

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC) AS A RELEVANT ELEMENT OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN TODAY'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

BY

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**CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)
AS A RELEVANT ELEMENT OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES
IN TODAY'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

by

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ABSTRACT

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In contemporary warfare, civil-military cooperation and interaction become a relevant area of activity for strategic military leaders and combatant commanders. Experiences from the most recent stabilization operations in Iraq and Afghanistan show how significant it is for military leaders and commanders to engage and unify all instruments of national and coalition power. This pertains to not only military but also civil capacities to achieve the desired political-military aims.

This project will explore the relations between NATO and U.S. military doctrines, and the demanding challenges for military commanders to coordinate civil-military activities and operations using civil-military (civil affairs) experts and other operational and tactical civil-military assets.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC) AS A RELEVANT ELEMENT OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN TODAY'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

...Developing a relationship on the battlefield in the midst of a crisis with someone I have never met before can be very challenging...Trust has to be built up over time...

--Admiral Mike Mullen¹

Civil-military cooperation during war and other forms of military operations is not a new phenomenon in the theory of warfare, but in the last decade it has become more relevant to the overall effectiveness of military operations and military collaboration with civil actors has also become crucial for Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) in order to achieve strategic military objectives and successfully accomplish the mission. This rising civil-military interaction activities have been met mainly with new forms of warfare, especially during the war on terror, counter insurgency (COIN) and stability operations as well as conducting different crisis response operations (CROs).

The most recent wars in Kosovo (1999), in Iraq (2003) and the present Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan are the best examples of how civil-military cooperation has shaped the joint operational environment (JOE) and engaged combatant commanders (CCDRs) in non-combat activities, and also show how crucial this is for obtaining the desired political-military end-states and mission accomplishment.

Because the military activities have always been replete with civil agencies and entities as well as international and non-governmental organizations, the CCDR has to develop the ability to put together and achieve unity of effort of all civil and military instruments of national power: "Diplomatic," "Information," "Military" and "Economic"

(DIME) ² despite the perceptual differences between civilians and military. To challenge this, the CDR needs to establish an effective, adaptive and flexible civil-military cooperation system consisting of civil and military assets and procedures to synchronize all civil and military activities in the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) operational environment.

Studying this new civil-military domain and the growing role of this activity in the operational environment, some strategic thinkers assume “civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and civil-military operations (CMO) as a strategy that it is desired to achieve some (political-military) goals”,³ and further confirmed a need to develop this trend in U.S. and NATO forces.

This paper reviews U.S. and NATO doctrinal and operational approaches to CIMIC and CMO and presents the growing relevance of civil-military cooperation as an effect of the lessons learned from the latest military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also describes how CIMIC and CMO need to be developed in U.S. and NATO forces to better meet the operational requirements in the coalition environment.

I. Background

The challenge for military operating in the civil environment,⁴ necessitating means other than military only to achieve military strategic objectives was already appreciated by President Kennedy during the Vietnam War. In his 1961 speech addressing the graduating class of the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, the President stated that the military should serve not only as commanders, but also as advisers to foreign governments. He also stressed that the military must understand not only their own country but other countries and must know not only strategy and tactics

and logistics, but also economics, politics, diplomacy and history in order to understand the limits of military power.⁵

Everything President Kennedy said about the cooperation between military and civil actors during military operations has been confirmed to be more evident and has begun to be appreciated by the U.S. and Polish Armies as well as other NATO countries attending military missions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, for U.S. strategic military leaders and combatant commanders, the key issue is to establish and maintain cooperation and coordination with all instruments of national power, to reach strategic objectives. Some military observers argue that "...The U.S. government has consistently failed to apply the full weight of its instruments of power in irregular warfare conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, largely due to an inability or unwillingness of various agencies to agree upon the ends, ways, and means needed to prosecute those wars successfully. When coupled with organizational structures that make disjointed vision and effort the norm rather than the exception, this strategic interagency failing has had dire consequences for U.S. national security."⁶

When military activities in the 21st century shifted from high intensive warfare to stability operations and the U.S. and Coalition armed forces were subsequently tasked mainly with counterinsurgency, stabilization, democratization and economical development, the civil instruments of national power became as important as military means. The new form of warfare is characterized by a growing number of civil players involved in the conflict resolution and post conflict stabilization process. Moreover, we also see the growing U.S. and NATO/EU forces in different crisis' response operations (CRO's). Despite the military forces playing a vital role to protect the people,

infrastructure and mitigate human suffering, the civil agencies and governmental and non-governmental organizations become sufficient role players in the whole operation.

