NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF DEFENSE BUDGET RHETORIC

by

Corey D. Barksdale

June 2011

Thesis Co-Advisors: Philip Candreva
Lisa Lindsey

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		*Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188*

1. AGENCY USE ONLY *(Leave blank)*	2. REPORT DATE June 2011	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A Content Analysis of Defense Budget Rhetoric		5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Corey Deon Barksdale		

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
    Naval Postgraduate School
    Monterey, CA 93943-5000
		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number: N/A

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

In accordance with federal law, the President is required to present to Congress a budget of the United States government by February of each year. This action marks the beginning of the legislative phase of the federal budget process. This thesis provides a systematic analysis of communication between the executive branch and Congress regarding the defense budget. A quantitative content analysis of the President's budget press releases and published transcripts from the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) authorization for appropriations hearings on military posture from fiscal years 2001 to 2010, will demonstrate that the framework of the President's budget press releases can guide issue attention in Congressional hearings, and that Congress uses congressional hearings to frame their own issues. The SASC hearings provide the first opportunity for Congress to collectively engage in constructive dialogue with the SECDEF and the CJCS following the release of the President's budget.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Defense Budget, Content Analysis, Political Discourse, Budget Rhetoric, Political Communication, Senate Armed Services Committee			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 69
			16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

**A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF
DEFENSE BUDGET RHETORIC**

Corey D. Barksdale
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2005

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2011**

Author: Corey D. Barksdale

Approved by: Philip Candreva
                Thesis Co-Advisor

                Lisa Lindsey
                Thesis Co-Advisor

                William R. Gates, PhD
                Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

In accordance with federal law, the President is required to present to Congress a budget of the United States government by February of each year. This action marks the beginning of the legislative phase of the federal budget process. This thesis provides a systematic analysis of communication between the executive branch and Congress regarding the defense budget. A quantitative content analysis of the President's budget press releases and published transcripts from the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) authorization for appropriations hearings on military posture from fiscal years 2001 to 2010, will demonstrate that the framework of the President's budget press releases can guide issue attention in Congressional hearings, and that Congress uses congressional hearings to frame their own issues. The SASC hearings provide the first opportunity for Congress to collectively engage in constructive dialogue with the SECDEF and the CJCS following the release of the President's budget.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DoD	Department of Defense
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
RDT&E	Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank God for giving me this opportunity. Thanks for picking me up when I was down, thanks for motivating me when I needed motivating, and thanks for giving me the insight I needed to "see it through."

To my friends, family, and classmates who supported me throughout this journey, I thank you. I never felt once that I was alone in this process.

I would also like to thank all the professors whom I have had the joy of learning from. Special thanks go to my advisors for believing in me and guiding me through this process.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I.   INTRODUCTION

A.   BACKGROUND

Federal budgeting is a highly structured and complex process that involves a variety of procedures requiring exhaustive coordination between executive and legislative branch officials. Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the "power of the purse," that is, the power to lay and collect taxes, borrow money, and pay debts as necessary to ensure the general welfare of the United States and its citizens. It also requires that all money drawn from the Treasury be subsequent to appropriations made by law. The Constitution does not explicitly stipulate the President's role in the nation's financial management process, nor does it provide a framework for how this process should be carried out.

Over the years, several laws have prescribed the way the nation's finances are managed. Two of the most notable budget laws were the Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921 and the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921 created the requirement for presidents to annually prepare and submit a comprehensive spending plan to Congress. The passage of this act also established the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget [OMB]), which was created to delineate budget guidance and assist the President with the formulation and execution of the federal budget. The passage of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 established the congressional budget and formalized the congressional budget process. It also established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to assist Congress in handling budgetary matters. Prior to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Congress played a minimal role in the federal budget process (Meyer, 2002, p. 73).

The federal budget cycle includes four phases: (1) executive formulation, (2) congressional action, (3) budget execution, and (4) audit and evaluation. During the executive formulation phase, OMB works closely with federal agencies to formulate their budget requests. OMB assists the agencies with resolving conflicts and provides guidance concerning the impact of potential policy initiatives and economic projections

on each agency's request. "Agencies are supposed to justify the President's recommendations, not their own. OMB maintains an elaborate legislative clearance process to ensure that agency budget justifications, testimony, and other submissions are consistent with presidential policy" (Keith & Schick, 2003, p. xxi).

The President is required to present to Congress a budget of the United States government by February of each year. The budget typically begins with the President's message to Congress and is followed by a summary and justification of major proposals associated with each federal agency. The President's budget is a management tool, which reflects national priorities. It is a detailed plan of how financial resources of the U.S. government should be allocated. The President's budget is also a policy tool, which is used to control and coordinate activities of the government.

It is important to note that the President's budget is only a *request* to Congress. Once the President's budget is finalized, it is presented to the press and handed off to Congress, where a series of hearings take place in which the President's budget is explained and defended. Congress can accept the budget as is, modify it, or reject it all together. The Senate and House Budget committees hold hearings and receive testimony from various civil and military officials on matters concerning the budget. During this process, other congressional committees simultaneously review the President's budget with respect to the programs in their jurisdiction. These committees present the Budget committees with "views and estimates" of their respective programs, which takes into account information gathered from the hearings, expert opinions, and congressional reports generated by the CBO. The Armed Services committees do this for defense matters. The Senate and House budget committees are responsible for aggregating this information and formulating a concurrent resolution on the budget by mid-April.

Section 301 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires that the content of the concurrent resolution on the budget include: (1) totals of new budget authority and outlays, (2) federal revenues and the impact of spending on debt and deficit, (3) spending broken down by functional category, (4) reconciliation and policy directives, and (5) other mechanisms of budget enforcement and control. More simply stated, the concurrent budget resolution sets the total spending levels for each of the nineteen budget

functions for the next five or more years, and estimates the revenues that the government expects collect. Budget authority for discretionary spending is allocated in a single binding number by the concurrent budget resolution to the Senate and House Appropriations committees. From there, the appropriations committees allocate budget authority amongst subcommittees responsible for the twelve regular appropriations acts. All regular appropriations acts must follow authorizing legislation. Legislative committees within Congress are responsible for creating, modifying, or cutting existing programs. No discretionary program can be appropriated funds without receiving the proper authority to exist.

The Department of Defense (DoD) typically is appropriated approximately half of all discretionary spending, which puts it at the epicenter of all budgetary debates. The DoD formulates its budget through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system. The PPBE system attempts to match resources to programs, which are in alignment with our nation's political and military objectives. In the executive formulation phase of the federal budget process, DoD leaders work closely with OMB and executive branch officials to plan a budget that is aligned with the goals of the President. Concurrent with the rollout of the President's budget, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) traditionally holds a press conference, which highlights the key elements of the DoD budget request. In the ensuing weeks, the SECDEF, along with other high-ranking military officials, will justify and defend the DoD's budget request in a series of congressional hearings.

A detailed overview of the federal budget process and the DoD PPBE system is not necessary to describe. For an in-depth description see Keith and Schick, 2003; Jones and McCaffery, 2008; Lee, Johnson, and Joyce, 2008.

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Constitutional doctrine guarantees separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government through a system of checks and balances. Although constitutional powers are distinct, both sides are dependent upon one another. "Collaboration between the two elective branches lies at the heart of the successes—and

failures—of our government" (Davidson, 2002, p. 71). As noted by Thurber (2002), "intense rivalry between the President and Congress is inevitable in an electoral system that can produce divided party control of the two branches" (p. 16); therefore, communication is essential for the effective and efficient execution of government.

The lives of many people are affected by budget decisions made by the U.S. government. The federal budget process involves a plethora of government actors who have different values and ideals, are motivated by independent factors, and are influenced by a variety of distinct individuals. Communication amongst these actors must be appropriately acknowledged as a critical element in order to conciliate conflicting priorities. The role of political discourse is important as it pertains to the federal budgetary process of the United States, especially during a time of increased budgetary tensions. "How an issue or policy is talked about is almost as important as what it actually is" (Andres & Griffin, 2002, p. 152). Enhanced communication can improve efficiency of the budgeting process, but at times "the development of the federal budget often appears to be a disjointed effort between two branches of government that fail to effectively communicate with one another or coordinate their efforts" (Cullather, 1995, p. 1).

Given the importance of discourse in the federal budget process, examining communication between the executive branch and Congress in the context of DoD budget issues deserves more attention. Systematic analysis of how the executive branch and Congress frame the debate on DoD budgetary issues is an important stepping-stone to understand how federal budget priorities are determined.

C.   OBJECTIVE

The primary objectives of this thesis are as follows: (1) provide a brief background of the federal budgetary process and create a context in which content analysis plays an important role in understanding the relationships between the executive branch of government and Congress from a communications perspective, (2) identify the key themes of the President's budget for the DoD through the SECDEF's published press

releases, and (3) evaluate how Congress frames the debate on DoD budget issues by analyzing their response to the release of the President's budget. This content analysis was driven by one basic research question:

- To what extent does Congress respond to the President's message framing of the annual defense budget?

A satisfactory answer to the primary research question will include a discussion of the themes and trends in the key issues and concerns that either Congress or the executive branch are concerned about. This thesis will provide valuable insight on the relationship between congressional committees and the executive branch as it relates to the defense budget.

D.   SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

The purpose of this thesis is to examine how Congress and the executive branch frame the debate on defense-focused budget issues. This research will not only add to the literature that currently addresses the communication and coordination issues between the executive branch and Congress, but will also highlight the importance of message characteristics in understanding how budgetary priorities are determined.

