THESIS

CHANGING THE AFGHAN CYCLE OF CONFLICT FROM THE OUTSIDE, IN

by

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June 2011

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This study explores the cyclical nature of conflict in Afghanistan and the elusive condition of stability as coalition forces begin their anticipated drawdown in 2011, and complete transition of security to Afghan forces in 2014. Assuming that the basic societal elements of stability require a balancing of political, economic, and security structures to form a sense of national cohesion, this study seeks to determine if national cohesion is sufficient enough to break the cycle of conflict; and if so, what strategy with neighboring countries will foster this cohesion in order to disrupt the cycle of conflict? A regional approach is necessary to buttress any internal strategies attempted within Afghanistan; but to do so, the alliance of partner nations must first begin small and then grow from a strong central core. The core players in the region are Iran, India, and Pakistan, but the nature of their self-interested interactions has proven unprofitable and unsustainable in the long-term. To the degree that these countries can be assisted to move beyond their pursuance of self-interests, to form a cooperative regional alliance, then the goal of regional stability, as well as stability in Afghanistan, can become a reality.
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ABSTRACT

This study explores the cyclical nature of conflict in Afghanistan and the elusive condition of stability as coalition forces begin their anticipated drawdown in 2011, and complete transition of security to Afghan forces in 2014. Assuming that the basic societal elements of stability require a balancing of political, economic, and security structures to form a sense of national cohesion, this study seeks to determine if national cohesion is sufficient enough to break the cycle of conflict; and if so, what strategy with neighboring countries will foster this cohesion in order to disrupt the cycle of conflict? A regional approach is necessary to buttress any internal strategies attempted within Afghanistan; but to do so, the alliance of partner nations must first begin small and then grow from a strong central core. The core players in the region are Iran, India, and Pakistan, but the nature of their self-interested interactions has proven unprofitable and unsustainable in the long-term. To the degree that these countries can be assisted to move beyond their pursuance of self-interests, to form a cooperative regional alliance, then the goal of regional stability, as well as stability in Afghanistan, can become a reality.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANA    Afghan National Army
ANP    Afghan National Police
ASF    Afghan Security Forces
CAR    Central Asian Republics
CN     Counter-Narcotics
COIN   Counterinsurgency
CT     Counter-Terrorism
ECO    Economic Cooperation Organization
EU     European Union
FATA   Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FC     Frontier Constabulary
FC NWFP Frontier Corps North West Frontier Province
FCR    Frontier Crime Regulations
FR     Frontier Regions
GCA    Greater Central Asia
GHQ    General Headquarters
GWOT   Global War on Terror
HiG    Hizb-i-Islami (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar)
IDP    Internally Displaced Person
IIP    Improvised Explosive Device
IG     Inspector General
IHK    Indian Held Kashmir
IPI    Iran- Pakistan- India (Gas pipeline)
ISAF   International Security Assistance Force
ISI    Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
NA     Northern Alliance
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<table>
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<td>NPS</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
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<td>NWA</td>
<td>North Waziristan Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Conference</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Political Agent</td>
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<td>PAKMIL</td>
<td>Pakistan Military</td>
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<td>POW</td>
<td>Prisoner of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SOTF</td>
<td>Special Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
<td>Special Services Group</td>
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<td>Taliban</td>
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<td>TAPI</td>
<td>Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India</td>
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<td>Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Sharia Mohammadia</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional Warfare</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

While much energy has been dedicated towards planning and executing a successful internal strategy for Afghan stability, this alone is not sufficient to ensure success beyond 2014. In addition to internal efforts, it is essential to look forward and beyond Afghanistan, and examine the broader effects of external actors on Afghan security and stability. External influences from neighboring countries as well as international super powers have always been at the forefront, and arguably in some cases the root of strife in Afghanistan. These interactions are so extensive that the sequence they follow seems to take on a cyclical nature over time. Historically, the process begins with external interferences that disrupt Afghanistan’s internal balance of power; this in turn creates unrest and conflict both in and amongst internal factions, and eventually against the external actors themselves. Once this conflict peaks, external interest wanes, forces withdraw, and Afghan affairs are left to their own devices until again, external powers and interests are heightened, which inevitably disrupt the internal balance and the cycle of conflict resumes. This pattern can be seen in varying degrees throughout Afghanistan’s storied history: from before and including the Anglo-Afghan Wars of the 19th century, to the communist interventions of the 20th century, to the current NATO operations of the past decade.

After more than nine years, conflict appears to be peaking in Afghanistan, after which external interest and activity will inevitably decline. This is a good thing as long as something is done to first resolve external interests. If nothing is done to rectify external concerns and interests then any resolutions found in the current conflict will surely be temporary. As international appetite for conflict in Afghanistan wanes, the question regarding what can be done to politically and socially strengthen Afghanistan, while simultaneously resolving the security and economic concerns of external actors, must be addressed. As discussions increasingly focus on the 2011 drawdown of surge forces and the 2014 transition to Afghan security forces, headway must be made in the context of Afghanistan’s external neighbors and partners, or all parties put at risk the internal progress made and possibly force another tragic repeat of the Afghan cycle of conflict.
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this thesis is to identify acceptable and sustainable measures that will reduce external interference in Afghan affairs and allow the formation of national cohesion. The breadth and depth of the Afghan conflict and all its inter-related problems are so profound that simply listing all the challenges that make progress difficult fails to truly illuminate the best way forward.1 What the process now requires is more constructive focus on areas of improvement that are viable so that incremental development may continue and ultimately provide forward movement. This can be derived from a range of possible outcomes, to the degree that they are acceptable to Afghans and the consortium of regional and extra-regional countries that have an interest in the future of Afghanistan.

The scope of this qualitative and longitudinal research will include analysis of the insufficiency of internal solutions alone, and the essential requirement for external interactions at the regional and international level. In addition to the analysis of the influence of regional actors, the authors will also describe how potentially fragile stability may be while trying to break the repeating cycle of conflict.

The nature of The Great Game in Afghanistan has transformed with the addition of economic giants like the United States, China, and India. Although the rich history of external influence and internal power struggles greatly colors the history of Afghanistan, these pre-21st century periods will only receive minor analysis. Notwithstanding the importance of a historical perspective, the greater scope of this thesis will focus on the current state of affairs, since the prospect of future stability must start from this particular point in the cycle. During this research, the authors will identify how the social network in Afghanistan supports the interwoven political, economic and security structures, and how proper balance can improve overall security and stability in Afghanistan by adjusting the external dynamics of bordering and interested states.

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B. BACKGROUND

Growing sentiment indicates that current conditions in Afghanistan are unsustainable, and the country is taking on a “Vietnam Syndrome” in American military and public discussions.2 This is true to the degree that, like Vietnam, U.S. public opinion in support of the war in Afghanistan appears to be waning, and after more than nine years economic, political, and military resources are quickly being drained. Inevitably, some form of military drawdown is imperative and so the question exists: what effects will a military drawdown have on the stability of Afghanistan, much less the region? Much has been written regarding the current counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that is being implemented in Afghanistan, and clearly the success or failure of this COIN strategy will influence stability in the short term. However, in order to establish a stable condition that is sustainable, changes to the external conditions that surround Afghanistan must occur.

In a broader sense, if there is widespread popular support for the Taliban, the Kabul government will find itself on a collision course with its own citizens. It is, therefore, essential to build a sustainable grassroots political relationship with the Afghan people that can develop beyond COIN and into a persistent long-term solution for Afghanistan.

In general terms, it is clear that the many different strategies that have been employed in Afghanistan have not achieved the desired levels of security and stability originally hoped for or intended. Previously, ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) success was measured by the number of insurgents killed or the number of operations conducted, which was a quantifiable measure that showed perceived success.3 Yet, the insurgents still seem to operate with growing impunity at the time and place of

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their choosing. According to David Kilcullen, “Historically, the more military pressure is put on a fragmented society like Afghanistan, the more a coalition against the invader becomes the likely outcome.”

The Karzai government remains weak, corrupt, and ineffective, and by far, this is the Taliban’s best talking point. Currently, the Afghan government that must win this war—if it is to be won—has not grown in capacity commensurate with the amount of money and efforts dedicated to this purpose. Elements of Southern Pashtun tribes perceive that they are underrepresented and appear disaffected with the central government. Such disaffection from the largest and traditionally most powerful of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups will have immensely destabilizing implications for Afghanistan and Pakistan if left unattended. The Taliban remain a resilient enemy who, after more than nine years of conflict, has not been defeated. Karzai and the Coalition are now talking about “good” and “bad” Taliban and even holding direct discussions with the good group. This would seem an effort to either co-opt more amenable elements or split the group into more factions. Ultimately this strategy is one that may result in a power-sharing arrangement in Kabul. Such an approach is just the beginning, but this could drastically change the dynamics of the conflict and its potential resolution.

Afghanistan is located at the tri-junction of three strategic regions of South Asia, Southwest Asia and Central Asia, and a position that raises its importance in the eyes of its neighbors and because of its own fragility makes it vulnerable to their influence. A regional balance of power and threat perception have played an important role in defining Afghanistan’s political structure. Since the intervention of the former Soviet Union in 1979, the factors of regional and international politics have added new and important dimensions to the country’s internal politics. With globalization and the increased reach of non-state actors, this region is likely to become even more vulnerable. The border separating Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east is largely irrelevant to the people that live there, as life is seen as no different from one side to the other. For this reason, often

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Pashtun discontent in Afghanistan can easily spill over to the same socially connected populations in northern Pakistan. Since the problem of loose borders is endemic throughout the region, the solutions to the Afghan problems require regional involvement in a coordinated and collaborative arrangement as never before envisioned or attempted.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis poses two questions in regard to the future environment in Afghanistan after a major withdrawal of coalition military forces. Assuming that the basic societal elements of stability require a balancing of political, economic, and security structures, is national cohesion sufficient to break the cycle of conflict? Additionally, the authors assume that stability in Afghanistan will surely require something different from Western models of governance. Based on the cultural characteristics of the Afghan society, the authors assume the specific formula for stability will be unique to Afghanistan, even when compared to other developing nations. The second question focuses more specifically on the long-term external environment: what strategy for stability with neighboring countries is necessary to foster national cohesion and disrupt the cycle of conflict? The authors will analyze the conditions that have led to stability in Afghanistan in the past, and focus on how to derive acceptable and sustainable stability for the future in light of the last decade of conflict.

Thorough analysis of these questions will provide context and focus to coalition efforts to foster long-term stability in Afghanistan. To the degree that they are relational, resolutions in Afghanistan may have application to other multi-player regional stability problems. At a minimum, this study seeks to illuminate the conditions necessary to stabilize the region as a whole.

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D. METHODOLOGY

The authors will use a combination of methods to analyze the question of stability in Afghanistan in a post-drawdown environment. First, they will use a form of longitudinal analysis to investigate the conditions relative to other instances of foreign intervention in Afghanistan. Within this analysis, they will define and discuss different forms of interventions\(^6\) and how these interventions have created instability. Second, they will draw from the empirical evidence that addresses the Afghan conditions both past and current. Finally, the authors will use game theory to demonstrate various status quo strategies that underlie efforts for lasting stability and peace in Afghanistan.

The path diagram in Figure 1 describes the causal mechanisms with regard to the first question posed by this thesis—national cohesion alone is necessary but not sufficient to break the cycle of conflict and stabilize Afghanistan for the long term.

Historically, Afghanistan included Pakistan’s northwestern Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), so when Afghan culture and traditions are discussed, they are the same as that being practiced in FATA and to some degree the larger part of Pakistan’s Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan provinces. These people are basically from the same tribes and follow the same traditions. The majority of the region’s inhabitants are from Pashtun tribes; fifteen million live in Afghanistan and almost thirty million live on the other side of the Durand line in Pakistan.\(^7\)

A general struggle against foreign occupation has always been a strong factor of unity and cohesion amongst these tribes. Therefore, the presence of occupiers can often serve to unite this society, which provides a common cause for insurgency. Also, because of the strong cultural and religious tenets of honorably living through “Jihad” and the respectable way of dying through “Shahadat,” many Afghans embrace insurgency as a societal obligation. Drawing stronger links between the political, economic, security and social factors is necessary to create a degree of internal stability, which is essential to create a form of national cohesion that has been fractured over the past thirty years of conflict. However, national cohesion, while necessary to strengthen the country internally, will not be sufficient to change the external environment that has weakened Afghanistan. Left unchanged, the external conditions of competing regional and international interests will easily re-fracture the fragile stability that may be present by the 2014 transition goal.

The second question this thesis poses addresses the complicated external dynamics that shape the nature of stability in Afghanistan. Coalition forces in Afghanistan have begun to recognize the breadth of the regional dynamics as evidenced in their increased attempts to synchronize international efforts beyond just Afghanistan. This has been a slowly developing realization, but one that will eventually play a singularly crucial role in post drawdown stability. If internal Afghan conditions are seen as beneficial to the majority of neighboring countries, then coalescing their disparate interests into a form of cooperation will make long-term stability feasible. The path diagram in Figure 2 shows how the ‘iceberg’ of Afghanistan, when surrounded by the turbulent combination of regional actors, is nearly overcome by external influences and accordingly, internal stability is threatened. However, if the structural environment in which these countries interact and influence the iceberg were to change such that the environment became more buoyant to the iceberg, then this change may be sufficient to allow Afghanistan to stabilize in a more long-term manner.
Changing this environment of regional and global actors is such a daunting idea that it is emblematic of the comparable feat of changing the buoyant characteristics of the water that surrounds the iceberg. Regardless, if the iceberg is to be stabilized, then the external conditions must be changed because the external status quo will doom the iceberg no matter how buoyant it is. From another perspective, repeated interventions have fractured the Afghanistan society from within and widened the gap of ungoverned regions. If an egg breaks due to external force, inside life ends; but if it breaks from inside life has begun.

Finally, while analyzing the game theory approach between the regional players the authors will discuss several theories concerning the balance of power. More
specifically, how regional players are employing both defensive and offensive realism, along with balancing and buck passing, to address their security concerns in Afghanistan.\(^8\)

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**Figure 3. Current Situation and Proposed Plan towards Stability in Afghanistan**

As shown in the figure, during the authors’ research they will determine that through better regional understanding and political/economic cooperation there can be a movement towards stability in Afghanistan and the status quo can be broken. International efforts in Afghanistan have largely been operating on the left side of the red arrow since 2001, but with increasing urgency, the strategy in Afghanistan needs to shift towards the right side and focus on regional understanding and alliances that strengthen both political and economic cooperation.

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E. THESIS OUTLINE

Chapter II will look at literature on stabilization and state building. In this chapter, the author contends that state building is not enough to achieve stability in Afghanistan. The author will also detail the general efforts of the past ten years and critically analyze how these measures are necessary but insufficient in creating long-term stability in Afghanistan. The effects of conflict in the last thirty years have been so extreme that the country has been severely fractured. State building and democracy have the potential to repair these fissures, but ultimately will be insufficient to stem the tide of the Afghan cycle of conflict without other drastic efforts in the region.

Chapter III will show the necessity and sufficiency of a regional approach to ultimately break the cycle of conflict. Moreover, this chapter will address the regional core players (RCPs) and the core controversial issues in Afghanistan that create mutual rivalry. A theoretical game approach regarding Afghanistan will further substantiate the complex rivalries between RCPs and the effect of external interference on regional balance of power.

In Chapter IV, the author will address the other relevant players in the region who have the ability to influence the core players along with the government and tribes inside Afghanistan. This chapter will also focus on different common issues in Afghanistan that can converge the interests of all regional players and make them stakeholders in Afghanistan.

In Chapter V, the authors will develop a framework for an alliance among the regional players. This will support the external approach but also show how the ultimate resolution to support one another will be mutually beneficial, as opposed to the current conditions in which all nations involved are losing in this “new great game.”

Chapter VI will provide some recommendations and discuss ‘shocks’ to show how vulnerable any regional cooperation would be to sustaining peace in Afghanistan. The thesis will conclude with a look at the transition timeline of 2014 and analyze the necessary requirements to strengthen stability both internally and externally in order to meet this goal. This chapter will also discuss the ramifications if changes are insufficient
to create long-term stability and how things could proceed if the process remains intransient. This analysis should be helpful in preparing policy makers for potential second- and third-order effects when considering long-term policies and strategies in the region.

F. CONCLUSION

Politicians and military commanders have different perceptions and solutions for Afghanistan’s problems. However, most of them agree on four fundamental aspects likely to influence post-drawdown stability in Afghanistan: stability requires a legitimate state, capable security forces, a regional balance of power, and the ability to satisfy the security interests of global partners. The first two of these four factors have been the focus of intense international efforts, but without a functional change in the way all actors approach the idea of a regional balance of power and the security interests of global partners, internal gains in Afghanistan will be short lived. The prescribed solution of alliances, in this region in particular, is one of the most challenging, but an essential necessity if a resilient and stable Afghanistan is to rise out of the decades of conflict and enter a new era of peace and stability. Afghanistan needs to be stable and strong from the inside to overcome the negative effects of repeated external interventions and influence.
II. LOOKING BEYOND INTERNAL STABILITY

Regardless of the ideological, political, or economic reasons for overthrowing a foreign government, putting into place a system that ensures durable large-coalition rule is unlikely.\(^9\)

A. INTRODUCTION

Tribal culture has always been dominant in Afghan society. For centuries the tribes have been independent, autonomous and generally resisted foreign occupation, but more specifically they have rejected the legitimacy of foreign-influenced governments in Afghanistan.

For various reasons, Afghanistan has been a focal point of different civilizations and while it has never sought foreigners on its land, it has repeatedly attracted foreign occupation. Historically, controlling Afghanistan from outside its geographical borders has been a more viable and pragmatic strategy than occupying this graveyard of empires. The British attempted twice in the 19th century to gain control over this piece of land, but soon withdrew to establish it as a buffer zone while maintaining external influence to resist Russian expansion. In the 20th century, repeated interventions (as shown in Figure 4) and experimentations in Afghanistan have made a cocktail of the Afghan social structure, which is now more bifurcated and fractured, and ultimately harmed those who used, misused and interfered in the region. Today, the credibility of Western-led nation-building is jeopardized because it is seen to deny justice to the very people it was supposed to help. According to Afghan expert Ahmed Rashid, “It could well be argued that over time Islamic extremists were emboldened rather than subdued by the travesty of justice the United States perpetrated. The people learn to hate America.”\(^{10}\)


B. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

From the founding of the Durrani dynasty in 1747 until 1838, Afghan rulers had only close relatives as rivals. Tribes in different parts of Afghanistan have been distributed throughout various population centers, and have neither been very mobile nor very interested in dynasty politics. Traditionally, none of the central governments interfered with the tribal, traditional way of living. With the growing interference and threat between Russia and Britain during the Great Game, Afghan rulers encouraged tribes to take up arms against their occupiers. During the first and second Anglo-Afghan wars, the tribesmen of Afghanistan, organized by the central Afghan government, defeated the British Army. According to Afghan expert Thomas Barfield,

Foreign interferences during the British-Afghan wars drew Afghan tribesmen increasingly towards guns and money. With each succeeding crises and popular military mobilization, the restoration of state authority became harder and disputes over who has the right to rule the state became fiercer.\textsuperscript{11} Later, political dynamics considerably changed after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The death of King Daoud after the Soviet coup brought an end to the monarch rule in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the continued struggle against the Soviet occupation to make Afghanistan ungovernable for the Soviets also resulted in the demise of the

\textsuperscript{11} Thomas Barfield, \textit{Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History} (Princeton University Press, 2010), 2.
fragile, legitimate political infrastructure in Afghanistan. Religious groups and drug warlords became even more powerful after the Soviet withdrawal. While Islam had always been a way of life in Afghanistan, the religious war against the Russian invasion gave further impetus to radicals and extremists. After the Soviet withdrawal and subsequent fall of the communist-backed government, the remaining Afghan state infrastructure was so fractured that it had lost all trust in the eyes of the population.

C. CONCEPT OF A STABLE STATE IN AFGHANISTAN

There is no memorable set pattern of stable governance built into the current generation’s psyche in Afghanistan. Looking further back, the concept of a stable state in the political history of Afghanistan has been one where the state, or the central government, rarely interfered with the tribal elders, elites and Maliks.

After the short reign of Nadir Shah his son, Ahmed Shah Durrani, founded the Durrani Empire in 1747. The Durrani Empire maintained a relative stable period of governance and authority over the country for twenty-five years. During this period and the various changes in the central government that ensued over the next almost two hundred years, three factors were predominantly visible for maintaining stable rule in Afghanistan: first, a decentralized method of governance; second, absence of interference by external players; and finally, strict implementation of the law through the Jirga or Shura system. While there existed some level of conflict in the deposing and changing of central leadership during this period, this conflict did not spread throughout the whole country. Only when one of the above three conditions was violated did widespread conflict ensue. The only prolonged exception to this was the era of Amir Abdul Rehman (1880-1901), which marked the beginning evolution of a cycle of conflict involving external players in which internal balances began to be realigned.

D. STABILITY THROUGH COERCION: AMIR ABDUL REHMAN (1880–1901)

The Iron Amir, as he was later known for his tough measures against opponents and countering revolt through force, was an exception to the cycle of conflict in that he
lasted more than twenty years. However, in the end this adaptation of foreign-supported rule was unsustainable much like the popular Middle East unrest that began deposing longstanding dictators in the beginning of 2011. In other words, the cycle of conflict in Afghanistan continued, it just took longer to overcome the illegitimate rule of the Iron Amir. Amir Abdul Rehman was able to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population initially because of his ability to provide security and stability in Afghanistan. He raised a strong security force and instituted strict laws to ensure central authoritative rule. Due to his political sagacity he was able to maintain firm control of his territory while implementing major reforms. His ability to keep the major powers outside of Afghan territory provided legitimacy and credibility to his central and strict form of government. He mercilessly executed elements of the non-Pashtun population in the north and northwest provinces of Afghanistan and favored Pashtuns to gain control of those areas. While Rehman was supported by the British, his strong Pashtun nationalism along with his religious dispensation of justice made him acceptable in the eyes of population for a time. It was basically Amir Abdur Rehman who destroyed the historic political structure and deprived different regions of political and economic autonomy by creating a strong central government.12 Eventually, this strong approach was viewed as an extension of British meddling and, while not directly administered, Rehman and external influence became synonymous to the extent that he was eventually deposed from within and the cycle of conflict began again.

E. STABILITY THROUGH COMPROMISE: NADIR SHAH AND ZAHIR SHAH, AFGHANISTAN (1929–1978)

During the era of Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah (1929–1978), Afghanistan saw a considerable period of peace and relative noninterference. The country maintained peaceful relations with its neighbors with no existential threat from any regional powers. Afghanistan was relatively stable for almost fifty-five years, avoiding any internal rebellion and foreign intervention. Today, that period of peace for five decades is

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12 Barfield, Afghanistan, 2.
considered to be the golden age in Afghanistan politics. Thereafter, the decade of the ‘70s was full of coups, war and rebellion. After the communist coup and Russian invasion, Afghanistan became a battleground and a zone of never-ending conflict.

F. DEFEAT OF THE USSR AND RISE OF THE TALIBAN

Within months of the 1979 Soviet occupation, Afghanistan became a focal point for the Cold War between the Soviet Union and United States. The Mujahedeen emerged as the main fighting force against the Soviet Army. However, for the Afghans the Soviet invasion was another opportunity to pursue their cultural art of guerilla warfare under the name of Jihad and the fight for freedom. One cannot assume that Afghans fought foreign intervention solely because of the financial benefits the conflict might bring. The loss of life, property, and human suffering far outweighed any development or aid these conflicts transferred, but the resilient Afghan people did find a way to survive and the currency during these times became guns and violence, which engendered power and money. This was a significant change from the traditional power structure that previous social norms relied on through the tribal hierarchy. From this conflict, which claimed 1.5 million Afghan lives and ended after Soviet support for the puppet government collapsed, emerged a second generation of Mujahedeen, who later called themselves “Taliban.” According to Ahmed Rashid, “Amir Abdur Rehman’s policy of empowering Islamic Mullahs and his revolts against non-Pashtun population were a few of the influencing factors on Taliban during their rise to power and their way of Governance.”

The Taliban phenomenon was a natural product of infighting amongst Afghan factions after the Russian collapse. In the 1990s, The Taliban emerged from among the young and energetic Pashtuns–mainly nurtured and groomed during the decade of war against Russia and indoctrinated with a strong spirit of Jihad and Islamic code of conduct.

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13 The meaning of “Taliban” is student. These were mainly young students from the Madrassas, which were raised during the Soviet War and funded by Saudis and Americans through Pakistan’s Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The majority of Taliban are Pashtuns, an ethnic majority in Afghanistan. Approximately fifteen million Pashtuns live in Afghanistan and thirty million are on the other side of the Durand line in Pakistan. Most of them are interconnected and support each other socially, economically, and politically.

During the Afghan civil war (1989–1995), many youth became disillusioned and dismayed by the corrupt and incompetent Afghan warlords. Following the civil war, none of the ruling factions in Afghanistan was competent enough to live up to the expectation of the Afghan people who had sacrificed for ten years to resist the Russian invasion in addition to civil strife. The Taliban provided hope for change and stability during that time of chaos and confusion. Unfortunately for the Taliban, they too allowed external influences to manipulate their fledgling system. Pakistani support was a major factor in strengthening the Taliban initially, but it also drew the ire and violent resistance from the Northern Alliance, who was in turn supported by other neighbors such as Iran and other Central Asian Republics. This arrangement of foreign sponsorship perpetuated the continued conflict and instability.

