MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT

Organizational Analysis of Food Service Management

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    June 2011

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ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF FOOD SERVICE MANAGEMENT

ABSTRACT

This study analyzes the current Navy Food Management Team (NFMT) alignment under the leadership of COMFISCS and the inability for NAVSUP Food Service (SUP 05) to directly coordinate with teams in the seven different assigned regions. This separation has raised difficulties for SUP 05 to gauge the effectiveness of training, budgeting, team make-up, fleet trends, policy implementation and instruction reviews and re-writes. The lack of continuity and consistency across Navy food service operations is driving the research behind this project, with the ultimate goal being recommendations that lead to the organizational structure that improves customer service fleet wide. The data set contains current Navy Food Management Team manning levels, annual budgets, Supply Management Certification scores for the last three years, training assist visit percentages and ship visit periodicities in each geographical area of responsibility. An extensive cost analysis was also performed covering salaries, basic housing allowances for team members by location, travel costs and facilities and office expenses in an attempt to provide a recommendation for the most efficient, cost effective team management for the future.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOR  Area of Responsibility
BAH  Basic Allowance for Housing
CMP  Continuous Monitoring Program
CNAF Commander, Naval Air Forces
CNIC Commander, Naval Installations Command
COLA Cost of Living Allowance
COMFISC Commander, Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers
COMSUBFOR Commander Submarine Force
CS   Culinary Specialist
CSCS Culinary Specialist Senior Chief
CVN  Carrier Vessel Nuclear
DDG  Guided Missile Destroyer
DoD  Department of Defense
FISC Fleet and Industrial Supply Center
FSM  Food Service Management
MM  Machinist Mate
MS   Mess Management Specialist
NAVICP Naval Inventory Control Point
NAVFSSO Naval Food Service Systems Office
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSUP Naval Supply Systems Command
NFMT Navy Food Management Team
OIC  Officer in Charge
PEO  Program Executive Officer
SIK  Subsistence in Kind
SMC  Supply Management Certification
TYCOM Type Commander
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I. INTRODUCTION

This project investigates the current state of the Navy Food Management Teams, whose primary mission is to provide on-the-job assistance and specialized training covering all aspects of food service operations. These teams and their management have undergone several changes in the past decade, but there is interest in how well they are currently managed and whether opportunities for improvement exist.

A. BACKGROUND

The Annual Management Report (AMR) is a brief delivered to the Chief of the Supply Corps that serves as a forum for the Commanding Officers of Fleet Industrial Supply Centers (FISCs) to voice concerns and individual perspectives about what is taking place on the naval waterfront. During the brief in October 2002, the topic of substandard performance of the Navy Food Management Teams (NFMTs) continually arose. Some common themes addressed were that the teams had become overstaffed, generally underworked, had mission duplication/conflict with the Afloat Training Groups (ATGs) and lacked the appropriate level of on-site supervision.

On April 1, 2003, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was set forth documenting the organizational relocation of the Navy Food Management Teams (NFMTs) from Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) control to the six (6) Fleet and Industrial Support Centers (FISCs) that existed at the time (7th FISC (Sigonella, Italy) established in 2005). The scope involved the FISC Commanding Officers incorporating the teams into their Logistical Support Centers (LSCs), with six of the seven NFMTs moving under their co-located FISC, while New London became a detachment of the Norfolk branch. The NFMTs were to be fully integrated into the LSCs and funding was transferred to the controlling FISC to cover expenses for FY2003. In FY2004, all funding was allocated to the Commander Fleet and Industrial Support Center (COMFISC) comptroller, whose job it was to divide the resources to the respective
FISCs. Both organizational parties agreed to the Transfer of Function on this date to acquire a more efficient command structure, better service to their customers and the reduction of overall costs (DON, 2003).

Over the past eight years, the NFMTs have remained effective even after taking on a different look, as some teams have gotten smaller, operating budgets have been reduced and assist visit completion for ships and shore installations has gone down. NAVSUP meanwhile, has retained their role of policy writing and implementation, fleet food service administration and quality of life program management for the Navy.

B.  PURPOSE

The purpose behind this research effort is to explore the current organizational model and determine if a new model could provide a more efficient alignment that could deliver greater benefits to the fleet. We will review the role of the stakeholders and the processes that go into performing the NFMT function. A baseline assessment will be established, where upon it will be determined what is effective in the operation today, what is lacking in efficiency, what makes common sense structurally and what is needed to properly meet the customer needs. After careful analysis of all data and procedures, our recommendations will be presented for the best way going forward for the future of the NFMTs and all of Navy Food Service Division operations.

C.  TIMELINE

Naval logistics operations have a long and storied history of providing combat readiness and support in sustaining the war fighter. Over the years, command structures have changed and new leadership concepts have been developed. The following timeline reflects the history of significant events in Navy supply support and how we have arrived at the alignment that exists today:

1919—Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Norfolk first commissioned as a Naval Supply Station.
2 OCTOBER 1942—Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) Pearl Harbor established.
AUGUST 1952—Naval Supply Depot Yokosuka commissioned.
2 OCTOBER 1967—Naval Supply Center Puget Sound established.
16 MARCH 1992—Department of Defense transferred warehousing operations to Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
1992—Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, San Diego established.
1 MARCH 1993—All Naval Supply Centers and Naval Supply Depots were renamed Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers.
29-31 OCTOBER 2002—NAVSUP corporate board meeting where NFMT re-alignment was suggested by FISC Commanding Officers.
1 APRIL 2003—NAVSUP to FISC transformation begins with FISC San Diego designated the “lead FISC” following Memorandum of Agreement for the organizational re-structuring.
2003-2005—Commander, Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (COMFISC) staff codes created to manage supply programs.
3 MARCH 2005—Sigonella, Italy becomes the seventh FISC.
1 AUGUST 2006—COMFISC established in San Diego, CA
1 JULY 201—Name changes as described below reflect “Global Logistics Support Network”. (https://www.navsup.navy.mil/)

D. RECENT ECHELON NAME CHANGES

Echelons are rank structures for an organization and establish the levels each command is placed at in the overall hierarchy. This paper refers to multiple commands whose current names are about to undergo change, in an initiative to provide stakeholders with a clearer understanding of Navy support capabilities around the world. The new names for the NAVSUP Echelon III activities, effective 1 July 2011, are:

NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support (formerly Naval Inventory Control Point–NAVICP)
NAVSUP Business Systems Center (formerly Navy Supply Information Systems Activity–NAVSISA)
NAVSUP Logistics Operations Center (formerly Naval Operational Logistics Support Center–NOLSC)
NAVSUP Global Logistics Support (Formerly Commander, Fleet & Industrial Supply Centers–COMFISCS)
The new names for the NAVSUP Echelon IV activities, formerly known as Fleet & Industrial Supply Centers, or FISCs effective 1 July 2011 are:

NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Centers: Jacksonville, Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, San Diego, Puget Sound, Sigonella and Yokosuka (Lyden, 2011).

E. RESEARCH SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This study will examine the following questions: (1) Who are the NFMT stakeholders and what roles do they perform? (2) What is the current process for requesting a NFMT assessment and how do the teams conduct the visits? (3) What works in this process? (4) What is flawed in this process? (5) What challenges are faced by the Navy Food Management Teams? (7) Should NAVSUP P-486 Food Service Management policy guidance change? (8) Should command and control be changed? (9) Is the “as is” model the best organization or is change required? (10) What are the final recommendations?

1. Scope

A program evaluation will be conducted on the Navy Food Management Teams to develop a baseline assessment of their current processes and performance, while gauging the operational success and efficiency of resource use in their attempt to achieve the best value management. The scope of this project will include: (1) a review of the Navy Food Management Team manning levels; (2) a review of the budgets allotted to each team; (3) a review of the process for requesting assist visits by a ship or shore installation through the actual completion of the assist, plus follow on reporting of results; (4) a review of Supply Management Certification (SMC) results to evaluate scoring trends over the last 3 years to analyze team effectiveness. The thesis will conclude with recommendations for improvement of the Navy Food Management Teams processes, team make up, geographic responsibilities and command and control structure.

