THE SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE BRIGADE: AN OPTION FOR NATO-LED PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

DAN V. ORZA, MAJOR, ROU ARMY
B.S., Bogdan Voda University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 2005

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2011-01

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
14. ABSTRACT
In response to current world security environment challenges at the regional level, several initiatives emerged establishing regional political or military organization. Today, with fourteen (14) member nations and two (2) observers, Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) and its operational extension South Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) is one of the largest regional initiatives in the world. The object of this research is to determine the suitability of SEEBRIG to perform NATO-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The analysis includes an examination of the SEEBRIG capabilities using NATO’s Allied Command Operations (ACO) evaluation criteria readiness, sustainability, deployability and connectivity. The constraints, limitations, deficiencies, and shortfalls that affect SEEBRIG capacity will represent the outcome of this entire study. In addition, the areas that SEEBRIG needs to improve in terms of capabilities to increase potential to conduct NATO-led PSO will complete the thesis structure. Thus, a surprising result emerged showing that several operational, logistical or financial gaps affect SEEBRIG preparedness for a NATO mission. Moreover, the findings revealed the absence of involvement, or the insufficient commitment of SEEBRIG nations to find realistic solutions to existing problems and to allocate reasonable resources for a possible participation in a NATO-led PSO. Finally, the thesis concludes that SEEBRIG is limited or not yet prepared to undertake and successfully fulfill an eventual NATO-led PSO mission that might be assigned to it.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
South Eastern Europe Brigade, Peace Support Operations, NATO, Afghanistan, regional partnership.
Name of Candidate: Major Dan V. Orza

Thesis Title: The South Eastern Europe Brigade: An Option for NATO-led Peace Support Operations?

Approved by:

______________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Mark R. Wilcox, M.A.

______________________________, Member
Edward D. Jennings, M.A.

______________________________, Member
Dennis L. Dolan, Ph.D.

Accepted this 10th day of June 2011 by:

______________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE BRIGADE: AN OPTION FOR NATO-LED PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS? by Major Dan V. Orza, 86 pages.

In response to current world security environment challenges at the regional level, several initiatives emerged establishing regional political or military organization. Today, with fourteen (14) member nations and two (2) observers, Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) and its operational extention South Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) is one of the largest regional initiatives in the world. The object of this research is to determine the suitability of SEEBRIG to perform NATO-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The analysis includes an examination of the SEEBRIG capabilities using NATO’s Allied Command Operations (ACO) evaluation criteria readiness, sustainability, deployability and connectivity. The constraints, limitations, deficiencies, and shortfalls that affect SEEBRIG capacity will represent the outcome of this entire study. In addition, the areas that SEEBRIG needs to improve in terms of capabilities to increase potential to conduct NATO-led PSO will complete the thesis structure. Thus, a surprising result emerged showing that several operational, logistical or financial gaps affect SEEBRIG preparedness for a NATO mission. Moreover, the findings revealed the absence of involvement, or the insufficient commitment of SEEBRIG nations to find realistic solutions to existing problems and to allocate reasonable resources for a possible participation in a NATO-led PSO. Finally, the thesis concludes that SEEBRIG is limited or not yet prepared to undertake and successfully fulfill an eventual NATO-led PSO mission that might be assigned to it.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Questions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Terms</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope, Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of Study</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO PSO Doctrine</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Peace Operations Doctrine</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEEBRIG Establishing Documents</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEEBRIG Internal Documents</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Articles</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Design</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation Criteria</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Basis</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary PSO and Possible Involvement of SEEBRIG</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO-led Operations</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities Analysis</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readiness</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Availability</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Component</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Command Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOO</td>
<td>Area of Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Counterintelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Command Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Contingency Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Contingency Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSSB</td>
<td>Combat Service Support Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Day of Supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRO</td>
<td>Disaster Relief Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETF</td>
<td>Engineer Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operational Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Framework Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FWB</td>
<td>Forward Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Generic Deployment Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP</td>
<td>Generic Operational Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Host Nation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMINT</td>
<td>Imagery Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFOSEC</td>
<td>Information Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>Initial Operational Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security and Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISTAR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMNB</td>
<td>Kabul Multinational Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL</td>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Lead Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMT</td>
<td>Medical Mobile Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPFSEE</td>
<td>Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRT</td>
<td>Mission Rehearsal Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological and Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Rapid Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE</td>
<td>National Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentor and Liaison Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEO</td>
<td>Peace Enforcement Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>Public Information Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMSC</td>
<td>Politico-Military Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Peace Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSF</td>
<td>Peace Support Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTT</td>
<td>Push to Talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSN</td>
<td>Role Specialist Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEDM</td>
<td>Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEEBRIG</td>
<td>South Eastern Europe Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operational Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>Tactical Command Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TETRA</td>
<td>Terrestrial Trunked Radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOA</td>
<td>Transfer of Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOO</td>
<td>Theater of Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>Unexploded Explosive Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNC</td>
<td>Voluntary National Contribution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background

After the Cold War’s end, the world security environment totally changed. The disbandment of the Warsaw Pact brought an additional contribution to the newly emerged challenges in Europe, and especially to Eastern Europe. The top European organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) looked upon these issues and arrived at different solutions and programs to prevent conflict escalation. Peace Support Operations (PSO) became the main solution used in reaction to the above-mentioned challenges.

Before the last decade, the South-Eastern European (SEE) region faced tumultuous experiences and challenges in the area of peace and security. Thus, at the regional level during late 1990s, eight regional countries¹ and the United States (US) established the Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) initiative. Later, Croatia, Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia became participants. Today, with 14 member nations and 2 observers, SEDM is one of the largest regional initiatives in the world. The SEDM process expressed the commitment of its member nations to take a "regional ownership" approach of working towards building a lasting secure and stable environment, and to contribute to peace-support operations in the region. It has established a new paradigm for cooperation and conflict prevention and has been serving as a bridge for building good relations among its members. The SEDM process was

¹Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Romania, Slovenia, and Turkey.
initiated to promote understanding, trust, and cooperation among SEE countries, enhance their contribution to regional and worldwide security and stability, and promote the Euro-Atlantic integration process of the region.

The outcome of the SEDM process was the creation of the PSO structure called Multinational Peace Force South Eastern Europe (MPFSEE). MPFSEE represented the solution found by SEE countries to manage their region’s security issues. For this structure, the member nations established and activated on 31 August 1999 an operational headquarters (HQ), the South Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). In accordance with the Establishment Agreement, SEEBRIG is available for possible employment in United Nations (UN) or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-mandated, NATO or EU-led conflict prevention and other peace support operations. It could also participate in “coalition of the willing”-type international initiatives. SEEBRIG declared its future availability for PSO and initiated the NATO certification process under the supervision of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) in 2002. In 2004, SEEBRIG HQ primarily focused on the NATO certification process, which involved two main evaluations. SEEBRIG achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in April 2004 and Full Operational Capability (FOC) in October 2004.

After a preparation phase, SEEBRIG assumed the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB) IX mission in Kabul, Afghanistan on 06 February 2006. SEEBRIG proved its utility and readiness and relinquished the KMNB IX mission on 6 August 2006. Since then, other opportunities have arisen to commit the SEEBRIG forces again. In 2008, for

---

instance, a SHAPE Mobile Team briefed the SEEBRIG Commander (COMSEEBRIG) about NATO’s Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) in Afghanistan. Although the SEEBRIG member nations have not made a decision on this initiative yet, it is important to understand that the brigade, through its creation, had become a possible solution to perform PSO in line with worldwide regular military forces. The goal of this thesis is to determine the suitability of SEEBRIG to perform PSOs in support of NATO.

**Research Questions**

The aim of this thesis is to narrow down the issue of the suitability of SEEBRIG for employment in PSOs by studying its organizational concept and capabilities. Nowadays, PSOs are one of the mechanisms used by major organizations like the UN, NATO, and EU to cope with newly emerging challenges. The 2006 Afghanistan mission proved that SEEBRIG is FOC, but since then PSO evolved significantly. Changes occur rapidly in the current environment and practice of PSOs and SEEBRIG must swiftly adapt its capabilities and address its shortcomings to remain operationally capable.

The thesis problem statement resides in understanding the relevance of applying SEEBRIG capabilities and experience in PSO and taking into consideration the challenges of such operations. Therefore, the topic of this thesis and the primary research question is to assess whether SEEBRIG is suitable, based on its organizational concept and capabilities, for employment in NATO-led PSOs.

The analysis of the SEEBRIG capabilities that support a potential PSO mission to include the constraints, limitations, deficiencies, and shortfalls that affect SEEBRIG

---

3Ibid.
capacity, will be the base of this entire study. The areas in which SEEBRIG needs to improve in terms of capabilities to increase potential to conduct PSO will complete the thesis structure.

Definition of Terms

Before proceeding, some terms must be explained in order to make clearer for the reader the purpose of this thesis. These terms are essential to understand the logic and flow of the thesis and to provide the necessary perspective on the SEEBRIG organizational concept, structure, and capabilities. The first set of terms is strictly related to SEEBRIG and describes in general terms the location of SEEBRIG in the SEE regional initiative.

Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE)--the force, currently a brigade-size formation, established by seven participating nations to contribute to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and foster co-operation among South-Eastern European countries.

Politico-Military Steering Committee (PMSC)--the joint executive body for oversight and policy guidance for deployment, employment and other activities of the MPFSEE.4

Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial (SEDM) process--a military consultation and decision-making process that is carried out through meetings of ministers of defense of MPFSEE member nations. Its aim is to review military subjects and to make decisions

---

and recommendations for participation in operations, overall guidelines for the employment of the force, rules of engagement (ROE), approval of contingency operations plans (COP), and operational plans (OPLAN).

The second set of terms is dedicated to the peace support area. It is intended to be an enabler for a more accurate perception of the very complex phenomenon of PSOs.

**Coalition of the Willing**--a group of states which, based on individual decisions and preferences, make up a alliance for the purposes of either actually participating in and/or providing political, logistic and other types of support to particular operations.\(^5\)

**Conflict prevention**--activities, normally conducted under chapter VI of the UN Charter, that range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployments of forces intended to prevent disputes from escalating to armed conflicts. Conflict prevention can also include fact finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections and monitoring.\(^6\)

**Contingency Operations Plans (COP)**--plans that are developed for possible operations where planning factors (e.g. scope, forces, destination, risks, area of operations) have been identified or can be assumed. These plans are produced in as much detail as possible, including the forces needed and deployment options, as a basis for the actual subsequent operational planning.\(^7\)

**Generic Operations Plans (GOP)**--plans which are developed for possible operations where some of the planning factors (e.g. scope, forces, destination, risks, area of responsibility, etc.) have not yet been fully identified or cannot be assumed. These

\(^5\)Ibid., 1.

\(^6\)Ibid.

