NATO, RUSSIA, POLAND, AND UKRAINE:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE UKRAINE
CANDIDACY FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

by

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June 2011

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Ukraine’s NATO ambitions form a controversial but vital international issue because they implicate the contradictory perspectives of Poland and Russia. The history and self-perceptions of all three states shape and reshape the question of Ukraine joining NATO, as a key step toward westernization, integration, and independence. The challenges of accommodating these competing visions of the past and future are relevant beyond the alliance to all practitioners and scholars of international affairs; in this connection, the question of Ukraine’s NATO status also can serve as a case study of the broader subject. The present analysis takes the basic form of a historical narrative that analyzes Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian views of their shared history and divergent visions of the strategic future. This thesis provides a current prognosis as to the likelihood of Ukraine joining NATO and shows the limits and potential of the westernization process, security threats in the region, Russian democratization, and Russian engagement in international relations with NATO and Ukraine.
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ON THE UKRAINE CANDIDACY FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

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ABSTRACT

Ukraine’s NATO ambitions form a controversial but vital international issue because they implicate the contradictory perspectives of Poland and Russia. The history and self-perceptions of all three states shape and reshape the question of Ukraine joining NATO, as a key step toward westernization, integration, and independence. The challenges of accommodating these competing visions of the past and future are relevant beyond the alliance to all practitioners and scholars of international affairs; in this connection, the question of Ukraine’s NATO status also can serve as a case study of the broader subject. The present analysis takes the basic form of a historical narrative that analyzes Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian views of their shared history and divergent visions of the strategic future. This thesis provides a current prognosis as to the likelihood of Ukraine joining NATO and shows the limits and potential of the westernization process, security threats in the region, Russian democratization, and Russian engagement in international relations with NATO and Ukraine.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2C</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Antiballistic Missile</td>
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<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FYP</td>
<td>Five-Year-Plan</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>JWGDR</td>
<td>Joint Working Group on Defense Reform</td>
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<td>KGB</td>
<td>Soviet Committee of State Security</td>
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<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>MPA</td>
<td>Main Political Administration</td>
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<td>MVD</td>
<td>Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NIDC</td>
<td>NATO Information and Documentation Center</td>
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<td>NLO</td>
<td>NATO Liaison Office</td>
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<td>NMD</td>
<td>National Missile Defense</td>
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<td>NPR</td>
<td>Nuclear Posture Review</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NUAP</td>
<td>NATO-Ukraine Action Plan</td>
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<td>NUC</td>
<td>NATO-Ukraine Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NUDDO</td>
<td>NATO-Ukraine Defense Documentation Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PARP</td>
<td>Planning and Review Process</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative</td>
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<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<td>USEUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics</td>
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<td>VPK</td>
<td>Soviet Military Industrial Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapon of Mass Destruction</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

NATO’s relationship with Ukraine is focused on developing peace, stability, and security within the Euro-Atlantic region while seeking an appropriate role in the European system by which Ukraine can function in accord with its neighbors. The fate of Zwischeneuropa in the international relations of central and Eastern Europe has been a steady theme of the last two decades, and the case of Ukraine, in particular, represents one of the most arduous challenges for other NATO members, for the organization itself, and for Russian statecraft and diplomacy. As of today, Ukraine has not received an invitation to join NATO as a full member, although it remains a valid candidate for membership. The forces that inform and shape this circumstance—and their ramifications for the alliance, Ukraine, and some Ukraine’s nearest neighbors on either side of the NATO divide (Russia and Poland)—form the heart of this thesis.

In 1991, when the relationship between the alliance and Ukraine was in its infancy, NATO and its prospective new member at least shared a common security challenge: Russia. Thus, more than a decade of corruption and varying close cooperation with Russia ensued, culminating in rigged presidential elections in 2004. Ukrainians addressed this final challenge to their national sovereignty and political direction by protesting for 17 consecutive days in Kyiv. These demonstrations, which became known as the Orange Revolution, saw Ukraine’s Supreme Court nullify one set of election results, and a cleaner rematch proclaimed the clear victory of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko. As president, Yushchenko made good on his long-standing platform of increased cooperation and integration with the West. This statecraft has progressed through various steps comprised of: the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan (NUAP), intensified dialogue, the NATO Information and
Documentation Centre (NIDC) in Kyiv, a civilian-led NATO Liaison Office (NLO), the NATO-Ukraine Defense Documentation Office (NUDDO), and NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).¹

Even though Yushchenko lost the 2010 election—to his pro-Russian rival from the Orange Revolution days—Ukraine continues to engage the West and the alliance and vice-versa. NATO’s priorities were and still are to help establish an independent national organization for Ukraine’s military and to improve Ukrainian cooperation with NATO military services through the NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defense Reform (JWGDR). The JWGDR provides Ukraine with support in military challenges and offers access to NATO’s defense doctrines, forecasting, and budgeting. The JWGDR also started the PfP (Partnership for Peace) Planning and Review Process (PARP) and the organization of roundtables with the Ukrainian Parliament (the Verkhovna Rada). These organizations currently offer support to Ukrainian national security organizations, such as the Ukrainian Border Guard, the Ministry of Emergencies, and the Ministry of Defense. The reform included language instruction, management training, strategic/military exercises, and demilitarization projects under an agreement with Ukraine’s National Coordination Centre, the NATO-Ukraine Military Work Plan, and the PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). NATO’s sponsorship also includes participation in seminars at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, the NATO school at Oberammergau, Germany, and the multinational faculty at the Ukrainian Defense Academy. NATO is definitely preparing Ukraine for a potential membership.²

Ukraine is taking full advantage of this opportunity in many areas, such as technical support and standards (a Joint Working Group on Armaments), civil emergency training and disaster preparedness, science and environmental issues (notably through a Joint Working Group on Scientific and Environmental Cooperation), and even in domestic public awareness and political education.³ The increasing dialog between

² Ibid., 209.
³ Ibid., 221–228.
NATO and Ukraine, as well as Ukraine’s determination to westernize, gives additional evidence in favor of Ukraine joining the alliance. According to David Yost, all involved are:

…mindful of the importance of a strong and enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine and recognizing the solid progress made, across a broad range of activities, to develop an enhanced and strengthened relationship between NATO and Ukraine on the foundations created by the Joint Press Statement of 14 September 1995.4

Ukraine already follows the principles of the Washington Treaty, presented as the 14 articles on which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded on April 4, 1949. (This point is important because, under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, NATO stands ready to accept as new members all those emerging European democracies that embrace the treaty and maintain its principles in practice.) All of the treaty’s articles promote unity and a common goal of protecting democracy, which themes resonate in Ukraine and beyond.5 However, newly elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych has halted all efforts to meet specific NATO membership requirements and has decided instead to focus on improving Ukraine’s relationship with Russia. (Yanukovych was Russia’s handpicked man in 2004.) As part of this process, NATO—and, by extension, the broader project of westernization—has been construed as being at odds with this Russian orientation.

In theory, even Russia, the successor state to NATO’s cold-war arch-nemesis, could seek (and hope to obtain) a membership in the alliance at some point in the future. However, Russia continues to view the Atlantic alliance as a potential threat and a clear rival to Russian influence in central and Eastern Europe.6 Of course, Russia is not in the position to vote for or against Ukraine’s membership in NATO directly, and therefore,

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5 Ibid., 303–307.
will have no formal say on the final outcome. Nonetheless, as a dominant power in the European system, with its own special relationship with other leading NATO members, Russia has consistently indicated its interests in its neighbors’ development, and, for reasons of history, geo-politics, economics, and strategy, Russia can be expected to exert considerable influence on decisions, such as Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Currently, Russia opposes NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, especially in regards to NATO offering a membership to Ukraine, which is a former Soviet Republic, a nuclear power, and an occasional Black Sea rival. Caught in the crosscurrent, Ukraine’s position in Europe and NATO remains unbalanced, which, in turn, destabilizes all of Zwischeneuropa and its coalescing anti-communism, democratic ideologies, and international cooperation.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis argues that NATO membership for Ukraine will resolve many of these tensions and conflicts, although for different reasons for the various stakeholders. For Ukraine, a NATO membership would provide new opportunities and chances. Ukraine has the capacity to make major contributions to treaties and in realizing its opportunities by sharing goals and values. NATO would help Ukraine gain insight into the “logic of security” in the event of a future political de-stabilization of Russia. Furthermore, NATO expansion to Eastern Europe would enhance the abilities of NATO forces to safely stage, deploy, and re-supply during conflicts in the Middle East “to ‘project sizable power outwards to East-Central Europe and elsewhere.’” NATO would also help Ukraine transform and westernize its own society, just as it has done with other new democracies in Europe. As former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted, the

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8 Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press Columbia, 2006), 128.


progression of NATO expansion “is not about escaping West, it is about gaining the confidence to look East in a spirit of cooperation.”\(^{11}\) NATO could help transform Ukraine into a multi-cultural new democracy.

U.S. foreign policy supports not only the economic development of Ukraine but also its military growth. The primary aspiration of U.S. policy in Ukraine is a completely democratic state with a U.S.-Ukraine military-to-military relationship based on U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) strategic fundamentals, which follow Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: “an attack against any one state is an attack against all states” within the North Atlantic Alliance.”\(^{12}\) In other words, NATO membership for Ukraine fits squarely within U.S. policy goals for emerging Eastern European democracies. Thus, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden visited Ukraine in July 2009, he promised that the United States would continue to support the Ukrainian candidacy for a NATO membership.

Similarly, NATO remains interested in deepening its ties to Ukraine (and vice-versa). On December 3, 2008, NATO decided to provide training, guidance, and practical support to Ukraine and to institute procedural changes that could enable the country to join the alliance without necessarily following the Membership Action Plan (MAP), a step required by NATO for all previous countries who desired membership. At the time, domestic political developments, notably the advent of the more Russian-oriented Party of Regions, slowed Ukraine’s membership momentum. Even with the new government declaring the current state of NATO-Ukraine relations sufficient, NATO continues to help Ukraine develop procedures similar to NATO’s standards.\(^{13}\)

Ukraine’s other neighbors, particularly Poland, also have an interest in Ukraine’s relationship with NATO. Poland’s views could be based on sentimental reasons, since both countries have experienced a similar fate throughout history. Most notable was the

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Russian occupancy and rule over their respective countries for 170 years. Poland would like to see Ukraine gain an alliance membership and enjoy the security and advancement NATO provides—although to some extent, Poland’s support is combined with guilty pleasure, because of Russia’s objections.

This thesis describes and analyzes the varied policy, institutional, and individual ambitions that surround Ukrainian membership in NATO—in such themes as the Russian government’s views on Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO membership and Russia’s motivations in opposing Kyiv’s pursuit of NATO membership, as well as the Polish government’s views on Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO membership and Polish public opinion support of Ukrainian ambitions to become part of the alliance—and concludes by showing that Ukraine’s application could have positive ramifications for all parties.

B. IMPORTANCE AND HYPOTHESES

In the effort to introduce a U.S. readership to a knotted problem of security in Eastern Europe, this thesis seeks to determine if Ukraine’s possible NATO membership presents special challenges to the alliance, to Ukraine, and to its historically connected region. Specifically, Ukraine’s NATO aspirations are complicated because they involve neighbors that are rivals, Poland and Russia—to say nothing of westernization, more broadly, in Eastern and Central Europe. Which factors of policy and statecraft in domestic and international politics influence the likelihood of Ukraine joining NATO? How do policymakers in Poland view Ukraine’s candidacy to NATO? How does Russia view the Ukrainian candidacy to NATO? Why should Ukraine join NATO—from its own point of view, as well as that of Poland and perhaps even Russia? What is the role of conflicted history and the shared experience in international relations among Poland, Ukraine, and Russia? How do these three nations perceive democracy, national identity, and themselves, as revealed by and through Ukraine’s on-again, off-again trajectory toward a potential NATO membership? Will newly elected Ukrainian President Yanukovych’s current decision to defer NATO’s membership candidacy offer for a stronger alliance with Russia have a significant influence on future NATO and Ukraine relations?
This thesis will seek to illuminate the limits, as well as the potential of Ukraine’s westernization process, its potential security threats, Russia’s democratization process and its possible setbacks, as well as Russian engagement in international relations with NATO as an organization, NATO members, and Ukraine.

This study will assert that Ukraine should receive NATO membership for several reasons. First, its increased involvement in peacekeeping operations worldwide indicates Ukraine’s readiness, willingness, and ability to undertake coalition missions to advance peace and stability—the heart of NATO’s role in the current global security environment. The alliance clearly would benefit from Ukraine’s strategic geographical location in Eastern Europe, both for maintaining the security of the Article 5 members and for promoting democratization in the region. As NATO’s former Secretary General Javier Solana stated in 1997, “Ukraine has a great strategic geographic location, and a stable Ukraine would be the key for stability and security in Europe.”

Polish interests coincide with a Ukrainian membership, a fact that further speaks in the membership’s favor. Poland hopes that its alliance with Ukraine can be reestablished through a common NATO membership. Both countries were under Russian and/or Soviet occupation for about 170 years. Poland used to occupy the same position that Ukraine has currently—one of the “justified security interests in the traditional zones of Moscow’s influence.” The Poles see “their own fate repeated” with Ukraine eventually freeing itself from Russia’s political influence and becoming “a part of the Western world.” More specifically, Poland is concerned with Ukraine continuing its westernization process. Zbigniew Brzezinski, an American statesman of Polish heritage who served as U.S. National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, stated, “from the Polish perspective the political value of the independence of Ukraine is equal to Poland’s membership of NATO since Russia—without Ukraine—is just a state, while

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16 Ibid., 110.
Russia plus Ukraine is an empire.”17 Poland realizes that its support for Ukraine joining NATO may irritate Russia. However, the Poles have taken a view that echoes George Kennan’s “long telegram:” If thus confronted, Russia may go away like a bully who was finally punched in the nose. If Ukraine is not formally allied with the West, Poland fears, Ukraine may face stagnancy amid the continued spread of Russia’s political influence, which may create an enduring instability on Poland’s eastern border.

Former Ukraine President Viktor Yushchenko is optimistic that his country will join NATO, an eventuality that he prefers to a possible membership in the Western Military Treaty. Yushchenko also stated that 33 percent of Ukrainians support a NATO membership.18 Yushchenko hopes to see Ukraine follow the path of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria in overcoming their communist “inheritance,” and NATO membership represents a means and a milestone to this end.

The alliance also has played a meaningful role in the stabilization and advancement of Europe’s new democracies and overcoming communism. NATO has established several new relationships within central and Eastern Europe, aimed at improving international security, relations between alliance members, and the organization of a military and diplomatic presence, especially in Europe and Eurasia. Candidates for membership must be able to show their commitment to the community before they can be measured for admittance. Such former communist states as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania have received the opportunity to join the alliance as long they showed dedication and loyalty to its norms and standards.19 The Czech Republic joined NATO in March 1999 and the European Union on May 1, 2004. On March 29, 2004, Slovakia became a NATO member, and on May 1, 2004, it joined the EU. In May 2005, the Czech Republic and Slovakia ratified the EU constitution. 20

20 Ibid., 111–135.
1991, Romania ratified a new constitution that included the express subordination of the armed forces to the general public. In 1994, the new law was implemented. The turning point in the Romanian situation was the election (November 1996) of Emil Constantinescu’s Democratic Convention of Romania and Petre Roman’s Social Democratic Union. Alliance representatives gave these liberal, democratic reforms proper recognition; in November 2002, Romania became a member of the alliance.21

By accepting NATO membership, Ukraine’s economy could benefit through an open market, export, and new financial opportunities within a new democratic system. Of course, the alliance would enhance Ukrainian security because NATO binds the allies together for the purpose of mutual defense and support.22

C. METHODS AND SOURCES

This analysis takes the basic form of a historical narrative, although it will advance some predictions for the future based on this sound understanding of the past and present. The project seeks to contextualize Ukraine’s possible NATO membership, given the ideological factors that may influence the likelihood. This includes Ukraine joining NATO and the evidence as to why and how Ukraine’s possible NATO membership could create an international conflict, especially between or among the alliance, Russia, and neighboring Poland. On the other hand, NATO membership would provide new opportunities. Ukraine has the capacity to make major contributions to treaties and to realize the opportunities presented by shared goals and values in the North Atlantic context. The project will provide research and opinions connected with this topic from the U.S., Polish, and Russian points of view, and ultimately, will offer an assessment of why Ukraine should join NATO.

At work here is a variable-oriented method based on precision and a specification of arguments. This methodology is based on narrative investigation and uses dependent and independent variables as “the structural components that produce meaning and

examining the functions of the reader and the author in the transfer of this meaning,”
including organizational development and history. The dependent variables are the following.

1. What is the likelihood of Ukraine joining NATO?
2. What factors influence the likelihood of Ukraine joining NATO?
3. How does Poland view Ukraine’s candidacy to NATO? How does Russia view the Ukrainian candidacy to NATO?
4. Why should Ukraine join NATO?
5. What is the role of history and experience in international relations between Poland, Ukraine, and Russia?
6. How do these three states perceive democracy, identity, and each other in connection with Ukraine’s possible NATO membership?

The first dependent variable is the primary variable, with number two and number three providing replica variables that reflect the original information. Dependent variables four through six will be explained in future prognosis. The independent variable is Russia’s stubborn stance and negative attitude towards Ukraine joining NATO. To achieve the operationalization of the variables, we must measure the validity, not reliability, of the concepts directly via statistical significance and ordinal analysis.

This approach does not use control variables because they represent changes based on mathematical logic instead of historical facts or storytelling. Instead, “discourse analysis” provides wide-ranging inventory of concerns enclosed in literature. Moreover, this method is showing a natural progression of a topic and is a reasonably modern and fundamental technique of study. According to M. Mitchell, author of Review of Narrative Methodology, “narrative offers the potential to address ambiguity, uncertainty, complexity, and dynamism of individual, group, and organizational phenomena.”

24 Ibid., 5.
D. THESIS OVERVIEW

The thesis is organized as follows.

1. Chapter II considers NATO’s strategic and operational objectives including NATO enlargement, the \textit{NATO 2020} report, post-9/11 strategy, and the NATO-Russian relationship.

2. Chapter III explores Ukraine’s views on its candidacy for NATO membership.

3. Chapter IV analyzes the Russian perspective on Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO membership.

4. Chapter V examines Poland’s views regarding Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO membership.

5. Chapter VI concludes with a prediction on Ukraine’s likelihood of eventually gaining its NATO membership.

Chapters III through V have a parallel construction that covers Ukraine’s, Soviet Union/Russia’s and Poland’s history and reform, relationship(s) with NATO, military affairs, self-image, and nuclear policy and strategy.
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II. NATO

NATO represents the gold standard of western integration, particularly to the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. The “new” Europe is tilting towards these challenges and promoting anti-communism, freedom of democracy ideologies, and the pursuance of international stability. Further NATO expansion in Eastern Europe would enhance NATO forces ability to deploy, and would help the Unites States by giving it an opportunity for better burden-sharing provisions, “modest redistribution of burdens within the alliance favorable to the United States.” The United States is in the position to “shift unwanted burdens to its partners.” Obtaining NATO membership would help Ukraine “transform and westernize” its own society, just as membership has done with other new democracies in Europe, especially Poland. As Madeleine Albright notes, “the process of NATO enlargement ‘is not about escaping West, it is about gaining the confidence to look East in a spirit of cooperation.’” NATO could help finalize Ukraine’s transformation into a multi-cultural and multi-language democracy.