2. Methodology

The methodology used in this thesis research consisted of multiple steps. First, a background review of the Navy Food Management Team history and past command and control structure was examined and compared to the present system in place. The “as is”
model was studied to evaluate the processes of the current way of doing business, noting where lack of efficiency was apparent and improvements could be implemented. NFMTs were contacted to provide metrics for mission accomplishment, such as how an individual team keeps ships in their area of responsibility in periodicity for required assist visits. Trend analysis was performed on results of Supply Management Certification Scores and a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) Analysis was conducted to determine the condition of the current state, with overall pros and cons compiled based on these analyses. In addition, an organizational change was proposed and assessed using a cost analysis, which included consideration of team pay, housing and travel costs. Upon completion of team function performance and efficiency review, recommendations will be presented for the best way forward for the future of Navy Food Service.
II. STAKEHOLDER REVIEW

This chapter reviews the functions and missions of the four major stakeholders in the NFMT process: Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), Commander, Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (COMFISC), the Navy Food Management Teams (NFMTs) and the customers. Figure 1 represents the current organizational structure.

A. NAVSUP

The Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), headquartered in Mechanicsburg, PA., has primary responsibility for providing supply support to United States Navy forces worldwide. With a worldwide civilian and military workforce of over 9000 people, NAVSUP meets this responsibility by performing a variety of logistic services including supply operations, contracting, resale, information systems, fuel,
conventional ordnance, transportation, support services, and security assistance. NAVSUP sets the policies, prescribes the procedures and evaluates performance in each of these areas. NAVSUP’s most important responsibility is the worldwide, integrated Navy Supply System, which gets the fleet what it needs, where and when it needs it.

The Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP), with headquarters in Philadelphia, PA., and consisting of two sites (Mechanicsburg, PA, and Philadelphia, PA), along with seven Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISCs), are the major activities in this system. The Naval ICP exercises centralized control over 350,000 different line items of repair parts, components and assemblies that keep ships, aircraft and weapons operating. NAVICP also provides logistic and supply assistance to friendly and allied nations through the Foreign Military Sales program. The FISCs provide a variety of logistics support services and products to Navy and other military customers in their respective regions. These products and services include material management, contracting, transportation, fuel services, customer service, hazardous materials management, household goods movement support, consolidated mail services and supply consultation.

NAVSUP falls under the umbrella of Fleet Support Services and manages a number of programs, including the Navy Food Service program, which prepares an average of 300,000 meals daily at 380 general messes afloat and ashore. NAVSUP establishes management requirements, provides professional guidance on nutrition, equipment and facility design, sponsors research for food programs and has overall supervision of seven Food Management Teams that provide worldwide training and assistance. NAVSUP has oversight of the following branches:

The Policy and Programs Branch controls key publications such as the P-486, which covers all food service management instructions, the P-476 quarterly food service newsletter, Food Flash information releases, auditing, Subsistence in Kind (SIK) interface, Navy Food Service Management Information Systems and presentation silver.

The Training and Nutrition Branch heads up training, nutrition, menu development, recipe control, Adopt-a-Ship and the Edward F. Ney Award for outstanding food service.

The Fleet Support Branch leads Food Service Management (FSM), facilities, design, readiness and distance support (McHargue, 2009).
B. COMFISC

COMFISC currently functions as NAVSUP’s global provider of integrated supply and support services to fleet units and shore activities; interfaces with System Commands, Fleet/Type Commanders (TYCOMS), Commander Naval Installations Command (CNIC), and Regional Commanders, to formulate common policies and procedures across all FISCs and perform other functions as directed by NAVSUP.

In 2003, the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) began implementation of a three-phased transformation plan based on a series of structural, functional and customer alignment initiatives. Principal of these initiatives was the designation of Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) San Diego as “lead” FISC. FISC San Diego was assigned responsibility to drive common policies across six supply centers located in San Diego, CA; Norfolk, VA; Jacksonville, FL; Puget Sound, WA; Pearl Harbor, HI; and Yokosuka, Japan, and to broker workload to maximize productivity in support of ships on the waterfront.

A standard FISC organization model was established and the position Commander, Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (COMFISC) was created to signify the Echelon III leadership of the lead FISC. COMFISC was given responsibility for overseeing field contracting operations; optimizing the performance of base supply functions such as hazardous material management, contracting, regional transportation and retail supply; and standardizing levels of service across 11 Navy regions. Unique COMFISC staff codes were created between 2003 and 2005 to manage programs across the supply domain. On March 3, 2005, a seventh FISC was established in Sigonella, Italy.

The original assumptions and concept of operations of the lead FISC were dramatically altered. Substantial changes in the scale of operations necessitated a structure of a stand-alone, flag-level Echelon III command and the re-establishment of FISC San Diego as an Echelon IV command. Accordingly, by direction of the CNO, on Aug. 1, 2006, COMFISC was formally established to focus on global logistics and
contracting issues and to drive best practices across the seven FISCs, thereby allowing FISC San Diego to focus on local logistics issues and to provide optimal supply support to Commander, Navy Region Southwest.

Headquartered in San Diego, CA., COMFISCS encompasses more than 5,700 military and civilian logistics professionals, contractors and foreign nationals operating as a single cohesive team and providing worldwide integrated logistics and contracting services to Navy and Joint operational units across all warfare enterprises, and base supply functions at 70 shore locations. A component of NAVSUP, COMFISCS is part of a worldwide logistics network of more than 22,500 military and civilian personnel. The team locations and their regional and operational alignments are shown in Table 1 (Naval Supply Systems Command, 2004).

Table 1. Navy Regional Alignments

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<td>Jacksonville</td>
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<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>Naval District Washington,</td>
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<td>Navy Region Mid-Atlantic,</td>
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<td>Navy Region Midwest</td>
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<td>Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>Navy Region Hawaii</td>
<td>Supports FISC San Diego when 3rd Fleet units are operating in their region</td>
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C. NAVY FOOD MANAGEMENT TEAM

Excellence in food service is essential to the health and morale of Navy members and to the overall readiness of the operating forces. Because food is a major item of expense, use of the best food management practices (conservation, preparation, and serving) is necessary. Navy Food Management Teams (NFMTs) use on-the-job training to provide food service personnel with skill in preparing and serving food. This effort significantly improves the overall Navy food service program. Table 2 is a breakdown of specific team Manning levels when the transfer of function took place in 2003, alongside 2011 team Manning (DON, 2003).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2003 Norfolk</th>
<th>Current Norfolk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Officer in Charge</td>
<td>O-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Senior Instructor</td>
<td>E-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Mess Management Specialists</td>
<td>E-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mess Management Specialists</td>
<td>E-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Army Staff Veterinarian</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Machinist Mate</td>
<td>E-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2003 San Diego</th>
<th>Current San Diego</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Officer in Charge</td>
<td>W-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Senior Instructor</td>
<td>E-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mess Management Specialists</td>
<td>E-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mess Management Specialists</td>
<td>E-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Mess Management Specialists</td>
<td>E-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Army Staff Veterinarian</td>
<td>E-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2003 Pearl Harbor</th>
<th>Current Pearl Harbor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Officer in Charge</td>
<td>W-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Senior Instructor</td>
<td>E-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mess Management Specialists</td>
<td>E-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Machinist Mate</td>
<td>E-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 Mess Management Specialists</td>
<td>E-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Army Staff Veterinarian</td>
<td>E-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Organization

The NFMTs are directly responsible to NAVFSSO (Navy Food Service Systems Office) for performance of their mission. The team members may be assigned for additional duty to the host command for military and administrative purposes. The primary focus of NFMT personnel is to provide service to the fleet and will only be assigned additional tasking if assist schedules permit. Table 3 shows the breakdown of the number of ship units and shore installations under the responsibility of the seven NFMTs.
Table 3. NFMT Ship/Shore Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Shore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puget Sound</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokosuka</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New London</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayport</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Mission

The NFMT’s mission is to aid ships and shore food service activities in raising the quality and standards of food service. This assistance is provided in the following manner:

Participating in an advisory capacity in managing the local food service program by working along with food service personnel.