There are a limited number of applications of the content analytic research method in the political science field. This thesis will further demonstrate and validate content analysis as a viable and useful tool for providing a quantitative representation of qualitative data, especially as it pertains to policy science.

E.   ORGANIZATION

The introduction begins with a description of the responsibilities of the executive branch and Congress on financial matters as set forth by the U.S. Constitution. There have been a few major legislative acts which have affected the framework of the federal budgetary process adhered to today. A brief overview of the federal budget process is provided. The purpose of Chapter I is to establish the context in which the communication between the executive branch and Congress is important to study.

Chapter II examines the current literature that discusses the relationships between the executive branch and Congress from a communications perspective. The concepts of framing, priming, and agenda setting are explored. A brief overview of content analysis is presented. This chapter ends with a survey of the literature in which the application of content analysis has been directed toward the policy sciences.

Chapters III–V takes the reader on a systematic approach to answering the primary research question presented earlier. Results and conclusions are reported, followed by recommendations for further study.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on political communications is highly fragmented. Political scientists and cognitive researchers saturate the field of study with broad approaches from varying perspectives. McGraw (2000) captures this phenomenon precisely by stating that, "although the pluralistic nature of the discipline is perhaps its most defining quality, there has also been an ebb and flow in the paradigms that have dominated political psychology scholarship" (p. 806). This discontinuity in the literature makes it difficult to build upon prior research. Subsequent to a thorough examination of scholarly articles and books, much of the literature can be aggregated in a manner representative of two very consistent approaches. In the first approach, the research impetus is directed towards examining the legislative response to executive budget proposals. The second approach is theoretical, and deals with the dynamics of what Thurber (2002) refers to as "message politics" (p. 169).

A. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO EXECUTIVE BUDGET PROPOSALS

The federal budget process has evolved in a manner that inhibits communication between the Executive and Congress. A chain of budget laws have redefined political responsibilities and provided a "congressional opportunity structure" (Sheingate, 2006) that allows participants to assert a more dominant sphere of influence on defense policy. Both sides produce a budget that often reflects disparate policy goals and competing priorities. A lack of communication is more transparent as the polarization of political parties becomes more distinct, and the growing mistrust in the management of federal agencies perpetuates throughout the government in the form of budget debates. "The lack of coordination and communication is often viewed as a symptom of a divided government," which as a result, has "hindered the efficiency of the budget process" (Cullather, 1995, p. 511). Wildavsky and Caiden (2004) refer to the budgetary process as a "process of opposites" (p. 220).

Historically, researchers have approached the communication between the executive branch and Congress from varying perspectives. Seldom has Congress and the

Executive agreed in whole on matters concerning the defense budget. Researchers tend to agree that there exists a lack of communication between the two branches of government. Thurber (2002) put it best when he said that, "understanding the dance between president's and lawmakers requires a broader perspective" (p. 158). Much of the literature on presidential-congressional communications has focused on the "why" of communications—as in why is there a lack of communication on certain policy issues, and not the "how" of communications—as in how much do these two sides actually communicate on certain issues. A lack of communication, in a budgetary context, is an effect of the differences between how each side handles budgetary matters.

"Change in budgeting means change in politics" (Schick, 1978, p. 65). Thurber (1988) examined how the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of 1974 and the 1985 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (commonly referred to as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act) affected congressional-presidential relations on budgetary matters. These two reforms were attempts by Congress "to recapture presidential domination of the budget-making process" (Thurber, 1988, p. 102). His findings suggest that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and the 1974 budget act have strained the budgeting relationship between the president and Congress. These two reforms have increased the number of actors in the budgeting process, created a budgeting process more independent of the president, and forced the executive staff to work closer with Congress (Thurber, 1988, p. 112). Budgeting, as a result, has become "more conflictual and difficult for the president and Congress" (Thurber, 1988, p. 112).

The scholarly debate on the relationship between the executive branch and Congress gravitates more toward who exercises control over the nation's priorities, rather than assessing the underlying stimuli responsible for their differing views. Aspin (1975) implicitly charges that the fight over control is a consequence of the expansion in scope of the Executive and the departure of Congress from the traditional role as a conduit for constituent concern, overseer of government programs and policies, and protector of the process of government (p. 174). Typically when Congress opposes the views of the Executive, "it is usually to protect some interest group or some aspect of the status quo rather than to initiate action" (Aspin, 1975, p. 173).

Cullather (1995) offers a somewhat similar view in that "the Executive and legislative branches do not share common perspectives" (p. 516). He states that, "the president is required to examine policies from a national perspective, while individual senators and representatives must consider the impact of government policies on their constituents" (Cullather, 1995, p. 516). Cullather (1995) advocates the use of budget summits as a tool to improve the communication and coordination between the executive branch and Congress. He believes that budget summits are the most effective way to achieve consensus between Congress and the President. Congress does not react to legislation proposed by the President in the same manner that the public reacts. The lack of recognition of the latter, Cullather (1995) states is "due to the lack of coordination between Congress and the president" (p. 516).

Competing priorities has been the topic of favor for some political science scholars. Kamlet and Mowery (1987) examined various influences on budgetary priorities in the executive branch and Congress. Their model assesses the relative influence (interdependence) on budgetary outcomes of fiscal, political, macroeconomic, and programmatic spending pressures. Kamlet and Mowery (1987) use the figures proposed in the President's budget and the congressional modification of those figures as a measure of budgetary priorities. Their findings suggest that the executive branch budgets are more interdependent than congressional budgets. The empirical results implicitly suggest a lack of communication and coordination between the executive branch and Congress. Competing budgetary priorities are merely a symptom of such nature.

Kanter's (1972) research on the congressional modifications of the President's defense budget employed a less sophisticated model than that of Kamlet and Mowery. His argument reiterated the universally acknowledged principle that congressional scrutiny of the budget favored a programmatic and fiscal orientation (see Mayar, 1993; Art, 1985; Blackmon, 1975) Kanter examined the changes made to the President's budget by both the House and Senate. He concluded that, "it is the programmatic explanations that have the greatest potential significance for defense policy" (p. 142). Maintaining

tight control over fiscal posture is still at the forefront of the congressional priority list; however, Kanter's (1972) findings indicate an ever-increasing desire for Congress to influence defense policy objectives (p. 142).

Research by Shull (1979) suggests that the lack of communication and coordination between the executive branch and Congress is attributed to differences in how each side views federal agencies. Shull examined the interaction between presidential support for agencies and Congress' reaction to the President's position on the policies relating to those agencies. He proposes that agencies attempt to increase the communication between the executive and Congress in order to increase chances at obtaining "budget success." When Congress agrees with the agency's policy direction, they are more likely to support the President's position on the budget. The assumption here is that the President himself supports the agency's policy direction as well. Shull criticizes his own work by acknowledging that the statistical relationships in his model are low. He justified the significance of his work by characterizing his efforts as an early attempt at establishing a linkage between communication and coordination and the support or non-support for federal agencies. Shull's hypothesis stands alone amongst similar studies and deserves further investigation. This thesis is designed to help fill the void in the political communications literature by addressing issues similar to those examined by Shull.

A personal observation is that the tone of the policy debate on the defense budget has become sharper in recent years. Congressional scrutiny of the defense budget has been characterized by some as micromanagement. "Micromanagement is best viewed as a problem of competition among political actors for policy control" (Mayar, 1993, p. 294). In his research, Mayar (1993) selected the number of defense budget line item changes by Congress as a measure of congressional activity on the defense budget. His research findings support that, "congressional activism is a direct function of policy and budgetary disputes between Congress and DoD" (p. 293). Works by Laurance (1976) and Lindsay (1987) clearly support an increasing insertion of Congress into the defense policy-making arena. The "outside game" as branded by Lindsay (1987), refers to the changes in congressional decision making on defense policy that emerged during the

1980s (p. 382). Congressional involvement in defense has become more visible and "much activity has bypassed the traditional channels of power within the defense committees" (Lindsay, 1987, p. 382). The "outside game" has motivated congressional actors to become more involved with a wider range of issues. The implications are that defense issues are more representative of individual views, consequently leading to delays in the budgetary cycle, the erosion of the committee system, and increased micromanagement of the DoD (Lindsay, 1987).   The mistrust and subsequent micromanagement of government agencies results in a self-perpetuating relationship that further breaks down communication.

There is an abundance of literature with specific focus on the process of communications. "The relationship between the branches is complex, dynamic, and fraught with misunderstanding" (Thurber, 2002, p. 160). Understanding why the executive branch and Congress sometimes fail to communicate is relevant because the decisions that get made on Capitol Hill affect the daily lives of the public. In no way do the aforementioned studies cover the broad array of theories and examinations that address the interpersonal and organizational relationships between the President and Congress.

B.   FRAMING, PRIMING, AND AGENDA SETTING

Political communications is narrowly defined as, "the activity of specialized institutions that disseminate information, ideas, and attitudes about the political system" (Abacarian & Soule, 1971, p. 8). Much of the literature on political communications consists of attempts to conceptualize the effects that strategic political messages and news media coverage have on the public (Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997). News media coverage of politically controversial issues has been proven to induce favorable effects on public perception (e.g., Iyengar, 1996). The concepts of framing, priming, and agenda setting are grounded in the fields of social and behavioral science. The importance of these concepts to research in political science has been realized through their noteworthy application in journalism and strategic decision-making.