Conducting the most recent stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and mitigating effects of the earthquake in Pakistan and in Haiti, the military has had to work shoulder-to-shoulder with all civil partners to succeed in the mission. Also, in the past, NATO and EU forces in the Balkans and Africa had to cooperate very closely with civil actors to protect the local population and stabilize the situation in European and North-Central African's region and achieve the political-military objectives.

These operations show how winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population for military forces can become more relevant than obtaining territory and/or political, economic, and social concessions. Therefore policy-makers, military practitioners, and civil organization members see a growing impact of civil-military cooperation on theater strategy and have started to perceive it as an imperative means to achieve political and strategic military objectives that bring long term peace and regional stability.

II. Problems

The most recent military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan conducted by U.S. and NATO forces indicated some discrepancy between military and civil players in an approach to the civil military relationship. Some civil agencies and governmental organization officials have stated they can do their business separately from the military using their means and ways. Sometimes, they are not enthusiastic to cooperate with the military and to coordinate their activities with the CCDR even in a hostile operational environment. Moreover, if the military and civil centers of gravity as well as strategic

objectives did not exactly overlap and the mission directions are vectored differently, the collaboration with them becomes more difficult to institute.

To facilitate civil-military cooperation and establish a good relationship with civil actors in the Iraq and Afghanistan theater, combatant commanders created some functional civil-military assets, such as Governorate Support Teams (GSTs), Provisional Liaison and Support Teams (PSLTs), Civil Military Operations Center (CMOCs), Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACC), and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which were neither structural nor functional CIMIC or civil affairs (CA) elements. These assets are designed to support commanders, provide the civil situation assessment and advice for the commanders as well as support interim governments and local civil authorities in reconstructions effort. Neither do the U.S. and NATO doctrines describe how those elements should be formed and what would be the main mission and tasks for these new assets in order to fulfill the doctrinal gap and develop additional capabilities depending on the civil situation changes.

As a result, the U.S. Army and NATO forces have set a new formula for civil-military cooperation for the new U.S. and NATO doctrines. Additionally, after Iraq, they updated and changed the CIMIC or CMO procedures and doctrine with the publication of new manuals in order to standardize them to the coalition environment.⁷ But, despite the implementation of lessons learned from the Iraqi mission, there are still differences in the new U.S. and NATO doctrines concerning definitions and terminology connected with civil-military cooperation, collaboration and interaction as well as discrepancy to the comprehensive approach to civil-military activities during coalition military operations.

The unity of the civil and military efforts is crucial for military effectiveness and mission accomplishment; therefore the combatant commander should have flexible and adaptable civil-military assets and applicable procedures to allow him to create universal civil-military cooperation system depending on the civil-military tasks.

It is evident that the solution to change the situation must be implemented by NATO and U.S. strategic thinkers and practitioners working together in the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) which collect a number of incentives that are offered by the United States and NATO member countries. The options are: 1) Based on the new comprehensive approach to civil-military cooperation review the U.S. and NATO doctrines, find common understanding, terminology and definitions of civil-military cooperation, civil-military operation, civil affairs and implement them to new NATO doctrine, that will be valid for U.S and NATO forces operating in the coalition environment. 2) Using the lessons learned from Afghanistan confirming optimal civil military assets from strategic, thru operational to tactical level needed to meet all civil-military requirements in VUCA operational environment.

III. Possible Changes in the Doctrinal and Structural Approach to CIMIC and CMO

Despite that U.S. and NATO forces have identified a great number of lessons learned from Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan concerning the comprehensive approach to civil-military activities and implemented them into new doctrines, there still exists differences in new U.S. and NATO doctrines and desired command and force structures referred to civil-military operations.

A. Doctrinal Approach to CIMIC and CMO

NATO officials and U.S. military leaders noticed the need to formalize the new ideas concerning a comprehensive approach to civil-military cooperation during stability and peace keeping operations. They initiated the implementation of a new CMO doctrine in the U.S. Army and new CIMIC doctrine in NATO as well as a new education and training process for military commanders and military personnel responsible for civil-military cooperation. As a result, we have improved our knowledge and ability to synchronize civil-military activities and cooperation with all strategic civil players in the comprehensive approach framework. Simultaneously, strategic thinkers and practitioners (together with interagency leaders) have started to establish new formula for civil military cooperation and published them into directive documents.