Demonstrating proper techniques in all phases of food service. This includes management production and serving of food, sanitation training and accounting. Their training also motivates food service personnel toward increased efficiency and effectiveness.

Providing on-the-job training to food service personnel through the “do as I do” method of instruction, employing advanced training aids and techniques.

Instilling management awareness in responsible food service personnel, placing special emphasis on high-quality food preparation, progressive cookery, proper serving techniques, food service safety precautions and operating procedures, fire prevention, sanitation and personal hygiene. Inducing and stimulating professional pride in food service personnel.

Reviewing the use of facilities, equipment, personnel and other food service resources to evaluate each General Mess visited.

---

Identifying limitations that hamper fulfillment of the food service goal.

Reviewing manual and automated food service records, organization and operating manuals, and financial returns to determine compliance with the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Manual and current food service directives.

Evaluating and aiding in implementing food service policies and procedures established by the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy and commands.

Aiding in developing patron food service education programs to make sure personnel understand the food service operation, especially conservation.

Providing information on and demonstrating new developments in food service and food items.

Evaluating the practical application of food service techniques.

Imparting programs of instruction, curricula and formal training through technical and on-the-job training, and thereby making necessary recommendations to NAVFSSO.

Exchanging ideas on food service operations with activities visited.

Sending new ideas to NAVFSSO for dissemination to other NFMTs and field activities.

Recording observations to provide a basis for follow-up actions to aid in resolving problems beyond the control of the local food service management personnel through better use of material and financial resources. After an NFMT visit, no report of discrepancies is made to higher authority (http://www.tpub.com/content/administration/14163/css/14163_284.htm).

3. Request for NFMT Assist Visit

Activities are highly encouraged to request food service training assistance visits, which can last for up to two weeks. Shorter visits maybe arranged if operating schedules or scope of food service operations dictates. An example is a ship desiring a visit to address specific problem areas. Team visits normally should not be requested during yard overhaul, while underway or before shakedown periods of newly constructed ships.
D. CUSTOMERS

The valued customers of the Navy Food Management teams are food service divisions of the 289 ships in the fleet and all shore installation galleys around the world. Afloat assist visits are expected to be requested once every 18 months while the standard periodicity for shore installations is one visit every two years. The customer can determine how long of an assist visit they desire and can have the training requested be tailored to their specific needs (DON, 2004).
III. NFMT BASELINE INFORMATION

This section introduces the echelon structure currently in place for command and control and discusses the NFMT training assist process from the initial request, to the final summary reports assessing the visit. In addition team manning make-up, facilities per area of responsibility, financial information, Supply Management Certification Scores and limitations in the data are explained.

A. ECHELONS (ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE)

Echelons constitute the command authority structure that is in place today for the Navy’s logistics system. OPNAV 5450 Ser DNS 33/6U827297 of 6 July 2006, formally established COMFISCS as a separate shore activity with the following chain of command depicted as follows:

Echelon Commands I, II, III and IV:
I. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
II. Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command (COMNAVSUP)
III. Commander, Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (COMFISCS)
IV. Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISCs) (https://www.navsup.navy.mil)

B. PROCESS FOR NFMT ASSIST VISITS

1. Requests for Assistance

Activities desiring food service training assistance are required to send a letter of request or naval message 60 to 90 days prior to the desired visit dates directly to the Officer-in-Charge of the appropriate Navy Food Management Team. It is recommended that afloat activities request a visit every 18 months and ashore activities every 24 months.

2. Length of Visit

Standard team visits can be requested from 3 days up to 14 days. Longer visits may be arranged if necessary due to operating schedules and commands may request a follow-up visit within 90 days of the initial visit.
3. **Time Periods for Visit**

Requests should indicate two or more convenient periods for the assistance visit. Ship assist visits are best conducted when the ship is underway, to which the team has the undivided attention of the Culinary Specialists. The type of assist visit can be tailored to the requirements identified by the requesting command. Normally, the NFMT will spend the majority of their time working with the CS division hands-on in the galley, cooking and training. The teams also provide classroom instruction on any of the food service lesson plans, identified on NAVSUP web page.

4. **Information Required**

Advance written or telephone contact with the Officer in Charge of the Navy Food Management Team within the designated area of responsibility is encouraged. The following information should be provided to the team before the visit:

- Location of ship during the requested dates
- Information on the Supply Officer, Food Service Officer, and Leading Culinary Specialist, such as name, rank/rate
- Particular problem areas requiring special attention
- Date of last/next Supply Management Inspection (SMI)

5. **Exclusions from Assist Visits**

A Navy Food Management Team assist visit will not be made to a general mess after it has been nominated by the controlling Fleet Commander/Major Claimant for Ney Awards competition. This exclusion will apply even if a visit had been previously scheduled and will remain in effect as long as the general mess is in competition. If an assist visit is in progress when a general mess is nominated by the commander, the visit will be completed. General messes affected by this provision should take action to re-schedule a Navy Food Management Team assist visit based on evaluation results announced in accordance with NAVSUPINST 5061.2 series. Team visits will not be requested during yard overhaul or prior to shakedown periods of newly commissioned ships.
6. Report of Visit

At the end of each visit, the Officer-in-Charge of the Navy Food Management Team or the designated representative will informally discuss the overall operation of the general mess with the Commanding Officer or designated representative, the Supply Officer, the Food Service Officer and key food service personnel. The Officer in Charge of the team will submit a summary of each assist visit to the Readiness Branch, Navy Food Service, Assistant Chief of Staff, Navy Family Support, Mechanicsburg (Naval Supply Systems Command, 2004). The entire assist visit process is represented in Figure 2.

![NFMT Assist Visit Process Chart](image)

Figure 2. NFMT Assist Visit Process Chart

7. Actual Assist Visits

NFMTs Puget Sound, Pearl Harbor and San Diego provided their assist visit tracking spreadsheets for review and all are in different formats. Puget Sound has 23 submarine crews, 2 aircraft carriers (CVNs), 2 guided missile destroyers (DDGs), 3 guided missile frigates (FFGs) and 4 shore galleys. They are not tracking past the last
two years and periodicities were not provided (Timothy Boyle, NFMT Puget Sound, U.S. Navy, personal communication, 20 March 2011). NFMT Pearl Harbor reported 100% periodicity for 2004–2007 and stand at 92% for this year (David Webb, NFMT Pearl Harbor, U.S. Navy, personal communication, 11 March 2011).

NFMT San Diego has perhaps the most unusual reporting structure. While they state that they are 13 for 13 (100%) in shore galley assessments in their AOR, 50% of the ships are out of periodicity, shown in Table 4. More alarming is the USS HOWARD, last having a visit in July of 2005, the USS CURTIS in March of 2005, the USS MCCLUSKEY in January of 2005 and the USS PEARL HARBOR in November of 2004. While those visits are well out of periodicity, the USS RENTZ takes the prize as the NFMT Sand Diego spreadsheet lists their most recent assist visit taking place in June of 1993 (Andrew Pickens, NFMT San Diego, U.S. Navy, personal communication, 30 March 2011). The question remains as to whether these ships have not requested NFMT assistance during these years as required per the Supply Management Certification checklist, or that the spreadsheets are not updated properly. These extreme examples are difficult to explain, and the accuracy and validity of these internal tracking systems are called into question for their reliability and value.

