support of the populace is equally important to both the insurgent and counterinsurgent and second, that this general support is gained through the influencing of an active minority. The third law is that the populace’s support is conditional, and can be won or lost, and finally the fourth law that the counterinsurgent must have significant resources at his disposal and be prepared to use them, and use them with intensity.19 Galula also provides an eight-step model for conducting a COIN campaign. The eight steps are as follows,

1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel the main body of armed insurgents.
2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose and insurgent’s comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives.
3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas.
4. Destroy the local insurgent political organizations.
5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities.
6. Test these authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace the softs and the incompetents. Give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units.
7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement.
8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants.20

A key aspect of Galula’s theory is that the counterinsurgency campaign must include multiple lines of operation. To be complete and effective Galula writes that the campaign must include police and judicial, and political as well as military operations. The police should have a paramilitary capability and be comprised of the indigenous personnel to the extent that this is possible. All of these operations are necessary to
address the root causes of the insurgency and most importantly must be unified. The counterinsurgent must have a command structure that synchronizes operations along each of these planes to neutralize the insurgent forces, protect the populace and reconstruct the government, and reconstruct the infrastructure to win popular support. In short, a unified command and control architecture must be in place to ensure harmony of effort between the planes and progress towards the correct objectives.

Writing at about the same time, though with different experiences, Sir Robert Thompson echoes many of the same concepts as Galula in his book *Defeating Communist Insurgency*. Thompson writes that the strategic aim of an insurgency is both political and military. That its objective is both control of the population, and neutralizing the governments armed forces. Thompson also discusses Galula’s “cold” phase saying that the government must attempt to win the insurgency quickly, while the insurgency is still in the subversive or cold phase. However, he recognizes that this is often impossible, as governments may not know that there is an active insurgency forming, and in that case, they must aim to win during the guerrilla phase and not let the conflict escalate into something akin to Mao’s war of movement.

As with Galula, Thompson also presents a COIN methodology. However, he presents his as principles for the conduct of counterinsurgent operations rather than as a prescription for them. To describe his five principles of COIN, Thompson writes that:

The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable. . . . [second] The government must function in accordance with the law. . . . [third] The government must have an overall plan. . . . [fourth] The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the
guerrillas. . . [fifth] If in the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first. 25

Thompson also devotes an entire chapter to intelligence, stressing that success in COIN depends on intelligence and that to defeat an insurgency requires an intelligence apparatus “staffed by well-trained and highly experienced intelligence officers.” 26 When speaking of the base Thompson, borrowing from Mao, includes both the physical base, and the population. He also adds an additional piece to his principles in that as the government is fighting an insurgency, there is some form of discord within the nation. In order to be successful, the government must offer the populace a better option, and it must be able to produce. His emphasis on creating a stable and viable nation in his first principle illustrates the importance of the governments not only countering the insurgent’s narrative, but also offering the populace a better alternative. 27

Thompson also touches on two additional aspects of note. The first is the overall command structure for the campaign. In Defeating Communist Insurgency, Thompson recommends that a combined War Council be established with membership from the host nation conducting the counterinsurgency along with representatives from the nations and aid agencies supporting them in their effort. This council would chart the course for the campaign, as well as set the priority for aid. 28 Regarding aid, Thompson goes on to discuss quite clearly that he sees the “real purpose of aid in all contexts, including counterinsurgency: to help the local government to get its organization right and its departments working efficiently.” 29 The two most important priorities for this aid should also go to training, both military and that of civilian administration, and to improvements in the communication and transportation infrastructure of the nation. 30
Roger Trinquier is another French Army officer who wrote based on his experiences in Algeria. His major work, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*, is often vilified for his condoning of torture and dismissed altogether, yet offers much to the student of COIN. Trinquier recognizes that control of the population is essential for victory in an insurgency, and that an insurgency is different from conventional warfare. He recommends additional study and preparation for any soldier embarking on a counterinsurgency operation, believing that the primacy of the inhabitant was not being reflected in either the doctrine or the military schools of his time. Trinquier writes that the “inhabitant in his home is the center of the conflict,” and that population control and security are essential elements of a counterinsurgency campaign. Trinquier goes on to describe how to establish a system that can both conduct a census and provide identification of the population. He also discusses the importance of establishing an intelligence apparatus and the conduct of human intelligence operations.

One dimension of counterinsurgency that Trinquier adds immensely to is the discussion on the training of indigenous forces. Trinquier specifically writes about the value, both to security and psychologically in establishing local defense forces, believing that the counterinsurgent must train the local inhabitants to help defend themselves. Trinquier also discusses the development of an organization that helps to do this; a local defense force designed to protect the populace where they live. Working alongside this effort, the counterinsurgent must establish some population control measures. Trinquier goes to great length to explain this, with the essence of his argument being that the
counterinsurgent operating in an area—and the government as well, must know who the residents are and where they live and work.  

Trinquier also emphasizes a unified effort, what one might refer to as a whole of government approach today. Trinquier believes that as a counterinsurgency campaign is truly about the populace that on a whole and is multi-faceted. It should be more of an extensive police operation than a military campaign—at least in the urban areas. Additionally, to be successful, the campaign must have a propaganda element associated with it. Also of extreme importance is that the counterinsurgents have a strong social program that follows the military actions.

It is important to note that just as Galula wrote that his methods were employed by the French throughout Algeria, many of the principles that Trinquier espoused in his writing, were also not always employed by the French Army. For example, the whole of government approach was not fully borne out in Algeria due to the conflicts between the military and the civil government that were inherent in the concept of guerre revolutionaire, namely that the government and the populace should give full and unquestioning support to the military during this time of conflict. Popular support for the army in France and for France in the international community suffered during the war as a result of the harsh methods employed in Algeria, a situation epitomized by President Kennedy’s support of Algerian independence. Contrary to the concept of uniting the nation and the government behind the cause, the French Army’s actions in Algeria caused it to become isolated from the support of the French populace and France to become isolated from the international community.
General Sir Frank Kitson carries forward the theme of unified action in both *Gang of Five* and *Low Intensity Operations*, with a position that a counterinsurgency solution can be neither purely political nor purely military. In *Bunch of Five*, General Kitson writes that an insurgency is violent by nature but to fight it, the counterinsurgent cannot look to a solely military solution. The counterinsurgent must combine political and economic measures as well as military and police actions. Most importantly, it has to be a unified effort, tailored for the situation and directed by the government at a common objective. General Kitson writes that a counterinsurgency campaign must have four elements to be successful. These are “good coordinating machinery. . . . Establishing of a political atmosphere within which the government measures can be introduced with the maximum likelihood of success . . . Intelligence . . . Laws . . . everything done by a government and its agents in combating the insurgency must be legal.” As with Trinquier, General Kitson also discusses preparing for counterinsurgency operations. He writes in *Low Intensity Operations* that study is relevant in preparing for conventional warfare, and it should be no less so when applied to preparing for an insurgency. General Kitson writes that “it would help . . . to study campaigns of counterinsurgency and it would also help those interested in the principles of war to see how these principles are as applicable to supervision and insurgency as they are to other forms of conflict.” He continues that there are additional aspects of training that would be beneficial for practitioners to learn. In addition to studying past counterinsurgencies and the tactics, techniques and procedures used by the counterinsurgent that were successful, he suggests that personnel practice how to design a campaign plan that includes both civil and
military measures. Additionally, they should learn how to work with and integrate police and indigenous forces into their organizations and to ensure all members of the counterinsurgent organization are certified to train indigenous forces on most of the common tasks that will be expected to carry out.43

In *The Insurgent Archipelago*, John Mackinlay proposes that an insurgency is a political process, and that its techniques evolve along the lines of the society in which it occurs. Mackinlay concurs with Mao by agreeing that insurgency is an act of desperation used when all other means have been exhausted, and that insurgency must involve the population.44 Mackinlay notes in the RAND publication, *Rethinking Counterinsurgency*, that while every insurgency is different, there are some common tenets that are as applicable in fighting the Global War On Terror as they were in countering communist insurgencies. Mackinlay suggests that to be successful in formulating a counterinsurgency campaign plan, one must be a solid critical thinker, and ensure that their plan adheres to these characteristics. It must be politically led, internationally comprised, multisectoral, multifunctional in their span of capabilities and actors, and genuinely joined up.45

Of note here, and throughout Mackinlay’s writing is that insurgencies are often regional or even global in nature. While this may not necessarily be so in their operation, it is so in their support. Thus given the democratization of the media and the rise of globalization, counterinsurgents must not only involve the whole of their government (multi-functional) they must include other nations, (internationally comprised) but other non-governmental organizations and even international corporations (multisectoral).
Mackinlay reinforces this in *The Insurgent Archipelago*, writing that future insurgencies will have to be addressed politically, with a unified effort from all branches of a government, but with civil primacy at all times. Additionally, counterinsurgents must recognize the importance of communication and having a strong narrative. An essential aspect of this is that the counterinsurgent must remain focused enough to attack local issues not global themes when conducting counterinsurgency operations.⁴⁶

Several themes seem common through these writings. John McCuen presents them succinctly as his five strategic principles that apply to both insurgents and counterinsurgents:

1. Preserving Oneself and Annihilating the Enemy.
2. Establishing Strategic Bases.
3. Mobilizing the Masses.
5. Unifying the Effort.⁴⁷

Given this wealth of observations and analysis, and for the purposes of this paper, the expanded, and non-doctrinal, definition for insurgencies are that they are a movement organized to seize power by all possible means and may include the use of subversion and armed conflict. To define counterinsurgency, we will use a variation of the United States government’s definition; counterinsurgency is a campaign of military, police, economic, psychological and civic actions undertake by a government to defeat insurgency and restore order in accordance with the established rule of law. Key to both of these working definitions is that neither insurgency nor counterinsurgency is a purely military campaign. Compare this to noted Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz. Often quoted as having written that war is merely politics, or more correctly the execution of
policy, by other means, Clausewitz first writes that war is akin to a duel and the purpose of it is to “compel our enemy to do our will.”

He follows this by stating that the endstate of war and the driving force for entering upon a war is politics. That is that war has a political objective, or endstate, the delineation of which defines the military’s objectives and role. The definitions of insurgency and COIN prescribed for this thesis as well as the writings of Mao Tse-Tung each stress the importance of the population and the political objective in insurgesies and counterinsurgency, and Clausewitz does the same. In Book One, Chapter One, Section 24 of On War, Clausewitz writes that not only is war a continuation of policy, but that war is in fact “a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”

Given these definitions it holds that COIN is a type of war, and while it may be conducted in a different manner than a total war, the tenets, principles and most importantly the objectives of it remain the same.

The case studies that follow will examine if counterinsurgents have understood these principles, and if so, how they have used this knowledge to prepare their forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Most importantly, have the militaries of the United Kingdom and the United States understood that no matter how clearly the themes or events of one insurgency mirror those of another there is no simple one-size-fits-all solution? Have they then educated their leaders accordingly? How well do today’s practitioners of counterinsurgency understand the classical COIN principles and are they able to revise them to be applicable to the unique conflicts of today?
Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2008), 2-1. FM 3-0 describes general war as an armed conflict between major nations of which the threat to one of them is existential and all belligerents use the total resources available to them. An unstable peace is explained as being a state when one or more parties has threatened to or used violence in order to reach their goals. FM 3-0, *Operations*, 2-2.

Ibid., 2-5.

Ibid., 2-13.

Ibid., Glossary-7.


Dr. Nagl is a former US Army battalion commander whose book *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, was widely read by military leaders serving in Afghanistan and Iraq. Dr. Nagl also coauthored the US Army Counterinsurgency doctrine, Field Manual 3-24, and served as an advisor to General David Petraeus. Dr. Kilcullen, a retired Australian Army officer, also served as an advisor to General Petraeus and Coalition Forces in Iraq. A noted author, his “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency” has been widely read and reproduced for teaching throughout the US and British militaries.


Ibid., Glossary-4.


Mark O'Neill, *Confronting the Hydra* (Sydney, Australia: Lowry Institute, 2009), 6.

Ibid., 19.

Mao was the first practitioner to write and successfully conduct an insurgency campaign in the 20th century. In The Sling and the Stone, Colonel T. X. Hammes writes that Mao was the first practitioner of fourth generation warfare, a form of warfare that uses the political, economic, social and military networks to defeat the enemy, or more importantly to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that they cannot win. Even with the fall of the Soviet Union, and the apparent waning of communism, Mao remains relevant to the discussion of insurgency because of his success and because his employment of all four of these networks served as the foundation for fourth generation warfare and the insurgencies of today. Colonel T. X. Hammes, USMC (Retd.), The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century (Minneapolis, MN: MBI Publishing, 2006), 4-54.

Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Dover, 2005), 42.

Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian, and the Frenchman Antoine-Henri Jomini were both 19th century military theorists who wrote in different manners. While Clausewitz wrote more theoretically with politics as a central theme of his work, Jomini wrote more of a field manual or handbook that detailed the principles and strategies that made Napoleon successful. The two men’s works were different yet in ways complementary for while Clausewitz might offer the policy behind war, Jomini offered a recipe for how to conduct and win the war.

Mao Tse-Tung, 43.

Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 52.

Ibid., 56.

Ibid., 61.

While Galula may attribute French success in Algeria to the prosecution of COIN according to his methodology, not all units were following his suggestions and were in fact violating them on several instances. The French victory in Algeria was as much of a political conciliation on the part of the De Gaulle government in Paris as it was due to the execution of Colonel Galula’s methods. One factor in this was most probably the French failure to isolate the FLN from outside support.

Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 2005), 29.

Ibid., 50.

Ibid., 51-57.
In Chapter 4 entitled Terrorism, the Principal Weapon, Trinquier describes the process for integrating an insurgent or terrorist. He states that the terrorist can neither be treated like an ordinary criminal nor as a prisoner of war and that if the subject is not forthcoming in answering questions that specialists should be employed to force the information from him. Because of this discussion, which comprises two paragraphs on pages 18 and 19, and the treasonous nature of certain aspects of Guerre Revolutionaire, his counterinsurgency methodologies are often ignored though they have much merit.


49 Ibid., 87.
CHAPTER 3

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE IN MALAYA 1948-1960

Given the government’s unpreparedness in June 1948, even a well based plan could scarcely have been expected to fructify...but there was no such plan and the first two years saw a succession of expedients, none of which enabled the government to seize back the initiative.

— John Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency*

The Foundation of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Four case studies follow to illustrate how the US and UK have organized and prepared their GPF for COIN; the first of these is the British Operations in Malaya from 1948 to 1960. This campaign serves as the anchor for the American intervention in Vietnam historical case study, and the current experiences of British and American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. While these conflicts and these two nations’ armies are each quite different, Malaya serves as the starting point, both chronologically, and because it provides an example of the British forces defeating an insurgency and establishing a unified counterinsurgency campaign plan that provided a methodology that has been applied both appropriately and inappropriately, ever since.¹

The roots of the Malayan Emergency, as it was called in the United Kingdom, were sown during World War II. Japanese forces began their Malayan campaign in the winter of 1941, seizing control of Kula Lumpur on Christmas Eve of that year.² Less than two months later, on 15 February 1942, the conventional campaign came to an end as British troops surrendered to the Japanese in Singapore in what Winston Churchill described as “the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British History.”³ Malaya remained under Japanese occupation until the end of the war. Though defeated, the
British did not end their involvement in Malaya, and established a relationship with the Malayan Communist Party, a predominantly Chinese organization, to organize the resistance in Malaya. Having a long history with and no affinity for the Japanese, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), formed the cadre of the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Party, an organization designed to resist the Japanese occupation and drive the Japanese out of Malaya. This force of several thousand guerrilla fighters was trained and armed surreptitiously by the British army in hopes that they could prevent any further destruction of British business and colonial interests on the peninsula.4

As World War II culminated, the Japanese withdrew, and the British were able to re-occupy Malaya. A power vacuum emerged as the Japanese left and before the British arrived in force. In their wake, the Japanese left a Malayan economy that was ravaged by unemployment, low wages, and scarce and expensive food. The British trained guerrillas of the MPAJP and the communists of the MCP initially filled Malaya’s leadership vacuum. The British government negotiated a refined plan for the administration of Malaya with the leaders of the Malayan states which became the framework that led to the establishment of the Federation of Malayan States on 1 February 1948.5

Fighting World War II had been created a significant financial drain on the British Government, leaving them with scant resources to spend in Malaya. This combined with their desire to increase the economic base led them to place a priority on protecting British owned businesses and plantations over those owned by Chinese or Malays. The Japanese had always favored the Malays over the ethnic Chinese and the perception of favoritism continued. Great Britain’s focus was on quickly repairing the Malayan
economy, with a special emphasis on the tin and rubber industries. These industries were
especially important both to recovery in England and across the Empire as they were
primarily British-owned. This perceived favoritism combined with the British failure, in
Chinese eyes, to fully prosecute the Malays who had collaborated with the Japanese
occupiers caused further alienation of the Chinese minority.\(^6\)

This emphasis on protection of British economic interests, the gap between the
local elite and the populace and the establishment of the Federation, created a confluence
that led to civil unrest, the initial flare-up of communism and the mobilization of the
MPAJA to begin a campaign of terror.\(^7\) On 13 June 1948, Sir Edward Gent, the British
High Commissioner, stated that Malaya was undergoing a “wave of violence,” and
declared a state of emergency days later, which led to the deployment of greater numbers
of British forces to the Malay Peninsula.\(^8\)

British Troops, led by Major General C. H. Boucher, believing that the insurgency
was merely a conspiracy “by a relatively small number of armed agitators” began a
campaign designed to capture or kill them.\(^9\) The troops that arrived to carry out this plan
were regular light infantry forces who were trained and equipped to conduct conventional
operations and in the wake of World War II, either conducting constabulary duties or
preparing to fight the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies on the plains of Europe.\(^10\)
With the drawdown of forces and budgets in the aftermath of the Second World War, not
only were these troops unprepared for jungle warfare, they had been poorly trained and
resourced for the European fight as well.\(^11\) These units, who been wholly focused on a
conventional threat and conventional conflict, began conducting conventional operations.
These were primarily sweep or search and destroy operations of battalion and brigade size and were mostly unsuccessful. When combined with aggressive tactics from the police forces these search and destroy missions led to a quadrupling in the number of insurgents over a three-year period from 1948 to 1951.12

In April of 1950, Lieutenant General Harold Briggs, a retired British Army general was appointed Director of Operations in Malaya. This appointment was important as his understanding of the situation led to the development and institution of a new more holistic strategy that set the foundation for success over the ensuing 18 months. A veteran colonial warrior with experience in Asia-Afghanistan and Burma, with a keen understanding of civil-military relationships, Briggs quickly assessed the situation, submitting his “Appreciation of the Situation in Malaya” on the 10th of April. In it he stated the “need for the closest co-operation between the Administration, Police and Army requires joint headquarters at all levels.”13 Briggs also directed the need to secure the population, the primacy of the police and framework operations, and the need for better and more refined intelligence.14 What came to be known as the Briggs Plan was introduced soon after and although it was not immediately successful, it formed the strategy that would ultimately prove successful in Malaya.

The Briggs Plan established that the organization of the counterinsurgent force was important; that it must include civil, military and police organizations; and that it must be unified and speaks with one voice at every echelon.15 Briggs’ initial vision in implementing the plan was to clear the peninsula from south to north by first dominating populated areas and developing a feeling of security among the populace within them;
secondly breaking up the insurgents, the Min Yuen, in populated areas; then isolating insurgents from the populace as well as from their food, intelligence and logistical networks; and finally forcing them to attack the counterinsurgent forces on the British’s terms and ground.\textsuperscript{16} To ensure the application and implementation of the plan, Briggs strengthened the administrative organization in Malaya by establishing a Federal War Council, with complementary councils at the State and District levels where they were known as War Executive Committees, or SWECs and DWECs, and included representation from each section of the community at that echelon.\textsuperscript{17} These committees were led by a civilian at each echelon, such as the state prime minister for a SWEC or the District Officer for a DWEC, and included the senior police officer, the senior military officer, the senior leader of the Home Guard, the areas information operations officer and the leader of Special Branch for its community. Other members of the civil service and prominent local leaders would attend as needed and often became permanent members of their committees as well.\textsuperscript{18}

One of the greatest operational impacts of the Briggs Plan was the resettlement operations designed to help ‘drain the swamp’ by resettling villagers, primarily Chinese, to new areas where they could be secured and more importantly were separated from the insurgent bands.\textsuperscript{19} A secondary effect of moving the squatters out of their home villages was that it now gave the military more open areas of operation in which to hunt for insurgents unencumbered by a local civilian populace. Squatter resettlement combined with the strengthening of the local administrative architecture illustrates Briggs’
understanding that the conflict could neither be won by military nor political means unto themselves.

For the army, the Briggs era brought forth the realization that the military was not prepared to conduct COIN in the jungle from either a training or educational perspective. As with most of Europe, the British were still recovering from the effects of World War II, economically, politically and militarily. Though the British had a wealth of jungle fighting experience in World War II, much of it had been dispersed across the Army, with the only units that showed that prowess in the initial stages of the conflict being the Gurkhas, some of the troops already garrisoned in Malaya, and a special task force led by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Walker known as the Ferret Force. This was a special unit manned with Gurkhas, British soldiers with experience in the jungle, and Malayan police. The Ferret Force operated in small 15 man sub-units and deployed for long periods of time into the jungle in order to find and interdict guerilla forces. Though disbanded after a year, due to command and control issues between the military and the police, the Ferret Force was highly successful and its tactics, techniques and procedures were recognized as having value for the entire force in Malaya.

Most of the units coming into Malaya from elsewhere were out of their element and performed poorly. They had spent the post-World War II years on constabulary duties or training for combat on the plains of Europe and were not prepared to combat an insurgent force in the jungle. For example, one of the first units that arrived was a battalion from the Scots Guards. These soldiers had been performing ceremonial duties in London and were in no way prepared for a jungle campaign. Additionally they were
understrength and had been rounded out with soldiers who had yet to finish their basic
training, so great was the need to move men to Malaya quickly.  

Recognizing this shortcoming, and needing to instruct the rest of the units in
Malaya, the British established an in-theater training center for the units that were
arriving for duty in Malaya. Under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Walker, the Far
East Land Forces Training Center, often referred to as the FTC, was established near
Singapore in order to provide training on jungle warfare and the successful tactics
employed by the Ferret Force to all incoming units. Using lessons learned in Malaya
and Burma, along with officers and NCOs that had extensive jungle warfare experience
as his cadre, Lieutenant Colonel Walker designed a program of instruction for incoming
forces. It included a history of the Communist Terrorists in Malaya, the organization and
roles of the government and the British and Malayan security forces, basic jungle survival
and hygiene training, how to navigate through the jungle, establish patrol bases, and
conduct immediate action drills. The course also included techniques on how to employ
dogs and how to track the insurgents, as well as jungle marksmanship and included a
section on sustainment training for units while deployed to Malaya.

Arthur Campbell, a company commander in the Suffolk Regiment who served in
Malaya in the early 1950s, describes the process that a unit would undergo in his book
Jungle Green. When he arrived in 1952, the model was that a battalion would depart
England and arrive in theatre and conduct approximately three weeks of reception,
staging, and acclimatization at the Nee Soon Transit Camp near Singapore. During this
time the unit’s leadership would move forward to the jungle training center near Kota
Tinggi where they would be trained by Colonel Walker’s cadre and members of the Gurkha Brigade in jungle warfare. Upon completion of this the unit leadership would link up with their soldiers at the Kota Tinggi or move to another camp in the vicinity of Kuala Lumpur where they would conduct another three weeks of training in the jungle. This training would be led by the unit leadership, all recent graduates of the FTC, who were assisted both by FTC cadre and a number of natives of the area, the Sakai. The Sakai lived in the local area and taught the soldiers about jungle survival, hygiene and tradecraft.