The U.S. Doctrinal Approach to CMO. The updated new U.S. Joint Publications and Manuals started to standardize civil-military cooperation and interaction on the strategic and operational level with NATO procedures, and guide the commanders and military personnel on how to plan, organize and coordinate the CIMIC and CMO activities to achieve unity of effort.

Recent NATO and U.S. doctrines and publications have developed a comprehensive approach to civil-military cooperation and improved common understanding of civil-military operations, conducted in the international environment. The present definitions of civil affairs and civil-military cooperation are related to civil-military interaction from the strategic, operational down to tactical level. Simultaneously, the U.S. command authorities issued other operational doctrines and new procedures

related to CMO and started to build civil affairs structures and civil-military cooperation capabilities.

The U.S. Joint Publication JP 3-57 provides joint doctrine for the planning and conducting of civil-military operations (CMO) by joint forces, the use of civil affairs forces, the conduct of civil affairs operations, and the coordination with other capabilities contributing to the execution of CMO to achieve unified action.⁸ The doctrine defines the CMO as "...the activities of a commander that establish collaborative relationships among military forces, governmental and non-governmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations that are nested in support of the overall U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government."

The doctrine emphasizes that civil-military operations are an inherent responsibility of command and facilitate accomplishment of the commander's mission. The U.S. Joint publication JP 3-57 amplifies the use of CMO as a primary military instrument to synchronize military and non-military instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with "asymmetric" and "irregular" threats in the 21st century. It provides an in-depth discussion of the relationship between CMO and the interagency, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector.⁹ According to JP 3-57, joint force commanders (JFCs) integrate civil affairs (CA) forces with other military forces (maneuver, health service, military police [MP]/security forces, engineering, transportation, and special operations forces

[SOF]), security forces (e.g., national, border, and local police), other government agencies (OGAs), indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), host nations (HNs), foreign nations (FNs), and the private sector to provide the capabilities needed for successful civil-military operations. Effective CMO require extensive liaison and coordination between U.S., multinational, and indigenous security forces and engaged OGAs as well as NGOs, IGOs, IPIs, or the private sector. At the strategic level, the CMO focus is on larger and long-term global or regional issues such as reconstruction, economic development, and stability.¹⁰

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive JP 3-57, the commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command, to achieve interoperability should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with U.S. law, regulations, and doctrine.¹¹

NATO Doctrinal Approach to CIMIC. NATO developed (in 2009-2010) a new Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine (Allied Joint Publication AJP-9) and endorsed the creation of specialized staff to be responsible for civil–military cooperation¹². The NATO Civil-Military Cooperation doctrine covers both the CIMIC policy and NATO doctrine.

According to the NATO approach the overall purpose of CIMIC is to create and sustain conditions that will contribute to the achievement of objectives within the overall mission and to the implementation of a successful military exit strategy. AJP-9 defines

the position of CIMIC within NATO's operations with regard to the context and nature of modern war operations.¹³ NATO doctrine defines Civil-Military Cooperation as "...the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies."¹⁴

In the NATO comprehensive approach¹⁵, CIMIC is describes as the link to the civil environment and the military facilitator. This enables the military to reach the desired end state by coordinating, synchronizing and de-conflicting military activities with civil actors, thus linking military operations with the civil sector.¹⁶ The principles of the CIMIC's implementation include its introduction into the Joint Operating Environment where the NATO forces and the CIMIC activities can be implemented through the preoperational, operational, or a transitional phase. The publication deals also with the civil organizations that are critical to mission success and is one of the main strongholds of a CIMIC.¹⁷

Should we compare the U.S. and NATO doctrinal approaches to civil-military activities during the military operation, we can notice that CIMIC in the NATO's doctrine refers to the overall operational military activities to follow the military strategy, while the new U.S. approach to the CMO is much broader and sees it as a part of its overall national strategy. However, both doctrines point out that it is through unity of effort that the Combatant Commander, coordinating all activities of military units with multiple civilian agencies and organizations can successfully achieve the strategic military objectives. Therefore the CCDR has to organize the CMO system from the strategic (theater), to the operational and tactical levels.¹⁸ Despite the new U.S. and NATO

doctrines that define CMO and CIMIC similarly, it is a commander's responsibility to establish a cooperative and collaborative relationship with civil actors in order to facilitate and support the military mission. Both doctrines use different terminology, even to refer to the same civil-military activities that confuse military personnel and civilian partners and need additional explanation or some changes in the doctrinal terminology to better understand international partners during coalition operations.¹⁹