Table 4. San Diego AOR Ships Out of Periodicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>LAST ASSIST</th>
<th>LAST RECORDED ASSIST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CURTIS</td>
<td>FFG-38</td>
<td>Mar-11</td>
<td>Aug-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOWARD</td>
<td>DDG-83</td>
<td>Jul-11</td>
<td>Dec-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHN PAUL JONES</td>
<td>DDG-53</td>
<td>Jul-98</td>
<td>Dec-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCCLUSKY</td>
<td>FFG-41</td>
<td>Jan-11</td>
<td>Jun-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEARL HARBOR</td>
<td>LSD-52</td>
<td>Nov-11</td>
<td>Apr-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENTZ</td>
<td>FFG-46</td>
<td>Jun-93</td>
<td>Nov-94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSHMORE</td>
<td>LSD-47</td>
<td>Jan-11</td>
<td>Jun-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THACH</td>
<td>FFG-43</td>
<td>Apr-11</td>
<td>Sep-11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. MANNING

The Navy Food Management Teams are designed to have a member with subject matter expertise on hand to cover all training needs of a unit. Positions that make up a team in a high fleet concentration area consist of: an Officer in Charge (OIC), a Senior Instructor, culinary specialists in the E-7 to E-9 pay grade, a machinist mate and an Army veterinarian. Areas with a lower fleet concentration, such as Yokosuka, may have less assigned personnel. More detailed manning information will be presented in the following chapter.

D. FACILITIES PER AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR)

The number of ship and shore facilities in each area of responsibility, AOR was analyzed, with San Diego’s data being used to set a baseline of service level for each team (Table 5). Adding the periodicity of ship and shore visits for each team resulted in an average visits per year figure. By dividing the average visits per year by the number of current team members, a determination of the average visits per year per man metric was made. Assist visits are not generally made by a single person so these are not actual average visits per year required by each worker, but this metric can be used as a relative workload comparison metric across NFMTs.

Some drawbacks to these calculations are that they average numbers over a 1-year time period, meaning they do not address demand spikes or slow periods of activity due to deployments or galley shutdowns. The numbers also do not account for the fact that Pearl Harbor augments Yokosuka on most visits or that New London is a detachment of Virginia and therefore is also augmented regularly.
Table 5. NFMT Ship/Shore Workload

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Ships</th>
<th>Shore</th>
<th>Average Visits / Year</th>
<th>Current # Personnel</th>
<th>Average Visits/Man/Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puget Sound</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearl Harbor*</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yokosuka</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New London</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayport</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Pearl Harbor supports Yokosuka with assist visits.

E. FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Financial data was obtained only in bits and pieces, as most teams have not kept historical records. This hindered any complete evaluations, but Pearl Harbor provided some information and is our best example of how reduced operating budgets may be affecting fleet performance. From 1998–2003, NAVSUP provided NFMT Pearl Harbor whatever funds were necessary to complete the mission, with no budgetary ceiling put in place. From then on, the budget has gone up and down according to their records, with a downward trend the last few fiscal years. This does not imply that the present command structure has provided less monetary support by choice, as the economic climate of the time may have been the driving force. It is indisputable however, that fewer funds have contributed to a weaker NFMT performance in their AORs in terms of assist visits. Pearl Harbor is unique in that naval bases in Japan (Yokosuka, Sasebo, and Okinawa) fall under their realm, requiring multiple visits per year to have a positive effect on training and proper periodicity coverage. Three to four trips per year were made to Japan by NFMT Pearl Harbor from 2004–2007. This was reduced to zero trips combined for 2008–2009 and only one each in 2010 and 2011. As a result, nine ships are out of periodicity due to not having a fully aligned team located within the country’s boundaries (David Webb, NFMT Pearl Harbor, U.S. Navy, personal communication, 11 March 2011). This lack of resources allocated to the NFMTs is either the result of less overall availability of funds or the re-allocation to higher priority missions by COMFISC.
1. Pay Charts

Various costs go into maintaining and operating NFMTs. Salaries, housing, allowances, cost of living allowances and travel expenses such as flights and per diem are all part of the equation. Basic Pay (Table 6), Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) (Table 6), Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) (Table 7) and per diem figures (Table 8) were based off of 2011 rate charts (DoD, 2011a; DoD, 2011b; DoD, 2011c; DoD, 2011d).

Table 6. Basic Pay and BAH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANKS</th>
<th>BASIC PAY</th>
<th>CA</th>
<th>WA</th>
<th>VA</th>
<th>FL</th>
<th>CT</th>
<th>HI</th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W-5</td>
<td>$6,821</td>
<td>$2,769</td>
<td>$1,713</td>
<td>$2,061</td>
<td>$1,737</td>
<td>$2,184</td>
<td>$3,192</td>
<td>$4,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-4</td>
<td>$6,190</td>
<td>$2,625</td>
<td>$1,638</td>
<td>$1,983</td>
<td>$1,695</td>
<td>$2,043</td>
<td>$3,048</td>
<td>$4,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-3</td>
<td>$5,685</td>
<td>$2,505</td>
<td>$1,575</td>
<td>$1,917</td>
<td>$1,659</td>
<td>$1,923</td>
<td>$2,928</td>
<td>$4,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-2</td>
<td>$4,988</td>
<td>$2,355</td>
<td>$1,473</td>
<td>$1,776</td>
<td>$1,527</td>
<td>$1,782</td>
<td>$2,667</td>
<td>$4,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-9</td>
<td>$5,437</td>
<td>$2,592</td>
<td>$1,620</td>
<td>$1,965</td>
<td>$1,686</td>
<td>$2,010</td>
<td>$3,015</td>
<td>$4,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-8</td>
<td>$4,692</td>
<td>$2,427</td>
<td>$1,521</td>
<td>$1,842</td>
<td>$1,590</td>
<td>$1,848</td>
<td>$2,793</td>
<td>$4,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>$3,912</td>
<td>$2,307</td>
<td>$1,440</td>
<td>$1,728</td>
<td>$1,482</td>
<td>$1,734</td>
<td>$2,580</td>
<td>$4,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>$3,441</td>
<td>$2,196</td>
<td>$1,365</td>
<td>$1,623</td>
<td>$1,380</td>
<td>$1,626</td>
<td>$2,385</td>
<td>$4,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>$2,948</td>
<td>$2,019</td>
<td>$1,233</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
<td>$1,248</td>
<td>$1,437</td>
<td>$2,040</td>
<td>$3,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>$2,326</td>
<td>$1,941</td>
<td>$1,158</td>
<td>$1,359</td>
<td>$1,179</td>
<td>$1,326</td>
<td>$2,016</td>
<td>$3,677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Travel Cost

Travel costs have risen while travel budgets have fallen. Increasing fuel prices and inflation have outpaced the authorized travel budgets over the years. NFMT Pearl Harbor has seen their travel allowances cut 25% and NFMT Mayport saw cuts of 50% this year from 2010 figures. This data will be used later when cost analysis is performed.
Table 7. Cost of Living Allowance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANKS</th>
<th>HI</th>
<th>JAPAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W-5</td>
<td>$1,125</td>
<td>$2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-4</td>
<td>$1,035</td>
<td>$2,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-3</td>
<td>$960</td>
<td>$1,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W-2</td>
<td>$960</td>
<td>$1,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-9</td>
<td>$960</td>
<td>$1,932</td>
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<td>E-8</td>
<td>$883</td>
<td>$1,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-7</td>
<td>$848</td>
<td>$1,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-6</td>
<td>$785</td>
<td>$1,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>$720</td>
<td>$1,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-4</td>
<td>$663</td>
<td>$1,237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Per Diem and Estimated Flight Costs

| FLIGHT CONUS | $500 |
| FLIGHT OCONUS | $1,000 |
| CA           | $202 |
| WA           | $144 |
| VA           | $153 |
| FL           | $133 |
| CT           | $159 |
| HI           | $283 |
| JAPAN        | $330 |

F. SUPPLY MANAGEMENT CERTIFICATION SCORES

Supply Management Certification (SMC) inspections are the required reviews of the food service division of each ship and shore installation. Achieving exemplary scores on these inspections is important as a representation of the readiness of the supply department and its ability to successfully complete assigned mission tasking. One significant purpose of the NFMTs is to train ship and shore installations on the criteria critical for food service operations, thus providing the skills necessary to score well on these inspections.