Upon completion of the training, the unit would be certified to conduct its onward movement into Malaya and integration into the force there. Walker, a veteran of the Burma campaigns of World War II, as well as the Ferret Force knew that to be successful, the British would have to employ small unit operations designed to push the guerrillas back into the jungle and further separate them from the populace. Knowing this, he also sought to educate the arriving forces in the best manner to conduct a jungle campaign. Drawing on his jungle fighting experience as well as that of his cadre, the FTC “emphasized that small reconnaissance patrols . . . should be sent out to gain information before larger fighting patrols were sent out to engage CTs.” Walker knew that by deploying a number of small dismounted patrols into a section of the jungle for an extended operation, the British would be more successful in finding and destroying the guerrilla forces that made their homes there and relied on the jungle to provide their sanctuary.
While not entirely successful, Briggs, in less than two years, did have a substantial impact on the Malayan insurgency, and on forming British counterinsurgency doctrine. For example, his concept to clear the peninsula from the South overlooked the geography of the peninsula which did not favor this direction of attack. Resettlement, while a key element of the Briggs’ Plan, also met with mixed reviews. The plan was not resourced appropriately and the resettled communities were often lacking basic infrastructure to sustain the families and solid security to protect them. While Briggs’ strengthening of the organizational architecture, specifically the establishment of SWECs, DWECs, and Joint Operations Centers, laid the foundation upon which his successor, Sir Gerald Templer, was able to build, Briggs never had the power to make the system truly unified between the civilian and military sides.

Just as Briggs was leaving Malaya, the new British Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton, went to Malaya to obtain a firsthand view of the situation. Finding the situation “far worse than I imagined: it was appalling,” Lyttelton returned to England with a six point plan, and knowing that its success required having the correct man in charge. The essence of Lyttelton’s plan, to build on Briggs’ foundation was that first of all, the mission needed unified overall direction and control, that is, a single office or leader in charge of both the civil administration and the military. Secondly, the police needed to be both reorganized and retrained, while thirdly, the government needed to run the primary education systems ensuring that the curriculum helped to counter Communist propaganda. Fourth, the security of the resettlement areas needed to be strengthened, which included the fifth point that the Home Guards needed to be reorganized and
include large numbers of Chinese in their ranks. Finally, Lyttelton argued that the civil administration in Malaya was overtaxed and needed to be expanded, but with the correct people properly trained.\textsuperscript{32}

**Arrival of the Proconsul**

It was with this guidance that Sir Gerald Templer arrived in Malaya in February of 1952, and over the next 18 months carried on with the momentum created by Briggs, but with new authority. Sir Gerald Templer was appointed as both the high commissioner and the military commander, thereby combining in one office both civil and military authority and responsibility.\textsuperscript{33} Templer also brought the former Commissioner of the London City Police, Sir Arthur Young, to Malaya and charged him with the responsibility for the reorganization and strengthening of the police force.\textsuperscript{34}

Templer believed that with a unified approach, he could control the campaign and that by winning support of two-thirds of the population would win. His methodology for doing this rested in his hearts and minds strategy designed to persuade the Malayans “that there is another and far more preferable way of life.”\textsuperscript{35} Templer said that the administration cannot separate peacetime activities of the government from counterinsurgency activities and that the key to winning a counterinsurgency had administrative, political, cultural, economic, spiritual and military factors.

Templer’s first priority was the police and the Home Guard, and began a complete overhaul of the system. Two of Young’s tenets of rebuilding the police and home guards were linked, morale and leadership. Young divided the Police into different branches, each with its own Senior Assistant Administrator that reported to him, and each with a re-
vamped training plan. Essential aspects to this were that the Police become more of a “service” than a “force.” This meant shifting the bulk of the Police away from counter-terrorist or paramilitary duties in the jungle and to focus them more on the populated areas and to include more traditional police work. This included establishing training academies and opportunities within Malaya as well as abroad. Young also sought to increase the number of Malays and Chinese in the ranks and improve the perception of the Police within the general populace.\textsuperscript{36}

Faced with the issues of poor security for many of the resettlement villages, Templer also worked to improve the Home Guard. The Home Guards were a village defense force established by the Malaya Federation during the early stage of the insurgency. Designed as a local or village defense force they were supposed to act as local security guards for their villages at night and to man the gates of their villages. They received no pay or uniforms and had few weapons and little training.\textsuperscript{37} After appointing an Inspector General of the Home Guard, Templer was able to establish a training camp for the home guard, staffed by experienced British and Commonwealth officers, in each Malayan state. The primary objective of these camps was to teach marksmanship and basic security procedures to the home guardsmen, as well as to help vet the personnel that were serving in the force.\textsuperscript{38}

Templer’s other great reform was in the expansion of the civil administration. He needed to fill the vacancies at the districts and in the resettlement centers. To do this, Templer increased Malayanization of the civil service, which included extensive training and increasing the prestige of the service. Templer was not only resettling the population
and fighting insurgents, but was also building Malaya’s governmental institutions at every level. The intent was to prepare the Malayans to govern and administer their country once independence was given. Templer also incorporated Chinese-speaking missionaries into the service, specifically to serve as resettlement officers, and recruited engineers, and teachers among other professionals developing a well-trained and indigenously led civil service that could further develop and sustain itself.

Additionally, Templer may have made his most lasting contribution to British counterinsurgency doctrine with his support of the Far East Land Forces’ Training Center and the development of *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorism Operations in Malaya* manual, commonly referred to as the *ATOM*, as a guide for operations in Malaya. Templer championed the continued work of Colonel Walker at the FTC, consistently expanding the training and updating the tactics, techniques and procedures being trained. By 1955, the FTC had expanded its entry training to include a capstone exercise against a real Communist Terrorist enemy. Brigadier Richard Miers writes that the patrol commanders and soldiers alike learned a great deal about themselves and their men during this exercise which he describes as a four day exercise that occurred in the jungle adjacent to the training center where a real band of guerrillas lived and operated.

As important as the training center however was the development of the *ATOM*. A small book that fit in the pocket of a soldiers’ battle dress uniform, the *ATOM* represented a dramatic leap forward as it was created in theater and was designed to be updated regularly to remain relevant. In the forward, Templer wrote:

> I have been impressed by the wealth of jungle fighting experience available on different levels in Malaya and among different categories of persons. At the same
time, I have been disturbed by the fact that this great mass of detailed knowledge has not been properly collated or presented to those whose knowledge is not so great. This vast store of knowledge must now be pooled. Hence this book.42

Counterinsurgency Doctrine in the United Kingdom

British COIN doctrine sees its roots in the book Small Wars-Their Principles and Practices, written in 1896.43 While the British did update their doctrine several times over the ensuing decades, the updates mostly focused on imperial policing and tasks associated with aid to the civil power, and the ATOM, along with A Handbook of Anti Mau Mau Operations, was the first publication that that addressed the conduct of COIN for the British Army in the 20th century. It provided the foundation for the British Army pamphlets Keeping the Peace of 1957 and 1963, as well as the 1969 and 1977 editions of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare, and the 1995 and 2001 editions of the Counter Insurgency Operations field manual. The 2001 version of Counter Insurgency Operations then provided the framework for the current British doctrine as dictated in Army Field Manual Volume 1, Part 10, Countering Insurgency published most recently in 2009.44 By basing their doctrinal foundation on the ATOM, the British sought to maintain the lessons learned in a theater of operations, seeking to ensure that they did not repeat the mistakes made after World War II, when in an alarmingly short period, the British Army forgot the lessons and doctrines that they had developed during the war.45

When looking at the Malayan Emergency from a historical perspective, several lessons emerge. Key among these are the importance of the organization and of the indigenous population. While Briggs made great strides, and set the conditions for the defeat of the Communist terrorists, he was unable to propel his plan with much force as he did not have the authority. Templer’s arrival and appointment as the proconsul in
Malaya with control over both the civil and military aspects of the campaign was essential. Templer also recognized the importance of winning the support of the population; just as the insurgents require popular support, so too does the counterinsurgent and the counterinsurgent must make efforts from day one that are aimed at that. Finally, the role of the indigenous population in counterinsurgency must be at the forefront. The investiture of the populace in the conflict, via their representation in the Home Guard, the civil service or the police and army was essential and remains so. The British counterinsurgent force would leave, as most all counterinsurgents supporting a host nation do, and the indigenous population must be able to continue to operate as seamlessly as possible to ensure continued success and relevance. In the words of T. E. Lawrence, “It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.”

When looking at the Malayan Emergency from the military standpoint, additional lessons emerge. There are the lessons about the importance of intelligence, the primacy of police, unified effort, population and resource control, resettlement, amnesty and tactical operations in the jungle, and there are lessons in the preparation and employment of forces as well. The successes of the British military in Malaya illustrate that a conventional force can fight a counterinsurgency campaign, but it must be trained and educated to do so. Pamphlets like the ATOM and exercises like those conducted at the FTC and at home station cover the training portion of preparation, and are seen as the model to be followed by Great Britain’s allies in the conflict. It almost goes without saying that an army that is conventionally trained must retrain and reorganize to fight in a COIN campaign. However essential to this, as Templer noted, was that the baseline
knowledge of how to conduct COIN successfully and without an inordinate amount of
discovery learning must already be present in the leadership.

This knowledge comes through the development of doctrine and most importantly, the teaching of it. General Sir Frank Kitson, author and a veteran commander of counterinsurgent forces in Kenya, Malaya, Oman, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland, said that COIN education should be a routine part of a unit’s training and should be integral to the course of study at the Army’s formal courses, such as Sandhurst, West Point, or the staff colleges. While an Army can institutionalize COIN education and doctrine at its level, it is still up to the individual commanders and trainers to take that knowledge and then seek initiative and do it.48 In other words while the Army may provide the cornerstone of a professional’s education, the soldier will always bear some personal responsibility to conduct personal study. This is especially true for those in the general purpose forces when preparing for COIN for it is that additional study that will provide him the depth needed to avoid falling into the pitfalls of false understanding and “cherry-picking” of solutions and tactics to apply.

This doctrine and the education that accompanied it were to form the foundation for the British Army’s experiences in Aden, Oman, and Northern Ireland over the latter third of the 20th Century.49 It is also the same doctrine, in the 2001 edition, that coupled with experience and SOPs from these campaigns should provide the foundation for Great Britain’s efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan during the first part of the 21st century.

1While it has been done frequently, most notably by Dr. John Nagl in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, comparing the Malayan Emergency and Vietnam War is akin to comparing apples to oranges. Not
only were the two conflicts much different in terms of geography and enemy, but the British Army in Malaya and the US Army in Vietnam were fundamentally different institutions. The former having both recent experience fighting in the jungle and extensive experience in fighting in, alongside, and administrating indigenous populations; the British Army’s experience as a colonial army as well as the British Civil Service’s experience as a colonial power afforded the British a decidedly different foundation upon which to learn. But the comparison of how the two forces learned and adapted during these conflicts and how they institutionalized the lessons learned remains a valid comparison and is the purpose for their use here.


3Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, 41.


6Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency, 42.

7Ibid.

8Department of Information, Federation of Malay, 12.


10These forces had previously trained and fought against the Germans and Japanese in World War II, but were spending their post war years conducting aid to civil power, administrative, and constabulary duties and were not properly trained for most any type of war. Additionally, while the British Army had recent jungle warfare experience in Burma, many of the soldiers who had fought there had since left service and returned to civilian life. For further information, see Daniel Marston’s chapter “Lost and Found in the Jungle,” in Big Wars and Small Wars.


14 Briggs envisioned a police force that would conduct typical civic police duties and have a paramilitary capability. Additionally, with its special branch, it would have the lead in gathering and analyzing intelligence in the populated areas. The police would also work closely with the army who would assist the police in conducting operations that they were unable to do. The overall concept being that the police and the army would work together using intelligence derived by the police to defeat the insurgents in the populated areas.


16 Stubbs, “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 1948-60,” 106.


25 Ibid., 10.


The importance of junior officer and non-commissioned officer leadership cannot be overstressed. The British discovered first in Burma in 1942 and then again in Malaya what the United States saw in Vietnam, and both nations saw in Iraq and Afghanistan; jungle war, and counterinsurgency are very junior-leader centric. Due to the nature of this fight, junior leaders found themselves making decisions that they would never have had the opportunity to make at their current echelon in a conventional battle.

During a 1950 conference on the strategy and tactics to be employed in Malaya the leadership of British forces in Malay decided not to publish a theater-wide handbook for soldiers. General Templer reversed that decision and directed the publication of the ATOM, as a baseline handbook for all units and soldiers deploying to Malaya.


Ibid., 22.


Stubbs “From Search and Destroy to Hearts and Minds: The Evolution of British Strategy in Malaya 1948-60,” 110.


44 Ibid., CS1-4.


49 The British, like the US, often failed to follow their own doctrine, several interviews with British commanders remarked that studying and internalizing doctrine was not considered proper form in the British military. This attitude most likely contributed to their failure to establish in theater training centers or local handbooks to share lessons learned in future conflicts.
Battles are won by the infantry, the armor, the artillery, and air teams, by soldiers living in the rains and huddling in the snow. But wars are won by the great strength of a nation—the soldier and the civilian working together.

— General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

Both the longest and greatest conflict for the United States in the latter half of the 20th Century, Vietnam was also the most complicated. American forces faced both a conventional enemy as well as an insurgency while supporting a series of weak governments on the Asian mainland. W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson Frizzell write in their book *The Lessons of Vietnam*, that “the entry of U.S. combat forces into Vietnam and the ensuing struggle between them and the enemy’s Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces formed only one, intermediate part of a much larger war.”¹ Vietnam was a French colony, when at the close of World War II, the Japanese encouraged the Vietnamese to rise up against the Vichy-French and seek their nationalization and independence. The League for the Independence of Vietnam, known as the Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh co-opted the Vietnamese nationalism movement in 1945 and led it throughout the campaign against the French, which ended in May of 1954 when the French sought to withdraw from Vietnam after their defeat at Dien Bien Phu.²

The Geneva Accords of 1954 divided Vietnam into two nations with a boundary at the 17th parallel; North Vietnam, a Communist country led by Ho Chi Minh and South Vietnam, a democracy, at least in name, which was led primarily by an oligarchy of elites from the Catholic minority in the country.³ After the French withdrew in 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised President Eisenhower that further involvement in Indochina
(Vietnam) would not be in the United States’ best interest. The Joint Chiefs told the President that there was no military objective in Vietnam, and that any serious military involvement there would be a misuse of the limited military assets available to the nation. However, the Chiefs did concede that if the President chose to conduct an offensive strike against Communists, the best option would be the Chinese. The ensuing American involvement in Vietnam had several distinct phases which Andrew Krepinevich has labeled the Advisory Years, from 1954 to 1965, the Years of Intervention from 1965 to 1968 and the Years of Withdrawal from 1968 to 1973.

The Foundation of the Intervention in Vietnam: The Initial Advisory Mission

While the Advisory Years may not have begun until 1954, the US advisory mission to Vietnam had begun four years earlier with the creation of a four man organization known as the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), which grew to 342 men by the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Initially providing assistance to the French, the American advisors became the guiding force behind the South Vietnamese counterinsurgency campaign for the next two decades. The leadership of the Catholic elite, especially Ngo Dinh Diem, exacerbated the situation insurgency with many of its policies and actions. Diem, who was Catholic, had lived in exile in the United States until returning to become the American-backed President of the Republic of South Vietnam. He was a nationalist and boycotted the elections agreed upon in the Geneva Accords, fearing that the North Vietnamese Politburo would be able to rig the elections.

Major General Edward Lansdale writes that “sometime in 1955, the Politburo secretly decided to win the South by ‘armed struggle’ instead of ‘legal struggle;” a
decision that led to North Vietnam’s Three Steps Plan.”9 This plan used the same strategy that ostensibly defeated the French. The concept behind it was to form a political-military nucleus consisting of cadre and bases across South Vietnam, followed by the organization of a greater political structure and the execution of guerrilla operations, and finally the transformation of these guerrilla forces into regular forces which would then destroy the military of South Vietnam. The first step was already in place as elements of a Viet Minh cadre had stayed behind after the signing of the Geneva Accords and the second, the organization of a greater political structure and the execution of guerrilla operations, would come into being in December of 1960 with the formation of the National Liberation Front.10

President John F. Kennedy took office in January 1961, having defeated Eisenhower’s vice president, Richard Nixon, and was immediately faced with a number of foreign policy and other issues and the question of Vietnam was not his top priority, especially since under President Diem, South Vietnam had survived its first six years. Despite increasing guerrilla activity by the National Liberation Front, Americans in Saigon believed that only a small increase in assistance would be needed for Diem to retain power.11 In Vietnam the insurgency gathered strength in the countryside; the first step, the latent and incipient phase continued to build momentum that eroded the South Vietnamese government’s presence and power in the countryside and replaced it with their own. By 1963, the Viet Cong would be engaging and at times defeating the South Vietnamese Army on the field of battle.12

Meanwhile, while engaged with Cuban and Laotian issues, foremost among them the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy remained involved with the question of what
to do in South Vietnam. Just a week after the Bay of Pigs, the President had directed Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to begin creating a program to “save Vietnam.” This fell in line with President Kennedy’s earlier directives for the study and expansion of the Army’s counterinsurgent capacity in both the Special Forces and in the general purpose force.

An ardent supporter of the need to be able to fight a COIN conflict, President Kennedy had championed the US Army’s Special Forces, and directed the military to increase its capabilities to wage COIN. On the surface at least, the military appeared to be doing that. Various departments had been studying the conflicts of the post-World War II era, and in addition to the 1961 edition of Field Manual 31-15, *Operations Against Irregular Forces*, the Army had produced various papers and pamphlets related to counterinsurgency. This included the 1960 issue of Field Manual 100-1, *Doctrinal Guidance*. FM 100-1, drew on many of the experiences of the British and French, as well as the ATOM. It included a chapter entitled, Military Operations Against Irregular Forces, that not only discouraged the use of large scale operations as they were ineffective against small bands of guerrillas, and also used the British committee model of SWECs and DWECs as its example of how to establish a combined and joint command structure in COIN.

The Army convened two boards in the early 1960s that produced reports that were very influential on the Army’s organization and doctrine, though the Army did not go nearly as far as either one recommended. The first was Brigadier General Richard G. Stillwell’s 1961 “Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of Declared War” report for the Secretary of the Army, and the second was the 1962 “Special Warfare
Board Final Report,” commonly known as the Howze Report which documented the findings of General Hamilton H. Howze’s study on the Army’s requirements for special warfare force structure, training and personnel.\textsuperscript{17}

General Stillwell recognized the importance of COIN, the scope of counterinsurgency campaigns, and that the Special Forces were limited in number and could not respond to every contingency. In his report to the Secretary of the Army, General Stillwell recommended that the Army designate its Special Forces as “an ancillary, rather than primary, source” for meeting the counterinsurgency mission and that henceforth the Army as a whole be utilized.\textsuperscript{18} The Howze Report met much the same conclusion as General Stillwell, namely that COIN was too large a mission for the Special Forces to handle by themselves, and recommended that three divisions and an additional three separate brigades be given counterinsurgency as their primary mission.\textsuperscript{19} Howze also recommended that an additional three divisions and two brigades be given counterinsurgency as their secondary mission. Each of those divisions and brigades whose primary mission would be COIN would also establish, train and maintain an advisory capacity commensurate with their size and potential scope. Both Howze and Stillwell viewed the escalation of COIN would see Special Forces deployed initially during the first phase or two of the mission, with the brigades and divisions deploying to reinforce them and expand the mission.\textsuperscript{20} The Army did not accept the majority of Stillwell and Howze’s findings, incorporating only some of their minor recommendations, and instead opted to establish four regionally aligned and strategically based brigades that could be used to reinforce the SF deployed to an area of operations. These units were general purpose forces and included infantry, armor, armored cavalry,
artillery, and engineers as well as psychological operations and civil affairs personnel and other enabler units. As each of these brigades was to be regionally aligned they were also supposed to have some language training and be fully certified to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The brigades were also designed to have a mobile training teams (MTT), designed to train and advise indigenous forces according to their specialty. These were five man teams and each had a military specialty. For example, an infantry MTT

can provide training, advice and assistance in infantry tactics and the use of infantry weapons for indigenous small units up through battalion level. Training, advice and assistance emphasizes counter insurgency/counterguerrilla operations. The team may be placed under the operational control of a MAAG advisory detachment as appropriate. The team can provide limited advice and assistance on military civic actions.

These Brigades, while designated, were not given much training in COIN. Contrary to the intent of this initiative, only about 12 percent of their annual training was focused on COIN and even then most of it was focused on search and destroy operations.

Yet while the doctrine was there, and the attention had been paid at the highest levels, much of it remained “lip-service” as much in training as it had in education up to that point. As a commander in the British Army during this period, General Sir Frank General Kitson had an American Army company assigned to his unit. He remarked that though this company was enroute to Vietnam, and knew it, they did not seem to have prepared at all for COIN, and as he recalled, most of the company was killed during their deployment. The US Continental Army Command or CONARC, the forerunner to today’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), had directed COIN training for all units in the Army as early as 1961, and by 1964 reported that of the 1443 hours of annual mandated training for Army units, over 918 hours, or 64 percent of it had COIN
The Army was very creative in what type of training it considered to have COIN applications. One example of this came in the Army’s 1965 evaluation of the concept of the Airmobile Division. The Airmobile Division was designed to be a readily deployable force of 16,000 soldiers who along with their artillery and ground vehicles could be flown into combat using the division's large fleet of helicopters. With three brigades, one of which was trained as paratroopers, and 400 helicopters, the lightly armored division seemed “tailor-made for Vietnam.” The COIN application of the division during the evaluation consisted of one of that division’s twelve infantry battalions conducting a five day exercise in the midst of the five week evaluation. The exercise used the battalion in a purely conventional role of finding, fixing and destroying an enemy force and did not emphasize their airmobile capabilities as an asset to be employed in securing or controlling a population. Of note, during this exercise the battalion reported difficulty in locating the small bands of guerrillas and recommended that a ground reconnaissance be conducted before committing the battalion into action while in combat.

In 1965, almost two years after having assumed the presidency upon the assassination of President Kennedy, President Johnson made the decision to commit troops in order to prevent the loss of Vietnam. Opting for a program described as the “slow squeeze,” the president authorized the deployment of 125,000 troops in July, with more to follow if they were necessary. Viewing the situation in Vietnam from the paradigm of the recent Korean War, the American and Vietnamese strategy initially was conventional and enemy centric. The United States entered Vietnam with a military that
was trained, equipped and organized to fight a conventional foe, and not prepared for
counterinsurgency operations. Tellingly the lieutenants and captains that made up the
company grade leadership of the army had not been educated for operations other than
those against a conventional Warsaw Pact force. They had had scant, if any, exposure to
COIN theory and tactics in their professional military education. In 1961, an infantry
officer attending the his basic course as a lieutenant received a three hour block of
instruction on COIN which was primarily focused on the political, social and
psychological aspects of it with approximately 90 seconds of that instruction devoted to
tactics. For the captain at his advanced course the block of instruction was 12 hours, but
again only four hours of the course were devoted to tactics. 29

Though the United States Army did have counterinsurgency doctrine, having
published Field Manual 31-15, *Operations Against Irregular Forces* in 1961 and Field
Manual 31-16, *Counterguerrilla Operations* in 1963, they did not enter Vietnam with a
campaign based on it. While it was not a holistic document for all aspects of
counterinsurgency, FM 31-15 did state that campaigns against irregular forces needed to
have a cohesive organization of military and civilian forces that were supported by the
population. Those three entities would organize to provide administration of military and
civilian areas, static security, mobile security detachments, task forces conducting police
operations as well as separate task forces conducting military operations, and civil
defense units designed to protect individual villages and towns. 30 While the Central
Intelligence Agency, some Special Forces and non-governmental agencies were
conducting counterinsurgency operations reflective of this manual, the bulk of the
American effort in Vietnam in 1965 was grounded in the military’s conventional experience in Korea.\textsuperscript{31}

The issue with the doctrine lay not necessarily in its scope or prescriptions, but in the Army’s lack of focus on it. As a superpower and largely conventional force, the military’s focus is most often on large wars, and low intensity conflicts or COIN cause problems for conventional forces as they often negate their strengths. This remains true in education as much in employment. The US Army saw its primary mission as the absolute defeat of an enemy on the battlefield and even though it had participated in counterinsurgency operations in China, Greece, Korea, the Philippines, and Lebanon since World War II,\textsuperscript{32} it still saw these as secondary missions and trained and educated their force as such.