Framing, agenda setting, and priming represent the most recent paradigm shift in political communication research (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 10). These three models combine to construct the strategic arsenal that political elites use to advance their position. The definitions of framing, priming, and agenda setting are similar, yet very distinct in meaning (Weaver, 2007). Framing an issue refers to shaping a message in a way that influences how the audience understands that message (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Framing effects occur when "a speaker's emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations cause individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions" (Druckman, 2001, p. 1042). Agenda setting and priming, often used interchangeably (Weaver, 2007), are "based on the memory-based models of information processing" (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 11). Agenda setting is based on the idea that issues that are more salient influence an individual's judgment, while priming refers to shaping the considerations people that people take into account when making decisions.

The intent is not to get too overwhelmed in theory (for in depth overviews of framing, agenda setting, and priming, see Druckman, 2001; Scheufele, 1999; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Weaver, 2007). The next two examples illustrate how some researchers have explored framing effects. Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier (2004) explored the priming strategies employed by political candidates. They developed a framework that suggests a candidate's priming strategy is driven by public opinion, the position and personality of competing candidates, and exogenous events (p. 1199). Barker (2005) evaluated how voters respond to different message frames during the 2000 Republican nomination campaign. His findings suggests that not only do people respond to frames more favorably when their values are similar to those of the messenger, but they also tend to more highly regard the messenger as well. Druckman and Holmes' (2004) study on President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address provided empirical evidence that the President can influence his approval rating by priming the issues that underlie his evaluation.

Issue framing is an important concept in political science. "Frames...become invaluable tools for presenting relatively complex issues...efficiently and in a way that

12

makes them accessible to lay audiences because they play to existing cognitive schemas" (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007, p. 12). How an issue is framed, plays an important role in the communication between political actors and their constituents.

C.   CONTENT ANALYSIS

Communication is the foundation of all social interaction. Effective communication is of paramount concern to organizations with high aspirations to thrive in dynamic environments. Many successful groups and institutions place a heavy emphasis on the role that communication plays in their organizational structure. Conventional wisdom suggests that effective communication can be linked to increases in productivity, innovation, and operational effectiveness. "It is thus axiomatic that the study of the processes and content of communication is basic to all social sciences" (Holsti, 1969, p. 596).

Communication takes shape in many forms. Greenbaum (1974) writes that, "organizational communication consists of various message sending and receiving phenomena affecting formal social units in which individuals work toward common goals" (p. 740). Content analysis the application of the scientific method in the field of communication. The goal of content analysis is to propose and test hypotheses which explain or makes inferences about a given phenomenon. The purpose of content analysis has been described by Janowitz (1968):

> Content analysis can be used for making inferences from content back to the communicator, in which case the analyst is concerned with understanding the intentions, strategy, and goals of the communicator. Secondly, content analysis can be used to make inferences from the content to the audience, in which case the analyst is concerned with audience response and reaction (p. 648).

Content analysis conforms to three basic principles: objectivity, systematic analysis, and generality (Holsti, 1969). Objectivity implies that the analysis method is constrained by a formulated set of rules such that the same results can be attained by a different analyst. Most researchers refer to this as reliability. Systematic analysis requires that the inclusion or exclusion of content or categories follows consistent

collection criteria—this prevents material being selected which only supports the investigator's hypothesis. Generality means that the results must have theoretical relevance. Systematic analysis and generality are forged into what more recent researchers refer to as validity. The basic structure of a credible content analysis, regardless of what topic or communication medium is being analyzed, must in some shape or form, resemble that of the scientific method.

"The purpose of content-analysis research is to present a systematic and objective description of the attributes of communication," (Holsti, 1969, p. 653). In the field of content analysis, research is generally performed for two main reasons: (1) to describe the characteristics of communication content; (2) to make inferences about the causes or effects of communication content. Table 1 adopted from Holsti (1969) summarizes three main purposes of content analysis and describes typical research question applicable to each purpose.

Purpose	Questions	Research Problem
To describe characteristics of communication	What?	To describe trends in communication To relate known characteristics of sources to the messages they produce. To audit communication content against standards
	How?	To analyze techniques of persuasion To analyze style
	To Whom?	To relate known characteristics of the audience to messages produced for them To describe patterns of communication
To make inferences as to the antecedents of communication	Why?	To secure political and military intelligence To analyze psychological traits of individuals To infer aspects of culture and cultural change To provide legal evidence
	Who	To answer questions of disputed authorship
To make inferences as to the effects of communication	With what effect?	To measure readability To analyze the flow of information To assess responses to communication

Table 1:   The Purposes of Content Analysis

Given the focus of this thesis is to examine how Congress and the executive branch frames the debate on DoD budget issues, content analysis is the best research method to answer the research questions listed above. Content analysis will be used in this study to describe the characteristics of communication and to make inferences as the effects of communication. Even though there is limited literature that applies the content analytic research method to the political sciences, the methodology has been proven as a viable tool to analyze budget rhetoric in presidential campaign speeches (Burden & Sanberg, 2003; Hart, Jarvis, & Lim, 2002), state of the union addresses (Moen, 1988; Druckman & Holmes, 2004), senate reports (Blackmon, 1975), and senatorial speeches (Tetlock, 1981). The possibilities of applying this research method are endless.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The framework for analysis used herein is a derivative of the flowchart for the process of content analysis research proposed by Neuendorf (2002, pp. 50–51). The thrust of this research process involved: (1) identifying the content to be examined, (2) defining the variables to be used in the study (conceptualizations), (3) developing a unit of data collection (operationalizations), (4) establishing computer coding schemes, (5) reporting results, and (6) assessing the reliability of the model.

A. SELECTION OF RESEARCH MATERIALS

The goal of this research project was to take an objective look inside the communications structure surrounding the executive branch and Congress, with particular focus on the defense budget. The intent was to examine the communication and coordination between these two branches by comparing and contrasting how debates over defense policy and other concerning issues were framed.

The research materials used in this thesis are the published transcripts of DoD authorization for appropriation hearings held before the SASC, and the President's budget press releases regarding the defense budget the for the period covering fiscal years 2001 to 2010. This period encompasses leadership from three different presidents, three different defense secretaries, contains one major war, and has at least two changes of partisan leadership in the executive and legislative branches. Thus said, ten years was considered a reasonable period of coverage to satisfy the objectives of this research project.

1. SASC Hearings

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 created the SASC. The SASC is one of sixteen standing committees in the Senate and has jurisdiction and legislative oversight over matters relating to the common defense of the United States. The Authorizations process is the "arena that the SASC displays the greatest potential for shaping defense policy or influencing specific program outcomes" (Blackmon, 1975, p. 19). Due to

jurisdictional coverage over the largest federal agency in the United States, the SASC can be considered as one of the most powerful and influential committees within the Senate.

The DoD Authorization for Appropriations hearings before the SASC were selected as the primary research materials to represent the views of Congress concerning defense matters. The hearings *typically* begin shortly after the President's budget is released in early February, and can sometimes run into the summertime months. The word "typically" is in italics to emphasize the volatility in the federal budget process. The SASC committee members typically begin the series of hearings with testimony from the SECDEF accompanied by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). In subsequent hearings, SASC committee members hear testimony from the Service Chiefs, Service Secretaries, and Unified Combatant Commanders—each of which take place on different dates. Hearings on major defense-related issues (i.e., ballistic missile defense and atomic energy) follow thereafter.

This thesis focuses on the hearings in which the SECDEF is the primary witness. The SECDEF is called as the chief witness during the hearings on *military posture.* The military posture hearings highlight the DoD's key points of interest in the President's budget. It gives the SASC the opportunity to provide its committee members with a baseline justification of some of the key elements of the proposed defense budget. Committee members are able to respond to the SECDEF with questions or comments in a time-constrained atmosphere. In addition to the question and answer period, committee members may also submit written statements (or questions) for the record; many of which are usually addressed by the SECDEF beforehand.

The military posture hearings are important because they address the broad policy and program initiatives driving the overall defense debate. Selection of research materials from the Senate was important because of term limits. Six-year term limits in the Senate (as supposed to two-year limits in the House) allow greater consistency in the views of Congress. It fosters greater preservation of values, stability, and provides less potential for outsider influence.

2. President's Budget Press Releases

The budget process is highly visible, and the media is a vehicle for public perception of that process. When the President's budget is released, the SECDEF normally holds a press conference in which he briefs the media on the defense-related portion of the President's budget. The press conference transcripts are made public record, and in recent years, the DoD has gone so far as releasing the budget briefing PowerPoint slides.

The President's budget press releases highlight key defense budget issues and are consistently available throughout the period analyzed. Consistency in the availability of materials is important to validate the method of analysis employed in this thesis. The budget briefing PowerPoint slides were initially the documents of choice for this research project, but they were not consistently available. Aside from that, the press releases were the only "text-based" documents of record that highlighted the important features of the defense budget.

B. CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

Conceptualization is the process of determining and defining the variables to be used in a research study (Neuendorf, 2002). Content analysis is a quantitative research methodology; however, the framework behind the analysis involves measures of subjectivity. "There are as many possible schemes for classifying content data as there are questions which may be asked of the data" (Holsti, 1969, p. 644). Neuendorf (2002) defines a variable as "a definable and measureable concept that varies; that is, it holds different values for different individual cases of units" (p. 95).

Conceptualization is the most critical element of content analysis. There is no universally accepted construct. There have been many attempts to create universal value dictionaries[1]—much of which have been created are only applicable to a limited set of categorical data. Ultimately, the analyst must decide, based on the content to be examined, which variable will best represent the data.

---

[1] For example, Lasswell Value Dictionary and Harvard IV-4 Psychological dictionary. Many content analysis computer programs are also now equipped with custom dictionaries.