SMC inspections cover all aspects of a supply department’s operations, ashore and afloat. They are conducted every 24 months and are performed by the Afloat
Training Groups (ATG) for surface ships and shore installations located in all numbered fleets. The food service division portion of the inspection is divided into three sections: accountability, sustainability and culinary specialists. Galleys and food service personnel are scrutinized in areas such as sanitation, records keeping, inventory, equipment safety and general knowledge (Naval Supply Systems Command, 2004). The NFMTs provide assistance and training in preparation for the inspections, though ATG has overall responsibility. Fleet scores for surface ships were collected over the last 3 years in hopes of finding a link between the varying service levels provided by the current NFMT structure and the SMC scores. The inspection grading scale is represented in Table 9:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Score Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outstanding:</td>
<td>100–95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excellent:</td>
<td>94.9–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfactory:</td>
<td>89.9–80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Satisfactory:</td>
<td>79.9–75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsatisfactory:</td>
<td>74.9–Below</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scores over this time period for the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets ranged from a high of 100 to a low of 55. The detailed SMC scores and an analysis of them appear in the next chapter.

G. LIMITATIONS

The data for this project have been difficult to collect. Some NFMTs wanted to keep the numbers in house, some did not keep records past the current year, and others did not respond to data calls. The types of information needed to perform a more effective analysis of NFMT performance and management includes current and historical data on: personnel, position, and pay grades for each team; annual budgets; both requests and completions of all assist visits, along with final reports; SMC dates and scores; and the status of all ships. Of this information, we were only able to obtain 2003 and 2011 information on personnel, positions, and pay grades for each team; SMC scores for prior
18 months to 3 years, depending on the team; only some information on the status of ships from two teams; and limited financial information from two teams. This lack of data significantly limited the analysis that could be performed. For example, it was impossible to link SMC scores with NFMT assist visits. In addition, issues with common metrics further limited the usefulness of the available data. For example, assist visit completion percentage for a NFMT may not be an appropriate metric for assessing NFMT performance. Our workload comparison metric showed that different NFMTs have very different average workload requirements as compared to their team size. In addition, even this data does not give the full picture because some teams receive assistance from other teams. In addition, a smaller fleet concentration area would be easier to maintain as opposed to San Diego, Norfolk or Pearl Harbor, which also has to monitor bases in Japan. Finally, this metric would not be as accurate over a short period of time because surges in demand can drastically affect the measure, as would happen in an area where many ships deploy simultaneously.
IV. NFMT DATA ANALYSIS

All pertinent data was reviewed in an attempt to discover positive and negative trends. Several analyses were performed and are discussed below including:

Scatter Plots and Trend Lines of SMC Scores
Comparison of Team Workloads
SWOT Analysis

And finally, following these analysis, we present pros and cons that have become apparent through these analyses.

A. SCATTER PLOTS

Supply Management Certification (SMC) scores covering the last 3 years were gathered and reviewed for surface ships in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets (Michelle Simmons, Commander Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Navy, personal communication, 29 March 2011; Jason Bartholomew, Commander Naval Surface Forces Atlantic Fleet, personal communication, 4 April 2011).

The scores were grouped into geographical areas where the inspections took place and tied to the Navy Food Management Team that owns responsibility for assist visits and training. The rationale for this analysis was to determine if lower manning and smaller budgets have affected the ability of the NFMTs to conduct the appropriate number of assist visits requested of them and whether the quality of the visits have been affected in negative or positive ways by the current command support structure. While NFMTs are not inspectors and do not directly impact SMC scores, the belief is that the training they provide prepares ships for the rigors they will face under the magnifying glass of intense inspections. The scatter plots (Figure 3, chart the available SMC scores over time for each of the NFMT AORs. They show what appear to be slight upward and downward trends in various regions for scores over the last 3½ years, but no strong correlation. Perhaps, having a decade’s worth of data would reveal stronger trends. In addition to this investigation of scores over time, a regression model showing the impact of smaller manned teams and decreased budgets was conducted in an attempt to uncover
a link between reduced service levels and lower scores. No correlations could be determined from either model. In addition, incomplete information led to the SMC score metric ultimately being thrown out from consideration of NFMT performance, as there was no way of determining whether a ship had received an assessment within 18 months of an SMC from our compiled data and if the quality of the visit directly tied into the score received. The overall result of this section of analysis is that no conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between NFMT characteristics or performance and SMC scores, likely due to a significant lack of available data.
Figure 3. Scatter Plots by NFMT Team
B. COMPARISON OF TEAM WORKLOADS

Comparisons were made of the number of facilities serviced by each NFMT with the number of personnel on the team using the visits per person per year workload comparison metric (Figure 4.). Upon review, Puget Sound, Pearl Harbor and Mayport were observed to have the smallest workloads when compared to other team regions. Recall that both Pearl Harbor’s and Yokosuka’s numbers may be misleading, however, as Pearl Harbor personnel augment Yokosuka on visits when they are able to travel there.

C. SWOT ANALYSIS

A game plan for building and sustaining proper management processes can keep any organization healthy. Once it has been established what business you are involved in and have a good definition of the big picture, it is easier to be able to adapt to changes that come along in the industry. The Navy is very dynamic to change, with new ship classes such as the DDG-1000 and CVN-21 coming on line with new levels of manning and food service arrangements.

1. **Strengths**

The teams are made up of personnel with many years of experience and a great deal of subject matter expertise. They are geographically located close to the ships and are within walking distance from the piers on the waterfront. Also, the fleet knows what to expect when a NFMT comes aboard, as their assistance function has remained the same for many years.

2. **Weaknesses**

NFMTs appear to suffer from underutilization in some fleet areas when reviewing their assist visit tracking spreadsheets and other relative workload analysis, primarily Puget Sound. They have no consistent metrics tracking to gauge their service to the fleet and no performance measurable that they are striving to attain. Teams do not provide reliable feedback up through the chain of command for analysis of training deficiencies and it is difficult to conduct policy implementation and publication reviews on a regular basis due to multiple command hierarchies.
3. **Opportunities for Improvement**

There appears to be an uneven distribution of workload across the NFMTs. A better distribution of assignments may allow for a higher percentage of ships achieving their required visit periodicity. Localized data and performance tracking systems show the need for a Navy wide, standardized data base that is accessible by all the teams.

4. **Threats**

The Afloat Training Group (ATG) and NFMT perform similar functions, so the possibility is there for an elimination of one of them if future severe budget cuts are required. Contracted out civilians may be the way of the future for Navy food service operations if overall active duty manpower levels are ever reduced.