In particular, this chapter of the thesis covers NATO’s historical background, NATO’s strategic/operational objectives, NATO’s enlargement, NATO’s nuclear strategy, and the NATO-Russian relationship.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NATO

While the Anglo-American union was defeating Nazi Germany during World War II in Europe, it set forth a marriage of expediency that ultimately begat NATO. As in any marriage, the parties differed in their views of the problems they faced and the decisions America and Britain would have to make. In this case, such matters loomed large for the transatlantic partnership as how (or whether) to shape the post-war order of Europe, what

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27 Ibid., 194.
28 Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door*, 229.
29 Ibid.
to do with Germany, and how to engage the Soviet Union—whose wartime tenure as an ally was clearly coming to an end. To be sure, Britain and the United States had worked out something of a prenuptial agreement of principles in the Atlantic Charter of July 1941.\(^{30}\) The common principles of the Atlantic Charter are promising in regards to the trio’s security measures, cooperation in the economic field, labor standards, territorial changes, and the rights of all people as well. Principle number six of the charter is questionable and wishful, not to mention reflects insecurity about how long after the destruction of Nazi tyranny would the union be willing to stay together? According to the Atlantic Charter (principle six):

\begin{quote}
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace, which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.\(^{31}\)
\end{quote}

During the Arcadia Conference, December 22–January 14, 1942, just after the Americans entered the war, Britain and the United States agreed to pool their military and strategic resources in Europe, establishing a unified command in the European Theater of Operations. Originally, the Anglo-American union was expected to last only until the Germans were defeated. Neither state had been inclined to remain overtly involved in affairs of the continent after the Great War, and certain disagreements (for example, British colonialism) promised to reassert themselves once the urgency of the war was past.\(^{32}\)

Nevertheless, much changed in the four odd years after Churchill and Roosevelt inked the Atlantic Charter—except, perhaps, Stalin’s unwillingness to sign onto any world-unifying plans that did not involve the collected works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. However exhausted Europe might have been by ideology after 1945, total war gave way to the Cold War. Allied unity barely lasted to V-E Day, and Europe settled into


increasingly separate blocs on either side of what became the frontline of the Cold War, characterized by Winston Churchill in 1946 as the “Iron Curtain.” According to the British Prime Minister Churchill:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.

In these new circumstances, the old transatlantic alliance not only persisted but also grew into a whole structure of agreements, mutual involvement, and coalitions that undergirded the western “pole” of the Cold War world order.

Among these new institutions of permanent western cooperation, NATO emerged in April 1949. The alliance was first to prevent military conflicts by providing a common armed defense and security to (and by) its members and their territorial regions in the event of any hostile actions. In its early years, the alliance was also self consciously anti-communist. (The original eight members of the Soviet-initiated Warsaw Pact realized their own mutual-defense organization in May 1955. The lag had enduring propaganda value, as the Warsaw Pact routinely portrayed itself as a response to western aggression in the form of NATO.) In December 1949, NATO approved the use of nuclear weapons in case of Soviet belligerence—particularly after the Soviets had tested their own nuclear bomb. Although the United States was confident regarding any military assault on its own or allied territory, the ideological struggle proceeded on several fronts. Ultimately, the goal was to prevent the potential for another world war.

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34 Ibid.

The first major threat along these lines came not in Europe but in Asia. The United States, in particular, had an interest in stopping the spread of communism into the entire Korean Peninsula. The war, its limits, and the idea of repelling or at least containing communism became central to the early conceptions of NATO’s business—although these ideas, too, changed with time and practice. The alliance model gained traction amid tensions of the early Cold War. In 1954, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan) was signed in Manila on September 8, 1954. This agreement eventually evolved into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which served the purpose of letting Russia and Beijing know that threatening Southeast Asia was no longer an option.36

In September 1958, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that NATO “is basically an exercise in interdependence.”37 In contrast to the Soviet Union, which had achieved its power “through dependence and dominance” of its so-called buffer states in Eastern and Central Europe, Dulles said that NATO had chosen a route that created independence through interdependence, giving each alliance member an equal position.38 In a similar tone, in June 1961, President Kennedy met with NATO allies before meeting with Nikita Khrushchev. He admonished the North Atlantic Assembly to “consider jointly how we can play a more significant role in other parts of the world now threatened by communist subversion or infiltration.”39 Kennedy sought to differentiate his administration from his predecessor’s in as many ways as possible, but tellingly, he agreed with Eisenhower on the fundamental purpose of NATO.40

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38 Ibid., 61–62.
39 Ibid., 64.
40 Ibid., 61–62.
So central was NATO’s anti-communist context that some of the greatest early challenges to the alliance arose when tensions between the superpowers relaxed. The years from 1967 to 1975 are commonly referred to as the détente period. Brezhnev’s Soviet Union seemed sated and stable; meanwhile, the United States had nearly completed its withdrawal from Vietnam, while gas crises and cultural conflict seemed to present more urgent and dire threats to America than communism. The differences among the Atlantic allies began to assume more prominence. In 1974, the same year that the Helsinki Accords promised much more person-to-person contacts between Europe’s blocs, the alliance mounted a renewed push for unity among members—and a further refinement of its missions and goals in the face of a Soviet threat that appeared to be on the wane. The United States, in conjunction with NATO, pledged, “not to accept any situation which would expose its Allies to external political or military pressure likely to deprive them of their freedom.”41 To some ears, this pledge might have sounded like old, die-hard Cold Warriors rattling ancient sabers in an effort to be heard over the chorus of friendship agreements and cultural exchanges. However, NATO champions also believed that the alliance had something to offer its members, even in détente.

During the years 1976–1985, the confrontation between superpowers resumed. The tensions among NATO allies persisted, as well; however, Regan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was supposed to provide protection against Soviet missiles, stressed relations further in 1983. This time, Western Europe responded with protests and an escalating antimilitarism. In response to this widespread popular pacifism, and in an effort to recapture the language of the times, NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns clarified that all NATO operations were to be peace operations.42 Margaret Thatcher echoed this and deemed NATO “the greatest peace movement in history.”43 While the protestors continued to equate NATO with death, the alliance seems to have convinced itself that its mission could include operations that served goals other than the all-out

41 Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance*, 106.
42 Ibid., 126–127.
43 Ibid., 127.
annihilation of the Soviet bloc. This project entailed an amplification of those positive values that NATO stood for—democracy, freedom, prosperity, genuine international cooperation—rather than the military power that it stood against.\textsuperscript{44}

During a period from 1986–1996, Germany was reunited, the Soviet Union came apart, communism was rejected, and the Cold War ended. To NATO’s critics on both sides of the Atlantic—now including leading political figures and pundits, as well as students, peace activists, and Euro-communists—the western alliance, by rights, should have wrapped itself up, having lost its principal business of opposing the Soviet threat. Instead, NATO took itself at its word by reaffirming its mission in light of those positive values. Rather than disappearing into the history of the Cold War, NATO undertook, if anything, the concept to expand its roles and missions in the name of securing the benefits of democracy and stability for its members.\textsuperscript{45}

B. NATO ENLARGEMENT

During the 1990s and in the wake of the Kosovo intervention, NATO updated and expanded its mission to include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and conflict prevention inside and outside the “traditional” Article V boundaries. The alliance also has played a meaningful role in the stabilization and advancement of Europe’s new democracies. To this end, the alliance established several new relationships within Central and Eastern Europe, with an eye toward improving international security, relations between alliance members, and the organization of a military and diplomatic presence especially in Europe and Eurasia.

In 1991, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) approved the expansion of the alliance in the East but clarification regarding membership was not announced. In October 1993, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) debuted, a U.S. initiative within NATO. The PfP role was to help potential members fulfil the requirements for membership. All members are participants in the burden-sharing process; membership is not only a privilege but also a responsibility. At the same time, this step represents a time of

\textsuperscript{44} Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, 4, 31–36.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 152, 188.
opportunity for the new members.\textsuperscript{46} Ian Thomas, a leading scholar on the topic, described the PfP as “a sort of training program for NATO membership.”\textsuperscript{47} Today, PfP also serves as a more formal partnership mechanism for states that may never join NATO. For example, the European neutrals, Ireland, Malta, Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria will participate in the PfP but do not wish to allocate financial or military support towards NATO issues or campaigns, a position that keeps their neutral status intact. Russia is also a member of the PfP.\textsuperscript{48}

Candidates for full NATO membership were required to show their commitment to the community before they would be measured for admittance. The first round of membership enlargement was extended to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Two other former communist states—Slovakia, and Romania—were also considered for the first expansion but both ultimately were deferred, pending a clearer adoption of NATO’s western norms and standards (democratic political process, civilian control of the military, etc.). A few of these cases will point to the challenges of enlargement for both candidates and the alliance.

The Czech Republic joined NATO in March 1999. The association of NATO with western values of democracy and liberty rendered the Czech membership peculiarly uncontroversial within the Czech Republic at the time.\textsuperscript{49} As Alexandra Gheciu observed, “the lack of a public debate in the Czech decision to join NATO played an important role in generating that perception.”\textsuperscript{50} Nearly 42 years of communist rule ended with the nearly bloodless “Velvet Revolution” in 1989. Václav Havel, a leading playwright and dissident, was elected president of Czechoslovakia in 1989. Havel had been imprisoned twice by the communist regime, and his banned plays became an international symbol for human rights, democracy, and peaceful dissent.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{46} Thomas, \textit{The Promise of Alliance}, 151–189.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 157.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 166.
\textsuperscript{49} Gheciu, \textit{NATO in the “New Europe,”} 25, 111–135.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 156.
The return of democratic political reform saw a strong Slovak nationalist movement emerge by the end of 1991, which sought independence for Slovakia. When the general elections of June 1992 failed to resolve the continuing coexistence of the two republics within the federation, Czech and Slovak political leaders agreed to separate their states into two fully independent nations. On January 1, 1993, the Czechoslovakian federation was dissolved—peacefully—and two separate independent countries were established, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.\(^{52}\)

In contrast to the Czech experience, Slovakian populist Vladimir Meciar, who served three terms as prime minister, exhibited increasingly authoritarian behavior, which was cited as the reason Slovakia was removed from consideration from both the EU and NATO, at least until he left office. On March 29, 2004, Slovakia became a NATO member and on May 1, 2004; Slovakia joined the EU—the same day that the Czech Republic joined the EU.\(^{53}\) In April 2000, Meciar was arrested and charged with paying illegal bonuses to his cabinet ministers while in office. A three-week standoff with police preceded the arrest, ending only when police commandos blew open the door on Meciar's house and seized him. He was also questioned about his alleged involvement in the 1995 kidnapping of the son of Slovakia's former president, Michal Kovac.\(^{54}\)

Despite being rejected from the first round of enlargement (with only a seven-month record of reform at the time), Romania created a methodical set of guidelines and provisions to prepare for the second wave of NATO’s enlargement. The country became very active in Eastern and Central Europe.\(^{55}\) After seven years of socialism under Ion Iliescu, Romania was ready for liberalization and the establishment of a democracy. In 1991, Romania ratified a new constitution, which included the subordination of the armed forces to the general public. The turning point in Romania’s situation was the election in November 1996 of Emil Constantinescu, of the Democratic Convention of Romania and


\(^{53}\) Ibid.

\(^{54}\) Ibid.

\(^{55}\) Gheciu, \textit{NATO in the “New Europe,”} 157.
Petre Roman of the Social Democratic Union. The goal of this new government was to lead Romania toward democracy and western policies and institutions, especially NATO. In preparation for this move, NATO prepared a great deal of training material for Romanian leaders. Approximately 800 military officers and civilians completed intense courses in the area of defense and security. Romanian policymakers implemented all the reforms that NATO suggested. Romania’s efforts were recognized, and in November 2002, the country became a member of the alliance.56

When the emerging European democracies joined the alliance, they seemed to over fulfill a mission posited by NATO’s first general secretary, Lord Ismay (although he could have had no idea in 1952 that his words about countering Soviet propaganda would mean welcoming states from the former Eastern Bloc into the alliance’s fold).57 Today, gaining NATO membership represents one ultimate aim of a whole westernization process that Central and Eastern Europe regards as the next logical step in the various national liberation movements that have reshaped the continent since 1980. In this context, NATO’s purpose represents a chain reaction. A stronger Western Europe represents a more powerful Atlantic community, which represents improvement in international relations and more peace around the world within the member and non-member countries.58 In addition, NATO as an organization has managed to prosper through several external and internal challenges, standing by its core values and principles throughout its growth process. According to Leo Michel, “through the [consensus] rule, NATO can build political and military solidarity through the alliance as a whole without imposing one-size-fits-all standards on its diverse membership”59

Macedonia, Georgia, and Ukraine have the potential to join NATO while Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Cyprus are possibly the next in line.60 Similarly, Ukraine

56 Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe,” 184–208.
57 Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, 37.
58 Ibid., 39.
60 Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe,” 181–182; Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO, 1–6; Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, 155–157, 163.
fits the description of a likely candidate for NATO membership. Ukraine has authentic free elections, an operational parliamentary system, and free media. The country is still pursuing a westernization process, which continues to benefit the state and society.61

C. NUCLEAR STRATEGY

After 20 years, nuclear weapons have returned to NATO’s front burner as NATO’s members have decided to develop a new strategic concept for NATO enlargement. NATO will reassess its traditional role of deterrence and defense by looking at the challenges of proliferation and the overall desire to reduce and/or eliminate the role of nuclear weapons. This balancing act has been ongoing since the Cold War but as time has moved forward and NATO has grown, so too have the concerns, and perspectives that the alliance must accommodate this new direction. Nuclear policy has represented the highest form of security for alliance members to date. The United States is viewed as the chief nuclear protector of NATO, a distinction that comes with a position of power and leadership. All alliance members have a voice when decisions are being made as a way to maintain peace, trust, and respect, which in turn, has kept members in favor of following the United States’ lead. It should be noted that France is an alliance member but does not participate in NATO’s nuclear affairs, nor do the French commit their nuclear forces to the alliance. Even so, France still has a desire to maintain a position within NATO that allows it to be part of the discussions regarding NATO’s general strategy discussions.

Of course, NATO is a nuclear alliance, but the question of how to reconceive this aspect of NATO in the post-Cold War world marks a key debate among the members. How will or should the nuclear contribution continue to figure into NATO strategy? How will non-nuclear members continue to participate? What about NATO’s desire for additional nuclear warheads in Europe? The goal of many non-nuclear members is to see a world free of nuclear weapons; other alliance members take the view that NATO’s nuclear weapons give the majority of them the security they need. Several alliance members want a stronger role in arms control and support the re-establishment of a

special group within NATO to help with this process. These differences have divided the alliance to a certain extent, but at the same time, the members realize that they must maintain their solidarity and cohesion. However, how will this happen?

A recent informal meeting for NATO foreign ministers was held in Tallinn, Estonia, where five alliance members—Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway—requested that NATO’s current nuclear policy be placed on the agenda. They felt the current policy could be changed. The United States placed the maintenance of NATO unity as the top priority. As a result, all members got back in line behind the United States leadership. However, to keep all members satisfied, the United States allowed a mutual agreement that any future changes to the nuclear policy would be agreed upon by all members and not by unilateral actions.62

The meeting in Tallinn may have disappointed some alliance members with the direction the meeting took, but most came away satisfied that at least there was now an open floor in regards to nuclear discussions. Many were surprised that President Obama expressed his support for a world free of nuclear weapons and the new position the United States took on the matter. The real meaning for this stance was to keep alliance members unified with the pending ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).63

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed five principles designed to help establish the basis for developing future nuclear policies. At the same time, these principles would help reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons as the long-term goal.

1. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance;
2. As a nuclear alliance, widely sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities is fundamental;
3. The broader goal of the alliance must be to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons…;

63 Ibid.
4. The alliance must broaden deterrence against twenty-first century threats, including missile defense, strengthen Article V training and exercises…;

5. In any future reductions, “our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe…”

However, the potential for a future reduction of nuclear weapons will depend on getting Russia to the table to discuss openly the option of a mutual reduction, which in reality, means this process is not going to happen any time soon.

**D. NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP**

Due to the old enmity between NATO and the Soviet Union, as well as post-Soviet/Russia views and the ambitions of Europe, Russia has taken a much dimmer view of the Atlantic Alliance than many of its former satellite states. (This dynamic, in turn, explains some of the charm of gaining NATO membership to the emerging democracies of former Soviet-dominated states in Central and Eastern Europe.) From the very beginning, NATO’s eastward expansion has sparked controversy in Russia.