B. Civil-Military Structure

To effectively conduct civil-military cooperation, the civil and military leaders from U.S. and NATO countries have created civil-military assets, as a group of well-educated, trained and professionally-prepared civil experts and functional specialists to establish close relationships with civil actors and facilitate mutual collaboration between them and the military on the strategic, operational and tactical level. The civil-military elements can be designed as separate or integral parts of the military structure, depending upon desired tasks and the designated organizational level.

United States Civil-Military Assets. In the United States Army civil affairs assets have been established from the strategic (DoD) level to the operational and tactical level. An organizational system is desired to link all CA elements thru all the levels.

On the U.S. strategic level civil-military cooperation is planned and conducted by the following elements: Political Military /PPA's Policy and Planning Team (PPT) engages the Department of Defense (DoD) on global political-military policy issues and coordinates strategic planning between the Departments of State and Defense.

The Country Team as a central element of interagency coordination and execution in a foreign country²⁰.

The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) which is a full-time, multifunctional advisory element of the combatant commander's staff that facilitates information sharing throughout the interagency community. Through habitual collaboration, it provides a means to integrate campaign planning efforts at the strategic and operational levels and throughout all U.S. government agencies. JIACG bridges the gap between civilian and military campaign planning efforts for potential crises.²¹ According to the operational concept, a JIACG is composed of military and civilian experts from various governmental agencies that have information, resources, and authorities as specified by U.S. law. These experts have particular knowledge of the unique capabilities and methodologies in their agencies which could be very useful for military planners. This allows the planners to appropriately assign tasks to military and other government agencies designed to participate in the mission. Moreover, the members of the JIACG effectively leverage and integrate other government agencies' capabilities into DoD and Combatant Command level efforts.²²

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), as new U.S. civil-military elements have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan for reconstruction and economical development during military operations. According to CMO doctrine (JP 3-57) a PRT helps stabilize the operational environment in a province or locality through its combined diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) capabilities. Focus on mutual military and civil efforts, PRT combines representatives from interagency and international partners into a cohesive unit capable of independently conducting operations to stabilize the

environment by enhancing the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the HN government.²³ The officials from the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense state that the creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been perhaps the most important of new initiatives which bring together civilian and military personnel to undertake the insurgency-relevant developmental work that has been essential to success in both Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the operational needs the PRTs' composition has changed and adopted to better meet mission requirements.²⁴

The operational level U.S. assets that facilitate the conducting of civil-military operations are as follows: "Civil Affairs Command conducts integrated, effects-based, full-spectrum Civil Affairs operations in joint, interagency and multinational environments in support of the Global War on Terror."²⁵

To enhance the commanders' civil-military capabilities on the operational and tactical level the U.S. Army has Civil Affairs units, increasingly recognized as important tools that not only garner local support for U.S. and host nation policies but also develop capability and institutions, and help deter terrorist recruitment. Additionally, Civil Affairs personnel serve as commanders' cultural advisors and regional experts as well as the Army's experts in negotiation, reconstruction, and civil reconnaissance.²⁶ Obviously, CA soldiers and civil experts are included in all phases of operation from planning to transition and are capable of performing CMO in support of the military mission. The Active Army CA battalion rapidly deploys as the initial-entry CA force with Civil Affairs Planning Teams (CAPTs), Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs), CA companies, and Civil Affairs teams (CATs).²⁷

The current CA structure does not properly align with the rapidly expanding and maturing needs of the CA total force. While it is tempting to continue to examine the problem of a CA proponentry from the Reserve component versus Active component perspective, the continuing demands placed on the CA branch compel us to embrace a new support paradigm.²⁸

Operating in a coalition environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. CA forces worked very closely with their NATO CIMIC counterparts and have developed interoperability in order to achieve unity of effort.