5. **Take-Away From SWOT Analysis**

The overall SWOT analysis is summarized in Figure 4. This analysis suggests that teams may be easier to manage if they operate only out of fleet concentration areas. Teams may be easier to manage if operating only out of fleet concentration areas. A consolidation of teams could be an option that may cut costs, simplify the tracking of performance statistics and relay new policies to the fleet expeditiously.
D. INTRODUCTION

It needs to be emphasized that the current system in effect right now works, as food service operations of the fleet are operating at a high level. Crews are being fed well-prepared items, have numerous choices from which to partake and are served in safe environments that enforce sanitation standards to the highest degree. The food service divisions are well trained. There is no need to introduce new ideas to a system if it is not broken, just for the sake of change. Upon further review, however, certain processes, procedures and ways of conducting business could be altered, to get the highest possible efficiencies. To do that, a change in the command and control structure may be necessary. Our evaluations recorded the following pros and cons from the current ways of doing business.
1. **PROS**

   a. **The Fleet Knows What to Expect**

      When a training assist visit it set up with a NFMT, our evaluation is that the ship or shore installation knows what to expect. They will receive quality training from seasoned personnel on food preparation, sanitation, records keeping, galley equipment safety, garnishing techniques, menu planning, nutrition, etc. This will be the same whether NFMTs teams are structurally aligned under COMFISC or NAVSUP. The reality is that sailors do not have an interest in what command structure exists, only that they have a robust learning experience that will prompt them do their jobs better, fill their knowledge toolbox and increase the likelihood of success on advancement exams.

   b. **Ney Award**

      NFMTs help prepare food service divisions to compete for the Edward F. Ney Food Service Excellence Award. Teams will examine all aspects of a food service division’s operation in preparation for the competition.

   c. **Advancement Preparation**

      Training received by culinary specialists during assist visits can act as a tremendous boost for their individual preparation for advancement examinations. NFMTs also periodically conduct nighttime exam study sessions, where any series of topics that could potentially arise on the tests are addressed.

   d. **Sanitation/Food Borne Illness Prevention**

      An often overlooked yet vital area is sanitation training, which always rates a strong emphasis. The training consists of personnel hygiene and health requirements, using thermometers and keeping temperature logs, inspection and storage of food, determining approved sources and the cleaning and sanitation practices of the facility and equipment. This training provides a better understanding for food service personnel to prevent potential food-borne outbreaks throughout the crew. Food-borne illnesses represent an ever-present threat to the health and morale of our military.
personnel. The training and application of sanitary food handling practices is a key to the success of food service aboard all U. S. Navy ships.

e. **Accessibility**

NFMTs and their corresponding FISC are located right on the waterfront (as opposed to NAVSUP located in Mechanicsburg, PA). They are accessible and offices can be walked to from the piers if an off ship visit is desired.

f. **Trainers**

NFMTs are trainers, not inspectors. This mission can lead to a more relaxed learning environment for the young sailors. While the commanding officer receives a debriefing of the division’s operating status, it is aimed in a way to make individuals improve their skills and better serve the crew. There are no failing grades, no extra stresses and limited inspection team pampering, which has become the norm for receiving a top grade during certifications. This separation of trainers and inspectors is valuable and remains a pro in the current alignment.

2. **CONS**

While the NFMTs are functioning well and meeting designed mission tasking, our evaluation concludes there are aspects to the operation that leave room for improvements. We have listed the following “cons” that are perceived as having room for improvements.

a. **Lack of Assist Visit Report Review by Chain of Command**

Only one NFMT confirmed that their assist visit reports were sent externally (FISC). The remainder stated that they keep a copy on file in their own offices and provide a copy for the ship that was recently visited. No other review apparently takes place.

b. **Policy Implementation**

Policy review, change and implementation are more difficult to perform when the policy maker does not have a direct line to the trainer. Engineering directives,
Food Service Management (FSM) instruction, safety initiatives and training plans gain efficiency and speed when driven from headquarters straight to the waterfront.

c. Yokosuka

Yokosuka is considered a NFMT, although not manned as such. Nine of their ships are out of assist periodicity due to the requirement for NFMT Pearl Harbor to travel to Japan to augment their lack of team personnel. Team Yokosuka has had no consistency to its team structure. In 2003, it was made up of three personnel; 2004–2006 they had four; 2007–2009 saw them drop to two, while an Army Veterinarian was the only team member for 2010. In recent months, a CSCS has come onboard. Ultimately, two people cannot perform the duties necessary for a fully functioning team. Reduced travel dollars have made it difficult, if not impossible, for NFMT Pearl Harbor to give the coverage required to provide Japan (Yokosuka, Sasebo, Okinawa) the service it requires. According to NFMT Pearl Harbor records, only two assist visits to Japan have taken place over the last 4 years, with zero occurring from 2008–2009. (David Webb, NFMT Pearl Harbor, U.S. Navy, personal communication, 2011, March 11)

d. Senior Culinary Specialists on “Twilight” Tour

For a training team such as the NFMT to be successful, the conventional wisdom is that you need the most experienced warrant officers and senior enlisted personnel with many years of service on the books. While we agree that experience is important, high energy and a desire for career advancement will add a needed boost to the teams and increase efficiency. Our nonscientific observation of numerous teams conveyed the impression that they do business a certain way and change is not an option. The lack of cooperation from many teams in providing data, slow return of requested correspondence, lack of spreadsheets tracking performance and underutilized teams in certain fleet areas indicates that the current system needs an alteration.

e. NAVSUP Controls Quality of Life

Regardless of overall command climate, good food and a clean, bright, theme decorated crew mess area can increase morale every day, even during high
operation tempo periods. Meal time is one aspect of sailor life underway that offers the chance to relax, socialize and sample the creations of today’s skilled Culinary Specialists.

NAVSUP has overall responsibility fleet wide for the quality of life the sailor experiences. To get timely, accurate feedback on trends covering current situations, a chain of command that has a direct link to the quality of life management division has an edge on making immediate improvements over a command structure that has multiple layers of bureaucracy. As it stands today, a NFMT discovers a development during an assist visit, provides a situation summary to FISC, who then needs to pass this on to COMFISC. If warranted, COMFISC will pass the information to NAVSUP. This multiple layered command structure increases the likelihood of newsworthy developments going unreported.

f. No Central Data Collection Point

A recurring theme that was encountered during research for this project was the lack of any historical data. Between NAVSUP, COMFISC, multiple FISCs and the NFMTs themselves, very little data from past years exists. Data such as team manning, budget allotments, travel costs, assist visits requested from the fleet, assist visits completed and Supply Management Certification scores are not maintained regularly from past years. Essentially, there is no one central data collection point where trends can be tracked and analyzed. This information is important to have access to, as it would be beneficial to gauge team performance in regard to how much they are accomplishing year to year with differing resources.
V. PROPOSED CONSOLIDATION ANALYSIS

Looking at results from our analyses, we determined that a possible improvement would be the consolidation of seven teams down to a total of three. The three teams that would remain in this proposal are located in the high fleet concentration areas of Norfolk, San Diego and Pearl Harbor. The primary benefits of consolidation would be potential cost savings, as well as an easier-to-manage system that allows for greater efficiency in instructional reviews, policy implementation and training feedback.

Costs incurred by the “as is” model were evaluated by measuring existing team make-up; base salaries earned by those individuals, housing allowances (calculated with dependents), and estimated travel costs (flights, per diem) for the current structure. Comparisons of those totals against what costs would be for consolidated teams were developed to look for savings potential. The new units proposed would operate out of the primary fleet concentration areas, have a reduced number of overall team members and be made up of motivated personnel in lower pay grades that are striving for further advancement. Increased estimated travel costs were accounted for, as they would accrue due to larger areas of responsibility (AOR). Our findings show consolidation would lead to valuable cost savings for the Navy. The following assumptions were made when producing these calculations:

- Basic Pay taken from the 2011 Navy Pay Chart (reference Table 6)
- Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) calculated for each region NFMT is located in at a w/ dependents rate (reference Table 6)
- Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) based on w/ two dependents (reference Table 7)
- Travel based on per diem for area traveled plus air fare (reference Table 8)
- Air fare rate averaged at $500 for CONUS and $1000 OCONUS per flight
- Number of flights based on number of visits per year divided by two
- Visit length is based on an average of 7 days

In the following sections, we analyze the current costs as well as the costs under consolidation for each of the three proposed areas of consolidation.
A. EAST COAST

The approximate costs of maintaining three separate East coast teams in Norfolk, VA, Mayport, FL, and New London, CT, is $896,677 when base pay and Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) are calculated (travel expenses are not included due to incomplete data). These costs are shown in the first column of Figure 5. Combining the teams to just one Norfolk location would make overall cost estimates higher, at approximately $1,061,261 (column 2, Figure 5). Following the plan of reducing redundant billets such as extra OICs (column 4, Figure 5) and filling team slots with exceptional personnel in lower pay grades(column 3, Figure 5), total costs could be as low as $819,104, even with estimated travel costs included. This would be a savings of greater than $77K per year with no foreseen reduction in service level to the fleet.