This lack of attention to anything but large scale conventional or maneuver warfare against the Soviet Union was also reflected in the US Army’s professional education. For example, in the first decade after World War II, the United States Army Command and General Staff College’s course consisted of 1219 hours of instruction. In 1956, of these 190 hours were devoted to conventional infantry division operations while none were allocated to the study of counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{33} Those majors who attended CGSC in the mid-1950s had become the battalion and brigade commanders of the mid-1960s.\textsuperscript{34}

Thus, when General William Westmoreland assumed command of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), which had followed the MAAG in early 1964, replacing Lieutenant General Paul Harkins,\textsuperscript{35} it was as a commander who had been educated in a conventional manner and would now be commanding a large,
predominately conventionally minded force. War plans had sought to create a bespoke combined and joint task force that would carry out a mission that had counter guerrilla, civic action, and limited war objectives.\textsuperscript{36} Given that Westmoreland was facing at least two distinct enemies, a conventional and an insurgent threat, he needed a force that had the capacity to address both. However, President Johnson, in rejecting the mobilization of the Reserves prevented the military from creating this full spectrum force as many of the skilled personnel and units, such as military police and construction engineers, designed for civic action were reserve component forces.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{Intervention: The Introduction of General Purpose Forces}

Working with the force, the leadership, and command structure that he had, Westmoreland writes that there were six distinct strategies in Vietnam between 1954 and 1969, which loosely align with the first two of Krepinevich’s phases of the war, the Advisory Years, from 1954 to 1965, and the Years of Intervention from 1965 to 1968. Westmoreland also writes that that under his command he followed a three phase campaign. First the United States would secure its logistics and infrastructure, then it would seek to gain the initiative by penetrating the enemy’s sanctuaries and base camps before finally destroying the last of the Communist and guerrilla forces or pushing them out of South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{38} This description of his strategy or attrition does not reference development of the South Vietnamese security forces, civic action or population security. The idea being that the Americans would fight the North Vietnamese, while the South Vietnamese tended to their people. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Maxwell Taylor, who was serving as the US Ambassador to Vietnam, argued to keep the United States’ general purpose forces out of a counterinsurgency role and contrary to the
opinions of the Marine Corps and many in the Army stated that the American soldier “armed, equipped and trained as he is, is not [a] suitable guerrilla fighter for Asian forests and jungles.”

While by definition a general purpose force is designed to do accomplish two or more basic tasks and is not specialized; the Army of the mid-1960s misread the geopolitical situation and was not really a general purpose force able to carry out both conventional and COIN operations. General Westmoreland remarks in “A Military War of Attrition,” that he had the Korean War in his recent memory as he went to Vietnam, and planned for a long war in which he would have the entire force at his disposal. In this light, Westmoreland goes on to describe his strategy as one of attrition and that while seemingly unsuited for the jungles of Vietnam that it could work just as “in World War I, one must admit that, for all the horrendous cost, it eventually worked.” In his study for the RAND organization, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, Robert Komer summarizes the institutional failings or inertia of the military that led to the US strategy of attrition, writing that

What we did in Vietnam cannot be fully understood unless it is seen as a function of our plying out our military repertoire—doing what we were most capable and experienced at doing. Such institutional constraints as the very way our general purpose forces were trained, equipped, and structured largely dictated our response. The fact that U.S. military doctrine, tactics, equipment and organization were designed primarily for NATO or Korean War-type contingencies—intensive conventional conflict in a relatively sophisticated military environment—made it difficult to do anything else. The U.S. Army’s force structure, its choice of equipment, its logistic support, it whole style of warfare evolved after World War II with combat against sophisticated Soviet forces primarily in mind.

General Westmoreland and his strategy have been at the center of one of the major debates that has ensued since the Vietnam. One side, captured by Andrew Krepinevich in The Army and Vietnam faults General Westmoreland from the beginning, arguing that “in
developing its Vietnam strategy . . . the Army compromised its ability to successfully combat lower-phase insurgency operations. . . . Furthermore, in attempting to maximize Communist combat losses, the Army often alienated the most important element in any counterinsurgency strategy—the people.”

Dale Andrade presents an alternative perspective writing that in order to get to the pacification phase he had to win the major combat operations first. Westmoreland, upon taking command, was faced with an enemy that had placed an ever increasing emphasis on conventional or main force combat, but that he also understood that the war would not be a purely conventional one. Andrade writes that Westmoreland knew that this was a different type of war and that victory would have to come on two fronts, “the first was to keep the enemy main forces away from the population, the second was to prevent ‘the guerrilla, the assassin, the terrorist, the informer’ from undermining the South Vietnamese government.”

Right or wrong, the strategy of attrition aimed at destroying the Communist forces continued for several years. However it did have opposition and resistance from within the military and government. One of the first major commitments of American troops to battle occurred in the Ia Drang Valley in November of 1965. This battle was cited as a great victory by MACV and as a validation of the conventionally minded attrition strategy, a perspective that was not shared by the battalion commander who led the American troops. Then Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore gave an assessment of the battle to Secretary of Defense McNamara who had flown to Vietnam in the days after the battle telling the Secretary that he believed that the current strategy and tactics not only underestimated the enemy, but would not secure victory in Vietnam. Moore writes in We Were Soldiers Once...and Young that “McNamara’s silence as I concluded was
significant. He now knew that the Vietnam War had just exploded into an open-ended and massive commitment of American men, money and material to a cause that he was beginning to suspect would be difficult to win.45

At the same time, the United States Marine Corps began conducting its Combined Action Platoons (CAP), program. With a basis in USMC doctrine, this program placed rifle platoons inside of villages where they lived, trained indigenous security forces and conducted operations with them. Begun by one enterprising company commander in 1965, the program had 56 units within a year, and 79 before the end of 1967. The Marines believed that living in the villages signaled to the populace that they were committed to their security and welfare. Their presence also helped in the development of the villages’ Popular Forces (PF), as they spent more time training with and conducting operations alongside them. The PF associated with CAPs saw a marked increase in their proficiency which led to the Viet Cong abandoning of these areas.46 While the CAPs seemed to be very successful, it was limited in scope, with only ten Marine companies committed to the program in 1967.47 This small amount of combat power placed CAPs in only about 20 percent of the villages in the I Corps areas of operations, and this small percentage contributed to its lack of strategic success.48 General Westmorland believed that the Marines’ commitment of troops to it was degrading their ability to conduct offensive operations as they were becoming overextended. Beyond institutional inertia, the limiting factor in CAPs seems to have been manpower; the Marines had only two infantry battalions in Vietnam in 1965, and while that increased to 85,000 in 1969, the Marines’ numbers were reduced to 500 in 1971.49
The Army’s advisory program, begun under the MAAG in the early 1950s had continued as well, though it was a supporting effort throughout most of the war, and was resourced as such. The mission of the advisors was “to advise the Vietnamese commander and staff of the unit to which it was assigned on all aspects of military operations and to coordinate all direct American assistance for that unit.” Prior to the commitment of ground troops in 1965, advisor duty, while not necessarily glamorous, was the primary method for commissioned and non-commissioned officers to get into combat. With the large scale deployment of troops to Vietnam, this was no longer the case, and what incentives there had been to become an advisor evaporated. The commissioned and non-commissioned officers that had previously been filing these advisor billets were now avoiding them in order to obtain assignment to combat units, as these assignments seen as the proper career progression. In their monograph, “The US Advisor,” General Ca Van Vien, former Chairman of the Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and his coauthors wrote that they understood that to be an Army advisor to the Vietnamese Army an American officer would be trained in his basic branch, that he had training and/or expertise for the type of unit he would be advising, and that he had a demonstrated level of proficiency in the Vietnamese language. In reality, they found that it was the rare advisor who achieved the desired level of proficiency in their language and sometimes the advisors did not have the requisite skills and experience to advise the type of unit to which they were assigned. In addition to advising the South Vietnamese Army, US Army advisor teams were also advising the territorial forces. The Territorial Forces were the old South Vietnamese Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps, now known as the Regional Forces and Popular Forces,
respectively. Known as the ruff-puffs collectively, the Regional Forces role was initially to secure infrastructure and to secure areas that had previously been cleared by US or South Vietnamese army units. The role of the Popular Forces was akin to that of the Home Guard in Malaya, as the PF would provide security for the villages in their home district.

All advisors were supposed to attend a preparatory course at Fort Bragg prior to deploying to Vietnam. This course was five and one half weeks long and included 217 hours of study. One former advisor, Colonel John Haseman, USA (Retired), described the training as insufficient and based on an outdated picture of the conflict. The full program of instruction covered six general areas, with Area Studies (63 to 71 hours depending on the type of advisor a student was going to be), COIN and Psychological Operations (41 to 57 hours), Communications (8 hours), Weapons (12 to 36 hours), General Subjects (61 hours), and Demolitions (8 hours), with Area Studies including 36 to 46 hours of language training and General Subjects’ 61 hours having 14 hours devoted to night training and 22 hours to physical training. More importantly than the training, the entire advisory effort was undermanned throughout much of the war. In 1968, the US was short over 2,500 advisors, which forced the MACV and the Vietnamese to create Mobile Advisory Teams that would rotate between Vietnamese units in order to fill some of these shortfalls. It was not until 1969, after recognizing that not only was MACV critically short on advisors, but that many lacked the experience, training and desire to do the job, that then MACV Commander, General Creighton Abrams, demanded better advisors, and not until late 1970, that the advisory program got the requested influx of top tier personnel.
Other voices in Washington had been raised, seeking an alternative approach that not only balanced the campaign between political and military means, almost from the beginning of the war. There was also a push to emphasize the holding of terrain once it had been cleared and development of population centers afterwards. This approach would also emphasize the employment of police and other security forces and securing the population. These points of view were expressed in the results of the study group led by General Creighton Abrams. The Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN), published results that indicated that the South Vietnamese forces had regressed and that 1966 could well be the decisive year in the conflict. The study stated that the key terrain in the conflict was represented by the village, district, and provincial levels of leadership and security. The crux of the group’s findings was that the American strategy was essentially flawed and that success would rest with the creation of strong indigenous security forces through the use of advisors, and that “Victory can only be achieved through bringing the individual Vietnamese . . . to support willingly the GVN (Government of South Vietnam).”

General Westmoreland, while accepting some of the concepts behind them, rejected many of the findings of the PROVN, essentially shelving the report because the situation in Vietnam did not support it. However, the fall of 1966 did see some changes, at least on paper. The Combined Campaign Plan for 1967, created by MACV and the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff, signaled the importance of pacification and directed that the majority of South Vietnamese armed forces would be committed to pacification operations. However, the main effort of the plan was still conventional.
operations against the North Vietnamese Army. 1967 did see the advent of one of the most successful initiatives of the conflict, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support program, commonly known as CORDS.

Formed in 1967, CORDS was designed to be the primary agency responsible for the conduct of pacification in South Vietnam. CORDS was unique and provides an example for future operations, in that it placed the pacification efforts of the CIA, United States Information Agency, United States Agency for International Development, and the Department of State under one organization, CORDS, with one leader. This director, the first one being Robert Komer, was then assigned as General Westmorland’s deputy commander for pacification, with the equivalent rank of a general officer. Each Corps Commander also had a deputy commander for pacification from CORDS, and under this arrangement, CORDS was able to place unified civil-military advisory teams in all of the districts and provinces of Vietnam. This was a significant boon to the pacification effort, as now it had not only had greater status and visibility as it fell under MACV, but it unified efforts between civilian and military agencies. Prior to CORDS, pacification efforts by the United States had been the epitome of disunity.

Less than a year later, the North Vietnamese conducted their largest attack of the war, the February 1968 Tet Offensive. Tet was seen as a victory by both sides. MACV characterized Tet as a victory based on North Vietnamese losses of 37,000 killed and 6,000 captured, as the North Vietnam’s loss of so many men met their measures of success given the strategy of attrition. The North Vietnamese believed that they won Tet as the losses, while substantial, served their overall purpose and sent a strategic signal to Washington. Tet was a turning point in the war as it simultaneously providing an
opportunity to change its strategy and its operational leadership in Vietnam. Tet also set the stage for Vietnamization of the war. Within four months of the offensive, President Johnson replaced General Westmoreland with Abrams, and announced that he would not seek re-election. Senator Robert F. Kennedy made redeployment from Vietnam one of the platforms of his presidential campaign and the Administration believed that the war had to be won before the forthcoming general election.69

With General Abrams’ arrival, came a new strategy.70 Previously serving as Westmoreland’s deputy, Abrams One War Strategy of 1968-72, represented a course correction. Incorporating many of the findings of the PROVN study, Abrams directed that the body count would no longer be used as a measure of effectiveness and that population security would be the goal. Tantamount to that would be MACV forces ability to separate the insurgent from the population and that its objective was to provide true and lasting security for the populace and increase civil authority and competence.71

Unfortunately for Abrams, it took over a year to fully implement his strategy, during which time the presidential elections occurred and President Nixon, became the fourth American president to undertake the issue of the Vietnam.

In July of 1969, President Nixon issued new guidance to General Abrams. These orders were that he needed to make MACV’s decisive effort the building of the South Vietnamese government’s capabilities to ensure the full responsibility for their security. Abrams assessed this as a daunting task, reporting to the new Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird that the Vietnamese Armed Forces suffered from poor leadership, high desertion rates and corruption. As such Abrams believed that they could not improve them to the size and level of proficiency that they would need to fight a combined threat
alone. Knowing that this assessment meant the United States would not be able to exit Vietnam gracefully in the near future, upon return to Washington Laird pushed for a hastening of Vietnamization. His hope was that the South Vietnamese could hold on for a period of time after the impending American withdrawal.\textsuperscript{72}

While a significant American presence remained in Vietnam until 1973, the war effort was winding down. Often lost in this is that it was not until Vietnamization began that counterinsurgency, through pacification and the training and advising of indigenous forces, truly came into existence. Unfortunately, these efforts were too little, as the advisory force was woefully under strength, and too late, having not begun in 1965. And it is in this lack of understanding of the situation and inability to create a multi-faceted strategy that the historical lessons of Vietnam lay.

From the beginning, the United States was unable to establish a clearly articulated strategy. While the North Vietnamese Army was the greatest threat facing the South Vietnamese, the early strategy of MAAG and MACV did not account for the importance and depth of the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI). MACV did not appreciate the political and logistical architecture of the enemy. Along with this, came the decision to create a South Vietnamese army that was focused on and could defeat a conventional threat. While in and of itself a sound decision, especially considering the conventional threat, MACV did not make an equally balanced effort to assist the police and other indigenous security forces. The United States did not allocate a large enough share of the manpower and resources to securing the population, showing an total lack of understanding of the role that the population, and politics play in war, and especially in counterinsurgency.
At the same time, organizations and programs such as PROVN, CAPS, CIDG, and CORDS demonstrated adaptability and progress. These organizations demonstrated an understanding of the importance of the population, and most importantly, that once an area is cleared, it must be held and further developed, or at least maintained, by the counterinsurgent lest it fall back into enemy hands. CORDS, in particular, provides another example, similar to the British Director of Operations in Malaya, of a command structure that enhances harmony of effort. By making Robert Komer General Westmoreland’s Deputy for Pacification, and giving him the authority that came with the title, CORDS was able to not only make progress, but to provide an example upon which future organizations can look to when seeking ways to harmonize their own efforts.

The Lessons and Legacy of Vietnam for the United States Army

The United States’ military commitment to the Republic of South Vietnam lasted two decades, and included the entire realm of military assistance from material and financial support, to special operations, military advising and logistical support, to the large scale deployment of troops in an effort that with the 1975 fall of Saigon proved to be an ultimately unsuccessful venture. While there are many factors from the strategic to the tactical level that contributed to this loss the most glaring was the United States Army’s unpreparedness to fight a counterinsurgency campaign. The United States not only had the opportunity to prepare its Army for COIN, but also had hindsight available to them from multiple prior experiences in COIN and other forms of low intensity conflict since the close of World War II. The Army maintained a laser like focus on the
conduct of maneuver warfare against the Warsaw Pact on the North German Plans and in the Fulda Gap in its organization, training, and education.

This is demonstrated on a number of occasions, but two of the most notable and which could have potentially had a substantial positive impact on the Army in Vietnam were the Stillwell and Howze reports.\textsuperscript{74} Had the Army fully embraced the findings of these two reports in 1962, as it did Modularity in 2004, the US Army would have been able to deploy its Southeast Asian-aligned brigade and then followed that up with the other regionally aligned brigades and purely conventional brigades as needed. Not only would these first four brigades bring maneuver forces trained in counterinsurgency operation, but they would have brought their internally sourced MTTs as well. This would have been a significant force, but not so large that it would have swung the Army’s pendulum away from its Soviet focus, but would have enabled MACV to create harmony of effort from the start in a brigade’s area of operations, with its own organic personnel. However a conventional organization of an army almost always leads to conventional employment of it.\textsuperscript{75}

Had the recommendations of the Stillwell and Howze reports been fully implemented, the force that the Army deployed to Vietnam would most likely have been employed conventionally, leading to no significant change in outcome, because of its leadership. The Army that deployed to Vietnam was, in theory, a general purpose force, but it was led by conventional leaders. While the junior leaders might be conducting all of the counterinsurgency training prescribed in FM 31-16, the leadership at higher levels, remained wedded to their previous experiences. Noted counterinsurgency theorist and practitioner Sir Robert Thompson served as the head of the British Advisory Mission in
South Vietnam from 1961 to 1965, was marginalized by the Johnson administration, members of which voiced their concern that in educating government officials on the Malayan concept of police primacy and how it might be applied in Vietnam, his true motive was to expand British influence in the region. 76

The Army had entered the war with a limited exposure to COIN in their professional military education, and left it the same way, failing, unlike the British in Malaya, to fully institutionalize the lessons learned in Vietnam. Almost every officer who entered into the Army in the 1960s and 1970s, and who formed the senior leadership that led the Army into Operations Desert Storm, and Iraqi and Enduring Freedom had served in Vietnam. This gave them the ability, over the ensuing decades, to ensure that counterinsurgency theory, tactics, techniques and procedures were a part of the service’s professional military education. The US Army instead chose to largely ignore its deficiencies in both doctrine and education. 77

This can be seen in the post-Vietnam era curriculums of the Army’s educational and training institutions. As early as 1971, training in stability operations was deleted from basic combat courses and in 1972, the Continental Army Command replaced all of its Vietnam and guerrilla warfare oriented in its advanced individual training scenarios with conventional maneuver warfare conditions.78 This decline was seen in the classrooms as well. West Point dropped its mandatory COIN course in 1974, while the Infantry School maintained 12 hours of COIN in its advanced course as late as 1978; it had dropped all COIN in its basic course. The Command and General Staff College continued to have 40 hours of COIN and low intensity conflict instruction up until 1977, but had eliminated all but 8 hours by 1979, while the Army War College had cut its study
of COIN, and stability operations to less than two days by 1975.\textsuperscript{79} This trend in education continued into the 1980s as West Point offered only three courses related to counterinsurgency; HI381, the History of Revolutionary Warfare which began with the American and French revolutions and continued through to recent revolutions, HI386, Korea, Vietnam and the American Military Experience, and SS485, Problems of the Developing Nations.\textsuperscript{80} At the Command and General Staff College of the 1980s, six electives were offered.\textsuperscript{81} These were P522, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency; A520, Research in Low Intensity Conflict; A524, Internal War and Revolution; A530, Internal Defense and Development, Host Country Military Force Roles and US Advisory Assistance, A597; Research in Terrorism; and A 626 Low Intensity Conflict: Case Studies in US Military Intervention.\textsuperscript{82}

Along with education, the Army shifted its doctrine away from insurgency and other forms of low intensity conflict as well. With a mandate from General Westmoreland, then Chief of Staff of the Army, to focus on future wars and not the last one, General William Depuy, commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, spent 1973 to 1976 revising all the Army’s warfighting doctrine.\textsuperscript{83} General Depuy had served in Vietnam both as General Westmoreland’s operations officer, or J-3, at MACV, and as a division commander. During these postings, he had argued for abandoning the Marines’ Combat Action Platoon program, and urged Westmoreland to undertake more deliberate large unit actions.\textsuperscript{84} General Depuy’s doctrine revision and the organization of the Army that followed again focused the Army squarely on the Warsaw Pact and Central Europe, and used the example of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War as a portion of the justification for it and its turn away from counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{85} The result of this
rewrite centered upon Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* published in 1976 which does not address counterinsurgency at all saying instead that

Battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw Pact is the most demanding mission the US Army could be assigned. Because the US Army is structured primarily for that contingency and has large forces deployed in that area, this manual is designed mainly to deal with the realities of such operations. The principles set forth in this manual, however, apply also to military operations anywhere in the world. Furthermore, the US Army retains substantial capabilities in its airborne, airmobile, and infantry divisions for successful operations in other theaters of war against other forces.86

General Donn Starry, Depuy’s successor at Training and Doctrine Command, wrote of the new doctrine that it was a deliberate attempt to look forward, and in doing so the Army saw two potential threats, one requiring mechanized forces and the other needing light infantry, and “decided to begin with developing operational concepts to cope with our most difficult problem, the mechanized war.”87

Even with the dearth of institutional counterinsurgency education, the Army did take a critical look at itself and continue to learn and adapt throughout the war at the unit level. After Action Reviews were conducted and while many of these resulted in merely developing techniques or new technologies designed to employ conventional firepower on the enemy, others did address the need for education and training and provided innovative solutions.88 In the late 1960s, the 101st Airborne Division placed a renewed emphasis on training in Vietnam and highlighted three practices that they believed were essential to their adaptation in Vietnam. Two of these were schools established by the Division. The first of these was the Screaming Eagle Replacement Training School (SERTS), near Bien Hoa, which was designed of all incoming soldiers to attend.89 The 101st also established an Airmobile Training Course; a familiarization course designed for all incoming aviators and field grade officers, and was attended by all of the
Division’s brigade and battalion commanders as well as their operations and air officers.  

Major General Kenneth Wickham, Commanding General of the 101st in 1970, also highlighted his unit’s adaptation and training initiatives in the After Action Report (AAR), for Operation Randolph Glenn. The Division saw three distinct and complex tasks; internal defense and COIN; territorial security; and population resource control and environmental improvement or civic action, that were to be conducted simultaneously during the operation. In order to do this the Division tasked two infantry battalions to train with the RF and PF in the Phu Loc and Phong Dien districts in order to both upgrade the effectiveness of those Territorial Forces as well as to aid in pacification in those districts. An additional three MTTs were organized by each American brigade to conduct training with the PF in the districts where the 101st did not normally operate. Illustrating the Division’s continued ability to improvise with regards to in theater training and education, Major General Wickham highlighted the effectiveness of a junior officer exchange program they had implemented. Under this program US platoon leaders and junior staff officers were exchanged between the 101st and ARVN units operating in the same battlespace. These exchanges lasted about one week and were designed to share lessons and to provide exposure to and a better understanding of each other’s organizations.

As an institution, the Army did conduct a formal review of the Vietnam War, with the Army War College and the Center for Military History both conducting detailed studies of the conflict. The Army War College’s review was published in 1980, and asserted that the Army had not learned to deal with counterinsurgency operations and had
instead developed a strategy and doctrine that they were to be avoided. The study went on to emphasize the problems of the Army’s doctrine and that the Army had failed to understand one of the key lessons from the Vietnam War, that military power alone could not win in a counterinsurgency.

Colonel Harold Summers wrote the rebuttal to the War College’s report, publishing *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* in 1982. Due to Colonel Summers’ influence and later assignments, his book is often viewed as the official position of the Army. In his book, Summers contradicts many of the War College report’s findings and emphasizes the requirement for the Army to maintain a focus on maneuver warfare, and that the defeat in Vietnam was due in no small part to a lack of clarity and understanding between the political and military objectives of the conflict. Focusing on understanding the Vietnam War in Clausewitz’s terms and concepts, Summers writes that the United States “failed to properly employ our armed forces so as to secure U.S. national objectives in Vietnam.” Summers goes on to conclude that the key aspect of the Army’s failure in Vietnam was neither tactics nor organization, but that it had not properly developed its capacity for strategic thinking to a level expected of a professional army.

The Army’s difficulty in dealing with low intensity conflicts predated Vietnam, and the loss there proceeded to exacerbate the situation. While a tremendous amount of work was done to try and capture the lessons of this war, the Army as an institution ignored them, preferring instead to focus on maneuver warfare and the active defense doctrine of the 1976 edition of FM 100-5. The effects of Vietnam were felt at the national level as well, with a general consensus being that the Army, and all US forces should
avoid counterinsurgency and low intensity conflict situations, and instead be reserved for
situations where they can provide overwhelming combat power to defeat and enemy.100
What this meant in reality was that the US Army, save for a small minority, failed to
internalize the lessons and experiences of Vietnam, creating a void in doctrine,
organization, education and training in the decades that led up to the invasions of Iraq and
Afghanistan.

1Major General Edward Lansdale, “Contradictions in Military Culture.” in, The
Lessons of Vietnam, ed. W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson Frizzell (New York: Crane,
Russak and Company, 1977), 43.