1. Category Development

Neuendorf (2002) recommends four techniques for the selection of variables: (1) a consideration of universal variables, (2) using theory and past research, (3) developing a grounded or emergent process, and (4) attempting to find medium-specific variables. The variables used in this research project are medium specific—that is, they are derived from the content itself. Categories were developed by: (1) extracting themes from the President's budget press releases, and (2) letting additional categories emerge from analyzing the SASC hearing transcripts.

The format of the President's budget press releases was conducive to developing issue categories (variables). The press releases were typically organized into five or six major budget themes. Budget themes in the press releases were identified through major headings, which were typically in bold font and centered. Issue categories were developed by aggregating the recurring budget themes of the President's budget press releases over the period analyzed. The aggregated list of recurring themes represents the general framework of the President's budget press releases.

Nine categories were constructed. The nine categories (along with the subcategories to be discussed later) are as follows: 1) Quality of life services, 2) Supporting troops in the field, 3) Managing force readiness, 4) Investment in current capabilities, 5) Investment in future capabilities, 6) Managing internal processes, 7) Transforming DoD infrastructure, 8) Protecting the homeland, and 9) Other (Budget Related, Not Budget Related). The ninth (Other) category was included to meet the requirements of mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness and to aid in the development of subcategories.

A note on subcategories. All issues that were coded "Other" did not fit into the frame employed in the President's budget press releases, and were appropriately placed into a set of subcategories. The subcategories emerged as the coding process progressed, by grouping issues containing similar content. The subcategories represent the additional framing employed by Congress, and will be discussed in detail in the results section.

2. Conceptual Definitions

In the process of content analysis, each variable must be defined by what Neuendorf (2002) calls a "conceptual definition" or a "declaration by the researcher as to exactly what he or she wishes to study" (p. 107). Conceptual definitions are dictionary-type definitions. It may be unclear as to which issues belong in each category. The complexity and range of military affairs often makes it difficult to comprehensively define each variable; therefore, in order to assist the analyst in coding properly, the *extensional definitions* of each issue category are provided in the Appendix. The extensional definition of a term is developed by means of specifying "terms" or "objects" that fall under the concept of the term in question. The conceptual definitions of the variables used in this study are as follows:

In the process of content analysis, each variable must be defined by what Neuendorf (2002) calls a "conceptual definition" or a "declaration by the researcher as to exactly what he or she wishes to study" (p. 107). Conceptual definitions are dictionary-type definitions. It may be unclear as to which issues belong in each category. The complexity and range of military affairs often makes it difficult to comprehensively define each variable; therefore, in order to assist the analyst in coding properly, the *extensional definitions* of each issue category are provided in the Appendix. The extensional definition of a term is developed by means of specifying "terms" or "objects" that fall under the concept of the term in question. The conceptual definitions of the variables used in this study are as follows:

- Quality of life services: Activities, services, or entitlements designed to enhance the quality of life of service members and their families. Quality of life services are designed to increase or maintain high morale, attract, motivate, or retain high quality individuals.

- Supporting the troops in the field: Ensuring forward deployed troops have the proper size and mix of forces, equipment, and support to successfully carry out and accomplish the mission. Supporting the troops means providing adequate capabilities that enhance or increase the effectiveness of U.S. forces abroad.

- Maintaining force readiness: Ensuring a ready and available warfighting force.

- Investment in current capabilities: Enhancing the conventional combat capabilities that will maintain traditional superiority against current or future threats.

- Investment in future capabilities: Enhancing the combat capabilities that will ensure superiority against future threats. Future capabilities are those that are characterized by a leap in technology.

- Managing internal processes: Changing the how the DoD does business. Managing internal processes involves overhauling or streamlining processes in efforts to become the most efficient organization in terms of matching resources to requirements.

- Transforming DoD infrastructure: Changing the underlying framework or features of a system within the DoD.

- Protecting the homeland: Efforts to strengthen the defense and security of the American people. Protecting the homeland means protecting the peace and prosperity of American citizens.

- Other: Issues not framed by the President's budget press releases.

C. OPERATIONALIZATIONS

Operationalization is a term that describes the process of selecting a unit of analysis (Neuendorf, 2002). A unit analysis is an "identifiable message or message component, (a) which serves as the basis for identifying the population and drawing a sample, (b) on which variables are measured, or (c) which serves as the basis for reporting analyses" (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 71). A unit of analysis is simply how the analyst chooses to break up the communication being analyzed. Holsti (1969, pp. 647–648) discusses five major recording units (units of analysis) used in content analysis: (1) the single word or symbol, (2) the theme, (3) the character, (4) the paragraph, the sentence, or other grammatical units, and (5) the item.

22

The golden rule in content analysis is that each unit of analysis can only be coded by one variable (see Neuendorf, 2002; Holsti, 1969). In the process of operationalization, "the researcher should try to achieve several things: categories or levels that are exhaustive and mutually exclusive and an appropriate level of measurement" (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 118). The analyst must ensure that every category (unit of analysis) must be specific to only one code or variable, and that every unit of analysis is measurable. This requirement may create the need for categories (variables) such as "other" and "general" (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 118).

The unit of analysis for the SASC hearings on military posture is every change of theme. Themes are analogous to topic issues. Units are coded every time a member of the SASC changes topic. Changes in topic are very distinct because Senators are allotted a set amount of time to articulate their concerns. Senators usually move on to other topics quite abruptly. Refer to the following example below (excerpt from FY 2010 SASC DoD Authorizations for Appropriations hearing on military posture):

> Senator MCCASKILL: Before I get into my arguing with you, I want to briefly also bring to your attention a story that concerned me yesterday in the New York Times about Dr. Kuklow. As we approach healthcare reform, there is this fuzzy line between pharmaceutical companies and the practice of medicine in the country as it relates to consulting fees and being paid. It was reported yesterday that one of our Army doctors at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center had fraudulently done surveys and studies on behalf of a private pharmaceutical company.
> What really offends me about that is that potentially he was using data from our wounded warriors, and I urge you to look into that. Personally, I know you brought some accountability to Walter Reed after the last scandal there. I want to make sure that our doctors there are reflecting the finest, because I know they are the finest and I know they do great work, and so I'd ask you to look into that.
>
> Okay, now what I want to argue with you about—I understand the decisions you're making as it relates to transition on stealth, and unmanned, and all of that, but I think I'm stating factually, we have a gap in fighters. If we're going to do 11 carriers, which is my understanding, you're recommending 11 carriers—
>
> Secretary GATES: Until 2040.

Senator MCCASKILL: —until 2040, we have 11 carriers. We have a gap. We have the JSF, which is over cost, behind schedule, unproven. We have an F–18 that is around $15 million a copy, versus the JSF, which is around $135 million a copy now. Who's to say what it will end up being, but that is what it is now, and we have this gap of 200 or more fighters on our carriers. I'm curious—with my auditor's hat on, knowing the cost savings of a multi-year procurement. Knowing of that gap, knowing of the capability, and how used the F–18 is, why we would not be looking at a multi-year procurement to fill in that gap as we approach the JSF down the line (p. 374).

In the above example, Senator McCaskill changed topics once. This indicates two recording units. During the first couple of paragraphs, she presented her concerns about the Walter Reed Army Medical Center fraudulently conducting surveys and studies on behalf of private pharmaceutical companies. The second half of Senator McCaskill's utterance deals with the gap in fighters aboard carriers. That same methodology was followed during the coding of every transcript.

D.   CODING METHODOLOGY

Appendix A contains the coding scheme employed in this project. Each variable was assigned an arbitrary code (e.g., A1, A2, A3...) corresponding to each of the issue categories. The content analysis software program Atlas.ti 6.2 was used to identify and mark each recording unit, assign codes to each recording unit, and create clarifying memos or comments. The military posture hearings always begin with opening statements from the chairman, the SECDEF, and the CJCS. Any written statements or testimony included for the record was purposely omitted. The coding process applied to live dialogue only. Atlas.ti 6.2 kept track of the occurrences of each variable for subsequent quantitative analysis.

Recording units assigned A9 (Other) were put into subcategories by assigning codes A9–BR (for budget related) or A9–NBR (for not budget related). Clarifying comments describing the content of these issues were recorded as well. The clarifying comments were used to further breakdown the subcategories into more specific categories (which will be discussed later).

Refer back to the example above. Two recording units were identified. The first recording unit was assigned a code of A9–NBR. The concern expressed was not related to a budgeted item. The Senator simply inquired about a situation she was concerned about. The second recording unit addresses the gap in fighter aircraft aboard aircraft carriers. This recording unit was assigned a code of A4 (investment in current capabilities). Current capabilities are conventional capabilities that maintain traditional superiority against enemy threats. This coding process was repeated for all ten hearings.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

A. RESULTS

This study posed one research question: What are the implications of framing effects by the President's budget on issue attention in congressional hearings on the defense budget? The analysis begins with a discussion of the framing identified in the President's budget press releases. Next, data from the congressional hearings will be analyzed. Specifically, I examine two aspects of the SASC hearings on the defense budget: (1) how Congress framed the debate, and (2) whether Congress was responsive to the President's budget framing.

1. Framing of the President's Budget

The framework of the President's budget press releases, for the sake of this specific study, is considered fixed. At this point in the budget process—the end of the executive formulation phase and the start of the congressional action phase, there is no doubt about how the President framed his debate. The President's goal is to convince Congress that his proposed budget is truly a "best fit" for the DoD. The key themes of the President's budget press releases from fiscal years 2001 to 2010 were strikingly similar; that is, the language was very consistent from year to year. Across all ten fiscal years, eight key themes emerged: (1) Quality of life services, (2) Supporting troops in the field, (3) Managing force readiness, (4) Investment in current capabilities, (5) Investment in future capabilities, (6) Managing internal processes, (7) Transforming DoD processes, and (8) Protecting the homeland. These eight themes constitute the framework of the President's budget for the DoD.