To make the situation even more convoluted, the Taliban invited a fundamentalist organization into the country, and ultimately this relationship with Al Qaeda would be its undoing. Over time it is possible that “Afghanistan [could] have reverted to its traditional but stable state had the Taliban administration in Kabul not granted sanctuary to Al-Qaeda.” However, even this is debatable because of the persistent conflict that external interference from the regional and international actors seemed to foment. Regardless, the crescendo of extra-national activity hit a peak on September and Afghanistan descended back into the cycle of conflict.

G. AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

U.S. Major General Michael Flynn, deputy chief of staff for intelligence in Afghanistan, made a bold claim in 2010 when he stated, "eight years into the war in Afghanistan… the vast intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate and the people they seek to persuade." This is also a telling statement considering how things began in 2001, following the World Trade Center attacks.

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Since 9/11, the United States has done much to change the balance of power in Afghanistan. The war against Al-Qaeda morphed into a war against the Taliban, and some contend that it has now snowballed into a broader regional proxy war. There have been phenomenal efforts in the last nine years to counter the Taliban insurgency and ensure that they never regain power.\(^\text{17}\) While a vast international alliance exists to counter the Taliban insurgency and attempt to expand the capacity of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, there are questions that remain regarding the actions of the regional players and their conflicting interests, which have yet to be resolved. Most significantly, the revamped COIN strategy that took root in 2008 has remained only tepidly successful in addressing the expectations of the population, or what David Galula refers to as “population survival strategy.” Counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen argues:

The population wants predictability, order and safety and that safety comes from knowing where you stand and knowing that if you do this or do not do this, following the rules, you will be safe. Even if they do not like Hezbollah or the Taliban in particular, they still feel safer living within the set rules. So, creation of safety, it is a lot about predictability, consistency, and reliability.\(^\text{18}\)

The perception exists that the international efforts of the last decade in Afghanistan have been somewhat futile, and coalition efforts are rife with inconsistencies in strategy. In terms of futility, one could reference the investment of more than $500 billion to build up internal security in Afghanistan over the last nine years through a


strong Afghan Security Force (ASF). Despite this incredible focus on security over comparable investment in infrastructure, for example, insurgent activity and the level of violence have only increased as the conflict has dragged on.

Figure 5. Graph of American Investment in Afghanistan

![Graph of American Investment in Afghanistan](image)

Figure 6. Number of Insurgent Attacks and Type by Week, January 2004-Current

![Number of Insurgent Attacks and Type by Week, January 2004-Current](image)

During President Obama’s Afghanistan review in 2008, there were debates over how to measure success, and there has been a shift when comparing current strategies, with the evolving objectives of the Bush administration. Vice President Joe Biden was of the opinion that, “our strategy in Afghanistan should not focus on state building and

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19 Manea, “Interview with Dr. David Kilcullen.”

eliminating Taliban,” though that is essentially what the United States is doing. While
the change in strategies was prudent and necessary, regional actors nonetheless see the
stagnated security conditions and evolving strategies, and act according to their perceived
best interest. These Actions often conflict with U.S. strategies, and even hamper regional
progress, which in turn exacerbates internal efforts. Here again the cycle of conflict
seems to only gain speed and grow in stature.

H. ANALYSIS

Considering all Afghan eras mentioned previously, the most evident conclusion is
that political, economic and military institutions have never been strong or particularly
resilient in Afghanistan. Second, foreign interference is an integral factor that has
repeatedly been a source of instability and turmoil in Afghanistan. Whether considering
the British conquests of the 19th century, the Soviet invasion of the 20th century, or the
U.S. attack in the 21st century, the conflicts always involve an effort to pacify the local
populace regardless of the initial reasons for the conflict. Foreign influence creates a
problem of sovereign legitimacy that eventually fractures whatever tentative peace or
stability may exist. Historian Hilton Root argues:

When leadership in the weaker country depends for legitimacy on the foreign
benefactor for resources such as foreign aid, abundant credit, and military assistance, the
government can neglect building its own predictable system of laws, policy, procedural
transparency, and political accountability.

This truth is especially prevalent in the case of Afghanistan in terms of its
political, economic, and security conditions during foreign interventions.

22 Root, Alliance Curse, 5.
Table 1. Evaluation of Afghan Regimes from 19th Century to Present

State power in Afghanistan has periodically collapsed due to armed conflicts and weak political authority, and the addition of foreign interference and interests have greatly compounded the levels of social disruption and use of force within the system as a whole. The cycle of conflict had run its course and evolved to such an extent over the years that when the Soviets withdrew, guns and money were readily available to all the ethnic groups. This created an increasingly dangerous dynamic that seemed to raise the ferocity of internal conflict with each generation of the cycle. Afghanistan after 1988 became a stage for a series of proxy wars between the neighboring states. Barfield contends, “As a consequence, the seemingly all-powerful centralized state that held Afghanistan in its thrall in 1901 was reduced to a powerless shell by 2001.” This meant that the regeneration of internal stability on its own was almost unthinkable because the infrastructure needed to nurture the state had disintegrated after years of conflict.

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I. ROOTS OF INSTABILITY: WEAK STATE CRAFT OR FOREIGN INTERFERENCE?

Since the 19th century, there has been a mix of centralized and decentralized models of governance in Afghanistan, including dynasties and authoritarian rule. However, generally those rulers who managed to avoid foreign interference and influence were able to gain legitimacy and ensure a level of stability in Afghanistan. There is no specific model of governance that can be considered successful for Afghanistan, though each has had their own inherent strengths relative to the social environment of the country at that time. While authentic data regarding the expectations of the population in Afghanistan is limited, one factor that has been consistent is the fact that the Afghan population, no matter how fractious, is always united against the perceived threat of occupation. Afghans have an admirably strong sense of prestige and ego that glue them together in their quest for self-governance while under occupation, and ironically the same ego divides them when they are independent of a foreign threat. This repeated phenomenon of cohesion and separation is visible after every occupation and withdrawal of intervening powers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Selection for Stability and Instability Reference</th>
<th>Foreign Occupation</th>
<th>No Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Influence (High)</td>
<td>Security Forces (Strong)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security Forces (Weak)</td>
<td>ISAF Intervention Karzai Govt (Unstable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Influence (Low)</td>
<td>Security Forces (Strong)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security Forces (Weak)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Table 2. Case Selections for Stability and Instability
J. WEAK GOVERNANCE: THE PRESIDENT KARZAI DILEMMA

Internal conflicts are endemic infections in the body politic that demand attention and intervention—undulating fevers, old wounds, and running sores that do not heal, that result in neither victory nor defeat, have no common cause, and yet are merely the aberrational outgrowths of normal political processes gone bad.²⁴

Nine years after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, inconsistent strategies, coupled with the inability of international forces and the Afghan government to provide security and stability, has severely undermined the national government’s legitimacy. This political vacuum along with repeated interventions has pushed Afghanistan into chaos, where it has become a playground for regional rivalries. In addition, the Taliban insurgency has been able to exploit the political gap, managed to transform itself into the defender of Afghan society, and are viewed as freedom fighters in the eyes of local people, meeting their needs where the national government is incapable.

Since 2002, the various methods attempted to achieve political, military and economic success in Afghanistan have remained subservient to one leader—President Karzai. For the last nine years, Karzai has wielded immense authority in Afghanistan, first as the appointed interim leader in 2002 and then as the elected leader through two national elections, albeit with noted irregularities in both. He has also cleverly attempted to walk the line between appealing to international partners who provide aid and sustenance to his fledgling government, and conversely, standing firm so as to not appear to Afghans as too beholden to international actors. Part of the power structure that allows Karzai to manipulate popular perceptions of his national leadership is that he controls all major appointments in the Afghan government, as well as in the provinces. As president, he also manages the flow of funds and aid money. He further has the authority and ability to manufacture and influence internal and regional alliances. Barfield asserts: “had Karzai been able to establish and extend his government control throughout the country, he would have met the basic test of legitimacy.”²⁵ However, this tightrope walk


has also made it difficult for Karzai to weed out corruption and power down national authority to the provincial and district levels. For this reason, the Karzai administration increasingly is viewed as illegitimate, which only fuels Taliban claims to authority and legitimacy.

The extent of the Karzai dilemma can be seen in terms of the classical game theory model of the prisoner’s dilemma. In this case, the Karzai government competes against the Taliban for rights as the legitimate ruling authority in Afghanistan. Karzai must weigh the strategies of allying with the U.S. for aid and assistance or distancing himself from such aid to appear more nationalistic. The Taliban, on the other hand, garners increased legitimacy when seen as confronting the foreign presence or less legitimacy when it is complicit to Afghan government activities or ostensibly the “foreigners.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Talibran (TB)</th>
<th>Karzai</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A</strong></td>
<td>(1,3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No-Occupation</strong></td>
<td>(2,4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. Karzai Dilemma Game Values

Based on game theory calculations (Appendix A: Karzai Dilemma), President Karzai would appear to be the primary beneficiary of the current war. For Karzai, the status quo seems to be the best option to maintain authority and control, though his legitimacy is weakened. On one side, Karzai is also cognizant of the fact that no previous Afghan ruler has survived without appearing legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan population, and so he has been often critical of the NATO occupation and accusatory of counter-terrorism strikes in the populated areas. However, on the other hand, he knows that the presence of the ISAF guarantees his longevity. A cynical view might conclude that under these conditions Karzai and other warlords have no interest in creating an
Afghan state that would provide economic development or improve the welfare of the average Afghan beyond the current status quo, because this strategy has immense personal benefits for the higher ups. More practically, he views the support of former power brokers as indispensible, because of their influence in provinces distant from the capital. However, their allegiance has a cost, which requires him to turn a blind eye to rampant corruption in the government. He also knows his weak security forces and infrastructure could not survive without the support of International forces to buttress them, and so Karzai continues to employ a series of strategies that cause many to think him duplicitous, self-aggrandizing or, at best, simply pragmatic. These are all characteristics not unlike those of numerous Afghan leaders before him.

K. AFGHANISTAN SECURITY FORCES—RIFE WITH DIFFICULTIES

There are three main issues that are confounding efforts toward the growth and development of a capable and credible security force in Afghanistan. The first involves the general size of the force including both the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. To date, coalition forces have invested heavily in Afghan security forces to ensure a level of peace before their inevitable drawdown. However, based on current projections, for an Afghan Army of the targeted size to be built, it will require enormous levels of foreign funding to maintain it since it will be many decades before the Afghan economy can support such expenditures. Afghanistan will therefore be under foreign influence for some time whether directly or indirectly. Even if American influence is regarded as benign, the following question remains: how many years until America will lose interest and completely detach itself from Afghanistan?

Second, if the enlargement of the army takes place while the Pashtun areas remain disturbed by the Taliban, much of the recruitment will continue to be done in the Tajik

26 Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11*, 28. Since FY2005, annual funding to train Afghan forces has grown rapidly from $1.3 billion to $7.4 billion in FY2007, and then fell to $2.8 billion in FY2008. In 2008, the DoD announced plans to double the size of the Afghan security forces in the next four years at a cost of about $20 billion.

and Uzbek areas, as has largely been the case to this point. This has the potential of creating a backlash in the Pashtun areas since it is unrepresentative of the corresponding population demographics, of which the Pashtun are a 42% majority compared to 27% for the Tajiks. It is also probable that a Tajik-dominated army will be regarded as occupiers in predominately Pashtun areas similar to how NATO forces are comparatively viewed. The subsequent unrest could also have an impact on Pakistani tribal areas and in the Pashtun belt of Baluchistan as well, further destabilizing the area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNICITY</th>
<th>Total (millions)</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>13.7 (42%)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>8.8 (27%)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazara</td>
<td>2.9 (9%)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>2.9 (9%)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aimak</td>
<td>1.3 (4%)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>1.0 (3%)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>0.7 (2%)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.3 (4%)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Afghanistan Population and Demographic Information

The third point of concern is that once an army of this size and structure is realized it will not be easily demobilized as security increases and its need declines. It will have to justify its existence and for that it might pursue a nationalist cause such as “Pashtunistan.” That situation reinforces the Pakistani concern of the dreaded “two front” situation with India in the east and an aggressive neighbor to the west, and further supports the reason for Pakistan continually pursuing options that provide “strategic depth” in Afghanistan.

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While there are many other issues such as illiteracy and high rates of desertion, the three points previously detailed are important because they highlight internal difficulties that could have potential strategic reverberations beyond Afghanistan and into neighboring nations in the region. These are points that need to be addressed with Afghanistan, its neighbors, and NATO leaders as well to appease regional concerns and clarify foreign intentions and commitments of support.

L. VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS AND AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

Committed to the survival of allies but lacking the leverage to discipline recalcitrant regime leaders, America creates a strategic vulnerability that even weak client states can exploit.29

Village Stability Operations (VSO) includes the concept of governance and security forces at the village level, and is an ambitious effort by the ISAF to achieve a level of security in Afghanistan where, thus far, national Afghan security forces have shown only nominal progress. The concept of bottom-up security may be a sincere step towards stability, but it has the added peril of potentially creating a parallel force to challenge the government in the future or so goes the internal master narrative to discount the effort. “One of [President Karzai’s] top advisors cautioned against moving too rapidly in expanding the Afghan Local Police (ALP) because of the risk of empowering local warlords who could destabilize the country. He cited the damage militias caused to the country in the early 1990s.”30 However, this does come closer to the historical power structure that has defined Afghanistan for centuries; namely a loose administrative power at the center, which is bolstered by the tribal structure in the periphery. So long as the tribes have been able to administer local affairs then the national government has had their support to administer affairs from beyond the national borders. The stronger central government that is attempting to provide rule of law throughout Afghanistan is largely creating something from nothing. A strong central government has not existed

29 Root, Alliance Curse: How America Lost the Third World, 174.

previously and until it does exist in a viable form, something must fill the gap. With this in mind, careful stopgaps have been employed in the institution of VSO and the ALP, which are intended to empower local villages but keep them tethered to the central government for support and authority.31 VSO are expanding based on initial successes, but efforts must remain vigilant to ensure that what was intended to be a stopgap does not in fact become the new normal, and if that is the intent then make sure it is a deliberate move rather than one that is stumbled into.

M. DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN AID—NO END IN SIGHT

Economically, militarily and politically, Afghanistan has increasingly developed a dependence on regional countries and great powers. Due to geographical conditions, for centuries Afghanistan has attempted to manipulate conditions brought on by great power rivalries in order to advance its own interests.32 The government itself has become so dependent on foreign aid and loans that by 1973, two-thirds of its annual revenue was derived from foreign grants and loans. While the people of Afghanistan have always bristled at foreign occupation, various rulers have at times found their stay beneficial. Beyond the Karzai dilemma already discussed, the Great Game even today has benefited a much broader segment of Afghan elite with the large amount of money that has been spent through various aid organizations. Afghan rulers at numerous levels have leveraged diplomacy and made fortunes without improving security and the living standards of the population. This pattern is widely continuing today to a degree that frustrates the efforts of coalition security forces to achieve broader peace and stability in Afghanistan. As more and more members of the population see international aid efforts making only modest gains in the lives of the people and incredible gains in the personal lives of various leaders,33 this perception feeds insurgent propaganda and support.


32 Barfield, Afghanistan, 205.

Rather than remaining independent, the broad efforts of international aid organizations become increasingly associated with the national government and synonymous with corruption. As long as this perception is unchanged, then obstacles to aid efforts will be nearly insurmountable.

N. CONCLUSION

Conflicting interests between the government and the Taliban has made political reconciliation a difficult option to bring stability to Afghanistan. Moreover, it is not clear that either side is sincerely interested in a reconciliation process for peace. Many Afghan elites believe that reconciliation is not in their interest. “They derive huge personal gain, through profits or graft, from what some regard as a ‘controlled’ conflict that attracts massive external resources.”34 On the other hand, the insurgents are seemingly expanding their influence and control, have a strong external support, and believe that they can outlast the coalition forces.

In the last hundred years, Afghanistan has been one of the most repeatedly invaded countries in the world. Occupation has been an increasingly destabilizing factor in Afghan history with each new foreign power. In Afghanistan, it is now time for credible commitments by all players and powers to bring sustained peace, and for that it is important to have more traders on the ground than invaders. It will take more than just internal improvements to infrastructure and governance though to achieve stability. Perhaps more important is what conditions exist at the regional level after the dust settles. If this condition does not receive equal, and in some instances more attention to reconciliation efforts, then internal peace will surely be short lived, and external interests will again muddy the waters and reignite the Afghan cycle of conflict.

III. NEIGHBORS: THE REGIONAL DYNAMICS

If [neighbors] don't stop, the consequences will be that this region will suffer with us, equally, as we suffer. In the past we suffered alone. This time everybody will suffer with us... Any effort to divide Afghanistan ethnically or weaken it will create exactly the same things in the neighboring countries. All the countries in this neighborhood have the same ethnic groups that we have, so they should know that it is a different ball game this time.  

President Hamid Karzai

A. INTRODUCTION

Since the Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan in 1989, there have been two important reasons that the regional states in close proximity to Afghanistan have repeatedly become involved with Afghan affairs. Primarily, Afghanistan’s neighbors have viewed Afghanistan as a buffer state and have therefore exploited conditions that protect their self-interests, but most importantly, that would keep turmoil across the border and prevent any spillover effect. The purpose of the buffer state was to prevent worse conditions from entering their own territory. The second reason for neighboring countries to become involved is a genuine uncertainty about the international community’s commitment to Afghanistan. This uncertainty has caused a void that invites neighborly interference. As a result, neighboring countries have pursued policies designed to first and foremost protect their own short-term interests, always at the expense of building regional cooperation and broader stability within Afghanistan. The regional balance of power has always been a complex balancing act in South Asia. As President Karzai eluded to in his 2006 remarks in Pakistan, preventing the Afghan conflict from spreading deeper into Pakistan, Iran, or other nearby states this time around will require a change to previous patterns of interference.

There are deeper forces at work that are causing strife all across Afghanistan and the FATA. Each neighbor in the region has concerns and interests that are strategic in

nature from their perspective but the threats are misaligned. “India is trying to link its problems with Pakistan to the global menace of Al-Qaeda, Pakistan is attaching its efforts towards the war on terror, to the resolution of the Kashmir issue, while Iran and the Saudis fight over Shiite and Sunni influence in this region and the greater Middle East.”

Beyond the AQ talking points that stoke the fires of extremists is the ability to directly confront the genuine fears, interests, and insecurities of each party. “It must be understood that a lack of economic opportunities in these areas escalates the recruitment for such extreme movements and ideologies and creates openings for others to settle old scores.”

There are so many things at work in Afghanistan that to call the issue of stability a “complex problem” is almost an understatement. For this reason, it is necessary to begin with only the most central of issues. Along with these core issues are Afghanistan’s neighbors, and incremental progress is dependent on the degree that progress can be made resolving their concerns over a regional balance of power, national security threats, and improved economic conditions. The aim of minimal regional cooperation might seem like too limiting a goal, but even this would be an improvement over the zero sum results each has pursued over the past decade and thus a positive step forward upon which to build for future progress.

For simplification and analysis, core neighbors—Pakistan, Iran and India—have been separated from other neighbors due to their interest, level of interference and influence in Afghanistan.

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37 POLITACT, “Afghan Conflict.”
Moving beyond just internal strategies and into the external approach to Afghan stability, one is immediately confronted with a dynamic consortium of interested countries. The core countries directly interested in Afghan stability show multiple strategies and desired end states each has for achieving peace in Afghanistan. Generally speaking, the informal alliance of nations is generally bound by a desire to combat terrorism, but each country does so from the perspective of their own self-interests, which often conflicts with allied partners. Across the board, the rivalries and levels of distrust among Afghanistan’s neighbors have created new challenges and perpetuated proxy wars within the Afghanistan Theater. These tensions are felt in Washington, where “there is a growing sense on Capitol Hill that the war needs to change, right now, but no one knows

### B. NO REGIONAL ALLIANCE WITHOUT REGIONAL TRUST

![Regional Core Players and Basic Core Issues](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Favors a Permanent ISAF Presence</th>
<th>Supports Reintegration with Taliban</th>
<th>Recognizes Pakistan’s Role in Peace</th>
<th>Supports Large Afghan Security Forces</th>
<th>Prefers Immediate Withdrawal of ISAF</th>
<th>Prefers a Non-Aligned Govt in Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Summary of Regional Country’s Interests
how to do it. The rhetoric has backed everyone into a corner.”\textsuperscript{38} With such caustic relationships, special care and consideration must be given to the idea of initially trying to rebuild the levels of trust among interested partners.

To begin the process, core issues should be identified which have the potential of changing the status quo. Three core issues that have such potential are:

- Foreign Intervention / External interference
- Reconciliation with Taliban
- Afghan Nation Building/ Security Forces

From these core issues, work can begin to identify common grounds to initiate discussion and reconciliation.

C. THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION

As discussed in the previous chapters, repeated intervention in Afghanistan has had a singularly detrimental effect on Afghan security and social structure. Moreover, repeated interventions have disrupted the traditional Afghan society from within and the present condition of continued conflict only makes reestablishing governance more challenging. Beyond the internal situation though, the presence of ISAF has also changed the balance of power in the region. Many countries have a dichotomous relationship with ISAF. We will discuss further how many actors have benefited from the international presence on one side, while simultaneously opposing the actions of the international community out of principle and cultural values.

D. PAKISTAN: AMONG THE MOST CONFLICTED

As Afghanistan’s primary neighbor to the east, and a territory known to be exploited by insurgents seeking sanctuary, it is easy to see why Pakistan is in an increasingly conflicted situation. According to the CATO Institute, Pakistan is the beneficiary of U.S. aid and military assistance second only to Afghanistan in the region,

but also, “the seemingly open-ended U.S. presence in Afghanistan risks creating worse problems for Pakistan. Amassing troops in Afghanistan feeds the perception of a foreign occupation, spawning more terrorist recruits for Pakistani militias and thus placing undue stress on an already weakened nation.”

Pakistan’s calculated support to assist in the Global War on Terror in 2001 was in stark contrast to its previous strategies. From a regional and realist view this is actually quite surprising because, after the ISAF intervention and overthrow of the Taliban, Pakistan lost a pro-Islamabad government and forfeited “strategic depth” against India. Previously, this depth combined with Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities had achieved a regional balance of power that Pakistan now feels vulnerable without.

The growing conflict in Afghanistan has also fomented serious security issues along Afghanistan’s eastern borders and the FATA of Pakistan, in part, because Pakistan has offered support to the U.S. and ISAF from the beginning of operations in 2001. Last year was in fact the bloodiest year for Pakistan since 2001. On average, more than 100 people were killed every month in suicide attacks in every major city of Pakistan. Radicalization and increased arming of the Pakistani society are some of the most visible third order effects of the growing conflict. The militia forces that were once a strategic asset in Kashmir, Afghanistan, and elsewhere have now become a liability as American and Pakistani forces target them through infamous drone attacks and direct operations. This targeting has adversely affected the credibility of the Pakistani military establishment and civilian leadership as the radical political parties in Pakistan exploit the actions as evidence of Pakistani abdication of sovereignty in support of American interests.

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40 Nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in 1998 created a balance of power in South Asia which had been asymmetrical due to India’s conventional military superiority over Pakistan.


Pakistan is now gripped with difficult decisions. It understands continued support of militia forces that carry out indirect actions against strategic foes complicates relations with the U.S. and international forces operating in Afghanistan. At the same time, unconditional (and even conditional) support of international actions within Pakistan and in neighboring countries raises the ire of domestic politics as well. It is a catch-22 situation for the leadership in Pakistan.

**E. INDIA: A POSITION OF STRENGTH**

In many circles, India is seen as greatly benefiting from U.S. actions in a post-9/11 war against terrorism. Apart from strengthening American relations, India has also exploited the favorable conditions in Afghanistan and disrupted Pakistan’s strategic defense in depth. After the Taliban took control of Kabul in the 1990’s, India’s influence in Afghanistan diminished. India continued to maintain relations with the Northern Alliance and has shrewdly maintained favorable relations with President Karzai, who completed university studies there. India has expanded its diplomatic infrastructure with consulates in major cities, such as Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandhar and Jalalabad, a move that facilitates their development projects throughout the country but also heightens Pakistani fears of infiltration and clandestine activities on its western borders.\(^{43}\)

Beyond endearing itself to the current Kabul administration and currying favor with the United States by supporting development efforts in Afghanistan and other trade partnerships, India has achieved one other key objective—it has dramatically broadened the perennial India-Pakistan conflict from a largely eastern Pakistan conflict centered on Kashmir, to one that engages Pakistan on multiple fronts.\(^{44}\) Some scholars refer to this as “strategic envelopment,” and in Pakistan’s eyes is the source of insurgency in


Baluchistan and elsewhere in which militants threaten Pakistani peace. Regardless of alleged Indian support for insurgent forces in Pakistan, the fact that India’s main rival is so embroiled in conflict would likely seem as a win, win for New Delhi.

In truth, an unstable and radicalized Pakistan is the worst possible combination for India and one in which the potential for blow back greatly surpasses any short term gains for manipulating current policy on Kashmir or otherwise. India has legitimate claims to investment and economic activity in Afghanistan, but broadening diplomatic actions or even military assistance in the form of training missions needlessly stokes the fire of concern from an Islamabad perspective. India would gain more in the long term by dealing with a rational actor in Pakistan rather than fan the flames of unrest.