2Nationalism was a key aspect of their narrative but not really a motivating factor
for the rural populace. It served to legitimize the effort, but nationalism was often
explained to the local populace as a component of assuaging their grievances, not as an
ends unto itself. Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley, CA: University of

3Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of

4United States Department of Defense, The Pentagon Papers; The Senator Gravel

5General David Petraeus, The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam
(Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Services, 1987), 58.

6Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins

7Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl USA (Retd), “Counterinsurgency in Vietnam,” in
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian
(Oxford: Osprey, 2010), 120.

8Lansdale, “Contradictions in Military Culture,” 44.

9Ibid., 44.

10Ibid., 45.

11Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American

13 In April of 1961, President Kennedy launched an invasion to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro in Cuba. The plan was for a force of Cuban exiles that were trained by the CIA to invade southern Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. This force was defeated in approximately 72 hours by the Soviet trained Cuban armed forces causing severe fallout for the President both politically and prestige-wise around the world.


18 Brigadier General Richard Stillwell, USA memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, “Army Activities in Underdeveloped Areas Short of War” (13 October 1961), xxviii. See also Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, 106. General Stillwell also wrote to the Secretary of the Army in his findings that the types of activities that constitute COIN: unconventional warfare and stability operations, are “simply auxiliary weapons within the total array of U.S. power.” He also concluded that the Army needed to assign its best personnel to work in these fields and that it had the ability to do so without degradation of its other missions and functions.

19 This finding echoes Sir Robert Thompson who wrote in *Defeating Communist Insurgency* that the primary role for special forces is to make contact with local tribes or leadership and then recruit and organize local defense forces.


22 Ibid., 44.


The Civilian Irregular Defense Group, or CIDG, was started by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961 with implementation by USSF as a local defense initiative. Within six months 40 villages in the Darlac Province had established CIDG and been pacified. By the time General Westmoreland assumed command, the CIDG program had been transferred from the CIA to MACV and in January 1965 the USSF were re-missioned away from CIDG to conduct more conventional operations. For more information see Nagl, “Counterinsurgency in Vietnam,” 124.


Andrew J. Birtle, in *US Army Counterinsurgency and Counterinsurgency Doctrine 1942-1976* discussed this in depth. By 1964, some progress was being made in expanding the Army’s COIN education. For example, majors attending the Army’s Command and General Staff College were receiving 42 hours of COIN instruction and an additional 142 hours of COIN-related topics throughout their 38 week course of instruction. However, the efficacy of that training remains in question, especially regarding the COIN-related topics. Birtle writes that at the US Military Academy, “Evolution of American Ideals as Reflected in American Literature from 1607 to the Present,” an English course, was COIN-related as it provided cadets with background on American ideals and the American way of life.

Harkins had been a purely conventional commander who gave little or no credence to the need for popular support or the concept of winning hearts and minds, and the strategy in place reflected this. One example of this was his lack of support for the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, or CIDG, that had been started by the CIA and implemented by United States Army Special Forces beginning in the late 1961. Though it showed significant progress, by the time that Westmoreland assumed command the control of the CIDG program had been stripped from the CIA and given to MACV.
Westmoreland further emasculated the program when he re-missioned the Special Forces away from CIDG onto more conventional operations in January 1965.


37 In *Dereliction of Duty*, Brigadier General H. R. McMaster writes that Johnson’s decision not to mobilize the reserve forces was based on his priority being domestic programs, such as the Great Society and a desire to avoid taking this decision to Congress as the mobilization would have required legislation. Michael Lind argues in *Vietnam: The Necessary War* that the limited war in Vietnam was not limited enough and that avoiding a full mobilization was the correct choice. President Johnson feared that calling up the Reserves would create war fever and would increase the overall scale and shape of the war.


41 Ibid., 66.


45 Lieutenant General Harold G Moore and Joseph L. Galloway, *We Were Soldiers Once...And Young* (New York: Random House, 1992), 400.


47 Ibid., 174.


49 Ibid., 6.


54 Ibid., 106.


56 Department of the Army, *Program of Instruction for Military Assistance Training Advisor Course* (Fort Bragg NC: US Army Special Warfare Center, 1962), ii.


58 Department of the Army, *Program of Instruction for Military Assistance Training Advisor Course*, iv.


Komer also had a special relationship with President Johnson, and so also reported to him.


See Hennessy, *Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972*, 118, for more discussion in the impact of CORDS on I Corps and III MAF. Up to this point in the war, the Marine Corps had controlled and administered their own civic action and pacification program in I Corps. Hennessy discusses that CORDs, while a blow to the Marines’ autonomy did not destroy what they had done, and that CORDs adopted many of their principles and methodologies.


Though the debate as to whether or not there truly was a change and strategy, and as to which general better understood counterinsurgency, that is not within the scope of this paper. What is fact is that after Tet the nature of the war, and the enemy had changed. While Westmoreland says that he wanted to commit more forces to pacification, his hands were tied as the conventional threat was greater and he had to provide security from the conventional army before he could do pacification and other COIN operations. Abrams had the luxury of having inherited a situation that allowed him to expand beyond conventional operations.


Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 60.


Dr. Richard Downie, *Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War* (Westport CT: Prager, 1998), 109. Conrad Crane provides additional evidence of this in his 2002 monograph “Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia,” writing, “the time has come for the Army to look more carefully at Vietnam, which seems more relevant for our current campaign against terrorism. As distasteful as the proposition may seem, in order to truly be a Full Spectrum
force, the Army must be prepared to deal with all aspects of a conflict resembling the lost war in Southeast Asia.”


79 Ibid.


81 Of note when looking at COIN training and future leadership of the Army, General Colin Powell attended Infantry Advanced course in 1964, CGSC in 1967 and the National War College in 1975; General Tommy Franks attended the Field Artillery Officers Advanced Course in 1972, the Armed Forces Staff College in lieu of CGSC in 1976, and Army War College in 1984; Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez attended the Armor Officers Advanced Course in 1978, CGSC in 1986, and AWC in 1992; General David Petraeus attended CGSC in 182 and completed a Senior Service College Fellowship at Georgetown University in lieu of the Army War College in 1994.


88 See Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, for more discussion on tactical innovations and the American propensity to solve all problems with technology and money.

89 While the British FTC may have provided a model for the course, SERTS was a Division level course and as such did not have the assets or availability that the theater level FTC did.

91Operation Randolph Glenn took place in the Thua Thien Province from December 1969 to March 1970, and was designed to provide increased security in the province by blunting North Vietnamese attacks. It was notable in that the 101st conducted operations in conjunction with RF/PF and ARVN and provided assistance to local government officials as well.


93Ibid., 5.

94Ibid.


96Ibid., 72.

97See General Petraeus, *The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam*, p 282-286, for further discussion on *On Strategy*, and its place as “military gospel” and inclusion on professional reading lists. Dr. Downie also discusses this book in *Learning from Conflict*, p 73-74, noting that while many of the Army’s professional reading lists include *On Strategy*, the War College’s report is noticeably absent and only 6 out of 392 students surveyed at CGSC had read it. In *Vietnam: The Necessary War*, Michael Lind provides yet another perspective, arguing that had the United States embraced Colonel Summers’ strategies, it would have caused China to escalate the conflict into a Sino-American war in lieu of a proxy conflict. While Lind agrees with Colonel Summers that the South Vietnamese population was not the conflict’s center of gravity, he disagrees with Summers who believes, displaying a conventional mindset, that the COG is the North Vietnamese Army, Lind argues that it is the population of the United States upon which the power and limiting factors of the conflict rested.


99 Ibid., 194.

100This is commonly referred to as the Weinberger or Powell-Weinberger doctrine and played a critical role first in Operation Desert Storm and later in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom when the initial position of the Department of Defense was that it fought wars, and did not “do nation-building.”
CHAPTER 5

IRAQ

Vietnamization took hold in the early 1970s, in 1973, the Arab-Israeli War occurred, and the Soviet Union’s strength in Eastern Europe was perceived to grow stronger. The confluence of these events enabled the Army to focus its attention away from counterinsurgency and back onto conventional maneuver warfare. Not only did the institution of the United States Army not truly heed the lessons of Vietnam as previously discussed, in many cases it conveniently forgot them completely. The next three decades were spent preparing for the next great maneuver war. General Starry continued the post-Vietnam doctrinal work of General Depuy with the publication in 1982 of an updated FM 100-5. This version of *Operations* centered around the doctrine of AirLand Battle which while designed to meet the “highly mechanized forces typical of Warsaw Pact or Soviet surrogates in southwest or northeast Asia,” does not really address both ends of this spectrum.\(^1\) The manual is designed for conflict alongside NATO forces and its real effort went toward integrating air and ground elements in maneuver, making no mention of counterinsurgency, low intensity conflict, or stability operations. “The AirLand Battle will be dominated by the force that retains the initiative and, with deep attack and decisive maneuver, destroys its opponent’s abilities to fight and to organize in depth.”\(^2\) The echoes of pre-Vietnam become even more eerie as much like the US Army’s experience in the 1950s, it was again preparing for the general war between the United States and its enemies, even while it was fighting small wars and stability operations in Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, Bosnia and Kosovo. In 1991, Operation Desert Storm
validated this position as the military conducted a swift and decisive counterattack against Saddam Hussein’s army and quickly reached its tactical and strategic objectives.³

In an 2006 segment on PBS, retired Army General John Keane, a Vietnam veteran himself and the former Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army, who acted as the Chief of Staff during the summer of 2003 as the insurgency formed in Iraq, told reporter Jim Lehrer that “after the Vietnam War, we purged ourselves of everything that dealt with irregular warfare or insurgency, because it had to do with how we lost that war. In hindsight, that was a bad decision.”⁴ The same trends seen in the 1800s, and again after World War II, became apparent again; the United States Army did not focus its education, training or preparation on creating a true general purpose force capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict. It instead focused the bulk of its efforts on preparing a force that could conduct maneuver warfare against a peer opponent, relegating almost all low intensity operations to the Special Forces. While the need to reorient on Europe and maneuver warfare may have been justified, the Army failed to institutionalize the knowledge learned during the Vietnam War. In the closing years of the war, and into the post-Vietnam era the Army as an institution abandoned its low intensity or COIN capability. The curriculum at West Point and the Command and General Staff College reflect this where the study of COIN and low intensity conflicts not only decreased but was often done surreptitiously if at all.⁵

In 1993, the US Army released another version of FM 100-5, updated since Operation Desert Storm. This time TRADOC, under the command of Desert Storm veteran General Fred Franks, included a chapter covering “Operations Other Than War.”⁶ In eight pages, the chapter defines the environment principles and potential activities that
the Army must have to undertake in what it termed OOTW. These included the principles of objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security along with thirteen activities that include insurgency and COIN along with peacekeeping, support to domestic civil authority, arms control and humanitarian assistance. In the section on insurgency, the manual states that the US often provides support to both insurgents and counterinsurgents and that the Army’s support to a host nation’s counterinsurgency campaign come primarily through foreign internal defense training, and logistical support. When supporting an insurgency, the manual defers to special operations, stating, “due to their extensive unconventional warfare training, SOF are well-suited to provide this support. General purpose forces may also be called upon when the situation requires their particular specialties or when the scope of operations is so vast that conventional forces are required.”

In the aftermath of the success of Operation Desert Storm, the Army felt vindicated in its post-Vietnam reforms, and in Operation Iraqi Freedom, deployed a force that as a whole was not aware of the entirety of its doctrine, and had neither the education nor the training with which to combat an insurgency.

**Attack into Iraq: Spring 2003**

The United States military and its coalition partners crossed the border to begin their attack into Iraq in March of 2003. Designed with four phases, the campaign’s objectives went beyond the removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party from power. Its other stated objective was to liberate Iraq and provide it people with a peaceful, stable and secure country that was a fully functioning member of the world society. On paper, the plan appeared to understand that the forces participating would
have to operate at both the high and low ends of the spectrum of intensity and that in addition to maneuver warfare they would be conducting stability operations that might include humanitarian aid and peace enforcement.\textsuperscript{12} Phase One: Preparation was designed to secure international support, establishing the air and sea lines of communications into theater, and posture US forces for the invasion. Phase Two: Shaping the Battlespace included such actions as beginning to neutralize or interdict the Iraqi command and control structure, special reconnaissance missions, the securing of key terrain to support the invasion, preparing the logistical footprint to support sustained combat operations and the continuation of diplomacy and operations to counter the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Phase Three: Decisive Offensive Operations comprised of the air campaign, preparatory ground operations, and the attack north to Baghdad focused on removing the Saddam Regime from power and would conclude with the securing of Baghdad. Phase Four: Post Hostilities was centered on the transition from conventional combat operations to stability operations. This phase ostensibly included reconstruction and it was recognized that the transition between Phases III and IV might be fluid and not happen simultaneously across the country or even across a large city.\textsuperscript{13}

Much has been written about the United States failure to adequately recognize and plan for what occurred during Phase IV, and while this debate is beyond the scope of this thesis, the framework for Phase IV does deserve mention.\textsuperscript{14} During the planning of the invasion, there were several different incarnations of the Phase IV plan. One of the first of these was General Tommy Franks, the Central Command Commander’s, original estimate of needing 250,000 troops in order to conduct stability and reconstruction operations.\textsuperscript{15} Franks’ staff expected that the initial military victory would come quickly
and that the troop levels would peak after the victory before quickly drawing down. Deemed too large a force by the Secretary of Defense, the US planners created another plan which while it did account for the collapse of the regime and its infrastructure was still hampered by false assumptions. These assumptions were that military operations would have a definitive end, and that there would not be an extensive or cohesive resistance to the Coalition once the regime fell, that the Coalition Forces would be dealing primarily with humanitarian assistance operations, and that the coalition would be able to hand over the governance of Iraq to the people of Iraq and its governing institutions very quickly. In the end, CENTCOM, and its operational command in theater, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), went forward with a plan to defeat the Iraqi Armed Forces, topple the Saddam Regime, and then be prepared to support another agency, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), which would be coordinating and planning the postwar operations. Established by Presidential Directive within the Department of Defense, in January of 2003, the ORHA was charged with the planning and implementation of Phase IV operations to include dismantling of weapons of mass destruction, defeating terrorist networks, reshaping and reforming the Iraqi security forces, protecting the Iraqi infrastructure, the restoration of essential services, and the establishment and transition to a new Iraqi authority. For all intents and purposes, the military, using a model that it had used in Desert Storm, Grenada and Panama would move in quickly, fight the war, and then redeploy, leaving the reconstruction efforts to other agencies. In its haste to hand off the bulk of Phase IV and focus on major combat operations, the military not only lost sight of the potential for an insurgency, but their role in combating it.
The United States and its military were unprepared to confront the Iraqi insurgency that followed the initial push into Baghdad. The Army and the Marine Corps had spent the bulk of their post-Vietnam years focused on learning and perfecting the art and science of employing combined arms in maneuver warfare. This was a tack borne of its desire to forget Vietnam and embrace conventional warfare. It was also a much different approach than the British had taken in southern Iraq, where the British senior leadership, quickly re-missioned their force to conducting stability operations reminiscent of their experiences in Northern Ireland. One of the first major missteps taken by the United States came quickly on the heels of the fall of Baghdad. Believing that there would be no need for a prolonged deployment of troops, and hoping that the governance of Iraq could be turned over to a new Iraqi government by the fall of 2003, on 16 April 2003, General Franks told the leaders of CFLCC that they should prepare to turn over control of all operations in Iraq to the US Army’s V Corps and prepare to redeploy within 60 days. CFLCC which had heretofore served as the operational command for the invasion, providing the strategic guidance to the units in combat would be replaced by V Corps, one of the war fighting units in Iraq, who would then be re-flagged as Combined Joint Task Force-7, or CJTF-7.

Transition to Counterinsurgency: Summer 2003

CJTF-7, under the command of Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, stood up and assumed their mission on 15 June 2003, and crafted a mission statement that detailed their support to the Coalition Provisional Authority, which had replaced the ORHA, and CENTCOM. In his memoir, Wiser in Battle, Lieutenant General Sanchez writes that the mission of CJTF-7 had been to continue offensive operations to eliminate any remaining 

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enemy forces and defend Iraq from any external threats. CJTF-7 would also provide
direct support to the Coalition Provisional Authority, and provide any needed aid for
humanitarian assistance or reconstruction efforts in Iraq.\textsuperscript{21} The strength and the weakness
of this mission statement was that it gave an incredible amount of freedom to Lieutenant
General Sanchez’s subordinate commanders. Each of them had the flexibility to conduct
operations in their battlespace as they saw fit.

In the Sunni Triangle, north of Baghdad, operations of the 4th Infantry Division,
commanded by Major General Raymond Odierno, were often seen as heavy handed, as
were the actions of the 82nd Airborne Division, operating west of Baghdad, however the
tactics of Major General David Petraeus’ 101st Airborne Division, operating in Mosul,
took on a different approach, focusing more on securing the population than his adjacent
division commanders.\textsuperscript{22} In attempting to explain these divergent methods for operating,
retired Colonel Paul Hughes of the United States Institute for Peace, who served in Iraq
as a senior member of both the ORHA and its successor, the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA), said that at the US did not recognize the beginnings of the insurgency
as such.\textsuperscript{23} This lack of guidance led the commanders to execute operations based on their
understanding of the situation and their personal experiences and education.

Colonel Peter Mansoor, who assumed command of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored
Division in Baghdad in the summer of 2003, writes in his book, Baghdad at Sunrise, A
Brigade Commanders War in Iraq, that prior to deploying to Iraq the 1st Armored
Division had trained for major combat operations, but had paid scant attention to the
conduct of Stability or Reconstruction Operations, and that the Division leadership
seemed overwhelmed by the magnitude of these tasks.\textsuperscript{24} Colonel Mansoor, a former
history professor who had studied the history of insurgencies extensively, says that the commanders on the ground fell back on their experiences and education, and as the Army’s Professional Military Education had all but ignored COIN in the aftermath of Vietnam, there was little doctrine and no institutional understanding of it, thus the commanders understanding of the budding insurgency were not equal. In describing his understanding of the situation and the direction that it was taking in Baghdad in the summer of 2003, Mansoor writes that the day after assuming command, his brigade hosted a team from the British Army’s Operational Training and Advising Group. These soldiers, all veterans of Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and other British campaigns, held a seminar with the brigade’s leadership to instruct them on counterinsurgency and the role of framework and surge operations. This tutorial and their papers formed the foundation for what became the brigade’s campaign plan for the rest of the tour. This session and the commanders’ new common understanding of COIN also led to one of Mansoor’s first orders as brigade commander which was to issue instructions to redefine how the brigade would interact with civilians aimed to avoid alienating the masses.

In the Anbar Province, one former Marine battalion commander said that the Marines, on the move north and in Al Kut, recognized the insurgency in 2003 and were conducting operations that their doctrine specified for COIN as early as April, May, and June of that year. However, as with much of the invasion force, the focus for the initial Marine units deployed at this time was on getting back on their boats and redeploying, not on a long term counterinsurgency campaign. During this same period, in Fallujah, soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division were seen to fire into a crowd on at least two occasions, killing or wounding over 100 Iraqis. While the 4th Infantry Division
continued to conduct several battalion, brigade and even multi-brigade sized operations targeting the resistance it was facing, officers within the division were recognizing the insurgency and that they had to attack it in different ways. Colonel Frederick Rudeisheim’s 3rd Brigade shifted its focus from attacking the insurgents once the majority of fighting had wound down in the summer of 2003 to the non-lethal types of operations that highlight a traditional COIN campaign, these included reconstruction, forming a local government and establishing Iraqi security forces. By the end of 2003, 3rd Brigade estimates that over 65 percent of its combat power was allocated to non-lethal operations.31 In Baqubah, junior officers from Colonel David Hogg’s brigade demonstrated an increased understanding of the environment and had recognized their shifting role in the late spring of 2003. One tank company commander described his role as being:

responsible for a town of about 10,000 people, including the function of the town. The executive officer was the security officer, and platoon leaders served as minister of public works (water and electricity), minister of oil (gas and propane), and minister of education. The FSO tracked the progress and kept a database of people and locations within the town. The task force set up city councils in each of the larger towns within the area of operations so that with our help, they could get the city functioning until the government was running. Our focus was to help in whatever way we could to get the city functioning.32

Meanwhile, in Mosul, Major General Petraeus, while often at odds with Ambassador Bremer and the CPA was conducting what appeared to be a decidedly different campaign.33 The 101st Airborne Division had conducted a train up much like that of the 1st Armored Division. It was focused on the high intensity combat that the Army leadership expected the Division to have to face, yet the 101st had also had to deal with civilians on the battlefield (COBs), during much of their training. While not training to conduct COIN operations, the insertion of the COBs forced the division to prepare for
more than just offensive and defensive operations, a nuance that helped the division’s
combat brigades immensely during 2003 and 2004. General Petraeus placed primacy
for his division on securing the population, believing this to be the key to successful
COIN campaigns, and weighed the balance between taking insurgents off the street and
creating more insurgents before approving any combat operations. His early emphasis on
this combined with his reaching out to both the Kurdish and Sunni leadership in northern
Iraq helped to keep insurgent attacks in the 101st’s area of operations very low
throughout their deployment. According to one of his brigade commanders, General
Petraeus assumed command of the 101st with an understanding that defeating the military
was only one portion of a war, and while the senior leadership of the Army may not have
been prepared for this, General Petraeus had consistently emphasized the role and
importance of Stability Operations, which was the only relevant doctrine that was current
when the war began, in any conflict. Additionally, General Petraeus had emphasized
stability operations during each of the brigades’ pre-deployment training and training
center rotations before the invasion, and this commander believes that it was General
Petraeus’ personal command emphasis on this type of campaign that led to their success
in Mosul. General Petraeus also stressed the imperative that there is no solution that is
applicable to every situation, writing in the 101st Airborne Division’s 2003 after action
review that as “a final note, I would caution those who would seek to apply the lessons
learned from the combat phase of OIF to future operations. This operation was, like all
operations are, highly contextual. What did (or didn’t) work here may not necessarily
work (or not work) in other situations with a different enemy, in a different cultural
context, in different terrain, and in a different environment.”

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In southern Iraq, the British were conducting a different campaign as well. The lessons that their Operational Training and Advising Group had been teaching to American units like Colonel Mansoor’s brigade were borne out of the British Army’s half century of experience in COIN. Using models from Malaya and Northern Ireland, the British quickly settled into their framework operations focusing their efforts on the collection of intelligence. Their system of framework operations, as well as the precise employment of lethal fires was designed to not alienate the Iraqis. One former British regimental commander remarked that while they may not have known the specifics of their doctrine, as represented by the British Army’s 2001 manual *Counter Insurgency Operations*, the term, if not all of the concepts of, hearts and minds was bred into the British Army through experience in Northern Ireland. Accordingly, the concept of securing the population was understood by everyone who served there; it was both intuitive and instinctive. The British also seemingly understood that along with intelligence, the raising of indigenous forces was essential to restoring security. As such, they, along with the other Coalition Forces in southern Iraq, put a premium on their establishment and development in the late summer of 2003, several months before the bulk of CJTF-7 began standing up Iraqi security forces. However, even given this experience and perceived head start, the situation in Basra degraded severely in the years to come. Given all of the British Army’s COIN experience, many British leaders failed to familiarize themselves with their doctrine, as the common belief was that COIN was automatic, and as such was not something into which they put a lot of training effort or emphasis. This lack of understanding was one of the key factors that led to their discarding of their COIN principles, and the ceding of Basra to the Shia militias.
Changes of Command and Strategy

In July of 2004, the United States adjusted the command structure in Iraq, and along with it the leadership and the campaign plan. Formerly Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army, General George Casey took command of the newly established Multi-National Forces-Iraq, and Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, commander of the Army’s III Corps, assumed the mantle of Multi-National Corps Iraq. These two organizations along with the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), were the new commands designed by the US to assist the Iraqis in rebuilding their government and securing their nation after the transfer of sovereignty on 30 June 2004. General Casey at MNF-I would provide the strategic and operational level planning and guidance while working alongside the newly appointed American ambassador to Iraq, Ambassador John Negroponte, while Lieutenant General Metz and MNC-I would oversee the tactical employment of Coalition Forces and MNSTC-I would relieve Ambassador Bremer and the CPA of the training and equipping of the Iraqi Security Forces. Additionally the US Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Directorate was overseeing the reconstruction efforts in Iraq. General Casey brought with him a coherent strategy for MNF-I, built upon two pillars. In a strategy that echoed the Vietnamization program of General Abrams, General Casey’s mandate was to build up the Iraqi Security Forces quickly and then transition security to them. Over the next year, General Casey, though often maligned, did spearhead a number of initiatives to increase the United States understanding of COIN. In August of 2004, MNF-I published their campaign plan. This was the first plan issued in theater that laid out the military’s objectives in Iraq, and it demonstrated a much clearer understanding of COIN theory as it described how the
military strategy was linked to political goals. For the leaders on the ground, however, the most influential portion of the campaign plan was a paper written by retired Lieutenant Colonel Kalev Sepp entitled Best Practices in Counterinsurgency. Later published in *Military Review* and used as the basis for numerous professional development sessions, this paper listed 53 different insurgencies of the 20th century and described common themes and best practices that could be taken from them. General Casey sought to create a cohesive strategic framework for the conduct of COIN in Iraq, while at the same time, preparing to turn it over to that nation’s the fledgling government.