What the key themes of the President's budget press releases represent is desired end state. Whatever budget decisions were proposed for any particular fiscal year, was in effect, the means by which to achieve the desired end state of the military. The President's budget press releases consistently used themes that were uncontroversial. For example, phrases such as, supporting the troops, reshaping the force, modernizing capabilities, changing how we buy, and reforming the budget, were key themes of the

fiscal year 2010 President's budget press release. Those themes are hard to argue against. Similarly, the fiscal year 2002 press release had themes that are uncontroversial: improving military morale, increasing readiness, transforming military capabilities, changing infrastructure, and pursuing a new management direction.

Subheadings under each key theme provide examples of major budget decisions that support principle objectives. Take fiscal year 2010 for example. The first theme is supporting troops and their families. Troops and their families are supported through: "fully funding" military healthcare; increasing pay for military and civilian employees; "fully protecting" and "properly funding" the ongoing growth in military end strength; funding the housing program; and "recognizing the responsibility" to care for the wounded, ill or injured. Examples of budget decisions that support the principle objective of reshaping the force include: increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support by funding 50 unmanned Predator-class aerial vehicles; increase funding for helicopters to sustain operations and address the principal limitation on capacity; and boosting global partnership capacity by providing additional funding to train and equip foreign militaries. The same format is followed for the remaining key themes addressed in the President's budget press releases.

A few more words on the President's budget press releases. There are two additional observations I wish to bring attention to. First, three of the most common themes mentioned in every press release from fiscal year 2001 to 2010 were: (1) supporting the troops, (2) modernizing or developing military capabilities, and (3) maintaining force readiness. Second, I mentioned above how subheadings support these key themes. Take a look at supporting the troops, the budget decisions described under these subheadings in the fiscal year 2010 press releases, consists of words that characterize the nature of the need. For example, the phrases *fully funding, fully protecting,* and *properly funding*, implies that supporting the troops is a critical area that must not be shortchanged. On reshaping the force, phrases such as *increase funding, address the principal limitation, boosting partnership,* and *providing additional funding,*

indicate that the need to reshape the force is not completely satisfied. The phrases only contribute to the need. This phenomena can be seen in all of the press releases I analyzed.

2.   How Congress Framed the Debate

The SASC authorization for appropriations hearings on military posture provides the first opportunity for committee members to collectively address the SECDEF and the CJCS about defense budget proposals. One should note that the framing of the President's budget is completely organized, thought-out, and rehearsed. In delivering this message, the SECDEF is acting on behalf of the President. The message is polished, and it comes from one person. Congress' response is the initial reaction, by a group of people, with varying points of views, different ideals, and diverse constituencies.

As mentioned earlier, I wanted to see whether the framing of the President's budget would guide which issues were addressed during budget hearings. I used the framework of the President's budget press releases to develop issue categories used to code the transcripts, and allowed additional issue categories to emerge as the Senate hearings were coded.

For each of the ten SASC hearing transcripts, the total number of utterances within each of the nine categories was tallied. The totals (including rounded percentages) are presented in Table 2.

Issues	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	total
Framed by President's Budget											
Quality of Life Services	4 (10%)	2 (4%)	6 (11%)	1 (2%)	2 (5%)	5 (12%)	5 (13%)	4 (7%)	2 (5%)	2 (5%)	33 (7%)
Supporting Troops in the Field	1 (3%)	1 (2%)	3 (6%)		3 (8%)	6 (14%)		13 (22%)		4 (10%)	31 (6%)
Maintaining Force Readiness	3 (8%)	6 (13%)	5 (9%)	2 (5%)	4 (11%)	2 (5%)	5 (13%)	5 (8%)	3 (8%)	5 (12%)	40 (9%)
Investment in Current Capabilities	2 (5%)	6 (13%)	6 (11%)	2 (5%)	2 (5%)	6 (14%)	3 (8%)	1 (2%)	4 (11%)	7 (17%)	39 (9%)
Investment in Future Capabilities	4 (10%)	2 (4%)	3 (6%)	3 (7%)		3 (7%)	1 (3%)	2 (3%)	1 (3%)	2 (5%)	21 (5%)
Managing Internal Processes	2 (5%)	1 (2%)		3 (7%)		2 (5%)	2 (5%)	2 (3%)	1 (3%)	1 (2%)	14 (3%)
Transforming DoD Infrastructure	1 (3%)	5 (11%)	4 (8%)	3 (7%)	1 (3%)	1 (2%)	1 (3%)	5 (8%)			21 (4%)
Protecting the Homeland	5 (13%)	8 (18%)	5 (9%)	8 (19%)	1 (3%)	2 (5%)	1 (3%)	1 (2%)	1 (3%)		32 (7%)
Total	22(56%)	31(69%)	32 (60%)	22(51%)	13(35%)	27(63%)	18(45%)	33 (56%)	12 (32%)	21 (50%)	231 (53%)
Additional Framing											
Other	17(44%)	14 (31%)	21(40%)	21 (49%)	24 (65%)	16 (37%)	22 (55%)	26 (44%)	25 (68%)	21 (50%)	207 (47%)

Table 2:   Total Number of Issues by Category in the SASC Hearings

In total, 438 utterances were coded. Congress addressed issues within the framework of the President's budget press releases, an average of 53% of the time. A total of 231 issues were conceptually associated with the issue categories framed by the President's budget press releases. The most common issues were maintaining force readiness and investment in current capabilities.

In the literature review I talked about the legislative response to executive budget proposals. I mentioned the phrase "congressional opportunity structure." Sheingate (2006) found that specialized committees with complex jurisdiction offer political entrepreneurs increased opportunities to introduce new issues. Hearings present legislative authorities with opportunities to exert their influence on budgetary priorities. Approximately 47% of the time, Congress attempted to frame their own issues. Additional issues framed by SASC members (including rounded percentages) are presented in Table 3.

Issues	FY2001	FY2002	FY2003	FY2004	FY2005	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	total
Framed by SASC members											
(1) Budget Related	6 (15%)	10 (22%)	14 (26%)	6 (14%)	7 (19%)	5 (12%)	9 (23%)	6 (10%)	9 (24%)	6 (14%)	78 (18%)
(2) Not Budget Related											
Policy Matters	8 (21%)	3 (7%)	5 (9%)	11 (26%)	11 (30%)	7 (16%)	11 (28%)	14 (24%)	10 (27%)	8 (19%)	88 (20%)
General Inquiry	3 (8%)	1 (2%)	2 (4%)	4 (9%)	6 (16%)	4 (9%)	2 (5%)	6 (10%)	6 (16%)	7 (17%)	41 (10%)
A9 (Other) Total	17(44%)	14 (31%)	21(40%)	21 (49%)	24 (65%)	16 (37%)	22 (55%)	26 (44%)	25 (68%)	21 (50%)	207 (47%)

Table 3:   Total Number of Issues Framed by SASC Members

Table 3 is an extension of the "Other" category shown in Table 2. In total, 207 of 438 utterances were not conceptually associated with the issue categories framed by the President's budget press releases. On average, approximately 18% (78 out of 438) of the utterances coded in the hearings were budget-related issues which did not fit into the framework of the President's budget press releases, and approximately 30% (129 out of 438) of the utterances coded in the hearings were either questions or concerns about policy matters or statements of general inquiry.

3.   Was Congress Responsive to the President's Budget Frame?

The data in Tables 2 and 3 indicates two significant things. First, "issue attention" in congressional hearings on the defense budget is shaped, to a considerable extent, by the President's budget press releases. Framing by the President's budget press releases affects the balance of issues discussed during the hearings. It is important to note that "issue attention" does not necessarily denote "issue agreement." Although I will comment on issue agreement several times throughout the remainder of this study, the focus was primarily on issue attention. The following examples provide evidence that the framing by the President's budget Press releases does affect issue attention in congressional hearings.

As mentioned above, the first key theme of the fiscal year 2010 President's budget press release was "supporting troops and their families." One way that the proposed budget accomplished that principle objective, was by properly funding the

31

ongoing growth in military end strength. In that same fiscal year's SASC hearing, three out of eighteen Senators addressed that same specific issue. Refer to the examples below (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010, 2009):

> Senator LIEBERMAN: I want to focus in particularly on the U.S. Army, which is bearing the largest burden of the wars we are involved in Iraq and Afghanistan and to put it in this context. Both you and Admiral Mullen said that your top priority is to take care of our personnel, of our All-Volunteer Forces. In fact, I think in this budget, building on previous budgets, we are trying our best to take care of those personnel and their families. The problem is there are not enough of them. As a result, they are under stress, and so is our military in some ways...Just let me get beyond all the numbers to say that by any projection I have seen, we are going to need more personnel for at least the next 18 months, certainly through fiscal year 2010. I don't think we have given you enough personnel to make this happen (pp. 349–350).

> Senator SESSIONS: Also one of the things I think we need to consider is the increase in end strength, the number of personnel in uniform. That number, I don't think we are at the maximum strength that we intend to reach, are we, Admiral Mullen? Are we still increasing personnel?

> So those numbers indicate to me that we are still pretty stressed in number of personnel. General Keane, I think, has called for instead of 500,000 plus, 700,000. Are you wrestling with that number (p. 351)?

> Senator REED: Will the increase in forces help mitigate those and give us the ability to rely less upon air strikes? Is that part of what the buildup was about?