\(^7\)Ibid., 2.
plans are produced at the level of detail required by the remit concerned and identify the capabilities needed.\(^8\)

**Host Nation Support (HNS)**—civil and military assistance rendered in PSOs and by a Host Nation (HN) to SEEBRIG’s forces, which are located on, or in transit through the HN’s territory. The basis of such assistance is commitments arising from the SEEBRIG or from bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded between the HN, SEEBRIG, and the parties having forces operating on the HN’s territory.\(^9\)

**Lead Nation (LN)**—the one nation that assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistic support for all or a part of the multinational force or HQs. Compensation and reimbursement will then be subject to an agreement among the Parties involved. The LN may also assume the responsibility to coordinate logistics of other nations within its functional and regional Area of Responsibility (AOR).\(^10\)

**Peace building**—actions that cover political, economic, social, and military measures and structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of a conflict. It includes mechanisms to identify and support structures

---

\(^8\)Ibid.


\(^10\)Ibid.
that tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being, and support economic and civil reconstruction.\footnote{South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial, \textit{Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe}, 2.}

**Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)** - undertaken under chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all parties to a conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.\footnote{Ibid.}

**Peace Support Operations** - multi-national operations conducted impartially in support of a UN or OSCE mandate and involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies, designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate. These operations include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations\footnote{Similar with NATO doctrinal PSO definition formulated under the Allied Joint Publication (AJP) -3.4.1 Chapter 2 \textit{The Nature of Peace Support Operations}.}.

**Peacekeeping operations (PKO)** - generally undertaken under chapter VI of the UN Charter and conducted with the consent of all the parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement.\footnote{South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial, \textit{Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe}, 2.}

**Peacemaking** - diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict, aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can

---

\footnote{South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial, \textit{Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe}, 2.}
include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation, and such actions as
diplomatic pressure, isolation, or sanctions.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{Role Specialist Nation (RSN)}--the one nation that assumes the responsibility for
procuring a particular class of supply or service for all or a part of the multinational force.
Compensation and reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties
involved.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Rules of Engagement (ROE)}--directives to military forces (including individuals)
that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions
which might be construed as provocative, may or may not, be applied. ROE are not used
to assign tasks or give tactical instructions. With the exception of self-defense, during
operations, ROE provide the sole authority to forces to use force.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Transfer of Authority (TOA)}--the formal transfer of a specified degree of
authority over designated forces between a Party and the COMSEEBRIG or between any
two subordinate commanders.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Voluntary National Contribution (VNC)}--subject to PMSC approval, voluntary
manning by the Parties, of the Brigade HQ or other multinational formations, outside the

\textsuperscript{15}\text{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{16}\text{Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe, }\textit{Annex A to Standard Operating Procedure 401, A-5.}

\textsuperscript{17}\text{South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial, }\textit{Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe}, 3.

\textsuperscript{18}\text{Ibid.}
scope of the approved personnel establishment, for a limited period and for meeting specific requirements of expertise.¹⁹

**Scope, Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions**

The subjects of this thesis, SEEBRIG and PSO, are complex and interconnected. Given such a large range of data to be analyzed, the scope should be very precisely identified. The thesis argument will study the organizational capacity of SEEBRIG for employment as a PSO asset, viewed through NATO related doctrine and standards. Moreover, the thesis will not assess SEEBRIG against existing PSO organizations’ doctrinal concepts. This study will assess the feasibility and suitability of the SEEBRIG organizational concept and capabilities only through the lens of NATO PSO standards and SEEBRIG Standing Operational Procedures (SOP)s. The main reason the author of this thesis does not use the UN guidelines or EU policy on PSO as a basis to conduct his research is because the vast majority of member nations of SEEBRIG are part of NATO and the SEEBRIG organizational concept, capabilities, and employment have been developed based on NATO doctrine. Additionally, among the above-mentioned three organizations for which SEEBRIG is available for possible employment, NATO has the most developed PSO doctrine. Thus, the NATO doctrine, criteria, and standards will better facilitate the analysis of SEEBRIG PSO characteristics with more exact and reliable results.

This work is conditioned on two assumptions, which are necessary to sustain the flow of analysis. The first assumption is that PSO are and will remain in the future the

¹⁹Ibid.
most relevant tool used by different organizations like the UN, NATO, or EU to resolve conflicts around the world. A second assumption is that regional structures like SEEBRIG will still be considered in the future as possible solutions for performing PSOs around the world.

**Significance of Study**

This study produces two important results. First, it could serve as a tool to assess the value added to international and SEE regional security of the creation of SEEBRIG through the SEDM initiative. Since its creation in 1998, the organizational concept and capabilities of SEEBRIG have continuously evolved. The 2006 KMNB mission was a first step in the international confirmation of SEEBRIG as a tool available for PSO. Therefore, evaluating SEEBRIG’s current status might provide a better perspective of its suitability for NATO PSOs. Secondly, this study could be used as an analytical tool for assessing future similar initiatives that might be created at the regional level around the world. Nowadays, when multinational forces like the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) for UN Operations are disbanded,²⁰ it is of value to understand if NATO could rely on them to carry out missions, like the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-Afghanistan.

---

²⁰ Multi-National Stand-By High Readiness Brigade, “Facts 2009,” http://www.shirbrig.dk/html/facts.htm (accessed 25 October 2010). SHIRBRIG consisted of 16 nations (Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden), while 7 more nations (Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Jordan, Latvia, and Senegal) had participating as observers. SHIRBRIG terminated all participation in UN operations and was disbanded on 30 June 2009.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

As stated in chapter 1, the purpose of this thesis is to assess the suitability of using SEEBRIG in PSOs, based on its organizational concept, capabilities and experience. Thus, the literature review focuses on relevant literature resources mainly on PSO and SEEBRIG. Sources referring to both domains will be very important assets and will constitute a binding tool in achieving the purpose of the research.

This chapter will be organized following the line of primary and secondary research questions. The structure of this chapter will unfold by providing literature information from different documents that are available and in correlation with thesis subject. The section of this chapter will cover a wide spectrum of documents beginning with the NATO and US Army PSO doctrine, SEEBRIG establishing and internal documents, or media articles.

Almost all-important international organizations like the UN or NATO have their own doctrines or at least guidelines in dealing with PSO matters. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the focus will be on the NATO PSO doctrine. In addition, the US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations* will add more depth and relevance to the research as a validation of NATO PSO precepts. This validation is important, because SEEBRIG has developed its entire PSO documentation based on NATO PSO doctrine. The goal will be to understand if the actual NATO PSO doctrine is a linkage factor in establishing the suitability of SEEBRIG for PSO. Moreover, an understanding of actual PSO doctrine from the strategic to tactical level will contribute to a correctly perception of the most suitable way for SEEBRIG to perform PSO.
NATO PSO Doctrine

The PSO doctrinal literature makes up a large database. Documents like Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations*, U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, or US Army FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* form the core of PSO doctrine; however, thousands of other documents are widely available elsewhere. To answer the primary research question and maintain the conciseness of this thesis, this research will focus only on doctrinally related ones.

NATO AJP 3.4.1 *Peace Support Operations* is the most significant document that exists right now in term of NATO PSO, so it is vital to exhaustively describe its contents. This publication gives to NATO members a strategic perspective on PSO. It is describes, in the first chapter, “the strategic environment for PSO . . . together with factual information covering NATO and other relevant organization.”21 The second chapter “discusses the factors affecting the achievement of success and examines in outline the types of operations that military forces are likely to undertake in PSO.”22 A very important aspect, which bears mentioning, is that this chapter gives a definition of PSO. The SEEBRIG nation-members use of this definition in the Establishment Agreement lends credence to the fact that the SEEBRIG foundation was intrinsically related to NATO PSO strategy and doctrine. Moreover, sections of this chapter define the success and the factors affecting success in PSO. In the opinion of the author of the AJP 3.4.1 success in PSO “will generally be related to the achievement of a number of pre-


22 Ibid., 2-1.
determined strategic objectives,” like “the establishment of a secure, stable, and self-sustaining environment for local population.”\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless, the “mission success requires that the Peace Support Forces (PSF) must be adequately led, trained, organized, equipped, and armed.”\textsuperscript{24} In addition, other ingredients like impartiality, professional conduct along with a correct attitude, and conduct of PSF personnel compliance will be the key aspects during the PSOs. Finally, the AJP 3.4.1 underlines the factors that can inhibit PSO success, like the lack of support from the international community or local populace, the leadership of the local parties, the tension between combat operations and PSO, cultural aspects, the multicultural character of any PSF, and the complexity of PSO.

The third chapter describes the fundamentals of PSO which are comprised of the principles of joint multinational operations like: impartiality, consent, restraint in use of force, and also other principles applicable specifically in PSO; i.e. objective/end state, perseverance/long term view, unity of effort, flexibility, legitimacy, security, credibility, mutual respect, transparency, freedom of military movement or civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). All the above fundamentals are very important factors in establishing the suitability of SEEBRIG for PSO. They are “sine qua non” principles for any type of mission conducted by SEEBRIG.

The PSO decision-making and planning considerations are contained in chapter four of AJP 3.4.1. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the interaction between the

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., 2-2.

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., 2-1.
elements described in the first three chapters “in context of NATO decision making and planning process in order to draw out the specific considerations relevant to PSO.”

With the primary research question, focusing on the importance of SEEBRIG capabilities in establishing the suitability for its use in PSO, the AJP 3.4.1 *Peace Support Operations* chapter five Military Capabilities establishes the relevant capabilities to PSO. In addition, differences in national capabilities and organizational structures are stressed as having a major impact and therefore must be widely considered. The last chapter contains a deep understanding of the “complex multifunctional and multidimensional” nature of operating in a PSO that “requires a conceptual vision that not only focuses on the here and now but also provides a framework to conceptualize many diverse activities in time and space.” In conclusion, the AJP 3.4.1 *Peace Support Operations* is a very complex and exhaustive document. It gives a strategic perspective in terms of doctrinal aspects to all international or regional organizations outside NATO including SEEBRIG.

**US Peace Operations Doctrine**

PSO are a subset of Peace Operation (PO) in US Army doctrine. Given that the US is a member of NATO, US Army doctrine is eventually aligned with most of the percepts of NATO doctrine. The documents that refer to PSO are the US Army FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, and the JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*. The publication explains that, “for the Armed Forces of the US, POs are crisis response and limited contingency operations, and normally include international efforts and military missions to contain

\[25\text{Ibid., 4-1.}\]

\[26\text{Ibid., 6-1.}\]
conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.”

In the US armed forces perspective, as described in JP 3-07.3 chapter one, the fundamentals that apply to PO are similar to NATO’s fundamentals with the only difference being the addition of “Current and Sufficient Intelligence” when conducting POs. The chapters two, three, and four discuss the fundamentals for all spectrums of POs, which constitute very important tools for the evaluation of the suitability of SEEBRIG for PSOs. The enumeration in JP 3-07.3 of ground forces capabilities necessary to meet the wide range of operational requirements is a tool to help in identifying possible gaps in the SEEBRIG pool of forces made available by member nations. In addition, within the same chapters, the planning, command and control considerations, and possible tasks for POs synthesize the necessary traits for conducting a successful PO mission.

Plain or simple as the descriptions of NATO and US military guidance related to PSO may seem, these documents are fundamental for an analysis of SEEBRIG organization, capabilities and performance. The experience accumulated by NATO along with the US during the last two decades proves the necessity of the above-mentioned documents as part of the analytical tools.