NATO Civil-Military Assets. To meet the growing civil-military cooperation needs, NATO has decided to form deployable, unified multinational CIMIC units. As strategic-operational CIMIC asset NATO has established a Multinational Civil-Military Cooperation Group (MCIMICG)²⁹ that is fully prepared to acts as a bridge between Alliance forces and civil agencies on the theater level. This Multinational CIMIC Group is structured to be able to provide the CIMIC HQ to support NATO Command at the strategic-operational level and is a framework to attach designated CIMIC units from member countries, which can be deployed in support of combat forces from combat brigades up to army corps' level. NATO countries have agreed to build CIMIC capabilities and contribute CIMIC units (groups, teams) including a pool of civil and military functional specialists, as CIMIC Deployable Modules to support the coordination and integration of any kind of CIMIC effort as well as providing consultancy and professional expertise to the Combatant Commander (Joint Force Commander). They will also serve as a bridge between Alliance forces and the civil agencies, institutions,

governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as the indigenous population.

In peace time during everyday activities, the Multinational CIMIC Group provides a center for training, education and permanent expertise and consultancy in the matter of civil-military cooperation. Additionally, it organizes multilateral meetings and consultations to be in permanent contact with the main international organizations, national and foreign non-governmental organizations.³⁰

Each of the NATO members develops civil-military capabilities and creates tactical CIMIC support teams comparable to CA teams with similar tasks to support the Division and Brigade commanders in cooperation and collaboration with civil partners on the tactical level according to the CIMIC directive from higher command echelon.

Lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan inspired NATO to build the pool of civil experts from different countries with the primary task to support the chain of command in carrying out CIMIC expertise for operational planning and as military advisors during the operation execution and post conflict reconstruction phase.

They are likely to contain or be able to call upon expertise in the following areas:

(1) Civil Administration; (2) Civil Infrastructure; (3) Humanitarian Aid; (4) Economy and Commerce; (5) Cultural Affairs.

All the U.S. and NATO civil-military assets create the civil-military system that link military needs and objectives with civil assets and activities conducted in the common joint operating environment. The operational effectiveness of the CIMIC/CA system depends on the relationship between all CIMIC and CA elements as well as how the commanders will use and manage the forces. Because a good relationship between

military and civil elements is crucial for mission success the CIMIC and CA elements should be planned to establish and maintain relationship with key civil actors before the operation begins, during the planning process and force deployment phase to create the conditions for future effective collaboration.

C. Case Studies on CMO/CIMIC

Iraq. At the beginning of the stability operation in Iraq we noticed a failure of the U.S. military and Coalition Provisional Authorities (CPA) to stabilize Iraq after invasion because of the lack of an overarching civil-military strategy. This undermined the overall effectiveness of the political, military and economical effort of the U.S. and coalition military forces. To bridge the gap, the coalition forces started to organize ad hoc civil-military cooperation without a previous plan and a clear picture of how to integrate all civil and military instruments together and effectively coordinate all civil activities in theater. Without a previous plan for reconstruction and stability operations CA/CIMIC elements at the operational and tactical level started civil-military operations according to U.S. and NATO doctrines, and also determined doctrinal priorities for post conflict operations.

At the strategic level, the newly formed CPA with Ambassador Paul Bremer, as head of the organization got full authority from the President “to bring all the resources of the American government to bear on Iraq reconstruction”³¹ and be in charge of all U.S. government personnel, activities and funds (all instruments of national power) in Iraq”.³² However, the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) assigned earlier in the theater formally had still reported directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon behind the CPA leadership.

Both organization's (CPA and ORHA) leaders also separately cooperated with civil leaders behind the CCDR and sought to influence military activities for diplomatic aims and change military rules of engagement (RoE) to better meet civil agencies' needs.³³ These civil-military relationships confused the U.S combatant commanders and other coalition commanders who were ordered to participate in the rebuilding process with CPA and form new elements called Governorate Support Teams at the tactical level, as civil-military assets designated to support and collaborate with CPA representatives located in the U.S. Embassy Offices. There was a lack of any interagency coordination group at the strategic level which could match all these organizations together for common planning, organizing and execution of the civil-military reconstruction effort. The Combatant Commander (CENTCOM) was not authorized to supervise the civil agencies assigned to the operation³⁴ to better cooperation and coordinate all activities in the joint operating area. Also a lack of political- military guidance for stability and reconstruction operation as well as civil-military cooperation doctrine resulted in poor coordination and cooperation between CPA and military commanders. The coalition commanders applied kinetic counter insurgency operations and without any coordination with the U.S. civil agencies, appointed mayors and governors in some Iraqi provinces to establish military "points of contact" in the local population. As senior CPA official, Hume Horan, observed "many of the commanders made these decisions without considering the political consequences".³⁵

When political and military strategic leaders appreciated the growing impact of civil-military cooperation on the overall Iraqi stability strategy, President Bush stressed the improved coordination between military and civilian leaders to focus activity for

winning “the hearts and minds” of the Iraqi population and put together all civil and military effort.