Another key theme in the fiscal year 2010 President's budget press release was "reshaping the force." One component of reshaping the force included increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support by funding 50 unmanned Predator-class aerial vehicles. Refer to the comments by Senator Bayh below (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010, 2009):

> Senator BAYH: Good. From time to time in the past, I've asked about the Predators and Reapers and that kind of thing, and not because we produce a whole lot out in Indiana, but because there was a weapons system that actually helping us in real time, facing some of the challenges we've had, and that some of my visits to the theater, some of the commanders have

32

expressed that they would like a greater capacity in that area. Admiral, for you and the Secretary, have we asked for everything we need in this area?

The fiscal year 2010 press release also mentioned the need for additional helicopters. Senator Udall brought attention to this same issue during his question and answer period (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2010, 2009, pp. 378–379). The fiscal year 2010 press release mentioned boosting global partnership capacity by providing additional funding to train and equip foreign militaries. Senator's Levin and Ben Nelson expressed concerns over funding Pakistan's military to aid in efforts on the Global War on Terror.

Congressional attention on issues framed by the President's budget press releases is fairly consistent from fiscal years 2001 to 2010. The results indicate favorable framing effects (issue attention greater than 50%), all but three years. In fiscal year 2007, 45% of the congressional debate on the defense budget resembled the framework of the President's budget press releases. In fiscal years 2009 and 2005, the same is true less than 36% of the time. Thirty-six percent is enough of a departure from the average value that I consider those two years as outliers. Interestingly enough, fiscal years 2009 and 2005 are presidential election years. The results suggest that Congress is less likely to be influenced by strategic framing during presidential election years.

When Congress did not talk about issues framed by the President's budget, what were they talking about? As mentioned previously, the subcategories that emerged from the SASC hearings were constructed by grouping issues assigned to the "Other" category into subcategories of similar content. Two categories emerged: (1) budget-related issues that did not fit into the framework of the President's budget press releases, and (2) non-budget-related questions and concerns about policy matters, and statements of general inquiry.

The A9 budget-related subcategory covered an expanse of issues including, but not limited to: defense budget top line, baseline budget requests, defense budget as a percentage of GDP, budget allocation, long-term spending, supplemental budget requests, continuing resolutions, and unfunded requirements. These issues generally fit into three

categories: budget process, budget allocation, and budget sufficiency. Refer to the following example (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006, 2005):

> Senator McCAIN. Mr. Secretary, what Senator Levin I think is trying to get to is part of your presentation. The normal budget cycle is 30 to 33 months and the supplemental is 9 months, and there are many of us that feel that the supplemental which is earmarked for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has been expanded to a significant degree to other programs, such as the modules that Senator Levin just talked about, which in the view of many of us should be in the normal authorization process so that we can exercise our responsibilities of oversight. They are not privileges; they are responsibilities (p. 342).

In the above example, Senator McCain was concerned about the budget process. Inserting funds for programs not directly related to combat operations into supplemental appropriations takes away from Congress' oversight responsibilities. Lindsay (1987) wrote heavily on congressional mistrust and micromanagement of the DoD. During the fiscal year 2009 SASC hearing, Senator Ben Nelson advocated the need for a budget that was both precise and accurate. He mentioned to Defense Secretary Gates that the budget looked like a "fudge-it" budget. What Senator Nelson meant by "fudge it," was that "uncertainty" created a gap between a budget that was both precise and accurate. That gap made it difficult to predict a budget; therefore, some of the numbers got "fudged" in for that particular fiscal year.

When Congress is dissatisfied with what the DoD is doing, they are more inclined to get involved in the process. During the coding process, I came across many examples where committee members expressed their frustrations with how the DoD handled the budget process. The following example is from the fiscal year 2007 SASC DoD Authorizations for Appropriations hearing on military posture:

> Senator McCAIN: As I count it, this year you will be submitting your seventh emergency supplemental of some $50 billion, we are told, coming to a total of some $400 billion in the last 5 years to 4 years that are emergency supplementals.
>
> I do not know how you call it an emergency any more when we know that we are going to have costs for a number of years associated with the

Iraq war. So what it effectively is, is an end run around the authorization process, going directly to the appropriations committees. For example, in last year's emergency request I counted $5 billion in unauthorized earmarks.

It has to stop. Your requests have to be included in the normal budget process, in the normal authorization and appropriations process, because we all know and can estimate that the war in Iraq and Afghanistan is going to cost a certain amount of money. So to continuously come up here with an emergency, which we all fully anticipate, although maybe not the exact numbers, and not go through the authorizing process, is something that has become unacceptable and it has to stop.

Now, Mr. Secretary, are you going to continue to do business by coming up here with emergency supplementals which thoroughly bypass the entire authorizing process, which is supposed to be the way the Congress of the United States operates (pp. 45–46)?

Senator McCain's previous two examples are a few of the many examples in which SASC members express their dissatisfaction with how the Executive branch's deviations from the standard budget processes undermine Congressional oversight responsibilities.

Congress was also concerned with budget allocation. The President's budget press releases framed budget allocation as something that contributed to *modernizing capabilities, supporting the troops, force readiness,* etc. Congress tended to frame issues concerning budget allocation in terms of appropriation title. Seeing this a few times throughout the coding process makes it worth mentioning. Here is an example from Senator Lieberman (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2002, 2001):

Senator LIEBERMAN: Therefore, there is some room for this committee, hopefully, to make some independent judgments about the budget. I would just say briefly, in response to Mr. Chairman, on the RDT&E, it is true that there has been a substantial increase. However, as I look at it, most of it, not all of it, is in the defense-wide area, which is mostly missile defense and increases to the services. Except for the Navy and Marine Corps, it is not great. The one part I do want to focus on, and I hope the committee can take a separate look at, is the science and technology budget. The total for this year is $9 billion, and you are

recommending $8.8 billion. I don't think we are going to be able to do
what we need to do unless we are investing in the technologies of the
future (pp. 205–206).

Congress expressed their concerns about the budget process and budget allocation, but they were also concerned about the size of the defense budget (budget sufficiency). There was also a lot of mention about the defense budget as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).   Refer to the following example below (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2009, 2008). In this example, Senator Inhofe expressed his concern about the size of the budget as a percentage of GDP. This is evidence that Congress is (or attempts to be) fiscally responsible:

> Senator INHOFE: It's been 7 years since that's really been discussed with
> this panel, and you talked about percentages of GDP, where we've been in
> the past, and where we are today. I believe I'm accurate when I say that if
> you go back to the 100years of the 20th century that it averaged 5.7
> percent of GDP. Then of course, at the end of the drawdowns of the 1990s
> it went down to under 3 percent, about 2.7 percent.
>
> So, having said that, where we are today if we include the supplemental
> spending over this last year would be up to 4.7 percent; without that, 3.7
> percent. I know you've probably given some thought in looking into the
> future about where we should be. Do you want to share any thoughts with
> us that you've had on that subject (pp. 29–30)?

I have provided a few examples of budget-related issues which did not fit into the framework of the President's budget press releases. Now I will examine issues which I have coded "not budget-related."   Over 30% of the utterances within each hearing involved Senators questioning or commenting about matters relating to policy, or making general comments about matters completely unrelated to the budget. First I will say a few words on general inquiry. The general inquiry category captured thoughts, concerns, questions, or comments that were not budget-related, and clearly did not fit into any organized category.   Most of the utterances coded in the general inquiry category reflected the committee member's individual motivations. For example, in the fiscal year 2007 hearings, Senator Graham expressed concern over the legal proceedings of the uniformed code of military justice. There is an example above, from the fiscal year 2010

hearings in which Senator McCaskill is concerned about Walter Reed Army Medical Center fraudulently conducting surveys and studies on behalf of private pharmaceutical companies. In fiscal year 2008, Senator Dole probed the SECDEF for his position on the need for follow-on legislation similar in manner to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The hearings present an opportunity for committee members to frame, or bring attention to their own, individual issues.

Approximately 70% of non-budget-related issues deal with matters concerning policy. During the fiscal year 2010 hearing, there was a lot of discourse about the political stability of Pakistan. Six of eighteen senators asked questions or made comments about the DoD's position towards Pakistan. SASC committee members expressed a lot of concern about how the Pakistani leadership is not committed to fighting the war on terrorism in their territory. How was DoD going to respond to this issue? In fiscal years 2005 through 2009 there was a lot of discourse about the policy towards Iraq and Afghanistan. Things such as risk sharing with other nations, reliability of the Iraqi army, the Iraqi constitution, policy towards prisoners, drugs in Afghanistan, and long term strategy, were all policy points of interest for SASC members. Congress was concerned about the implications of DoD's decision-making. Policy decisions made by the DoD have political ramifications, as well as long term implications on budget resources; therefore, Congress was interested in being a part of those decisions. In the following example, Senator Warner asked the DoD to include Congress in decisions made in Iraq and Afghanistan (Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2009, 2008):

> Senator WARNER: I just feel that Congress should be made a full partner in the decisions with respect to both Afghanistan and Iraq as we go forward into the next administration, and that we need the support of Congress because therein rests the support of the American people. So I do hope that you lay that foundation (p. 25).

B.   ASSESSMENT OF MODEL

Ten random utterances were chosen from the SASC hearings transcripts and coded by two separate individuals. Out of 20 utterances, a 70% overlap in the results was

achieved. The first coder overlapped with six out of ten categories, and the second coder overlapped with eight out of ten. Neuendorf (2002) associates a reliability coefficient of 90% or better as acceptable to all, and a reliability coefficient of 80% or better as acceptable in most situations (p. 143). Anything below 80% would be subject to disagreement. For the sake of this project, 70% coder reliability was deemed acceptable.