**SEEBRIG Establishing Documents**

The second important part of the literature review is comprised of SEEBRIG establishing documents. As described in the literature review, SEEBRIG suffers from a lack of attention in writings on European Security and PSO. Therefore, the MPFSEE

---

Establishing Agreement and the additional Agreement Protocols will constitute the bulk of the primary source information about SEEBRIG.

The SEEBRIG member nations developed the agreement on the establishment of the MPFSEE using the NATO PSO doctrinal principles. For example, the definition of terms used within the document is similar to NATO PSO documents. As a document itself, the agreement provides the SEEBRIG member nations with the necessary understanding of the establishment, deployment, and employment of SEEBRIG in PSO. The document states that SEEBRIG will be available for employment in UN or OSCE-mandated NATO or EU-led conflict prevention or other PSOs and “could participate in ‘coalition of willing’ type international initiatives.” In addition, the agreement specifies that in aforementioned PSOs type, “the Brigade will be subordinate to the bodies delineated in the mandate of relevant international organizations after the Parties have agreed to undertake such operation.”

Article IV of MPFSEE Agreement deals with the political and military consultation and decision-making. This article clearly specifies that the PMSC, as the joint executive body for oversight and policy guidance for deployment, employment and other activities of the MPFSEE, must develop all future policies and guidance for SEEBRIG within the framework of UN, NATO, OSCE, and EU. Moreover, the depositary of the MPFSEE agreement (Bulgaria) will have the obligation to inform UN, UN, and OSCE. 

---


29 Ibid.
OSCE, NATO, and EU about the establishment of SEEBRIG.\(^{30}\) The force structure is described inside article VI and, annexes A and C to the MPFSEE Establishing Agreement (see Appendix A). In addition, follow-on articles and annexes provide details on the SEEBRIG command and control structure, force generation, training activities, logistics, or financial issues. The additional Agreement Protocols, especially the fourth protocol, generated sufficient inputs to clarify the evolution over time of SEEBRIG in terms of chain of command, organization, sustainment, or fiscal changes and improvements.

**SEEBRIG Internal Documents**

In addition to the SEEBRIG establishing papers, and some of the most important and precise information that the author was able to examine, was found in two SEEBRIG internal documents. The documents are related to the lessons learned after the mission in Afghanistan became available for examination. After the 2006 KMNB mission in Afghanistan, the SEEBRIG staff elaborated a lessons learned (LL) report.\(^{31}\) The document describes the issues the SEEBRIG HQ identified in the areas of personnel and administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, CIMIC, communications and information systems (CIS), engineer, and financial aspects. In regards to the SEEBRIG organization and capabilities, analysis of this document gave the author an important perspective on the problems of the internal organization and capabilities during the only NATO-led PSO mission performed by SEEBRIG in 2006. Moreover, the document

\(^{30}\)Bulgaria submitted this notification to UN, OSCE, NATO, and EU on August 1999 after the establishment of MPFSEE.

\(^{31}\)South Eastern Europe Brigade, *Lessons Learned from Afghanistan Mission* (Constanta: SEEBRIG, 2006), (document received from SEEBRIG HQ on 4 November 2010).
includes solutions to the concerns generated by the discrepancies discovered during the six month mission in a difficult combat environment like Afghanistan.

The second document examined was the SEEBRIG *Disaster Relief Operations (DRO) Concept*.\(^3\) SEEBRIG HQ developed the concept as a response to the growing dimension, frequency and complexity of disasters, and the increasing number of people affected, who demand a capability for military as well as civil response. This initiative was oriented towards small-scale civil assistance in the interest of the parties. In support of the above-mentioned document, with the adoption of the second Additional Protocol, the SEEBRIG member nations established an Engineer Task Force (ETF). The concept embeds purpose, scope and, responsibilities related to a future involvement of SEEBRIG in DRO. In addition, this document opened for the author the possibility to visualize along with the thesis hypothesis the existence of a different option that was considered by the SEEBRIG member nations.

Ultimately, the last documents analyzed and used by the author during his work are the SEEBRIG Directives, SOPs, Generic Deployment Plan (GDP), and GOP. These plans and procedures are of a great importance because are the linkage to the doctrinal aspects of the SEEBRIG organizational concept. The SEEBRIG HQ developed its directives, SOPs, GDP, and GOP respecting and adopting all principles describe in regulations like AJP 3.4.1 *Peace Support Operations*, JP 3-07.3 *Peace Operations*, or US Army FM 100-23 *Peace Operations*. These documents are also a primary source of

---

\(^3\) South Eastern Europe Brigade. *SEEBRIG Disaster Relief Operations Concept.* (Istanbul: SEEBRIG, 2009).
information analyzed along the thesis to answer the primary and secondary research questions.

Media Articles

The fundamental reasons, for reviewing SEEBRIG literature, are, first, to understand its capabilities with the purpose of discovering the suitability of having SEEBRIG carry out PSOs and, second, to identify a body of literature about SEEBRIG. To the author’s knowledge, few sources examine SEEBRIG and PSO simultaneously. It was very difficult to find any document in mass media using a symbiotic approach or analytical describing of SEEBRIG and PSO as one entity. Thus, the media articles written about SEEBRIG compensated for the existing gap in the thesis analysis by trying to build up a bridge between SEEBRIG and PSO, even though their analytical value was of little impact.

However, several articles mention SEEBRIG. Most of these articles are mainly acknowledging the initial presence and the follow-on development of SEEBRIG as an organization within the realm of PSO. The emphasis of this review will fall on those articles that describe SEEBRIG’s contribution of troops during the 2006 Afghanistan mission. Starting with 1999, numerous newspaper articles, news conferences and online articles, characterized SEEBRIG as a promising alternative for PSO coming from Southeastern side of Europe. The most important declarations were attributed to former US Secretaries of Defense. Referring to the imminent deployment of SEEBRIG to Afghanistan US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in a news conference on 6 December 2005, “This effort will give the Afghan people encouragement and confidence,
as the free people of SEE reach out to aid a region that is well beyond their borders."\textsuperscript{33} In addition, he asserted, “An area of the world that helps stem the tide of totalitarianism is becoming a unified force in promoting the spread of democracy.”\textsuperscript{34}

Moreover, the current US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made very important remarks on SEE BRIG organizational capability to conduct PSOs after the return of SEE BRIG from its first mission in Afghanistan. He asserted that the 6-month deployment of 100 staff personnel belonging to SEE BRIG HQ was a very important effort and great example on how to contribute to the war on terror. Moreover, in his opinion this type of commitment should be encouraged and viewed as a successful involvement in bringing stability to a place far from home. In addition, Secretary Gates acknowledged the intention of SEDM members, who have contributed with personnel, equipment, and funding to SEE BRIG, to see the brigade deploying again. However, before another deployment, he encouraged an assessment of the brigade. “We should take an honest look at SEE BRIG’s capabilities, shortcomings and requirements, and carefully review the assets SEE BRIG nations contribute to the brigade,” he said.\textsuperscript{35} To conclude, Mr. Gates stated his intention to press members of the SEDM to send troops to Afghanistan to fill the existing gaps. Thus, he proposed to SEDM members to have a realistic discussion


\textsuperscript{34}Ibid.


The opinions of senior US military leadership in the mass media about SEEBRIG’s contribution in Afghanistan revealed a favorable perception of the greatest military power in the world about the contribution of a regional initiative to a PSO. They also made clear that SEEBRIG needed to perform necessary corrections, but that future deployments should be encouraged.

The last article used by the author, yet very important is an article written in 2003 by two Greek university professors Mr. Bourantonis and Mr. Tsakonas. This article discusses the origins, structure, and mission of the MPFSEE. It also investigates the reason for MPFSEE inactivity and its limited involvement in PSO in region and worldwide. Thus, the authors conclude that the reasons for SEEBRIG lack of the initiative are: the lack of autonomy; insufficient member nations commitment; absence of shared interests with regard to specific conflicts; and the failure to develop institutional capacity. All these findings provided additional evidence for a more introspected research on SEEBRIG suitability for PSOs. It confirmed the MPFSEE member nation’s lack of political commitment and the hesitations to provide the necessary resources for SEEBRIG deployment in a NATO-led PSO.

Finally, the minutes of meetings of the Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) contributed to a better understanding of the evolution over time of SEEBRIG in terms of concept, capabilities, regulations, or structure modification. Moreover, these
documents contain evidence that answer the thesis’ research questions by visualizing all nations’ opinions, including US, on the future possible use of SEEBRIG capabilities.

Conclusion

In summary, the literature review identified fertile ground for original research about SEEBRIG and its suitability for NATO-led PSOs. The author was not able to find any documents that analyzed the suitability of SEEBRIG for PSO. This distinctiveness attests the importance of the study and justifies the necessity for answers to the research questions. The thesis will provide more depth and knowledge in the unclear areas of regional PSO initiatives. No matter the answer to the research questions, the necessity of similar initiatives like SEEBRIG to exist will be better understood.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

In the process of proving the validity and the relevance of a thesis, finding evidence to support it is crucial. “People often use a systematic approach when they collect and interpret information to solve the small problems of daily living. Research is a systematic process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting information (data) in order to increase our understanding of a phenomenon about which we are interested or concerned.”\(^{37}\) Therefore, the research sequence must be well structured for the purpose of discovering feasible, suitable, and credible evidence with which to confirm or deny the thesis. In order to reflect the above-mentioned statement, this chapter is organized in three parts. The first one is the research design. This chapter segment will present the steps used to reach the purpose of this thesis, which is, analyzing the SEEBRIG capabilities with a view to a future NATO-led PSO mission. The second part will describe the evaluation criteria, and their importance. In addition, it will give details about how the SEEBRIG capabilities analysis was structured in order to achieve the best possible results. Finally, the conclusion will summarize this chapter and provide a follow-on to the next chapter.

Research Design

The research design used for this thesis is a qualitative research case study. The research gathered data on individuals, programs, or events by looking at all existing organizational characteristics or qualities. Finally, the aims of the study comprehensively answer the thesis primary research question: “Is SEEBRIG, based on its organizational concept and capabilities, suitable for NATO-led PSO employment?” In addition, all this data collection was strictly related to the secondary research questions:

1. What are SEEBRIG capabilities that support an eventual NATO-led PSO mission?
2. What are the constraints, limitations, deficiencies, and shortfalls that affect SEEBRIG capacity to conduct NATO-led PSO?
3. In which areas does SEEBRIG need to improve in terms of capabilities to increase the potential to conduct NATO-led PSO?

In order to achieve the goal of this thesis with maximum efficiency the author followed three steps. The first step is a brief analysis of current missions conducted by different military organizations under the lead of the UN, EU or NATO. The author specified during previous chapters that his focus would be only on NATO-led PSO, however this analysis will provide additional understanding and reasoning for his decision to limit his research of SEEBRIG suitability for future PSOs to NATO-led operations. In addition, it will position SEEBRIG in the existing PSO realm in terms of its current capabilities.