At the highest levels, this controversy begins with a Cold War style war of words. Russian officials have always insisted that NATO expansion violates a solemn pledge by West Germany and the United States in 1990 not to involve any former communist states in NATO expansion plans. In 1997, Former Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Anatolii Adamishin claimed that during the German reunification process, NATO leaders had promised the Soviet government that they would not expand their current membership. Other Soviet officials, including Mikhail Gorbachev in 1996–1997, confirmed this assertion. In addition, Jack Matloqck, U.S. Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics (USSR) in 1990, stated that Gorbachev had received a clear commitment by NATO that if Germany united and maintained their membership in NATO then it would not expand eastward. Another outside view was introduced in 1998 by British analyst

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65 Lunn, *Reducing the Role of NATO’s Nuclear Weapons, Where Do We Stand after Tallinn?*


67 Ibid.
Michael McGwire, who wrote an article that was completely against NATO’s decision to invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to become members of NATO in 1997 because, he claimed, Gorbachev was given top-level assurances that NATO would not expand east. This promise should give Gorbachev a guarantee that Russia would have a non-aligned buffer zone from NATO’s eastern border. 68 When NATO expansion east became imminent, McGwire claimed that it violated the 1990 bargain agreed that allowed the newly united Germany to be a member of NATO provided NATO would not expand east of Germany. 69

On the other hand, Phillip Zelikow, former senior official on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, stated that at no time did the United States make a commitment on the future shape of NATO during Germany’s reunification process—although there was discussion of East Germany, the cost to the USSR of Germany’s reunification, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops as codified in Article 5 and included in the “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany signed in September 1990.” 70 Former President George W. Bush; former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft; and former Secretary of State James A. Baker, all of whom were involved in German unification and all attendant discussions, have echoed this version of events. The relevant records were finally declassified, and from all points, it appears that Zelikow’s accounting of the events during Germany’s reunification were finally proven to be accurate and that at no time did the United States and NATO agree not to expand NATO beyond Germany. Indeed, it was not until after the USSR fell that Moscow brought up the purported promises that NATO made in 1990 about expanding eastward or including any former Warsaw Pact states in the process. 71

Although Moscow accepted the 1999 accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as the newest members of NATO, the rhetoric flared again when NATO decided to expand further, this time to the three more strategic Baltic states that as

69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 40.
71 Ibid., 39–61.
recently as 1991, were still part of the USSR. Then, in 2008, NATO planned to extend invitations to Georgia and Ukraine—both on Russia’s borders. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov brought up the promises that he said the United States and NATO made during Germany’s reunification that assured Russia that NATO would not expand toward the east. In retaliation for this “betrayal,” Russia made Georgia the scapegoat when it invaded them in August 2008.72

Thus, are NATO-Russian relations doomed to remain in a posture of mutual suspicion and animosity? On May 17, 2010, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and a group of experts from NATO released a new document, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, which sets forth a vision of the alliance for the next decade and beyond.73 This document does not take a necessarily adversarial view of Russia. Enlargement, that is, the expansion of the alliance to include the successor states to communist Europe, figures prominently in these ambitions. According to Nicola Krastev, “Albright said, “no one should be excluded from NATO—not even Russia.”74 The NATO 2020 document continues the theme:

Partnerships, in all their diversity, will occupy a central place in the daily work of the alliance. To make the most of this reality, NATO must strive to clarify and deepen relations with key partners, to establish new relationships where appropriate, to expand the range of the partnership activities, and to understand that each partner and partnership must be dealt with on its own terms.75

The priorities also include strengthening the relationship between Russia and NATO and revitalizing the NATO-Russia Council.76

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74 Ibid.
76 Krastev, “Albright Presents Strategic Concept for NATO’s Next Decade.”
The ongoing overtures to Moscow may be posting some incremental successes. On November 20, 2010, at the Lisbon Summit, NATO and Russia agreed to start a new relationship based on future events and not on the past. There was also an agreement to cooperate on missile defense, other common threats, and security issues. According to the *International News* article from November 21, 2010, Anders Fough Rasmussen, current Secretary General of NATO, said, “we have identified the real threats, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the spread of missiles that can hit our territory even today.” Both sides agreed to:

1. Support the NATO/Russia mission in Afghanistan (Russia will allow the transport of alliance supplies through its terrain);
2. Support Afghan aviation/maintain helicopters;
3. Protect NATO and Russian military forces from potential missile attacks by re-establishing a project postponed after Russia’s attack on Georgia;
4. Perform a joint study regarding long-range missile projections if launched from the Middle East.

The reorganization of antimissile systems, radars, and interceptors for long-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles will be enlarged to include the Mediterranean, Romania, Poland, and maybe Turkey. Although Russia had some reservations regarding the programs influence on the strategic value of its ballistic missiles, the project should be completed by 2020. At present, the biggest challenge is to turn the plan into reality based on collaboration between two so very different systems. Rasmussen added, “for the first time in history, NATO countries and Russia will be cooperating to defend themselves…That alone draws a clear line between the past and the future of NATO-Russia relations.”

NATO members and Russia have been meeting on a regular basis as equals in the NATO-Russia Council since 2002 to discuss current political issues in common areas of interest. The most important strategic priorities, according to Albright, include “things

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78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
that we should work on in common: counterterrorism, drug trafficking and climate, which were a variety of issues that we have in common. And specifically, in this report, we suggested there will be work together on missile defense.”

Russia could become a secure partner if it follows NATO principles, which are based on an equal partnership commitment, democracy, territorial integrity, mutual intelligibility, conflict prevention, peacekeeping operations, support, and communication. If this is a possibility, NATO’s doors are still open, and the alliance is prepared for a new future, then this option has a chance.

If NATO starts a cordial relationship with Russia, then it may be possible to achieve a peaceful and beneficial partnership between Russia and NATO. A partnership, such as this could be the basis upon which to establish a “united” enhanced missile defense system. “Practical cooperation” with Russia has improved, but political differences are still present, especially concerning Russia’s defense reform and NATO-Russian joint peacekeeping efforts.

E. CONCLUSION

Today, gaining NATO membership still represents the ultimate aim of a whole westernization process that Central and Eastern Europe regards as the next logical step in the various national liberation movements that have been reshaping the continent since 1980. In this context, NATO’s purpose represents a chain reaction. A stronger Western Europe represents a more powerful Atlantic community and is the precondition for “growth toward unity” and stabilization of “the world by promoting peace both in Europe and beyond.” One example that comes to mind is Ukraine’s plight. Despite its historical heritage and Russian providence, Ukraine has authentic free elections, an

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80 Krastev, “Albright Presents Strategic Concept for NATO’s Next Decade.”


82 Adomeit, Inside and outside Russia’s Policies toward NATO, 3–8.

83 Thomas, The Promise of Alliance, 49.

84 Ibid., 48.
operational parliamentary system, and free media. The country is still pursuing a westernization process, which continues to be a benefit for the state.\textsuperscript{85} NATO could further help Ukraine by helping it gain “inside logic of security” and better understand “the construction of Western-defined liberal democratic institutions”\textsuperscript{86} that would give Ukraine the same peace of mind that NATO gave Poland in its ultimate fight against the Soviet military threat and/or the constant political influence.\textsuperscript{87}

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\textsuperscript{85} Brzezinski, “Putin’s Choice,” 104.
\textsuperscript{86} Ghecu, \textit{NATO in the “New Europe,”} 233.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
III. THE UKRAINIAN PERSPECTIVE

Ukraine has become a self-controlling force since its Orange Revolution, but the process of democratization has been accompanied by turmoil at home and abroad. One particularly difficult set of concerns has been the security challenges related to Russia.\(^{88}\) Russia has a history of trying to intimidate, coerce, and interfere with the internal affairs of any former member of the Soviet republic that makes a move toward establishing a democratic movement or the desire to establish relations with the European Union (EU) and/or NATO. On the other hand, Ukraine has long-standing cultural, historic, and economic ties to Russia—for example, today Russia is the primary supplier of natural gas to Ukraine. These connections draw Ukrainian politics and policy toward Moscow.

Amid this tension, Ukraine continues to struggle for national independence, consistency in its democratization process, and successful relations with both NATO and the EU. An independent Ukraine has looked forward to assimilating NATO’s positive values, which are based on “respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all other states, for the inviolability of frontiers, and the development of good-neighborly relations,”\(^{89}\) human rights, a multicultural democracy, a free-market economy, political stability and pluralism, westernization, improved security, prevention of conflicts, and support of peacekeeping operations.\(^{90}\) NATO’s relationship with Ukraine is focused on developing these principles to assure security within the Euro-Atlantic region. The problem, from Kyiv’s perspective, is what these increasingly formal relationships with the major supranational institutions of the West might cost Ukraine in terms of its newly won independence and autonomy. In contrast, the Russian flirtation forms an alternate vision of Ukraine’s true independence and international stability—with Russia representing a kindred nation amid similar circumstances, however problematic the long association has been.

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\(^{89}\) Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 327.

\(^{90}\) Ibid., 325–329.
Thus, in trying to please itself, Ukraine seems to be trying to please two parties, which may or may not be polar opposites. First, it continues to cooperate with NATO, but then came the announcement that it would forgo NATO membership, at least for now, in favor of re-building a fragile relationship with Russia. This shifting inclination has characterized Ukrainian politics at least since the breakup of the Soviet Union; indeed, many of the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe have vacillated similarly. A much larger state that at least once possessed a significant chunk of the old Soviet army, Ukraine may develop the momentum to take it further down alternate path toward autonomous modernity.

More likely, although, at some point Ukraine, may no longer be allowed to play both sides, which could force a long-term decision that will have a tremendous impact on its future. NATO may hold Ukraine responsible and require the republic to clarify its political orientation and relationship with Russia. Ukraine might choose to collaborate with Moscow or could follow Poland, which crowned its post-Cold War democratization and independence by obtaining memberships with both the EU and NATO. This chapter traces the relevant history and public opinion that shape this issue in Ukraine to demonstrate the complicated calculus that goes into NATO candidacy for Ukraine.

A. UKRAINIAN HISTORY

Ukraine has been occupied by both Poland and Russia (and was under a constant threat from the Ottoman Empire) at different times in its history. As such, historians tend to view Ukraine as part of a larger Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russian Empire, or the Soviet Union. Indeed, the very name “Ukraine,” according to some translations, means “borderland,” a relative position that Ukraine occupied for centuries following the decline of the Kievan Rus in the thirteenth century.91 A view of Ukraine’s history from a purely Ukrainian perspective is necessary for any understanding of what Ukraine is today and what they may become tomorrow, particularly in connection with Ukrainian independence.

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Until 1344, Ukraine remained under the influence of the Golden Horde’s *Pax Mongolica*. In the fourteenth century, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania challenged the hegemon. In 1386, Jagiełło, the Lithuanian pagan grand duke, married the Polish princess, Jadwiga. In this union, he accepted Roman Catholicism and promised to return to Poland all Lithuanian and Rus’ lands that Poland claimed, including Galicia and western Volhynia in Ukraine. Paul Robert Magocsi writes:

> The fall of Galicia-Volhynia, then, marked the beginning of a new era in Ukrainian history, the course of which would be determined by the destinies of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and, subsequently, the Kingdom of Poland.92

As a consequence of this second-hand destiny, the territory—and people—of Ukraine tended to get the worst end of the Polish-Lithuanian relationship, with pressure for increasing serfdom from the monarchy and nearly constant skirmishes for the land among the three competing empires in the region.

In 1615, Kiev received its own brotherhood schools. The schools were established as a way to promote the fight for national independence against the Polish-Lithuanian state. In 1630, the Zaporozhian Cossacks were enrolled into the Kiev Brotherhood and together they rebelled against Polish control. In no small part because this rebellion marked one of several, the Zaporozhian Cossacks figured significantly in the Ukrainian past. In the late-seventeenth century, this group of wildly independent cavalymen—then in the employ of the Polish territorial overlords to protect the border from the Turks—defied both the Ottoman forces and their Polish masters, who were set to cede the region during “The Ruin,” as this tumultuous period in Ukrainian history is known. The local peasantry, accustomed to seeking protection from the Cossacks against all predations, joined in several uprisings against the Poles. Ultimately, the Zaporozhian Cossacks established a quasi-military state, resolutely Orthodox. While they succeeded in wresting Ukraine from the Poles, however, they did not establish an entirely sovereign Ukraine, as their neighbor to the east developed designs on the territory soon enough.93

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93 Ibid., 229–237.
In 1654, the union between Cossack Ukraine and Muscovy was established. At that point, Hetman Khmel’nytskyi offered his services to the tsar. In 1700, 40,000 Cossacks were sent to the Great Northern War against Sweden. When the two-decades-long war saw fighting on Ukrainian territory, the Muscovite troops abused Ukrainian peasants and town residents whom the Russian army regarded as ripe for plunder rather than respect.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century, Ukraine, too, was subsumed by Russia piece by piece, as the successors of Peter the Great expanded the empire’s borders. According to Paul Robert Magocsi, “the first territory to be fully incorporated into the Russian imperial governmental structure was Sloboda, Ukraine, in 1765; then followed Zaporozhia, in 1775; and finally the Hetmanate, between 1781 and 1785.” Ukraine struggled against each and every incursion. For example, in 1790, a Ukrainian nobleman attempted to start a revolutionary movement to recreate an independent Ukraine. All these efforts were unsuccessful; however, and Catherine II finished the business of integrating the fertile farmlands and the taxable, draftable peasants of Ukraine entirely within the Russian empire.

By the late nineteenth century, when distinct nationalist politics and parties were forming throughout Europe, the budding modern Ukrainian nationalist discourse focused on the Zaporozhian Cossacks and their more or less independent, Orthodox state. Later nationalist interpretation held that “Polish landlords, Muscovite tsars, Catholic popes, and Jesuits” interrupted these plans. This pantheon of enemies starkly defined who was in and who was out of the Ukrainian nation. The threats on all frontiers, as well as from distant supranational organizations, loomed large in the earliest articulations of modern Ukrainian nationalism.

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95 Ibid., 244.
96 Ibid., 265.
97 Ibid., 276.
98 The Cossacks were infamous for working/fighting hard and playing/drinking hard—an example that latter-day Ukrainians also took to heart.
In the event, during the nineteenth century, Ukrainian history, economy and social life were characterized by subordination and dependency on the Russian Empire. During the 1880s, Ukraine reached out to Poland for support and to establish a new relationship—that included national independence for Ukraine. (The two wary neighbors were unified in this period in their desire to limit or push back Russia’s influence in the region.) Indeed, through World War I and the Russian Revolution, Ukrainians made numerous attempts to gain its independence, often with aid or at least sanction from its western neighbors. All of the attempts were unsuccessful.

In 1919, when Kiev fell to the Russian Bolsheviks, the Soviet Ukrainian Republic was established. In 1920, another Ukrainian-Polish alliance, this one skewed heavily to favor Polish ambitions in the region after the war, failed to repel the Red Army. The last real incursion of anticommunist Ukrainian “white” nationalists was put down in November 1921. In 1922, with the end of the Russian Civil War, as well as the hostilities within Ukraine, the USSR was proclaimed, and the new USSR put the remaining Ukrainian territory under its law in the name of communist “federation” among Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Transcaucasia.100 Once again, Ukraine found itself ensconced within a larger political entity that only rarely noted Ukrainian interests. It also was effectively cut off from the West.

The Soviet government authorized a Commissar on Ukrainian Affairs for all issues pertaining to Ukraine. A Soviet-Ukrainian government was established although the rigidly centralized and centralizing Moscow government, which then stripped the new government of any real power. From 1933 to 1939, the Soviet-Ukraine incorporated the whole of Soviet society into its makeup. The republic’s highest legislative branch was the Congress of Soviet Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers Deputies. This body later became known as the Verkhovna Rada. At last, a nominal Ukrainian nationhood became official when the Bolsheviks approved the so-called Ukrainianization process, which saw

100 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 499–520.
changes in leadership, the political theater, culture (the Russian language became dominant), economy, and the demographic structure of the state—at the expense of Ukraine’s considerable ethnic minority populations (notably Germans and Poles).  

The State Planning Commission, Gosplan, supervised the economy, agriculture, and industrialization according to strict Leninist principles. As a consequence of this catastrophic planning and the wages of forced collectivization, Ukraine experienced the Great Famine from 1932 to 1933. Millions of people died despite the potential for plenty from the Ukrainian “breadbasket.” The famine further solidified Moscow’s control over Ukraine.

On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked Soviet territory. Four months later, Ukraine was under German control. Initially, the Ukrainians did not oppose the invasion, hoping for a better life and possible autonomy; unfortunately, these promising ideas did not come to life. The Nazis’ racial ideology translated to a brutal and exploitive occupation of Ukraine, which inspired widespread resistance. On July 14, Stalin famously appealed to the citizens of Ukraine to protect the mother country. Ukrainians largely heeded the call. Allied victories from January 24 to February 17, 1944 meant that by the fall of that year, the majority of Ukrainian territory—Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, Polissa, northern Bukovina, and lower Bessarabia above the northern part of the Danube River—was again under Soviet control. (The other part of Bessarabia maintained its independence and today is known as a Republic of Moldova.)

The land had been devastated—the fighting cost Ukraine most of its industrial infrastructure and one in every six Ukrainian was killed in the war. Moreover, its borders shifted. According to the post-war settlements, the region of Carpathian Ruthenia, formerly a part of Hungary, was merged into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as were parts of pre-war Poland. The final expansion of Ukraine took place in 1954, when

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102 Ibid., 538–559.
103 Ibid., 637–639.
the Crimea was transferred to Ukraine from Russia with the approval of Premier Nikita Khrushchev, who had political and personal roots in Ukraine. Ukraine settled into obedience to the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{104}

According to Paul Robert Magocsi, “the Soviet Ukrainian status quo still discriminated against Ukrainians in numerous ways.”\textsuperscript{105} Some of these issues involved non-recognition of the Ukrainian language, environmental imperialism, higher education restrictions, and psychological uncertainty. Furthermore, “Soviet Ukrainianism was a form of political accommodation without assimilation.”\textsuperscript{106} In other words, Russia came to dominate Ukraine (like the other Soviet republics) without necessarily extending the full measure of “fraternal” equality or mutuality. Of course, the question remains just how much more assimilation the Ukrainians would have tolerated. Even after centuries of occupation and oppression, Ukraine retained its desire for national independence, although the embers of this dream were indeed deeply buried.

\textbf{B. REFORM}

Initially, Soviet Ukraine did not experience much \textit{perestroika} or \textit{glasnost}, but a couple of years after their introduction, some of Gorbachev’s reforms began to take hold.\textsuperscript{107} At first, the implications for the Ukrainian-Russian relationship were subtle. For example, in October 1989, Ukraine officially regained their national language. That same year, \textit{Rukh}, the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring, was founded (as a citizens movement, as the law still did not allow the formation of new political parties). Quickly, \textit{Rukh} became the trendiest and most vital organization in the republic; its priorities were human rights and political, economic, cultural, and environmental changes. The movement, with approximately 300,000 members, held its first national

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{104} Magocsi, \textit{A History of Ukraine}, 658–662.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Ibid., 669.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Ibid., 663.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 668.
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congress in Kiev on September 8–10, 1989, and elected Ivan Drach its first leader.\(^{108}\) *Rukh* participated in elections for Ukraine’s Supreme Soviet, the *Verkhovna Rada*, and won all but about 100 seats of the 450 available.\(^{109}\)

Now the stage was set for a major revision of Ukraine’s relationship to Russia. On July 16, 1990, the parliament declared independence for Ukraine. Leonid Kravchuk, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, declared Ukraine’s independence on September 24, 1991. On August 24, 1991, Kravchuk proclaimed Ukraine to be an independent territory—the sixth time in its national history.\(^{110}\) After this announcement, Ukrainians corrected the Russian spelling of their capital, Kiev, to the proper Ukrainian spelling—transliterated as “Kyiv.” A symbolic measure, this revision also served to restore pride and give Ukrainians a start at putting Russian influences behind them. According to Paul Magocsi, “for the first time, [...] Ukrainians have the opportunity to resolve their problems on their own.”\(^{111}\)

One of the more pressing problems is what to make of Ukraine’s future. On the one hand, political habits, and cultural affinities seem to urge a genuine partnership with Russia. (This tendency has been underscored by Ukraine’s dependence on Russian trade to keep its economy afloat, the strategic port leases in Sevastopol for the Russian Black Sea Fleet until 2042 and the procurement of natural gas from Russia.) In some quarters, this stance owes to fear of any move that could provoke Moscow, “which has threatened to aim nuclear weapons at Ukraine if it joins the alliance and deploys anti-missile defenses on its territory. Millions of Ukrainians who live and work in Russia or have relatives still there would also suffer if Moscow were to require visas.”\(^{112}\) At least as common, however, is a discomfort with the West and its institutions, which leads more or

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\(^{109}\) Ibid., 672.