V. CONCLUSION

A. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS

SASC authorization for appropriations hearings on military posture presents opportunities for its members to collectively engage in constructive dialogue with the SECDEF and the CJCS following the release of the President's budget. The President's budget reflects national priorities. On behalf of the President, the SECDEF and the CJCS are called as primary witnesses before Congress to defend those priorities. The way that the budget is framed is of the utmost importance. Framing theory suggests that framing effects occur when a message is emphasized strategically, such that it causes individuals to focus on relevant considerations when constructing their opinions. The President's budget press releases are just one way that the executive branch communicates their agendas to Congress. Setting a national policy agenda involves figuring out "how to guide other players, rather than be swept along by their initiatives (Davidson, 2002, p. 72)

The differences between legislative and executive agendas are really a function of varying priorities. Those who seek to compare congressional budget priorities to presidential budget priorities often measure the difference between the President's proposed budget figures and the subsequent congressional modifications of those figures. Comparing budget priorities through examining the framework of rhetorical debates on budget issues provides more substantive approach to understanding dynamics of communication exchange within the legislative and executive realm. The purpose of this study was to fill the gap on political communication by examining whether Congress was responsive to framing by the President's budget. To accomplish this, I used the framework of the President's budget press releases from fiscal years 2001 to 2010 to analyze the content of SASC hearings on the defense budget.

My findings indicate that over half of the time, issue attention in congressional hearings is shaped by the frame of the President's budget. Approximately 53% of the time Congress addressed issues that were conceptually related. However, issue attention was not the same thing as issue agreement. The key themes in the President's budget

press releases were chosen such that the principle objective or the desired end state was difficult to argue against. Congress generally agreed with the desired end-state (supporting the troops, protecting the homeland, etc.), but they did not necessarily agree with what the decisions that the executive branch proposed to achieve those ends. Congress examined the budget requests. When they disagreed with some of the decisions that were proposed in the President's budget, they wanted to know what the DoD wanted to buy, how much the DoD wanted to buy, the costs associated with what they were buying, why the DoD decided to buy it, how would buying it help to achieve the desired end state, and what the follow-on implications were. Rarely was anything taken at face value.

It is highly unlikely that all people will respond to frames. Nelson et al. (1997) suggests that relatively knowledgeable people (i.e., political elites) do not necessarily have fixed opinions on political issues. Attitudes on political issues "should properly refer to a range of potential evaluative expressions, tied to a foundation of beliefs, emotional responses, and past behavioral episodes that combine in varying strengths..." (Nelson et al., 1997, p. 237). What Nelson et al. is trying say, is that frames ignite specific consideration for issues, but the weight of consideration is affected by endogenous factors.

Approximately 47% of the time, Congress did not respond to issues within the framework of the President's budget, in fact, they created their own frame. The SASC hearings provide the first opportunity for Congress to collectively address the defense budget. Congress does not come to these hearings completely blinded. Oleszek (1989), as cited in Diermeier and Fedderson (2000), contends that congressmen attend hearings with a list of prepared questions and expected responses. The President's budget is a finished product. Congressional scrutiny of the budget is just beginning. The executive branch and Congress have competing priorities. The literature review explained how the President's budget was more interdependent. At this point, Congress has not been as integrated into the budget process, and because it is a committee and not a single entity, their questions might appear disjointed. Congress tries as much as it can to be prepared; therefore, they spent a little time addressing issues framed by the President's budget.

They considered the issues highlighted in the President's budget press releases, then they went into expressing whatever additional concerns they had about the budget and about other policy areas related to national security, even if only indirectly related to the budget. Thurber (2002) describes Congress and the executive branch, as both rivals and partners.

In framing their own issues, Congress spent a considerable amount of time critiquing the defense budget process. Congress wanted to be more involved in decision-making. Committee members felt that the lack of transparency in the budget process encumbered Congress' responsibility to provide oversight. As evidenced in the literature review, this sort of self-perpetuating relationship increases mistrust and promotes micromanagement. Shull (1979) proposed that the lack of communication between the executive branch and Congress is attributed to differences in how both sides view federal agencies. There is some evidence of that here. Congress had a negative perception of the DoD in terms of how they manage the budget process.

Congress also looked at whether or not the budget was sufficient (i.e., how large it was, and whether it was enough to accomplish the principle objectives). Congress commented a lot about the growth-rate in the defense budget. They also expressed concerns about how the budget was allocated. Kanter (1972) argued that programmatic explanations have the greatest potential for impacting defense policy, but maintaining tight control over fiscal posture still remains a top priority for Congress. Approximately 1 in 5 of the utterances recorded in this study had something to do with the overall allocation to defense.

When Congress framed their comments outside the President's structure, it normally concerned defense policy. The results confirmed the presence of what Lindsay (1987) referred to as the "outside game," that is, the increasing desire for Congress to encroach on defense policy. The "outside game" erodes the committee system by creating an environment in which congressional issue attention becomes more individualistic. This study presented evidence that Congress uses a portion of the hearings to bring attention to (frame) their own individual issues.

In summary, this research concludes three main things. First, the framework of the President's budget press releases appears to guide issue attention in Congressional hearings. Specifically, Congress has a tendency to frame their questions and discussions around the key issues set forth by the President's budget. Although presidential framing can guide issue attention, external events such as presidential elections might guide issue attention, as well. Second, Congress frames their own issues during congressional hearings. Congress used the hearings to frame additional concerns over the defense budget, issues concerning defense policy, and many individual issues and concerns, as well. The executive branch seeks to influence the legislative branch, and the legislative branch seeks to influence the executive branch. Both sides need each other. Third, Congress wants to be more involved in the overall budget process. On several occasions, Congress outright expressed dissatisfaction with their level of inclusion in the decision-making process.

The nature of the relationship between the executive branch and Congress, in the absence of a consolidated theory or framework, is consistent with the literature. It explained why Congress' priorities were different from the President's. The literature review illustrated Congress' desire to exert an increasing sphere of influence on national policy. It provided an indication of Congress' growing mistrust and subsequent attempts to micromanage the DoD. I was able to begin my analysis with a satisfying level of expectations.

Many scholars have dedicated significant time and effort to examine what motivates political actors. Scholars have also completed very compelling works on political media and its effect on public opinion. What is different about this study, is that it combines these two topic areas by examining how political actors interact and influence each other. Similar research in this field is fragmented. This study is aimed at bringing together some of the concepts that were presented in the literature review.

B.   RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

This study finds its advantage in being the first of its kind—the first use the President's budget press releases to determine whether the President's message framing

can guide issue attention in congressional hearings. Although the current study has many strengths, several limitations must be discussed. First, the research materials cover only a span of ten years. A wider sample could have provided more comprehensive and consistent results. This belief is in-line with the conventional thought that the more data, the better.

Second, this research precluded examining opening statements or submitted statements for the record. Opening statements or submitted statements for the record may have a significant impact on the trajectory of the hearings. A critical assumption embedded in this project was that the SECDEF framed the budget debate during his testimony before Congress exactly as it was framed for the press. Research on framing suggests that strategic messages are tailored to the audiences intended to receive the message. It is perfectly plausible that the SECDEF may frame the defense budget debate differently when addressing members of Congress.

Third, coder reliability was not optimal. Content analytic research usually involves more than one coder because the volume of content examined is often burdensome, and a high measure of subjectivity can invalidate the results. The coding process typically involves two or more individual coders that complete the entire coding process individually. The goal is to achieve an acceptable percent overlap. For the sake of time, and due to the lack of willing participants, a less rigorous assessment of reliability was employed.

C.   RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

This study provides a concrete foundation for additional research in framing theory, specifically as it pertains to political communication. Anyone who is interested in studying the dynamic relationship between the executive branch and Congress should find this data useful. Those interested in the content analytic research methodology may also find this study beneficial.

I encourage future work to build upon the results presented in this research paper. There are several opportunities to advance this research. For example, it may be worthwhile for someone to extend this study over a greater length of time. The data

presented indications that framing by the President's budget press releases has less of an effect during presidential election years. One might hypothesize this phenomenon.

Those interested may explore whether congressional "issue attention" has anything to do with party affiliation. This research ignored whether the President and/or SASC members were democrats or republicans. There is also evidence to suggest that the House has stronger influence on defense issues (see Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004). Future research might be directed at replicating this research using hearing transcripts from House Armed Services Committee as opposed to the Senate. It would be interesting to make a comparison of the data.

Regardless whether anyone wishes to expand the scope of this project, my hopes are that this study will help strengthen the connection between politics and communications research. Everyone is affected by the decisions that the executive and legislative branches make. It is important to understand how both sides interact.

APPENDIX.   CODEBOOK

The twenty-first century represents a new age in which irregular warfare dominates, but the threat of conventional attacks still exists. These codes were developed with the realization that the national security strategy identifies the U.S. military as a global force. Terrorism (and thus the GWOT) was coded into the topics because it represents a particular aspect of that topic.

Code	Extensional Definitions
A1: Quality of life services	Increases in pay and benefits, housing allowance and other subsidies, affordable health care programs, childcare services, proper treatment and benefits for the wounded, ill, or injured.
A2: Supporting troops in the field	The sustainment or replenishment of equipment and supplies, providing the right amount of equipment to meet the threat, force protection, not putting the troops in excess danger, providing adequate intelligence and command control capabilities in the field, efforts to build and strengthen military and security capabilities of global partners to increase the effectiveness of U.S. forces, training friendly nations to help combat terrorism and support U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A3: Maintaining force readiness	Establishing proper training and maintenance cycles (i.e. flight hour program, steaming days), ensuring high levels of proficiency, ensuring units are adequately prepared and properly rested, building and strengthening the reserve component, maintaining force depth, managing the demand on the force, base and facility support, National guard and reserves affairs, military modernization, consequences of not being ready, force management.
A4: Investment in current capabilities	Investment in capabilities or technologies which are intended to meet the current threat, this includes RDT&E and procurement activities, modernization of the conventional force, enhancing current intelligence and command and control capabilities.