---

38 Ibid., 137.
The second step is composed of an extensive collection of data on the SEE BRIG concept, structure, capabilities, and internal regulations from its establishment until the present, in order to understand SEE BRIG capabilities that could support an eventual NATO-led PSO mission. This step is the basis for the entire study. The research corollary will be to assert a valid and unbiased conclusion by using criteria, categorization, and interpretation of data in terms of synthesizing an overall portrait of SEE BRIG suitability for NATO-led PSO missions. Thus, the author executed a detailed analysis on the SEE BRIG capabilities considering functional areas like personnel, intelligence, operational, training, logistics, CIMIC and financial as part of SEE BRIG organizational concept.

The final stage, following the secondary research questions was to draw conclusions and make some recommendations by connecting the products of the previous research stages to identify constraints, restraints, limitations, shortfalls, and deficiencies that affect SEE BRIG. The answer to whether or not SEE BRIG is suitable to perform PSO emerges by linking the significant traits of the two main subjects of this thesis, SEE BRIG, and NATO-led PSO, and the analysis of the outcomes from all steps.

**Evaluation Criteria**

Data analysis is a crucial step in interpreting information pertaining to the problem under investigation. Consequently, establishing the right evaluation criteria is a difficult problem, yet one of great importance in reaching a desired product. Moreover, the evaluation criteria must be chosen in such a way that they are feasible, suitable, acceptable as reference points to the thesis primary research question, in this case the analysis of SEE BRIG’s suitability to conduct NATO-led PSO. Therefore, the second part
of chapter three focuses on the criteria used and their importance in evaluating SEEBRIG capabilities.

The criteria used for this study to assess the SEEBRIG suitability were the NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) standards and criteria. The ACO Standards for NATO Response Force (NRF) are a NATO tool to evaluate partner nations, to enhance interoperability in order for them to take part in NATO-led operations.\textsuperscript{39} The validity of these standards and criteria for the follow-on analysis of SEEBRIG suitability for NATO-led PSO lies in the fact that they were used to certify NATO operation HQ, including a non-NATO HQ, the EU Nordic Battle Group.\textsuperscript{40} The author selected the following ACO NRF standards and criteria for this study: readiness, sustainability, Combined Joint Status of Requirements (CJSOR), deployability, and command and control (C2) capability.\textsuperscript{41}

The first criterion, readiness, covers areas like employability, assured availability, multi-nationality, and interoperability of the examined organization. It gave a good perspective on vetting the SEEBRIG potential to conduct an internal operational decision-making process, and the ability to prepare, train and conduct operations. In addition, the researcher examined the SEEBRIG personnel establishment status to find out if it is tailored to have the available human resources to properly respond to a NATO-led PSO mission.


\textsuperscript{40}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid.
The second criterion, sustainability, was of primary importance for the evaluation of SEEBRIG logistic and financial functional areas. It provided insights about existing support elements capable of providing real life support and services to combat units. The financial part of the analysis showed whether nations are ready to provide the necessary funds to support the SEEBRIG readiness including the logistical aspect of it.

The next two criteria, deployability and C2 capability, took an equal value in drawing a balanced conclusion about the SEEBRIG forces control, coordination and synchronization in preparation for pre-deployment, and deployment activities corroborated with the CIS (the SEEBRIG command and control system) responsiveness in the view of NATO-led PSOs.

The thesis author because of the lack of SEEBRIG data did not use the criterion of CJSOR. Moreover, this criterion mostly evaluates functions like flexibility, survivability, and force protection at a combined joint level, which exceeds SEEBRIG organizational capacities.

Finally, during the IOC and FOC evaluation of SEEBRIG as a standing Brigade that were conducted in April 2004, the NATO evaluators assessed SEEBRIG HQ capabilities to conduct planning, deployment, operations, command, and control, logistics and CIS support. All the above-mentioned PSO specific aspects were evaluated in accordance with the NATO standards and procedures. The author would have drawn his research on these assessments; however, the classified status of detailed results and

---

standards used by the evaluators and the extended period since the evaluation took place rendered this endeavor unfeasible.

Conclusion

Initially, the author was committed to an approach that relied deeply on his own SEEBRIG experience and perspective. Subsequently, the research and analysis of several SEEBRIG documents uncovered other very significant aspects to the overall thesis goal, to draw conclusions about the suitability of SEEBRIG for NATO-led PSO. Thus, an early assessment proved that the available resources and information are sufficient for a comprehensive, consistent, and synchronized analysis. Secondly, as the analysis unfolded the answers to the secondary research questions became a very important factor in generating the necessary facts for a balanced conclusion about SEEBRIG capabilities for a possible NATO-led PSO. It provided pertinent evidence and revealed the strengths and weaknesses of SEEBRIG’s capacity to perform as a well-coordinated military organization. Finally, based on above-described research design, the next chapter generated relevant data through an extended analysis of SEEBRIG capabilities, existing shortfalls, limitations, and deficiencies in order to identify its suitability for NATO-led PSO.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Over a period of 11 years, SEEBRIG has been a useful tool in the hands of member nations, aiming to contribute to regional security and stability, to foster good neighborly relations among the countries in the region and to support their further integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Nonetheless, the rapid changes in the security and operational environments may require that SEEBRIG adapt itself in order to remain more effective. It may require more effective military capabilities to better address these security concerns. In this context, it is vital that SEEBRIG work directly with a larger sphere of allies. In this framework, MPFSEE nations may realize the opportunity to revise and redefine the SEEBRIG capabilities tailored for potential PSOs as well as crisis management.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the current SEEBRIG capabilities, shortfalls and other relevant data in order to draw conclusions about its suitability for NATO-led PSO. The analysis will include the capabilities, limitations, legal basis, available equipment, training requirements, and civilian impact, and define possible in- or out-of-area missions.

SEEBRIG has gained precious knowledge by conducting and participating in several exercises and has obtained a valuable experience deriving from the 2006 KMNB IX mission in Afghanistan. An additional asset to the continuous improvement is the FOC evaluation performed by NATO Joint Forces Command (JFC) Naples in 2004. The
following analysis also relies on the LL from all above-mentioned activities. The study will consider the current SEEBRIG structure and capabilities derived from the MPFSEE Agreement and the Additional Protocols, including the fifth Additional Protocol, which all SEEBRIG member nations have yet to ratify.

The chapter is organized in two parts. The first part provides a concise description of the legal basis for SEEBRIG participation in PSO followed by a brief scrutiny of present UN, EU, and NATO-led PSOs with the purpose of better understanding of the place of SEEBRIG in the current context of PSO. The second component of this chapter provides detailed answers to the primary and secondary research questions and consists of an extended analysis of SEEBRIG capabilities, shortfalls, and limitations. The focus of the analysis was in response to a possible NATO-led PSO mission; however, for the purpose of analysis fluency, this focal point was not stated repeatedly throughout the study. The analysis covered the following functional areas: personnel, intelligence, operations and training, logistics, CIMIC, and financial as part of the SEEBRIG organizational concept.

**Legal Basis**

The UN Charter and MPFSEE Agreement with its additional protocols constitute the main legal basis for SEEBRIG to participate in PSO, as well as humanitarian and DRO. In addition, the NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and their additional protocols apply within the territory of any other signatory states to the MPFSEE Agreement. All PSO are based on mandates adopted by the UN.

---

Security Council (UNSC). The UNSC, in its resolutions, identifies the type of operation and the chapter of the UN Charter that provides the authority for the PSO.\textsuperscript{44} However, according to the MPFSEE Agreement, Article III, paragraph 2, SEEBRIG will not participate in Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO) defined as chapter VII operations under UN Charter.\textsuperscript{45} This caveat creates a legal limitation and a friction point for SEEBRIG employment in a NATO-led PSO.

**Contemporary PSO and Possible Involvement of SEEBRIG**

The contemporary PSO challenges are unprecedented in range, difficulty, and risk level. The reason is the transformation of the operational environment after the end of Cold War and the perpetuation of internal armed conflicts in the world’s poorest countries. This situation is reflected more clearly in the dramatic shift in the complexity of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), i.e. the UN equivalent to NATO PSOs, under chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter. Thus, from the traditional PKOs where the tasks assigned were military in character involving observation, monitoring, and supervision of cease-fire, a dramatic shift occurred to a new generation of multidimensional UN PKOs with a mixed employment of military, police, and civilian capabilities. Military engagement involves now not just the fulfillment of wide variety of different tasks according to the specific conditions in the area of operations, but also a direct role in political efforts to solve the conflict. During PSO, troops encounter a very complex operating environments ranging from those where some form of conflict continues, to

\textsuperscript{44}NATO, Allied Joint Publication 3.4.1, *Peace Support Operations*, 13.

\textsuperscript{45}South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial, *Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe*, 4.
those where a fragile stability has been reached, or where a solid peace process is in place and the peace building process dominates.

According to the MPFSEE Agreement, SEEBRIG is available for employment in UN or OSCE mandated, EU or NATO led PSO.\textsuperscript{46} Currently, there are many PSO around the world conducted under the umbrella of the UN, NATO and EU. SEEBRIG employment in any type of PSO remains a possibility based on the will of the participating nations to contribute to regional and international peace and stability, despite the considerable costs that may accompany this engagement. A successfully accomplished mission will increase the politico-military credibility of SEEBRIG in the international security environment and will have positive impacts in the region.

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) currently manages 15 operations.\textsuperscript{47} Based on the available information it appears that SEEBRIG has limited suitability for most UN operations for a variety of reasons. First, some UN operations are based on chapter VII of the UN Charter (example include UNOCI – UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire, MINUSTAH – UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, UNAMID – African Union and UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur)\textsuperscript{48} which share several particularities specific to peace enforcement operations like the possibility to use force beyond self-defense to coerce or compel HN compliance with the UN resolution or sanctions. However, as was mentioned earlier in this chapter under the heading “Legal

\textsuperscript{46}South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial, \textit{Agreement on the Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe}, 4.


\textsuperscript{48}Ibid.
Basis,” according to the MPFSEE agreement SEEBRIG is available for employment in all types of PSOs except PEOs. Second, in some UN operations, there is no need for the participation of military forces like SEEBRIG because police or military observer tasks are the primary duties (e.g. UNMOGIP–UN Military observer Group in India and Pakistan and UNMIT–UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste). 49 Third, the great distance between SEE and conflict zone make SEEBRIG participation in some of these operations very difficult in terms of logistics and finance. Even if participation of SEEBRIG in PSO under the UN might be considered as a contribution to global security for the above mentioned reasons and, possibly, because of insufficient member nations commitments, based on disparate and self-serving motives, since its establishment in 1998 SEEBRIG has conducted only the KMNB mission in Afghanistan in 2006. 50

The EU is conducting two different types of PSO. The first type is the military operation, a good example of which is “Operation Althea” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 51 As a reaction to the piracy threat at the Horn of Africa, the EU is also conducting a maritime operation, “Operation Atalanta” formally the EU Naval Force in Somalia. 52 The last type of operation performed by EU is a civilian-military operation. Further examples

49 Ibid.


of this second type of operation are the crisis management operation in Iraq, EU JUST LEX, in support of the Iraqi Government, and the EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo, EUSEC RD Congo.

The participation of SEEBRIG in an EU-led operation could be handicapped by the requirement for consensus regarding all its activities. Moreover, because "SEEBRIG is composed of member nations who have differing vested interests and opposing views on how conflicts should be resolved, the MPFSEE is unlikely to be a neutral forum."