Unfortunately for MNF-I, one of Sepp’s unsuccessful counterinsurgency practices, the concentration of military units on large bases was also a key tenet of General Casey’s plan. Believing that the presence of Coalition soldiers in the cities, towns and neighborhoods was actually inciting more unrest, and preparing to transition as much of the security of Iraq as possible to the ISF, General Casey planned for their withdrawal to large bases. Unfortunately, MNF-I did not accompany this withdrawal with an aggressive public relations or information operations campaign to explain what the forces were doing. This failure led to the Iraqis inside Baghdad viewing the withdrawal suspiciously “rather than accepting the stated motive that we were merely empowering local Iraqi security forces.”

The increasing sectarian split in the security forces compounded the suspicion of the Iraqis who were coming to view the security forces as simply another militia, a problem that would continue to haunt Iraq and eventually play a role in the Awakening.

In November of 2005, the United States published its National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, and in it addressed the principles of COIN and how military and political
goals were intertwined. This document also set out the Clear, Hold, Build strategy for 2006, but still handcuffed the COIN forces in Iraq because it did not address the fact that any COIN campaign, especially one that focuses on securing the population and separating the insurgents from it like Clear, Hold, and Build, was incompatible with the planned drawdown of forces. Unfortunately up to this point only two Clear-Hold-Build operations, those in Tal Afar and Al Qa’im had been successful. The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq also lacked clear input from the Government of Iraq. While it does state that all efforts are being integrated with those of the Iraqi government, it neither discusses how the Iraqi perspective has been incorporated into it nor does it fully take into consideration the true capabilities of the Government of Iraq and its security forces.

Colonel H. R. McMaster commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment understood that he would be deploying his unit to Iraq, and had tailored his unit’s pre-deployment training for COIN. He instituted a robust educational program that centered on language, history and COIN theory, a program that paid off when the deployed to Tal Afar. Prior to deploying, Colonel McMaster inculcated the key to COIN was to focus on the population, not on the enemy into his organization. The pre-deployment training period for the regiment included language training for ten percent of the unit and a reading list and OPD program for his officers that was heavy on the theory of counterinsurgency and the history of Iraq and the Middle East. Upon arrival in Iraq, the 3rd ACR began by securing the border and villages that offered sanctuary to foreign fighters and insurgent supplies coming into the area from Syria. They did this in conjunction with the local Iraqi Security Forces, and then sought to engage the local Sunni leadership. Taking a suggestion from local leaders, Colonel McMaster’s unit built
a berm to control access in and out of Tal Afar, and established over two dozen combat outposts in the city. Over the next several months, the 3rd ACR helped to train a responsible multi-ethnic police force, establish a functioning government, and to emphasize treating all Iraqis with dignity and respect, which led to an immense drop in attacks during their deployment.54

The 3rd Battalion 6th Marine Regiment led the second successful Clear-Hold Build operation in Al Qa’im. In November 2005, during Operation Steel Curtain, the 3/6 Marines supported by more Marines and an Iraqi Army battalion cleared the city over ten days.55 As with the 3rd ACR, the key was the ability to hold the city afterwards, and just as Colonel McMaster did in Tal Afar, the Marines did it by establishing combat outposts and Joint Security Stations across the city. The battalion commander believed that by co-locating with the population they would be able to garner more intelligence from the population and that the insurgents left in Al Qa’im would be forced into action as well. While the Marine Corps has a long history of participating in low intensity conflicts and living alongside indigenous security forces, the commander did not have any personal experience with it and knew that he was taking a significant, but calculated risk in dispersing his troops.56 The Marines effect on Al Qa’im as they occupied 12 outposts, each in conjunction with an Iraqi Army platoon, was tremendous and led directly to a substantial increase in support and recruits for the Iraqi Security Forces from local Sunni tribes who had been unwilling to support the army and police previously.57 However, for every positive example of leaders and units employing creative techniques and “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” there were far too many that were still not.
The traditional training model of the US Army had led its leaders to think primarily in terms of kinetic action. After years of training in this mindset, the leadership in Iraq was seeing that many organizations were not able to conduct COIN operations, especially the non-lethal aspects of them nearly as well as they could conduct major combat operations. In the fall of 2005, General Casey looked to the past to address this issue, using the examples of the British who established the FTC in Malaya, and the US Army’s own Military Advisor Training Academy from the Vietnam era, and establishing the COIN Center for Excellence, also known as the CFE, at Camp Taji in Iraq. General Casey’s intent was to establish a common understanding of COIN and the MNF-I campaign plan for the leaders of every conventional unit that deployed into theater. The program of instruction in 2005, called for all maneuver brigade, battalion, and company echelon commanders as well as operations officers, intelligence officers and effects coordinators to attend the six day course. The course itself was initially taught by a cadre of US Special Forces officers and NCOs, and was designed to introduce attendees to the principles and techniques of counterinsurgency. The course included such topics as Fundamentals of Insurgency, COIN Doctrine, Intelligence in COIN, COIN Mission Planning and Leadership in COIN and Population Needs, Security, and Civil Military Operations. The COIN Course also enabled both the MNF-I and MNC-I commanders to meet with each unit’s leadership and deliver their commander’s guidance personally. As did the FTC, the COIN CFE also brought in leaders from units that were already in sector to discuss the environment and security situation that they were facing at that time. The CFE was in many ways similar to the FTC in that it was an in-theater solution to address institutional educational and training shortcomings.
One battalion commander, who attended the COIN course while serving as an infantry battalion operations officer, said that the education at COIN was exactly what his battalion needed to learn as the environment had transformed and at this point in Operation Iraqi Freedom, they did not yet have any real theoretical background in COIN. Unlike any previous training events at home station, the COIN academy enabled the brigade’s leaders to all come together and learn as they had been training core competencies up to this point and had not wrapped their heads around how the environment had changed since they had redeployed in 2004. One former brigade commander remarked that value of the COIN CFE, in addition to the education was that it afforded the senior leaders of MNF-I and MNC-I an opportunity to brief their expectations and guidance to all of the leaders coming into country, down to the company level. General Odierno, then the MNF-I commander, briefed the brigade leadership on what his priorities were and what really mattered to him, ensuring that everyone understood his position.

The CFE attempted to maintain as much relevancy as possible by bringing in the members of units already in country to brief the incoming students. Oftentimes these were the unit commanders, but the CFE also had intelligence officers and local Iraqi and Iraqi Security Force leaders brief as well. A company commander who attended the CFE in 2009 believed that having leaders from the unit that his brigade would be replacing brief at the CFE was invaluable. While the CFE had a tremendous impact on US forces, British units deploying into southern Iraq were noticeably absent, not attending any of the courses offered there until February 2008.

The Army also looked to the history books for ideas on how to develop the new Iraqi Army. There was never any doubt that Iraq would need a security force, and soon
after dismantling the Iraqi Army in 2003, the CPA knew that it would need a new force. Initially known as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and then the Iraqi National Guard, training began for the ICDC in the fall of 2003 by units across Iraq.\textsuperscript{67} Designed to enable Iraqis to assume a greater role in Iraqis security, CJTF-7 had developed a training program from the ICDC that covered basic soldier skills, Traffic Control Points (TCPs), infantry squad tactics, first aid, marksmanship, drill and ceremony, as well as rules of engagement (ROE), laws of land warfare, civics, cultural awareness and human rights, and then left it up to the individual units that would be sponsoring the ICDC to organize, train, and employ the ICDC as they saw fit.\textsuperscript{68} Meanwhile, the national army, known first as the New Iraqi Army and then finally as the Iraqi Army, was being trained by a cadre of American national guardsmen and contractors from MPRI under the guidance and command of Major General Paul Eaton, the former commander of the US Army Infantry Center and School at Fort Benning.\textsuperscript{69}

The spring 2004 battle of Fallujah is seen as a low water mark for as the Iraqi Army performed poorly and many of its members deserted.\textsuperscript{70} MNF-I had previously assigned soldiers to serve as advisors to the IA, but in February 2004, had elevated the importance and visibility of the ISF development with the formation of MNSTC-I, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq under the command of Lieutenant General David Petraeus. With MNSTC-I’s formation came emphasis on the importance of advising and mentoring the new force and the Military Transition Team (MiTT).\textsuperscript{71} Though not yet published, Field Manual 3-24, \textit{Counterinsurgency}, states that the training and development of the host nation’s security forces is extremely important and describes the mission of a MiTT fairly well saying that at times, “U.S. forces might be actively
engaged in fighting insurgents while simultaneously helping the host nation build its own security forces. The MiTTs would be responsible to advising and mentoring the Iraqi Army units to which they were assigned. A descendent of the advisory mission in Vietnam and a technique already being employed in Afghanistan, the MiTTs were the military’s answer to training and advising indigenous forces on a nationwide scale. The first advisors were selected and trained in a haphazard manner; many of them were Army Reservists, and the initial quality of MiTT team members varied greatly between soldiers and teams.

The USMC fielded MiTTs as well, and faced the same problems as the Army, and their predecessors in Vietnam; fielding qualified advisors. In his book, In The Gray Area, Lieutenant Colonel Seth Folsom writes that while the military touted the transition team mission as the main effort in Iraq, it was ostensibly one of the Commandant of the Marine Corps’ top priorities; the reality was that the best officers and NCOs were not being chosen for this duty. He states that “the personnel officers of the division and other major subordinate commands within I Marine Expeditionary Force were merely going down the list of their master personnel rosters, selecting to serve on the teams any and every available company and field-grade officer, staff noncommissioned officer and junior Marine not already spoken for within the force.” Another Marine MiTT Team leader said that while his team was comprised of members of his organic artillery battery, they did not have any special skills or qualifications and only received three months training as a Police Transition Team before deploying. However, the training that they did receive at their home station and during Asian Viper, their MRX at Fort Polk, Louisiana was very beneficial to them.
MiTT selection and training became more formalized over the ensuing years, with the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley Kansas providing the bulk of the training, conducting over 60 classes and 15,000 advisors from 2006 to 2009.\textsuperscript{80} However, the fact that it took three years and the re-tasking of a heavy brigade to form the training cadre highlight the conventional forces unpreparedness for counterinsurgency. The problems of advising were not unprecedented, and could have been foreseen had the institutional Army maintained an appreciation for the lessons of Vietnam.\textsuperscript{81}

One of the hallmarks of the US Army has been its ability to produce agile and introspective leaders, who while not necessarily prepared for a situation are able to adapt and succeed.\textsuperscript{82} Tactical commanders repeatedly demonstrated this in Iraq; company commanders learned to adjust the level of force that they employed, they discovered innovative ways to develop security, and found that by conducting a cordon and knock versus a cordon a more aggressive cordon and search they might receive more intelligence from the local populace. However this was all done at the individual soldier or unit level, these were tactics, refined at the lowest level, and in the absence of an effective counterinsurgency doctrine and corresponding education there would be no way to develop a common understanding of COIN across the entire military.\textsuperscript{83} While the Army had released an interim COIN manual in 2004, it was the publication of Field Manual 3-24, \textit{Counterinsurgency}, in 2006, that provided the comprehensive doctrine that the force had been lacking.

Drawing extensively from Galula and Thompson, FM 3-24 begins by stating that:

Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse this trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to CON with the realities of a new international
arena shaped by technological advances, globalization and the spread of extremist ideologies—some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith.\textsuperscript{84}

FM 3-24 is based on the premise that while different all insurgencies are wars among the populace and it distinguishes itself from previous American COIN doctrine in three specific manners. First, it assumes that COIN campaigns will include a significant number of US troops. Second, it acknowledges that the military will most likely have to conduct the entire ranges of tasks associated with COIN, that there would not be a significant civilian force working alongside it. Thirdly, it emphasizes the complex nature of counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{85} Published almost four years after the war in Iraq began, the manual did at last provide the military with a doctrinal baseline for conducting counterinsurgency campaigns. At the same time, the introduction of FM 3-24, has not been without controversy.\textsuperscript{86} One common complaint from soldiers has been that FM 3-24 is a “wall of words” and is too strategic and as such not very useful at the company or even battalion echelon.\textsuperscript{87} This is true, in part, due to FM 3-24s writing style; recognizing that COIN cannot be conducted the same way in every instance, unlike many Army field manuals, FM 3-24 was not intended to provide a prescriptive sequence of actions to take. Additionally, Conrad Crane, one of the authors of the manual writes, that

\textit{the writing level of the manual . . . is aimed at college level, unlike most other American field manuals, which are written at the high-school level. The writers, and Lieutenant General Petraeus, felt that this more elevated discussion was necessary because of the complexity of the topic and because the target audience was generally officers at the battalion level and higher.}\textsuperscript{88}

In order to make itself accessible to all levels, the first chapter of FM 3-24 describes where counterinsurgency fits in the spectrum of conflict as well as the historical principles of COIN and includes a section on the paradoxes of counterinsurgency to illustrate the complexity of COIN and that it is sometimes counterintuitive for a soldier.\textsuperscript{89}
To address this, in 2009, the Army released FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, which was written to provide organizations from the brigade echelon and below with fundamental principles for conducting tactical COIN operations. Based on historic and contemporary lessons learned, the manual has chapters covering the fundamentals of insurgency and counterinsurgency as well tactical planning in COIN, considerations for offensive, defensive and stability operations in COIN and support to host nation security forces. Included in the appendices of FM 3-24.2, is a reading list, as well writings by T.E. Lawrence and Dr. David Kilcullen.\(^90\) FM 3-24 also had a significant influence on the new British manual, AFM 10, Part 1, *Countering Insurgency*, published in 2009 as well. One former British battalion commander summed it up well, when describing FM 3-24, and AFN 10, remarking that the “manuals give you useful tools for your quiver, but the key is that no two tools are the same.”\(^91\)

Lieutenant General David Petraeus, serving as the commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, oversaw both the writing of FM 3-24 and the curriculum of the Command and General Staff College. Recognizing the COIN void at CGSC, General Petraeus instructed that the college adjust their curriculum to meet the needs of the current operating environment. This resulted in a dramatic increase in the curriculum over previous decades with 36 percent of the core curriculum, or 201 of 555 classroom hours now being on COIN or related topics. When added to the 40 hours of COIN electives that students were averaging, and an additional 165 hours of COIN or COIN-related scenario based exercises, the average CGSC graduate was receiving over 400 classroom hours of COIN academics.\(^92\) In addition to taking 1100, Stability Operations, students were required to read *Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory*
and portions of the relevant Army doctrine such as FM 3-24. Additional blocks of instruction at CGSC covered: Stability and Reconstruction Operations: Terms, Definitions, Characteristics, and Effects; COIN Warfare: Theory and Practice; Current COIN Doctrine; COIN Analysis Framework; U.S. in the Philippines (1898-1908); Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Doctrine; and several training and advising case studies covering the British in Malaya, the French in Algeria, Soviet Union in Afghanistan and current operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines.93

While Clear-Hold-Build had been successful in Tal Afar and Al Qa’im, Baghdad represented another problem. Sectarian violence in the city had overwhelmed the Iraqi Security Forces and threatened to spiral into a nationwide civil war.94 MNC-I answered with Operations Together Forward I and II in the summer and fall of 2006.95 Similar to the operations in Tal Afar and Al Qa’im, MNC-I coordinated with local officials and involved Iraqi Security Forces, but neither operation succeeded. In the first the combined forces established new population resource control methods like checkpoints, walls and a curfew in addition to increasing their patrolling, while in the sequel, US forces cleared neighborhoods block by block. However unlike the previous operations, the US forces in Baghdad were not going to remain behind in the neighborhoods, instead relying on the Iraqi Security Forces to hold them, a task that the Iraqis unable to confront either the Sunni insurgents or the Shia militias were not ready to do.96

Operation Together Forward II not only reinforced the viewpoint that Iraq was on the brink of civil war, but demonstrated that the American strategy of transitioning security to the ISF and consolidating on large base camps out of the cities was failing as
well. Dr. David Kilcullen writes in *The Accidental Guerrilla* that the American strategy in Iraq had failed and with it had MNF-Is ability to stabilize Iraq.\(^9^7\)

**The Awakening, the Surge, and Accommodation**

Believing that the Shia dominated government of Iraq, or the Persians as they referred to them, were an existential threat, Sunni dominated Al Anbar initially welcomed Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), into western Iraq.\(^9^8\) However, by late 2005, AQI’s tactics had become too extreme and the tribes of Ramadi began their first Awakening and attempted to drive AQI from the region. The tribes formed a small armed resistance group, but were ultimately not able to defeat AQI.\(^9^9\) In the summer of 2006, then Colonel Sean MacFarland’s 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division was operating in Ramadi and conducted its own Clear-Hold-Build operation, “one neighborhood at a time by establishing combat outposts and developing a police force in the secured neighborhoods."\(^1^0^0\) As the Brigade demonstrated its resolve and its intention to maintain forces within the city as autumn approached the tribal sheiks turned to Colonel MacFarland’s troops as their new ally, against both AQI and the Persians. Concerned initially only with security, and not with reconstruction or civic action, the tribes formed the neighborhood watch organizations and began working with the American and Iraqi Security Forces.\(^1^0^1\) These local defense forces, alternatively known as the Iraqi Awakening, or Sahwa, Concerned Local Citizens, or Sons of Iraq (SoI), expanded across Iraq. The SoI conducted a variety of tasks, though their primary function was, like the Home Guard of Malaya or the Popular Forces of Vietnam to serve as neighborhood watches. Armed and sometimes given a modicum of training, these groups augmented the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces growing to more than 100,000 men across Iraq.\(^1^0^2\)
As the Awakening demonstrated the importance of local defense forces and reconciliation and reintegration in counterinsurgency, the bulk of the Army’s new doctrine was given its operational test with the Surge of 2007. The surge as outlined by President Bush in 2007, called for sending an additional 20,000 troops into Baghdad to clear and hold its neighborhoods alongside the Iraqi Security Forces. General Petraeus, now the MNF-I commander, disseminated COIN guidance for the forces in Iraq along with the operations order for the Surge in the summer of 2007. Almost serving as a condensed version of FM 3-24 and echoing many of Sepp’s “Best Practices,” Petraeus’ guidance was really a list of 23 principles along with a short explanation of them and would unpin the Surge and the legacy of FM 3-24.

The first three paragraphs define the operational change in Iraq immediately, beginning with “Secure and serve the population . . . Live among the people . . . [and] Hold areas that have been secured” telling the force and the Iraqi population that they were the objective and that American forces would be moving back into Baghdad. Realizing that clearing and area is no good unless it is able to be held, US and Iraqi forces moved into Baghdad deliberately and en masse, establishing over 50 Joint Security Stations manned by US forces, Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police across the city. General Petraeus’ next eight principles provided his guidance on how to attack the enemy, reintegrate former insurgents and the importance of cooperation with other Iraqi and Coalition government agencies; “Pursue the enemy relentlessly . . . Generate unity of effort . . . Promote reconciliation . . . Defeat the network, not just the attack . . . Foster Iraqi legitimacy . . . Employ all assets to isolate and defeat the terrorists and insurgents . . . Employ money as a weapon system . . . [and] Fight for intelligence. The final
dozen principles focused internally. They specified how the Americans should act and see themselves and were to walk, to understand the neighborhood, build relationships, look for sustainable solutions, maintain continuity and tempo through transitions, manage expectations, be first with the truth, fight the information war relentlessly, live our values, exercise initiative, prepare for and exploit opportunities, and finally, to learn and adapt.108

While the Surge was occurring in Baghdad, southern Iraq was feeling the effects of what became known as the Accommodation. After initial successes early in the war, the security situation had changed in Basra, and the British forces fundamentally misunderstood it.109 After seizing control in Basra, the British quickly settled into their counterinsurgency and peacekeeping framework operations. However, unlike in Malaya, they failed to fully understand the true nature of the threat and adapt to meet it.110 By 2006, political support for the war had waned in Britain and the British had overstretched their military in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to meet their commitments, the British had to make some compromises and draw down forces, and the vehicle to do this presented itself in Provincial Iraqi Control and the opportunity to conduct some prisoner releases.111 In a negotiation that became known as the Accommodation, the British forces would “withdraw from their remaining base in Basra City to the airport [COB Basra]; Jaysh al Mahdi would cease attacking British targets; and the British would release, over time, their 70 Jaysh al Mahdi prisoners,” and portray the situation in Basra to the public as mere criminality, not an insurgency.112 With the shift to Iraqi-led security, the British, with no role in the city, had been expanding their operations along the Iranian border, conducting combined operations with the 14th Iraqi Army Division and Iraqi Border Patrol forces.113 Seeing the situation in Basra deteriorating but bolstered by the successes
of 14th Division along the border, General Mohan Al-Furayji, the commander of the Basra Operations Command, went to Baghdad in March 2007 to request assistance from MNC-I and the Iraqi government. General Mohan briefed that he would need approximately 90 days to set the conditions for his operation, requesting logistical support from MNC-I and outlining a combined British and Iraqi training plan to be conducted in the interim to improve their proficiency. Prime Minister Maliki was briefed on the Mohan Plan the next day and promptly told General Petraeus on Friday 21 March 2010, that he was relocating to Basra in order to oversee Operation Charge of the Knights which would be launched the following Monday.

The Iraqi’s launched their assault into the city on 25 March 2008 and were initially repulsed by a militia that numbered around 10,000 fighters. However, Prime Minister Maliki was not going to let this operation fail and repositioned elements of another Iraqi Army Division and a National Police Brigade to Basra each of which came with a MiTT Team. MNC-I also redirected aerial reconnaissance assets, attack helicopters, logistical support and an infantry battalion to Basra.

The British forces in Basra used the appearance of the other MiTTs along with backing from general Mohan to position previously identified MiTT forces alongside the 14th Division within 48 hours. With their reinforcements and the support of the MiTTs and Coalition aviation, Mohan’s forces regained control of the city with their counterattack on 1 April, following which Prime Minister Maliki ordered a cease fire in order to conduct leader engagements to discuss the disbanding of the militias in Basra, by 11 May 2008, the operation was deemed a success and completed. Of more interest than Operation Charge of the Knights is how the British Army found itself in this
situation, especially given the direction that the Americans, with the Surge, had begun taking.