Code	Extensional Definitions
A5: Investment in future capabilities	Future capabilities are designed to counter unconventional threats, unmanned systems, enhanced mobility, new concepts, future weapons, cyberspace, integrated intelligence networks
A6: Managing Internal processes	Changes to the acquisition, procurement, budgeting, or financial management system; management controls; becoming more efficient, management reform.
A7: Transforming DoD infrastructure	Streamlining or upgrading DoD facilities, changes in the operational or administrative command structure, BRAC, proper amount of civilian and DoD support staff, military installations, depot management, asset positioning.
A8: Protecting the homeland	Ballistic missile defense (BMD), detection and protection against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), emergency response systems, countering the threat of catastrophic weapons, protecting our ports and citizens from terror attacks, interagency cooperation, homeland command and communication systems.
A9: Other	Category added to fulfill the requirements of mutual exclusiveness and exhaustiveness.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Abcarian, G., & Soule, J. W. (1971). *Social psychology and political behavior: Problems and aspects.* Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company.

Andres, G., & Griffin, P. J. (2002). Successful influence: Managing legislative affairs in the twenty-first century. In J. Thurber (Ed.), *Rivals for power: Presidential-congressional relations* (2nd ed., pp. 141–162). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Art, R. J. (1985). Congress and the defense budget: enhancing policy oversight. *Political science quarterly, 100*(2), 227–248. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2150654

Aspin, L. (1975). The defense budget and foreign policy: The role of congress. *Daedalus, 104*(3), 155–174. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024350

Barker, D. C. (2005). Values, frames, and persuasion in presidential nomination campaigns. *Political behavior, 27*(4), 375–394. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4500205

Blackmon, L. W. (1975). *An application of content analysis to the budgetary behavior of the Senate Armed Services Committee.* (Master's thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

Burden, B. C., & Sanberg, J. N. R. (2003). Budget rhetoric in presidential campaigns from 1952 to 2000. *Political behavior, 25*(2), 97–118. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657324

Cullather, K. K., (1995). Budget summits: A consensus building approach to the federal budget process. *Presidential studies quarterly, 25*(3), 511–531. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551465

Davidson, R. H. (2002). The presidency and congressional leadership. In J. Thurber (Ed.), *Rivals for power: Presidential-congressional relations* (2nd ed., pp. 71–88). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2010 Part 1: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., 323 (2009) (Military Posture). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg52620/pdf/CHRG-110shrg52620.pdf

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2009 Part 1: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 110th Cong., 2nd Sess., 6 (2008) (Military Posture). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg42629/pdf/CHRG-110shrg42629.pdf

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2008 Part 1: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (2007) (Military Posture). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg39435/html/CHRG-110shrg39435.htm

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2007 Part 1: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1 (2006) (Military Posture). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg30347/html/CHRG-109shrg30347.htm

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2006 Part 1: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., 286 (2005) (Military Posture). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg21102/pdf/CHRG-109shrg21102.pdf

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2005 Part 1: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., 10 (2004) (Military Posture). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg93571/pdf/CHRG-108shrg93571.pdf

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2004 Part 1: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 108th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (2003) (Military Posture). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg87323/pdf/CHRG-108shrg87323.pdf

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2003 Part 1: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., 10 (2002) (Military Posture). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg81922/pdf/CHRG-107shrg81922.pdf

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2002 Part 1: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., 179 (2001) (Military Posture). Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg75346/pdf/CHRG-107shrg75346.pdf

Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2001 Part 1: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 106th Cong., 2nd Sess., 9 (2000) (Military Posture). Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Print.

Diermeier, D., & Fedderson, T. J. (2000). Information and congressional hearings. *American journal of political science, 44*(1), 51–65. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2669292

Druckman, J. N. (2001). On the limits of framing effects: Who can frame? *The journal of politics, 63*(4), 1041–1066. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2691806

Druckman, J. N., & Holmes, J. W. (2004). Does presidential rhetoric matter? Priming and presidential approval. *Presidential studies quarterly, 34*(4), 755–778. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/27552635

Druckman, J. N., Jacobs, L. R., & Ostermeier, E. (2004). Candidate strategies to prime issues and images. *The journal of politics, 66*(4), 1180–1202. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3449534

Greenbaum, H. H. (1974). The audit of organizational communication. *The academy of management journal, 17*(4), 739–754. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/255650

Hart, R. P., Jarvis, S. E., & Lim, E. T. (2002). The American people in crisis: A content analysis. *Political psychology, 23*(3), 417–437. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792586

Holsti, O. R. (1969). Content analysis. In L. Aronson (2nd ed.), *The handbook of social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 596–692).

Iyengar, S. (1996). Framing responsibility for political issues. *Annals of the American academy of political and social science, 546,* 59–70. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1048170

Janowitz, M. (1968). Harold D. Lasswell's contribution to content analysis. *Public opinion quarterly, 32*(4), 646–653. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2747743

Jones, L. R., & McCafferey, J. L. (2008). *Budgeting, financial management, and acquisition reform in the U.S. Department of Defense.* Charlotte, NC: Information Age.

Kamlet, M. S., & Mowery, D. C. (1987). Influences on executive and congressional budgetary priorities, 1955–1981. *The American political science review, 81*(1), 155–178). Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable1960783

Kanter, A. (1972). Congress and the defense budget: 1960–1970. *The American political science review, 66*(1), 129–143. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1959282

Keith, R., & Schick, A. (2003). *The federal budget process.* Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science.

Krippendorff, K. (2004). *Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Laurance, E. J. (1976). The changing role of congress in defense policy-making. *The journal of conflict resolution, 20*(2), 213–253. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/173398

Lee, R. D., Johnson, R. W., & Joyce, P. G. (2008). *Public budgeting systems.* Sadbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett.

Lindsay, J. M. (1987). Congress and Defense Policy: 1961-1986. *Armed forces and society, 13*(3), 371–401. Retrieved from http://afs.sagepub.com/content/13/3/371

Mayar, K. R. (1993). Policy disputes as a source of Administrative controls: Congressional micromanagement of the department of defense. *Public administration review, 53*(4), 293–302. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/977142

McGraw, K. M. (2000). Contributions of the cognitive approach to political psychology. *Political psychology, 21*(4), 805–832. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792032

Meyer, A. E. (2002). *Evolution of United States budgeting.* Westport, CT: Praeger.

Moen, M., C. (1988). The political agenda of Ronald Reagan: A content analysis of the state of the union messages. *Presidential studies quarterly, 18*(4), 775–785. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40574729

Nelson, T. E., Oxley, Z. M., & Clawson, R. A. (1997). Toward a psychology of framing effects. *Political behavior, 19*(3), 221–246. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/586517

Neuendorf, K. A. (2002). *The content analysis guidebook.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2009. *Overview of the DoD fiscal 2010 budget proposal.* Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/2010%20Budget%20Proposal.pdf

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2008. *Fiscal 2009 Department of Defense budget released.* Retrieved from http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2009/2009_Budget_Rollout_Release.pdf

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2007. *Fiscal 2008 Department of Defense budget released.* Retrieved from http://comptroller.defense.gov/Docs/2008_Budget_Rollout_Release.pdf

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2006. *President Bush's 2007 defense budget.* Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2006/d20060206_Budget_Rollout.pdf

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2005. *President Bush's 2006 defense budget.* Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/Feb2005/d20050207budget.pdf

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2004. *Fiscal 2005 Department of Defense budget release.* Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7046

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2003. *Fiscal 2004 Department of Defense budget release.* Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3615

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2002. *Details of fiscal 2003 Department of Defense (DOD) budget request.* Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3226

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2001. *Department of Defense amended budget for FY2002.* Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=2958

Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2000. *Department of Defense budget for FY 2001.* Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=2306

Sachs, R. C., (2003). *Hearings in the U.S. senate: A guide for preparation and procedure.* Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from http://www.crs.org

Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. *Journal of Communication, 49*(1), 103–122. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02784.x

Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda setting, and priming: The evolution of three media effects models. *Journal of Communication, 57*(1), 9–20. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00326.x

Schick, A. (1978). Systems politics and systems budgeting. In F. J. Lyden & E. G. Miller (3rd ed.), *Public budgeting: Program planning and evaluation* (pp. 65–88). Rand McNally College Publishing Company.

Sheingate, A. D. (2006). Structure and opportunity: Committee jurisdiction and issue attention in Congress. *American Journal of Political Science, 50*(4), 844–859. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4122919

Shull, S. A. (1979). Policy-making: Congress and the president compared. *Presidential studies quarterly, 9*(2), 180–191. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/27547461

Tetlock, P. E. (1981). Personality and isolationism: content analysis of senatorial speeches. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41(4), 737–743.*

Thurber, J. A. (2002). *Rivals for power: presidential-congressional relations* (2nd ed.). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Thurber, J. A. (1988). The consequences of budget reform for congressional-presidential relations. *Annals of the American academy of political and social science, 499,* 101–113. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable1045821

Weaver, D. H. (2007). Thoughts on agenda setting, framing, and priming. *Journal of communication, 57,* 142–147. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.0033.x

Wildavsky, A., & Caiden, N. (2004). *The new politics of the budgetary process* (5th ed.). New York: Pearson/Longman.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California