The rivalry between India and Pakistan has made the whole scenario in Afghanistan much more different and more complicated than it was back in 2001. New Delhi has increased its political-military role in Afghanistan by assigning 500 border guards to protect Indian reconstruction workers, inaugurated an air base in neighboring Tajikistan, and supported Iran’s Chabahar port as an alternative to Pakistan’s Chinese backed Gwadar port. In turn, Pakistan sees its own dreaded encirclement being realized by these moves and India’s increases activities in Afghanistan. Logically enough, then, “India-Pakistan relations are in many ways key to the peace in the region,” as Julian Lindley-French has suggested.

F. IRAN: WIN-WIN SITUATION

Like India, Iran also has much to gain from a post-9/11 environment in Afghanistan. Iran was likely supportive of U.S. efforts to topple the Sunni Taliban, who


48 Bajoria, India-Afghanistan Relations.
were becoming increasingly hostile toward their Shiite neighbors. A point even more pronounced by their own support of the Northern Alliance in the preceding years before September 11, but one that seems at odds with it historic antagonism toward U.S. objectives.

Surprisingly, Iran fell in line with U.S. objectives in the ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003 as well, but despite this incongruous alignment, Iran was uneasy with U.S. encroachment on both its borders. For this, as well other reasons, Iran has taken a measured role with indirect attacks that target U.S. forces; not sure whether Iran itself would be the next target of American militarism, they also supported U.S. efforts which coincidentally installed friendly governments in Kabul and Baghdad.

Ultimately their pragmatic participation in both insurgent activities in Afghanistan as well as supporting the Karzai regime can be seen as reflective of their disdain for both the Taliban and the United States. Foreign intervention suits Tehran’s regional and global strategies and to the degree they can exploit one to pursue the other then Iran is truly in a win-win situation.

G. REINTEGRATION WITH TALIBAN

One of the most important issues between the Karzai government and ISAF is how to negotiate and reintegrate moderate Taliban and make them part of the leadership in Afghanistan. This idea is not new, but has not shown significant signs of progress to date.

After nearly a decade of conflict, the Taliban insurgency has increasingly spilled over across the region despite its quick overthrow in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom. Despite this constant conflict, reconciliation with the Taliban has always been on the table in varying forms. The Taliban initially rebuffed attempts by Karzai to include them in the transition government in 2002, though it is questioned how feasible this might have been considering the heavily dominated Northern Alliance administration that initially took hold. Over the course of the conflict though, reconciliation has occurred at all levels of government though admittedly on a scale too small to widely
influence the broader conflict. Nonetheless, peace talks continue and the hope for political reconciliation increasingly seems like the only possible conclusion.

Many doubt American sincerity in allowing Karzai to act on such efforts, and think negotiations with the Taliban contradict American goals for Afghanistan to be seen as viable. Some argue that any Taliban return to power would erode the NATO image and would be interpreted as “negotiating with terrorists.” While these assumptions may be true to a certain degree, delaying the likely outcome of reconciliation may only delay the inevitable.

President Obama has repeatedly emphasized the U.S. government’s goal in Afghanistan as that of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan by pursuing the following objectives:

- Deny al Qaeda a safe haven
- Reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the Afghan government; and
- Strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and the Afghan government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.49

Reconciliation is not incongruous with any of these objectives because the Taliban would most likely be incorporated into the structure of the current government and not complete return to Taliban authoritarianism. Such an expectation would be understandable and even acceptable given the broad support of the Taliban movement by Pashtuns who are the ethnic majority in the country. Provided this balance remains, with the Taliban participating in the government as opposed to ruling, one could argue that this balance would be acceptable to Pakistan, India, and Iran. It would require assurances of non-alignment by the government in Kabul with any particular party and thereby balance the competing interests of the core regional partners.

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H. SECURITY CONCERNS

1. Pakistan Feels Marginalized

Economically, politically and militarily, Pakistan views itself as the most affected of the core states. According to Ollapaly, “While Pakistani Pashtuns feel sympathy for their Afghan brethren in the U.S. campaign, Afghan Pashtuns remain suspicious that Pakistan seeks to control events in Afghanistan.” Pakistan is right to feel threatened by these militant groups. The situation is not unlike the threat Jordan faced from Palestinian guerrillas who fomented unrest against King Hussein in 1970–71. The Palestinians, like the Taliban against Pakistan, received aid and support from a benefactor and eventually turned against Jordan for various reasons. Over the course of the last ten years, the Taliban too have expanded their attacks to not just target Afghanistan and ISAF, but to also target their one time benefactor in Islamabad. For this reason, Pakistan senses an existential threat from the situation in Afghanistan. Neither Iran nor India or any other Central Asian state can purport the same level of destabilization like that of Pakistan. It is out of this fear that Pakistan favors reconciliation with the Pashtun population in Afghanistan. The Pashtun population numbers roughly 15 million in Afghanistan and 25 million or so in Pakistan. Pashtuns are known to rally for a fight, but they can also be appeased to fight against a common enemy, as was the case during Soviet occupation, or if a proper deal is offered.

According to Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan controls supply lines for both sides of the war. NATO depends on Pakistan for more than 80% of the supplies, while Taliban depends on their safe havens in Pakistan to refit and resupply.” The Pakistan military fears the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan—an issue that has been understated

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from Islamabad’s view. For this reason, Pakistan wants to use talks with the Taliban as a point of leverage, so that maximum concessions can be extracted from the U.S., India, and Afghanistan in exchange for Pakistan obtaining concessions from the Taliban. Based on the extent of conflict with insurgents within Pakistan itself, the ability to coerce Afghanistan’s Taliban is, as of yet, undetermined.

2. **India: Prevent Taliban at All Costs**

Having already invested heavily in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, India supports a strong coalition presence in the region, ostensibly as insurance for its own efforts. India is wary of America’s intentions because it recognizes the confluence of interest between the United States and Pakistan over the so-called “Af-Pak” border. India is also concerned about the possibility of negotiations with the Taliban, because India believes Pakistan supports and harbors the Taliban as a form of state sponsored terrorism inside Afghanistan and India. Moreover, India is also concerned that the coalition’s expedient withdrawal from Afghanistan would create a vacuum that cannot be filled by Afghan security forces and which might usher in a complete Taliban resurgence. India fears that if the Taliban regains power, then it can provide a resurgence of violence to the Kashmir intifada. In other words, India sees the Kashmiri freedom fighters and Taliban as intertwined and mutually supportive. India’s security concerns, despite having being varied and somewhat strategic are nonetheless very real and the 2009 Mumbai attacks are proof enough to lend weight to their extrapolations.

3. **Iran: Oppose Taliban but Support Insurgency**

Iran and India would both like to maintain a Northern Alliance-dominated government in Afghanistan, which they have already sponsored for decades. Iran’s interests require keeping the Sunni Taliban out of power. The U.S. threat of military action against Iran is all the more credible considering the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

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53 Riedel, *Deadly Embrace*, 94.
Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran, however, has attempted to fight this threat through careful support of insurgents, such as Shia groups in Iraq and supporting insurgency in Afghanistan.

Peter Tomsen, former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, told the Council on Foreign Relations in 2006, “A weakened Afghan state lessens the likelihood it can become a U.S. ally against Iran”. By maintaining a certain level of instability, he said, "It keeps us tied down. After all, we have air bases in Afghanistan where we could mount attacks on Iran." Some analysts refer to this strategy as "managed chaos." Iran’s support of the Taliban could also be a leverage point until such time when it is under pressure to end its uranium-enrichment program.55

I. ANALYSIS

The core issues of foreign intervention, Taliban reconciliation, and Afghan Security Force capacity are a base that provides both an opportunity to change the status quo, and of which there are degrees of concurrence in a sea of contrary positions. For instance, both India and United States are not in favor of having a Taliban resurgent regime in Afghanistan. While it may be an commitment trap for the United States to counter the Taliban to justify their presence, for India it has roots in the history of alleged Pakistan designs to increase the level of insurgency in Kashmir while the Taliban government in Kabul provides ‘strategic depth’56 to Pakistan.

In such a condition, India would ensure through political and economic measures pressure on the United States to maintain a permanent presence in Afghanistan, while attempting to isolate Pakistan from the Afghanistan peace process. Pakistan, on the other hand, would require of the United States to maintain military and economic aid, while keeping the capacity to maintain stability in Afghanistan. According to Bruce Riedel, “America wants Pakistan to focus on the global threat, be it communism or jihadism.


56 A term coined by Pakistan military where a favorable government in Afghanistan could provide Pakistan freedom to use Afghan land and airspace in case of a war against India.
Pakistan wants to concentrate on the threat next door.\textsuperscript{57} For Pakistan, terrorism and war in Afghanistan is now a war against existential and separatist threat. The situation is more serious for Pakistan than any other country in the region. As Christopher Layne observes, “states may have many goals other than survival, but survival is the prerequisite in attaining them.”\textsuperscript{58}

Any future conflict between India and Pakistan would have a debilitating effect on Afghanistan and the whole region. An overt threat from India would force Pakistan to move all of its forces towards India which could seriously affect ISAF COIN efforts in the east and southeastern Afghanistan. For this reason India’s role and activities in Afghanistan may, in fact, result in regional destabilization, but could still be realigned.\textsuperscript{59}

Afghanistan has serious vulnerabilities in the west, but Iran’s own experiences and demographic changes greatly reduce the likelihood of an Iranian conquest in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{60}

In contrast to Iraq, which is the cradle of Shiism—home to the faith’s most important shrines and seminaries in Najaf and Karbala—and also the country’s majority religion, the Shia in Afghanistan are a distinct minority, comprising less than 20 percent of the population.\textsuperscript{61}

Ultimately, the lack of trust is what weakens the relations throughout the region. Particularly in the case of Iran, the U.S. questions Iran’s nuclear motivations and their sincere desire to assist in the peace process. Iran feels that Washington wants more than to simply influence Iranian actions, but rather to direct Iranian affairs through regime change. Without an improvement in trust, headway is likely to be limited.\textsuperscript{62}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{57} Riedel, \textit{Deadly Embrace}, 123.
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\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{59} Ganguly and Howenstein, “India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan,” 138.
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{60} Karim Sadjadpour, \textit{Afghanistan and Pakistan: Understanding and Engaging Regional Stakeholders} (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Middle East Center, 2009), \url{http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=22913} (accessed on 05/24/2011).
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{61} Sadjadpour, \textit{Afghanistan and Pakistan}.
\end{flushright}
\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{62} Sadjadpour, \textit{Afghanistan and Pakistan}.
\end{flushright}
For the present Afghanistan government, Iran is a friend and Saudi Arabia is an enemy, whereas for the United States Iran is an enemy and Pakistan presumably a friend. Strangely, American actions in Afghanistan largely favor Iran and are counter to Pakistan’s security concerns; similarly all actions in Iraq are again favorable for Iran and detrimental for the Saudi Government.63 Pro-Iranian government in Afghanistan, Iraq and increasing influence in Syria64 are unfavorable signs for Saudi Arabia.

63 The governments in Iraq and Afghanistan are considered favorable for Shia Iran, compared to the previously strong Sunni regimes that ruled both countries. Thanks to the American interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran has significantly better relationships with both neighboring governments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>Divergent Interest</th>
<th>Mutually converging interests</th>
<th>Acceptable outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>India-friendly Afghan government; disintegration of Pakistani state under terrorist threat; Rise in separatist movement; upsurge of Afghan refugees</td>
<td>Increased Indian presence in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Terrorism, Drugs, Poverty and Water crisis</td>
<td>Favorable government in Afghanistan and reduce terrorist and Drone Attacks in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Pakistan friendly government in Afghanistan, U.S. Reintegration with Taliban and drawdown of foreign forces</td>
<td>Pakistan -- American influenced regime in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Terrorism, Separatism, Drugs, Poverty, Energy and Water crisis</td>
<td>Favorable government in Afghanistan along with prolonged ISAF presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>American influenced regime, Reintegration of Taliban and Refugees</td>
<td>Pakistan -- American dominated regime in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Terrorism, drugs and refugees</td>
<td>Favorable govt in Afghanistan and American reduced influence in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>American permanent presence in the region, Terrorism and Indian growing influence in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Peace and stability through silk route and less American influence</td>
<td>Drugs, Terrorism and economic corridor</td>
<td>Independent stable Afghanistan and strong role of SCO65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Taliban free government in Afghanistan, Reduce American influence in the region</td>
<td>Less American influence and reduced NATO presence</td>
<td>Drugs, separatism and Terrorism</td>
<td>Role of SCO for peaceful resolution of Afghan issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Reconciliation with Taliban and increased Shi’i influence</td>
<td>Permanents American presence in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Terrorism and revolution</td>
<td>Less American influenced and Sunni dominated Independent Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Regional Interests and Concerns by Country

Table 5 summarizes the regional dynamics and why the region is so sharply divided and disturbed. On one side stands Pakistan, with some support from China and Saudi, on the other hand, Iran, Russia, India, and the NATO, which are extremely

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45
suspicious of Pakistan and the Taliban but lack a strategy to deal with them. They want
the U.S. to stay longer in Afghanistan, but are also suspicious of an indefinite U.S.
presence.

A win-win-win situation is not often seen in international relations. U.S. -
Pakistan-Iran cooperation in Afghanistan would be to the benefit of all regional countries,
just as U.S.-Iran antagonism the last several years has been to the detriment of all
neighbors.

The United States’ approach to both of the primary neighbors of Afghanistan is
colored by skepticism and distrust, much the same way that the populations of Iran and
Pakistan regard United States’ military and political approach in the region. Both Iran
and Pakistan see United States helping their arch rivals in its Afghan strategy. According
to latest PEW polls, more than 80% of the Pakistani public does not trust United States’
policies and military action in Afghanistan. “Pakistan and a few other neighbors see the
consolidation of the Afghan state, dependent on the United States as a long-term
threat.”66 An Al Jazeera-Gallup poll conducted in Pakistan points to the fact that half of
the Pakistani population feels that United States is the primary threat, while only 18%
feel India and 11% thought the Taliban was a threat for Pakistan.67 This is the first time
in the history of Pakistan that United States outpolls India as a threat, but may indicate
that the time is right for these two historical adversaries to sit down and find a resolution
to the broader conflict in Afghanistan.

One of the key elements for success in COIN is to deny external support to the
insurgents.68 There seems to be a free flow of guns and money from both Pakistan and
Iran to help insurgency against the foreign forces. Recent interception of huge amounts of
weapons entering in Western Afghanistan from Iranian border is a manifestation of Iran’s

66 Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, Resolving the Pakistan- Afghanistan Stalemate (Washington
67 Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 122.
68 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of
active support for insurgency in Afghanistan. Clearly left to its own devices the same old strategies of self-interests will be perpetuated. It is important for the United States to draw the core regional players beyond this point to strike some kind of basis to trust one another. If for no other reason than to point out that mutual distrust has proved mutually destructive, then perhaps this will motivate all sides to see that increased trust is the last remaining way forward.

IV. GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE REGIONAL CORE PLAYERS: REVISITING THE GREAT GAME

Many have noted that the war in Afghanistan is a result of deeper regional conflicts, and in order to establish stability in the former, then the broader disagreements of the latter need attention. The venerated statesman, Richard Holbrooke, has been recorded as noting, “A stable Afghanistan is not essential; a stable Pakistan is essential.” He recognized the key role of Pakistan’s stability, and as such it was highly dependent on the dispute with India regarding Kashmir.\textsuperscript{70}

A. BACKGROUND

As mentioned in previous chapters, Afghanistan’s centrally located and landlocked position in the heart of Asia has shaped the course of its history. As such it has played a role in both global and regional competitions. Afghanistan’s regional neighbors have managed to penetrate and pursue their own national interests, which intrinsically share roots of political rivalries, economical competition and security concerns.

While there is a general consensus among all the Asian countries over the importance of stability in Afghanistan to their national security and economic development, most notably the direct effect of pursuing their regional and national strategies—directly or indirectly—undermines Afghanistan’s stability.

The question here remains: will stability in Afghanistan be sufficient to overcome these regional circumstances? If the answer is “no,” then what are the consequences of such regional competition on the stability of Afghanistan? Will a regional approach help to enhance the regional political environment to support and sustain stability in Afghanistan? Is a regional approach achievable? What will be the shape of this regional

approach? Who are the main players? How can it be arranged? Will all the RCP be willing to join in a regional coalition? Will a final agreement be sustainable and long lasting?

Previous research regarding balance of power theory and its relevance to neo-realism regularly notes the importance of Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer. For the purpose of this thesis, we use the same definitions and assumptions made by previous research, namely that:

balance of power refers to the tendency of competing states to alter their perceived power posture in order to ensure the survival of the state and to promote the power of the state relative to rivals that pose a threat to national survival. Where equilibrium is not achieved, war is the likely result because one side may feel threatened by the perceived lack of relative power.

The focus of this analysis will be on the neo-realists’ theories of offensive and defensive realism. We will attempt to explain the South Asian states quest for power to gain security and its impact on the Afghan stability.

Determining which countries are the primary regional core players (RCP) was based on the political influence, economics, and security perception of each. Accordingly, the selected states were India, Iran, and Pakistan. A close analysis of the RCP’s international relations would reveal the following characteristics about their attitude and their strategies toward Afghanistan.

India, as an emerging regional hegemony, is trying to balance China’s military and economic might, while employing offensive balancing against Pakistan. Moreover, India seems to be a free rider in Afghanistan as far as confronting the Islamic militants and the Taliban. Pakistan in contrast, being a comparatively weaker state, traditionally balanced conventional disparity against its archrival, India, through nuclear threats and proxies. Pakistan’s defensive balancing approach was altered after American intervention in neighboring Afghanistan and India’s increased influence in Pakistan’s backyard. Iran,

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on the other hand, is trying to employ defensive asymmetric balancing against the U.S. in Afghanistan by abetting the insurgency at times, while passing the buck to the U.S. to fight against the Taliban and Sunni extremist elements at other times. Theirs is a role of convenience at all levels.

B. PURPOSE

The aspiration of this game theoretical approach, by using neo-realist theories, is to examine the ability of RCP to reach an agreement among themselves about stability in Afghanistan, according to their respective security concerns. Additionally, it will examine the RCP’s ability to form an alliance that can support and sustain such stability in Afghanistan by using their coherent consent over certain convergent matters. Moreover, it explain, how the U.S. presence in Afghanistan has affected the regional balance of power.

The game theoretic approach here is primarily used to understand the regional political dynamics that influence Afghanistan. However, it may also provide different courses of actions for the U.S. to exploit in order to ensure national security concerns in Afghanistan. Moreover, it provides a road map to form a cooperative working alliance between the United States and regional players, which can support stability in Afghanistan.

Although influence is neither measurable nor transferable, we assume that the influence sphere is assessable and can be divided, shared, or lost. Therefore, in the advance stages we’ll use interval scaling as a subjective way to first determine the amount of influence each of the players has, and secondly the perceptual weight of this influence for the player, and the division of such influence sphere between the players. Additionally, we also assume that the amount of influence each of the players can exert depends on different variables like physical proximity, ideology, economy, military power, and diplomacy. Therefore, we will use these assumptions in the course of constructing this game and assigning the influence values for each player.
C. GAME SETUP

The game will be constructed in three phases. The first phase will illustrate a game that describes the political approaches of the two main RCP, “India and Pakistan,” which traditionally has been described as a zero-sum game;\textsuperscript{73} however, in the course of this research, the India-Pakistan game will be translated into a “partial sum”\textsuperscript{74} prisoner dilemma game.\textsuperscript{75} In the second phase, we will try to introduce the third player “Iran,” to examine its effect on the game. In the final analytical phase, we’ll introduce the dominant external player “the United States,” to highlight, how the U.S. intervention transformed the game and its impact on each player.

D. PHASE 1: THE INDIA–PAKISTAN GAME

The game is constructed to describe and examine the players’ strategy toward Afghanistan. While each of the players has their own regional and national concerns and interests, both players have two options to achieve their national interests. They can either pursue a strategy that can ensure their influence on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) or relinquish efforts of direct influence. The strategy may also be conducted unilaterally or through cooperation depending on their perceived interests.

The main assumptions and rules of the game and the players’ behavior are driven from the neo-realist theories that were briefly described in the introduction.

1. The Game Assumptions

Assumptions for the game are as follows:

\textsuperscript{73} A zero-sum game is a game where the players’ payoffs for each outcome add to zero, “it represents a situation of pure conflict between…two players”. For more on zero sum game see Philip D. Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy (The Mathematical Association of America, 1996), 5.

\textsuperscript{74} The characteristics of a partial sum game are when “one player’s gain is not necessarily the other player’s loss, where the payoff may be unquantifiable, and where the players’ decisions may not be independent of each other.” For more on this see, Saul Stahl, \textit{A Gentle Introduction to Game Theory} (American Mathematical Society, 1998), 121.

\textsuperscript{75} The prisoner’s dilemma is non-zero sum game that has a unique equilibrium, which is non-Pareto-optimal. For more on this read Straffin, \textit{Game Theory and Strategy}, 73.
• The game is an ‘influence’ competition game, in which each player tries to gain more influence on the GIRoA. This influence is considered to have a maximal effect on the players’ national interests.

• India pursues an offensive balancing, which is clearly evident and manifested in seeking a regional hegemony. This would enhance its international status and protect its national interests; thus, an offensive realist approach is adopted and pursued through soft power means.

• Pakistan, in contrast, pursues a defensive balancing of threat strategy driven from security concerns that have been historically rooted and exacerbated by the Indian hegemonic ambition.

• Both players are initially seeking to maximize their national interests.

• Each player prefers to play alone and to self-determine the conditions of security, national prestige and domestic politics; i.e., the maximum payoff or the best outcome arrives from unilateral influence in Afghanistan.

• Both players agree that the stability in Afghanistan will affect their own countries directly or indirectly; therefore, the players’ second best outcome is obtained by cooperating, or at least denying the other player from unilaterally influencing the ultimate outcome.

• The regional players are using various tools and means to pursue their respective strategies. India is using a soft-power means and its economic weight, while Pakistan is using ideological, social, and asymmetrical means to confront India in the region.

• The historical rhetoric suggests that both players lack trust, which favors the unilateral strategy.

2. The Game Rules

The rules of the game are as follows:
• Both players are rational players.
• The game is conducted with imperfect information; i.e., neither player knows the other player’s action/strategy in advance.
• Both players seek to maximize their own national interests by increasing their respective payoffs.
• The system is best described as being anarchic.

3. Scoring

In the “Influence in Afghanistan” game setup, the players’ two main options are either to have an influence or not have an influence. They accordingly pursue a strategy that can achieve these options; however, this influence can also be achieved if the two players cooperate and agree to divide the payoffs among themselves. Therefore, the scores would be assigned according to the player’s ability to achieve a unilateral influence, partial influence, or no-influence, respectively.

• The best option is to have unilateral influence and is rewarded by “2” (influence).
• The second best option is to cooperate with all or some players and divide the influence, which is rewarded by “1” (cooperation).
• The worst payoff comes from losing influence, where the player gets a “0” (no-influence).

Figure 9 depicts the interaction between the two players and the combination of their various strategies. After showing the comparative interaction of the strategies, values are assigned to each strategy and are subjectively determined according to the preferences and interests of each of the players as described above.
4. India’s Options

- **2: Best Choice:** to have influence within the GIRoA and prevent Pakistan from gaining any influence.
- **1: Next Best Choice:** both players cooperate to gain influence; in this case they have to divide their payoffs between themselves, a difficult proposition due to a long history of enmity.
- **0: Worst Option:** to lose influence in Afghanistan.

5. Pakistan’s Options

- **2: Best Choice:** to have influence on the GIRoA and prevent India from gaining such influence.
- **1: Next Best Choice:** both players cooperate to gain influence; in this case they have to divide their payoffs between themselves, a difficult proposition due to a long history of enmity.
- **0: Worst Option:** to lose influence in Afghanistan.
Once values are assigned to each player’s options, they can be input into the game to determine which strategy affords each player the best possible option. The comparative relationship of the player’s strategies and their value will determine which strategy to choose to achieve a balance in the game.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pakistan’s Options “Pursues a balance of threat strategy”</th>
<th>India’s Options “Pursues Offensive Balancing Strategy”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Influence A</td>
<td>Influence C  (1,1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No-Influence D (2,0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-Influence B</td>
<td>Influence C  (0,2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No-Influence D (0,0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10. The Payoffs for both Players

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11. Pure Strategy- movement Diagram

The “Influence in Afghanistan” game’s likely outcome, without communication, is the Nash equilibrium of (1, 1), while the dominant strategy for both players is influence. The red arrows show the dominant strategy for India and the blue arrows show the dominant strategy for Pakistan. This means that both India and Pakistan will exert their influence on Afghanistan. Motivated by their ambition to increase their payoffs, both countries will try to pursue their influence strategy by different means to prevent the other player from improving, which will eventually lead to cooperation, or confrontation.
that may lead to unilateral influence for one of the players while the other loses influence. This situation is historically demonstrated, especially in Afghanistan, where both countries have pursued their influence strategy for many years. In the 1990s, India supported the northern alliance in Afghanistan, which encouraged Pakistan to support the Pashtun majority. Eventually, Taliban control of Kabul significantly reduced the Indian influence in Afghanistan.

By playing the game repeatedly, the ‘cooperation’ option should be the ultimate result and the game equilibrium. Unfortunately, the historical evidence shows that due to traditional rivalry and distrust between both players, the tendency is to move toward conflict.