\(^{110}\) Ibid., 670–674.

\(^{111}\) Ibid., 675.

less naturally to a kind of revived pan-Slavism. For example, Halyna Reztsova, an anti-NATO activist stated, “I don't trust NATO. I want to be with Russia and Belarus, with Slavic people.”\(^{113}\)

Thus, the existence of opposition to NATO in Ukraine creates a stronger association with Russia, which seems to promise the necessary counterweight to the pressures on Ukrainian autonomy.\(^ {114}\) For example, results of a poll (with a 0.02 statistical error) of 2,017 surveyors conducted by the Razumkov Center in February 2008 showed that 53 percent of Ukrainians were opposed to NATO membership, while 21 percent supported the idea, and the remaining 26 percent did not vote due to lack of interest, lack of a specified decision or simply were unclear on political orientation.\(^ {115}\) The head of the center’s sociological service, Andriy Bychenko, deemed the Ukrainian view in relation to NATO as “quite bad.”\(^ {116}\)

However, a breakdown of these sentiments by region suggests a more complex set of trends in Ukraine. According to Maria Danilova:

> Joining NATO was backed by nearly half the people polled in western Ukraine. […] But in eastern parts of the country, which were long under Russian rule, as many as 70 percent of residents were bitterly opposed to membership. Central and southern regions were also hostile toward NATO.\(^ {117}\)

Thus, proponents of NATO membership tend to be from western Ukraine, while opponents reside in eastern section of the country. This internal divide in Ukrainian society reflects the legacy of the country’s shifting borders and political status vis-à-vis its neighbors. As the nation unifies, dialog and consensus likely will develop accordingly.

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\(^{114}\) Danilova, *Ukrainians Split over Push to Join NATO*.

\(^{115}\) Ibid.

\(^{116}\) Ibid.

\(^{117}\) Ibid.
The large share of non-opinions in this poll may also be meaningful, particularly for pro-NATO leaders: “in the opinion of former president Yushchenko,” according to a news story from when the survey results were released,

Once Ukrainians had enough information about NATO, they would accept it, he argued, citing the results of an unnamed opinion poll in which 95 percent of Ukrainians said they wanted to have more information about NATO.\textsuperscript{118} Yushchenko himself later stated that 33 percent of Ukrainians support NATO membership, while the rest believe that “the later, the better.”\textsuperscript{119}

On the other side of the debate over Ukraine’s future orientation, the record of Russia’s involvement in Ukrainian politics bodes rather less optimistically for Ukraine’s transition. One well-publicized example was the dioxin poisoning of then-presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko in 2004. Yushchenko was an ardent westernizer with an American-born wife; his leading-man good looks seemed to go right along with the energetic, reinvigorating platform that his Our Ukraine party championed. Yushchenko was challenging then-President Leonid Kuchma and then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, both of whom were clearly closer to Moscow. As the election campaign wore on, however, Yushchenko’s photogenic face became distorted and scarred. In September 2004, he was flown to Austria for medical treatment of his symptoms, including a severe viral infection and acute inflammation of his internal organs. On December 11, 2004, Dr. Michael Zimpfer, director of a private Viennese hospital, informed the public that Yushchenko’s mysterious illness was caused by dioxin poisoning, which could not have happened inadvertently.\textsuperscript{120} Various not-quite allegations have circulated about who might have tried to kill the glamorous reformer; the story circulated widely in the western media, which chalked the episode up to more spy-versus-

\textsuperscript{118} “Ukrainians Differ on NATO Summit Results.”
\textsuperscript{119} Kitchen, The Globalization of NATO.
spy tricks from Moscow. However, old cold warriors from the western capitals were not the only ones thinking back to poison-tipped Bulgarian umbrellas. According to Ron Synovitz, Yushchenko admitted, “I am convinced, that this [poisoning] is the work of those in power.” The question remains whether he meant those in power in Kyiv or Moscow. In the end, Yushchenko won the election, although his fractious tenure in office reflects the deep division in Ukrainian society over the extent to which Ukraine should engage the West.

C. RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO

Yushchenko believes that Ukraine will follow the path of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria to overcome communist influence. Gaining NATO membership would be a milestone; it also would help Ukraine’s economy and give it protection since NATO binds the allies together for the purposes of mutual defense and support. NATO brings institutional and behavioral components for emerging democracies based on “regular competitive elections, full enfranchisement, free speech, an accessible and critical media, and freedom of association,” as well as the establishment of foreign policy, economic reforms, democratic organizations, and integration with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

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(OSCE), “free and fair” elections, elimination of “political pressure, control, and violence” are requirements for any true democracy including any middle-income democracy.126

Ukraine certainly has undertaken several key steps on the way to a deeper relationship with NATO. Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Council (later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) in 1991, then Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994. Ukrainian soldiers were deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina as a part of NATO forces in 1996. NATO opened the Information and Documentation Centre in Kyiv in 1997; a NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defense Reform was developed in 1998; a NATO Liaison Office was established in 1999; and a Polish-Ukrainian battalion was deployed to Kosovo. The training and qualifications of military forces are the two main fundamentals for acceptance by NATO. In addition, NATO is helping Ukraine develop procedures similar to NATO’s military standards.127 Progress continues to this day in this area of participation.

In May 2000, the Ukrainian parliament updated the PfP Status of Force Agreement.128 In May 2002, then-President Leonid Kuchma informed the NUC about Ukraine’s goal of gaining a NATO membership. During the NAC meeting in Reykjavik, this goal was discussed. The NATO-Ukraine relationship was given a new and higher level of importance. In Donetsk, a PfP Trust Fund project was established for the safe destruction of 400,000 landmines in July 2002; ultimately, Ukraine was supposed to destroy 133,000 tons of conventional munitions within twelve years plus 1.5 million small arms and 1,000 man-portable air defense systems.129 Also in 2002, a NATO-


129 Ibid.
Ukraine Action Plan was adopted at an NUC meeting in Prague. In March 2004, the Ukrainian parliament approved an agreement with NATO on a host nation support plan and also signed an accord with NATO on a strategic airlift plan.\textsuperscript{130}

In 2005, newly elected President Yushchenko was invited to a summit meeting at NATO headquarters. During this same period (2005), the allies and Ukraine had begun Intensified Dialogue regarding Ukraine’s potential NATO membership and the major reforms connected with this achievement (Operation Active Endeavour). In October, Ukraine was a host for a multinational disaster-response exercise and the NAC Kyiv visit with Ukraine’s foreign and defense ministers.\textsuperscript{131}

In February 2006, a Re-Settlement and Re-Training Center was concluded in Chmielnicki (Khmelnitskyi). In March 2006, NATO Secretary General acknowledged free and fair parliamentary elections as a part of democratization process in Ukraine. In September 2006, Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych expressed his feelings regarding Ukraine’s dedication to a NATO membership:

Yanukovych stressed Thursday that he was not turning his back on the West. For the time being, we are looking at enlargement of our cooperation with NATO, rather than membership, he said. We should be a reliable bridge between the European Union and Russia.

Yanukovych promised to continue supporting internal reforms that “will bring us in the long term to accession of the European Union.”\textsuperscript{132}

One month after Yanukovych’s visit with NATO, the Ukrainian parliament confirmed the concurrence on a strategic airlift. The tenth anniversary of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership was celebrated in 2007. Ukraine supported Operation Active Endeavour to which it deployed two Ukrainian ships (the frigate \textit{URS Termopil} and the corvette \textit{URS Lutsk}) to support the operation. The focus of Operation Active

\textsuperscript{130} “NATO-OTAN, NATO’s Relations with Ukraine.”
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
Endeavour was patrolling the Mediterranean and protecting it against potential terrorist activity. The operation has given the alliance knowledge and exercise regarding global efforts to fight terrorism.133

In 2008, at the Bucharest Summit, allied leaders came to an agreement that Ukraine was fully eligible for NATO membership. The NATO-Ukraine Commission was modernized and used for supporting Ukraine, as it becomes a NATO member in the future.134 In 2009, *URS Termopil* was deployed for the third time as part of Operation Active Endeavour.

Based on its contributions to NATO and its participations in the preliminaries of membership, Ukraine seemed headed for a more formal association with the alliance—until the 2010 presidential elections, which saw the staunchly pro-western Yushchenko replaced by Viktor Yanukovych of the pro-Russian Party of Regions. President Yanukovych took office on a clear platform of establishing stronger relations with Russia. To accomplish this goal, Yanukovych would have to abandon or at least significantly slow efforts to gain NATO membership because of Russia. In May 2010, Foreign Minister Konstantin Grishchenko announced that Ukraine had moved NATO membership off the national agenda.135

A renewed and healthy relationship with Russia is one thing, but Yanukovych did not want Russia’s political presence back in Kyiv. To prevent any creeping influence from Moscow, Yanukovych has vowed to continue building alliance relations as a measure of protection. Grishchenko also has called consistently to continue building alliance relations. On August 21, 2009, the “Declaration to Complement the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine” was signed as a follow-up to a foreign ministers’ meeting in Bucharest.136

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134 “NATO-OTAN, NATO’s Relations with Ukraine.”


136 “NATO-OTAN, NATO’s Relations with Ukraine.”
The “distinctive partnership” is emblematic of Ukraine’s current preferred position between western institutions, particularly NATO, and Russia. The ideal of a “middle way” between competing views of Ukraine’s future seems, then, to take the shape of an à la carte relationship between Ukraine and NATO, an arm’s-length engagement of the West that ensures the full measure of Ukrainian sovereignty, at least from Kyiv’s perspective. Will Ukraine’s competing suitors—Russia and NATO—allow such an approach? Why do Ukrainian leaders believe they can pursue such a course?

D. UKRAINE AND THE NUCLEAR ISSUE

The answers begin with a peculiarity of Ukraine’s post-Soviet situation, namely its status as a nuclear power. One of the NATO requirements for Ukraine’s membership—bespeaking a larger concern in the West—is the control of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine received by inheritance the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. When Ukraine realized its new position on the world stage, its first order of business was to use this power to gain its independent security. A primary step towards this goal was accomplished by establishing its own military. This military was initially built with the troops and equipment gained from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ukraine continues to streamline and improve its military in an effort to bring it up to NATO standards. Even though President Yanukovych has aligned Ukraine with Russia, he will continue working with NATO in regards to building a more professional Ukrainian military.

In regards to Ukraine’s actual nuclear arsenal, the Ukrainian military statistic (WMD missiles) stated, “Ukraine inherited significant intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) design and production capabilities from the Soviet Union. These included the Pivdenne (formerly Yuzhnoye) Design Bureau, responsible for the design of the SS-18 and the SS-24 ICBMs, and the Pivdenmash (formerly Yuzhmash) Machine-Building Plant, which produced a wide range of Soviet ICBMs, including the SS-18 and SS-

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137 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 50.
Statistically speaking, Ukraine received 176, SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs, 1,240 warheads and 44 strategic bombers and an undetermined number of tactical nuclear warheads.139

In May 1992, Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol, under which it was obligated to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) under which the country turned over all nuclear weapons to Russia for “disposal” and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state.140 Ukraine also signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which included its reduction of tanks, artillery, and armoured vehicles. According to Davis Andrews, “preserving the anti-Soviet partnership therefore remained within the sphere of the politically possible.”141 In December 1994, Ukraine acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state.142 As stated in Ukrainian military statistics, “the last warheads were transferred by June 1996 in return for Russian compensation in the form of fuel for Ukraine’s nuclear power reactors and eliminating missiles, missile silos, and strategic bombers on its territory.”143

Kyiv’s position was already distinguished in the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership in 1997, which involved common matters, such as:

1. Conflict prevention, crisis management, peace support, conflict resolution and humanitarian operations, taking into account the roles of the United Nations and the OSCE in this field; the political and defense aspects of nuclear, biological and chemical non-proliferation;

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139 Ibid.
143 “WMD Nuclear,” (Ukraine).
2. Disarmament and arms control issues, including those related to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), the Open Skies Treaty and confidence and security building measures in the 1994 Vienna Document;

3. Arms exports and related technology transfers.144

Ukraine is progressively working on meeting NATO’s standards connected with its established military doctrines, procedures, and burden-sharing matters. Training and qualifications of military forces are the two main fundamentals for acceptance. NATO is still supporting Ukraine’s desire to comply with NATO’s standards in these areas of interest.145 Thus, NATO seems to pay particular attention to Ukraine as a potentially unaligned nuclear power. Ukraine has leveraged its status to secure its “special” relationship with NATO (and, not incidentally, with Russia). Currently, the state of affairs on the nuclear issue suggests that Ukraine can and will approach its relations with both NATO and Russia on pick-and-choose basis, playing both larger powers off each other to ensure its own independence.

E. CONCLUSION

While this approach accords with current public opinion, the larger question is whether Ukraine loses more in such a bargain than the perceived intrusions on its national sovereignty that more formal ties with NATO might entail. In this connection, critics of Ukraine’s westernization might want to reexamine the country’s similarly hesitant progress toward integration into the European Union, which has hit some real snags:

First, the EU was seriously underwhelmed by Kiev’s [sic] previous performance and is now experiencing what has widely become known as the ‘Ukraine fatigue.’ What seems to be particularly bad news for Kyiv is that the feeling of frustration with Ukraine’s infighting and corruption has gripped not only the old core countries of united Europe, but also spread

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144 “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine.”

over the EU’s “eastern wing,” including the Baltic nations and Poland—the countries that used to be Ukraine’s staunchest supporters within the Union.146

This observation should not suggest that a finite “window of opportunity” exists for Ukraine’s membership in these western organizations. However, the longer these entities make do with Ukraine on the outside, the more Ukraine must do to join later.

In the meantime, Ukraine’s tentativeness presents a further challenge to its neighbors, particularly those with westernizing aspirations of their own. According to Alexandra Gheciu, NATO helps “to establish stability in the region through the projection of a particular set of Western-defined liberal democratic norms of governance.”147 With these norms comes the promise of democracy, security, and prosperity—for Ukraine and for the entire region. Arguably, partial measures as regards NATO will beget partial results for all the rest of the “package.” To the extent that Ukraine’s progress will influence developments in Moldova and Belarus, the next steps are a matter of regional importance.

Moscow remains an active opponent to Ukraine’s potential NATO membership and has implemented a zero-sum methodology in regards to Ukraine’s independence.148 In fact, Vladimir Putin famously threatened to destroy Ukraine if it joins NATO. However, from the regional perspective, especially, even Russia stands to benefit from Ukrainian membership in NATO.

In part because of its history and its nuclear status, Ukraine may not believe that the model of smaller and arguably more western states—for example, Poland—applies. The concessions of autonomy that Poland appears to have made to the West for inclusion in its organizations, such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO Parliamentary Assembly and Partnership for Peace, may be more than Ukrainians think they want to pay for admission. The alternative of an utterly independent course, with each aspect of


147 Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe,” 212.

relations with NATO and Russia and anyone else, for that matter, shimmers alluringly, especially to a society that conceives of itself as the historical victim of centuries of occupation. Alexandra Gheciu argues:

With particular reference to the Czech and Romanian cases, [...] in the post-Cold War period NATO became involved precisely in such a pedagogic project aimed at socializing Central/Eastern Europeans into thinking about the world—and, hence, identifying reasonable courses of action—within the framework of Western-based liberal democratic norms.¹⁴⁹

However, even Europe’s staunchest neutral powers are giving up all but the rhetoric of neutrality as the requirements of coalition warfare, global terrorism, and the economic downturn impel them to align with, if not join, such organizations as NATO and the EU. (To be sure, Switzerland maintains its neutral status and its capability to defend its own borders alone, but such a resource-intensive approach seems all but practically impossible for Ukraine, even if its strategic location on the NATO frontier permitted such an eventuality.)

For the long term, then, more extensive and formal relations with NATO seem like the clear best answer. To secure the dream of having its sovereignty and establishing a democracy, the Ukrainian leadership must educate its constituents and clarify the anti-NATO propaganda and stereotypes through increasing awareness of how the NATO ideology could benefit Ukraine. Even though Yanukovych’s Ukraine has changed its course toward accepting Russia’s involvement in the arena of its foreign policy, Ukraine still has time, according to NATO, to meet its requirements. To this end, the final decision may be based on the intensity of Russia/Ukraine cooperation, which perhaps should be based on NATO’s guidance, westernization, and the potential for further development as a sovereign country.

IV. THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

This chapter outlines Soviet and Russian history, reform (notably Gorbachev’s *perestroika*), Russian military affairs; and Russian-Ukrainian-NATO relations. The chapter also describes Russia’s reinvention and transformation “from a communist dictatorship to a multiparty democracy in which officials are chosen in regular elections”\(^{150}\) and the Russian government’s motivation for change in relation to Eastern Europe’s reinvention, current nuclear policy, military affairs, and the budding capitalist economy. The chapter may prove to be the most pivotal because it analyzes the Russian government views on Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO membership and explains Russia’s motivation in opposing Kyiv’s pursuit of NATO membership.

From the Russian perspective, NATO’s eastward encroachments represent several troubling continuities. At the very least, Moscow sees a sort of Cold-War triumphalism at work as its old nemesis projects its military alliance ever closer to Russian borders while routinely disregarding Russia’s interests, particularly in its currently or formerly allied neighbor states. Worse, the new Article 5 map reinforces the prejudice that Russia is distinct from the West and separate from “mainstream” Europe, except perhaps as an exporter of raw materials and natural gas. NATO enlargement—at least as much as the expansion of the European Union—seems aimed at sidelining or isolating Russia. For historical, as well as strategic reasons, Russia has resisted these measures, although perhaps at the cost of affecting real change and stability for itself.

Russian “exceptionalism” is by no means unique to Moscow. Even as the Soviet Union dissolved into its various republics and nationalities, western policy implied that Russia was different—dangerously different—from the other emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. The U.S. approach was based on establishing a NATO “Dual Track” program initiated by President George H. W. Bush and modified, but otherwise, continued by the Clinton administration. The Clinton administration modified the Dual Track program so it could generate an additional function for NATO, which

…represents the global extension to the Leonid Breznev Doctrine—which, to its credit, applied only to the ‘socialist community,’ as opposed to the unlimited potentially world-wide scope of the Clinton-Bush Doctrine. The ‘socialist community’ stopped on the Elbe, but this ‘new NATO’ stops nowhere. It is the agent of revolutionary dynamism with global ambitions, in the name of ideological norms of ‘democracy, human rights and open markets.’