The British Army has a long experience conducting COIN operations, and a steady progression of doctrine associated with it as discussed in Chapter 3, yet they failed to follow it. One former battalion commander noted that COIN tactics were second nature to the British Army as “they’d been bred into them through their experiences in Northern Ireland.”\(^{119}\) What he failed to take into consideration was that his experiences as a young lieutenant in Northern Ireland in the 1980s were much different from those that served in the 1990s and that many of his young soldiers and junior officers had yet to serve there. The British Army was also dealing with many of the same problems that the American had, namely a lack of COIN education in their schools. In his book, *The Junior Officers’ Reading Club: Killing Time and Fighting Wars*, British Army Lieutenant Patrick Hennessy discusses his professional military education as being entirely focused on maneuver warfare. While at Sandhurst in 2004, Hennessey writes that the course was focused on leadership and indoctrination into the military, but that while cadets there, they were consistently told that the mission-specific training that they would need would come later. The extent of his COIN training came during his infantry platoon leaders course, and consisted of one morning.\(^{120}\) A common refrain in the British Army during the early 2000s was that few if any could discuss COIN theory, principles or history, and that this was due to a “lack of education in COIN from Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) through to Staff College.”\(^{121}\)

This was not the case for every unit, either British or American that deployed to Iraq. Many of them conducted either formal or informal Officer Professional
Development Programs (OPD), aimed at filling that COIN knowledge gap. One American brigade commander, a strong proponent of professional military education, believes that two-thirds of the Army still does not understand how to operate in COIN environment in 2010. In order to combat this within his command, he conducted an OPD program for all Captains in the brigade where they would meet monthly for a couple hours to discuss a book that they had read. His reading list included Malcolm Gladwell’s *Blink*, as well as Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, Kilcullen’s *28 Articles* and *The Accidental Guerilla*, Bard O’Neil’s *Insurgency and Terrorism*, Crisis of Islam by Bernard Lewis and Fawaz Gerges’ *Journey of the Jihadist*, the OPD program was designed to educate the officers that they need to understand why they were doing something.\(^{122}\)

Another commander used FM 3-24 and other relevant doctrine as the foundation for his units OPD program and also discussed the importance of capturing lessons learned and institutionalizing them in our doctrine. Personally he has been pushing this issue through unit after action reviews and in contributions to professional military journals.\(^{123}\)

For the British Army, education has been one of the lessons learned from Iraq. Prior to 2006, one senior officer said that when compared to the Americans, he viewed the British as being a superior force, despite the size, and that Iraq had changed his mind set. He says that now he realizes that they had not understood their doctrine, and had consequently failed to resource it.\(^{124}\)

As General Petraeus changed command in Iraq, handing the mantle to his deputy, General Odierno, there was little doubt that Iraq was more stable, and had gained momentum. Many question whether it was the Surge or the Awakening that provided this movement. While it is too early to truly know, the answer probably lies somewhere in
between. Just as General Abrams was able to apply a One War strategy that would not have been possible before Tet, so too would the success of the Surge not have been possible without the Awakening. One senior leader stated that SoI was huge successes, but could not have been done without pressure being applied to the insurgents that would force them to the negotiating table, and the Surge provided this sustained pressure.125

The armies of the US and Great Britain have adapted phenomenally since the beginning of the war in Iraq. In addition to consistently displaying their agility and adaptability, they have made a concerted effort to capture lessons learned from the battlefield and institutionalize them. Both militaries also recognized the gaps in their doctrine and education discovering that without effective COIN doctrine and the education that would develop a shared understanding of COIN, each unit, each leader, and each soldier learned its lessons individually and often the hard way.126 With the advent of full spectrum operations and the role that general purpose forces have demonstrated that they can play in counterinsurgency, the ability of the training and doctrine systems to remain relevant and consistent will be essential and will be directly reflected in their successes or failures. An element of this will be how the British and American armies deal with the lessons learned from theatre, both physically and theoretically.

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2Ibid., 1-5.

3President George H.W. Bush stated in an address to Congress on 5 August 1990, that the U.S. national policy objectives in the Persian Gulf were to: effect the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; restore Kuwait's
legitimate government; ensure the security and stability of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf nations; and ensure the safety of American citizens abroad.


5Dr. John David Waghelstein, Preparing for the Wrong War: The United States Army and Low Intensity Conflict, 1775-1890 (Ann Arbor MI: University Microfilms International, 1990), 11.


7Ibid.

8Ibid., 13-0.

9Ibid., 13-7.

10Ibid., 13-8.

11Colonel Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Through May 2003) (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of the Army, 2007), xxii.

12Ibid.

13Ibid., xxiii.

14For further reading on this subject, see the US Army’s Strategic Studies Institute’s paper “U.S. Military Operations In Iraq: Planning, Combat, And Occupation,” Thomas Ricks’ Fiasco, and reports by Army historian Major Isaiah Wilson, and former CENCTOM J-4, Brigadier General Mark Scheid, USA (Ret.) who also discuss Phase IV extensively.


16Ibid., 1023.

17Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez USA (Retd) and Donald T. Phillips, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story (New York: Harper, 2008), 171. Retention of the Iraqi military had been a cornerstone of the ORHA and CENTCOM plans for post conflict operations, and they had never sought to disband it completely. More discussion on this order can be found in On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States
Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003-January 2005 by Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese or Thomas Ricks’ *Fiasco* among other books.


19Common thinking is that the bulk of the British Army had been training for or conducting patrolling and framework operations in Northern Ireland, however this was not the reality. While most of the sergeants major, field grade and general officers had seen service in Northern Ireland, the majority of their younger force had not. Even those few that had service in Northern Ireland, had served in an environment that did not resemble the security situation in Basra at all.


21Sanchez and Phillips, *Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story*, 197. Dr. Donald P. Wright and Colonel Timothy R. Reese, in *On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, May 2003-January 2005*, reference a transition briefing given by CJTF-7 in September 2004, on page 30 that generally confirms this. During this meeting, CJTF-7 briefed their mission statement upon transitioning from being V Corps proper as having been to “Conduct offensive operations to defeat remaining noncompliant forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in the AO in order to create a secure environment in direct support of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Concurrently conduct stability operations to support the establishment of government and economic development in order to set the conditions for a transfer of operations to designated follow-on military or civilian authorities.”


24Colonel Peter R. Mansoor USA (Retd), *Baghdad at Sunrise; A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 25.

25Ibid., 345.

26Ibid., 34. See also the British Ministry of Defence’s 2003 AAR, *Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future*, which states on page 66 that, “personnel from the UK’s Operational Training and Advisory Group travelled to Iraq in July to provide a training package for US forces and to learn from US experiences in Iraq. This was a useful
exercise for both parties, with over 500 US Army commanders provided with training to run peace-keeping and counter-terrorist training at unit and sub-unit level.”

27 Ibid., 35.

28 Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA907, Battalion Commander.

29 Ibid.


33 Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA811 Colonel Paul Hughes USA (Retired).

34 Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA510, Brigade Commander.


36 Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA510, Brigade Commander.

37 Department of the Army, Lessons Learned, Part 1, Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq: Headquarters 101st Airborne Division, 2003), xi.


39 Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA1004, Battalion Commander.


41 Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA1004, Battalion Commander.
British aversion to professional military education and theory is not a new state. In *The Art of War*, Dr. Martin van Creveld states that the British have always been pragmatic in their approach to military operations and had traditionally not had well researched and defined theories of warfare, believing that they did not need education in the theories of warfare.


Brian Burton and Dr. John Nagl, “Learning As We Go: The US Army Adapts to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, July 2004-December 2006,” in *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 19, no. 3 (September 2008): 305.

Sepp created a chart that listed successful and unsuccessful practices in Counterinsurgency. The successful list was: Emphasis on intelligence, Focus on population, their needs, and security, Secure areas established, expanded, Insurgents isolated from population (population control), Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader), Effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns, Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents, Police in lead; military supporting, Police force expanded, diversified, Conventional military forces reoriented for counterinsurgency, Special Forces, advisers embedded with indigenous forces, and Insurgent sanctuaries denied. The unsuccessful practices listed were Primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency, Priority to “kill-capture” enemy, not on engaging population, Battalion-size operations as the norm, Military units concentrated on large bases for protection, Special Forces focused on raiding, Adviser effort a low priority in personnel assignment, Building, training indigenous army in image of U.S. Army, Peacetime government processes, and Open borders, airspace, coastlines.


Colonel Peter Mansoor, USA (Retd) address to the Marine Corps University Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond Seminar, Washington, DC, 23 September 2009.


Ibid., 310.


Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA907, Battalion Commander.


It is common practice in the military to delineate operations into two groups, kinetic and non-kinetic. Combat operations that involve confrontation and oftentimes gunfire are generally termed kinetic, while civic aid and reconstruction operations are examples of non-kinetic operations.


The COIN CFE cadre has gone through several permutations, beginning with an SF company headquarters and then to being filled by individual augmentees and tasked manpower from deployed units, to contractors hired to instruct and study the COIN campaign in Iraq. The Phoenix Academy, a course for advisors coming into Iraq was held adjacent to the COIN CFE. Marine Lt Col. Sean Folsom described the Phoenix Academy in his book, *In the Gray Area: A Marine Advisor Team at War*, as being “another in a series of disappointing, substandard training course designed to prepare us for our mission. Largely taught by contracted personnel, the academy instructors seemed woefully uniformed on what our mission as advisors would actually entail.”

COIN Center For Excellence Syllabus, Class 06-01, 5 August 2005. This is the author’s personal copy as he attended this course in the fall of 2005 while deploying for his second tour under Operation Iraqi Freedom.
63. Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA301, Battalion Commander.

64. Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA201, Brigade Commander.


69. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 328.

70. Not all units performed poorly at Fallujah, the Kurdish battalions were recognized as conducting themselves quite well there. Due in part to resourcing and standardization of training and employment, the ING were later absorbed by the IA.


73. As COIN in general had been almost solely the purview of USSF, Foreign Internal Defense, or FID, the raising, training, advising and employment of indigenous forces had formed the backbone of the USSF mission. Military and contracted trainers and advisors worked with the other arms of the ISF, police, border patrol, etc. . . . as well.


75. Lieutenant Colonel Seth W. B. Folsom, USMC, In the Gray Area: A Marine Advisor Team at War (New York: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 13.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.
Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA902, Police Transition Team member.

Ibid.


Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA510, Brigade Commander.


Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, vii.


A spirited debate exists across the military and civilian sectors about FM 3-24. Colonel Gian Gentile, USA a former cavalry squadron commander and current history professor at West Point often represents the dissenting opinion. Colonel Gentile’s position is that the manual has become dogmatic and is seen as a prescription for all counterinsurgency campaigns. He argues that not only is this incorrect, but that the manual misses the mark in that it does not include a strategy, that it does not link the means to the ends. Another point of his argument is that FM 3-24 provides for only one way to counter insurgency, the population-centric method, and devotes only five lines to discussing any other options. See FM 3-24, paragraph 5-88 for a discussion of Limited Support and see Colonel Gian Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army in Parameters August 2009, “Our COIN Doctrine Removes the Enemy from the Essence of War,” in Armed Force Journal January 2008, “Eating Soup with a Spoon” in Armed Forces Journal September 2007 or the Small Wars Journal or Abu Muqawama websites for more discussion on this and Colonel Gentile's concerns that the Army in particular is investing in COIN capabilities at too great a cost to its core warfighting competencies and is drifting to the opposite side of the general purpose spectrum from the force that invaded Iraq. For additional information on this debate, see also “COIN Toss: The cult of counterinsurgency” by Michael Crowley in The New Republic, 4 January 2010. John McCuen, author of The Art of Counter-Revolutionary Warfare, also penned a rebuttal to Colonel Gentile, published by Thomas Ricks at ForeignPolicy.com on 4 December 2009. McCuen writes that “Gentile fails to recognize the key point in any counterinsurgency strategy. The purpose of such a strategy is not ‘to
win hearts and minds.’ The purpose is not ‘nation building.’ The purpose is to win the war against the strategy imposed upon us by our enemies who wage this type of war against us because experience has shown them that it is the only one by which they can defeat us—what Mao described as a ‘protracted revolutionary war.’ They wage this war within the population by using the population as a shield and weapon. Thus, the population becomes the ‘terrain.’ ‘Population terrain’ becomes just as critical to insurgent warfare as physical terrain is to conventional warfare. We must learn to clear, secure, stabilize and organize population terrain in insurgent or hybrid war as we must clear, secure, stabilize and organize physical terrain in conventional war.”

87 Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA603, Civil Affairs Team Leader. This point of view was corroborated in at least seven additional interviews, however, as with any healthy debate, there are at least that many favorable opinions of the manual. The writers of the manual recognized this shortcoming of FM 3-24 prior to publishing. One of the authors, Colonel Peter Mansoor, raised the issue in 2006, which led to the writing of FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, later published in 2009.


89 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 1-19 to 1-29. Additionally, the manual includes 21 historical vignettes to illustrate its principles as well as an appendix that is designed to guide a leader or staff in transplanting the lessons of the manual into a plan. The manual also advises that there is no standard counterinsurgency template that can be successfully applied to every conflict.

90 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), Contents and preface. The US Army has also made use of its Center for Army Lessons Learned to provide digital references and regular pamphlets to the force that reflect current tactics, techniques and procedures being employed by both friendly and enemy forces on the battlefield. These handbooks provide information specific to a theater and are more in line with the tailored material, like the ATOM, that the British produced in Kenya and Malaya.

91 Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA1008, Battalion Commander.


93 Ibid.
Dr. Carter Malkasian, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq: May 2003-January 2010,” 302. See also Lieutenant Colonel Seth Folsom’s *In The Gray Area*, for discussion of the animosity between the different ethnic security forces in Iraq, as well as Cordesman’s *Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success*, which devotes a chapter to the rise of sectarian and ethnic conflict.

A Troop, 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, was assigned to the area of Hawr Rajeb, a Sunni enclave just on the outskirts of the Abu Disheer an exclusively Shia section of the Rashid district of Baghdad. In addition to the indirect fire battles that went on between the two neighborhoods, each morning during the summer of 2006, Apache Troop was responsible for conducting a police call along the river that ran south out of Abu Disheer to collect all of the bodies, often mutilated that had been dumped upriver during the night.


Brigadier General Sean McFarland USA, classroom discussion, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 July 2010.


Brigadier General Sean McFarland USA, classroom discussion, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 July 2010.


One of the key aspects of the SoI program is that it provided employment to tens of thousands of often unemployed men. There is little doubt that many of the SoI are former insurgents themselves, but this program offered the majority of them—those that were not the most hard core—a choice between legal and illegal employment. When the SoI was formalized, MNF-I and the Government of Iraq also included a concept to demobilize it and transfer its members into formal positions with the ISF or other government agencies. This has not been a smooth process, and MNF-I has had to oversee portions of it and finance it at times, but was undoubtedly a positive leap forward on many levels.

*Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance* (Baghdad: HQ MNF-I, 2008): 1. This is the author’s personal copy from having served in Iraq while General Petraeus was the MNF-I commander.


*MNC-I Commander’s COIN Guidance*, 1.

Ibid., 2.


Ibid.


Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA1012, British General Officer. Due to the shift to Provincial Iraqi Control and Iraqi led security, this officer believed that the brigade was struggling for purpose, and they shifted their focus east to the Iranian border where they would conduct combined border operations. The brigade commander attempted to use the increased border operations and their success to influence the Iraqi leadership to get more active in Basra. These actions led to General Mohan’s development of the plan that would become Charge of the Knights.


Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA1012, British General Officer. MNC-I was not prepared for the speed of the operation initially and the Corps commander had recently told the British command that he did not want them mounting an offensive while the situation in Baghdad was so unstable.

Dr. Daniel Marston, “Adaptation in the Field: The British Army’s Difficult Campaign in Iraq,” 79. See also Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA1012, British General Officer. One senior officer familiar with the situation stated that with the transition to Provincial Iraqi Control, the British shifted away from MiTT or “Partnering” towards conducting combined operations. This was problematic as the MNF-I guidance was to increase MiTTs while the mandate from London was to pull back. This was a result of both the fundamental mischaracterization of the violence in Basra as being merely criminal and decreased support for the war in the UK. Further complicating matters in the weeks leading up to Charge of the Knights, the British Division and MNC-I headquarters were conducting their transfers of authority, leaving the British brigade commander as the only point of continuity for MND-S.


Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA1004, Battalion Commander.


Dr. Daniel Marston, “Adaptation in the Field: The British Army’s Difficult Campaign in Iraq,” 72. Additional interviews concur with this viewpoint. One senior officer stated that in the first part of the 20th Century COIN was really not in British Doctrine or education. See Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA1011, interview with a British General Officer.

Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA103, Brigade Commander.


Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA1012, British General Officer.

Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA305, Brigade Commander. This position was echoed in interview AA303, with a Special Forces commander, who said that reconciliation through the SoI program was all enabled by putting pressure on the networks. The Surge enabled SOF and conventional forces to put sustained pressure on the insurgents, which forced them to “come in from the cold.” Both of these commanders also stressed that reconciliation is probably the toughest part of COIN, especially when there is American blood involved, and that a reconciliation criteria could be judicial. If an
insurgent can be prosecuted in an Iraqi court of law then that should be their route, but if not then they should be reconciled and reintegrated into society. They both also stressed the importance of education of US forces on the purpose and reasoning behind reconciliation, and that this is tough.

CHAPTER 6

AFGHANISTAN

This war will not be like the war against Iraq a decade ago, with a decisive liberation of territory and a swift conclusion. It will not look like the air war above Kosovo two years ago, where no ground troops were used and not a single American was lost in combat.¹

— President George W. Bush

Dismantling Al Qaeda and the Taliban:  
The response to 9/11

The attacks of Al Qaeda on 11 September 2001 have been the most significant action of this young century. The attack on the American mainland and destruction of the World Trade Center towers shattered the innocence of America and demonstrated to the world the power of what columnist Thomas Friedman calls the super-empowered angry man.² The United States’ response to this attack by Al Qaeda was the invasion of Afghanistan undertaken with support and participation from NATO, the UN and the international community, an invasion which “aimed to overthrow the Taliban and destroy Al Qa’ida organizational infrastructure. It achieved the former but not the latter.”³ In Counterinsurgency in the Modern World, Dr. Daniel Marston writes that the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan has only now begun, in 2010, fully eight and almost nine years after the conflict began.⁴ While the war in Afghanistan has been eclipsed by the war in Iraq, it has now moved back to the forefront and as it seems likely to continue it provides one final case to study to illustrate the performance of general purpose forces in counterinsurgency and determine what factors might lead to their success or failure. These factors will provide valuable information for chapter 7, which
seeks to synthesize the case studies and provide recommendations for Afghanistan and future conflicts.

On 20 September 2001, President George W. Bush stated in an internationally televised address that Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were responsible for the 9/11 attacks on New York, and they are being sheltered in Afghanistan. President Bush also delivered an ultimatum to the Taliban, then in power in Afghanistan, demanding that they turn over Al Qaeda and close all of their terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, and if they did not do so immediately then they would share their fate.\textsuperscript{5} Dramatically, the President stated that the United States would

direct every resource at our command--every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war--to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.

We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest.

And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.\textsuperscript{6}

The President followed this speech with additional requests to the Taliban who at one point offered to try Osama bin Laden in an Islamic court, a compromise that was swiftly rejected by the United States.\textsuperscript{7}

While the United States had quickly determined the source of the 9/11 attacks and the assistance that Al Qaeda had been receiving from the Taliban in Afghanistan, in a situation that echoes many of the past, few fully understood the history or reasoning behind it. While Afghanistan had received its independence from the Great Britain in 1919, the British legacy was not this independence but the Durand Line which served as
the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Durand line also divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes between the two countries, a calculated decision that made to keep them from becoming too powerful in either of the nations. In December 1979, the Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan to stabilize the political unrest which had seen two coups in the past 18 months, and its influence quickly wane. Over the next ten years, the Soviets saw their occupation contested by Afghan resistance fighters, and in 1989 the Soviets withdrew, leaving behind a puppet government that was toppled in 1992. Given that Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, making up 40 percent of the population, the Afghan freedom fighters, or mujahedeen, who had fought the Soviets, had a high percentage of Pashtuns as well. During the war these multi-ethnic groups were supported by both the United States and Pakistan who used the false boundary imposed by the Durand Line to funnel weapons and support into Afghanistan. After the war, and the 1992 coup that followed, the Pashtun majority found themselves abandoned by the United States and the West and out of power in Afghanistan a nation they had dominated politically for two centuries. At the time of the Soviet withdrawal, there were upwards of 30 different mujahidin groups that were active in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Taliban, who championed themselves as the protectors of the Pashtun, began as a small group of disgruntled mujahedeen who, led by Mullah Omar, opened a military, political and religious campaign to reclaim power in Afghanistan in 1994. Initially underestimated by Afghanistan’s power brokers they were able to take advantage of the inability of those in power to cooperate effectively, exploiting the seams between the warlords who were in power to systematically seize Kandahar, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif and the bulk of the nation by 1998. While many Pashtuns did not agree with the Islamic
traditionalism or fundamentalism of the Taliban, they did see them as “their community’s
dream of creating a sense of security at the local level, and at the national level,
outmaneuvering the Tajik and Uzbek interlopers.”16 While opposition to the Taliban remained
in Afghanistan, their most potent internal enemy was the Islamic Front for the Salvation
of Afghanistan, or Northern Alliance, who only controlled approximately 15 percent of
the country.17 The Northern Alliance was a coalition of several of the ethnic minority
groups in Afghanistan, and included the Tajik militia of Sheik Ahmed Masud, remnants
of the since fallen Rabbani government, the Uzbek militia of General Dostum, the Hezb-
e-Wahadat, itself a coalition of several Shiite groups, and former Prime Minister
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e-Islami.18 It was during the Taliban’s rise to power
that Osama bin Laden arrived seeking refuge and agreeing to support the Taliban with
material and money in exchange for it.19 This was the foundation of the Afghanistan that
the Americans faced in 2001.20

The initial plan for Operation Enduring Freedom, the US response to the 9/11
attacks was developed by CENTCOM, under the command of General Tommy Franks in
the days and weeks following the attack. General Franks, with direction from President
George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld crafted a campaign plan that
had fairly limited objectives, namely to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan and
eliminate Al Qaeda there as well.21 CENTCOM had settled on these objectives during
their planning after conducting an historical review of Great Britain’s 19th century
adventures in Afghanistan as well as the Soviet invasion of 1979. CENTCOM planners
viewed these both as examples of failure and determined that the US would have to take a
decidedly different approach to be successful in Afghanistan.22 CENTCOM reached two
conclusions that would form the foundation for the US campaign plan. The first was that there could be no large ground force involved as this would turn the Afghan population against the US and its coalition, and secondly that the entire campaign had to be executed quickly and then had to turn power over to the Afghans as soon as possible.23

The United States had no intention in 2001 of getting involved in post-conflict reconstruction, or nation-building, and did not plan to commit troops as part of a security or stabilization force in Afghanistan, with Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush focused squarely on hunting down Al Qaeda and the senior Taliban leadership. Stabilization was a task that they believed their European allies were more willing and suited to undertake.24 The CENTCOM plan was SOF heavy with a limited role for the general purpose forces and conventional tactics, employing the Northern Alliance as their proxy, who aided by Coalition air power and USSF, were able to drive the Taliban from Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul and Kunduz within a month.25 By late January 2002, all of the known Taliban and Al Qaeda forces had been destroyed, captured, or had fled, and the US and its Coalition partners were prepared to transition the mission to stability operations.

With a power vacuum now existing in Afghanistan, the international community, led by the United Nations agreed that a security force would be needed to secure Afghanistan.26 While American, British and Afghan leaders, such as Hamid Karzai, discussed creating a security force as large as 25,000 men that would be deployed to Kabul and other key cities in Afghanistan, the United States remained firmly entrenched in its position and its focus on Al Qaeda and the Taliban.27 This mission however, while having begun with a study of previous military adventures in Afghanistan did not fully
take into account the current political and military situation on the ground, oversights that contributed to the growth of the insurgency.\textsuperscript{28}

In December of 2001, Major General Frank Hagenbeck and his headquarters, the 10th Mountain Division, who served as the Coalition Forces Land Component Command, (CFLCC), forward headquarters for Afghanistan began preparing for the transition to stability operations. Though a division commander and later to become designed as a Combined Joint Task Force, General Hagenbeck had only a skeleton staff in his headquarters and one infantry brigade assigned to him, a force which was primarily concerned with force protection duties on his base.\textsuperscript{29} With Secretary Rumsfeld insistent that the United States’ primary mission in Afghanistan was countering Al Qaeda and not nation-building, General Franks “envisioned a total of about 10,000 American soldiers, airmen, special operators and helicopter assault crews” would be deployed for Phase IV of Operation Enduring Freedom.\textsuperscript{30} In a foreshadowing of what would occur in Iraq, the 10th Mountain Division saw itself as transitioning to Phase IV and was planning its redeployment to New York in early 2002 when they began receiving intelligence about large enemy concentrations in the Paktia province.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{Transition: Introduction of General Purpose Forces and COIN}

The first large deployment of general purpose forces into Afghanistan came in February and March 2002 with Operation Anaconda. Comprised of over 2,000 Coalition troops the mission was to kill or capture Al Qaeda fighters who had fled to eastern Afghanistan’s Shahi-Kot Valley and to further prevent them from further evading into Pakistan.\textsuperscript{32} While Anaconda was tactically successful, killing several hundred enemy
fighters, and quashing the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s ability to conduct significant military operations against the Coalition in Afghanistan, it also highlighted many of the friction points that existed between SOF and conventional forces, and the challenges of integrating air, ground, and indigenous forces.\(^{33}\) Over the next several months, the United States and Coalition recognized that their speedy withdrawal was not realistic and began adjusting their campaign plan to include a new focus on security missions to prevent Taliban resurgence as well as reconstruction operations and a training program for the Afghan security forces.\(^{34}\) However, the mission in Afghanistan had the smallest commitment of troops and financial assistance of any stabilization operations since World War II.\(^{35}\) These low troop levels limited the American’s ability to truly provide law and order, eerily foreshadowing the situation in Iraq just two years later; they could clear the ground, but not hold it.\(^{36}\)

Lieutenant General David Barno served as the commander of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, the Corps level command that was established in Afghanistan, writes in *Military Review*, that the coalition was not prepared to counter the threat posed by the insurgency in Afghanistan.\(^{37}\) Having no doctrine and little experience to fall back on, General Barno’s headquarters was charged with creating a counterinsurgency campaign plan for Afghanistan. General Barno and his staff, which included both American and British offices, relied on his personal library which included *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, Lewis Sorley’s *A Better War*, and West Point’s *History of Revolutionary Warfare*, as well as the experiences from Northern Ireland that the British officers brought to craft what became CFC-A’s “Five Pillars” COIN Strategy.\(^{38}\)
The soldiers that were deployed under General Barno’s command were in the same predicament. These were the same soldiers that General John Keane, the acting Chief of Staff during the summer of 2003, told reporter Jim Lehrer that “we put an army on the battlefield that I had been a part of for 37 years. The truth of the matter is: It doesn't have any doctrine, nor was it educated and trained, to deal with an insurgency.”