The tradeoff of increased travel costs versus lower salaries and allowances appears beneficial. Office facility expenses in Mayport and New London would not be accumulated, as only one headquarters in Norfolk would need to be maintained. The key to this succeeding is having the right people in the right billets who know how to make the best use of travel time. Each trip made by the team would include stops to multiple ships and shore facilities to maximize coverage while in a region. Also, not all team members would need to travel at one time to save on flight costs and per diem. For example, three to four team members could travel to New London to do assessments on the fast attack submarines stationed there, while the remaining members continue to work the Norfolk fleet. A full team should not be required every time a visit is requested. Teams could also supplement from ship’s force when doing a visit, such as borrowing a machinist mate from the Engineering Department to do galley equipment safety inspections.
B. PACIFIC FLEET

Figure 7 shows similar cost comparison for the Pacific Fleet AOR. Combined costs for Pearl Harbor and Yokosuka are currently estimated at $860,142. Consolidating down to one team located in Hawaii could result in savings of more than $100K per year. Cost of living allowance (COLA) could also be greatly reduced if all team members were stationed in Hawaii instead of Japan, as rates are roughly half in Hawaii.

Similar to the East Coast AOR, increased travel costs are offset by the reduced personnel costs. In the Pacific Fleet AOR, the Yokosuka office would no longer be needed, which could further reduce costs, with Pearl Harbor being the NFMT’s headquarters for this AOR.
Figure 6. Cost Analysis for Pearl Harbor/Yokosuka

C. WEST COAST

Figure 7 shows similar cost comparison for the West Coast AOR. Combined costs for San Diego and Puget Sound currently equal $712,735 without travel expenses added in. Combining the teams with reduced ranks and manning levels could save around $2K annually and approximately $50K once travel is included.

In the West Coast AOR, the Puget Sound office would no longer be needed, which could further reduce costs, with San Diego being the NFMT’s headquarters for this AOR.
When looking at the results for all three consolidated AORs, we see that potential cost savings from consolidation could total more than $200,000 per year. It should be noted, however, that this analysis is only for personnel and travel cost. Other factors, such as facility expenses for headquarters and office support material costs may also need to be considered.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

Upon careful analysis of the processes that make up the “as is” model, extensive review of the roles played by stakeholders and data analysis, we developed the following conclusions:

1. Navy Food Service (SUP 05)

Navy Food Service (SUP 05) falls under NAVSUP, naturally entitling all units involved in food service to be tied under a single command structure. Having the NFMTs acting as a separate entity, away from SUP 05, is fundamentally flawed. SUP 05 has control of the all other food service functions under the following branches: Policy and Programs Branch, Training and Nutrition and Fleet Support.

2. NFMT Data Recording and Archiving

The lack of consistent data makes any verifiable measurements of efficiency or effectiveness of the teams very difficult. NAVSUP, COMFISC, FISCs and the NFMTs, maintain very little data from past years. Data such as team manning, budget allotments, travel costs, assist visits requested from the fleet, assist visits completed and Supply Management Certification are not archived. Essentially, there is no one central data collection point where trends can be tracked and analyzed.

3. Engineering (Galley Standardization)

SUP 51 holds the technical warrant for food service operations and galley design. The scope of the warrant includes policy, galley design, equipment, culinary specialist rating sponsors and other key functions. NFMTs have engineering and culinary expertise needed to assist with NAVSUP policy compliance efforts and galley equipment engineering and technical support responsibilities. NAVSUP partners with Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA (the technical community), Department of Defense (DoD) and industry in a coordinated effort to provide safe and reliable equipment to the fleet. There is an extensive push towards standardization to reduce the cost of training and
maintenance with installed systems afloat. There is active Program Executive Officer (PEO) Carrier and PEO Ship action items with data requirements the NFMTs could support, which is an important role outside the FISC domain. NAVSUP leads up Life Cycle Review (cradle to grave), playing an essential role in design, procurement, installation, operation, maintenance and replacement (DON, 2009).

4. **Policy Implementation**

The NFMTs are not currently utilized consistently for direct support of projects and initiatives. For example, when extensive reviews and rewrites of the NAVSUP P-486, Food Service Management publication takes place, teams could be tasked with certain sections of the document and would be responsible for the review of those chapters and recommended changes of the volume.

5. **Afloat Training Group**

The Afloat Training Groups (ATGs) and Navy Food Management Teams perform remarkably similar functions. They both provide assistance and training for food service operations ashore and afloat, yet one is perceived as a “friend” (assistance) while the other (ATG) is seen as the “inspector” (inspection). These are not scientific views, but a general perception that sailors have when it comes time for an external review. With the need for a team that can visit a ship or shore installation to lend a helping hand without fear of inspector reprisal, the desire is to leave the ATG and NFMT as status quo, separate entities for as long as funding remains available to support both units.

6. **FSM Implementation/System Analysts**

The Food Service Management (FSM) system has been the standard in food service records keeping for many years and has served its function to the fullest. It is under the guidance of the Fleet Support Branch and its analysts reside under SUP 05, not COMFISC. With the existing FSM system due to be replaced by the newer FSM 3.0 version, a “train the trainer” technique is to be utilized by the technical experts to train the NFMTs, who in turn train sailors in the fleet on the intricacies of the new version. This is another case where a direct link from NAVSUP to the NFMTs may result in a
smoother transition, a more efficient training program and quicker implementation of the
records system for the culinary specialists in the fleet.

7. NAVSUP Budget Control

Budgets for each team are not currently managed and evaluated by a central
office. By monitoring the travel and operating budgets centrally, it would be easier to see
when teams were running low or had an excess of funds, allowing them to be moved
accordingly. This budget oversight, while appearing as micro-management, could save
valuable resources from being wasted unnecessarily.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Develop Centralized Data Collection Point

Our primary recommendation is to develop a standardized process for data
collection, analysis and archiving. During the course of this research, one item that
became painfully clear is the need for a centralized data collection point, a type of
Continuous Monitoring Program (CMP). Historical records should be kept covering
statistics that are relevant to team performance over the course of at least 10 years. The
following would be beneficial if tracked centrally:

- Number of personnel listed by team
- Job positions held by team members
- Pay grades of the personnel holding the positions
- Annual budgets for office supplies and materials
- Annual travel budgets
- Supply Management Certification scores for all ship classes
- Assist visits requested by ships/shore installations
- Assist visits completed at ship/shore installations
- Ships that are within/outside of visit periodicity
- Situation summaries/assist visit reports

Without this data collection and an analyst to review trends, it is difficult to gauge
the effectiveness of NFMTs over time. This recommendation would aid in determining
metrics of success for teams and whether they are doing the best they can with the resources allocated to them. Political conditions and inflation each year may limit the effectiveness of budget tracking over time, yet it is all part of the overall snapshot for historical team performance and data accessibility, which can be useful when planners are studying what works and what should be cut.