6. Strategic Moves

The “Influence in Afghanistan” game, without communication, reveals that both players will pursue their influence strategy, which will eventually lead to either confrontation or cooperation. To examine what would happen if lines of communication were opened, a strategic moves analysis is needed to determine if any of the players have a threat or a promise or a combination of both, which, if communicated, would alter their payoffs, or prevent the other player from exerting his influence on Afghanistan.

a. India

First Move: India

i. If India pursues the influence strategy, Pakistan will choose influence also with payoffs (1, 1).

ii. If India does not choose influence, then Pakistan will pursue influence with payoffs (2, 0).

iii. India, in this case, can secure a better payoff by pursuing its influence strategy and achieve its second best option of the likely outcome (1, 1).
b. Threat: India
   i. India does not want Pakistan to pursue its likely influence strategy; therefore, India places its threat on Pakistan’s influence strategy.
   ii. Normally: If Pakistan plays influence, India plays influence with payoffs (1, 1).
   iii. Threat: If Pakistan plays influence, then India will not pursue its influence strategy, which will credit Pakistan a higher payoff of 2, while India will get 0 (no-influence), the final payoffs will be (2, 0).
   iv. The threat hurts India, but it does not hurt Pakistan, which means it is not a threat. Therefore, India does not have a threat.

c. Promise: India
   i. India wants Pakistan to play a strategy of no-influence. Therefore, the Indian promise will be on Pakistan’s no-influence strategy.
   ii. Normally: If Pakistan plays no-influence, then India plays influence with payoffs of (0, 2).
   iii. Promise: If Pakistan plays no-influence then India will play no-influence with payoffs (0, 0).
   iv. The promise hurts India, but does not benefit Pakistan. Therefore, India does not have a promise

d. The Threat and Promise Combination

This combination is not available for India.

e. Pakistan

First Move: Pakistan
   i. If Pakistan pursues the influence strategy, India will also choose influence with payoffs (1, 1).
ii. If Pakistan does not choose influence, then India will pursue influence with payoffs (0, 2).

iii. Pakistan, in this case, can secure a better payoff by pursuing its influence strategy and get its second best option “the likely outcome” (1, 1).

f. Threat: Pakistan

i. Pakistan does not want India to pursue its likely influence strategy; therefore, Pakistan places its threat on India’s influence strategy.

ii. Normally: If India plays influence, Pakistan plays influence with payoffs (1, 1).

iii. Threat: If India plays influence, Pakistan will not pursue its influence strategy, which will credit India a payoff (0, 2).

iv. The threat hurts Pakistan, but it does not hurt India, which means it is not a threat. Therefore, Pakistan does not have a threat.

g. Promise: Pakistan

i. Pakistan wants India’s no-Influence strategy; therefore, the promise will be on India’s no-influence strategy.

ii. Normally: If India plays no-influence, then Pakistan plays influence with payoffs of (2, 0).

iii. Promise: If India plays no-influence, then Pakistan will play no-influence with payoffs (0, 0).

iv. The promise hurts Pakistan, but does not benefit India; therefore, Pakistan does not have a promise.

h. The Threat and Promise Combination

This combination is not available for Pakistan either.

Neither the threat nor the promise option is available for either player, which indicates that even with communication, both cannot secure better payoffs. In this
situation, it is prudent to look into the players’ security levels and their prudential strategies.\textsuperscript{76} The security level is a way to determine the minimal payoff that a player can secure by playing his prudential strategy. It gives a fair indication of the player’s game value. By playing the prudential strategy, a player can assure that the least he gets is his security level, if his opponents choose to hold his payoffs down.\textsuperscript{77}

7. **The Security Levels**

India’s Prudential Strategy Solution

a. In India's game, India is maximizing “mini-max,” while Pakistan is minimizing “maxi-min,” the opponent's payoff. We extract India’s game and Pakistan’s game to find the security levels from the prudential strategy.

b. It is a game with India's payoffs.

c. India has a pure prudential strategy to play influence whenever Pakistan plays influence. See Figures 13 and 14.

d. The security level is $Y=1$; the value of the game is 1.

Figures 12–14 show only India’s relative values in the game and thereby help determine India’s most secure option. This option ensures the most value with the least chance of losing.

\textsuperscript{76} “In a non-zero-sum game, the player’s optimal strategy in his own game is called the player’s ‘prudential strategy.’ The value of the game is called the player’s ‘security level.’” For more on this read Straffin, *Game Theory and Strategy*, 69.

\textsuperscript{77} Straffin, *Game Theory and Strategy*, 69.
Figure 12. The Indian Influence Game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-Influence</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13. Pakistan Minimizing Strategy.

Figure 14. India Maximizing Strategy.
Pakistan’s Prudential Strategy Solution

a. In Pakistan's game, Pakistan is maximizing “Mini-max,” while India is minimizing “maxi-min,” the opponent's payoff.

b. It has become a Zero-Sum Game with Pakistan’s payoffs.

c. Pakistan has a pure prudential strategy to play influence whenever India plays influence. See Figures 16 and 17.

d. The security level is X=1; the value of the game is 1.

Figures 15–17 show only Pakistan’s relative values in the game and thereby help determine Pakistan’s most secure option. This option ensures the most value with the least chance of losing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>No-Influence</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 15. Pakistan Influence Game
Figure 16. Pakistan Maximizing Strategy

Figure 17. India Minimizing Strategy

Figure 18. The Security Levels for both India and Pakistan
As shown in Figure 18, the security level for both India’s “red line” and Pakistan’s “blue line” is (1, 1). This point is on the negotiation set, which appears as “the green line” connecting the points (0, 2) and (2, 0), the unilateral influence for both countries. On the negotiation set, which is the green line, the gains of one player are at the other’s expense. None of the players can improve their own status or payoffs without hurting the other. Accordingly, unless one of the players agrees to cooperate or is forced to reduce his influence, the other player cannot improve his own payoff. However, as noted, the Nash equilibrium and the security levels have the same value. If we do not like the outcome, then we can revisit the payoff values using the interval scaling.

8. Conclusion

Both India and Pakistan will proceed with their influence strategies. None of the players can alter payoffs by using a pure strategy, or the strategic moves. The lack of viable threats or promises will reduce the players’ ability to improve their payoffs or knock the other player out of the game. The players are likely to reach the game “Nash equilibrium” point, which is “cooperate,” if they realize that cooperation can provide them suitable payoffs, otherwise their aggressive competition to gain influence will ultimately erase their payoffs and their ability to influence accordingly. This situation will lead both countries to a second-order option to either adopt other means to achieve their ends, or quit if the costs overshadow the benefits. The game is conducted within the negotiation set, which is the set in which neither of the players can improve his payoffs without hurting the other. The game becomes a zero-sum game within this set and exemplifies the conditions in the region after ten years. If things were going to improve based on the strategies that have been employed by the different countries, then current strategies would have altered the current stale conditions that appear to exist.

E. PHASE 2: ENTER IRAN

In addition to India and Pakistan that were analyzed in the first phase, Iran is also considered to be an important RCP, and can even have an effect on the India-Pakistan game described above. The introduction of Iran is important as a counterbalance, or also
as an Indian friend, which supports the Kautilya “Mandala theory.” This states that where your immediate neighbors are your enemy, then the neighbors of your close enemy are your friends. With Iran, we can see the change in the nature of the game. First, it can alter the stalemate, and secondly it can give incentive to all the players to cooperate or establish alliance. Another possibility that may arise from the cooperation between the players is increased splintering coalitions between different players; all these scenarios will be analyzed in the following non-zero-sum game.

The actions of the three RCP, India, Iran and Pakistan, in Figure 19 show their respective orderly choices based on their political influence, economical interests, and security perception. The same assumptions and rules apply for Iran, where Iran pursues defensive balancing in south Asia.

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78 “Kautilya is most famous for outlining the so-called Mandala theory of foreign policy, in which immediate neighbors are considered as enemies, but any state on the other side of a neighboring state is regarded as an ally, or, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Roger Boesche, “Kautilya’s Arthas’ astra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India,” The Journal of Military History 67 (January 2003): 18.
Figure 19. The RCP Available Strategies in the Influence Game

1. Iran’s Options

The game rules for Iran are similar to the previous India-Pakistan game.

- **2: Best Choice**: to have influence on the Afghani government and prevent both India and Pakistan from gaining such influence.
- **1: Next Best Choice**: All players cooperate to gain influence; in this case they have to divide their payoffs between themselves.
- **0: Worst Option**: to lose influence in Afghanistan.

Like the two previous two player game, the following figure shows the values for each player with reference to the choices and strategies. They can then be input into the game to determine which strategy affords each player the best possible option. The comparative relationship of the player’s strategies and their value will determine which strategy to choose to achieve a balance in the game.
2. Pure Strategy Solution

By examining the pure strategy, we can see that each of the players has a dominant strategy to exert influence on Afghanistan; this is clearly manifested on the movement diagram shown in Figure 13. The blue arrows show India’s pure strategy, the red arrows show Iran’s pure strategy, and the green arrows show Pakistan’s pure strategy.

3. Analysis

The pure strategy of each player clearly suggests that they have a dominant strategy to exert their influence. The players’ desire to exert influence on Afghanistan opens up possibilities of confrontation and cooperation as well. This in turn may lead to the formation of alliances. To determine the likely alliances, we need to examine all
coalition formation possibilities by considering all possible values for the alliances games. These values give a direct indication of the more likely coalition, such that the higher the value, the more likely the chance of a coalition.

4. The Coalition Game

In the expanded influence game, there are four different coalitions to investigate. The first is the ideal coalition of all three players combined; the second is a coalition of Iran and Pakistan playing against India; the third is a coalition of India and Pakistan against Iran; and the final is a coalition of Iran and India against Pakistan.

5. The Ideal Coalition: India, Iran, and Pakistan

In this coalition, the three players agree to cooperate and share the payoffs, which will reasonably address all their concerns and sustain their interests with minimal cost. The value of the game for the three players is (1, 1, 1).

6. India Vs. a Coalition of Iran and Pakistan

India’s Prudential Strategy Solution

a. Regarding India’s payoffs, where the coalition is trying to hold the Indian payoffs down, India is trying to maximize its minimum payoffs.

b. India's game: India is maximizing “Mini-max,” while the alliance of Pakistan and Iran is minimizing “maxi-min” for their opponent's payoff.

c. Since strategies AE, AF, and BE have the same payoffs and strategy BF has a different payoff, India will try to maximize its payoffs by pursuing strategy C hoping that it'll get the best option if none of the players exert influence on Afghanistan. The coalition, on the other hand, will try to hold India’s payoffs down. In this case, the BF strategy is dominated by the other three strategies, which means that the coalition will exclude the BF strategy to prevent India from getting its higher payoff. The only strategy that resembles the coalition is AE; therefore, India has a dominant strategy C to exert influence with a value of 1.
d. India has a pure prudential strategy to play in order to influence whenever the alliance plays either influence or no-influence. The probabilities are 1 for influence and 0 for no-influence.

e. The value of the game is also India’s security level: 1.

Figure 22 depicts the subjective values associated with the coalition strategies. These values are a function of the points described above and show a mixed strategy solution for the coalition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iran &amp; Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 22. Movement Diagram for the Coalition of Iran and Pakistan against India

7. **Iran Vs. a Coalition of India and Pakistan**

Iran’s Prudential Strategy Solution

a. The game is played with Iran’s payoffs. The coalition is holding its payoffs down.

b. For Iran's game, Iran is maximizing “Mini-max,” while the alliance of Pakistan and India is minimizing “maxi-min” for their opponent's payoff.

c. In a similar situation, Iran has a pure prudential strategy to play influence whenever the alliance plays either influence or no-influence.

d. The value of the game is Iran’s security level of 1.

This figure is also a prudential strategy depiction of a coalition, though in this solution there is no mixed strategy solution.
Figure 23. Movement Diagram for the Coalition of India and Pakistan against Iran

8. Pakistan Vs. a Coalition of India and Iran

Pakistan’s Prudential Strategy Solution

a. The game starts with Pakistan’s payoffs. The coalition is attempting to hold Pakistan’s payoffs down.

b. Pakistan's game: Pakistan is maximizing “Mini-max,” while the alliance of India and Iran is minimizing “maxi-min” of their opponent's payoff.

c. Pakistan has a pure prudential strategy to play influence whenever the alliance plays either influence or no-influence.

d. The value of the game is 1.

This figure is the final of the three coalition strategy problems, and has the same values of the previous two; (1,1,1).

Figure 24. Movement Diagram for the Coalition of India and Iran against Pakistan
9. Conclusion

The game value and security level is 1 for all players, which suggests that the minimum payoff any player can get by playing his prudential strategy of influence will be 1. None of the players can be driven out of the game, nor forced to unwillingly cooperate. Theoretically, influence can be exerted on any country without physical involvement, but reality suggests that such influence should be supported with physical proximity, ideology, economic factors, superior political structure, military power, and lastly threat perception and/or security concerns. Thus, the level of influence is directly proportional to all or some of these elements. However, although the three countries share the same security ordinal value, this value does not mean they have the same level of influence or share the same perception of such influence. Finally, the security level can also be interpreted as the players’ status quo.

10. How to Change the Status Quo

In the previous calculations, ordinal scaling was used. This did not evaluate the weight each value has on the respective players. For instance, the value of 1 is different in weight for each RCP. To assess the weight, the interval scaling is arranged with respect to the assigned ordinal values, and thus we see that influence and cooperation have different values for each RCP.

11. Interval Scaling

The three ordinal values available for each RCP are to have unilateral influence with the reward of 2, to cooperate with another player and achieve 1, or to have no-influence and get 0.

As previously mentioned, the Indian quest for power to pursue its offensive balancing strategy against China and Pakistan has driven its regional strategies toward its neighbors to the West in order to sustain its regional hegemonic status. This quest for
power gives India a subjective value of 8 for its ability to positively influence Afghanistan, and only a 2 if it has no-influence at all. Basically the influence strategy is important for India but it is not essential for its survival.

While the focus of the Iranian foreign policy is directed towards the gulf region and balancing Saudi Arabia, Iran has their national interest in Afghanistan as well. Here Iran would prefer a neighbor who is not expressly anti-Shia as were the Taliban, and an administration able to curtail the flow of opium and refugees into Iranian territory. Under these circumstances, Iran would assign a 7 to its influence strategy, 5 to its cooperation strategy and 3 to its no-influence strategy, since its threat from Afghanistan is perceived as less severe.

Pakistan, in contrast, views the no-influence option in Afghanistan to be a serious threat to its security and national survival. This is in part a factor of the large Pashtun population Pakistan shares with Afghanistan, and the broadened base of support it values, as a counter to Indian hegemonic ambition. Subsequently, Pakistan would assign a subjective value of 9 to its influence strategy and 1 to its no-influence strategy. Under this assumption, the cooperation (alliance) option is 8. The interval scaling values are shown in Table 6. Figure 25 shows the payoffs according to the interval scaling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale 1-10</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. RCP Interval Scaling Values of the Influence in Afghanistan Game
Each of the players has a dominant strategy to exert influence on Afghanistan. This is clearly manifest on the movement diagram shown in Figure 26. The blue arrows show India’s pure strategy, the red arrows show Iran’s pure strategy, and the green arrows show Pakistan’s pure strategy without communication.

12. The Coalition Solution

In the influence game, there are four different coalitions to investigate. The first combines the three players and is called the Ideal Coalition. The second is a coalition of Iran and Pakistan playing against India. The third is a coalition of India and Pakistan against Iran. The final is a coalition of Iran and India against Pakistan.
13. The Ideal Coalition: India, Iran, and Pakistan

In this coalition, the three players cooperate and share influence, and the value of the game is (8, 4, 5).

14. India Vs. a Coalition of Iran and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iran &amp; Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 27. Movement Diagram for the Coalition Iran and Pakistan against India

In Figure 27, values represented in strategies AE, AF, and BE are the same for India, while the value of the BF strategy is different, which means that the Indian payoffs will notably increase if both Iran and Pakistan do not pursue their influence strategy in Afghanistan. However, since the coalition will try to hold India’s payoffs down, it may be concluded that the BF strategy is dominated by the other three strategies. This means that the coalition will exclude the BF strategy to prevent India from getting its higher payoff. Moreover, the only strategy that resembles the coalition is AE; therefore, India has a dominant strategy C to exert influence with a value of 4.

The value of the game is 4. India’s prudential strategy is influence. The coalition’s prudential strategy is also AE, which is the only available strategy. Finally, since the game is assumed to be super-additive, then the value of the game for the coalition will be the sum of their cooperation strategy. This is called “mutual influence,” with a total of 13. The division of this value between the coalition members, using Linear Programming (LP), will be discussed later in this section.

---

79 Super-additive describes the combination two separate values, in which the resultant value is greater than the simple addition of the two original values. For mathematical definitions and examples see, Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, 131.
15. Iran Vs. a Coalition of India and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>India &amp; Pakistan</th>
<th>AC</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>BC</th>
<th>BD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>←</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>←</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 28. Movement Diagram for the Coalition of India and Pakistan against Iran

By analyzing Iran’s movement diagram in Figure 28, we notice that Iran has a dominant strategy, E, to exert influence with a value of 5. The coalition has only one dominant strategy to pursue its influence over Afghanistan, with a game value of 12.

16. Pakistan Vs. a Coalition of India and Iran

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>India &amp; Iran</th>
<th>CE</th>
<th>DE</th>
<th>CF</th>
<th>DF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>←</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>←</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>←</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 29. Movement Diagram for the Coalition of India and Iran against Pakistan

Pakistan’s movement diagram in Figure 29 shows that it has a dominant influence strategy, A, with a game value of 8. The coalition in this case has only one strategy, CE, with an additive value of 9.

17. The Coalition Payoffs Division

To find the coalition’s payoffs division among the players, the Linear Programming (LP) method will be used.
18. Linear Programming (LP)

Let us assume that the decision variables are \( X_1, X_2, \) and \( X_3, \) and are defined as follows:

\( X_1 = \) India, and the unilateral game value for \( X_1 \) is \( V(X_1) = 8 \)
\( X_2 = \) Iran, and the unilateral game value for \( X_2 \) is \( V(X_2) = 7 \)
\( X_3 = \) Pakistan, and the unilateral game value for \( X_3 \) is \( V(X_3) = 9. \)

From the previous coalition games, Table 7 shows the possible coalition structures and their respective payoffs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The coalition structures</th>
<th>( V(X_1) )</th>
<th>( V(X_2) )</th>
<th>( V(X_3) )</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( X_1 + X_2 + X_3 )</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>The three cooperate and reduce the influence costs. The Ideal coalition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X_1 + X_2 ) while ( X_3 ) is alone</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>The minimum ( v(X_3) ) is its security level 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X_2 + X_3 ) while ( X_1 ) is alone</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>The minimum ( v(X_1) ) is its security level 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X_1 + X_3 ) while ( X_2 ) is alone</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>The minimum ( v(X_2) ) is its security level 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( X_1, X_2, X_3 )</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Every one exerts influence unilaterally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Coalition Structures and Game Values

Let us assume that we have the function \( Z, \) which describes the possible coalitions’ payoffs from the previous game, where \( Z(X_i) = V(X_i) \) for all \( i = 1, 2, 3. \) The \( Z_i \) function is subject to the following constraints:

\[
\begin{align*}
V(X_1 + X_2 + X_3) &= 17 \\
V(X_1 + X_2) &= 9 \\
V(X_2 + X_3) &= 13 \\
V(X_1 + X_3) &= 12 \\
V(X_1) &\leq 8 \\
V(X_2) &\leq 7 \\
V(X_3) &\leq 9, \text{ where all } V(X_1), V(X_2), V(X_3) \geq 0 \text{ “non-negativity.”}
\end{align*}
\]
To find the maximum payoffs the players can get, we need to find the maximum value of the function $Z_i$ ($\text{Max. } Z_i$) for all $X_i$, where $i = 1, 2, 3$, and represents the coalitions’ payoffs. The coalition description according to the function $Z$ is illustrated below.

- $Z_1$ represents - the ideal coalition, $Z_1(X_1+X_2+X_3) = V(X_1+X_2+X_3)$
- $Z_2$ represents - India and Iran coalition against Pakistan, where $Z_2(X_1+X_2) = V(X_1+X_2)$.
- $Z_3$ represents - Iran and Pakistan coalition against India, where $Z_3(X_2+X_3) = V(X_2+X_3)$
- $Z_4$ represents - India and Pakistan coalition against Iran, where $Z_4(X_1+X_3) = V(X_1+X_3)$.

By maximizing the $Z$ function, we find the payoffs division among the players. Table 8 describes the results after calculating the players’ payoffs, through linear programming. Mathematical calculations can be found in Appendix B, but Table 9 helps depict the value of each respective coalition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalitions</th>
<th>The payoffs division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max.$Z_1$ = $V(X_1+X_2+X_3)$</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max.$Z_2$ = $V(X_1+X_2)$</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max.$Z_3$ = $V(X_2+X_3)$</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max.$Z_4$ = $V(X_1+X_3)$</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Payoff Division Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition evaluation</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Iran</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Coalition Evaluation with Respective Values
19. Conclusion

The following notes can be derived from the payoffs division:

1. Comparatively, Pakistan has the fewest options and perceives itself to be at the greatest risk. Therefore, it should not play a zero-sum game in Afghanistan and needs to open other options.

2. Coalitions between the three RCP provide the only tool to achieve both secure influence and stability in Afghanistan.

3. The single player repeatedly achieves less than his security level, even if he plays his respective prudential strategy. This suggests that the players’ best interest should be toward more willingness to cooperate, and thereby protect their influence.

4. Players should be prepared to sacrifice some of their influence to form a coalition, because not sharing will result in less value than sharing.

5. The previous points provide evidence that the influence sphere is limited and mutually dependent.

6. Not all the players, even if they cooperate and join a coalition, can secure their security levels. Pakistan, for example, cannot reach its security level in any two-player game. Additionally, if Pakistan allows the other players to form a coalition it would seriously degrade Pakistan’s own influence.

7. While it is easier for the players to reach their security level payoffs if they all play separately, when coalitions start to form they should join one.

8. Coalitions without side payments:
   
a. India prefers to play with Pakistan, which is unrealistic provided the initial two-player game described here.

   b. Iran prefers to play with Pakistan.

   c. Pakistan cannot get above its security level by joining any coalition; but to reduce its losses, it prefers to play with Iran.

   d. The likely coalition to form, if Pakistan accepts, is Iran and Pakistan. Since Iran does not have an incentive to join, India and Pakistan should accept to go below their security level.
e. Coalitions with side payment: With side-payments the coalition formation depends on negotiations and it is also dependent upon the weight of incentive each player can provide or convince the others to play toward his side.

f. The ideal coalition is the only coalition that satisfies the three players’ security levels.

g. The second easiest coalition to form is Iran and Pakistan, since Pakistan should offer Iran only half a unit of its influence to encourage Iran to join.

h. The third coalition is India and Iran, since India needs to give only one unit of influence to Iran to encourage Iran to join in.

i. The last coalition is India and Pakistan. In this coalition India needs to provide Pakistan with one and half units to induce Pakistan to join the coalition, which is almost what India is getting above its security level if it plays alone. From the two-player game first described, the conclusion was that both will proceed alone and will not agree to cooperate, so the coalition is unlikely to form.

20. Assessment

The previous model shows the regional dynamics and regional balance of power conditions from a pre-9/11 perspective. Pakistan was able to gain maximum influence in Afghanistan before 2001 due to a favorable Taliban government in Kabul. Iran and India on the other hand separately cooperated with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, who lost influence after the rise of the Taliban.

The value of the game suggests that none of the players would agree to go below what each can get by playing his prudential strategy, which is not optimal. The game, therefore, recommends that India would have less incentive to cooperate with any of the players. However, from its security perspective, it would prefer an alliance with Pakistan if the game were played repeatedly. Additionally, Iran, driven by its concerns, would be open to cooperate with any of the players, but prefers to form a coalition with Pakistan.
The game also proposes that Pakistan, under its security concerns, would be very motivated to form an alliance with any of the players, but also prefers a coalition with Iran. However, according to the previous 2x2 game, Pakistan would be reluctant to cooperate with India under these security conditions, especially while India itself does not have the incentive to form such an alliance. The likely coalition in the absence of a Taliban regime would thus be between Pakistan and Iran.

F. PHASE 3: U.S. PRESENCE AND ITS AFFECT ON THE GAME

After analyzing the “Influence in Afghanistan” game between the three RCP, the effect of the United States intervention and continuing presence will now be considered. This surely alters the players’ priorities in Afghanistan, and may also change the outcomes of the various games. With this factor included, a review of interval scaling is also necessary.

1. Interval Scaling

As a result of U.S. presence in Afghanistan, as derived from Chapter III, India benefits greatly and is anxious to maintain influence in Afghanistan. Therefore, in the scale we see a rise in the weight of India’s influence strategy, and the new value is 9. With increased influence in Afghanistan, India sees less reason to compromise with Pakistan or Iran. This will decrease the weight of its cooperation option to 3, and it’s no-influence strategy to 2, though an existential threat is still unlikely.

Iran has also increased its level of influence since the U.S. intervention, but also feels threatened due to the large U.S. troop presence on its borders. For Iran to maintain influence in Afghanistan, it is now a struggle for sovereignty and survival, so we see considerable increase in weight from 7 to 10. With U.S. presence and the threat it represents, Iran has more interest in cooperating with India or Pakistan, and values this strategy as an 8. Iran’s no-influence strategy is also an unacceptable position considering the presence of American forces. Accordingly, the no-influence strategy will have a value of 1.
Pakistan, above all others, perceives the no-influence option in Afghanistan to be an existential threat to its security and survival. The presence of an anti-Pakistani regime in Kabul and rising Indian influence in Afghanistan increases the weight of influence for Pakistan to a value of 10. The no-influence strategy remains 0, and the cooperation (alliance) option is better than nothing so they are willing to lower this value to 5.