After a few months, the U.S. and coalition forces started to enhance the civil-military cooperation in Iraq to set interagency coordination cells at the strategic and operation level and CMO teams at the tactical level, manned by professional civil and military personnel to garner the expertise of the local leaders and the PRTs to accomplish the mission.³⁶

Operation Iraqi Freedom is the best example for military and civilian leaders of how vital is mutual cooperation and synchronization of all civil and military endeavors. This demonstrated the best test for the military on how to meet the tasks and to find common ground with interagency partners, non-governmental, international organizations, and other civil actors, in order to achieve the unity of effort to achieve military objectives and accomplish the mission.

Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, a NATO-led security mission (ISAF) makes a significant contribution to the U.S. effort to defeat Al-Qaida and stabilize the civil-military situation in the Afghan – Pakistan (AFPAK) region. The United States and other Allies have increased their footprint in Afghanistan, strengthening military presence and improving security. They have also expanded civil and military efforts to create conditions for long-term stability, reconstruction and regional security.

NATO, while conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, with U.S. forces, had realized the need for a new “comprehensive” approach to civil-military activities, and has recently developed a series of initiatives aimed at increasing its effectiveness in stabilization operations in Afghanistan. These operations show that the

NATO combatant commander and his staff are challenged with the task to cooperate with large number of civilian actors from strategic, operational down to the tactical level, as well. The ISAF command and control (C2) structure initially was not fully prepared to meet the needs and started to develop the civil-military system and fix the gap to effectively conduct CMO as a an integral part of full spectrum operations, in which civil actors engagement became crucial to achieve military objectives.

Lessons learned from Afghanistan continue to be a principal basis for the development of the civil-military approach and capacity at the strategic level. NATO and non-NATO actors have created common understandings of a comprehensive approach to the civil-military cooperation and have found a new formula to develop the alliance's own civil-military capabilities, as NATO member's contribution to the Alliance operation.

NATO leadership decided to apply new CIMIC initiatives called the "comprehensive approach" to enhance the level of cooperation among all participating nations to better meet the CMO requirements. The Combatant Commander has benefitted from the new NATO initiative with the result of rising effectiveness of coalition civil-military assets conducted cooperation and collaboration with all civil domestic and international actors involved in rebuilding and stabilization process to create conditions for beginning "transition" to Afghan security control .

IV. Lessons Learned

The military lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan show the difficulty for U.S. and NATO forces in conducting stability operations that require the military to better understand the cultural, religious, political and historical context in the theater. To achieve success the military has to cooperate with the local population,

provide them security with the purpose of denying the enemy's abilities to influence and survive among the people. But this can be achieved only by political legitimacy, respect and support of the people and through permanent contact with them.

The United States and NATO partners have fortunately learned a great deal about the nature and character of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan and how to operate in the civil environment to "win the hearts and minds" of the local population and find the best way to persuade the people for peace and security as a condition for economic development and future long term stability.

Some of the most important lessons are as follows:

(1) Unity of planning and execution between military and civilian leaders is essential.

There was clearly a struggle to find common ground for military commanders at Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and Multinational Corps Iraq (MNC-I) with Coalition Provisional Authorities (CPA) leaders (civilian commands) at the central (Baghdad) and regional (provincial) levels with the Multinational Division (MND) and Multinational Brigade (MNB). Most of the interagency focus has been between DOD and USAID in Washington and there was not any official inconsistency between the MND Commander and CPA leaders. It was really difficult to figure out who was responsible for what in the operation area. The lack of synchronization among military and civilian arms of the U.S. Government emerged at the beginning of post-invasion Phase IV operations in the spring of 2003. For example, some decisions made by Paul Brenner, the Coalition Provisional Authority administrator surprised the military commanders.³⁷ This shows that during the planning process for the transition phase, the civil and military leaders at the

strategic, operational and tactical level have to work together, exchange information, and find common ground for cooperation to achieve unity of effort.