At the heart of this two-part view of Europe’s future lay the assumption that NATO expansion was not realistically going to go as far as Russia because Russia was against or at least distinct from everything western. In one sense, Russia has progressed as a democracy in its economic and social aspects, but it remains distorted due to its inability to reduce those aspects not typical of successful western liberal democracies, such as high corruption, internal (government) and external (private enterprise), and organized crime (“power-hungry mafia”), which have gained prominence in the system. Russian “exceptionalism” and “the rising tide of anti-Western sentiment,” if not brought under control, may ultimately prevent secluded Russia from realizing the goal of a true liberal democracy and establishing “a framework for NATO-Russia cooperation’ […] ‘increasingly elusive.” Thus, for Russia, the question of Ukraine joining NATO may represent an intermediate step for its own relations with the alliance. It also stands in for the larger and long-standing issue of Russia’s position within or alongside the West.

A. RUSSIAN HISTORY

Russia’s royal leadership over the centuries established a pattern of rule that oscillated between iron-fisted reforms and utter neglect; a legacy that shaped the country and its politics well after the last noble family lost properties in the early twentieth century. The diversity of Russia’s denizens and the vastness of its territory have posed particular challenges to those who sought to govern Russia. At the same time, the size


152 A vision of Russia, which “resembles the reflection in a distorting mirror: its features are recognizable, but they are stretched and twisted out of proportion. To see Russia clearly, one must return to the facts.” Shleifer and Treisman, “A Normal Country, Rethinking Russia,” 22.

153 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 109.

154 Ibid.
and potential wealth of the country—especially its natural resources—have distinguished Russia as a formidable power in the minds of other European leaders, a recognition perhaps too grudgingly accorded, from the Russian perspective.

In some sense, Russia started out late—and therefore at a disadvantage—compared to its western European neighbors. The Rus’, were initially referred to as Varangians, that were made up of Swedes, Normans, Angles, and Gotlanders. The Varangians were pushed out by the original tribes composed of the Chuds, Slavs, Merians, Krivichs, and Veps, but the Varangians were eventually invited back to preside over the unruly land. In 862 A.D., Russian territory was under the control of the Danish Viking Rurik and his dynasty. Rurik created a formal government from the unorganized tribes. His Varangian successor, Vladimir, famously auditioned the contemporary monotheistic faiths, settling on Orthodox Christianity in 987. This decision created a strong connection between the Rus’ and Byzantium and availed Rus’ traders of latter-day Silk Road commerce.\footnote{155 “The Varangians (Normans) and the Origin of the Russian and Ukrainian States;” http://www.dur.ac.uk/a.k.harrington/vikings.html.}

In the mid-thirteenth century, the trade routes from Asia brought the Mongols, who rampaged through Russian territory on their way west into Central Europe. Even though they retreated from Hungary and Poland, they retained some Russian land for settlement and rather more for tribute, remaining a threat, particularly along Russia’s southern and eastern borders, for centuries thereafter. In 1386, Lithuania and Poland established a union that included the majority of Lithuanian-controlled Rus’ areas, bringing a Catholic and western power right to Russia’s door.\footnote{156 Richard Pipes, \textit{Russia under the Old Regime} (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 1–37.}

A good century passed before Russia began to consolidate, not accidentally, about the time that Constantinople fell at last to the ascendant Muslims. The Grand Prince of Moscow, Ivan III Vasiliyevich (1462–1505), commonly known as Ivan the Great, styled himself as tsar—and the successor of the Byzantine emperors. Ivan was an excellent warrior and negotiator. He ended the Mongols’ influence in Russia and extended Russia’s territory up to Siberia while thwarting Polish-Lithuanian designs on his territory when he
wrested sole control of the Russian throne from his brothers. Ivan the Great curtailed the tradition of consulting the noble boyars in matters of state, the first—but not last—step toward establishing an autocratic and centralizing regime. Under Ivan III, the first Russian legal code was transcribed and the Kremlin in Moscow began to take its current form.\(^{157}\) Both measures served to link Moscow to the glories of Byzantium, as well as to strengthen and modernize Russia along the prevailing lines of the European Renaissance.

Upon the death of Ivan the Great (after 43 years on the throne), his son, Vasili III Ivanovich (1505–1533) became Grand Prince of Moscow and really did nothing more than manage his father’s successes. Then, Vasili’s son, Ivan IV Vasilyevich (1533–1584), also known as Ivan the Terrible, took over. He was an absolutist leader whose territorial conquests established Russia as a multi-ethnic empire. (He had Moscow’s Cathedral of St. Basil constructed to commemorate these victories.)\(^ {158}\)

Especially in the earlier part of his reign, Ivan fundamentally changed Russia’s governmental organization, created a standing army, instituted the national assembly (with representation from the three accepted estates), formalized the role of the Orthodox Church in politics and society, and took the official title of tsar. He also undertook economic reforms, although his efforts to connect Russia to the Baltic and Central European trade realms were thwarted by Poland and Lithuania. The printing press made its Russian debut—briefly—during Ivan’s reign, which shows the tsar’s reforming tendencies, as well as his mercurial personality and the distinct shift in the character of his regime following a near-fatal illness in 1553 and the assassination of his wife in 1560 by mutinous boyars. Ivan’s revisions to Russia’s legal code included the laws that eventually gave rise to serfdom in Russia.\(^ {159}\)

After his death due to a stroke, his son, Feodor I Ivanovich (1584–1598), took over. Feodor’s reign was considered weak, as he had no interest in politics; Feodor may or may not have been mentally retarded. Either way, he left the day-to-day business of

\(^{157}\) Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime*, 1–37.

\(^{158}\) Ibid.

\(^{159}\) Ibid.
running Russia in the hands of his brother-in-law, Boris Godunov (1585–1598). (Godunov was an oprichnik, that is, a member of the guard/secret police that Ivan the Terrible established to counter and perhaps even replace the untrustworthy noble boyars.) During this period, Feodor and his wife, Irina (Alexandra) Feodorovna Godunov, bore a daughter who died at the age of two, and the couple never had another child. This event ended the Rurik Dynasty. Boris Godunov (1598–1605) was elected by the national assembly and officially became the first non-Rurik tsar of Russia in September 1598. Boris was a popular leader who made every effort during his reign to bring Russia up to the standards of the West. He imported scores of teachers from across Europe in an effort jump-start education in Russia and bring his country into the full swing of the Enlightenment. He also allowed Lutheran churches in Russia. Godunov instituted further economic reforms in the spirit of his time and place. On the one hand, he dropped tariffs to encourage trade with Britain, and he otherwise preferred diplomacy as the means of connecting Russia to Europe. On the other hand, a 1597 law, aimed at stabilizing taxes and revenues, bound the Russian peasantry to the land and effectively instituted serfdom in Russia.160

Upon his death in 1605, his son, Feodor II Borisovich Godunov, all of 16 years of age, became the tsar of Russia. Boris Godunov had taken the steps to appoint a council to help his son when the boy finally took control. The council was a step toward something other than absolute rule and represented a movement of greater popular participation. Still, the young tsar’s reign lasted just a few months before turmoil (the so-called Time of Troubles) led to his removal as tsar and subsequent murder—all before his seventeenth birthday. Dmitriy I (1605–1606) was next to become tsar during the Time of Troubles. His ascent to tsar was clouded in mystery since he claimed to be the youngest son of Ivan IV, who managed to be moved to safety when the surviving family was murdered. Some did not believe this account, and he became known as the False Dmitriy I or Dmitriy Ioannovich. His time as tsar was also short-lived, anyway; he was murdered after just 10 months. Vasili IV of Russia (1606–1610) was given the position of tsar after the death of Dmitriy I. His lineage traced back to Rurik the Viking, but regardless of his bloodline, he

160 Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, 1–37.
was never really accepted as tsar. His position was viewed as temporary until a better candidate could be found. In the event, Vasili IV was not murdered during the Time of Troubles but was removed as tsar in 1610. While Russia’s would-be rulers occupied themselves with intrigues and infighting, the country suffered a devastating famine (which may have killed a third or more of the population), civil uprisings, and occupation by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.161

Mikhail I Fyodorovich Romanov (Michael of Russia/1613–1645) was the first ruler from the Romanov dynasty, whose reign ended the Time of Troubles. A truce with Poland-Lithuania in 1618 reasserted Russian independence and set the stage for improved foreign relations, particularly when the relevant offices in Russia came into capable hands. When Mikhail I passed, his son Aleksey Mikhailovich Romanov (Alexis I/1645–1676) at the age of 16 had been prepared to take on the role of tsar. His reign was mostly known for the truces he secured and the expansion of Russia, which now encompassed roughly two billion acres. When Alexis I passed, his oldest son, 14-year-old Feodor III Alexeevich (1676–1682) became the new tsar. His time as tsar was as short as his life. The unexpected death of Feodor III sparked the Moscow Uprising of 1682, which saw regiments of the standing army (the streltsy) attempting to intervene in the succession process. (Mobs of Moscow’s poor joined the violence and looted the city.)162

In a compromise solution, Feodor’s son, Pyotr Alexseyevich Romanov (Peter I, the Great/1682–1725), became the new tsar but was jointly ruling Russia with his sickly older brother, Ivan V Alexseyevich Romanov (1682–1696). Their union persisted until Ivan V died at the age of 29, but Peter was clearly the man in charge. An enlightened despot much taken with the Enlightenment in France, Peter the Great’s reign expanded heavy industry and introduced reforms related to westernization, particularly in medicine and architecture but also strategy and foreign relations.163 In addition to his western

162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
inflection, his military victories, particularly against Sweden, brought Russia squarely into Europe’s view as a major power; they also expanded Russia’s borders, including access to the Baltic through the tsar’s new self-designed capital of Petersburg.

Catherine I (1725–1727), born Martha Skavronskaia and a Livonian peasant, gained the throne when Czar Peter I elevated her from mistress, to wife, then to Czarina—joint ruler. She was appointed ruler by Menshikov and the Imperial Guards when Peter died without naming an heir. Catherine I was the first Empress of Russia and a supporter of her husband’s vision of modernizing Russia. One of the steps she took in this connection was the creation on February 8, 1726 of the Supreme Privy Council (the Verkhovniki Council) “as a result of the struggle for power among separate groups of the dvorianstvo (nobility or gentry).” The council was supposed to “limit the autocracy in the interests of the aristocracy,” very broadly along the lines of the way that the English nobility limited the powers of their king, although without a Magna Carta or a fully functioning parliament. Pyotr II Alexseyevich (Peter II/1727–1730) became the Emperor of Russia. (Peter II was not a descendant of Catherine I but was the son of Peter the Great and his first wife.) During his reign, the Senate and Privy Council handled the day-to-day operations of the Russian Empire. His ruling principles were similar to Boris Godunov. He also continued the movement of greater popular participation. Peter II was to be married in 1730, but passed away at the age of 14 due to smallpox.

Anna Ivanovna was appointed Empress of the Russian Empire by the Verkhovniki after she signed a credo limiting her authority. Anna (1730–1740) was the daughter of Ivan V. Her appointment was based on the idea that she would allow the Supreme Privy Council to make all decisions for the Russian Empire in regards of foreign affairs. However, Anna had her own ideas; she established herself as a dominant ruler and then re-established the Security Police to handle all those who might oppose her. Her reign tilted Russia back toward an authoritarian regime, although also a more centralized and bureaucratized style of rule.

165 “A Short Overview of the Russian History.”
Anna had made provisions for her adopted son Ivan VI (1740–1741), who was an infant, to become Emperor of Russia. It was obvious that an appointed council would make all the decisions, but within a year, Ivan VI and his family were overthrown and jailed. Elizaveta Petrovna (1741–1762) was established as the Empress of Russia—a very different empress than Anna had been. During her reign, she refused to have anyone executed, initiated the War of Austrian Succession and later the Seven Years’ War. During her reign, Russia once again expanded its borders to an amazing four billion acres.\textsuperscript{166}

Elizabeth of Russia never married or bore an heir, so she had to select one. Peter III (1762–1762), her nephew, found himself the new Emperor of Russia for roughly six months until his murder. There were claims that Peter’s wife Catherine II may have been involved in the circumstances surrounding her husband’s death, or it could have been due to his pro-Prussia stance after he ended the Seven Years’ War and reinstated to Prussia those lands that Russia had captured. Either way, Catherine II, known as Catherine the Great (1762–1796), was the new Empress of Russia even though she had no clear blood connections to the throne.\textsuperscript{167}

Catherine the Great continued in the mode of an enlightened despot, using her absolute authority to force reforms, at least to those parts of state and society that she (or any Russian leader) actually could control. During her reign, westernization continued; she introduced French culture and European philosophies on education to the citizens of Russia as a way to improve the lives and fortunes of the average Russian citizen. After the French Revolution began, however, she executed everyone suspected of following French/revolutionary ideology; like many of the old regime’s philosophes, Catherine did not believe in mass rule or any of the other more radical manifestations of revolution in the West. She won her war against the Ottoman Empire and greatly expanded Russia’s reach and influence in foreign relations. Catherine also gained control over Ukraine,

\textsuperscript{166} “A Short Overview of the Russian History.”
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.
Crimea, and Poland, and …she did show herself to be very unscrupulous. Her opposition to the reform of the Polish government [and Ukrainian as well] was plainly due to a wish to preserve an excuse for further spoliation, but her conduct was less cruel and base than that of Prussia.168

Catherine’s son Paul I (1796–1801) succeeded his mother to the throne. Initially, he made some strong decisions, such as recalling all Russian military expansion forces that had previously been sent out by Catherine the Great. His hatred for the French and Napoleon’s eventual march throughout Europe to conquer pushed Paul I to ally with other countries and to go war against France. He was eventually murdered and his son, Alexander I (1801–1825), became the next Emperor of Russia, as well as the first Russian King of Poland (1815–1825). Alexander was also the first Russian Grand Duke of Finland and Lithuania. It was Alexander I who eventually defeated Napoleon.169

Upon his death, his brother Nicholas I (1825–1855) took over as Emperor of Russia. He also took on the titles of King of Poland and Grand Duke of Finland. During his reign, Russia had pushed its borders to the point of covering more than seven million square miles. He also wanted to abolish serfdom but did not pursue it order to keep wealthy landowners on his side. (He eventually tried to establish some type of control over the wealthy landowners.) Nicolas I implemented educational reforms, which included establishing Kiev University in 1834.170

Nicholas I made a move on the Ottoman Empire, but soon Russia found itself at war with all of Europe. At the time of his death, the Crimean War (or Eastern War) was still ongoing. Alexander II (1855–1881) was the next Emperor of Russia and also took the same additional titles of his father—King of Poland and Grand Duke of Finland. His first course of action was to get Russia out of the Crimean War (or Eastern War) because of the toll it was taking on the country. He began to make radical moves, such as

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169 Ibid.
170 “A Short Overview of the Russian History.”
negotiating the improvement of peasants living conditions and wanting to give them the right to own land. He also followed up on the serf’s liberalization by signing the Emancipation Law on March 3, 1861. The manifesto brought economic reforms, which further led to a market economy.\footnote{171}

The Polish January Uprising of 1863–1864 was handled swiftly since Alexander II had made it a priority to rebuild Russia’s military after the Crimean War debacle. He improved peasant health care, railroads, and schools, introduced banking, and expanded the borders to the Pacific and into Central Asia. His reign witnessed revolutionary strikes, and in the end, the rebels assassinated Alexander II. Alexander III (1881–1894) was an iron ruler and also known to be a reactionary leader. He created a secret police force to fight bloody revolutionary/terrorist movements, including the Narodnaya Volya, which initiated the revolution.\footnote{172}

The last tsar, Nicolas II (1894–1917), the oldest son of Alexander III was crowned in 1894 and given the official title of Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias. He did not pursue any substantial changes; he was a weak leader who did nothing to prevent the revolution. His focus was on military strength. The Russo-Japanese war (which Russia lost) and later World War I, created a collapse of Russia’s military and economy. In the midst of this ruin, Russian citizens gathered together in front of the tsar’s residence with simple requests that could improve their way of living. The tsar did not respond as his people hoped. The nonviolent demonstration resulted in hundreds being killed, an event, which became known as “Bloody Sunday.” The final revolution escalated to the ultimate stage in July 1918 and on July 16/17, 1918, the Bolsheviks killed the tsar and his family.\footnote{173}

\footnote{171 “A Short Overview of the Russian History.”}
\footnote{172 Ibid.}
\footnote{173 “Nicholas II (Tsar of Russia),” http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/414099/Nicholas-II.}
B. SOVIET HISTORY

The Russian Revolution introduced drastic political and economical changes in Russian history and became a connecting point between “tsarism and communism.” Russia’s legacy of chaotic and ironhanded rule survived, at least in vestiges, in the post-revolutionary system, even if the men and women who had perpetrated it most recently did not.

As early as December 1917—mere weeks after their successful revolution—the Bolsheviks began creating their own imperial system. During the same month, the party established its political secret police force, the Cheka. The Cheka’s primary mission was to exterminate Whites (the anti-revolutionaries) in Russia and throughout the emerging communist federation. The Cheka became powerful in a short period of time and exercised its power to the fullest extent. In September 1918, the police executed 500 citizens they considered “enemies of the state.” The Cheka and the “Revolutionary Tribunals” managed “the mass executions, forced labor camps, exile, censorship and all the other repressive measures which they instituted were conceived by them as necessary to uproot what was still left of the old regime.”

Lenin, and later Josef Stalin, had additional plans in place to protect the communist party and the new government. Although Lenin and Stalin represented a new revolutionary government, their ideology was established around a communist dictatorship, which drew much from the authoritarian, if modernizing, governing principles of Anna Ivanovna and Catherine the Great. When Stalin took over as head of the Soviet Union, he sought to accelerate Soviet industrial and economic development in preparation for the war with capitalism, which he viewed as imminent. To this end, Stalin set about undoing Lenin’s economic and social compromises and enforcing a more rigid centralized order (and ideological orthodoxy) on the Soviet society. Economic reform focused on exporting food in exchange for heavy equipment, as well as on eradicating the

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174 Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, xix.
175 Ibid., 318.
176 Ibid., 317–318.
last vestiges of the small business owners and independent peasantry that Lenin had tolerated in the name of sustaining the Soviet Union in its earliest days. Agricultural reform entailed introducing forced collectivization on the one hand and policies of liquidating the kulaks (dekulakization), as the rich peasants were called, on the other. These measures were also meant to finalize the project of “spearhead [socialism] in the countryside” and remove any traces of resistance to Sovietization from among the religiously or nationally inclined rural populations.\footnote{\textit{Subject Essay: Lewis Siegelbaum, Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, 1929: Collectivization/Liquidation of Kulaks as a Class},'' http://www.soviethistory.org/index.php?page=subject&SubjectID=1929collectivization&Year=1929.} The Great Famine and other privations that eventuated were part and parcel of this greater project.