The perceived weight of the strategies mentioned above is shown in Table 10 in interval scaling format. Figures 30 and 31 show the game values and movement diagram similar to what was calculated before for the same game. Here though, interval scaling is utilized and these values are calculated utilizing the same coalition conditions, except now the U.S. presence is factored into the game’s strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale 1-10</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>U.S. presence has altered the interval values and raised the stakes for each player. It has provided both India and Iran to extend itself, which may not have been possible without U.S. presence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Interval Scaling in Light of U.S. Presence in the Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The influence in Afghanistan game</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>(5,8)</td>
<td>(5,2,8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>(1,8)</td>
<td>(1,2,10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 30. The “Influence in Afghanistan” with Adjusted Values
As in phase II, assume that the decision variables are $X_1$, $X_2$, and $X_3$, which are defined as follow:

$X_1 =$ India, and the unilateral game value for $X_1$ is $V(X_1) = 9$

$X_2 =$ Iran, and the unilateral game value for $X_2$ is $V(X_2) = 10$

$X_3 =$ Pakistan, and the unilateral game value for $X_3$ is $V(X_3) = 10$.

From the previous coalition games, Table 11 shows the possible coalition structures and their respective payoffs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The coalition structures</th>
<th>$V(X_1)$</th>
<th>$V(X_2)$</th>
<th>$V(X_3)$</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X_1 + X_2 + X_3$</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>The three cooperate and reduce the influence costs. The ideal coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1 + X_2$, while $X_3$ is alone</td>
<td>3 8 - 11</td>
<td>The minimum $V(X_1)$ is its security level 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2 + X_3$, while $X_1$ is alone</td>
<td>8 5 13</td>
<td>The minimum $V(X_1)$ is its security level 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1 + X_3$, while $X_2$ is alone</td>
<td>3 - 5</td>
<td>The minimum $V(X_2)$ is its security level 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1$, $X_2$, $X_3$</td>
<td>9 10 10</td>
<td>Every one exerts influence unilaterally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Possible Coalition Structures and Their Respective Payoffs
Let us assume that we have the function $Z$, which describes the possible coalitions’ payoffs from the previous game, where $Z(X_i) = V(X_i)$. The function $Z$ is subject to the following constraints shown below:

- $V(X_1 + X_2 + X_3) = 16$
- $V(X_1 + X_2) = 11$
- $V(X_2 + X_3) = 13$
- $V(X_1 + X_3) = 8$
- $V(X_1) \leq 9$
- $V(X_2) \leq 10$
- $V(X_3) \leq 10$, where all $V(X_1), V(X_2), V(X_3) \geq 0$ “non-negativity.”

To find the maximum payoffs the players can receive under the previous constraints, we need to find the maximum value of the function $Z_i$ (Max. $Z_i$) for all $X_i$, where $i=1, 2, 3$, which represents the coalitions’ payoffs. The coalition description according to the function $Z$ is illustrated below:

- $Z_1$ represents - the ideal coalition $Z_1(X_1 + X_2 + X_3) = V(X_1 + X_2 + X_3)$
- $Z_2$ represents - India and Iran coalition against Pakistan, where $Z_2(X_1 + X_2) = V(X_1 + X_2)$
- $Z_3$ represents - Iran and Pakistan coalition against India, where $Z_3(X_2 + X_3) = V(X_2 + X_3)$
- $Z_4$ represents - India and Pakistan coalition against Iran, where $Z_4(X_1 + X_3) = V(X_1 + X_3)$.

Table 12 describes the results after calculating the players’ payoffs, through linear programming. Mathematical calculations can be found in Appendix C, but Table 13 helps show the value of each respective coalition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Max $Z_i$</th>
<th>The payoffs division</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Z_1$</td>
<td>$V(X_1 + X_2 + X_3)$</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>India + Iran + Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_2$</td>
<td>$V(X_1 + X_2)$</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>India and Iran Vs. Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_3$</td>
<td>$V(X_2 + X_3)$</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Iran and Pakistan Vs. India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Z_4$</td>
<td>$V(X_1 + X_3)$</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>India and Pakistan Vs. Iran</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Coalition’s Payoffs Divisions Among the Three RCP
## Table 13. Coalition Evaluation of the Three RCP

![Coalition evaluation table]

### 3. Conclusion

The following notes can be derived from the payoffs division:

1. Confrontations severely reduce the payoffs.
2. Coalitions provide the only tool to secure influence in Afghanistan.
3. The single player under this division gets under his security level, even if he plays his respective prudential strategy. This suggests that the players should show more willingness to cooperate in order to join a coalition that can protect their influence.
4. Players should be prepared to sacrifice some of their influence to form a coalition, but this is better than no-influence.
5. Not all the players, even if they cooperate and join a coalition, can secure their security levels. Iran, for example, cannot achieve its security level in any two-player game. Additionally, if Iran insists on playing alone it severely undermines its payoffs.
6. Looking at India’s payoffs, if Iran and Pakistan form a coalition, this coalition will severely reduce India’s influence.
7. Pakistan is still in a better situation in this game, as it loses only 2.2 units of its influence in the worst-case scenario. This may be related to the wide Pashtun support that Pakistan has on both sides of Durand line, or the inefficiencies of the GIRoA.
8. It is easier for the players to achieve their security level payoffs if they all play separately; however, when coalitions form, they should join one.
9. Coalitions without side payments:
   a. India prefers to play with Iran.
   b. Iran cannot move beyond its security level by joining any coalition, but to reduce its losses it prefers to play with Pakistan.
   c. Pakistan prefers to play with Iran.
   d. The likely coalition to form, if Iran accepts, is Iran and Pakistan. Since Iran does not have an incentive to join India, Pakistan should agree to offer one and half of its influence units to Iran as an incentive to form a coalition.

10. Coalition with side payment:
   a. The ideal coalition is the only coalition that satisfies the three players’ security levels. However, other coalitions can provide more payoffs to the players.
   b. The second probable coalition of Iran and Pakistan may not be possible if the U.S. and Saudi Arabia oppose. This may in part be due to its religious and ideological orientation and its dependence on American aid.
   c. The third coalition is India and Iran. This coalition will leave India with its best outcome, but at the same time it will not satisfy Iran’s security level. However, Iran may accept this option to enhance its political situation in relation to the U.S. and its regional reach. India in this setup needs to give at least two units of influence to Iran to guarantee Iran’s acceptance, which will reduce the advantages India can get and reduce its influence accordingly.
   d. The last coalition is India and Pakistan. In this coalition, India needs to provide Pakistan with a half unit to induce Pakistan to join the coalition. Note that the gap here between India and Pakistan has already been reduced to its minimum. The main concern for Pakistan is the view that U.S. policies have favored India and reduced their space to maneuver. Pakistan now is trapped between
the U.S. and India. Especially after the killing of Osama bin Laden, Pakistan is under intense international pressure. This also provides an opportunity for the U.S. to address the security concerns of Pakistan and make it an honest ally against Al Qaeda. Issues like Kashmir will continue to pose an obstacle, though, and should be addressed. There are limited opportunities for all involved, but if navigated judiciously the potential exists of achieving conditions that all may be willing to accept.
V. THE RELEVANT PLAYERS

The special aspect of Afghanistan is that it has powerful neighbors or near-neighbors—Pakistan, India, China, Russia, Iran. Each is threatened in one way or another and, in many respects, more than we [the United States] are by the emergence of a base for international terrorism: Pakistan by Al Qaeda; India by general jihadism...China by fundamentalist Shiite jihadists in Xinjiang; Russia by unrest in the Muslim south; even Iran by the fundamentalist Sunni Taliban.  

Henry Kissinger

A. THE RELEVANT FEW

The core regional countries discussed in Chapter III, (Pakistan India, and Iran) were those determined to have the greatest levels of influence, interference and stakes in Afghanistan. There are other nations that are both regional and global players and also have significant concerns regarding foreign military presence, economic activity and diplomatic relations in Afghanistan. These countries operate primarily at the system level and include such nations as Central Asian Republics (CARs), China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Many are closely monitoring and even contributing towards stability in Afghanistan in their own ways. Russia and China are major global powers with important regional interests, while Saudi Arabia and Turkey are crucial and strategic Muslim partners in Afghanistan. As immediate neighbors to the north, the CARs each feel the reverberations from instability in the south, but can positively affect economic conditions through trade relations and more open systems. All these players form the second circle of influence for Afghanistan, after the core countries, and have a significant ability to shift the balance in Afghanistan through political, economic and military support.

B. SYSTEM LEVEL PLAYERS (SLP)

One major change in the new Great Game in Afghanistan is the increase in the number of powerful players. This is in part a result of the rise of post-colonial and post-Soviet Union independent states. Many of Afghanistan’s regional neighbors have sizable strength and influence, and there are many other issues interwoven into the relationships and which extend beyond Afghanistan. For instance, the nuclear ambitions in the region among Pakistan, India, and Iran have historically been at odds with U.S. and international nonproliferation policies. This point of contention inevitably bleeds over into other relations and in part is why Afghan cooperation is so convoluted. Where cooperation is required, coercive tools and deterrence can have a limited effect especially with strong neighbors. On the other hand, analysis of the different system level players can reveal important concerns as well as conditions for cooperation that may prove beneficial in moving toward lasting stability in the region.
C. CHINA: THE NEW GIANT

China in recent years has changed its only eastward approach and directed efforts further west and northwest. Beginning with the investment of $3 billion in the Afghan copper project, it is clear that China has investment and economic interest in the region and this is a point upon which to build.

China has an extensive economic, military and nuclear relationship with Pakistan, and the friendship between the two countries has been long lasting and resilient. China also shares Pakistan’s wariness about India’s growing influence in Afghanistan, though clearly the threat is less pressing for them. “This relationship is likely to grow in the wake of the CIA rupture with the Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI).”81 While China may seem to be supportive of U.S. policies in the region, it benefits more by standing in the wings while the U.S. underwrites conflicts and reconstruction, and then China attempts to fill the void diplomatically as U.S. prestige in the region wanes.

When it comes to Southwest Asia, China has acutely prioritized its commitments and areas of interest. According to Niklas Swanstrom, “China has four aims in the region: Development of Xinjiang; political and regional stability; energy security; and an alternate transport corridor to Europe and South Asia.”82 Western China is so expansive that it is almost a landlocked country. It is closer to the Indian Ocean than to the South China Sea, and thus looks increasingly towards its western borders to expand and develop this region, as well as to sustain the massive growth China is experiencing. China’s active participation in building Pakistan’s Gawadar port is also testimony to the fact that China seeks strategic connectivity with the Arabian Sea. Perhaps China’s most pressing interest is the ability to sustain its upward growth curve, but equally important is to stave off any conditions which might disrupt this growth such as violent extremism or terrorism.

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D. RUSSIA: THE SILENT BEAR

Second to China in size and economic interest in Afghanistan is Russia, who some may argue is enjoying a free ride as other nations fight to achieve many of Russia’s own self-interests without bearing any of the costs. Even more interesting is the fact that two of the countries that collaborated in forcing Soviet troops out of Afghanistan in 1989 (Pakistan and the United States) are today fighting against the same adversary that was raised and nurtured by them to counter the Soviets, and is today even more dangerous and determined. Russia also views America’s increasing influence in the region with a degree of skepticism and distrust as it always has when American presence increases near its borders, such as in the entire western European region. While it supports American efforts in the counter-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan, it likely has not forgotten the memories of its own Afghan War (1979-89) and the roll of the U.S. in supporting anti-Soviet Mujahedeen. In the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, “This was an opportunity of giving the USSR its Vietnam War” 83—to demoralize and bleed the Red Army dry. Some may have said that following Vietnam, the Soviet excursion into Afghanistan evened the score between the two states, but there is no doubt that the memories and resentment remain and play a distant role in the interaction between the two.

While Russia has kept its distance from directly becoming involved in Afghanistan this time around, the Russians are playing an active role in the SCO, which seeks to address the challenges of terrorism, separatism and extremism. In this capacity, Russia has offered a forum for dialogue with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran for aligning their interests in Afghanistan. Russians, like the Chinese, have been silently pursuing policies of regional alliance with the key countries in the region, and this too aligns with their perceived interests in capitalizing on ripe economic conditions and controlling the regional threats they perceive as growing in some instances.

E. SAUDI ARABIA AND THE MUSLIM WORLD: FORCE MULTIPLIERS

Unfortunately, Afghanistan today has become a focal point for a myriad of Jihadist organizations drawn to the prospect of fighting against the West, as espoused by their radical leadership. According to Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Anti Americanism has worsened among America's European allies and is very, very bad in the Muslim world."84

Under these conditions, Saudi Arabia’s influence as the caretaker of Islam’s holiest sites could prove very helpful to friendly Western nations. Two major interests motivate Saudi Arabia’s deep involvement in Afghanistan today. First, Saudi Arabia acts as a partner with the United States in targeting its local radicals and extremists who are potential threats to the kingdom. Osama Bin Laden himself was a Saudi before his citizenship was revoked for threatening the royal family. Second, the Saudis want to counter the spread of Iranian Shia ideology by preaching their own ‘Wahabi’ ideology.85 During the rise of the Taliban, the ‘Golden Chain’ was established as a means of informally connecting prominent Saudi and Gulf state individuals with the cause of likeminded Afghan fighters.86 This introduced massive amounts of funds to prolong the fight, as well as funding specific madrassas (religious schools) to spread Wahabi thought, and lasting social connections to maintain influence for years to come. As a result, Saudi leadership still enjoys a degree of influence on Taliban madrasas they financed and supported, which has likewise maintained their good public standing in Afghanistan to a large degree.

Shia and Sunni tensions are perpetuated by the public and private competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Sunni House of Saud surely views the United States’ actions in Iraq and Afghanistan as conflicting, given their strong relationship with the West and the manner in which both conflicts have indirectly benefited Shia Iran with

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86 Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires*, 291.
favorable regimes. Nonetheless, the U.S. needs to better engage the fast growing population of the Muslim world, which is likely to be 1.8 billion by 2025 and the Saudi trust and influence is invaluable in maintaining links to the Middle East and the broader Muslim population.

F. PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN TROOPS SUPPORT IN AFGHANISTAN

Figure 33 shows the polls carried out by the PEW organization and how the public in different countries see American occupation and policies in Afghanistan.89

![Figure 33. United States’ Rating in the Muslim World and Other Regional Countries](image)

As shown in Figure 33, the countries with a high Muslim population show much less public support for the conflict in contrast with other regional nations. This may be emblematic of several issues, not least of which are the economic and political benefits some of the regional and system level countries reap from the efforts.

This graph is also emblematic of the public opposition found within countries that at a national level largely support U.S. counter-terrorism (CT) operations and the broader

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Afghan operations. Allies like Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan and many others have facilitated a great number of CT actions, and while there are obvious benefits for each country there are also significant costs in terms of domestic politics. For many leaders, including Musharaf and Zardari in Pakistan, Mubarak in Egypt, Saleh in Yemen and even Karzai in Afghanistan, support of U.S. policies have been a liability.

In contrast to this predicament, other regional organizations like the SCO and Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) may be able to breach this divide as they are viewed more positively at present. The SCO and OIC may even be more effective than NATO or the UN in addressing regional concerns and security issues inside Afghanistan and South Asia. Clearly there is not a silver bullet, but the social influence that certain system level players such as Saudi Arabia wield must be maximized, and if current strategies are not producing desired effects then it is essential to look elsewhere, especially for bold new ideas.

G. REGIONAL CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES

Other than the core issues, there are many other serious challenges for Afghanistan and its immediate neighbors that need focus and better understanding. These issues have direct bearing on the core issues as well, and one country’s domestic interests are no longer an isolated concern confined to the geographical boundaries of a single state. Issues in Afghanistan, like terrorism, narcotics and demographics have international repercussions. Some social scientists call these issues “intermestic,” as they are both international and domestic at the same time.\textsuperscript{90} With so many neighboring states and so many differing perspectives, it is only logical that there be multiple intermestic issues, which conflate the problem. A deeper understanding of some of the most prominent of these issues helps illustrate the magnitude of the dilemma and delineates priorities to address them.

\textsuperscript{90} Nye and Welch, \textit{Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation}, 248.
H. TERRORISM

Like the regional core players (RCP), the threat of terrorism is universally concerning for all the SLP, and the broader insurgency in Afghanistan gives training, experience, and connections to a wide array of terrorist fighters who export these skills back to their home countries in the region. While Pakistan, India, Iran, China, Russia, and the Central Asian Republics each have their own specific self-interests in Afghanistan, they can all agree on the danger of the spread of extremism in the region by way of Afghanistan’s instability. By creating a regional alliance and ensuring security agreements aimed at stabilizing Afghanistan, Afghanistan’s neighbors can agree to restrict their foreign intervention in Afghanistan and thereby reduce the regional security competition. The development of arguably the most significant counter-terrorism operation in U.S. history has garnered mixed reactions throughout the region. While some have applauded the actions, most notably Pakistan is defensive. It is as of yet unseen how the killing of Osama Bin Laden may affect the combined terrorist operations that had previously enjoyed significant collaboration throughout the region. Clearly the lack of such collaboration would undermine the future successfulness of counter-terrorism operations.

I. DRUG TRAFFICKING

Afghanistan has not only been a safe haven for terrorists in the past, but also a hidden paradise for drug lords. Previously, the Taliban had discouraged the cultivation of poppy (main precursor for heroin), but as the insurgency has grown it has done so through the funding that drug trafficking provides. In addition to the effects of insurgency and foreign intervention, drug barons have injected themselves into Afghan society. The illicit economy that has flourished as a result of the drugs now accounts for fifty percent of Afghanistan’s GDP, so the importance and effect of this activity cannot be overstated.

The effects of Afghanistan’s massive opium production are felt throughout the world as well. The total number of deaths attributable to Afghan narcotics far exceeds
the number of deaths resulting from terrorist attacks to include the 9/11 tragedy. According to Armen Oganesyan, “The war will not end if and when bin Laden has been caught or the Taliban routed. The war will go on as long as the drug barons find it profitable and keep financing terrorism through drug money.”

While Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opium, Iran is the world’s largest consumer. Iran has the highest number of opium addicts in the world, with more than three percent of the population above the age of fifteen addicted to heroin.

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92 Oganesyan, “How Long is the War in Afghanistan Going to Last?”


95 Tellis et al., “Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan?”
Russia too claims losses of as many as thirty thousand lives every year as a result of heroin. In NATO countries, the number of people who die of heroin overdoses every year (more than ten thousand) is five times higher than the total number of NATO troops that have been killed in Afghanistan in the past eight years. Any solution to Afghanistan's opium problems needs regional/global cooperation because it is fueled by regional demand.

![Figure 35. UN-evaluated High Risk Areas in Afghanistan in 2010.](image)

The map in Figure 35 depicts the high-risk areas in terms of weakened security and criminal activity, and correlates them to the insurgency areas. Not surprisingly, high-risk areas almost exactly mirror areas of significant increased opium production since 2001 as reported by the UNODC. According to the UNODC, “Kandahar and neighboring Helmand remain by far the biggest centers of poppy cultivation, with nearly three-quarters of Afghan opium coming from the two southern provinces.”

According to Afghan intelligence estimates, “30% of Taliban income [comes] from involvement in

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drug trafficking.” Similar to other narcotics-funded insurgencies in the world, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (better known by its Spanish acronym, FARC), the Taliban roots of support can be severely stunted if effectively targeted. As this is a regional problem, it will take a multi-pronged attack to defeat the Taliban. Policies to engage the growers in Afghanistan are only one part of the solution; the focused efforts of all the regional countries should likewise engage from their end of the equation if there is to be hope for success.

J. DEMOGRAPHY

We recognize that our fate - that is, our security, our freedom, and our prosperity - are linked to the people of Pakistan.100

John Negroponte

The region, consisting of Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan India and China, has more than sixty percent of the world’s population. More specifically, the youth of Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan are one of the highest populations in the world, and as such they are vulnerable to radicalism, if they do not perceive substantial incentives for education and employment. This volatile nature of a youthful population has manifested itself in striking form recently throughout the Middle East, and yet an energetic youth can also be viewed as a national asset, if systematic and planned investment in human capital is pursued.

The recently espoused “National Strategic Narrative” offered by two senior field grade officers in the Pentagon states that the United States’ first two investment priorities should be the education of young Americans and the nation’s sustainable security.101 This may seem like an unlikely ordering from Pentagon insiders, but if the value of education and jobs is viewed as strategically strengthening society, how much more strengthening would an emphasis on education and employment be for the five hundred

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99 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 195.


million youth in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and India? Education without jobs is a dangerous proposition, since this may be more fuel to the fire of insurgency if an economic backbone is not simultaneously fostered to support a young, educated populace. Anticipating the needs and desires of this fast-growing demographic could be one of the most propitious strategies emplaced by a regional coalition and an important point to consider when devising long-term and short-term strategies alike.

K. REGIONAL/GLOBAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

1. NATO

As the central component of the ISAF, NATO has committed itself to achieving the lofty goal of sustainable peace in Afghanistan. As the conflict has progressed, most NATO countries have come to understand and support a regional approach to resolving the conflict. Most of these countries also agree that Pakistan is a central link to effectively pursuing a regional approach to Afghan stability.\textsuperscript{102}

Though NATO countries display a unified coalition, there are varying levels of commitment and interest throughout the alliance. This disjointed commitment and tendency for limited engagement at the individual country level has added an unnecessary level of friction and strife in the alliance. In addition, the decidedly Western face of the coalition and the drawn-out nature of the conflict (almost ten years) have further complicated coalition operations and strategies. All these points notwithstanding, there are impressive strengths that NATO bares. Finding an effective balance is important to establishing realistic goals for the future and solutions for the current difficulties the alliance faces in Afghanistan.

2. SCO: An Underutilized Regional Organization

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was initially formed to counter the ever-growing influence of the Taliban and their support of radicalism in Central Asia

\textsuperscript{102} Rashid, \textit{Descent into Chaos}, 82.
and China’s Uyghur province. In this regard, one can see many potential points of cooperation between this organization and that of NATO in Afghanistan. The SCO has grown considerably since its 1996 birth, and the organization is facing major challenges as well as opportunities in the coming years.

The characteristics of the SCO are one of several concerns regarding the organization. Is it a political–military organization, an alliance, or just a multi-regional organization? Where should its focus be: simply Central Asia or beyond? The second challenge relates to the coordination of policies among member states. The internal dynamics between China and Russia and their relationships with the Central Asian states makes the grouping, in and of itself, very interesting. Given the differences in history, culture, and interests between these several countries, it is clear that each has its unique priorities. Finally, the decision regarding the organization’s expansion of membership poses interesting dilemmas as Iran, India, and Pakistan are all in an observer status. Since growing instability in Afghanistan in the form of Taliban terrorist activities and drug trafficking seriously threatens Central Asian security, it would seem logical that the SCO would consider an increased role in Afghanistan specifically. The manner in which the SCO should interact with other international governmental organizations to promote cooperation remains a challenge though. Specifically, its relationships with the Eurasian Economic Community, Collective Security Treaty Organization, and NATO are of critical importance.

Under the present global economic situation, the need to turn to regional cooperation and to make use of the capabilities of regional organizations for achieving development and economic growth is undeniable. In describing China’s leadership role in the SCO one scholar said, “China has to balance between managing its relationships with Central Asian states and Russia on the one hand, while at the same time resisting the temptation to turn the SCO into an anti-West and anti-U.S. NATO-like alliance on the

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The system level players in the region and the United States have serious concerns regarding energy security, WMD nonproliferation, and anti-terrorism. These are concerns that can unite NATO, the EU and the SCO in handling these issues. To avoid a new Great Game of power rivalry in Afghanistan, Beijing, Moscow, and Washington would be better off keeping engaged with one another in forums like the SCO and the OIC.

3. Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)

The OIC is strongly influenced by Saudi Arabia and has been effective in communicating the interests of Muslim countries around the world. The OIC may not enjoy the same influence as the Arab League and NATO, but it is still seen as a forum to address issues of the greater Islamic world. In 2010, President Obama appointed Rashad Hussain, deputy associate White House counsel, as the United States special envoy to the OIC. The appointment demonstrated the importance of considering this organization and its role in addressing broader concerns of the Islamic world. In March 2011, a group of more than 120 international representatives from fifty countries held a meeting at the head offices of the OIC in Jeddah to discuss a range of political issues related to dialogue between the Karzai government and the Taliban. In this capacity, the OIC may become an effective forum for addressing the ideological narrative of the Taliban in Afghanistan and help to resolve some concerns of the insurgents.

4. The Silk Route: Economic Strategy

Traditionally, Afghanistan and Pakistan were at the center of the overland routes that operated for centuries connecting the major trade capitals of the world from East China to Western Europe. “The so-called Silk Road was the most famous overland route, [and created] a world market for luxury goods that could bear the cost of long-distance

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104 Jing-Dong Yuan, “China's Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),” *Journal of Contemporary China* 19, no. 67 (2010), 869.

transport.” Since that time, this economically important trade link has seen the rise and fall of many leaders and even civilizations and cultures.

Recognizing the importance of this historical precedence, it is surprising that more has not been done to formulate broader economic policies to capitalize on this point. Though scholars and historians alike have mentioned it many times, there has still been limited effort to build the necessary infrastructure to shape a future corridor of trade in the region.