One former brigade commander who served early on in Afghanistan remarked that a counterinsurgency fight is done at the company commander, battalion commander and brigade commander level; it is not a division echelon fight. These leaders are of the same generation discussed in the last chapter who had not benefitted from a professional military education that extended past maneuver warfare to include counterinsurgency conditions, and just like the soldiers that they were leading, had neither prepared for COIN, nor understood it. Soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division were described in a Newsweek report as not only not fully understanding COIN, but also conducting operations that did little more than terrorize the local populace, and strengthen the insurgency, thereby setting COIN and intelligence operations back by at least six months.

Counterinsurgency Strategy and Commander’s COIN Guidance

As 2004 dawned, General Barno’s headquarters issued the campaign plan that would take CFC-A through to the 2004 Afghani elections and serve as the foundation for the rest of the conflict. This plan was based on two principles, first that the Afghan people were the center of gravity and second that in order to be successful the force needed to have interagency and international unity of effort. Supporting these two
principles, were General Barno’s Five Pillars of: defeat terrorism and deny sanctuary, enable the Afghan security structure, sustain area ownership, enable reconstruction and good governance, and engage regional states. General Barno understood that merely focusing on the Taliban and Al Qaeda would not be enough. This meant that CFC-A had to focus on reconstruction of the physical and social infrastructure of Afghanistan, and that success would come only through their ability to influence the local population to support the fledgling government of Iraq.

At the same time, General Barno also had to establish an agreement with the Interim Authority in Afghanistan led by Hamid Karzai. This later became General Barno’s “Fifteen Point” and served as a counterinsurgency checklist to make soldiers more aware of how to interact with the local populace and to facilitate cooperation between the military, civilian agencies and Afghan officials. Though rudimentary, this served as the first iteration of Commander’s COIN Guidance for Afghanistan. Generals Stanley McCRystal and David Petraeus have continued this technique in order to ensure that the mission in Afghanistan is able to speak with one voice.

General Barno’s guidance was disseminated across the force, and reached back to the units that were preparing to deploy as well. Colonel Richard Pederson, commander of the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division created How to Think OEF, a handbook that presented his guidance on how soldiers should operate on the ground. It also explained some of the nuances of COIN and stressed the importance and security of the population. One British commander, in preparing his battalion for deployment to Afghanistan, stressed the importance of integrating both combat, or kinetic, operations and civic aid and reconstruction, or non-kinetic operations. He worked with his leaders to
include considering the effects of their actions into every training event during their pre-deployment work up, with his goal being that they develop an ability to both recognize and understand causes and effects.\textsuperscript{46}

Leaders were seeking to educate themselves on COIN as well, as the US Army introduced its interim counterinsurgency field manual, units began holding professional development sessions to introduce its concepts to them. Other leaders again exercised personal initiative; one brigade staff officer described his preparation for deployment as including what he referred to as “graduate-level study” reading about Afghanistan, as well as Galula, Trinquier, and Nagl.\textsuperscript{47} As in Iraq, Marines that deployed to Afghanistan focused on their history with small wars and the doctrine that accompanied it. One Marine battalion that deployed later in the conflict had a professional military education (PME), program that focused on COIN theory as part of their pre-deployment training. In it they included current and historical counterinsurgency doctrine.\textsuperscript{48}

Just as in Iraq, as the conflict progressed and FM 3-24 was developed, the training for Afghanistan matured as well. Pre-deployment workups included many of the standard tasks and events that units normally executed, but included COIN conditions and increased interaction with civilians on the battlefield. While train-ups often tried to integrate interagency aspects, this was a common shortcoming. A British platoon commander described the high points of his trainup as being an exercise conducted by his battalion at the Thetford training area which was resourced with a significant amount of Afghan role players. This was an excellent learning experience because as infantrymen, their soldiers were had an expectation of what they would do in combat and had become somewhat frustrated with all of the COIN focus. This exercise provided them with an
insight that they did not previously have, it got the soldiers to “thinking about the Afghans as humans, but just with a very different life style.”

Developing Afghan National Security Forces

Recognizing the value and need for indigenous support, formation and training of the Afghan Nation Security Forces became developed momentum as it was pushed to the forefront as one of General Barno’s five pillars. By the end of 2003, the Afghan National Army represented a major success for CFC-A, as an example of what the Coalition could do with regards to reforming the institutions of the Afghanistan. Just as the MiTT was essential for the development of the Iraqi Army, for the Afghan National Army, the ANA, it was the Embedded Transition Team. The ETTs were to be teams of soldiers or Marines who would embed with an ANA unit. While the first teams joined their ANA units while still in training, the subsequent teams joined their units at their bases or in some cases in combat. ETTs varied in size at the tactical level between 15 and 75 members depending on the echelon of ANA unit to which they were attached. The ETTs would advise the commander in camp and on operations and helped to develop training plans and administrative systems. In the year that followed the ETTs helped the ANA significantly, but as with the MiTTs in Iraq and the military advisors in Vietnam, the selection and preparation for ETT members often was less than desired and the performance of the ANA units often reflected this.

One US Marine Corps AAR discussed this issue, finding fault both with the selection process and the lack of training that the ETT underwent. This AAR went on to state “many ETT personnel do not have a ground combat arms background or prior experience training personnel in basic tactics,” and found that that several of the ETTs
interviewed had neither medical nor logistics personnel assigned. This AAR concluded that “This lack of experienced trainers reflects in the proficiency of the ANA soldiers they train.”

In order to help standardize training and employment of ETTs and ANA as they matured, two steps were taken. The first was the creation of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, which was established in 2009 and combined both the CFC-A’s training mission, which had been known as CSTC-A, and NATOs which had been under the command and control of ISAF. The second step was the US Army’s creation of the Advise and Assist Brigade, also known as the Security Force Assistance Brigade. These organizations were conventional brigades that would be augmented by centrally selected commissioned and non-commissioned officers for duty in Afghanistan, or Iraq. These additional personnel would be assigned to the brigade up to one year before deployment and would train, along with the rest of their brigade to advise and partner with a host nation security force. One of the previous complaints from ETT members and the Coalition units in country was that there was no established relationship between the two. ETTs were selected and trained and then would deploy in support of a unit that they had never before met. Another complaint has been that the NATO Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT), in addition to being inadequate in number, have suffered from shorter deployments and rotating out at critical times.

A key component to correcting this disconnect was the construct of the Advise and Assist Brigade. When deployed, these brigades using their now organic ETTs as well as their staffs, maneuver, and support units to partner with the host nation security force in their area of operations, thereby both increasing their own combat power and
enhancing their ability to increase the ANSF performance. Enthusiastically supported this transition stating that when the British took command of RC-South, they also absorbed all of the transition teams into the line battalion that were deployed. This then facilitated much better partnership between the US and the ANSF.

Problems still remain with partnering, many of which stem from the Coalition unit and the ANSF unit working for their respective chains of command and having two different sets of goals and expectations. During a panel discussion in September 2010, members of a British infantry battalion described partnership as still being embryonic with both forces not yet having achieved what they believe to be true embedded partnering. An example given was that while ANSF and Coalition forces might be training and working alongside each other, their bases camp were separated so that but upon completion of the mission each could retreat to his respective side of their combined camp. One Marine who conducted an assessment on partnering during November 2009 concurs with this, stating that during this period only one coalition battalion was seen to be truly partnered. He went on to stress that both sides received benefits from partnering, and the importance that sharing risk and living condition to establishing the rapport and bonds needed between two forces working alongside each other.

How does this end?

General Petraeus once asked “How does this end?” when discussing Iraq. For the American and British armies in Afghanistan, the answer is not yet, and they are continuing to prepare for deployment to Afghanistan. What seems essential is that in order to successfully disengage from Afghanistan, the Coalition needs to protect the
Afghan populace while developing the capacity for the Afghans to do so for themselves.\textsuperscript{65} With the drawdown forces in Iraq, these armies now have more manpower that can deploy to Afghanistan. It also means that soldiers and units that deploy to Afghanistan may be going there for the first time or had increasingly longer breaks between deployments. This is important as this will stress the educational and training base of the two militaries as they will not only have to maintain currency on what is happening in Afghanistan, but also ensure that units innately understand that there are no standardized answers or one-size fits all solutions. While some units may rotate back to the same areas that they were in before, much of their leadership will be different and the situation in Afghanistan will most certainly have changed. This will require that the communication between the in theater units and those in training is strengthened, this will enable the unit commander to build decision points into the pre-deployment training plan that will drive his training based on input from theater. The goal of the pre-deployment training remaining to create a force that is lethal, yet culturally sensitive, and prepared to handle the complex situations that they will face.\textsuperscript{66} The Grenadier Guards of the British Army having already seen this, with one captain commenting that as they prepared to deploy to Afghanistan in 2009, it had been two years since they had been there before, the environment had changed and they “had to get Herrick 6 [their previous deployment] out of our head.”\textsuperscript{67} Clearing the head will become even more important in the years to come.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{1}This is a portion of President George W Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001.}

3 Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2009), 100.


6 Ibid.

7 Donald P. Wright et al., A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Department of the Army, 2010), 30.

8 Dr. Daniel Marston, “Realizing the Extent of our Errors and Forging the Road Ahead,” 253.


10 Dr. Daniel Marston, “Realizing the Extent of our Errors and Forging the Road Ahead,” 254.


12 Dr. Daniel Marston, “Realizing the Extent of our Errors and Forging the Road Ahead,” 254.

13 Shaul Shay, The Endless Jihad (Westport, CT: ICT, 2002), 57. Shay also discusses the role of the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI in supporting the Taliban and other groups in the years after the Soviet withdrawal. See also Obama’s Wars, in which Bob Woodward relates a discussion between Secretary of State Clinton and President Karzai during which he stated that the ISI are significantly engaged with the Taliban and could capture Mullah Omar at their leisure, if they wanted to do so.

It has been remarked that Osama bin Laden sought refuge under the Pashtun code of honor known as Pashtunwali. For more information on this and bin Laden’s establishment in Afghanistan see “Pashtunwali: Honour Among Them” in The Economist, 19 December 2006, or Pashtun People by Frederick Miller.

There are a number of levels to the various militias and the Taliban and their foreign support. While the ISI and the ethnic Pashtuns of Pakistan supported the Taliban, India sought to counter Pakistan by strongly backing the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance. Iran, Russia and the United States all had interests in the region as well. Seth Jones and Shaul Shay both discuss this in their respective works In The Graveyard of Empires, and The Endless Jihad, as does Antonio Giustozzi in Empires of Mud.


Dr. Daniel Marston, “Realizing the Extent of our Errors and Forging the Road Ahead,” 258.

In December 2001, members of the UN and Afghan leaders met in Bonn, Germany to draw up a plan for governing the country for the next two years until elections would be held and also called for the deployment of an International Security Assistance Force to be led by NATO. ISAF was formed as a 4000 man security force solely for the city of Kabul.

Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan, 111.
28 Dr. Daniel Marston, “Realizing the Extent of our Errors and Forging the Road Ahead,” 257.

29 Donald P. Wright et al., *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005*, 127.


31 Donald P. Wright et al., *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005*, 127.


33 Donald P. Wright et al., *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005*, 180. For more information on Operation Anaconda, see Sean Naylor’s *Not a Good Day to Die*, which details many of the friction points of the battle and describes an army that had many rough edges and was not fully prepared. Of note, many of the tactical communication, and command and control issues that Naylor highlights have been improved upon, as have the techniques of air-ground integration with the army owing much to the lessons learned of Anaconda.

34 Ibid., 181.

35 Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan*, 118.

36 It is important to remember, as with Operation Anaconda, that the general purpose forces deployed to Afghanistan in 2002 came from the same background in education, training, organization, and experience as those that deployed to Iraq a year later.


38 Ibid., 34.


40 Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA609, Brigade Commander.


43 Donald P. Wright et al., *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005*, 245.


45 Donald P. Wright et al., *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005*, 282.

46 Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA1008, Coalition Task Force Chief of Staff.


51 The ETTs were teams of American soldiers and Marines, as the previous chapter discussed on the MiTTs for the IA, this one will focus primarily on those teams assigned to the ANA. However just as the Iraqi Police, Border Patrol, Air Force, Coast Guard and Navy were MiTT’d so too were the other elements of the ANSF. Many of the NATO countries, such as Great Britain, use the potentially more appropriate term Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team, or OMLT. OMLT, or POMLT for a police team, refers to a team that while larger and having a wider mandate fulfills much the same role as the US ETTs. Initially, in 2002, Seth Jones writes in *In The Graveyard Of Empires*, training for the Afghans was conducted by USSF soldiers from the 3rd Special Forces Group. Having USSF soldiers who were experienced in FID was a key element of some of the Afghan Army’s first successes.

52 Donald P. Wright et al., *A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005*, 264.

Major Richard Hetherington USA, conducted a survey of veterans of Vietnam and Afghan advisory missions for his 2009 thesis *Foreign Military Advisor Proficiency: The Need for Screening, Selection and Qualification*. In his thesis, he recommending that a more circumscribed selection process be implemented as current beliefs amongst advisors was that they were selected to “fill a slot” regardless of their abilities to serve in an advisory role.


55 Ibid.

56 Dr. Daniel Marston, “Realizing the Extent of our Errors and Forging the Road Ahead,” 271.

57 Lieutenant General William Caldwell, briefing at The Brookings Institute, on Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* given 27 March 2009. Washington, DC. Another, telling step, according to *Washington Post* reports Ann Scott Tyson was the Secretary of the Army’s assignment of General Petraeus to chair the 2007 Brigadier General’s promotion board. Though deployed to Iraq at the time, General Petraeus was summoned to Washington to lead the board sending a clear signal to the other board members and the Army at large that General Petraeus’ thoughts were valued and that the traditional more conventionally minded leadership was not what the force need for the future. See also “Petraeus Helping Pick New Generals: Army Says Innovation Will Be Rewarded,” *Washington Post*, 17 November 2007.

58 This is neither a new complaint nor one isolated to the contemporary conflicts, as seen in Vietnam and Dhofar amongst other campaigns as well.


62 One component of this is tour lengths and troop rotations. While a partner might be in theater for 6-12 months, the ANSF unit has been in combat for several years. For more discussion on this see part two of LTC Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel Stevenson’s interview with the US Army Combat Studies Institute’s Operational Leadership Experiences series.

During this interview, the respondent also further described partnership in terms of living arrangements, stating that if partners are not sharing the same latrine facilities then they are not truly partnered.


Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA303, Special Forces Commander.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AND FUTURE CONFLICTS

The study of history will tell you why you and your adversary are where you are now: it will establish in broad political terms the context in which both of you will take the decisions that lead you into the future...once one understands these facts one can begin to comprehend the decisions made.

—General Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*

Conclusions

The previous chapters have reviewed four of the major counterinsurgency conflicts that the United States and Great Britain have participated in over the past fifty years. This study has demonstrated that general purpose forces play an important role in counterinsurgency operations, a point that is now apparent to both nations, and is being reinforced at the national level. It has also shown that the general purpose forces of these nation’s armies are capable of conducting both maneuver warfare and counterinsurgency operations.

Historical examples of Malaya and Vietnam illustrate the importance of education and training in counterinsurgency. In Malaya, British general purpose forces were aided immensely in their success by the training they received at the FTC, and the guidance they found in the ATOM. The British then used that experience to create their counterinsurgency doctrine which was refined through decades of experience in Northern Ireland. However, the British Army’s failure to truly internalize that doctrine and educate those leaders and soldiers who had never experienced Northern Ireland for themselves led
to their missteps in Iraq. This experience also led to their development of new doctrine and renewed emphasis on teaching it and maintaining proficiency in COIN.

The seminal COIN experience for the United States in the 20th century was Vietnam. In Vietnam, there was little understanding of the role of counterinsurgency and even less of a desire to implement a nationwide counterinsurgency campaign. While the United States did adapt and learn how to fight against an insurgency, once its army redeployed, those lessons were relegated to the dustbin in favor of maneuver warfare on the plains of Europe and the Fulda Gap. These experiences were reinforced by the swift success of Operations Desert Storm and initially by the Thunder Run into Baghdad. As the spring of 2003 progressed, the US Army found itself dealing with an increasingly stronger resistance that it failed to acknowledge as an insurgency. Even if it had acknowledged it as an insurgency from the beginning, the US Army did not have the capability to counter it across the force. As with the British, the US Army has also produced new doctrine and even without a written direction from the Department of Defense has re-invigorated its COIN education and training.

While it is unsurprising that the research conducted for this thesis identified that the elements of success for GPF in COIN rested in leaders’ initiative and ability to adapt to new or foreign situations, it did highlight some common themes with regards to education, training, and organization for counterinsurgency. These commonalities are as applicable to counterinsurgency and stability operations as they are to high-intensity maneuver warfare or humanitarian assistance operations. In addition to a leader’s initiative and ability to innovate, a common theme found was the importance of professional military education. The paragraphs below highlight some of themes best 

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practices in preparing for counterinsurgency as culled from units that recently redeployed from service in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines. Some of these practices will be quite familiar to veterans of Malaya, Dhofar, Vietnam, and Northern Ireland, as well as to those that served in Korea, the Falklands, Desert Strom, Bosnia or Kosovo. By no means an exhaustive list these are merely examples of practices that practitioners found to have helped them in preparing for counterinsurgency operations in the contemporary environment.

Professional Military Education

General Sir Frank Kitson wrote in *Bunch of Five* that “The educational function of the army at these critical moments is most important. Amongst senior officers particularly, ignorance or excessive diffident in passing such knowledge can be disastrous.” He goes on to emphasize that the British Army’s COIN training has not always been adequate, and that education, and life-long learning for all types of warfare are essential for a soldier as they provide him with the foundation to be “able to size up the situation, as it exists, and make the best of it.” In order to provide that well-rounded education for an army it needs to develop doctrine for the full spectrum of warfare and maintain it. This doctrine then can be combined with historical study of applicable previous conflicts to provide that well-rounded education.

In the British Army, studying doctrine has not been emphasized. General Kitson remarked that the reason that he was sent to Oxford to write his thesis was so that *Low Intensity Operations*, could be published as a commercial book because as doctrine the Army expected that it would not be read. According to one senior leader in the British Army, there has been a decided shift away from this, and that today, “Young officers are
hungry to understand their profession better,” and are reading doctrine and professional journals. In the past generals wouldn’t read doctrine, but recently there has been a shift away from the “cavalier chastisement of anyone reading doctrine,” and an associated drive to both make the doctrine better, and also more accessible to the 21st Century soldier. Major Rupert N. H. Greenwood, a British Army exchange officer instructing at the US Army’s Maneuver Captains’ Career Course argues that the British Army needs to adopt a more American model for professional military education, bring soldiers together for longer periods of time instead of merely attending short courses. Major Greenwood believes that the British Army’s short course “lack the time to create a real adult learning opportunity. This can only be achieved by running longer and wider ranging courses where students interact and learn from one another, as opposed to solely from an instructor.”

As demonstrated in the lead up to Vietnam, and again afterwards, the US Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine and education were lackluster at best. COIN is now being taught in the Army’s educational institutions and it needs to remain. One member of the writing team for the US Army’s interim counterinsurgency manual recently said remarked that the US has “done COIN this century but have left it in the dustbins of history. We need to learn from those lessons.”

Filling in the gaps: Personal Military Education

The counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan were heavily shaped by improvisation, and in order to prepare themselves for deployment, successful leaders and units improvised as well. Many of the units and leaders interviewed discussed what they did personally to prepare for deployment as well as the importance of their units’
officer and non-commissioned officer professional development programs. While many of the units used FM 3-24 and Kalev Sepp’s article as the foundations for their programs there were also some more unique and intense programs that had much positive feedback.

One brigade conducted an OPD program for all captains that met for a couple of hours each month. Organized like a graduate school seminar, each month’s sessions centered on a book that they had been assigned to read. These books were primarily counterinsurgency theory and history and the program was designed to educate the officers that they need to understand the reasons why they might be doing something. The OPD program also emphasized creating meaningful measure of effectives to determine if they are doing the correct things while deployed. The brigade continued to conduct the OPD program during the deployment, using monthly commander’s conferences to meet as well.¹⁰

Malcolm Gladwell’s book *Tipping Point* was used by several units in their pre-deployment OPD program, and again was referenced in theater. One brigade, seeking to jumpstart the reconciliation process looked for Gladwell’s Connectors who would be able to bring together power brokers from different spheres of influence. The brigade used standard link analysis tools to determine who these people were, then sought them out to hold a Unity Conference which brought them together with local and regional government, religious, and security officials to advance reconciliation and to find solutions to their local problems.¹¹

Several other units also looked beyond the resources provided by the military and brought in professors, authors and other individuals with subject matter expertise in counterinsurgency or an aspect of it. Some were brought in to give lectures and classes
while others conducted practical exercises and seminars. One other tactic that several units discussed was bringing in academics or specialists to speak with their leaders. Some of the personnel mentioned were authors such as Drs. John Nagl, Gerald Hickey, Daniel Marston, and David Kilcullen, criminal and forensic investigators from local police the FBI, and agricultural professors from a local university. Also, units invited USSF instructors to assist them in preparing their soldiers to train and operate with host nation security forces. The 1st Cavalry Division among others, also leveraged the expertise of their local city administration to prepare their staffs in particular for the complexities of reconstruction and restoration of services.

Pre-deployment Training

Most of the units interviewed had completed a mission rehearsal exercise (MRX), prior to deploying, or in some cases had done so and were planning another one. While there was a difference of opinion on the focus and efficacy of the MRXs there was almost universal agreement that the foundation for their training, their core competency training was very valuable and the correct focus for pre-deployment training. One brigade commander was very unhappy with the MRX his unit conducted at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, commonly known as NTC, believing that it required a two month commitment to reap 14 days’ worth of training. More importantly though was his observation that the scenario appeared to be 24 to 36 months behind the situation in theater. Of note, the battalion and company leaders interviewed from this brigade found that the training experience at NTC was very good for their echelon in that it especially challenged the junior leaders. While he did comment that the scenario was familiar and a couple years behind, one senior non-commissioned officer said that the NTC is different
terrain, has the facilities, role players and capabilities that their home station does not and it “forced us out of our comfort zone; it was very beneficial for the PL [platoon leader] and PSG [platoon sergeant] and it set us up for success.”

Leaders felt much the same about training conducted at the other American and British training centers, with a common point being that the MRXs were by nature more kinetic than what the current situation in theater was, but this was a positive as it demonstrated the environment a unit would face if things degraded. One brigade commander explained it by saying that he could throttle back his unit if need be, but if they have not experienced that kinetic situation in training it is hard to throttle up once in theater.

Leaders were also universal in their support of the role players, with one commander emphasizing the how the players at NTC did a phenomenal job at helping his troopers to learn how to build genuine trust. He asked the role players to help his soldiers to emphasize acting as professionals, which is important as in a COIN environment, in any environment, indigenous populations trust professionals. In a COIN environment the population has most likely seen good and bad security forces and trusts professionals who are not necessarily nice guys, but are able to target the right people and do the right things.