Where Lenin had concerned himself primarily with consolidating communism within the Soviet Union, Stalin also wanted to advance the communist cause abroad, in large part as a way to secure his state. For one thing, Stalin came to believe that the “inevitable confrontation between communism and capitalism” that Marx prophesied was imminent. World War II seemed to bear out this view, particularly when Nazi Germany became an official enemy in 1941. (Hitler’s Third Reich was certainly anti-communist, if not exactly dedicated to free-market capitalism.) The war also thrust the Soviet Union into the uppermost reaches of alliance and diplomacy; now Stalin was one of the “Big Three,” along with Churchill and Roosevelt, who opposed the Axis. From this position, Moscow sought to press its advantage over western allies that seemed less than unified.

February 1945 brought the Yalta Conference on the restructuring of Europe after WWII. The Big Three finally approved an agreement:

They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.\footnote{\textit{The Yalta Conference Agreement, Russian News Network},'' http://www.russiannewsnetwork.com/yalta.html.}
However, the Yalta conference also showed the divisions between the allies in sharper relief even than some of the earlier discussions, particularly as regards the Soviet “sphere of influence” in such states as Poland, where Moscow wanted to see weak communist governments installed.\textsuperscript{179} There are two schools of thought/opinions regarding decisions made during the Yalta conference. First, the decisions “were based on U.S., not Soviet proposals” and “the Soviet delegation did not make any amendments, while the British delegation only worked its style.”\textsuperscript{180} Alternately, the second school of thought argues that Stalin “outplayed Roosevelt or used his failing health to his advantage.”\textsuperscript{181} The extent to which formerly Nazi-held territory had been liberated and held by the Red Army may have added some weight to Stalin’s side, as well. Either way, Yalta established that the USSR now could and did demand full recognition as one of the world’s dominant powers. The Soviets’ first nuclear detonation in 1949 dispelled any doubts about this status, as well as helping to cast the Cold War in nuclear terms.

At the peak of the Cold War, there were several attempts made by the Soviet Union to change the world into a “socialist camp” and a “free world.” During this period, the Bolsheviks started their activity in Prague and created the Communist Information Bureau (the Cominform). The Soviet Empire used military power to limit ethnic autonomy of all new republics, began the “korenizatsiia/implementation” of Soviet organizations and used the Communist International (the Comintern) to manage all international communist parties.\textsuperscript{182}

After World War II, the Soviet Union sought to implement the “communism” doctrine throughout Eastern Europe, most notably, the strategic states located on its borders. To accomplish this, countries that the Soviet Union already inhabited during WWII had pro-Soviet Union coalitions secretly established within the targeted countries to avoid uprisings and to initiate a false sense of security, as a Soviet takeover via a three-}


\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid.

stage bloc-politics process was imminent. Anyone who opposed this action was removed. The countries pulled into this process were East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia by all accounts was fully vested in the communist transition, to the point that the Soviet Union did not immediately force bloc politics on its government. This anticipated victory by the Soviet Union quickly soured when Czechoslovakia continued to operate according to its established politics, on the assumption that an independent and nationally inflected Czechoslovak communist party would satisfy Moscow. The Soviet Union reacted quickly to this suggestion of potential resistance on its western flank. The parliamentary democracy of Czechoslovakia “was overthrown by communist one-party rule—a crucial stage in the outbreak of the Cold War.”  

Czechoslovakia was now a part of the Eastern Bloc or, in Churchill’s enduring phrase, behind “the Iron Curtain” of Soviet influence.

The Warsaw Pact was created in 1955 as a response to the establishment of NATO, and especially in regards to West Germany’s membership. In theory, the Warsaw Pact was a strict military contract that made each of its members responsible to aid all other members, if any one of them became a victim of foreign aggression. The practical usage of the doctrine was different; however, the treaty was not based on a partnership; it clearly sought to make the Soviet Union the dominant power in Eastern Europe. The terms included a unified military command and the stationing of Soviet troops in other member states. The Warsaw Pact also provided the mechanism by which a coalition of “fraternal” socialist states joined the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia following the Prague Spring of 1968.

The Soviet response to another show of independent communism in Czechoslovakia initiated the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine—whereby Warsaw Pact signatories could expect armed interference by Moscow if their domestic affairs, policies, or practices were to “endanger socialism.” The ensuing lock step of opinion and policy

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in the Eastern Bloc facilitated détente with the West; it also committed the Soviet world to a course of steady political, economic, and social stagnation, granted its concern with preserving the status quo.

The persistence of the KGB was a force in both the militarization of Russian society and the privations of a permanent revolution, which increased Soviet military power. The civilian populations in several states were absolutely against Soviet rule and did not want to support the Soviet armed forces; however, fear and a growing Red Army made them a part of it. The Soviet military had become a major superpower that was capable of providing the Soviet Union a full spectrum on all security measures. According to Steven Miller, “the hard core of Soviet power was, of course, a formidable military widely regarded for much of the Cold War as superior to the combined defense exertions of a global coalition of industrial democracies.”

C. REFORM

In 1983, Mikhail S. Gorbachev saw the need for change. On the one hand, he was a resolute communist who undertook the task to make the Soviet Union a better communist state. On the other hand, he was the first Soviet leader with no direct connections to the old “fighting” days of the revolution—a real generational shift. Mikhail Gorbachev was the youngest General Secretary in Soviet history when elected by the Politburo in 1985. Gorbachev received full membership in the Politburo in 1980—he was only 49 at the time—and by 1983, was already one of the more visible members. From as early as 1972 until 1985, Gorbachev made several trips abroad as head of several Russian delegations. Through his observations, he became acutely aware of the USSR’s

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187 Ibid., 284.
deteriorating economic status as compared to western countries, as well as morally challenged by the openness of the West. These experiences helped him understand why his country needed to change so there could be a better future for all Russians.189

From Gorbachev’s perspective, the Soviet Union was bankrupt and laboring under political and strategic strictures no longer suited to the realities of the day. One item in particular was the exorbitant cost of maintaining the Brezhnev Doctrine. Party officials throughout the Soviet Union knew that the economy was headed for disaster. The officer corps—from Marshal Yevgenii Shaposhnicov to Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Rodin—also acknowledged the problem and offered the solution of making cuts in military spending. In addition, Gorbachev meant to “open” society to the healthy criticism and new ideas that he believed were simmering beneath the crusty surface.190

Gorbachev’s message was, “we do not reject socialism;” in fact, his reform campaign hinged on his assumption that socialism had taken firm root in the hearts of the Soviet citizens after 70 years.191 However, Gorbachev also declared it possible “to reach agreement on peace [with the West], not having changed the character of the two opposing systems.”192 When Gorbachev discussed military economics, he often used the expression “reasonable sufficiency” as an explanation for decreasing Soviet military armed forces.193

Peace within the borders of the Soviet Union and its “buffer states” proved more difficult for Gorbachev. His explicit rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine meant that Moscow had to watch former “fraternal” states Poland and Czechoslovakia reject Soviet hegemony, and eventually, Marxism-Leninism. In addition, Soviet republics—and more ominously, the constituent “nationalities” (in the Soviet terminology)—started clamoring for increasing autonomy and even independence. When the Baltic States rebelled in 1988,

190 Ibid., 100–110.
191 Ibid., 98.
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid., 106.
openly proclaiming their own national political reforms, Gorbachev stuck by his principles by rejecting any Brezhnev-style crackdown. To his surprise, the Soviet Union ultimately came apart rather than growing together. Among other things, the pervasive Russo-centrism of the USSR apparently could not persist without the threat of armed response.¹⁹⁴

D. MILITARY AFFAIRS

NATO represents a particular hot button for Russia because of the special role that military affairs played in the Soviet Union and continue to play in post-Soviet Russia. (Moscow tends to regard NATO, incorrectly, as a military alliance in the first instance.) Military affairs also gave the Russia-Ukraine split a special charge that continues to color the dialog between these two states today.

The Ministry of Defense (MoD) and General Staff were the highest and most important departments in the Soviet military configuration. The Committee of State Security (KGB), the Military Industrial Commission (VPK), and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) were not included in the central Administrative Organ Department. The General Staff prepared plans for direct deployments, maneuvers, invasions, and war emergencies. The General Staff also planned for mobilization, designed plans, prepared strategic and operational objectives, procedures for training, and doctrines for service. The commanders had double duty as ministers of defense. The Soviet MoD had linked military collegiums, which comprised the ministers and their deputies. The MoD also contained military schools for intelligence and technical support. The Red fighting forces included the army, navy, air force, the rocket forces, and surface-to-air missile forces.

After World War II, the Soviet military branches either stood pat or introduced changes. For example, the Navy did not make any changes and kept its air power; the Army underwent a major reformation while land forces got separated into armor, artillery, and infantry regiments; and finally, the aviation branch was separated into two separate units: frontal Air Force and the long-range, military-transport unit. The mass voluntary organization was the largest force in the Soviet Army and assisted primarily

with the Army and aviation branches. The Command and Control (2C) was based on the cooperation of all services and military districts from all republics. Military operations were planned according to the operational theaters. A “theater of war” was a separate identity and had the most influence on how plans were to be created. The KGB and MVD built its own structure. The KGB had approximately 250,000 troops and the MVD 350,000 troops. Both organizations controlled internal peace and operated the labor camps responsible for prisoner transport and coordination of peacetime evolutions. The most important function for both departments was counterintelligence and the internal control of the communist party’s well-being, but with corruption and bribery running rampant, the system deteriorated. Although the basic structure of the Main Political Administration (MPA) was located in the General Secretariat and had remained the same, the MPA was reorganized many times. During this time frame, the Soviet military was quickly becoming concerned with both its neighbors and the United States. Although the size of the MoD and VPK grew larger and their forces grew stronger, they still operated according to unwritten military doctrine. Sustained growth of the Soviet military eventually made Russia a very powerful country on the world stage.

Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader who tried to make changes and apply new strategies and methodologies. Gorbachev’s perestroika was based on the idea “to curb the growth of the Soviet military and then to reduce it surprised most observers, both Soviet and foreign.” The first change in military policy was related to Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Gorbachev appointed General Zaitsev in charge of the newly created Politburo Commission that had orders to investigate Soviet input into the war and later on how to reduce Soviet armed forces. Very often Zaitsev used the expression “reasonable sufficiency” as an explanation of decreasing Soviet military armed forces.

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196 Ibid., 23–36.
197 Ibid., 37.
198 Ibid., 99.
199 Ibid., 106.
Gorbachev’s “new doctrine” was based on managing arms control (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed in 1991) and “new thinking’ and war in the nuclear age, calling on all states to assume a purely defensive military posture.”

During the mid-1980s, most decisions were still made by 70-year-old senior officials—some were even older. Marshal Yevgenii Shaposhnikov realized that an “aging” issue existed, so in 1991 he took over the post of Minister of Defense. In a contradiction to his plan, he was not able to completely remove the retired high-ranking officers from active duty. To make matters worse, they also received additional privileges, such as a hunting area, personal staff, and an infirmary.

Another issue to deal with was the corruption and bribery, which were treated as an “open secret.” Troops were often used as a private work force from which the senior military executives gained benefits and privileges. With turmoil at the top, overall morale of junior officers and enlisted personnel was declining. The structure of the system was based on a five-year-plan (FYP) formulated on an annual plan created by companies’ proposals submitted and further on approved by the ministries, VPK and General Staff.

E. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR POLICY AND STRATEGY

Of course, a major defense outlay for the Soviet Union was its nuclear program. Starting in the Cold War, the Soviet Union dominated the Warsaw Pact countries because of its nuclear stockpiles. The same arsenal made the Soviet Union the other superpower in the bipolar global order that ensued. This nuclear legacy—and its manifestations today—continue to inform the Russians’ view of themselves and their role among their neighbors. As such, some further history merits attention here.

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200 Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, 120.
201 Ibid., 42.
202 Ibid., 53.
203 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 122.
In 1960, the Soviet Union signed the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) procurement. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the ABM treaty related to limitation of exercise locations. All Russian systems were moved outside of Moscow. The elimination of the ABM program “reflected the United States' realization that it could do little to defend itself against a Soviet ICBM attack other than to respond in kind.”204 Until 1980, the treaty of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) controlled the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In 1990, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) took over role of MAD. In 1991, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Soviet Union, the National Missile Defense (NMD) system was off balance since the Soviet Union was no longer perceived as a nuclear superpower. To some extent, the NMD undermined Russia’s nuclear authority and placed it in a second-strike capacity. According to Wirtz and Larsen:

Russia has only two remaining attributes of major power status: territorial size (‘top ten only—Russia—17,075,400 sq km’205) and nuclear weapons. If the U.S. were to develop an effective missile defense, the Russians would lose confidence in their ability to play a significant role in world affairs, and they might fear that they could no longer deter an American attack.206

However, does the United States seem likely to present such a threat to Russia? Currently, the Obama administration sees Russia as a supporter against Iran and “al Qaeda and their extremist allies,”207 and in general, as a partner in anti-terrorism prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation.208 According to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) from April 6, 2010, “efforts like the New Strategic Reduction Treaty with

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208 Ibid., iv.
Russia, the Nuclear Security Summit, and our work to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and a broader approach to deterrence are central elements of this strategy.”209 According to the 2010 NPR:

Russia remains America’s only peer in the area of nuclear weapons capabilities. But, the nature of the U.S.-Russia relationship has changed fundamentally since the days of the Cold War. While policy differences continue to arise between the two countries and Russia continues to modernize its still-formidable nuclear forces, Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and prospects for military confrontation have declined dramatically.210

Along these lines, a new and promising U.S.-Russia Treaty was signed on April 15, 2010 as a new direction for such political and military objectives. The new treaty stated that an upper limit of 1,500 nuclear warheads for each country.211 Subsequently, on May 4, 2010, “the United States revealed for the first time that it has more than five thousand nuclear warheads in its stockpile—5,113 to be exact.”212 The U.S. government last disclosed the size of its nuclear arsenal in 1961.213

On February 2, 2011, President Obama signed the United States-Russia nuclear treaty. President Medvedev signed similar document as well. The newest START treaty “limits each side to 1,550 strategic warheads, down from 2,200. The pact also re-establishes a monitoring system that ended in December 2009 with the expiration of an earlier arms deal.”214 A nuclear partnership—or at least successful and sustained cooperation—between the United States and Russia may provide important hooks on which to hang an improved Russian-NATO relationship by playing to Russia’s self-perceived strengths while including Russia in the joint solution to the challenges at hand.

209 “The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),” i.
210 Ibid., iv.
213 Ibid.
F. RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND NATO

On May 17, 2010, former U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright and a group of experts from NATO countries released a new document, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, which sets forth a vision of the alliance for the next decade and beyond. The enlargement—that is, the expansion—of the alliance to include the successor states to communist Europe, figures prominently in these ambitions. According to Nicola Krastev, “Albright said no one should be excluded from NATO—not even Russia.”215 The NATO 2020 document continues the theme:

Partnerships, in all their diversity, will occupy a central place in the daily work of the Alliance. To make the most of this reality, NATO must strive to clarify and deepen relations with key partners, to establish new relationships where appropriate, to expand the range of the partnership activities, and to understand that each partner and partnership must be dealt with on its own terms.216

The priorities also include strengthening the relationship between Russia and NATO and revitalizing the NATO-Russia Council.217 If hope glimmers for this relationship, then Ukraine’s NATO ambitions cannot be counted out entirely.

Meanwhile, however, Hannes Adomeit, who examined NATO’s relationship with Russia through January 2007, determined that Russia considers the alliance’s enlargement a threat.218 Many Russian observers contend that NATO is slowly surrounding Russia and that Ukraine may be the next border state to complete the “encirclement” process. At any given time, Russia could decide that it will put its thumb on Ukraine through potential military actions or the use of economic sanctions, which could keep Ukraine in constant fear of repercussions. According to Niall Green, Moscow “was especially hostile to the efforts of Washington and Yushchenko to incorporate

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215 Krastev, “Albright Presents Strategic Concept for NATO’s Next Decade.”


217 Krastev, “Albright Presents Strategic Concept for NATO’s Next Decade.”

218 Hannes Adomeit, Inside and outside Russia’s Policies toward NATO (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2006), 3–8.
Ukraine, the second most populated ex-Soviet republic, into NATO. Until the Yushchenko administration took power, Ukraine and Russia retained highly integrated defense industries and shared military installations.\textsuperscript{219} Russia also worries about the future of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters located in Sevastopol in Crimea, which is Ukraine’s province, even though it has a lease on Sevastopol until 2042. Other Russian concerns include the natural gas pipeline network in Ukraine and the possibility of foreign and local investments in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{220} Putin claims that Ukraine is unable to pay for gas, which, according to him, could lead to Russia to cut off the gas delivery. In the event, Ukraine suffered a gas “blackout” during the coldest part of the winter in 2010, although the Russians have since taken a softer stance:

Thousands of opposition protesters rallied outside the parliament building today to denounce the deal, signed by Yanukovych and his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev on April 21. In return for the extension, Moscow pledged to cut by 30 percent the price cash-strapped Ukraine pays for Russian natural gas.\textsuperscript{221}

Since 2008, Ukraine has been negotiating a free trade agreement with the EU. If an agreement cannot be forged by the end of 2011, Ukraine will look at alternate options, such as Russia’s Customs Union. Russia has pressured Ukraine since 2008 to join its Customs Union, which already enjoys an exclusive free trade arrangement with the EU. In the opinion of Russia, this arrangement presents a win-win situation for both parties, although Ukraine has expressed the desire to continue talks with the EU for its own free trade agreement. This action has forced Putin to initiate a threat of establishing a trade border against the EU to protect itself and its Customs Union partners (Kazakhstan and Belarus) against EU goods if Ukraine reaches an agreement. This statement by Putin should raise flags of caution for Ukraine, as it seems that if Ukraine does not agree with Moscow’s recommendation, as in the past, then there will be consequences.

\textsuperscript{220} Ibid.
G. CONCLUSION

Hypothetically speaking, if the West moved further east with its expansion plans, it could eventually bring a new democratic Russia and Ukraine on board. According to Ronald Asmus, the Clinton administration was already looking toward “the consolidation of democracy in Russia.”\(^\text{222}\) NATO members and Russia have been meeting on a regular basis and as equals in the NATO-Russia Council since 2002 to discuss current political issues in common areas of interest. The most important strategic priorities, according to Madeleine Albright, include “things that we should work on in common: counterterrorism, drug trafficking and climate, which were a variety of issues that we had in common. And specifically, in this report, we suggested there will be work together on missile defense.”\(^\text{223}\)

Even with these major points of potential contention on the road to resolution, the question of Ukraine’s NATO membership remains, to Moscow’s thinking, subordinate to the larger Russian security requirements. Russia has accommodated Poland in NATO (and the EU, for that matter), just as it has come to terms with other former “fraternal” nations’ approaches to the West. Even former Soviet republics—notably the Baltic states—have made their way into the western institutions, but for the Russians, Ukraine represents something different. This distinction should give the Ukrainians pause as they determine just what this special status means to Moscow, particularly with Russia in another uncertain juncture in its internal struggle to govern its vast territory and diverse population.