2. **NFMTs Back Under NAVSUP Control**

Re-align the Navy Food Management Teams under the command and control of Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP). By making this happen, the NFMTs would once again assume their natural position within the Naval Food Service Division where they belong and alleviate some of the complexities of the existing setup. The direct link from NAVSUP to the NFMTs would aid in communicating training deficiencies faster, as highly trained culinary specialists are a key component of quality of life for the sailor and a priority for the NAVSUP Enterprise. To do this, a new Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) would need to be authored to transition the alignment of the NFMTs back under NAVSUP, effective at the beginning of the new fiscal year.

   a. **FSM Implementation/System Analysts Under NAVSUP**

   The link from technicians to the NFMTs should be a direct one, without additional levels of command structure in between. This will speed up training on the new program, allow for more immediate feedback of concerns or training issues and expedite implementation throughout the fleet. Putting system analysts from NAVSUP to work directly with the NFMTs long term would be ideal during the program transformation and greatly assist NFMT personnel understand the nuances of a system they have been tasked to teach.

   b. **Engineering (Galley Standardization)**

   If the NFMT is in a direct support role under the FISCs, it becomes a question of FISC priorities as to whether the assets can be made available to support requirements at echelons above III, such as engineering plans and galley design. If the
NFMTs were in general support under NAVSUP control, they could be deployed to support requirements and priorities from an enterprise wide perspective. The bottom line is that NFMT support must be provided to the fleet in a timely and comprehensive manner. Alignment under NAVSUP would allow these important assets to be applied where and when they are needed to meet ship/TYCOM requirements, while satisfying enterprise wide objectives.

c. **NAVSUP Budget Control**

Central control of budgeting would lead to increased oversight of costs incurred and allow the flexibility to re-allocate funds to teams that are in need of additional travel dollars.

3. **Policy Implementation**

The NFMTs should be used regularly for direct support of projects and initiatives. For example, when extensive reviews and rewrites of the NAVSUP P-486, Food Service Management publication takes place, teams should be tasked with certain sections of the document and shall be responsible for the review of those chapters and recommended changes of the volume.

4. **Competitive Tour**

A highly recommended change is to make a billet assignment working with a Navy Food Management Team a highly competitive, career enhancing role. Too often the NFMT is viewed as a “twilight” tour, meaning the final job before retirement. In the present make-up, the most experienced culinary specialists from the fleet run the teams, control their allotted budgets, conduct assist visits and train junior personnel on the best techniques for proper galley operation. This arrangement has been the standard mode of operation during the existence of the teams and one that has been for the most part, quite successful. To gain absolute efficiency, motivation, effectiveness and an infusion of new energy, we propose making the NFMT a highly sought after, “competitive” tour. If completed successfully, these billets will lead to strong evaluations that will enhance individual advancement prospects due to the importance of the mission conducted. The
theory is that hard charging E-7s, E-8s and newly appointed warrant officers already have the necessary technical expertise, real-world experience and positive energy to make significant improvement in team performance. While the teams are not geared toward Supply Management Certification (SMC) results, a more ambitious team organization will lead to improved fleet performance once evaluated numerically.

5. **NFMT Consolidation: East Coast, West Coast and Pacific Fleet**

By consolidating teams to three; an East coast, West coast and a Pacific Fleet unit, eliminating extra OICs and reducing ranks of team personnel, there will be an anticipated reduction in overall costs of the operation. Travel costs will increase due to added AORs, but reductions in manpower, salaries, BAH and facilities expenses will offset these costs, making this prospect appealing when looking at future budget reductions. Tables 10–12 show the proposed manning and rank for the consolidated teams.

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<th>Table 10. Proposed Norfolk Consolidation of Teams</th>
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Table 12. Proposed Pearl Harbor Consolidation of Teams

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<td>Senior Instructor E-9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Culinary Specialists E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Army Staff Veterinarian E-6</td>
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</table>

Figures 8–10 define the consolidated AOR’s for each of the teams. An added bonus of consolidation is the ability to surge teams to an area that may see the need to schedule multiple visits at the same time (Naval Supply Systems Command, 2004).

**NFMT Norfolk**
Virginia; West Virginia; Illinois; North Carolina; Maryland; NAVDIST\NASH; Keeflavik; and European areas as far east as the eastern border of Turkey

**NFMT New London**
Naval Submarine Base, New London Pennsylvania; New York; New Jersey; Connecticut; Rhode Island; Massachusetts; and Maine

**NFMT Mayport**
Florida; Louisiana; Bahamas; West Indies; Gulfport & Pascagoula, MS; Kings Bay, Georgia; Texas; South Carolina; Tennessee; Puerto Rico; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and Panama Canal Zone

Figure 8. AOR: Norfolk, Mayport and New London
Upon initial observation, the combining of the three teams in the new AOR for NFMT Norfolk looks massive and unreasonable in scope. Upon closer examination, however, many of these regions no longer have bases or there are very few food service operations that require assistance. Virginia, Connecticut, Florida and Kings Bay, Georgia would be the primary scope of coverage required, with the remainder not requiring extensive manpower or financial resources. As can be seen in Figures 10 and 11, the other two proposed AORs do not have nearly as large a list of coverage areas.

**Figure 9.** AOR: Pearl Harbor and Yokosuka

- **NFMT Pearl Harbor**
  - Hawaii; Guam, Southwest Asia (SWA), Japan, and Korea

- **NFMT Yokosuka**
  - Fleet and Industrial Supply Center
  - Diego Garcia; Japan; and Korea

**Figure 10.** AOR: San Diego and Puget Sound

- **NFMT San Diego**
  - Naval Station San Diego
  - California; Nevada; and Oregon

- **NFMT Puget**
  - Washington; Oregon; and Alaska
6. Improve Avenues for Communication and Feedback

One of the main issues with the current organizational chart seen in Figure 11 is the “feedback loop.” NFMTs, ATG and COMNAVAIRFOR (CNAF) see events unfolding each day out in the fleet. Their version of immediate events and upward/downward trends proceed inconsistently through their chain of command and are unlikely to make it all the way to NAVSUP. Various NFMTs have stated they debrief the supply officer and commanding officer after an assist visit, but no one else. There is no apparent summary report to FISC, COMFISC or NAVSUP, which can be detrimental to correcting training flaws that are observed. This lack of feedback affects publication review, policy implementation and quarterly training plans.

An effective “feedback loop” allows help to be sent where required, using assets from one team to help another if necessary (Figure 12). For example, a team member in
San Diego may be an expert cake decorator. If the Pearl Harbor team lacks that particular skill set, proper communication from a hub such as NAVSUP could allow that skilled team member to travel to Pearl Harbor to teach a cake decorating class. Whenever an emergent requirement arises on a ship where assistance is needed, a solid communication link between the teams and one end source (SUP 05) is logical.

This figure represents an extremely simplified structure for what is recommended. All NFMTs and TYCOMs will be on equal footing in regards to the “feedback loop.” All organizations will report situations concerning the customer to NAVSUP, who will in turn provide timely recommendations and initiate policy change if called for. These reports will not be grades or critiques of a specific unit, only reflections of training successes and deficiencies. This elimination of bureaucracy will bring timely information from the waterfront to the Navy Food Service Division expeditiously and with no extra interference.

Figure 12. Proposed “Feedback Loop”

In this chapter, we have summarized our conclusions and set forth several recommendations regarding the management of Navy food service in the future.
Execution of the following five steps drawn from established management principles can help the organization move forward with changes that are chosen to be implemented, improve the health of NFMT training abilities, facilitate clearer communications and better define team performance goals:

1) Establish overall goals for the next 3 years.
2) Ensure everyone in the organization knows and understands what is to be achieved.
3) Break down goals into monthly or quarterly segments.
4) Review the people, processes and policies in place each year to reach the established goals.
5) Execute the plan!
LIST OF REFERENCES

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http://www.defensetravel.dod.mil/site/colaCalc.cfm

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