The apparent unwillingness of the EU or OSCE to trust MPFSEE and see it as potential candidate to undertake any type of mission, including PSOs, is another discouraging factor. Finally, in recent years the EU developed a concept that is promoting synergies between the EU civil and military capabilities. This characteristic of EU civil-military operations might affect the potential for SEEBRIG to conduct civil-military operations under EU because of lack of a previous experience in working together with a civilian organization as a single-body.

---


55Bourantonis and Tsakonas, 79.

NATO-led Operations

“Since its first military intervention in 1995, NATO has been engaged in an increasingly diverse array of operations. Today, roughly 70,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world, successfully managing complex ground, air and naval operations in all types of environments. These forces are currently operating in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, the Mediterranean, off the Horn of Africa and in Somalia.”\(^57\) The most significant operations, which are based on chapter VII of the UN Charter, are the ISAF in Afghanistan and the Kosovo Force (KFOR).\(^58\) NATO also conducts training missions in Afghanistan (NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, NTM-A) and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I).\(^59\) The maritime operations are the counter piracy mission off the Horn of Africa, “Operation Ocean Shield,” and counter terrorism mission in the Mediterranean Sea, “Operation Active Endeavour.”

Considering the fact that among the SEEBRIG member nations only FYROM is not yet a NATO member,\(^60\) it is reasonable to think the political authorities of MPFSEE will be more willing to employ the SEEBRIG in a NATO led operation for visibility purposes, if nothing else. This action might show the commitment of MPFSEE nations in


\(^58\)Ibid.

\(^59\)Ibid.

\(^60\)The accession of the FYROM to NATO is currently pending as of 2009. NATO’s invitation to the Republic of Macedonia was blocked by Greece at the 2008 Bucharest summit. FYROM continues to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and Allied leaders have agreed to invite the country to become a member as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country’s name has been reached with Greece.
support of NATO efforts to maintain regional or international peace and stability. In addition, in terms of available forces, readiness, interoperability, operationalization, standardization, equipment, and sustainment of the committed pool of forces to SEEBRIG HQ, the member nations should already be meeting NATO standards, which is a very important and positive factor for SEEBRIG suitability for a NATO-led PSO. Moreover, in terms of existing operational experience, most of the SEEBRIG member nations are already participating in NATO missions around the world with significant forces.\textsuperscript{61} The aforementioned reasons are logical and plausible in the study’s context. The next part of chapter four, the capabilities analysis will provide a more detailed evaluation of the suitability of SEEBRIG, based on existing capabilities, for a NATO-led PSO. This analysis will be based on the criteria identified in chapter three: readiness, deployability, sustainability, and C2 capability.

\textbf{Capabilities Analysis}

The capabilities analysis section of chapter four is the most important part of the study. The examination of SEEBRIG capabilities using NATO certified criteria provides the necessary data for a complete analysis of SEEBRIG. It will also underline the existing shortfalls, limitations, and constrains present in the SEEBRIG organizational concept and capacities. This subchapter is organized according to the criteria used for assessment: readiness, deployability, connectivity, and sustainability. In applying these criteria to SEEBRIG, the analysis will also consider engineer, intelligence, and CIMIC assets, as

well as the functional areas operations, logistics, and training. The objective of the analysis is to give the reader a clear image of what is missing for a sustainable NATO-led and PSO oriented SEEBRIG force.

Readiness

Although SEEBRIG has been FOC since 2004, manning and training issues call into question its readiness. After the 2004 evaluation by JFC Naples, SEEBRIG attained FOC status with limitations to deploy to a NATO-led PSO in the Balkans. According to the report of the JFC Naples Evaluation Team, “the results of evaluation indicate quite clearly that HQ SEEBRIG is capable of making a meaningful and valuable contribution to NATO-led Peace Support Operations albeit there are a number of limitations that would need to be taken into account at the time.” Thus, during the SEEBRIG’s annual exercise in 2004 Seven Stars-04 the JFC Naples evaluators observed “38 criteria of evaluation together with all their sub-criteria have been demonstrated by SEEBRIG HQ in reality, as during a real mission. The evaluators have assessed and checked SEEBRIG HQ capabilities for conducting planning, deployment, operations, command, and control, logistic and CIS support, as well as other specific aspects of PSOs, in accordance with the NATO standards and procedures.” In terms of training for a mission, SEEBRIG HQ has


64Ibid.
the necessary documents to plan, coordinate, and conduct collective, functional, and individual training of nucleus staff and contingency establishment respecting NATO standards.65

Personnel turbulence is a factor that affects the readiness of SEEBRIG. During his SEEBRIG experience, the thesis author noticed that part of personnel who attended the SEEBRIG main Command Post Exercise (CPX), called “Seven Stars 05” in November 2005 were different from those who attended the Mission Rehearsal Training (MRT) at the Joint Force Training Centre, Germany in December 2005 for KMNB IX 2006 mission.66 Furthermore, some of the contingency establishment personnel trained during the above-mentioned training events were also different from those assigned to the mission. Moreover, the SEEBRIG KMNB IX organizational chart had 199 positions, but 28 remained unfilled.67 In addition, 13 personnel out of 171 declared and filled positions did not arrive in the mission area.68 Personnel qualifications and experience in some cases did not comply with job descriptions and mission requirements. It is not clear when the new personnel will be added to the personnel establishment in accordance with the fifth Additional Protocol, because not all SEEBRIG member nations have completed national approval procedures, which, in turn, delays the implementation of the agreed personnel


67South Eastern Europe Brigade, Lessons Learned, 3.

68Ibid.
upgrade. Additionally, the existing national caveats may decrease the effectiveness of SEEBRIG operational capabilities. As a final point, cross training between nucleus staff, contingency establishment and augmenters could be insufficient in case of short-notice missions. All of these issues affect the overall mission effectiveness of SEEBRIG in terms of command and control, responsiveness and flexibility, and will possibly affect the force during a future NATO mission.

In terms of existing shortfalls, the SEEBRIG HQ contingency establishment has not been evaluated since the 2004 NATO FOC assessment. In addition, the SEEBRIG HQ personnel have a very limited knowledge of procedures, documents, and activities about ongoing NATO missions because of inexistent connectivity with NATO Crisis Response Operations in NATO Open Systems (CRONOS) network.

The individual training of nucleus staff personnel is hampered by internal national financial limitations that do not allow their attendance in training courses abroad or their participation in multinational exercises. For instance, some of the MPFSEE member nations allow to their personnel during their three years tour of duty with SEEBRIG to attend only one training course at the NATO School in Germany. The rotational policy established by the MPFSEE member nations has a negative effect on contingency establishment cross training with nucleus staff through repeated exercises, because only a

---


70 CRONOS is a interconnected computer network system. It is used by NATO to transmit classified information with access to NATO intelligence applications and databases.

Force Availability

On paper, the MPFSEE member nations have committed a pool of forces to SEEBRIG (see Appendix B). In reality, these commitments are subject to limitations. The personnel available to SEEBRIG according to MPFSEE agreement and committed permanently by nations for staffing the HQ nucleus staff or personnel establishment consist of 36 officers and noncommissioned officers (see Appendix D). The SEEBRIG HQ nucleus staff is designed based on NATO standards received from JFC Naples before the 2004 FOC evaluation to support routine functions and upon activation of the force, for exercises or operations, to become the core of the deployed HQ.\footnote{NATO uses the Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL) and Operational Capability Concept (OCC) Evaluation programs to evaluate and enhance interoperability of Partner Nations Land HQ and units in order to take part in NATO-led operations. All standards utilized during the evaluation process are classified and they were not accessible to the thesis author for analyzing purposes.} The contingency establishment strength of 107 personnel ensures the needed resources to conduct any generic mission (see Appendix C).

In accordance with the fifth Additional Protocol to the MPFSEE Establishment Agreement, SEEBRIG HQ manpower resources will be improved with a G-5 Section as a Planning Section, G-9 as a CIMIC Section and a new position in the G-4 Section; the
Purchasing and Contracting Officer. Additionally, the SEEBRIG structure must receive several additional elements such as a Military Police (MP) company, CIMIC and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) platoons, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Counter Intelligence (CI) teams for the mission. The authorized total strength of SEEBRIG HQ together with all assigned units is 5,052 personnel.

Aside from the aforementioned commitments of personnel, other factors contribute to the complexity of the organization and manning of SEEBRIG. While the SEEBRIG HQ Host Nation always provides HQ and Signal companies, the other contributing nations must fill the additional units approved for a mission during the force generation process. Furthermore, the most important logistical tool to be used during an eventual mission, the Combat Service Support Battalion (CSSB) is multinational and will be assembled only after the commitment of National contributions.

SEEBRIG depends on its member nations for rotational manning of the HQ and units. Congruent with the MPFSEE Agreement, some SEEBRIG personnel have to be rotated on yearly basis. According to the SEEBRIG Chief of G1, for instance, during the summer of 2009, SEEBRIG received replacements for 11 nucleus staff out of a total of 36. Moreover, another 25 percent of the nucleus staff, including the SEEBRIG Commander, was already replaced during 2009. This became an issue when the

---

73 The fifth Additional Protocol to the MPFSEE Establishment Agreement has yet to be ratified by all member nations.

personnel who planned the mission have to rotate before executing it. As a result, the
mission would be conducted with new personnel that have not participated in the
planning process. The SEEBRIG personnel duty tour for a mission is a NATO standard
of six months. The assignment of personnel and the integration of replacements (as well
as casualties) into units is a national responsibility. Those personnel policies add an extra
friction to the SEEBRIG organizational and personnel issues.

Engineer Component

Looking beyond SEEBRIG as a hole, i.e. a brigade, it is possible that some of the
current SEEBRIG capabilities, like the ETF structure, could be used as niche military
capabilities by outside organizations that may need them. SEEBRIG engineer capabilities
include the ETF (composed of six engineer companies and one platoon) and two
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams as a part of CSSB.\textsuperscript{75} The engineers’
capabilities, features, and organization show that SEEBIRG can to provide specialised
engineer support for its organic units and for humanitarian convoys within an Area of
Operations (AOO). Moreover, SEEBRIG is ready to provide assistance to different
organizations or agencies for clearance of minefields and obstacles (both natural and
artificial)\textsuperscript{76} and other mine awareness training to SEEBRIG personnel on local mines,

\textsuperscript{75} Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe, \textit{Fourth Additional protocol: Annex A; Appendix 3}, 1.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), booby traps, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). When deployed, the SEEBRIG ETF can plan and conduct the following missions: limited road construction and repair, limited bridging and bridge repair, limited rail repair, earth moving, drainage and unexploded ordnance clearance. In terms of constraints, the engineer heavy machinery and equipment needs special transportation assets, which sometimes are difficult for the Nations to procure or rent. The special needs of engineer units for spare parts and maintenance could lead to additional requirements for storage facilities and lift, and specialized handling equipments, which can increase the SEEBRIG logistic footprint in any AOO. Nevertheless, the limited number of EOD teams can provide support for SEEBRIG units in EOD and de-mining missions but cannot be engaged in large-scale humanitarian de-mining operations. Unfortunately, SEEBRIG does not have any Medical Mobile Teams (MMT) to support the engineer units in case of employment, when SEEBRIG ETF would work in large areas and in a decentralized way.