Despite the many security and political concerns that exist among the different SLPs, this should not limit continental and regional trade corridors. This is a point that Afghanistan understands as it has recently been trying to expand trade in every direction. Unfortunately, the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, as well as the war in Afghanistan, has been two of the greatest impediments in improving regional and transcontinental trade. The economic cost of the Kashmir stand off for both India and Pakistan has been tremendous. The perceived gains in security have actually brought on greater insecurity and continue to impede growth and true security and stability. If more attention can be given to the reality of the expanding trade opportunities in the region and the transformative nature that improved economic well-being can have, then silk route success should be more persuasive in bringing disparate nations to the bargaining table.

L. CONCLUSION

Many writers think that what started as an isolated war in Afghanistan in 2001 later turned into a regional insurgency, but the truth is regional conflict has been at the heart of conflicts in Afghanistan for many, many years. Today, most of the regional players view their gains and losses in Afghanistan as a zero sum game, which has been

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110 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 308.
the main hindrance towards peace and stability in the country. This perception of regional players is based on traditional rivalries and national interests that have been exacerbated by the United States’ incursion into the region.

The regional relationships that extend beyond the core players include the world’s greatest powers, and each has its own view of what success should look like in the region. The U.S. would do well to consolidate the moderate forces in these surrounding countries and strengthen their legitimate democratic governments to build a broader coalition for long-term regional stability. The costs to stabilize Afghanistan are simply not sustainable for the U.S. alone or even by the larger NATO contingent. Strong, stable and independent Muslim governments, along with regional powers such as Russia and China, will be able to counter the extremist non-state actors and their false hope of creating a larger Muslim Ummah without geographical boundaries. The system level players have a validly strong interest in the region and a role to play in threats that directly affect them such as narco-trafficking. Efforts to build a base starting with the RCP is important, but as that base solidifies the regional hope for stability becomes even stronger as more system level players become invested in the process and the outcomes. This is especially true considering the potential benefits from reestablishing something like modern Silk Road.
VI. POSSIBILITIES FOR RESOLVING THE REGIONAL RIVALRIES

Over the Long run, humans would evolve beyond war for three reasons: the great destructiveness of war; the growth of economic interdependence, and the development of what he called republican governments and what we call today liberal democracies.\textsuperscript{111}

\textit{Thoughts on Immanuel Kant, 18\textsuperscript{th} Century Philosopher}

A. INTRODUCTION

Despite the mountain of differing interests that face the domestic, regional, and system actors involved in Afghanistan, there is one central issue that unites them. Terrorism comes in a variety of forms and motivations for each country but the effects of it are universally destabilizing, and each nation is equally interested in limiting this threat in its many forms. Before all international actors can work harmoniously against the threat of terrorism though, it is essential they share the same perception of the threat. For this purpose, William Zartman’s ripeness theory and its concept of “mutually hurting stalemate”\textsuperscript{112} is quite relevant for Afghanistan.

This theory basically talks about the warring factions, when they are unable to achieve a decisive victory, then the prospects of a negotiated settlement increase. Perceptions are tied to fears and motives, and discrepancies usually develop between a rich country and the one that is struggling for survival.\textsuperscript{113}

From this understanding, one can examine and recognize how the various partners share a perception of threat and what perspectives have overlap among the neighbors as opposed to what simply divides them.

Previously, in Chapter II, the cyclical start and stop of development and progress in Afghanistan over the past two hundred years was described. No one presumes that a

\textsuperscript{111} Nye and Welch, \textit{Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation}, 324.


\textsuperscript{113} Zartman, \textit{Elusive Peace}, 18.
rural tribal state like Afghanistan, lacking the economic wherewithal, can immediately transform into a modern state; however, it seems clear that various Afghan monarchs and regimes have themselves exacerbated the state’s problems. The history of Afghan leaders invoking or allowing global and regional players to use Afghan territory for the pursuit of their interests is long. Many times these actions were in conflict with the interests of the Afghan state, but they often did this for economic and security reasons. According to Barnett Rubin, “The more domestic legitimacy and the less international opposition to the Afghan state, the fewer subsidies a ruler in Afghanistan needs to maintain power.”

The internal situation has consistently been very complicated in each respective era of rule in Afghanistan.

What has changed is that, where once Russia and Britain dominated Afghanistan’s regional environment, today the disputatious successors to the Raj—Pakistan and India—play major roles, as do Russia and other successor states to the USSR, an independent revolutionary Iran, the Arab kingdoms and emirates of the Persian Gulf, powers like the United States, China, NATO, the EU, the UN and international financial institutions.

For this reason, balance of power theory discussed in Chapter IV fits appropriately into Afghanistan, where global and regional powers are attempting an “asymmetric balancing” against the United States and also against each other at the expense of the Afghan population. Examples of this balance of power can be seen in Pakistan’s actions to disrupt India’s reconstruction activity in Afghanistan, or in Taliban attempts to disrupt NATO security efforts, and now even Taliban attacks against


Pakistani authorities for support and assistance of NATO operations. In each instance, the weaker actor attempts to counter the stronger player in order to decrease the disparity between military, economic, or political capabilities.118

B. PRESENT CONDITIONS

From the previous chapters, one can describe the current conditions in Figure 36.

In desiring to break the status quo, one must derive the relationship between certain cause and effect conditions, recognizing that simple linear connections may not be directly extrapolated. Nonetheless, analyses can infer certain valuable relationships. As previously noted, while the coalition of nations working in Afghanistan has made sincere efforts to transform the country into a stable state, the progress has been extremely slow and gradual. This is in no small part due to certain assumptions (listed below) that have underdeveloped or proven unrealistic over the years.

1. That the Karzai government would be able to rise to the challenge of governing and legitimately meet the expectations of the people.

Figure 36. Current Status Quo Conditions and Effects Need to be Altered

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2. That Pakistan would be able to assist in preventing safe haven in the FATA.

3. That Afghan security forces would be able to take control of security more rapidly.

The RAND study entitled “How Insurgencies End” details numerous characteristics of both successful and unsuccessful insurgencies. Correlations to these three points and the COIN fight in Afghanistan can be easily extrapolated in order to better understand the challenges and potential solutions. RAND notes that anocracies (pseudo-democracies) rarely fare well against insurgencies, and Karzai’s ineffective government fits many of the stereotypical characteristics of an administration that is neither a democracy nor fully authoritarian. As such, Karzai’s administration can never achieve full support or subservience from the population and flounders as ineffective and vulnerable to an insurgent movement. Finally, foreign external support can be both a boon and a bane depending on the conditions. To the degree that support creates dependency it is problematic, and the failure of the Afghan security forces to develop more quickly might be attributed in part to this over dependence on external support.119

The nature of a supportive safe haven in Pakistan also does not bode well for a COIN conflict, and the FATA has clearly offered that to recovering Taliban over the course of the past ten years. Ultimately, Pakistan’s ability to target all terrorist hideouts in the FATA is probably overrated,120 the Afghan government is too weak to govern effectively, and Afghan security forces have developed a debilitating dependence on

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119 Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2010), xiii.

external support.121 While each of these factors has an important internal dimension, there are also key regional aspects that could positively influence each point if properly addressed.

Recognizing that there are certain positions that are immovable for both sides, the final strategy for the U.S. should not be based upon “cooptive power,” as defined by Joseph Nye, which is a form of coercion that hinges on the ability of the United States to influence external powers to “define their interests in ways consistent with its own.”122 Instead it should be viewed as approaching the conflict in order to help Afghans who have been suffering for the last three decades. As an honest broker among the regional core players (RCP), the United States could better broker an agreement if it was genuinely seen as pursuing this goal.

Understanding the substantial causes of ineffective governance, security, and safe havens, as well as pursuing primarily Afghan issues, sets the stage for attempting to resolve the regional balance of power. The core regional threats are security, political, and economic in nature, and an alliance of the RCP to address these initial areas could regionally balance concerns in such a way that internal Afghan development could grow and stabilize.

C. CHANGING PERCEPTIONS

*There has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited*

- Sun Tzu

At present, only the United States has the wherewithal to create a regional balance of power and convince all the regional players through coercion or persuasion to work together for stabilizing Afghanistan.123 To achieve a regional understanding, the United

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States must remain resolved that a stable and peaceful Afghanistan is important for the region and the whole world. It would be short-sighted for the United States to stabilize Afghanistan internally and then leave without coming to some understanding with Afghanistan’s neighbors about future engagements. Therefore, the United State needs to engage Afghanistan’s neighbors in order to achieve stability in Afghanistan.

Table 14 shows a longitudinal analysis of three important interventions in Afghanistan’s history and how the rulers during these periods were able to gain legitimacy and ensure stability/instability in Afghanistan. Of interest in these cases is how the neighbors, external forces, the incumbent government, and the population view one another; perception truly is reality and defines the nature of the COIN conflict and its relative success or failure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interventions</th>
<th>Neighbors Hostile to COIN forces</th>
<th>Occupier as the key COIN force</th>
<th>The AFG Government and external support not mutually supportive</th>
<th>Population supports COIN forces</th>
<th>Stability and security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amir Abdul Rehman (British Occupation)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babrak Karmal (Soviet occupation)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karzai (ISAF intervention)</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14. Key Characteristics of Historical Afghan Interventions

D. CHANGING THE STATUS QUO

To make progress towards stability, the status quo in Afghanistan needs to change. The United States and ISAF walk a fine line between providing enough assistance to Afghan forces and its government in order to enable them, but not foster complete dependency. For example, Japan currently pays the salaries for all Afghan
National Police (ANP).\textsuperscript{124} This was necessary to jumpstart the security apparatus, but completely unsustainable in the long term. Unless a clear plan for transitioning away from this payment imbalance exists from the beginning of the initiative, it will create a dependency and Afghanistan will not be motivated to be self-sustaining. Secondly, without falling deeper into a commitment trap, the U.S. should endeavor to become a broker for a regional alliance and facilitate economic, political and security cooperation between the RCP. Figure 37 provides a depiction of this balanced approach.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{balanced_approach.png}
\caption{Balanced Approach to a Stable Afghanistan}
\end{figure}

Though the balance between the United States’ instruments of power (including diplomacy, information, military and economics) has significantly emphasized support of military actions since 9/11, the need for re-balance could not be more prescient. To this point, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “We now need to work on the diplomatic surge to bring stability in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{125} Policy advisors have further suggested, “a diplomatic solution may need to precede an internal reconciliation in Afghanistan.

\begin{itemize}
\end{itemize}
Otherwise, any security gains on the ground could systematically and very rapidly be reversed by the self-serving actions of regional powers.”

According to Joseph Nye, “In the politics of interdependence, the distinction between what is domestic and what is foreign becomes blurred.” What happens in Afghanistan has repercussions in the United States and elsewhere, and vice versa. Instability in the Middle East has been a cause of concern for much of the last century, and the conditions of the last decade, involving conflicts and global terrorism, only accentuate the increasing interdependence in the world over. According to Rajan, “In this era of growing world integration, the frustrated young men in a failed state affects the comfortable citizen in a developed country in a variety of ways, ranging from the benign, immigration, to the malign, terrorism.”

E. FINDING A REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER

Changing perceptions and the status quo of insecurity and distrust are imperative to establishing a firm foundation upon which to build on. Alongside this task, shoring up a regional balance of power can take hold and in time intermingle the RCP in a mutually supportive and beneficial relationship. According to Patrick Morgan, “To achieve balance of power, regional states tend to put great emphasis on autonomy and manipulate their relationships primarily on the basis of relative power capability.” The regional powers are less autonomous than the great powers, so the initial drive to preserve and support a regional balance of power will depend on the great power. The United States should launch regional working groups to develop a common understanding of the future of Afghanistan in the region with all neighbors, including Iran, Russia, China, India and the Persian Gulf countries, as well as all the local forces. Both the UN and


127 Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation, 248.


130 Paul, Wirtz and Fortmann, Balance of Power, 7.
regional organizations offer forums to pursue these objectives. Afghanistan can no longer be an isolated buffer state; rather it can serve as a connector of a wider region through trade, transit, energy transmission and labor migration as long as it is not a source of threat. While establishing Afghanistan as a focal point for regional cooperation is amenable to many of the RCP, the idea of making it a base for U.S. power projection in the region may not be compatible with this structure. The long-term U.S. presence in Europe following World War II was enabled by the substantial overlap in membership between the security alliance (NATO) and the framework for economic and political cooperation that came to exist later in the European Union. Without a similar overlapping of security and economic frameworks in South Asia, a large U.S. presence ultimately will be destabilizing and debilitating and undermine the regional balance of power.

F. POLITICAL STABILITY

1. Building a Regional Alliance

American presence over the past ten years has had clearly effected the previous balance of power in the region. According to Christopher Layne, “A state that attained hegemony would gain security for itself, but would threaten the security of others; a ‘hegemonic’ rise is the most acute manifestation of a security dilemma.”131 Regional alliances like the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)132 and the SCO can bring better understanding between West Asian, East Asian and South Asian countries. These alliances can provide a regional solution to the complicated problem of Afghanistan,

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131 Layne, The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power, 104.

132 “Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is an intergovernmental regional organization established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for the purpose of promoting economic, technical and cultural cooperation among the member states. ECO was the successor organization of what was the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), founded in 1964, which ended activities in 1979. In 1992, the [ECO] expanded to include seven new members, namely Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.” “Economic Cooperation Organization,” www.ecosecretariat.org, http://www.ecosecretariat.org/Detail_info/About_ECO_D.htm (accessed on 05/24/2011).
which may be more acceptable to the broader grouping of RCP. Other stakeholders such as Russia and China can also increase the degree of influence in ways that may draw the RCP closer rather than divide them.

Ultimately, the SCO can become an effective forum to address security, economic and political concerns of all the regional players. According to Daryl Morini, “Viewed objectively, seeking a rapprochement with the SCO should be a central pillar of any Western diplomatic strategy aimed at leaving Afghanistan on favorable terms.”133 The SCO is one organization that already exists in this region, having most of the greater Central Asian and South Asian countries as members or observers in this group. In the past, it has shown the resolve to overcome regional issues and gain the confidence of the regional players. It has been dominated by the great powers like Russia and China and at times has had a thinly veiled antagonism toward the West, but can still play a role in facilitating dialogue and resolving issues between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and India. This organization can assist in influencing both India and Pakistan, through Russia and China respectively, to move beyond their security concerns, develop confidence building measures, and work conjointly for a regional solution. This sort of organization should be encouraged by the United States without considering it as counterweight or ‘asymmetric balancing’134 against U.S. interests in the region.

2. **Good Governance and Strong Leadership (Pakistan – Afghanistan)**

In countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan, strong and sincere leadership is the single most important factor that can prevent fragmentation and radicalization of these societies, where patriarchal and patrimonial rules have destroyed all institutions.135 The rulers in these countries, like most third world countries, follow the politics of survival rather than the politics of rule.136 Continued engagement from the United States should work to strengthen the civilian leadership in order for them to gain greater authority and

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136 Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 236.
legitimacy. The opposite can happen though if the civilian leadership resist change and hold onto previous methods and policies. Ultimately, this is something that only Pakistan and Afghan leaders can do for themselves, the ability to engender trust and confidence by suffering with the population without any foreign stamp is essential. The United States and other partners walk a fine line between being a help or a hindrance. Those leaders, who have less credibility at home, are a liability for international partners as well, as they can betray their powerful mentors and supporters for their own survival, and when their demise is imminent they blame others for their fall.

The United States should take care to engage strong and legitimate leadership in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran without propping up self-centered dictators or corrupt civilians. According to Bruce Riedel, “Strong military-military and intelligence-to-intelligence networks are vital for an effective engagement approach, though it must avoid circumventing political leadership.” The short-term benefits of working with leaders like Pakistan’s Zia and Musharaf left few other options, but in the long-term created another set of problems and difficulties down the road.

3. Local Initiatives

The government of Afghanistan is the key player in supporting regional and local arrangements. In the game of power politics for keeping a hold on the presidency, Karzai might be prepared to accept Taliban participation at the local and even national level. Encouraging regional mediation of leaders and instituting certain reforms would facilitate this integration. While the Taliban are not likely to consider a settlement until after the exit of ISAF forces, a broader devolution of power across the provinces is appropriate to empower the local rule of law and ability to govern regardless of the Taliban or any other party. This speaks to the concern that undue influence from the national level is spoiling the sincere efforts of regional and provincial governors.

138 Riedel, Deadly Embrace, 128.
Some have suggested a return to the pre-1970 form of governance with a federation of sorts among the provinces and a loose mandate from the national level. At this point, such a severe reversal seems unlikely, as does the suggestion of partitioning areas to Taliban rule but keeping them beholden to Kabul. These previous conditions are no longer viable because of the level of development currently in place. Instead, the options are becoming fewer and fewer to the point that the best negotiable option for the Taliban is to avow allegiance to Afghanistan’s elected government and then try to influence the system from the inside out. This sort of arrangement can be supervised by the regional organizations (SCO and ECO) and the United Nations.

While the United States seeks to provide provincial autonomy to different ethnically divided provinces, any efforts to divide or quarantine Taliban areas from the rest of Afghanistan or create a firewall\(^{139}\) would spread chaos over the whole region. Former U.S. Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwell, suggested the de facto partition of Afghanistan. According to Blackwell, the Pashtun majority areas (Pashtunistan) of East Afghanistan should be isolated and cordoned off from rest of Afghanistan.\(^{140}\) He further suggests that drone technology and special forces should be enough to quarantine and police that area, so that terrorism should remain restricted to those parts of the region. However, the suggested solution is likely to create further destabilization not only in Afghanistan, but South and Central Asia as well. The creation of a Pashtun ‘killing zone’ in Afghanistan will affect Pakistan’s Pashtuns in the FATA, Khyber Pasthunkhwa, and Baluchistan. Such a plan will spillover instability and extremism along Pakistan’s border with China, Iran, India and Afghanistan. The Durand Line \(^{141}\) will disappear as the

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141 “The Durand Line was demarcated by the British and signed into a treaty in 1893 with the Afghan ruler Amir Abdur Rehman Khan.” The international border extends some 2,640 kilometers and divides Pakistan from Afghanistan, and is still a point of dispute today between the two countries. “Durand Line,” [http://www.afghanistans.com/information/history/durandline.htm](http://www.afghanistans.com/information/history/durandline.htm) (accessed on 06/01/2011).
indicated zone extends east and southwards from Afghanistan. Therefore, the plan will not only destabilize Afghanistan but also expand into neighboring states.

The need for reconciliation must allow for the consideration of Taliban concerns yet not create conditions that might broaden the conflict in the region. Participation in the local political structure can make the Taliban stakeholders in the process and responsible for legitimate functions of the system, rather than disrupters.

4. Economic Convergence

The primary force that now drives relations and rivalries among the global and regional powers is economics. Most of the liberal economists think that economic interdependence is a positive sum game. This aspect is true to a greater extent, because during the rise of the Asian tigers in the early 1990s, mostly all of the countries of Southeast Asia showed remarkable signs of progress and prosperity within a decade. Similarly, the economic rise of India and China can have a positive spillover in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The most effective investments for improving Afghanistan’s economy may well be achieved by assisting its neighbors and giving them a stronger stake in Afghanistan’s success.

5. Modern Silk Route (MSR)

David Ignatius and Thomas Barnett have made the same argument that “with trade and economic growth comes stability.” By opening the silk route between Central Asian countries and India, Afghanistan’s stability and peace might follow. Connecting Iran with India, Russia with Pakistan, and China with the Arabian Sea through Pakistan could knit together the rising powers of this region and make Afghanistan a hub rather than a barrier. For Pakistan and Afghanistan, this strategy would have a transforming effect on their economy. According to Fredrick Starr, “Indus valley civilization (Pakistan) would return to the status of a continental entrepot it


enjoyed from the Monhenjo-Daro age four millennium ago.” 144 This strategy has been discussed before but never fully executed in order to determine its ultimate viability because of security concerns. It is time to fully engage all parties in order to spur on this untapped resource.

Consequently, the stakes for the United States in the reconnection of Eurasia, where Afghanistan is virtually at the epicenter, could not be higher. 145 Other stakeholders, including the Central Asian Republics (CARs), China, Europe, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and Turkey, also have a very significant interest in the stabilization of Afghanistan. Many argue, logically, that these actors should take greater responsibility for the fate of Afghanistan because of regional proximity. However, in this sense Afghanistan is a classic collective action problem. Many of the states located close to Afghanistan view their interests in the country differently, and regard the actions of others as being suspicious. 146 To the degree that their economic activity is interconnected, this suspiciousness would be degraded through familiarity. And familiarity with each other could be achieved through increased trade and political interaction. Rail systems, road networks, and pipelines could be the arteries that pump the lifeblood of economic prosperity throughout the region and benefit each of the RCP to the degree that their security concerns could be minimized.

6. Regional Energy and Trade Agreements

Pakistan, India and Afghanistan are each suffering from energy scarcity. Pakistan and India’s combined population is likely to reach more than two billion by 2050. Demand for energy is expected to rise exponentially in the coming years. Both India and Pakistan have adopted policies for using gas in future electrical generation projects. This will increase the gas demand sharply and has generated interest in gas pipelines to facilitate imports from neighboring countries. India is one of the highest consumers of energy in the world. Similarly, the most powerful drivers of the expansion of

transcontinental Eurasian trade in the coming years will be the rapid growth of the Indian and Chinese economies.147 On the contrary, Central Asian states and Iran are energy-rich countries, and Afghanistan is the most central route to connect the energy-starved booming economies with the resource-rich Central Asian countries.148 Gas pipelines like the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan and India (TAPI) pipelines are a few of the cost effective and essential projects to improve life and the economy, along with confidence building of rival regional countries. Deepa M. Ollapally observes, “From the regional viewpoint the U.S. resistance to a potential IPI natural gas pipeline is a huge stumbling block to one of the biggest confidence building measures imaginable in the troubled neighborhood.”149 However, it may be a means to extracting support from Iran in other areas of concern.

No matter what type of economic activity is pursued, the risk of corruption remains high. At every possible turn, degrees of transparency at the local and international levels must be established. In the case of the Anyak copper mine, which China has committed to develop in Northeastern Afghanistan, the revenue from the mine will be deposited into an internationally monitored fund. From inception, this openness was intended to curtail opportunities for bribes and fleecing of proceeds from the mine. Institutional transparency must be consciously employed in order to minimize corruption with massive economic growth.

The flow of thousands of trucks from the Karachi port to Afghanistan, full of NATO supplies, through the most volatile Pashtun areas of the insurgency is manifestation of the power of economic activity even in the most risky part of the world. The flow of traffic through these areas has been economically beneficial for the local population; they in turn take ownership of security of these routes against the insurgents. According to Fredrick Starr, “As long as such economic incentive structures hold, local populations have shown themselves ready to prioritize commerce over political

147 Starr et al., The Key to Success in Afghanistan, 30.
148 Starr et al., The Key to Success in Afghanistan, 25.
violence.” Afghanistan's neighbors would be more likely to help contain the Taliban under a mutually beneficial trade agreement than under wartime conditions in which they want to avoid identification with an unpopular U.S. military presence.

The primary goal is to rekindle the cooperative relationship that once existed among the RCP, however short-lived and tenuous it may have been. The common goal of preventing radical rule in Kabul has a mutually beneficial interest for all the regional neighbors to include Pakistan. If “trade agreements could lead to coordinated aid efforts and could encourage the neighbors to increase their economic assistance, then these partners are more likely to provide large-scale aid if helping out supports their own interests in Kabul rather than merely reinforces a U.S.-dominated regime.”

Iran and India are already keenly interested in economic aid for Kabul and might carry a heavier load if other foreign aid is decreased. “Li Qinggong, deputy secretary-general of the China Council for National Security Policy Studies, alluded to increased Chinese aid in a September 29, 2009, statement, which also envisioned talks on 'how to dispose of the forces of al-Qaeda' if and when the United States disengages.” Chinese investment in the northeastern copper mine is widely referenced but Russia too has stepped forward with aid package offers “to refurbish 140 Soviet-era hydroelectric stations, bridges, wells, and irrigation systems.”

More economic cooperation and trade agreements would lead to security agreements rather than thinking the other way around. The agreement should include the RCP initially but should eventually expand to include other system players at the international level as well. “Signatories would pledge to respect the country’s military neutrality, not to provide arms to warring factions, and to co-operate in UN enforcement of an arms ban.” The importance of a silk route strategy as a framework for

150 Starr et al., *The Key to Success in Afghanistan*, 26.
152 Harrison, “How to Leave Afghanistan.”
153 Harrison, “How to Leave Afghanistan.”
154 Harrison, “How to Leave Afghanistan.”
interconnecting the RCP to one another to strengthen economic ties and thereby mutual security issues is a much stronger position that could affect the plight of the lowest members of society as well as increase the national wealth of Afghanistan.

G. MILITARY/SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1. Noninterference in Afghanistan

Before any regional solution can be initiated though, all the stakeholders must recognize the futility of the zero sum game that has been played out in Afghanistan over the past decade. One such instance is when The Hamid Karzai provisional government, organized during The Bonn Agreement of December 2001, made careful note in Annex III to ask the United Nations to ‘guarantee' noninterference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. This is a strong precedent and one that could be used as a basis for urging the Secretary-General of the United Nations today to continue fulfilling this obligation of regulation. This could also ultimately lead to a regional summit to extract the same support from RCP to simply abide by this original UN agreement of noninterference in Afghan affairs. If all the RCP started from the equal footing of noninterference, then moving forward simultaneously to the goal of mutual cooperation might be easier rather than dismissing some RCP based on their advantageous positions of influence.