Partnering, Foreign Internal Defense, and Security Force Assistance

Whereas partnering with host nation forces was almost solely the domain of SOF, with the need to develop indigenous security forces on a nationwide scale, there has been a “blurring of the edges between general purpose forces and SOF.” One senior leader interviewed said that in the current environment all forces now must be prepared to do
the whole spectrum and have the attitude and training to do so. There is a historical precedent for this, and by expanding this capability to the general purpose forces it allows our “top tier guys to be going after the top enemy. . . . You don’t have to be Tier 1 to train indigenous forces. We [have been] successful in doing it.”18 Universally the units, both conventional and SOF believed that a general purpose force can train and advise a host nation security force. However they also all agreed that training a civic police force as opposed to an army or paramilitary police unit required additional training and a different mindset. Additionally, most units, both conventional and SOF, felt that SOF forces remained best suited for developing a host nation’s elite forces.19

One Marine battalion commander remarked that he had thought initially that training Marines to do COIN would be hard as they would be resistant, but saw that they “understood that creating local security forces and working with them was their ticket to going home.”20 He attributed this to the fleet Marine forces experience of going to other countries and working alongside other nations forces, and believes that this has always been a part of the USMC culture and so aided in their transition to COIN and partnering with local security forces.21 This commander’s experience during trainup was fairly standard in that they did not do any tailored training for their units that partnered with host nation security forces, but that they were cognizant that not every member of their unit would be good at it.22 Finally, there was universal agreement that developing a host nation unit required a strong commitment and acceptance of a certain level of risk. To be effective advisors had to live and fight alongside their host nation counterparts, and without persistent efforts and repetition to make the partner units better, “it’s just random acts of touching.”23
Organization

While Security Force Assistance has only recently become an official enduring task for the US Army’s general purpose forces, units have been organizing to execute this mission for several years.\(^{24}\) Commanders interviewed generally agreed with Sir Robert Thompson in that conventional operations are often led by conventional organizations and felt that there were two important aspects to organizing for COIN.\(^{25}\) The first was best summarized by one British commander who said that the unit commander must have the freedom to make changes yet avoid reinventing the wheel . . . look at what your predecessors are doing” and if it is working, mimic it.\(^{26}\)

The second aspect, and potentially most important one, is choosing the right people. Some leaders and organizations are better suited for the partnership than others, and commanders felt that that personality, demeanor and experience were the most important facts in assigning missions.\(^ {27}\) Colonel Philip Battaglia, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, recently wrote in *Military Review* that advising and assisting or partnering is a mission not a different formation unto itself. His point being that there is no need to redesign the force structure; just train and task organize the existing one for the mission.\(^ {28}\)

Major General Michael Flynn argues in his recent paper *Fixing Intelligence: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*, that one element of the force structure that needs to be adjusted is tactical intelligence. General Flynn echoes the theorists and modern practitioners who emphasize the importance of intelligence and that that in counterinsurgency the intelligence is developed from the lowest echelon.\(^ {29}\) To address this and better analyze intelligence at the point where it is gathered he
recommends redistributing intelligence analysts and placing more in the intelligence sections of the maneuver battalions and even companies. While most units interviewed did adjust or reorganize their staffs, the 25th Infantry Division demonstrated one of the most comprehensive descriptions of their staff task organization.

While deployed to Iraq, the Division wanted to ensure that it maintained a constant focus on each of its lines of effort, and an unblinking eye, that could ensure that progress was being made and the desired effects were being achieved. To do this the division staff dismantled much of the traditional Napoleonic staff structure and task organized work groups for each of the lines of effort. These work groups were comprised of personnel from each of the staff sections, and work group members were chosen based on their knowledge, skill, and experience, not necessarily because of rank or military occupation. The effect of this flattening was that information was shared more freely and got to the commander quicker and with less filtering than it would have under the traditional system.

While there was no single standard method of organization, common aspect that stood out was the importance of combined operations centers. One company commander felt that having an operations center manned by both his and host nation soldiers was the biggest asset in countering the insurgency during his deployment. Having a combined operations center enabled the two forces to have a better, if not always perfect, common understanding of events in and the situation in their area of operations. As counterinsurgency forces drawdown, they become increasingly more reliant on the host nation security forces understanding of the situation so establishing the combined
operations center is essential. Combined operations centers also provide an excellent example of collaboration for soldiers of both nations.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{Recommendations}

In 2005, Brigadier Aylwin-Foster wrote of the US Army in \textit{Military Review} that it has been a victim of its own successful development as the ultimate warfighting machine. Always seeing itself as an instrument of national survival, over time the Army has developed a marked and uncompromising focus on conventional warfighting, leaving it ill-prepared for the unconventional operations that characterise OIF Phase 4. Moreover, its strong conventional warfighting organisational culture and centralised way of command have tended to discourage the necessary swift adaptation to the demands of Phase 4.\textsuperscript{36}

Brigadier Aylwin-Foster’s words are applicable to the British Army as well. For both nation’s the ability to conduct full spectrum operations is present in their general purpose forces, but in order to be effective, they have to be educated and trained to operate across the entire spectrum, and they have to be adaptive enough to organize themselves to meet the needs of any specific conflict.

To maintain the capability to conduct full spectrum operations, this thesis makes three recommendations. First is that in order to truly institutionalize the practice of counterinsurgency it needs to stop being thought of as a different type of conflict. An insurgency is a condition that an army might have to face at any point on the spectrum of conflict. History has shown that insurgencies can take place simultaneously with major combat operations, in the period preceding them, and in the post-conflict period after them. Conducting counterinsurgency operations should not be a singular task for either the Americans or the British, but inherent in each of their core competencies. Thinking of COIN as another condition on the battlefield will enable units to better include it in their training in lieu of conducting two different evolutions of training. Just as a soldier might
first learn to navigate during the day, before doing it at night, so too could COIN conditions be added to this task as his proficiency increased.

The second recommendation of this thesis comes with the drawdown in Iraq and the increasing amounts of time between deployments that are the goals for both the British and American armies. This recommendation is that brigades conduct two brigade level training events. The first would be a full spectrum event at one of the training centers. It would include all aspects of FSO, and would enable a unit to work on their foundation and identify gaps in their capabilities. Once a unit was notified that it would be deploying it would then transition into more theater specific training after which it would conduct a true mission rehearsal exercise. This exercise could be either at its home station or one of the training centers but would have to be fully resourced with enemy forces, role players, linguists and coach/mentors. These exercises would also have a bespoke scenario built around the area or operations the brigade expected to assume, and would be built with date and input from the unit already there is possible or appropriate.

The key to executing this series of exercise lies in elevating the level of COIN competency across the force, which is this thesis’ third recommendation. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated to all potential enemies the value of terrorism and insurgency as tactics to be employed against the United States and Great Britain.\(^{37}\) While historically these two nations’ militaries have neglected their counterinsurgency education once a conflict has concluded, they can no longer afford to do so. To maintain the ability for general purpose forces to train and conduct counterinsurgency operations, counterinsurgency theory and history must be maintained in the educational institutions of these two nations’ militaries. The failure of the United States and Great Britain to
provide counterinsurgency education as a part of their professional militaries education was reflected in the missteps by both forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Not only must the current level of counterinsurgency history and theory be maintained at the military academies, Staff and War Colleges, but it must be expanded to the entire training base. The British Army’s Operation Entirety plan describes this as elevating the understanding of counterinsurgency principles during the course of their foundational training.\(^{38}\) Having a decidedly higher level of COIN understanding will enable a unit to enter their pre-deployment or mission specific training period at a higher level; this in turn will ensure that a unit executes its MRX with a greater proficiency than it would have had it only had three to six months of mission specific training to train on COIN.

While counterinsurgency is often referred to as the graduate level of war, this is not truly accurate; however counterinsurgency often requires a more intellectual and nuanced approach to conducting operations.\(^{39}\) An army must be prepared for this during its training, and so must adapt its education and training model as well. Academic education in counterinsurgency must be extended to the entire force; it cannot be reserved for commissioned and non-commissioned officers. It is oft remarked that a corporal in the current operating environment makes decisions that have strategic implications, and he must be educated as well. Any training event has a standard or measure of performance that must be met, thus for this academic counterinsurgency training an academic evaluation must be emplaced as well.\(^{40}\)

Adding comprehensive instruction in counterinsurgency history and theory to the educational foundation of the armies of the United States and Great Britain will help to
develop the critical thinking skills that their leaders and soldiers need in the contemporary environment. For the United States, military education must include a foundation with frequent refreshing of all aspects of FSO; soldiers must be educated in the fundamentals and history of offensive, defensive, stability and civil support operations throughout their career. Insurgencies can occur during each of these and span multiple levels of combat. As such the study of counterinsurgency can serve as a vehicle to help soldiers not only to better understand the context of where they stand in a conflict, but also in what direction they should look to go. Imbuing leaders and soldiers alike with this solid counterinsurgency background will not only enable them to train consistently with COIN as a condition, but it will also enhance their overall preparedness to execute operations across the entire spectrum of conflict.

1Great Britain, currently in the midst of series national budget cuts and austerity measures, is looking to conduct OP ENTIERTY, a five-year plan that focuses the British Land Forces on Afghanistan an accepting risk that they will not be needed for any other contingency operations. The US Department of Defense recently issued DoD Instruction 5000.68, which directs the armed services to permanently incorporate security force assistance capabilities into their general purpose forces. This directive was designed to align the services with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review that makes SFA a cornerstone of US defense policy.

2Sir Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five, 300.

3Ibid., 301.

4Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA1009 Sir Frank Kitson.

5Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA1013, British General Officer.

6Ibid.

Ibid.

Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA505, Director USA Counterinsurgency Center.

Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA103, Brigade Commander; AA105, Company Commander; AA107, Battalion Commander.

Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA201, Brigade Commander; AA202, Brigade Planner; AA806, Policy Advisor.

Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA1010, British Battalion Commander; AA1013, British General Officer; AA204, Battalion S3; AA512, Colonel (Ret.) Roger Donlon; AA304, Company Commander; AA806, US Policy Advisor.


Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA102, Company First Sergeant; AA103, Brigade Commander; AA106, Support Battalion Commander; AA107, Battalion Commander; AA108, Battalion Command Sergeant Major. One additional point on the NTC rotation was that while the terrain is varied and it has the capability to create some extended movement, the training afforded the brigade’s support battalion was unrealistic as they were unable to replicate the number and length of simultaneous logistical convoys that they would conduct in theater.

Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA201, Brigade Commander.

Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, *Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010*, AA401, Battalion Commander; AA201, Brigade Commander; AA204, Battalion S3; AA905, Company Executive Officer; AA620, Special Forces Company Commander; AA810, Joint Staff Action Officer; AA903, Company Executive Officer; AA1015, British Platoon Leader.

All interviewees stated that they could always benefit from more language training.

Among others, the following interviews also addressed this issue: AA303, Special Forces Commander; AA305, Special Forces Commander; AA810, Joint Staff Action Officer; AA901, Police Transition Team Advisor; AA1013, British General Officer; and AA1005, Dhofar Veterans Panel.


Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 60.

Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA1008, British Task Force Chief of Staff.

British Platoon Leader.


The distinction is that signal and imagery intelligence, assets belonging to higher tactical echelons can determine the location, actions and direction of movement of large troop formations and push that information down to battalions and companies in COIN the information that is needed is “grass roots” intelligence. This is information collected primarily using human intelligence methods at these same lower echelons and is then pushed higher.


Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA506 Division Chief of Staff, and AA509, Division Commander.

Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA506, Division Chief of Staff.

Command and General Staff College Scholars Program 2010, Scholars Program Counterinsurgency Research Study 2010, AA205. Company Commander. Interviews AA206, Troop Commander; AA504, Military Police Company Commander; and AA1012, British General Officer, also cover this.


Austin Long, On Other War: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2006), 73.


Low and high intensity conflict are both complicated and complex operations, but in different ways. The complexity of counterinsurgency for a leader may be that he has to make a tactical decision that takes into account what his narrative is supposed to be, what the threat in his area is, what the other destabilizers in his area are, while being accounting for the social as well as the geographical terrain. He must understand each of these so that when he can make the best informed decision if having to decide whether to drop a bomb or knock on a door. That same leader, in a high intensity maneuver battle, might be called upon to breach an obstacle. To do this he might have to orchestrate the actions of a sapper section and their explosives, an infantry section providing security ion the obstacle, artillery-fired smoke obscuring the obstacle while he himself is suppressing enemy forces with his tank while navigating cross-country at forty miles an hour. While these examples illustrate two decidedly different skill sets, they do highlight the need to be prepared for all potential contingencies.

One former brigade commander described this concept by relating counterinsurgency education to traditional army tasks, writing that “Privates can read, therefore hold them accountable for learning COIN also. A U.S. Army Sergeant would never take his platoon to a range, shoot all day, then come home without qualifying. He
would never spend hours teaching soldiers about driver skills and not ensure they passed the driver’s test. Likewise, the Army must ensure soldiers understand COIN by testing them.”
SUBJECT: Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Scholars Program 2010 (Pilot)

General: The 21st century security environment is one of complexity and uncertainty. The United States Army CGSC has determined that the current program of Intermediate Level Education (ILE) provided to field grade officers may not be sufficient for educating our future leaders for the complex challenges of this environment. Therefore, the CGSC Commandant, at the advice and direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army, created the CGSC Scholar’s Program.

Concept: Students selected for the Scholars Research Program are assigned to a seminar group. Each seminar is organized around a research topic of interest. Some examples of these topics may include “Modern Applications of Human Intelligence” or “Facing Asymmetric Threats.” Upon successfully completing the CGSC Scholars Program, students receive an MMAS degree.

Selection: In order to participate in the program, CGSC students (O-4 to O-5) volunteer to compete in a selection process that considers past operational experience, educational background, interest in joining an enhanced educational program, and potential contributions to the seminar. CGSC Scholars complete all Core Curriculum requirements for the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) before starting the research seminar.

Faculty: Dr. Daniel Marston, Ike Skelton Chair in Counterinsurgency and renowned historian, serves as the faculty lead for the first CGSC Scholars Pilot. Other members of the faculty team come from the Department of Command and Leadership, Department of History, with research faculty. All CGSC Scholars faculty have a terminal academic degree.

Program: The initial Pilot (class 10-02) has four Lines of Instruction. The initial main effort and overall seminar theme focused on History of Counterinsurgency. Curriculum dealt with eight insurgency case studies that included Northern Ireland, Rhodesia, Malaya, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The Leadership and History lines covered material similar to existing CGSC lessons. Research lessons covered basic methods, advanced qualitative research methods, and a thesis seminar.

Schedule: The initial CGSC Scholars Program had three major phases. In Phase 1 (Academics) Leadership, History, and Research meet for four hours one day over nine weeks. The COIN sessions meets for four hours, twice each week. In Phase 2 (Implementation), students conduct field research for approximately seven weeks and then devote around four weeks to writing an MMAS thesis. In Phase 3 (Closeout) students have about ten days to provide briefings on their research, conduct their AAR, and prepare for CGSC graduation.

Research: CGSC Scholars conduct primary source research. This research may involve travel around the country, to allied nations, and when possible, directly into a theater of operations. Students conduct field research with practitioners, senior leaders, and policy makers. This research often includes oral history interviews as well as collection of relevant data at each location.
Bottom Line: The CGSC Scholars program is an intense, “accelerated” educational experience that provides graduates with tools to meet challenges through Senior Level Education.

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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

A. Pre-Deployment Preparations
1. Describe your organization’s mission and how it fit into the counterinsurgency effort. (Ken)
2. What did you and your unit do to prepare for deployment? (Carrie)
3. Describe how you used COIN manuals? (Carrie)

B. Relations with other US Agencies
1. How would you define the command relationship between your unit or parent unit and other US agencies? Describe the relationship? (May prompt, PRT, DOS, USAID, CIA etc) (Ken)
2. Describe your unit’s relationship with SOF. (Ken/Jesse)
3. How did JSOA/ROZ affected both SOF and conventional forces? (Jesse)
4. How do you view the role of SOF in COIN campaigns? (Jesse)

C. Relations with Host Nation/ Security Forces Interaction
1. Describe your relationship with host nation security forces (national, regional, and local) and how did you integrate them. (Ken/Carrie)
2. How did your unit or your parent unit coordinate efforts with the host nation government (national, district and or local)? (Ken)
3. How effective was your interaction host nation government, local authorities, and local security forces? (Carrie)
4. Describe specific instances of corruption, how can you mitigate corrupt host nation officials, and what measure have you witnessed at vetting or screening to ensure host nation forces are not infiltrated by insurgents? (Travis)
5. How did you task organize your unit in order to “partner” with host nation security forces? (Mac)
6. Describe the command relationship between the security forces you worked with and the host nation government (nation, district, and local)? (Ken)
7. Did you conduct any special training or education to prepare the Soldiers that would be working with indigenous forces for that assignment? (Mac)
8. Did your preparations/training make your unit better able to employ local security forces? (Carrie)
D. COIN Actions
1. Describe the in-theater training process your unit went through? (Mac)
2. As to Heart and Minds, what did you do to win or control the population? (Matt)
3. Describe how development dollars affected the population’s behavior and was a dialogue held with local leaders IOT leverage these projects to achieve US/Host Nation objectives? (Matt)
4. Describe how you used PSYOP (MISO) and IO in your operations? (Travis)
5. Have you witnessed any cases of military deception MILDEC? (Travis)
6. How did your unit convey your narrative (define) to the population IOT gain their support? (Karsten)
7. As to population and resource control, how did you secure or separate the local population from insurgents? (Matt)
8. Did the operational boundaries of your unit or parent unit match the civil boundaries (district, village, city)? (Ken)
9. Did a plan, operation, action, activity, or initiative ever have unintentional positive outcome? (Mike)
10. Was there an amnesty program in your AOR? Describe it? If not, did you observe opportunities for reintegration and reconciliation? (Karsten)
11. Describe the use of turned or flipped insurgents in COIN (use of former insurgents groups to work for the government through incentives)? (Travis)
12. Based on your experience, what do you think amnesty, reconciliation and reintegration should be? What should its end effect be? (Karsten)

E. Lessons Learned
1. Did you do something that was not based in doctrine that had positive results? (Mike/ Carrie)
2. Looking back at the whole deployment, did you ever do something that disrupted, reduced, or nullified insurgent intelligence collection, information operations, C2, fire and maneuver, or leadership? (Mike)
3. What did you feel was the most effective part of countering the insurgency and can you provide any examples that you witnessed? (Karsten)
4. How would you use combat tracking in COIN? (Travis)
5. What would you do differently for your next deployment? And any final comments? (Carrie)
CONSOLIDATED COIN THEMES:

Are there historic lessons from counterinsurgency campaigns with respect to counterinsurgent organizational models that facilitated unity of command or effort and positive effects that could be applied or adapted for current or future counterinsurgency campaigns? (Ken)

How can counterinsurgency be employed through the use of local security forces and further supported by both pre-conflict and later-developed versions of doctrine? (Carrie)

How can government forces turn insurgents for pseudo operations and use them to find and destroy other insurgents? (Travis)

Can counterinsurgency be conducted more effectively at the tactical level by taking away or undermining the strengths of the insurgent force in regards to the Elements of Combat Power? (Mike)

Could previously successful hearts and minds strategies be applied to current day population and resource control (PRC) methods in conducting counterinsurgency? (Matt)

How has the United States Special Operation Forces (often looked upon by the rest of the Army to lead in institutional change) evolved in counterinsurgency conflicts in the past century, mainly from lessons learned of counterinsurgencies such as Malaya (British SAS), Vietnam (American Special Forces) and Dhofar (British SAS)? (Jesse)

How have we as militaries in the United States and Great Britain planned for counterinsurgency operations and subsequently trained and organized our forces to implement them? (Mac)

How does the strategy and tactic of amnesty for enemies affect past insurgencies and their counter insurgency effort? (Karsten)
INTRODUCTION
You are invited to participate in a research study exploring counterinsurgency (COIN) from both a scholars’ and a practitioners’ perspective. You were chosen based upon the simple criteria that you have served in some capacity, either military or civilian, in a counterinsurgency effort.

This study is being conducted as primary source research to support the efforts of the Command and General Staff College Scholars Program and the researchers’ completion of theses for Master of Military Art and Science degrees. CGSC students (O-4 to O-5) have volunteered to compete in a selection process that considered past operational experience, educational background, interest in joining an enhanced educational program, and potential contributions to the seminar. CGSC Scholars completed all Core Curriculum requirements for the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) before starting the research seminar.

This interview is being conducted in accordance with US Army Center for Military History guidelines. Interviews are solely for the purpose of oral history.

RESEARCH PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to define COIN from both a literature and a practitioner’s point of view. Literature reviewed by the researchers includes original doctrine, case studies, and classicists’ perspectives. Practitioners can provide aspects of their personal experience that will further help to define COIN. Both literature and shared information will be analyzed and compared, with appropriate citations provided.

Ultimately, the ILE Scholars will publish their findings as theses for a Masters in Military Arts and Science for the military’s wider use. Your participation will significantly assist in this goal.

RESEARCH PROCEDURES
If you agree to participate in this study, I would ask you to participate in an interview and potentially be available for follow-up clarification. The interview will last between one to two hours, and the topics discussed will include themes surrounding COIN. The purpose of the interview will not only address specified questions, but also your personal experiences and perspectives on COIN. You will be free to decline to answer any question. The interview will be recorded to assure accurate transcription of your perspectives. You may decline to be recorded or stop the recording while the interview is in progress.
Because the interview will be shared with eight members of the Scholars Program and their faculty advisors, additional clarification may be requested by one of the researchers. If you agree, you will be asked for contact information (email address, phone number) so you can be reached. Any further contact will follow the same rules of confidentiality as agreed upon before, and will be reviewed prior to any additional contact.

CONFIDENTIALITY

There is some choice regarding the level of confidentiality that will be ensured for this study. Given the high-profile nature of the potential participants, I ask that you choose whether and to what extent you may be identified. There are three possible levels:

________ No Personal Attribution. Names and organizations of those interviewed will not be published. Only contextual criteria will be included for clarity of information (e.g., Commanding Officer of an Armor Brigade; company-grade staff officer for a battalion-sized element). The participant’s name and affiliation will not used on audio files or transcripts (if identification is made by mistake, it will be deleted from the transcript. Data provided will be identified by a code number. Any quotes or interview excerpts will not be attributed to the participant by name or in any way that could lead to identification of the participant. Your unit will not specifically be mentioned. Your tenure in theater may be alluded to in order to provide context (e.g., This officer served in both the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom and a mature theater in Operation Enduring Freedom.). For clarity, years may be used. Please provide a future date when this restriction can be upgraded:

________ Partial Personal Attribution. Names and organizations of those interviewed will be published. Quotes/excerpts will not be accompanied with a name or information that could lead to identification. Data provided will be identified by a code number. Names or specific affiliations will not be included in any report or publication of the study findings. Please provide a future date when this restriction can be upgraded:

________ Full Personal Attribution. Names and organizations of those interviewed will be published and quotes will be attributed to the participant personally, by name and by organization.

Please review the three potential levels of confidentiality and disclosure, and choose one by marking your initials on the blank to the left of the choice you prefer.

In addition, to protect the confidentiality of participants of this study, the master list of names, audio recordings, transcriptions, and notes will be property of the United Stated Government and will reside with the Ike Skelton Chair for Counterinsurgency (Dr. Daniel Marston, please see below for contact information) the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS under appropriate US Army Regulations and Policies.
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF THE STUDY

Taking part in this research study is completely voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate in this study will not affect your current or future relations with the Command and General Staff College. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time.

For your protection, you have the right to request that the researchers stop the recording device, discontinue taking notes, etc. Information you provide "off the record" will not be used as quotations in a thesis, but may provide context and/or background for certain topics.

SECURITY

Interviews will be conducted at the UNCLASSIFIED level.

HOW TO GET ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS

You are encouraged to ask questions both before you agree to be in this study and also at any time you need information in the future. Dr. Daniel Marston holds the Ike Skelton Chair for Counterinsurgency at the Command and General Staff College and exercises faculty oversight for this research project. You may contact him directly at any time. He can be reached at daniel.marston@balliol-oxford.com or daniel.p.marston@us.army.mil. Alternately, please call him with questions at (913) 684-4567.

You may also contact Dr. Robert Baumann, Director of the Command and General Staff Graduate Degree program. He can be reached at robert.f.baumann@us.army.mil or by phone at (913) 684-2752.

STATEMENT OF CONSENT

I have read the above information. I have asked questions and received answers. I consent to participate in this study.

I will be given a copy of this form for my records.

Signature          Date
I have fully explained this research study to the participants, and in my judgment, there was sufficient information regarding risks and benefits, to enable the participant make an informed decision. I will inform the participant in a timely manner of any changes in the procedure or risks and benefits if any should occur.

__________________________  ____________________
Signature                    Date
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