In December 1999, the MPFSEE member nations adopted the second additional protocol to the MPFSEE agreement, which reaffirmed that the scope of the formation of the ETF is also to provide the parties with an emergency relief and humanitarian

---


intervention capability.\textsuperscript{80} In addition, “the Parties agree on the establishment of a Crisis Information Network (CIN), initially a PfP Information Management System (PIMS) based capability oriented toward support of the ETF.” In that view during the last decade, member nations permanently discussed the creation of a secondary branch in SEEBRIG development. Thus, in February 2009, the SEEBRIG HQ finalized a DRO concept and the MPFSEE member nations approved it during the 22nd PMSC meeting. The importance of this concept and how it might affect SEEBRIG as a force only committed to PSOs derives from the fact that the political leadership will always have as an option an alternative to achieve visibility for SEEBRIG vis-à-vis the commitment to DRO. It could also affect the financial resources allocated for the improvement of SEEBRIG PSO capabilities after the 2006 KMNB Afghanistan mission, because some of the funding might now be directed toward the development of capabilities associated with DRO.

CIMIC Component

As described in SEEBRIG SOP 501 \textit{Civil Military Cooperation}, the CIMIC section can establish and manage a relationship between COMSEEBRIG and the national authorities, international and national organizations and civil populations in defined AOO, using all CIMIC means and capabilities. In addition, they are continuously improved, and updated according to NATO CIMIC doctrine. Additional documents necessary to conduct CIMIC activities like the preparation of country studies, necessary guidelines, and studies on ongoing CIMIC activities, relief and humanitarian operations,

have to be prepared by the CIMIC section prior to deployment.\footnote{Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe, \textit{Section 5-Civil Military Cooperation: SOP 501 Civil Military Cooperation}, http://www.mod.gov.al/SEDM/mpfsee_seebrig_documents.htm (accessed 25 October 2010), 12.} When SEEBRIG is not engaged in operations, the CIMIC section’s task is to plan and conduct specific activities mainly focused on support for participation in SEEBRIG and multinational exercises, for the execution of related training activities, and for participation in NATO CIMIC training courses and conferences. Another responsibility of the CIMIC section, as describe in SEEBRIG SOP 006, is to conduct Public Information Operations (PIO), and welfare activities. Following the adoption of the fifth Additional Protocol SEEBRIG has a multinational CIMIC subordinate structure capable of conducting CIMIC activities, as required, in any specific mission. SEEBRIG has, theoretically, the necessary means and tools to integrate or cooperate with other different CIMIC units that could be attached to the brigade during any operation.\footnote{Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe, \textit{Section 5-Civil Military Cooperation: Annex A to SOP 501 Civil Military Cooperation}, http://www.mod.gov.al/SEDM/mpfsee_seebrig_documents.htm (accessed 25 October 2010), 1.} This successful integration can increase SEEBRIG CIMIC capabilities, while an incomplete integration can create difficulties as part of a NATO-led mission.

The major constraint on CIMIC is the absence from the SEEBRIG budget of pre-established resources for CIMIC to plan and conduct quick-impact projects, like infrastructure repairs.\footnote{Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe, \textit{Lessons Learned}, 27.} This situation became apparent during the 2006 NATO-led mission in Afghanistan when only two major CIMIC projects were conducted and
Thus, the SEEBRIG CIMIC activity would be limited in effectiveness to a very low level. In addition, according to the GDP, SEEBRIG CIMIC staff actions during pre-deployment, i.e. fact-finding missions, reconnaissance in the AOO, and mission preparations would be limited. Furthermore, delays in the permanent update of the CIMIC specific documentation might hamper CIMIC activities.

Intelligence Assets

SEEBRIG HQ can generate limited intelligence, security, and terrain and weather analysis in order to support the decision-making process and SEEBRIG employment in any particular AOO. Within its current capacity, SEEBRIG HQ is capable of performing the specific functions of data base management, information operations management, information estimates, intelligence plans management and cooperation – coordination with other sections and special agencies.85

Unfortunately, when confronted with NATO standards during the 2006 KMNB mission in Afghanistan, SEEBRIG suffered from the absence of an information security (INFOSEC) system to monitor automatic data processing and information security issues.86 Furthermore, the lack of a secure intelligence connectivity system limited the HQ ability to establish secure connections with its NATO partners as required by theater


86 South Eastern Europe Brigade, *Lessons Learned*, 17.
of operation (TOO) specificity.\textsuperscript{87} To compound these challenges the SEEBRIG structure does not include Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Electronic Warfare (EW), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), and meteorology assets.\textsuperscript{88} Therefore, in terms of above-mentioned intelligence disciplines, SEEBRIG must rely exclusively on higher-level commands. Thus, during any employment of SEEBRIG under NATO, the nations are required to negotiate in advance the provision of the needed secure intelligence connectivity system; with the respective organizations during the Force Generation Process. Another potential challenge is the lack of necessary operational expertise to lead the ISTAR Platoon, CI, and HUMINT teams that attach to SEEBRIG just before a mission.

\textbf{Deployability}

Deployability, to include the internal process by which the military organization prepares the force for a mission, is the key to the ability of SEERIG to support a PSO. Commitments and experience, however, indicate shortfalls in this area.

SEEBRIG can activate its own internal operational decision-making process, immediately after the MPFSEE member nations take the decision to employ the Brigade in an operation. Likewise, the SEEBRIG operational decision-making process is supported with proper official documentation that regulates all necessary activities.\textsuperscript{89} In

\footnote{\textsuperscript{87}Ibid.}


addition, C2 relations provide COMSEEBRIG with the necessary authority to conduct an operation by Transfer of Authority (TOA) over SEEBRIG units from member nations.\textsuperscript{90} Considering the 2006 KMNB Afghanistan mission experience and the existing CIS resources, SEEBRIG HQ can exercise to command and control of all the assigned units as a whole or part of them as described in the MPFSEE Agreement. However, preparations by SEEBRIG are time constrained because of the fact that the initiation of internal decision-making process along with mission preparations cannot start before the final decision for employment of SEEBRIG is taken by the political leadership of the MPFSEE member nations. The current GDP allocates only two months for preparation, from ministerial decision until deployment.\textsuperscript{91} This period is inadequate and needs to be reconsidered. When the mission for Afghanistan was officially declared to SEEBRIG on 6 December 2005 at SEDM Ministerial Meeting in Washington DC, there less than two months remained for preparation, deployment and handover take over procedures. The brigade’s personnel hardly worked together as a cohesive unit, because meetings, rehearsals, training, and reconnaissance took place in different countries, over such a restricted time.\textsuperscript{92}

Three probable SEEBRIG employment scenarios seem likely, based on operational experience and the capabilities of SEEBRIG. The first option, which played

\textsuperscript{90} Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe, Establishment Agreement: Annex C, 3-5.


\textsuperscript{92} South Eastern Europe Brigade, Lessons Learned, 2.
out during the KMNB IX mission to Afghanistan in 2006 is the SEEBRIG HQ along with its HQ and Signal Company. The second option is the Task Force, a structure that would include the personnel establishment and limited number of assigned units. The last scenario is the full SEEBRIG employment, in which nations would provide the maximum number of units they had agreed to offer for deployment. In order to answer to respond to these scenarios, however, SEEBRIG HQ needs other niche military capabilities in order to fill previously identified gaps in, for example, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), MP, CIMIC, HUMINT, engineer, and helicopter support. The real needs will differ from mission to mission, and even the development of a niche capabilities concept cannot precisely foresee them. A potential solution to the problem of gaps in certain capabilities would be for newly acceding nations to be asked to explore the possibility to contribute to SEEBRIG forces with the specific capabilities that are still missing.

Moreover, if for a future mission the actual operational requirements will exceed the operational capabilities of SEEBRIG (as derived from HQ staffing and units) the necessary additional contribution could be negotiated in Force Generation Conference.

Command and Control
Communication and Information System

Problems with the interoperability and shortfalls in equipment, especially cryptographic and other secure means, limit the effectiveness of communications and information system in SEEBRIG. According to the Operation Plan (OPLAN), SEEBRIG has among its organic capabilities a Signal company to provide necessary C2 support.

93Political Military Steering Committee, 13th PMSC Meeting Minutes ITEM VII, 2.
The capabilities resident in this component are satellite, High Frequency (HF) and Very High Frequency (VHF) radios, based on MPFSEE and donor nations’ contribution during the years.\(^9^4\) The CIS concept of SEEBRIG is based on single channel military satellite systems, commercial national satellite systems, and military combat net radio. Thus, SEEBRIG Information Systems provide secure and non-secure services: voice, facsimile, data, and video teleconferencing.\(^9^5\) During the reconnaissance and the deployment of the main Command Post (CP) and subordinate units, information exchange is based on voice-only communication. SEEBRIG is conducting a CIS upgrading process with the help of United States. As soon as this process is completed, “the CIS system will become operational, interoperable, and capable of supporting large-scale exercises and missions at a certain level.”\(^9^6\)

SEEBRIG suffers from a number of CIS shortfalls. One of the SEEBRIG major CIS deficiencies is lack of data transmission capabilities for the Tactical Command Post (TACP) vehicles. Radio communications for the TACPs are limited to voice only.\(^9^7\) Other shortfalls a lack of spare parts for radio system and power generators for Harris radios on Mercedes vehicles and the lack of switchboard connection for the Terrestrial

---


\(^9^5\) Ibid., 2.


\(^9^7\) Ibid., 8.
Trunked Radio (TETRA) system.\textsuperscript{98} As a result, from an operational point of view, the CIS architecture and the flow of information are not optimal tools for the command and control system. Moreover, the SEEBRIG CIS relays mostly on the CIS capabilities of the national units that are part of its structure. In the event of a deployment, SEEBRIG would have no support of EW and cyber warfare (CW) structure and equipment.\textsuperscript{99} Finally, SEEBRIG has no hardware and software applications for situational awareness and compatible formatted messaging.\textsuperscript{100}

Secondly, during evaluation visits and exercises, SEEBRIG staff must inspect and test CIS equipment in terms of interoperability standards like hopping frequency, encryption system, etc. Finally, for every mission, the encrypted information needs to be upgraded at least to “Mission Secret” level and every nation should have a compatible encryption system in order to allow SEEBRIG to cover the requirements prior to the deployment phase. Unfortunately, the HN did not finalize the reinforcement of security measures of HQ SEEBRIG within summer 2005, in order NATO to approve the connectivity of NATO CRONOS system following the FOC.\textsuperscript{101} This deficiency created and will possibly create a major intelligence awareness gap for SEEBRIG during the mission because the ongoing realistic intelligence updated never happened.

\textsuperscript{98}Ibid., 10-11. TETRA is combination of group voice communications (one-to-many), mobile telephony, and mobile data services accessible from one radio device. It supports data applications for command and control systems, automatic vehicle location, database queries, reporting, or image.


\textsuperscript{100}South Eastern Europe Brigade, \textit{Lessons Learned}, 19.