Historically speaking, the habit of considering Ukraine part of Russia’s vital sphere has deep roots that, in turn, relate to Russia’s relations in and with the West. That is to say that Russia’s own sense of separateness from the West—and the lingering competition with the West that this sense begets—both informs its unease about

\(^{222}\) Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door*, 84.

\(^{223}\) Krastev, “Albright Presents Strategic Concept for NATO’s Next Decade.”
Ukraine’s westernization and offers the basis of any combined solution. If Russia can learn, “a new stage of cooperation, coordination and partnership,”224 with the West entails a very big “if,” however.

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V. THE POLISH PERSPECTIVE

This chapter of the thesis examines Poland’s views on Ukrainian candidacy for NATO membership, which is a matter of some urgency to Warsaw. This view is formed, first, by Polish history and the perception of its past—a story typically told from the underdog’s perspective, with Russia represented as a competitor, occupier, and nemesis. This self-image also represents the Polish view on past and present relations between Poland and Ukraine. Particularly, the experience of homegrown reform (Solidarity) and democratization in the 1990s, to the popular Polish mind-set, distinguishes Poland as the avant-garde in the developments that now confront Ukraine and imparts a kind of leadership to the Polish republic in Central and Eastern Europe. These legacies combine to help explain Poland’s involvement in the U.S. missile defense project, as well as in the Poles’ ambitions for Ukraine in NATO. For Poland, both of these projects hold the key to future success of other erstwhile Soviet bloc states that desire to establish a stable democracy and receiving both practical and philosophical ramifications towards national security.

A. POLAND’S HISTORY

Poland’s history has been a struggle to maintain not only Poland’s independence and culture but also even the physical boundaries of the country. It seems Poland has dealt with conquering forces from the sixteenth century through the twentieth century. Poland has been partitioned several times throughout history mostly by Russia from the east (sixteenth century–twentieth century), Germany/Prussia from the west (eighteenth century–twentieth century), Austria and Hungary from the south (eighteenth century–twentieth century), and Sweden from the north (seventeenth century). Southern Polish culture has been influenced by the Czech Republic and Slovakia since the seventeenth
century. Surprisingly, these influences, which persist to this day, are not particularly controversial, even though territorial disputes with Czechoslovakia persisted well into the second half of the twentieth century.225

At one point, Poland was a kingdom, actually a collection of small duchies that, and, for the most part, could rightly be deemed a colony of whichever country was invading at the time. This experience predominated along the border regions of Poland. During the middle ages, when Poland was stronger, the kingdom sought to remove the influences, as well as the actual persons of such Slavic nationalities as the Pomeranians, Prussians, Lithuanians, and other Baltic peoples who had settled in the border territories.

Poland’s historical self-image is primarily rooted in being the victim of great forces and powerful neighbors, but in the fourteenth century, Poland actually became the overlord of Lithuania/Ukraine. This period began in 1386, when the Lithuanian pagan Grand Duke Jagiello married the Polish princess, Jadwiga. To make this union suitable, Jagiello accepted Poland’s Roman Catholic religion and agreed to return to Poland the territories of Galicia and western Volhynia, which were part of Ukraine then. In 1560, the Tsar of Muscovy, Ivan IV, assaulted Lithuania. In response to this aggression, the Polish Kingdom united with Lithuania, and on July 1, 1569, this fortified entity became known as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which included Volhynia, Bratslav, eastern Podolia, and Kiev. Unfortunately, the Kiev Brotherhood did not completely agree with the new Commonwealth rule, particularly its Roman Catholicism. Thus, in 1654, the union between Cossack Ukraine and Muscovy was initiated when Hetman Khmelnytskyi, leader of the Kiev Brotherhood, offered his services to Ivan IV, Tsar of Muscovy.226

The seventeenth century experienced competition among the Eastern European powers of the time—Sweden, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Russia—and the Ottoman Empire in regards to territory, trade, language, religion (Christianity versus Islam), economy, and influence on the European arena. The Battle of Vienna in 1683 was the final engagement between Christian Europe—or as they were also known, the Holy

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League—and the Islamic Ottoman Empire. The success of the Holy League during this battle finally put an end to a 300-year-old struggle by the Ottoman Empire to take over Vienna, which the Ottoman Empire had coveted as a strategic stronghold to preserve and enhance its access to the Black Sea and trade routes. The Ottomans wanted to expand for trade and prestige reasons, but, at that particular juncture, they were less inclined to compete directly with other Muslim cultures. With relative peace on its outer borders and major social, political, economic, and cultural changes roiling the continent, however, Europe turned its military might inward. The eighteenth century was a series of internal conflicts and wars, which played out particularly roughly in Poland. Ultimately, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth dissolved, and Poland’s dependent territories were partitioned (for the first time) among other European powers. During this period, Poland enjoyed variously long episodes of independence, which are referred to as the 
Rzeczpospolita or “republic” periods. (The Roman Republic of Augustus served as the model for this highly stylized social and political system, in which wealth, status, and citizenship was concentrated in the hands of the nobility.) The first and longest of these nobility-dominated “republics” ran from 1505 to 1794/95.227

In 1794, Tadeusz Kosciuszko, fresh from his distinguished service on the winning side of the American Revolution, led a rebellion against the Russians and Prussians in the name of Polish independence and a republic that accorded more contemporary conceptions of the term. However, by the following year, Warsaw and Krakow were lost to Russia and Austria, respectively, as Europe’s great powers of the ancient regime struggled to contain the military and social force of Napoleon. This event is known as the Third Partition of Poland, and it effectively wiped Poland off the map.228

In 1807, Napoleon Bonaparte was poised to invade Poland, which the Poles saw not as an assault but as an opportunity to join forces with France and possibly regain their sovereignty, not to mention regain their lost territories. In the event, after defeating Russia, Prussia, and Austria, Napoleon established the Duchy of Warsaw in the Tilsit

228 Ibid.
Treaty, reinstating the Polish state in from lands currently under the rule of the Kingdom of Prussia. Later in 1809, there was a short war with Austria, in which Duchy and French forces defeated the Austrian army in the Battle of Raszyn and then captured Krakow and Lwow, gaining additional lands that had been annexed by Austria during the Partitions of Poland. The Treaty of Schönbrunn allowed the Duchy to gain further territory in the south, including old Poland/Lithuanian lands.²²⁹

In 1815, Napoleon's army was defeated at Waterloo—and Poland was lost as well. Once again, the “Holy Alliance” of Russia, Prussia, and Austria divided Poland. On June 20, 1815, the Congress of Vienna officially formalized Russian dominance of Poland, in place since 1813, by putting the Polish Congress Kingdom into a subordinate union with Russia and under the rule of the Russian tsar. Prussia took over the Grand Duchy of Poznan; Russia, Prussia, and Austria took over the Republic of Krakow.²³⁰

During this time, the Congress Kingdom of Poland was ruled by the tsar, but, according to the requirements of the Congress of Vienna, it had a constitution. Subject to careful review by the tsar, the constitution was drafted by Adam Prince Czartoryski, a member of the Szlachta, one of Poland’s families eligible for the “elected” monarchy (were Poland in a position to elect its own rulers anymore), now restored to some power under Russian rule in return for their obedience to the tsar. The constitution of 1815 stands out as one of the more liberal instruments of Eastern Europe at the time, but tellingly, both the document and the rights it enumerated were bestowed upon the people by their monarch. (The king also retained significant powers over all aspects of state and government.) Nonetheless, the words on the page did guarantee certain civil liberties to the people of Congress Poland. The Sejm, the revived three-chamber Polish parliament, also remained under the influence of Szlachta descendants, who, although patriotically inclined, also sought to ensure their continuing privileges. The parliament was losing its influence and constitutional rights were not applied. It was more or less abandoned in the wake of the so-called November Uprising in 1825. On December 14 of that year, five army officers officially refuted Tsar Nicholas’ rule, refused to swear their loyalty to the

²³⁰ Ibid.
Russian monarch, and tried to start a revolt, which presently gained some popular support in occupied Poland. The small revolution was thwarted and some of the participants were hanged, some sentenced to hard labor, and some evacuated. Afterwards, Alexander I and Nicholas II slowly eliminated the Polish voice.231

These events established a pattern of sorts. When the Poles got tired of the injustices of occupation, they usually responded with some form of uprising, which typically ended in defeat, thus forcing them to accept their fate.232 In 1831, after the Tsar began preparations to fight the revolution in France, Poland again rose in rebellion, which lasted six months. When it was crushed, the Polish Sejm, the Army, and educational institutions were closed down (Polish opposition was sustained by students, Army officers, cadets, underground patriotic groups, and secret societies), and Field Marshal Paskevich took control of the country. In 1833, Austria, Prussia, and Russia signed a treaty of Münchengrätz, called “the Holy Alliance of the East,” which papered over tensions among the three conservative monarchies and boded ill for any hopes of liberal reform in Poland. (Indeed, the agreement prompted the formation of a counter-bloc of western powers, the first of the modern divisions of Europe that wrought their own devastation on Polish territory and national ambitions.)233

These agitations for independence in Poland echoed the broader developments in European political thought and deed. Even partitioned, Poland partook in the sweeping movements of the age—nationalism, socialism, communism—with a measure of internal turmoil that compares to that of its neighbors and occupiers. The nationalist party—Liga Polska Naradowa—formed in 1893 but operated initially as a secret underground movement. Its founder, Roman Dmowski, championed a unifying and galvanizing Polish nationalism, which, typical for the time and place, excluded Jews and other minorities, although he espoused nonviolent measures and diplomatic dialogue. Dmowski traveled to London with an appeal for help in founding a modern, independent, self-determining Polish state. Also, characteristic for the later nineteenth century, the Polish National

231 “Polish History-Chronological History of Poland.”
232 Ibid.
League opposed the Polish Socialist Party, as well as the nascent communist movement. According to Robert Gildea, “The struggle to achieve statehood for a given nation was the driving force behind nineteenth-century nationalism.”234 As in much of Russia and the region during this period, communism gained only a marginal following, but a more moderate socialist faction led by Józef Pilsudski won broader support through its emphatic advocacy of Polish independence. By 1905, Pilsudski’s Polish Socialist Party was the largest socialist party in the Russian Empire.235 This party also made it known that it was resolutely not Russian and “it was interested only in founding a Polish democratic republic, not a Russian democratic federation.”236

Poland emerged from World War I as an independent state once again, now known as the Republika Polska (reflecting also the updated ideal of “republic”).237 The Treaty of Versailles (1919) created the new borders for Poland. The country gained a portion of West Prussia (the Polish Corridor), the eastern part of Upper Silesia, the Dzialdowo area of East Prussia, and a small portion of East Prussia (Warmia and Masuria). The League of Nations appointed Gdansk/Danzig a free city. Poland was also negotiating its territory with Ukraine. On July 17, 1919, the Polish-Ukrainian conflict ended and Poland gained East Galicia. In 1920, the “Warsaw miracle” took place, when the Polish Army stopped the advance of the Bolshevik army into Central Europe. Poland gained Vilnius and half of the Austrian part of Silesia.238 In 1921, the country amended the first article of its constitution so it would reflect the new national identity, “the Polish State is a Rzeczpospolita.”239 The name Rzeczypospolita meant commonwealth, public affair, and democratic state with a parliamentary system, term that was officially used until the German invasion of Poland in 1939.240

234 Gildea, Barricades and Borders, 70.
235 Ibid., 327–410.
236 Ibid., 403.
237 “Polish History-Chronological History of Poland.”
239 “Polish History-Chronological History of Poland.”
240 Siuchninski and Kobylinski, Ilustrowana Kronika Polakow, 156–159.
On September 1, 1939, Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime initiated World War II by bombing Westerplatte and Gdansk. Poland found itself dealing with the Munich Agreement, which was signed between Germany and Russia. Per the much-storied secret clause, the new partnership agreed, among other things, to wipe Poland and its constituents out of existence. Fortunately, when Russians found out that their country was to suffer the same fate at the hand of the Germans, they switched sides and played a major role in defeating the Germans.

Much of World War II unfolded in all its brutality on Polish territory. The Battle of Wizna in 1939 exemplifies the kind of patriotic determination Poles can muster, even in a battle against tremendous odds. The German military arrived for this battle with air support, tanks, and a 60-to-one advantage in manpower, only to be held at bay by a brave group of 720 soldiers for a period of three days. Poland now refers to this battle as the “Defensive War” of 1939. In August 1944, the Warsaw Uprising against Nazi occupiers broke out; the resistance managed to carry the battle for two months before all members were violently suppressed.

In 1945, the “Warsaw Pact” was signed. Even though Russia had joined forces with the allies, it also managed to murder almost as many Poles as Germany and those not murdered were sent off to Siberian work camps. The Soviet Union leadership, having helped defeat Germany, was again in a position to force its will on Poland, which included forming the “People Republic of Poland” and placing their handpicked communist political leaders in place.

B. REFORM

In 1970, Edward Gierek was appointed to the position of first secretary of the Party Rzeczpospolita Polska. He replaced Władysław Gomulka. Gierek tried to improve Poland’s way of life through loans that he arranged from France and Germany. As a

242 Ibid.

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result of this help, the availability of goods increased, but the economy did not show progression. The oil crisis of 1976 brought additional problems in relation to commerce, rations, inflation, and the amount of credit Poland could obtain. All these problems created unease in the country, especially in Gdansk and Szczecin.244

In 1980, Gierek was forced to award the Solidarność Party (Solidarity) the right to strike, which was known as the Gdansk Agreement. In September 1980, Stanislaw Kania released Gierek from his office due to non-performance. In 1981, Prime Minister General Wojciech Jaruzelski jailed him and accused him of contributing to the failure of the Polish economy.245

Poland’s Solidarity movement changed the political scene forever. The crisis that broke out in the summer of 1980 began the development of the Solidarność Party, which contested the communist party’s power in Poland. Many Poles followed the ideology of the Solidarność leader, Lech Walesa. His leadership was the principal reason why the communist regime in Poland came to end. In 1989, the Soviet military was removed from Poland. On February 25, 1991, after the Soviet Bloc collapse, military functions of the Warsaw Pact were terminated, followed by the political functions on July 1, 1991.246

Since returning to a democracy, the country has made it a priority to liberalize its economy from a market previously influenced by communism, and finally, to be in a position to embrace a free market economy.247

Leszek Balcerowicz, chairman of the National Bank of Poland, introduced a shock therapy program during the early 1990s that enabled Poland to transform its communist based economy into a free market economy. As with any dramatic changes, Poland suffered a temporary slump in social and economic standards, but by 1995, it

245 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
became the first post-communist country to reach its pre-1989 gross domestic product level goal. Most visibly, there were numerous improvements in human rights, one being the freedom of speech.248

The final hurdle to be overcome in Poland’s move toward the “Euro Zone” involved the currency transition from the Polish zloty to the euro. The Polish government considers the prospect of joining the European Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II)—or euro zone—as a painful obligation. In 2008, Prime Minister Donald Tusk declared that the Polish economy would be ready to adopt the common euro currency in 2012, leading the government to work out a “Roadmap for the Introduction of the Euro in 2012.” This document explains Poland’s strategy on how it intends to meet the fiscal requirements of the European Central Bank (ECB).249 After completing its first year with the EU, Poland felt as though the initial growth period had gone easier than predicted. Former President Alexander Kwasniewski “praised his nation's first year in the European Union as ‘one of the best times in our history,’”250 Indeed, most politicians describe Poland’s first year in the European Union as successful. Even Polish Euro-skeptics do not attack the idea of European integration as fiercely as they did during the pre-accession period.

Since the early 1990s, Poland has become one of the United States closest allies in central and Eastern Europe. After September 11, 2001, the state managed to get closer to the United States than many of its western European allies. Poland has also been praised early in this relationship by the United States as being an example of a “new Europe” versus those like Germany and France who were referred to as “old Europe.” Poland initially attacked “Atlanticism” with an energy that reflected its desire to please the United States, but as time passed and Poland’s standing in the EU became increasingly stronger, its enthusiasm began to slow due to America’s leadership in Iraq.


Poland is slowly becoming known as an “instinctive Atlanticism” country, since it has a desire to keep its relationship with both the United States (for security guarantees) and the EU (thus, proving it is a committed member) in good standing.251

Today, Poland finds itself at a specific stage in its development. On the side of concern, Poland has suffered huge underdevelopments in the fields of infrastructure, transportation availability, ubiquitous delivery of the Internet and advanced tele-information services are visible, as well as the inefficiency of energy potential and transmission pipelines or absence of diversified sources of energy to ensure their energy safety. In all of these areas, an improvement may be achieved only by a significant increase of expenditures and a focus on the state’s performance as regards to the management of such processes. Taking advantage of the intellectual capital, readiness for mobility, adapting to circumstances and dynamism of a young generation, whose representatives quickly absorb new skills and the metropolises develop in line with modern paradigms, will allow this state to compete with other European agglomerations successfully.252

Poland’s future is bright in spite of a 2010 air crash that took 96 members of the government, including President Lech Kaczynski and his wife. As Poles see it, they have fought these battles throughout their entire history, but never with the security of the EU, NATO, and the United States in their corner to help them overcome any obstacle that may derail their future success.

C. POLAND IN NATO

NATO’s eastward expansion plans began when Lech Walesa, the leader of the Solidarność Party and former President of Poland, visited the United States in 1993.253 According to Ronald Asmus, Walesa told the President: “we are all afraid of Russia’.

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252 “Board of Strategic Advisers to the Prime Minister of Poland, Poland 2030 Developmental Challenges,” www.zds.kprm.gov.pl/userfiles/POLAND_2030_INT.pdf.

… ‘If Russia again adopts an aggressive foreign policy, that aggression will be directed against Poland and Ukraine.’254 Poland expressed its security concerns to NATO and asked the alliance to consider its candidacy seriously. The civil-military reform in 1997 gave Poland the opportunity to prepare for its new position. Poland was granted membership into both NATO (1999) and the EU (2004) but the crowning moment may have been its new relationship with the United States.255

As Ronald Asmus notes, Polish Foreign Minister-Bronislaw Geremek informed Madeleine Albright that NATO enlargement “is the most important event that has happened to Poland since the onset of Christianity.”256 Madeline Albright is said to have responded, “it doesn’t get any better then this. We are making history.”257

D. POLISH-UKRAINE RELATIONS

Poland believes it has a close and special relationship with Ukraine due to their similar histories. Both countries were under Russian occupation for roughly 170 years. Poland was in the same position that Ukraine currently finds itself in, with Moscow considering its geographical location a zone of “justified security interest of Russia.”258 For Poles, the history regarding this matter may repeat itself with Ukraine unless it moves forward and completes its NATO membership, which would eventually free it completely from Russia’s political influence.