There is also a sense of mixed anxiety about the ISAF’s intention to stay or go home. This question looms even larger now that Osama Bin Laden was killed in May 2011. Some of the seventy-four U.S. bases in Afghanistan, including airfields, have already been transitioned completely to Afghan leaders and soldiers, but the large


presence at Bagram and Kandahar is projected to grow in the years ahead—many see this as a mixed message and cannot determine what that means for the long term. Uncertainty in this case causes leaders to hedge their bets and act in their own best personal interests rather than the best Afghan interests. Even if the end goal is simply access rather than permanent bases, then clearly articulating that could allay fears of the U.S. becoming too entrenched in the culture. The perception is that Afghanistan and other nations want international allies close but not too close, and that is a good thing for handing over more reigns and responsibilities to the Afghans themselves and increasingly allowing the ISAF to be less prominent in both security and governance functions.

2. Resolving India–Pakistan Disagreements from West to East

Efforts at regional diplomacy in order to bolster efforts to end the war should first focus on Pakistan and India, “with the aim of ensuring that a political settlement does not give rise to increased competition or zero sum behavior at Afghanistan’s expense.” Pakistan’s serious concerns regarding encirclement by India through Afghan cooperation are enough (for Pakistan) to destabilize the region. Likewise, India’s concern is that Islamabad may destabilize it through asymmetric means. This zero sum competition can have no solution so long as the two engage in a “move-counter move-move” strategy. Alternatively, “a government in Kabul that is seen as not under the sway of either India or Pakistan provides the most stable outcome.”

Even more beneficial might be the normalization of Indian-Pakistan relations, but because that is not essential for stability, “a modest objective of an Afghanistan that is not viewed as under the sway of either India or Pakistan might be achievable if all parties can

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158 Harrison, “How to Leave Afghanistan.”
be persuaded to take a few important steps.”161 Linda Robinson, a senior adviser to the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence at U.S. Central Command, offers four measures to move in this direction beginning with greater Indian transparency about actions within Afghanistan. Next, the role of international players such as the United States should be maximized to counter Indian actions and put Pakistani concerns at ease. Third, Afghanistan can begin a formal demarcation process of the Durand Line and model its free flow of goods and people after the European structure that still has a strong identity of sovereignty and formal borders. Finally, impress upon Pakistan, through other nations, the need to move beyond its perceived threat from India, as a result of Pakistan’s own nuclear deterrent capability. This may be emphasized by conveyance of isolation, sanctions, or retribution if a terrorist attack emanates from Pakistani soil.162

Rather than getting into the same stereotypical rhetoric of coercive measures against Pakistan, the U.S. needs to address Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns. Other trust building measures might include, “opening U.S. markets to Pakistani textiles and other goods, promoting dialogue to resolve the Kashmir dispute with India, and offering a civil nuclear cooperation deal comparable to the one concluded with India, provided that Pakistan adequately addresses proliferation concerns.”163

Similarly, the U.S. along with regional powers has an opportunity today to settle the grave issue of Kashmir in a better way. It is also in the interest of India to find a solution to this issue that has generated three full-scale wars between the two neighbors and brought great misery and chaos to more than a billion persons living on both sides of the border. If the United States can generate a solution to the Kashmir problem, it would gain true legitimacy in the eyes of Pakistanis and the greater Muslim world; moreover, it would have the opportunity to pressure Pakistan in giving up its alleged support for all terrorist groups, including the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani network and Lashkar e Taiba among others. After Osama Bin Laden’s death and alleged support by some elements of Pakistani intelligence, this option seems to have a better chance of gaining mutual trust

161 Robinson, “How Afghanistan Ends.”
162 Robinson, “How Afghanistan Ends.”
163 Robinson, “How Afghanistan Ends.”
and addressing grievances of a key ally. It is not surprising that regardless of the amount of aid and assistance Pakistan receives, its motivation is still determined by what it perceives most important, which is the Kashmir and India situation. All other concerns from the American perspective are secondary as long as it does not significantly undermine this primary objective. According to former United States PakAf representative Holbrooke, “A stable Afghanistan is not essential; a stable Pakistan is essential. He believed that a crucial step to reducing radicalism in Pakistan was to ease the Kashmir dispute with India, and he favored more pressure on India to achieve that.”164

3. Time to Talk to the Taliban

The roots of insurgency were set when the Taliban chose not to participate in the original Bonn negotiations of 2001. Since that time, a degree of silent reintegration has proceeded with handfuls of Taliban commanders and fighters rejoining the government largely based on personal relations and assurances from trusted government officials. Larger movements toward talks have started and ended in fits with little effect. There are prospects for hope though, starting with the efforts of President Karzai’s peace commission. The commission has traveled widely among regional partners in an effort to extend an olive branch to the Taliban and encourage outside parties in neighboring countries to exert influence where possible. Another recent development that may open a window to pursue discussions may be the recent death of Osama Bin Laden. The Taliban’s decision to harbor the infamous leader of Al Qaeda was a primary point of conflict and with that obstacle removed, perhaps the Taliban can be assuaged to the bargaining table no longer bound by Pashtunwali obligations. The time for reconciliation could never be more opportune from a U.S. perspective, which is looking to begin transition to Afghan forces in terms of security and governance. If the recently established Taliban office in Ankara can facilitate any reconciliation or reintegration with

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the moderate Taliban, that could make transition much easier and faster. The United States, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are already part of this peace process, but the fruits of their efforts are, as of yet, still undetermined.

One potential starting point from where to begin discussions is offered by Fareed Zakaria. He argues that the goal of separating “as often as possible, the global jihadist from the accidental guerrilla,” warrants a conversation with all insurgents willing to forsake diehard opposition. Both sides surely understand the simple fact that not all Afghans who are fighting against ISAF forces are Taliban and not all Taliban for that matter are linked to Al Qaeda. The more opportunities that can be created to broaden discussion between factions, the greater the possibility to find points of concurrence. Ultimately, as with all things, the solution must come from the Afghans themselves. T.E. Lawrence famously recognized this point in Arabia, directing that the emphasis should be on helping the Arabs and not winning the war for them. More recently retired Army Officer, Raymond Millen similarly noted in this same context, “that it is better for the Afghans to shoulder their responsibilities even if done imperfectly.”

4. Countering Narco-Terrorism

Most experts rightly believe that the armed extremists in Afghanistan cannot be defeated without an effective opposition to drug production, which has increased forty times over since the beginning of the counterterrorist operations of 2001. The drugs are the lifeblood which funds the insurgency but it is also a major source of economic livelihood for average Afghans as well. The Taliban have exploited the economic hardship of the region to widely expand production and, in turn, the ability to fund operations. Unfortunately this has also created a massive illicit economy that Afghanistan is unable to legitimately counter. Thus, a portion of the population’s self-


interest is greatly served by complicit support with no immediate means to reverse this cycle. The catch-22 condition of the opium trade makes the problem all the more acute, but as long as this source of funding remains unhindered the insurgency will have incredible staying power.

5. USA and China as Guarantors

The U.S. has an enormous amount of influence and ability in this region to shape the agenda. Still, this is sometimes insufficient and does not always achieve the desired end state. The same may be said for China as well. Notwithstanding the incredible potential for positive regional influence, countries such as Iran, Pakistan, and India act independently. This assumes that just because the U.S. or China want something, other weaker or smaller nations will always concede. This is, of course, not the case and the level of backchannel operations in the region exemplifies the level of independence these countries maintain, especially in consideration of their perceived self-interests. What the U.S. and China can do effectively, though, is act as a guarantor. According to Thomas, “U.S. military dominance, backed by its ability to control economic rewards for those who oppose or support American policies, has relegated the character of the United Nations.”

Both Washington and Beijing have the ability to influence regional players and ensure conformity of treaties and pacts between the regional rivals. Beijing, being an immediate neighbour, has equally high stakes and in some instances better ability to act as an impartial negotiator at the regional level. Both these countries can influence Pakistan, India and Iran by ensuring a regional alliance and helping to enforce agreements.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS

One recommendation is to accelerate the drawdown of U.S. security forces in conjunction with the transition of security missions to ASF. This process has already

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begun in some regions in order to meet the goal of complete transition by 2014. Any opportunity to responsibly accelerate this transition before the final deadline should be exploited in order to break Afghan dependence on external support. Politically, there is time to adjust if the transition hits stumbling blocks. The same may not be true if transition remains slow. In fact, the Osama development may even increase pressure within the U.S. to accelerate the transition of security responsibilities from the ISAF to Afghan forces. An accelerated drawdown would also allay Russian, Chinese, Iranian, Pakistani, and Afghan population fears that Washington and its allies do not seek long-term geopolitical and economic advantages by leaving behind a massive military footprint in Afghanistan. A smaller specialized force would likely be more acceptable to regional interests, and in light of recent events, few could argue the effectiveness of these missions to pursue U.S. national interests. Ultimately the speed of the withdrawal must be carefully balanced with the quality of the transition. It is not simply a matter of reducing the number of U.S. or foreign troops, but visibly changing the nature of their mission and their popular perception. This will, in effect, achieve an overall drawdown in the number of forces, but not spur greater instability.

Another recommendation is that the U.S. should attempt to form a regional organization of states to foster cooperation and consideration of individual states’ concerns and interests. Initially, the organization should include only the regional core players of Pakistan, Iran, and India. This may expand with time to include other regional players such as China, Russia, the CARs, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, but initially, maintaining a small core contingent will make consensus easier and focus the group on the most immediate and pressing issues. This will also focus the group and force priorities from the outset, which will increase the probability for success, upon which the group can build. As one has seen, Russia–U.S., India-Pakistan, Iran-Pakistan, Iran–U.S., and to a lesser extent, India-China competition have all contributed to the perpetuation of war on Afghan soil. Thus, there is a dire need to first bring all of the external parties to the Afghan War around a common table to reach a minimum understanding of their common interests to facilitate the internal Afghan peace process.
Regional organizations like the ECO and SCO should take a proactive role in resolving regional issues and misunderstandings. The United States should encourage such agreements rather than being skeptical of ‘asymmetric balancing’ by China or Russia. These forums can ensure effective agreements against drug trafficking, cross-border terrorism and demographic issues, as well as encourage long-term economic investment in the region and specifically in Afghanistan.

Drug production and trafficking should be discouraged in order to minimize terrorist financing and arming. Focused anti-drug operations will take funding from the insurgents and disassociate them from the populace who are exploited for their labor. Creation of a licit economy is essential for improving the political and economic health of the nation and ultimately providing a long-term, sustainable system.

It would be a great achievement if India, Pakistan, and Iran could compete in a positive sum game to rebuild Afghanistan’s state and public infrastructure. The United States can lead this process and help these states avoid a zero sum game through confidence-building measures and trade agreements. Rather than playing politics or planning military adventurism, these countries should invest in human resource development and poverty alleviation measures through a strong economic plan for the region. This is less a matter of nation building and more one of strengthening conditions to support long-term national interests.

I would be beneficial to develop intercontinental transport and trade that includes roads, railways, pipes, and hydro-electric and hydro-carbon power. Afghanistan is at the nexus of the Central and South Asia trading corridor. The ISAF is uniquely positioned to execute this strategy. “Afghanistan and its neighbors stand to benefit immensely from this trade through the collection of tariffs and the growing role of their own transit-related industries.”

America should take care to reduce the opportunity for free riders and increase the benefit for invested stakeholders. Those nations who have sacrificed the most should feel that their efforts are effective; otherwise they will be continuously pushed toward zero

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169 Kuchins, A Truly Regional Economic Strategy for Afghanistan, 86.
sum strategies trying to maximize self-interests. This holds true for external regional players just as much as for internal factions such as the Taliban. Greater numbers of Pashtun representation at the national level, in the civilian and military sectors, is essential to reconcile some of the primary grievances that fuel the Pashtun’s feelings of exclusion and isolation.

I. CONCLUSION

The list of problems facing Afghanistan is long, and for every one problem, there are a myriad of suggestions to begin to move things in a more positive direction. It seems though that with every solution devised there is some other conflicting condition that causes a never-ending string of catch-22 situations. Rather than stringing together a list of solutions tied to a list of problems, the key is to start small. Build a base of success and growth, and then expand from there. This starts first with the number of participants in the end state solution. There are many concerned nations in the region but the focus should begin with only the most essential—the regional core players. Among these players there should first be a focus on only the most central problems and their solutions. These broad categorical issues generally fall in the realm of political, security, and economic concerns, and specifically include the issues of foreign intervention, Taliban reconciliation, and Afghan capacity building. These are the basis of a first step solution, and from there the long list of woes can be addressed.

Among the many assets that the United States has in facilitating this first step solution is perhaps the image it can project as a security broker, able to subdue the infighting and distrust between the regional core players and Afghanistan. “In order to do so, the United States has to develop a regional policy that both reflects a long-term commitment and meets the interests and challenges facing Afghanistan and its neighbors.”170 This is where the issue of building Afghan capacity comes in. Without doing it for them, the U.S. must find a way to help them help themselves. “Fortunately, the Afghan government is working to provide the answer with the proposal of a transit and trade facilitation strategy that will serve the interests of Afghanistan’s sustainable

economic development as well as that of its neighbors." This is an economic strategy that builds capacity in the Afghan infrastructure, which can translate to successes in many other areas.

The political realm of problems and solutions is one that, from a regional perspective, can be very difficult. There is such a complicated web of ancillary issues that involve the regional core players that it is often easy to become swallowed up by the problems that exist. This is especially true in the case of India and Pakistan, but could be said for any other combination of regional core players. In this situation, the case of internal intervention and large military presence poses a degree of concern for each of the neighboring countries. As the move toward transition accelerates and this presence diminishes then politically the U.S. position strengthens. This may seem counterintuitive, but in fact it shows a degree of understanding that will be more influential than the physical presence of thousands of troops could ever achieve. For this reason, the accelerated transition from foreign troops to the Afghans must be prioritized as much as responsibly possible.

Finally, the security dimension is one that has proven extremely problematic over the past decade, and one that could scuttle all the other efforts if not resolved. Reconciliation with the Taliban must be of the utmost importance, recognizing that political solutions are often necessary for successfully ending an insurgency. The sooner productive and meaningful reconciliation can be made with the Taliban, the sooner security concerns will subside, economic investments will expand and political changes can take hold to pacify and rebuild the region.

There is a great deal of pressure that has been building with the impending arrival of the ten-year anniversary of the U.S. war on terror and the beginning of the current conflict in Afghanistan. This pressure has altered the strategy of the U.S. in Afghanistan by hastening a surge in troop levels, and a comprehensive redirection of COIN operations throughout Afghanistan. It is appropriate to examine the internal conditions of the

172 Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 154.
conflict that necessitated these redirections in the first place. But on their own, these internal measures will not bring peace to Afghanistan. The regional rebalancing of power through cooperation of the countries at the physical and systematic core of the problem is the key to both Afghan and regional stability. Once these conditions are externally balanced from the outside, Afghanistan will be able to internally strengthen and break free from the cycle of conflict in which it has been entangled for more than thirty years.
VII. EPILOGUE: SHOCKS

States can cooperate, although cooperation is something difficult to achieve and always difficult to sustain.\textsuperscript{173} John J. Mearsheimer

A. INTRODUCTION

The recommendations and solutions provided for stability and peace in Afghanistan are as complex as the history of Afghanistan. The study of international relations reveals that there is rarely a “one size fits all” defined solution, and future conditions are often unpredictable and uncertain. Like the terrible storms and calamities of nature, man-made calamities can change the course of history, and one never knows how these actions may change or develop until the moment arrives.

The complex and crosscutting nature of competitions between the regional players around Afghanistan is testimony to the fact that, while stability in Afghanistan is achievable, it is also very fragile. Any compromise and cooperation between the regional core players (RCP) is extremely vulnerable to developments that may shock the delicate balance of power. According to Grieco, “Two factors inhibit cooperation: considerations about relative gains and concerns about cheating.”\textsuperscript{174} The air of skepticism and distrust may be overcome to a degree, but it also remains possible that the slightest shock could knock the RCP off their tenuous ledge of stability. The United States and other nations have great capacity to facilitate the peace process and may also act as an effective shock absorber, but just as these shocks are unpredictable their results are equally undefined.

B. FRAGILE STABILITY

There are numerous “what if” scenarios that could be potentially destabilizing to a fragile peace in Afghanistan and the region. Some might be imaginable and others completely unexpected. In recent months, two such examples are the raid to kill Osama


Bin Laden and the Arab Spring across the Middle East. As the most wanted terrorist in the world, it was not beyond the range of possibilities that Osama Bin Laden would eventually be found or killed by U.S. forces. The Middle East protests and the resulting regime changes, on the other hand, came rather unexpectedly and few would have envisioned the powerful changes that mostly peaceful protests could elicit. The difference between the unimagined and the possible is that by simply considering the possible, one can develop courses of action for a future scenario. While the authors do not offer solutions for these shocks here, it is nonetheless helpful to consider the effects of such to provide perspective for planners as they consider the future plans and policies in terms of the efforts and actions currently being employed in Afghanistan and the greater region. Some of those shocks might include:

- Military attacks against Iranian nuclear installations
- A larger Mumbai-type attack in India
- Karzai coup or assassination
- Use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in a Western nation
- Complete loss of rapport with Pakistan

1. Attack Against Iranian Nuclear Installations

With American forces heavily committed in Afghanistan and having a diminishing presence in Iraq, along with the growing concern in Libya, the chance of attack against an Iranian nuclear installation by the U.S. seems quite remote. However, a state such as Israel could decide to act unilaterally, in which case the region may see a dramatic change in the current situation. Iran’s direct response to Israel would surely be an element of concern, but indirectly, Iran’s reaction might also be to increase support of the insurgency in Afghanistan. This approach would give Iran recourse against the U.S., which they ultimately view as a pro-Israeli enabler regardless of the situation in this particular attack. An increase in the insurgency may also jeopardize the ability of Karzai to govern in Afghanistan and stress Iranian–Afghan relations, as Afghanistan is ultimately a beneficiary of U.S. assistance. The Iranian support of insurgency in Iraq was a problematic aspect of the fight there, and may also cause conditions in Afghanistan to
further boil over, if the Iranians were given reason to become more involved. Such involvement could also be manifest in other efforts to derail the peace process or poison the talks with the Taliban. Such an event would likely increase tensions wildly throughout the region and not just in Afghanistan.

2. Terrorist Attack in India

There have been repeated entreaties to Pakistan by both American and British leaders to prevent a Mumbai-style attack against India. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral, Mike Mullen, told reporters travelling with him on his way to India: "One of the things that struck me then, and is still a great concern, is how 10 terrorists could drive two nuclear-armed nations closer to conflict."175 In a visit to India, U.S. Defense Secretary Gates expressed concern about the effects of groups in Al-Qaeda's syndicate, such as the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the Pakistan-based Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. He said that such groups posed a danger as a whole, as they are trying “to destabilize not just Afghanistan, not just Pakistan, but potentially the whole region by provoking a conflict perhaps between India and Pakistan through some provocative act.”176 Such an event could provoke India to launch surgical strikes inside Pakistan against alleged terrorist camps in the Punjab and Pakhtunkwai provinces, increasing tensions between the nuclear rivals. Pakistan could also withdraw key forces supporting ISAF cross-border operations from their western front to counter anticipated Indian buildups in the east. This could also interrupt NATO supplies via Karachi and reinvigorate Pakistani interest in elements that could counter Indian actions in Afghanistan, from which the Pakistanis may feel threatened as conflict resumes with India.


3. Karzai Coup or Assassination

Since his selection to head the transitional government following the Bonn Agreements, the U.S. has had a mixed relationship with President Karzai. Despite the political difficulties though, President Karzai has prevailed in two national elections and is the face of Afghanistan’s democracy—good, bad, or indifferent. His assassination would obviously be tragic, but in terms of political upheaval a coup could possibly be even worse. Such an event would call into question the validity of all the efforts of the international community to create a stable democracy in such an unstable region. Talking about Karzai, Derek Harvey, the Director for the Center of Excellence for CENTCOM stated, “He’s a very strong president in a weak system, and we’ve assumed for too long that he’s a weak leader in a weak system.”\(^{177}\) The U.S. has ultimately decided that the integrity of the system bears more importance than the person in the job. Thus, a coup would be an affront to that democratic system and be more detrimental in the long run than the short-term effects of an assassination. On the other hand, many feel that a different leader guiding the fragile Afghan system would be preferred to the allegedly corrupt cadre atop the government now.

4. Use of a WMD in a Western Nation

The detonation of a nuclear device by a terrorist group in any of the major Western cities would be a massive shock. According to President Obama, it would be “a potential game changer.”\(^ {178}\) Some suspect that Al Qaeda already has the capability but has been reticent to use it. Perhaps the killing of Bin Laden will change that or elicit another spectacular attack as Al Qaeda has threatened. In any case, the concern with a WMD would be the origin of the device. If that were to lead to Pakistan, for example, the dynamics of the region would be understandably altered. In a 2008 meeting between the National Security Advisor, Gen. Jones, and Pakistani President Zardari, Jones spoke soberly about such an event. “No one will be able to stop the response and consequences,” although he stopped short of stating that the response might consist of

\(^{177}\) Woodward, Obama’s Wars, 347.

\(^{178}\) Woodward, Obama’s Wars, 363.
escalated attacks against “up to 150 known terrorist safe havens inside Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{179} Potential attacks inside of Pakistan may take the sovereignty questions going on now to a new level, but unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan has the means to counter an attack on its sovereignty and may react with both aerial and ground defenses. If that were to happen, would China and India feel compelled to intervene?

The introduction of a nuclear weapon to the situation, by a non-state actor, could be so destabilizing that it is difficult to imagine how that would reverberate throughout the region, and harkens back to the uncertain and trying times of the Cold War and near nuclear confrontations that nearly occurred. If establishing stability in Afghanistan has been difficult with Pakistan as a partner, then how much more difficult would it be if the Pakistan-U.S. relationship were to irreparably fracture? Truly, a Pakistan-sourced WMD attack would shock the stability of the region.

5. Complete Loss of Rapport With Pakistan

There are echoing concerns from Congress and the White House about Pakistan’s active role in providing a safe haven to Al Qaeda.\textsuperscript{180} After the successful attack against Bin Laden, the U.S. may be even more emboldened to conduct similar cross-border operations to further target Al Qaeda leadership. Both the United States and Pakistan have shown measured control in handling the situation, especially considering other recent upheavals in their relationship. Two other recent bombshells included the WikiLeaks revelations that trumpeted U.S. suspicions about Pakistan’s complicit support of insurgents in Afghanistan, and the Raymond Davis incident in which a CIA contractor shot and killed two alleged thieves at a busy traffic stop in Lahore but were later believed to be Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) operatives. As previously mentioned, the leadership in Pakistan is caught in a difficult bind, as both the United States and the Pakistani public are asking questions regarding the presence of Osama, and also about the details of an

\textsuperscript{179} Woodward, Obama’s Wars, 364-365.

unauthorized raid inside a sovereign country without any reaction from the Pakistani Military (PAKMIL). It would seem that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is truly being pushed to its limits and one must question what would happen if it finally reaches a breaking point. If the events of the last year have not been enough to completely fracture relations, it may be a sign that the bond is unbreakable, able to endure any stress. If there were a catastrophic loss of rapport between the U.S. and Pakistan for any number of reasons, it would seem that this shock could be one of the most damaging to the region at large, because it would serve to divide primary partners when cooperation is so imperative to the process of stability.

C. CONCLUSION

Pakistan has an incredible ability to influence the conditions in Afghanistan and the region at large. As expressed by an adept Pakistani lawyer, “It is time to publicly articulate our legitimate security interests linked to the future of Afghanistan and develop a regional consensus around it.”181 There is little tolerance to withstand shocks of any kind throughout the region, and so the sooner relations can be shored up and improvements made in every facet, the better it will be for everyone involved. In the past, cooperation among the regional partners has seemed to be an intolerable option, but after continued competition over the past decade and worsening conditions for all the regional partners, more of the same seems equally intolerable. The time has come for an end to the regional intransience, and while this may not the best possible solution for any one player, it is better to choose a direction than to have an unpredictable one forced upon you.

APPENDIX A. GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF KARZAI’S DILEMMA

A. INTRODUCTION

After nine years of intervention in Afghanistan, the situation is still largely unstable and there are many questions about both the root causes of the problem and the best solution to move forward. The inability of both the intervening foreign forces and the national government to provide security and justice to the Afghan people has severely undermined each other’s legitimacy. This has in turn created rifts between the national government and intervention forces, and between the national government and its own people. Regional neighbors view this instability with concern and in the vain of self-preservation and national interests, each act individually to achieve its own best options.

The Taliban (TB) recognizes these rifts and further exploits them by framing their actions as a rejection of foreign occupation. As freedom fighters, in some regions the TB engender greater public support because they appear more credible and more legitimate than government forces. In this sense, public support is more important and valuable than external support in maintaining the insurgency over the last decade.

To understand Karzai’s situation, one needs to consider the effect of the continued presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, and how that influences his dealings with his own government, neighboring countries, the international community, and competing forces such as the Taliban.

B. GAME SETUP

The game describes the strategies pursued by both Karzai and the Taliban, where both are seeking similar ends of power and control as well as a liberated Afghanistan. The game explains the different approaches for the two players to achieve their goals and tries to examine how these approaches have exacerbated Karzai’s fears and strengthened the Taliban’s strategies. The game also demonstrates the environmental effects on the players and how this may have shaped the players’ actions.
Regarding control, Karzai is trying to maintain his influence and governmental control but must rely on foreign forces to enforce and sustain his administration. The Taliban on the other hand is attempting to regain control, having lost it following their demise at American hands. For each of the players there are advantages and disadvantages. While Karzai has greater control, the support of foreign forces decreases his popular legitimacy. The Taliban have less control but their resistance to foreign forces often strengthens their popular support.