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid.
Moreover, considering the fact that its actual C2 capabilities are only functional with the assigned units, SEEBRIG cannot be employed on a standalone basis without being embodied in a command structure of, at least, a Land Component Command concept. Any other different structures may affect the overall SEEBRIG operational capability in the AOO, mainly because of lack of interconnectivity and interoperability.

**Sustainability**

The sustainability concept for SEEBRIG has yet to be tested, either in an operation or in exercises. Sustainability, therefore, remains a large question mark in assessing the ability of SEEBRIG to support a PSO.

According to the MPFSEE Agreement, the units involved in logistics during a mission are the HQ Company, Multinational CSSB, and National Support Elements (NSEs).\(^{102}\) The SEEBRIG HQ Company, with its support elements, is capable of providing life support and services as well as limited transportation capabilities to the HQ. It can establish a point for petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) distribution, ensure maintenance of vehicles and equipment, and maintain the appropriate level of stocks of supplies.\(^ {103}\)

The CSSB can establish SEEBRIG Logistics Forward Base (Log FWB) in the assigned AOO and provide the necessary logistics support for all SEEBRIG units.\(^ {104}\)

---


\(^{103}\)Ibid., 9.

\(^{104}\)Ibid., 10.
concept of support for SEEBRIG forces is that national units will be self-sustaining i.e. that sustainment is a national responsibility. However, multinational arrangements, LN, Role Specialist Nation (RSN), and HNS are envisioned with the consensus of all the participating nations, where possible. Nevertheless, SEEBRIG can coordinate with different logistic structures of nations and other organizations (e.g. UN, OSCE, NATO).

Unfortunately, SEEBRIG faces several logistical constraints and limitations. One of them is the limited transportation assets for deployment and redeployment.\(^\text{105}\)

Therefore, in the view of a future mission, SEEBRIG would need to contract or rent necessary transportation assets on case-by-case basis. Owing to the variety of vehicles and materiel that national contingents are equipped with, SEEBRIG is confronted with a lack of interoperability. Moreover, the CSSB cannot implement specific PSO logistics functions like maintenance, day of supply (DOS) for all classes, and supply provision for common spare parts due to the lack appropriate capabilities.\(^\text{106}\)

To compound these challenges, SEEBRIG Commander would not have an overall logistics picture during the early stages of a deployment, because the national contingents do not have any obligation to report to COMSEEBRIG until the TOA.\(^\text{107}\) As a result, COMSEEBRIG has limited co-ordination capability.

The CSSB is the locus of most of the logistic deficiencies. Having a multinational structure and an unusual chain of command, the CSSB is difficult to assemble and train.

\(^{105}\) South Eastern Europe Brigade, Lessons Learned, 13.

\(^{106}\) Ibid.

\(^{107}\) Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe, Section 7-Logistics: SOP 401 Logistic Operations, 2.
Therefore, the CSSB Commander is not in a position to know and evaluate well in advance of a deployment his staff and subordinate units. This unit has yet to be called up or to conduct any type of common training or readiness evaluation.\(^{108}\) This not to say that the multinational CSSB is the only support unit that faces limitations, another important shortfall to be considered when planning for a mission is the unavailability of Air Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC).\(^{109}\)

All of the above-mentioned shortfalls constitute a burden for a future NATO-led mission. The existing financial support for development of SEEBRIG does not support an extended improvement of logistical capabilities; the SEEBRIG member nations commitment in this direction is limited in only providing the necessary resources for the support of the SEEBRIG HQ, itself.

Financial Aspect

In any type of mission, and especially in a PSO, the financing support is a critical. SEEBRIG has a particular and complicated funding system. SEEBRIG HQ is funded by the contributions of the MPFSEE member nations. SEEBRIG HQ prepares and submits a common budget to the SEDM for approval via PMSC.\(^{110}\) For each nation, the cost share of the common budget is calculated on the number of personnel establishment positions (slots) allocated to the specific nation (see Appendix E). However, the overall impression

\(^{108}\) South Eastern Europe Brigade, Lessons Learned, 14.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.

is that SEEBRIG member nations are not ready to commit more financial resources. Evidence for this impression can be found in the amounts of the total budget for SEEBRIG in 2005 and 2010, which are almost the same (Fiscal Year 2005 in amount of 496,515 $, the equivalent of 331,162 euro, and 2010 budget with 338,980 euro).\textsuperscript{111}

For mission purposes, HQ SEEBRIG must submit a separate budget plan to the PMSC. Thus, MPFSEE member nations will be obliged to discuss the provision of adequate funding to support a given mission. In addition, depending on the nature of the mission and operations, specific budget estimations for CIMIC and HUMINT must be included. In accordance with Annex E of the MPFSEE Agreement, common budget funds in a mission will cover the approved expenditure for the following needs: operations and maintenance costs; mission related costs; transportation costs; costs related to command, control, communications and information systems requirements; costs incurred from claims; investment costs; and exercise costs.\textsuperscript{112}

In addition, the fifth MPFSEE Additional Protocol specifies that all costs for the mission for HQ SEEBRIG, and the Signal, and HQ Company will be funded from the common budget. The contribution of the nations to the mission budget is based on the same premises as the common budget, i.e. based on the number of contingency establishment slots allocated for each nation in the manning list adopted for the specific mission. Nevertheless, it is a national concern to fund the costs for Role 3 medical

\textsuperscript{111}Political Military Steering Committee, 22nd PMSC Meeting minute: G8 presentation, 8.

\textsuperscript{112}Multinational Peace Force Southeastern Europe, Establishment Agreement: Annex E, 2.
treatment (medical facility with extended surgical capacity), salaries, per diem and travel expenses for personnel leave during the mission.

In terms of financial and budget procedural issues, the constraints, restraints, and limitations derive from the allocated budget, time, and existing theater agreements. The allocation for the mission budget funds requires some of the nations parliamentary approval and that may require extended time.113 The preparation and finalization of a large number of contracts prior to the deployment might take longer time than expected. In addition, a functioning and reliable banking system in the theater is essential, because it affects the financial procedures of SEEBRIG HQ. An inefficient banking system in the area of operations leads to a significant flow of cash and requires additional security measures.

Based on SEEBRIG LL, if a SOFA is not in place, a variety of limitations on the implementation of the budget, like currency, custom procedures, taxes, legal basis for contracts, and financial documentation such as invoices, might arise. Another issue, observed by the thesis author, was the limited or even missed participation of financial contingency establishment personnel during SEEBRIG’s exercises. Therefore, cross training with nucleus staff has not been at the required level. Moreover, the position of Fund Manager Officer, even when requested and very necessary, has not been filled according to the SEEBRIG HQ personnel establishment.114


114 Political Military Steering Committee, 22nd PMSC Meeting minute: G8 presentation, 36.
In conclusion, the impact of financial shortfalls on mission generated by time, financial systems, and existing theater agreements could be solved through better training, improved procedures, or continuous negotiation among nations. Unfortunately, at this moment the current committed resources do not provide SEEBRIG with any certainty that the political leadership would be motivated to support the SEEBRIG capabilities enhancement for a PSO mission. However, in terms of budgetary allocations the 2006 mission, with a budget of twelve million euro, showed that when political will exists a significant amount of financial resources could be provided by nations.

Summary and Conclusion

Any operational organizational, or capabilities gap between SEEBRIG structure and NATO specific mission requirements (within the MPFSEE Agreement framework) can be discussed, negotiated and filled during the Force Generation Conference, as long as it take place early enough for the nations and SEEBRIG. Practically, SEEBRIG participation in operations should be decided by the Nations at least 12 months prior to deployment and if possible be included in the annually approved triennial plan. This could be the most efficient and resource saving way to involve SEEBRIG in operations. At the same time, if the nations would adopt this approach, it would no longer be necessary to proceed to further MPFSEE Agreement amendments, which have proven to be time and effort consuming for all Nations and SEEBRIG HQ.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made a very interesting statement at the 12th SEDM conference that took place in Kiev, Ukraine in October 2007. His opinions, on SEEBRIG participation in 2006 Afghanistan mission, support the thesis author’s answers in determining whether SEEBRIG is suitable for employment in PSOs. Thus, Secretary Gates asserted that the SEEBRIG deployment in Afghanistan with the KMNB in 2006 was a good example of partners coming together and providing an important contribution to the war on terror. He also acknowledges that before deploying again SEEBRIG an honest assessment must be performed to identify the shortcomings and requirements for additional SEEBRIG capabilities.\(^\text{115}\)

It is evident that SEEBRIG is struggling to overcoming existing shortfalls. Therefore, the prerequisite and significant aspect for a successful mission would be the nations’ willingness to commit suitable resources and synchronize the overall efforts according to the SEEBRIG motto “One Team, One Mission.” In addition, the necessity to receive from member nations early warning about any intention to deploy the brigade would have a great impact in terms of SEEBRIG mission preparedness. Any operational gap that has been, or will be, identified so as to fit the SEEBRIG structure with specific mission requirements must be discussed, negotiated and filled during a the Force

Generation Conference, early enough for the nations and SEEBRIG to be able to incorporate and synchronize the solution.

The previous chapter’s findings showed that SEEBRIG is affected by some limitations, shortfalls, and deficiencies. Thus, based on the evidence, evaluation, and interpretation outcomes, this chapter is organized in three parts. The first part will interpret the findings depicted in chapter four to include the outcomes’ significance and future impacts. In addition, the author will discuss the unanticipated results found during research. The second part will consist of recommendations and conclusions about how to covering the gaps identified during analysis. In addition, suggestions for additional investigation will be provided with a focus on the unanswered questions or different approach to conducting the analysis. Finally, the chapter will end by determining whether research is complete or more evidence is required.

**Findings Interpretation**

Considering the fact that SEEBRIG is the extension of a political-military initiative, the outcomes resulted after the analysis of SEEBRIG capabilities must be viewed in a holistic manner not only relative to the international military environment, namely the PSOs, but also to the political decision factor.

In terms of NATO criteria, the major outcome after analyzing and interpreting evidence is that SEEBRIG is limited in its capacity to perform NATO-led PSO. Thus, the pool of forces provided by nations is only composed of ground forces with a restricted potential to perform an eventual NATO mission. Specific gaps identified during the analysis might affect the size and structure of SEEBRIG. These gaps are based on partial availability or lack of committed combat support and combat services support units like
NBC, MP, CIMIC assets, HUMINT, engineer, and helicopter support, all of which handicap any type of mission. Moreover, the CSSB concept is not realistic and it has never been used since the establishment of SEEBRIG in 1999. Nevertheless, the entire development of SEEBRIG as an organization, including internal directives, GOP, GDP, SOPs, and a training concept based on NATO principles and policies, together with the 2006 KMNB Afghanistan mission as a pinnacle, add some support for its ability to perform a NATO-led PSO at least theoretically.