NATO-Ukraine relations were initiated again in 1991, a couple of years prior to Walesa’s visit to the United States. Then, in March 1992, Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).259

254 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, 24.
256 Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door, xxvii.
257 Ibid.
Ukraine’s ambition to become part of the alliance has been backed favorably by both Polish public opinion and the government. On March 28, 2008, the Polish Prime Minister stated, “if not today, then tomorrow. If not tomorrow, then the day after. The issue is not easy, we know that. But if it comes to Poland, we are determined to support your aspirations.”

In the eyes of the Polish government, NATO’s willingness to accept new members was an answer to increasing and developing security measures in Europe. Poland’s former President, Alexander Kwasniewski, stated:

Security is of fundamental value to all states. It provides the necessary framework in which the well-being of their citizens could flourish and in which friendly co-operative international relations could develop. By conscious choice based on informed debate, the Poles have reached the conclusion that security to them means first of all Poland's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance.

He also pointed out that NATO enlargement plans are connected to additional issues, such as the NATO-Russian relationship, the security of Ukraine, the cost of enlargement, and U.S. nuclear weapon deployments to Europe. Poland agreed that NATO’s enlargement plan would help to supplement Ukraine’s safety and security as an independent republic. Poland was one of first countries to recognize Ukraine’s independence on August 24, 1991. For smaller countries, it is always less expensive to be a part of a combined security organization than try and depend on one’s own military assets independently.

Meantime, Russia is trying to exert, through a variety of tactics, a way of establishing its dominance in the post-Soviet region. Perhaps the most astonishing example of said exertion was the war in Georgia in 2008. According to an article entitled, the “Georgia Conflict:"

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262 Ibid.
Western nations (United States, France, Great Britain, Poland, Ukraine, The Czech Republic, and many others) urged Russian President, Dmitri Medvedev, not to take such a step, as it would grossly violate the sovereignty and integrity of Georgia. The UN had passed resolutions affirming that the surrounding provinces belonged to Georgia, resolutions that Russia itself had voted for.263

Despite Russia’s attempt at coercive statecraft, Poland continued its support of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine and Georgia at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008. Poland is concerned for the Baltic States and has a desire to help any of the former Soviet Republics that desire to implement a westernization process. At the same time, Poland understands that Ukraine’s protection is based solely on its NATO membership.

In Poland’s opinion, Ukraine needs support from the West to face Russia and meet NATO’s standards. According to Przemyslaw Zulawski:

Ukraine will not evolve into the Western type of democracy if it remains undermined by Russian-inspired separatist movements in the Crimean peninsula and the Trans-Carpathian region, threatened with a territorial dispute on Tuzla Island and the Sebastopol naval base (connected with the issue of the future of the Russian Black Sea Fleet) and with ‘gas war’ constantly repeated each January since 2005.264

The Polish government understands that its support for Ukraine’s NATO membership may cause a possible conflict with Russia but Poland’s government feels it must remain supportive. If NATO does not help Ukraine now, Russia will be emboldened to go after other states surrounding Poland’s borders. Furthermore, the states may face stagnancy and be more susceptible to the potential political influence of Russia. Enlarging NATO’s influence in the region is the next step towards fulfilling its final goal of destroying the post-Soviet empire.

On September 8, 2009, Viktor Yushchenko, the former President of Ukraine, and his wife visited Poland to meet with Poland’s President, Lech Kaczynski, the Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, and Bronislaw Komorowski, Marshal of the Polish Sejm. At the

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press conference, President Kaczynski stated, Poland considers Ukraine a “strategic partner and Europe very much needs a partnership like the one between Warsaw and Kiev.” According to the Polish President, Europe should be a Europe of teamwork and a joint effort, not a dictatorship, and should be based on mutual support. Even though the Polish-Ukrainian relationship was not always ideal, a future relationship should be continued with an even higher intensity. The countries should learn from past mistakes and express their feelings openly since they are planning to be strategic friends and partners in the future. The president signed a “road map” for relations between Poland and Ukraine in the areas of politics, economics, security, and safety. He called Ukraine’s desire for NATO membership “obvious.” According to Sabina Zawadzki, Poland offered support for Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership but also acknowledged that this process would not be very quick. The Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, stated Ukraine had “serious supporters” for its NATO aspirations, including the United States. Poland seems to be eager and determined to support Ukraine’s aspirations to join NATO. After the “2004 Orange Revolution,” Poland was Ukraine’s faithful supporter.

On October 16, 2006, former Polish President, Alexander Kwasniewski, expressed his sentiments regarding Ukraine’s relations with Russia, the European Union, and the United States, as well as the impact of the Orange Revolution on Ukraine and its democratic changes. In his opinion, the Orange Revolution was an extraordinary event for this republic, Russia and Europe. With Poland’s working example serving as motivation, Ukraine has become a self-controlling force that began to think about its possible NATO and EU membership. Due to the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has been able to expose and introduce itself to the world. Ukraine’s economy continues to grow;
the present relationship between former President Yushchenko and President-elect Yanukovich is healthy and based on national interests. If this continues, both leaders will be able to develop a great cooperation and integration between eastern and western Ukraine.270

Nevertheless, former Polish President Kwasniewski has criticized the Yushchenko presidency. In his opinion, Yushchenko has not used his time properly since he has not achieved the planned changes and reforms needed to keep Ukraine on track for its NATO membership. The Ukrainian population does not know what to believe and why promises have not been realized. The government must overcome fatigue, continue the Orange Revolution, and work together to help the country maintain its solidarity and identity. In the future, Ukraine has to become a part of the EU and NATO in order to be in a position to develop new relations between Europe and Russia.271

Also, according to the 2010 Georgia Daily Independence Voice, the Polish parliament wants to push for Georgia and Ukraine to join the alliance and has encouraged NATO to continue working toward a process of westernizing Ukraine. According to “The Polish Parliament Wants Push for Georgia, Ukraine to Join NATO” article, “The Parliament of the Republic of Poland holds the position that the right answer for NATO to give in the current situation should be the intensification of activity for the membership of Georgia and Ukraine in the North Atlantic Alliance.”272

In an interview with the Ukrainian Weekly, Polish Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski stated, “we welcome Ukraine’s decision, since we believe that the European and Euro-Atlantic prospect is natural for your country. We are also asking our allies to back Ukraine’s bid.”273 In his opinion, the membership bid was not written during the “Orange

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270 “The Orange Revolution Two Years on: Prospects for Ukraine.”
271 Ibid.
Revolution,” so the fresh memories did not help Ukraine’s desire to join NATO. Russia is disturbed over Ukraine’s aspiration for NATO membership, which may critically damage Russian-Ukrainian relations.274

    On February 12, 2010, NATO, the EU, President Barack Obama, the European Parliament President and Jerzy Buzek, Former Prime Minister of Poland (1997–2001), congratulated Viktor Yanukovich on his election victory in Ukraine. Poland is prepared to “raise the stakes” by offering even stronger assistance to Ukraine in its effort to gain NATO membership, help with its transformation process and improve the growing relationship between the two countries. The election showed development towards democracy since it was “a peaceful expression of the political will of Ukrainian voters which is another positive step in strengthening democracy in Ukraine.”275

    President Lech Kaczyński attended the swearing-in ceremony. During his visit to Ukraine, he also met with the President of Ukraine and other government members. Yanukovych asked Lech Kaczyński if he still supported Ukraine’s development in Europe, to which Kaczyński stated, that Poland would still continue its help. They also talked about issues, such as Ukraine’s economy and the renovation of systems dealing with corruption problems.276 The President of Poland stated, “Poland is interested in the Balkans, but we may not give up on the idea of extending the Union and NATO in a different direction as well: in the direction of Ukraine, Georgia and, in the future—if such is the will of the people of Azerbaijan—also Azerbaijan. This is an important direction.”277

274 “Poland Urges NATO Countries to Back Ukraine’s Membership Bid.”
277 Ibid.
On March 12, 2010, the Warsaw Royal Castle facilitated the third international annual conference on NATO and international security, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept—Global, Transatlantic and Regional Challenges and Tasks.” The event evaluated NATO’s future goals and challenges. Participants discussed the new security environment, security perceptions in Central and Eastern Europe, and NATO’s partnerships. According to the NATO website, “Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen met with Polish President Lech Kaczynski and held talks with Foreign and Defense Minister’s Radoslaw Sikorski and Bogdan Klich. These discussions focused on NATO's new Strategic Concept, Afghanistan, NATO’s relations with Russia and its open door policy.” Maintaining the open door policy has been a process that greatly contributed and is still contributing to the collective security of NATO members.

E. MISSILE DEFENSE

Poland has always sought help to defend its borders from invaders as a means to maintain its identity. This was finally achieved when Poland was granted membership into both NATO and the EU but the crowning moment might have been their new relationship with the United States. Poland finally has a true sense of security, which will help with maintaining and growing their new identity.

Poland is not a nuclear power and has no aspirations of becoming one; however, it does find itself among several nuclear states. Its security and defense necessarily will happen in alliance and coalition with the EU and the United States and among other things, the missile defense proposal promises a maximum, state of the art defense within alliance.

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280 Twinning Project PL, “General Information on Poland.”
In a 2006 report, it was stated that U.S. nuclear abilities were unquestionable since nuclear weapons could not be removed from history. The biggest problem is that terrorist groups can easily acquire all the technologies related to the development of nuclear weapons. Just a small number of particular individuals have the explicit skills that include the knowledge of system engineering and/or integration. For instance, the Iraq Survey Group exposed that Iraq had attempted in June 2002, in a project called Jinin, to transform the HY-2 anti-ship cruise missile into a 1,000 km-range land-attack cruise missile (LACM). Iraqi engineers produced designs that depended heavily on foreign components (including engines and guidance components) but achieved only minimal progress as a result. In addition, Chinese fingerprints are all over Pakistan’s Babur LACM, while Russia has enabled China to produce a workable propulsion system. Russian technical assistance was formalized in a joint production agreement. Iran’s three cruise-missile programs still depend on a foreign educated staff from France, Germany, Russia, China, and North Korea. The success of American Tomahawk cruise missiles in the 1991 and 2003 Gulf War pushed Iraq for an appeal.281 The Soviet Union picked Moscow as a missile defense location. The United States chose a location in North America.282

In 2009, the Obama Administration removed from consideration the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) long-range systems destined for Poland and the Czech Republic.283 Currently, the main focus is on short- and medium-range missiles.284 Now, Poland’s hopes hinge on how well NATO can manage its relationship with Russia. As part of the alliance, however, it is not wholly beholden to the geo-strategic machinations of distant superpowers.

283 The NMD had originally been negotiated by the Bush Administration. The White House is basing its decision on the fact that Iranian long-range missiles are not complex enough nor do they have the capacity to pose any real threat at this time.
F. CONCLUSION

Warsaw supports an eastward enlargement of NATO, especially when it concerns Ukraine. A Ukrainian membership in NATO promises to stabilize the area and implement a democracy, for not only Poland but also all of Europe. Ukraine’s participation in NATO would bring the country closer to western standards, a market economy, and bring peace and stability to the continent. Poland’s loyalty and support has grown even stronger since the Orange Revolution of 2004. Poland would favor Ukraine’s independent involvement in Euro-Atlantic relations instead of Russian influenced politics. This attitude is based on Poland’s national interests. Ukraine should appreciate and use this support since Poland is successfully progressing as a member of NATO, the EU, and the EEC. According to Jon Puhl, “for Poland, NATO membership was a “ticket to the West” that it wants to see extended to its Eastern European neighbors. The strategic goal is to shift the body’s momentum eastward.”

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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND PREDICTIONS

Ukraine’s national flag (see Figure 1) was officially adopted in 1992 (after the dissolution of the Soviet Union) by the Supreme Council, the Verkhovna Rada, of the independent Ukraine. The flag was based on the colors of its natural resources and beauty. The golden yellow “symbolizes fields of wheat and the blue represents the sky, mountains, and streams of Ukraine.” The stylized trident or tryzub that forms the small coat of arms on the official banner may claim similar symbols from Varangian times in its heritage, but its use as a national emblem dates to Ukraine’s first modern efforts at national independence in the early twentieth century, just before the communist revolution swept it into the Soviet Union. As such, the tryzub harkens to national opportunities lost, perhaps to remind Ukrainians of the importance of their independence today. Tellingly, Ukraine has not yet adopted a great coat of arms, perhaps because its self-image is still taking shape. Will this symbol tilt toward the West?

Figure 1. Ukrainian Flag

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287 Ibid.
Until 1991, the Soviet flag featured a yellow hammer and sickle on a distinctively communist-red background. The Russian national flag was officially adopted in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The flag was based on three pan-Slavic colors—white, blue, and red.288 The three colors have four different interpretations. The first version came from:

The coat of arms of the Duchy of Moscow, which depicts Saint George wearing white (silver) armor, riding a white horse, wearing a blue cape and holding a blue shield, on a red field. According to another version, these three colors were associated with the robes of the Virgin Mary, the holy protectress of Russia.289

The third version is based on the three estates of the social system of tsarist Russia. The white symbolizes God, blue the tsar, and red the peasants. The fourth and perhaps the most popular version associate the colors with former republics of Russia. White symbolizes Belarus (White Russia), blue Ukraine (small Russia), and red the Russian motherland.290 All of these interpretations are steeped in Russian history; all also refer to a larger or expanding Russia, distinct from the West except perhaps for the shared pan-Christian heritage that connects the major sects in the faith.

![Russia’s Flag](http://russian-flag.org/)

Figure 2. Russia’s Flag291

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289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
Poland’s national flag (see Figure 3) was officially adopted in 1919 when the Poles had regained their statehood after World War I. The flag was based on colors of the national coat of arms. It has a white eagle on a red shield and dates back to the thirteenth century, when Poland squared off (valiantly but tragically) with the rampaging Mongols. The red horizontal line on the bottom of the banner today symbolizes the bloodshed in the country's fights for independence and the white horizontal line on top symbolizes peace.292 The story that Poland tells about itself in these symbols celebrates a glorious past and a stable future among its European neighbors, all in the embrace and furtherance of western values.

![Poland’s Flag](image)

Figure 3. Poland’s Flag293

Interestingly, NATO imputes no particular meaning to its long-time logo—the white-and-blue compass on the dark blue field. The official account of the emblem notes only that “the basic design was conceived by a member of the international staff,” and that the Council approved the logo for use on October 14, 1953.294 Whether by plan, then, or by accident, the NATO logo (see Figure 4) can mean just about anything, depending on the viewpoint of the observer.

293 “Polish Flag.”
What does Ukraine see when in the NATO compass? Ukraine’s NATO aspirations are complicated because they involve historic rivals, Poland, and Russia, along with the promise and dangers of westernization and modernization in Ukraine and the region. Kyiv’s back-and-forth between Russia and the West, especially NATO, reflects and responds to this tangle of experiences, views, sentiments, and ideas. Ukraine’s President Yanuchovych realizes that for most Ukrainians, falling again under Russian rule is not an option. Nonetheless, Yanuchovych has chosen not to renew Ukraine’s prior interest in obtaining a NATO membership in the near future. Instead, he seeks to improve Ukraine’s relationship with Russia and, at the same time, keep relations with NATO acceptable enough to show Russia that the new relationship between these countries will be established on equal footing. The à la carte approach to international security arrangements helps the president walk a narrow path of independence and stability, capitalizing on Ukraine’s peculiar situation as regards its strategic location and its nuclear legacy. For now, all sides seem willing to wait and see while Ukraine sorts out the options and the ramifications of each option.

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295 “The Official Emblem of NATO.”
U.S. President Obama did not clarify his position in relation to Ukraine. Yurity Shcherbak, a former Ukrainian ambassador to Washington, said:

I’ve got the impression that Obama will conduct a traditional Democratic policy. That means that Russia will come first….I think our prospects under an Obama government will be quite difficult. We don’t know whether, and to what extent, Obama will be ready to defend the sovereignty of Ukraine.296

The questions, large and small, related to Ukraine in NATO persist.

So far, Poland supports Ukraine joining NATO and hopes that the alliance with Ukraine can be reestablished through a common NATO membership. Both countries were under Russian and/or Soviet occupation for hundreds of years. Until the solidarity movement, Poland used to live under the same set of circumstances in which Ukraine currently finds itself. Poles look forward to the day when Ukraine is free from Russia’s influence and can finally focus on being part of NATO’s westernization process. To elaborate, Poland’s future is bright in spite of recent events that took 96 members of its government. This can be directly attributed to Poland’s EU, NATO and U.S. relationships. Poles have fought many battles throughout their history, but never with the security of the EU, NATO, and the United States in their corner to help them overcome most obstacles.

Poland has openly petitioned for Ukraine to join NATO, but at the same time, Poland also fears that giving this support could develop new problems with Russia. In addition, if Ukraine does not gain support from the West, it may stay in a holding pattern until Russia’s political and economical influences again step in and prevent Ukraine’s opportunity to establish true stability and a democracy free of outside influence. Due to the emotional and sentimental connection with Ukraine, Poland stands behind Ukraine joining NATO and agrees that NATO’s enlargement will help increase Kyiv’s welfare, safety, and its overall stability within Europe.

296 “Win, NATO Prospect for Ukraine, Georgia Appear to Shift,” http://www.rferl.org/content/With_Obama_Win_NATO_Prospects_For_Ukraine_Georgia_Appear_To_Shift/1339534.html.
According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Russia needs Ukraine more than Ukraine needs Russia. Russia does not want to lose its dominance over Ukraine and has no desire to see Ukraine succeed independently without Russian involvement. As a result of this ideology, Russia does not approve of Ukraine’s current participation in the westernization process as it may lead to further talks of a potential NATO membership, which will mean gaining full NATO protection. Russia also feels that NATO’s expansion eastward represents a threat to its security and that NATO is also trying to control further influence in Central Asia by the quickly developing relationship between the United States and China.

Alternate visions exist, however. If Ukraine became a member of the alliance (with Russia’s approval) and participated in the NATO-Russia Council, Europe could become a more peaceful continent. Similarly, a more cordial NATO-Russia partnership would provide the needed basis for establishing a “united” enhanced missile defense system. Russia could become a secure partner of NATO, if the desire is there, by following NATO principles based on equal partnership commitment, democracy, territorial integrity, mutual intelligibility, conflict prevention, peacekeeping operations, accepting western standards, communication, and, finally, mutual trust. It would truly be in Russia’s best interest to cooperate with NATO since the benefits would certainly outweigh the risk of any possible conflict with the West. The same calculus applies to Ukraine and, indeed, the other states in the region.

In conclusion, Ukraine should put its effort toward clarification of its political orientation, priorities and aspirations; educate its public in matters related to NATO, and most of all, continue its budding partnership with the alliance. Therefore, Ukraine’s political future in the international arena will depend on the motivation of Ukrainian leaders and the support of its constituents.

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LIST OF REFERENCES


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