The situation described above will be common to any element that assumes national authority in Afghanistan, where the lack of national identity dictates conflicting loyalties. The social construct is largely responsible for stirring rivalry, and tribal politics plays a crucial role in shaping domestic politics. The struggle for the ruling party is to integrate the alienated groups and different fractions to garner sufficient national unity without losing basic tribal support and legitimacy.

C. THE GAME’S ASSUMPTIONS AND RULES

1. Assumptions
   a. Both players are rational players.
   b. The game is conducted with imperfect information, i.e., neither player knows the other player’s action/strategy in advance.
   c. Both players seek to maximize their own status by increasing their respective payoffs.

2. Rules
   a. The two main strategies for Karzai are to pursue control or not to pursue control. The other is to accept external support from the U.S. or reject such support.
   b. The Taliban also seeks control or not to pursue control. Secondly they too must decide to work with, or reject external U.S. support.
   c. The game uses ordinal scaling.
   d. Scoring:
The best option is ranked by four (4) points on the scale.

ii. The second best option is ranked by three (3) points on the scale.

iii. The second worst option is ranked by two (2) points on the scale.

iv. The worst option is ranked by one (1) point on the scale.

D. BASIC GAME

The basic game strategies are presented in Figure 38; they manifest the players’
available options and strategies. The assigned values are presented thereafter.

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<th>Karzai</th>
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<td>Occupation A</td>
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<td>No-Occupation B</td>
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Figure 38. Game Strategies with Descriptions

1. Karzai’s Options

4  **Best Option:** To have all the authority, control, and power of the state without any rivals such as the Taliban and without foreign occupation. He would be
perceived as a patriotic liberator who, from the depths of a refugee camp in Pakistan, managed to ascend to the presidency responsible for ending foreign presence and the radical Taliban regime.

3 **Next Best Option**: To have all the authority and power of the state, yet operate under the influence of foreign forces. The foreign actors provide the means for him to maintain this status and security, which degrades popular support but he still maintains his position and stature. This is essentially the present situation, which is excellent for Karzai, but because it is not optimal for other players as the game expands, it will ultimately not be sustainable in the long-term.

2 **Next Worst Option**: To lose authority and power of the national government. There is no foreign presence to guarantee security but he is not viewed as illegitimate for supporting a foreign presence.

1 **Worst Option**: Karzai loses control and authority within the Afghan national government. There is an active foreign presence to guarantee security but this presence also jeopardizes his legitimacy with the populace.

2. **Taliban’s Options**

4 **Best Option**: To see Karzai lose control of the government and have no threat of foreign presence to inhibit their contest for control. They maintain popular support by opposing foreign presence and ousting Karzai, the illegitimate leader.

3 **Next Best Option**: Taliban takes control from Karzai, yet a foreign presence remains and their movement is unthreatened.

2 **Next Worst Option**: Karzai maintains control with no foreign occupation. Karzai would have greater legitimacy and thus would make it harder for the Taliban to take control.

1 **Worst Option**: Karzai has strong control but there is also a foreign presence. This makes it difficult to wrestle control away from Karzai and there is a foreign occupation that must be resisted as well. This causes an extremely heightened sense of insecurity for the Taliban.
3. Game Solution

a. Nash Equilibrium

The strategic moves of the two players without communications, presented in the movement diagram below, demonstrate the likely outcome from the players’ rational choices to maximize their payoffs.

The movement diagram suggests that Karzai’s dominant strategy is to pursue his control always, while the Taliban’s dominant strategy is to resist occupation and proceed with their insurgency always. The Nash equilibrium is (2, 4) where Karzai pursues control and the Taliban resists occupation. Figure 40 shows the game payoff polygon and Nash equilibrium point.
b. **Strategic Moves**

Karzai’s dilemma game without communications reveals that both players will pursue their dominant strategies, which will eventually lead to the equilibrium point. Next, the authors will examine what will happen if the lines of communications are opened and the players have the ability to communicate. A strategic move analysis is demonstrated below to determine if any of the players has a threat or a promise or a combination of both, which, if communicated, would alter their payoffs or reduce the other player’s payoffs.

4. Karzai

   a. **First Move: Karzai**

   i. If Karzai pursues his control strategy, then the Taliban will choose no-occupation with payoffs \((2, 4)\).

   ii. If Karzai does not choose control, then the Taliban will pursue no-occupation with payoffs \((4, 2)\).
iii. Karzai in this case can secure a better payoff by pursuing his control strategy and gets his best option of the likely outcome (2, 4).

**b. Threat: Karzai**

i. Karzai does not want the TB to pursue their likely strategy of “no-occupation;” therefore, Karzai places his threat on the TB’s no-occupation strategy.

ii. Normally: If the TB plays no-occupation, Karzai plays control with payoffs (2, 4)

iii. Threat: If the TB plays no-occupation, Karzai will not pursue his control strategy, which will credit the TB a higher payoff of 4, while Karzai will get 2, and the final payoffs will be (4, 2)

iv. The threat hurts Karzai, but it does not hurt the TB, which means it is not a threat. Therefore, Karzai does not have a threat.

**c. Promise: Karzai**

i. Karzai wants the TB to play their unlikely occupation strategy; therefore, Karzai’s promise will be on the TB’s occupation strategy.

ii. Normally: If the TB plays occupation then Karzai plays control with payoffs of (1, 3).

iii. Promise: If the TB plays occupation then Karzai will play no-control with payoffs (3, 1).

iv. The promise hurts Karzai and benefits the TB; therefore, Karzai has a promise that works alone but leaves him with his worst option.

The threat and promise combination is not available for Karzai.
5. The Taliban (TB)

a. First Move: The TB

i. If the TB pursues U.S. strategy Karzai will choose control with payoffs (1, 3).

ii. If the TB chooses no-occupation then Karzai will pursue control with payoffs (2, 4).

iii. The TB in this case can secure a better payoff by pursuing their no-occupation strategy and get their third best option “the likely outcome” (2, 4).

b. Threat: The TB

i. The TB does not want Karzai to pursue his likely control strategy; therefore, the TB places their threat on Karzai’s control strategy.

ii. If Karzai plays control the TB plays no-occupation with payoffs (2, 4)

iii. Threat: If Karzai plays control the TB will pursue their occupation strategy, which will reduce Karzai’s payoff (1, 3).

iv. The threat hurts the TB and hurts Karzai, which means it is a threat. Therefore, the TB has a threat but does not work alone since Karzai can secure 4 by playing his control strategy.

c. Promise: The TB

i. The TB want Karzai’s “no-control” strategy; therefore, the promise will be on Karzai’s no-control strategy.

ii. Normally: If Karzai plays no-control then the TB plays no-occupation with payoffs of (4, 2).

iii. Promise: If Karzai plays no-control then the TB will play occupation with payoffs (3, 1).

iv. The promise hurts the TB but does not benefit Karzai; therefore the TB does not have a promise.
The threat and promise combination is not available for the TB either.

Neither the threat nor the promise option work for either player, which implies that, even with communication, both players cannot secure better payoffs. “In this situation, it is strongly recommended to look at the players’ security levels and their prudential strategies.” The security level technique is a method to determine the minimal payoff that a player can secure by playing his prudential strategy. It gives a fare indication of the player’s game value. “By playing the prudential strategy, a player can assure that the least he gets is his security level, if his opponents choose to hold his payoffs down.”

6. Security Level Solution

When both Karzai’s and the TB’s games are extracted, one can find the security levels from the prudential strategy.

a. Karzai: Prudential Strategy—Solution

a. Karzai's game: Karzai is maximizing “mini-max” while the TB is minimizing “maxi-min,” the opponent's payoff.

b. It is a game with Karzai's payoffs, and has a pure strategy solution.

c. Table 16 shows Karzai’s game:

d. Karzai has a pure prudential strategy to play control whenever the TB plays occupation. See Figures 41 and 42.

e. The security level is Y=3; the value of the game is 3.

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182 Philip Straffin defines the prudential strategy in a non-zero sum game by the player’s optimal strategy in his game; moreover, he defines the player’s security level by the value of the player’s game. For more read, Philip Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy.

183 Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, 69.
b. The TB: Prudential Strategy—Solution

a. The TB's game: the TB is maximizing ‘mini-max’ while Karzai is minimizing “maxi-min,” the opponent's payoff.

b. It has become a zero sum game with the TB’s payoffs.

c. Table 17 shows the TB’s game:

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<td>Dominant</td>
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Table 16. Karzai’s Game

Figure 41. TB Minimizing Strategy

Figure 42. Karzai Maximizing Strategy
d. The TB has a pure prudential strategy to play no-occupation whenever Karzai plays control. See Figures 43 and 44.

e. The security level is $X=2$; the value of the game is 2. Figure 45 shows the security levels; the red line represents Karzai security level and the blue represents the Taliban.

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Table 17. The TB’s Game

Figure 43. TB Maximizing Strategy

Figure 44. Karzai Minimizing Strategy
7. The Equilizing Strategy

The following solution explores what will happen, if the players try to equilize each other in order to get equal payoffs, which will put the game in a stable equilibrium status.

a. Karzai: Equalizing Strategy—Solution

a. The TB game: Karzai is equalizing while the TB is maximizing.
b. It is a zero sum game with the TB payoffs.
c. Table 18 shows the game:
d. TB has a pure dominant strategy to play no-occupation.
b. **TB: Equalizing Strategy—Solution**

   a. Karzai's game: Karzai is maximizing while the TB is equalizing.
   
   b. It has become a zero sum Game with Karzai’s payoffs.
   
   c. Karzai has a pure dominant strategy to play control whenever the TB plays no-occupation.
Table 19. TB’s Game

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taliban (TB)</th>
<th>Karzai</th>
<th>No-Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No-Occupation</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 47. TB Equalizing Strategy.

The above calculations of the security level show the prudential strategy and the equalizing strategy. The players’ status quo is (2, 3) and the Nash equilibrium point is (2, 4). The status quo suggests that Karzai can secure a minimum payoff of 3, his second best, if the Taliban try to hold his payoffs down, while Taliban cannot secure more than their second worst with a value of 2 if Karzai tries the same. This shows that the Taliban are in a weaker position than Karzai, which mainly comes as a result of the support and protection Karzai receives from occupation forces. The results also explain that Karzai cannot get to his best option without giving some of his control to the Taliban and turn against the occupation, while the Taliban, if successful, can get their second best by
undermining Karzai and his government. This situation manifests Karzai’s dilemma, where he cannot improve his situation without losing his powers and turning against his allies.

8. Nash Arbitration

Neither Karzai nor the Taliban can improve by departing unilaterally from the conservative strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the game solution suggests that the Nash equilibrium point, which is not Pareto optimal, is on the negotiation set. The line that connects points (2, 4) and (4, 2) is at, or above, security levels. The Pareto optimal concept means that the players still can improve their payoffs by another outcome. The previous solution also declares that while the Taliban seems to be in a weaker position, Karzai has more incentive to change his payoffs due to time limitations and his own moral dilemma.

The negotiation set in this case represents a suitable bargaining point for both players to improve their payoffs. The Taliban, as a weaker player, can negotiate on control but it is unrealistic to expect that they would reduce their payoffs below their security level and accept occupation; however, Karzai has a good negotiation point that may enable him to bargain and improve his payoffs. To do that, Karzai may offer a side payment, or essentially a bribe, to incentivize the Taliban to be more cooperative. The problem with this reasoning is that it advises Karzai to go against occupation to enhance his payoff, which is an unrealistic option that resembles the core of the problem. However, recently a notable change in Karzai’s attitude and an understandably pragmatic shift toward the Taliban has developed in which Karzai is more critical of foreign forces and more sympathetic toward the Taliban.184

The new arbitrary outcome and payoffs “Nash point” for the players can be calculated by the following equations, which are demonstrated in Figure 48, and depicts the Nash point algebraic method and calculations. Also Figure 49 shows algebraic calculations of mixed strategies.

Nash Point \((X + b/2, M, Y + b/2)\)

where,

- \(X\) and \(Y\) are the security levels,
- \(M\) is the slope of the Pareto optimal line,
- \(b\) is the height of the triangle.

**Solution 2 Step 1**

**Figure 48. Nash Point Algebraic Method and Calculations**

**Solution 2 Step 2**

**Figure 49. Nash Arbitration Calculations and Algebraic Demonstration.**
The Nash point is (2.5, 3.5), which shows an improvement in the players’ payoffs. To reach the new point, Karzai should play 25% of the time no-control and 75% control, while the Taliban should continue playing 100% of the time no-Occupation. The previous piece of information supports the assessment that Karzai will try to integrate Pashto (Taliban sympathizers) in his government without losing his control to enhance his payoffs; in contrast, this will not happen unless he moves against the occupation on the negotiation line. The Taliban should insist on their no-occupation strategy which will ultimately improve their payoffs.

E. CONCLUSION

The game supports the general assessment demonstrated as Karzai’s dilemma. While Karzai can improve his payoffs in the game by resisting the occupation and gaining increased national legitimacy, the reality suggests that by doing so, Karzai undermines his control. He understands that he cannot depend on his security forces to provide the minimum level of security needed to maintain the state’s monopoly of violence, defend its border, or confront the Taliban, so he is dependent on foreign support. Karzai knows that while he can depend on the occupation forces to protect his status, he actually cannot rely on them to enhance his declining legitimacy, and for this reason he defaults back to familial and tribal relations. For all his Western associations, education, and familiarity, he still recognizes he is Pashtun first, Afghani second, and a player on the international stage third. For Karzai the price is high; if he leaves office before the occupation, it means he may spend the rest of his life in Dubai. In contrast, the Taliban do not have the same time value, as they have already prepared themselves for a long protracted war. The Taliban are basically trying to outlast their foreign foes and increase the costs that the foreign forces must assume. The Taliban are now at their security level and realize one of their greatest strengths, which is no one can lead the country without the Pashtun majority. Nearly ten years of conflict confirms this reality and if things are going to change from this course it will require bold adjustments. Not only must things change from within Afghanistan such as reducing corruption, but the external and regional conditions must also change.
APPENDIX B. LINEAR PROGRAMMING FOR PHASE II

The Influence in Afghanistan Game’s Mathematical Calculations
Phase II
The Coalitions Payoffs Division

Let us assume that the decision variables are $X_1$, $X_2$, and $X_3$, which are defined as follows:

$X_1 =$ India, and the unilateral game value for $X_1$ is $V(X_1) = 8$

$X_2 =$ Iran, and the unilateral game value for $X_2$ is $V(X_2) = 7$

$X_3 =$ Pakistan, and the unilateral game value for $X_3$ is $V(X_3) = 9$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The coalition structures</th>
<th>$V(X_1)$</th>
<th>$V(X_2)$</th>
<th>$V(X_3)$</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1 + X_2$</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>while $X_3$ alone</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2 + X_3$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>$X_1$, $X_2$, $X_3$</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<thead>
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<th>Remarks</th>
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<td>The three cooperate and reduce the influence costs. The Ideal coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The minimum $v(X_3)$ is its security level 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The minimum $v(X_1)$ is its security level 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The minimum $v(X_2)$ is its security level 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every one exerts influence unilaterally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20. Possible Coalition Structures and their Respective Payoffs

Let us assume that we have the function $Z$, which describes the possible coalition’s payoffs from the previous game, where $Z(X_i) = V(X_i)$. The function $Z$ is subject to the following constraints shown below:

$V(X_1 + X_2 + X_3) = 17$

$V(X_1 + X_2) = 9$

$V(X_2 + X_3) = 13$

$V(X_1 + X_3) = 12$

$V(X_1) <= 8$

$V(X_2) <= 7$

$V(X_3) <= 9$, where all $V(X_1)$, $V(X_2)$, $V(X_3) >= 0$ “non-negativity.”

To find the maximum payoffs the players can receive under the previous constraints, we need to find the maximum value of the function $Z_i$, (Max. $Z_i$) for all $X_i$,
where $i=1, 2, 3$, which represents the coalitions’ payoffs. The coalition description according to the function $Z$ is illustrated below.

- $Z_1$ represents - the ideal coalition $Z_1(X_1+X_2+X_3) = V(X_1+X_2+X_3)$
- $Z_2$ represents - India and Iran coalition against Pakistan, where $Z_2(X_1+X_2) = V(X_1+X_2)$
- $Z_3$ represents - Iran and Pakistan coalition against India, where $Z_3(X_2+X_3) = V(X_2+X_3)$
- $Z_4$ represents - India and Pakistan coalition against Iran, where $Z_4(X_1+X_3) = V(X_1+X_3)$
The Linear Programming Calculations

The Ideal Coalition $Z_1(X_1+X_2+X_3)$ for the Three RCPs:

Max. $Z_1 = V(X_1 + X_2 + X_3)$
Subject to:
$V(X_1 + x_2 + X_3) \leq 17$
$V(X_1 + X_2) \leq 9$
$V(X_2 + X_3) \leq 13$
$V(X_1 + X_3) \leq 12$
$V(X_1), V(X_2), V(X_3) \geq 0$

Decision variables:

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<tr>
<td>$V(X_3)$</td>
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Objective function

Max. $Z = 17$

Constraints

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The Linear Programming Report:

\[ Z = X_1 + X_2 + X_3 \]

Target Cell (Max)

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The Coalition of India and Iran Against Pakistan $Z_2(X_1+X_2)$:

Max. \[ Z_2 = V(X_1 + X_2) \]

Subject to:

\[ V(X_1 + x_2 + x_3) \leq 17 \]
\[ V(X_1 + X_2) \leq 9 \]
\[ V(X_2 + X_3) \leq 13 \]
\[ V(X_1 + X_3) \leq 12 \]

\[ V(X_1), V(X_2), V(X_3) \geq 0 \]

Decision variables:

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Objective function

Max. \[ Z = 9 \]

Constraints

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The Linear Programming Report:

\[ Z = X_1 + X_2 \]

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The Coalition of Iran and Pakistan Against India Z_3(X_2+X_3):

Max. \[ Z_3 = V(X_2+X_3) \]
Subject to:
\[ V(X_1+x_2+X_3) \leq 17 \]
\[ V(X_1+X_2) \leq 9 \]
\[ V(X_2+X_3) \leq 13 \]
\[ V(X_1+ X_3) \leq 12 \]
\[ V(X_1), V(X_2), V(X_3) \geq 0 \]

Decision variables:

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Objective function

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Constraints

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The Linear Programming Report:

\[ Z_3 = X_2 + X_3 \]

**Target Cell (Max)**

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The Coalition of India and Pakistan Against Iran $Z_4(X_1 + X_3)$:

Max. \[ Z_4 = V(X_1 + X_3) \]

Subject to:
\[ V(X_1 + x_2 + x_3) \leq 17 \]
\[ V(X_1 + x_2) \leq 9 \]
\[ V(X_2 + x_3) \leq 13 \]
\[ V(X_1 + X_3) \leq 12 \]
\[ V(X_1), V(X_2), V(X_3) \geq 0 \]

Decision variables:

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<td>V(X2)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>V(X3)</td>
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Objective function

Max. \[ Z = 12 \]

Constraints

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The Linear Programming Report:

\[ Z_4 = X_1 + X_3 \]

Target Cell (Max)

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Payoffs' Division

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>India</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Max.Z_i = V(X_1+X_2+X_3)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max.Z_2 = V(X_1+X_2)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max.Z_3 = V(X_2+X_3)</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Max.Z_4 = V(X_1+X_3)</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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Table 21. The Coalition’s Payoffs Division Among the Three RCP
APPENDIX C.  LINEAR PROGRAMMING FOR PHASE III

The Influence in Afghanistan Game’s Mathematical Calculations
Phase III
The Coalition’s Payoffs Division

As in phase II, let us assume that the decision variables are $X_1$, $X_2$, and $X_3$, and are defined as follows:

- $X_1$ = India, and the unilateral game value for $X_1$ is $V(X_1) = 9$
- $X_2$ = Iran, and the unilateral game value for $X_2$ is $V(X_2) = 10$
- $X_3$ = Pakistan, and the unilateral game value for $X_3$ is $V(X_3) = 10$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The coalition structures</th>
<th>$V(X_1)$</th>
<th>$V(X_2)$</th>
<th>$V(X_3)$</th>
<th>total</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$X_1 + X_2 + X_3$</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>The three cooperate and reduce the influence costs. The ideal coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1 + X_2$ while $X_3$ alone</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>The minimum $V(X_3)$ is its security level 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_2 + X_3$ while $X_1$ alone</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>The minimum $V(X_1)$ is its security level 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1 + X_3$ while $X_2$ alone</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>The minimum $V(X_2)$ is its security level 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_1, X_2, X_3$</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Every one exerts influence unilaterally</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22. Coalition Structures and Payoffs

Let us assume that we have the function $Z$, which describes the possible coalitions’ payoffs from the previous game, where $Z(X_i) = V(X_i)$. The function $Z$ is subject to the following constraints shown below.

- $V(X_1 + X_2 + X_3) = 16$
- $V(X_1 + X_2) = 11$
- $V(X_2 + X_3) = 13$
- $V(X_1 + X_3) = 8$
- $V(X_1) \leq 9$
- $V(X_2) \leq 10$
- $V(X_3) \leq 10$, where all $V(X_1), V(X_2), V(X_3) \geq 0$ “non-negativity.”
To find the maximum payoffs the players can get under the previous constraints, we need to find the maximum value of the function $Z_i$, $(\text{Max. } Z_i)$ for all $X_i$, where $i=1, 2, 3$, which represents the coalitions’ payoffs. The coalition description according to the function $Z$ is illustrated below:

- $Z_1$ represents - the ideal coalition $Z_1(X_1+X_2+X_3) = V(X_1+X_2+X_3)$
- $Z_2$ represents - India and Iran coalition against Pakistan, where $Z_2(X_1+X_2) = V(X_1+X_2)$
- $Z_3$ represents - Iran and Pakistan coalition against India, where $Z_3(X_2+X_3) = V(X_2+X_3)$
- $Z_4$ represents - India and Pakistan coalition against Iran, where $Z_4(X_1+X_3) = V(X_1+X_3)$
The Ideal Coalition $Z_1(x_1 + x_2 + x_3)$ for the Three RCPs:

Max. $Z_1 = V(x_1 + x_2 + x_3)$

Subject to:
$V(x_1 + x_2 + x_3) \leq 16$
$V(x_1 + x_2) \leq 11$
$V(x_2 + x_3) \leq 13$
$V(x_1 + x_3) \leq 8$
$V(x_1), V(x_2), V(x_3) \geq 0$

Decision variables:

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$V(x_1)$</td>
<td>9 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>$V(x_2)$</td>
<td>10 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V(x_3)$</td>
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Objective function

Max. $Z = 16$

Constraints

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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
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The Linear Programming Report:

\[ Z = X_1 + X_2 + X_3 \]

**Target Cell (Max)**

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<tr>
<th>Cell</th>
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**Constraints**

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</table>
The Coalition of India and Iran Against Pakistan $Z_2(X_1+X_2)$:

Max. \[ Z_2 = V(X_1 + X_2) \]

Subject to:
\[ V(X_1 + x_2 + x_3) \leq 16 \]
\[ V(X_1 + X_2) \leq 11 \]
\[ V(X_2 + X_3) \leq 13 \]
\[ V(X_1 + X_3) \leq 8 \]

\[ V(X_1), V(X_2), V(X_3) \geq 0 \]

Decision variables:

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Objective function

Max. \[ Z = 11 \]

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The Linear Programming Report:

\[ Z_2 = X_1 + X_2 \]

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The Coalition of Iran and Pakistan Against India $Z_3(X_2+X_3)$:

Max. \[ Z_3 = V(X_2 + X_3) \]

Subject to:
\[ V(X_1+x_2+X_3) \leq 16 \]
\[ V(X_1+X_2) \leq 11 \]
\[ V(X_2+X_3) \leq 13 \]
\[ V(X_1+X_3) \leq 8 \]
\[ V(X_1), V(X_2), V(X_3) \geq 0 \]

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Objective function

Max. \[ Z = 13 \]

Constraints

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The Linear Programming Report:

\[ Z_2 = X_2 + X_3 \]

**Target Cell (Max)**

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The Coalition of India and Pakistan Against Iran $Z_4(X_1 + X_3)$:

Max. $Z_4 = V(X_1 + X_3)$

Subject to:
$V(X_1 + x_2 + X_3) \leq 16$
$V(X_1 + X_2) \leq 11$
$V(X_2 + X_3) \leq 13$
$V(X_1 + X_3) \leq 8$

$V(X_1), V(X_2), V(X_3) \geq 0$

Decision variables:

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</tr>
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<td>$V(X_3)$</td>
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</table>

Objective function

Max. $Z = 8$

Constraints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USED</th>
<th>RHS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>&lt; 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>&lt; 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>&lt; 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>&lt; 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 23. The Coalition’s Payoffs Division Among the Three RCP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Max. $Z_1 = V(X_1 + X_2 + X_3)$</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>India + Iran + Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Max. $Z_2 = V(X_1 + X_2)$</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>India and Iran Vs Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max. $Z_3 = V(X_2 + X_3)$</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Iran and Pakistan Vs India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max. $Z_4 = V(X_1 + X_3)$</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>India and Pakistan Vs Iran</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF REFERENCES


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