However, even though the study vetted SEEBRIG suitability against purely NATO military analytical criteria the political factor, mainly decision-making, should be always considered as a decisive factor in establishing the future of SEEBRIG. Moreover, the participation in a mission is limited by national caveats and procedures. Making a parallel with the NATO decision process, any type of initiative or resolution could be at least a time consuming factor if not an unsurpassable one. In addition, different nation parts of MPFSEE initiative have different national interests and specific views on using SEEBRIG. This problem becomes obvious only by specifying that some of the member nations like Greece, Turkey, or FYROM have political disagreements outside SEEBRIG initiative. Secondly, the level of commitment depends not only on the existing capabilities but also on SEEBRIG member nations desire to get involved. The financial aspect is very important considering the fact that involves political support and decision. Moreover, the accession of other nations must be considered an unexploited opportunity to fix some existing shortfalls. Finally yet importantly, SEEBRIG is an available tool in the hands of member nations.
In terms of unexpected findings, the author found certain opinions asserting that “rather than as vehicle for achieving specific goals, the MPFSEE should be essentially be seen as the embodiment of a certain principle of co-operation and, in a vague but still fruitful way, as a means of fostering a feeling of family togetherness and shared interests among a group of states that have very little in common to begin with.” \(^{116}\) Implicit in this finding is a view that SEEBRIG is more a political than a military (i.e. operational) phenomenon. However, the experience of the KMNB IX mission in Afghanistan in 2006, for which the member nations committed twelve million euro points to an operational value for SEEBRIG.

Another surprising result is the number of existing gaps. Whether operational, logistical, or financial the deficiencies have appeared to be more than the author expected, and therefore, they must be offset by a great deal of involvement and willingness of SEEBRIG nations in order to successfully perform during a possible mission. This unanticipated finding entirely supports the thesis conclusion that SEEBRIG is not yet prepared for another NATO-led PSO mission.

**Suggestions for Additional Investigation**

To fill the overall purpose of this analysis the thesis author believes that US role as a potential contributor in the future development of SEEBRIG should be analyzed in a further study. US as an initial and observer member had during the evolution of SEEBRIG a very important role. \(^{117}\) Therefore, the author considers that answering the

\(^{116}\) Bourantonis and Tsakonas, 80.

question of the US influence in SEE area, and especially relative to SEEBRIG potential, provides invaluable relevance.

In terms of how things could have been approached differently, a possible option would be to analyze SEEBRIG capabilities against DRO concept. The DRO concept during the last years has become a valuable option for SEEBRIG operational future. The existence of an ETF within the structure of SEEBRIG was an undeniable reason for most member nations to consider the DRO as an alternative option for the brigade future. Most of the PMSC meeting contained references, capabilities analysis and member nations opinions that SEEBRIG must be refitted and prepared to conduct DRO in an equal manner with PSO. Another alternative could be to conduct a throughout analyze of every aspect in a dual military and political perspective. The study should explore the political decision-making and its influence on the SEEBRIG operational readiness. This alternative will give a realistic view of the dynamic existing between the political and military components of SEEBRIG and the long-term effect on the future development of a competent and well-equipped force. Finally, an assessment on the necessity for a new concept for SEEBRIG would be a very promising area to be examined in a further study. The central idea could be to present to the political leadership suggestions and proposals to optimize the capabilities deriving from the current structure and institutional provisions. This new concept, as a suggestion, should be oriented to the reach the following desirable end-states: additional resources allocation, maximum usage of military diplomacy, optimization of capabilities, early warning for an imminent mission,

realistic and compatible operational planning, and a clear demarcation between PSOs and DROs. Thus, by analyzing SEEBRIG future through a new PSO concept or a distinctive DRO concept would bring the expected predictability specific to a mature organizational structure.

Ultimately, the thesis purpose was to explore the suitability of SEEBRIG capabilities for a NATO-led PSO. However, in fact, the argument has opened a new perspective to other interested peoples in foreseeing possible positive results following a regional initiative whose purpose is to establishing a more secure environment in South Eastern Europe or around world.

**Recommendations and Conclusions**

It is the author’s belief based on evidence identified in chapter four that if the member nations want SEEBRIG to play a key role not only in the development of regional cooperation but also in promoting the international peace and security should make available all necessary means for future development of SEEBRIG. They should act to improve institutional and legal provisions, manpower, financial support, internal and external procedures, knowledge, experience, and time management.

Bearing in mind the critical role of political will on the part of the member nations and the challenges the nations’ government face in making choices about the allocation of resources, following are the recommendations that address the top priority shortfalls that hinder SEEBRIG as possible contributor to a NATO-led PSO.

There are numerous areas in which SEEBRIG need to take action in order to alleviate the shortfalls, deficiencies, and limitations discovered during the analysis. The NATO specific evaluation criteria used in chapter three provided the tool to identify the
existing gaps along the SEEBRIG functional areas. The author’s recommendations are aligned with the aforementioned criteria i.e. readiness, deployability, C2, and sustainability. They are based on his SEEBRIG tour of duty, operational experience in Afghanistan, and the knowledge gained during his Intermediate Level Education at US Army Command and General Staff College.

The organizational readiness is a critical factor in overtaking any type of mission. The SEEBRIG underperformance in terms of mission preparedness might initially emerge from the forces availability. Thus, to keep updated in its forces database, SEEBRIG should establish a permanent report system of assigned units’ availability, similar with the NATO Order of Battle (ORBAT). The identified lack of critical assets in areas like MP, NBC, intelligence, CIMIC, or counter-IED might endanger any type of PSO including a NATO-led mission. In consequence, MPFSEE Nations should take into consideration the acquisition of additional or use third party capabilities. The personnel training is another vital part of the readiness aspect. The contingency establishment personnel who joined exercises and training together with nucleus staff should be the same as the one who finally participate in the mission. In addition, the individual training of nucleus personnel should not be hampered by internal national financial limitations that do not allow abroad training course attendance. Finally, in order to maintain the operational capability to a high level, MPFSEE nations must consider the possibility to request to NATO a new evaluation for SEEBRIG HQ.

Secondly, the failure to provide adequate time to prepare for Afghanistan mission will affect the SEEBRIG capacity to deploy. Therefore, SEEBRIG should revise its PSO GDP to fit NATO standards with a realistic timeline for deployment of MPFSEE Nations
and SEEBRIG HQ capabilities. Based on LL and current experience, the final decision from MPFSEE Nations for SEEBRIG employment in NATO PSOs should be made at least one year before the deployment.

The SEEBRIG C2 system, with its enabler CIS capability, carries a great deal of importance for a future NATO-led PSO. Any shortfall in these area burdens and will deeply affect the capacity to conduct a PSO in good conditions. The existing CIS systems development financed by the US is a part of the available solution to the upgrade of EW and CW elements.

From a sustainability point of view, MPFSEE nations should think to change their current logistical model to FN, LN concepts of support or using contractors to fill the existing logistical gaps. As a final point, the most important factor for any type of mission, the financial aspect, should be mitigated through the SEEBRIG nation’s commitment to provide a percentage of their contributions immediately after the approval of the mission budget. As an example the main expenditures for the 2006 Mission in Afghanistan for 6-month period was around 12 million euro.

All these proposals must be viewed from the perspective of SEEBRIG member nations’ unrestricted financial commitment. Unfortunately, at this moment considering

119 NATO uses the Combat Readiness Evaluation (CREVAL) and Operational Capability Concept (OCC) Evaluation programs to evaluate and enhance interoperability of Partner Nations Land HQ and units in order to take part in NATO-led operations. All standards utilized during the evaluation process are classified and they were not accessible to the thesis author for analyzing purposes.

120 South Eastern Europe Brigade, Lessons Learned, 11.

the existing global economic crisis and the contraction of most of the SEEBRIG counties defense budget is highly improbable in the next years that such large amount of money would be made available for a SEEBRIG deployment in any of PSO type and especially for a NATO-led mission.122

In conclusion, based on analysis findings, SEEBRIG is limited or not yet prepared to undertake and successfully fulfill an eventual NATO-led PSO mission that might be assigned to it. There is very little evidence found during the analysis that shows the intention of SEEBRIG nations to overcoming the shortfalls outlined during the SEEBRIG capabilities analysis. The same amount in SEEBRIG budgetary allocations, the slowness in finding solution to identified problems after 2006 mission in Afghanistan show a limited commitment for improvement or development of SEEBRIG PSO capabilities. A perfect example is the CIS improvement program that even financed by US Government for the last decade is still pending its completion. The solutions like the elimination of shortfalls or deficiencies under the precondition of early warning for a future mission are palliative. The provision of adequate time to prepare is a critical factor for operational success (in terms of preparative actions) but strategically talking it could not replace the insufficient commitment, or the absence of involvement of SEEBRIG nations for a realistic solution to existing problems. Consequently, several question might arise, are SEEBRIG member nations ready to commit more financial resources for a second mission? Is the political will at the same level and in line with the military side? Moreover, are the SEEBRIG forces ready to perform again? Are they trained at home

according to NATO standards and at the appropriate level to perform in good conditions? Is it the time to develop a new concept and change the destination from PSO to DRO? There are many things to be answer maybe at some point in a further research. Therefore, nations should initiate and propose actions to be taken to improve SEEBRIG efficiency by using all the potential from the available resources.

Nevertheless, “in sending their military units to SEEBRIG, where they work together, get to know each other better, and collectively promote common aims, the MPFSEE has succeeded in creating a sense of community among the member nations.”\textsuperscript{123} Moreover, “if the MPFSEE remains incapable of fulfilling its original mandate, it can at least create a new sense of direction in handling other important regional issues.”\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{123}Bourantonis and Tsakonas, 80.

\textsuperscript{124}Ibid.
APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATION OF SEEBRIG

* From one company to regiment.

APPENDIX B

TROOP CONTRIBUTIONS BY PARTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NR.</th>
<th>NATION</th>
<th>BDE HQ</th>
<th>SIGNAL COY</th>
<th>MANEUVER UNITS</th>
<th>COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS</th>
<th>COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BATTALION</th>
<th>ETF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX C

STRUCTURE OF HQ SEEBRIG (CONTINGENCY ESTABLISHMENT)

APPENDIX D

STRUCTURE OF HQ SEEBRIG (NUCLEUS STAFF)

APPENDIX E

FY 2010 NATIONS CONTRIBUTION TO SEEBRIG BUDGET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATION CODE</th>
<th>FLAG</th>
<th>No of Slots</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE (ROUNDED)</th>
<th>TOTAL SHARE 2010</th>
<th>1st CASH CALL 50%</th>
<th>2nd CASH CALL 50%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>🇦🇹</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.16%</td>
<td>44,603</td>
<td>22,301</td>
<td>22,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>🇲🇰</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.53%</td>
<td>35,682</td>
<td>17,841</td>
<td>17,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>🇪🇹</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18.42%</td>
<td>62,444</td>
<td>31,221</td>
<td>31,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>🇮🇹</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.53%</td>
<td>35,682</td>
<td>17,841</td>
<td>17,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>🇲🇩</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
<td>8,921</td>
<td>4,460</td>
<td>4,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>🇪🇪</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18.42%</td>
<td>62,444</td>
<td>31,221</td>
<td>31,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>🇹🇷</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26.32%</td>
<td>89,205</td>
<td>44,602</td>
<td>44,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>338,980</td>
<td>169,490</td>
<td>169,490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


Online Publications


Online Periodicals


73
Government Documents


**Other Online Sources**


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Mr. Mark R. Wilcox
DJIMO
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. Edward D. Jennings
DTAC
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Dr. Dennis L. Dolan
DTAC
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301