(2) Military leaders and combatant commanders must be historically and culturally aware of the region and accept and respect the cultural diversity and history of the country in which they operate. Combatant commanders met some tensions which had strategic implications because of cultural misunderstanding and lack of respectful attitude for tribal norms and behavior.

(3) Military forces in the transition phase have to balance between kinetic activities and civil support operations to achieve the designed strategic end state. The transition period is the stage between conflict and reconstruction requiring its own approach. There is an apparent lack of consensus on what constitutes the elements of this transition stage.³⁸

(4) There is a lack of civil-military functional specialists and political advisors to support the commanders and help to cooperate with local authorities and civil organizations during the rebuilding process. The civil experts and advisors are vital to provide for CCDR the professional expertise and situational awareness about the civil environment and critical public services that shape the joint operating environment and influence military operation.

(5) Diversity in U.S. and NATO civil-military procedures and assets dedicated for conducting civil-military activities, made the civil-military system complicated and not efficient enough to operate in the VUCA environment. United States forces were structured with Civil Affairs Teams while other coalition forces had Civil-Military Groups or Teams, Governorate Support teams (GST), Provincial Support and Liaison Teams

(PSLT). When coalition partners conducted their activity according to NATO procedures, as described in the Allied Joint Publications (AJP), the U.S. forces were standardized according to the U.S. Joint Publications.

All the experiences from the latest military operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan show that the close cooperation between civil actors and military leaders is a relevant part of operational activity and critical in stability and peace keeping operations to achieve military objectives and ultimately the political-military end state.

The new NATO comprehensive approach for interagency collaboration that has recently been initiated also changes the combatant commander's perception toward military activities in strategic theater. United States and NATO military leaders have appreciated that non-kinetic military operation become as important as the kinetic activity and integration of all civil and military instruments of national power ultimately bring political-military success.

V. Recommendation

1. Civil – military cooperation is about effectiveness and should be perceived as a system that consists of functional elements as CA /CIMIC assets linked with CMO/CIMIC doctrines and procedures. As a holistic system it should be organized from the top (theater/strategic level) down to the tactical level and linked horizontally with other CA/CIMIC elements as well as appropriate civil partners in the joint operation environment.
2. All CA/CMO assets have to be professionally prepared to operate in the VUCA environment as the CCDR's tools for establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting

relations between military forces, governmental and non-governmental organizations and civil authorities as well as local populations in a friendly, neutral, or hostile JOE.

3. I agree with the idea that for integrating policy among military and non-military agencies on the strategic level the CA/CIMIC system should be leveraged by Joint Interagency Command (JIACOM), as a NATO or U.S. permanent existing structure or organization, forming with competencies and authority to connect all civil government agencies below department (ministry) level.³⁹ It could be led by a highly credentialed civilian, potentially with high military rank (general) as deputy or possibly by both a military and civilian, if by mutual agreement.

4. Since the majority of operations have been conducted with coalition forces, there is a need to enhance mutual knowledge of about CA/CIMIC and CMO among not only NATO but also non-NATO countries participating in coalition operations to improve cooperation and collaboration within the coalition environment and encourage NATO and U.S. strategists to unify the CMO/CIMIC doctrine and cement cooperation between coalition forces and U.S. civil agencies and international governmental and non-governmental organizations.

VI. Conclusion

Meeting today's security requirements depends upon involvement of a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments and close cooperation and coordination among a variety of civil and military players. It requires a comprehensive approach by international military forces as well as all civil actors in the JOE. Military and civilian personnel need to cooperate together to plan and operate in harmonizing ways to support on another and others for common objectives related to security and stability in

the conflicted region. Therefore, it is crucial for U.S. and NATO partners to use the same comprehensive approach, similar methodology, terminology and procedures described in allied directives documents (doctrines) to build interoperability to facilitate the effective using of civil-military assets for strategic, operational and tactical needs.

The development and implementation of NATO and U.S. contributions to the common universal civil-military doctrine will be a long-term effort. The Alliance intends to improve its ability to work and coordinate more closely with all its partners and other international actors incorporated in the civil-military operation system and achieve lasting mutual understanding, trust, confidence and respect for combatant commanders and strategic, operational and tactical military leadership.

Examining the U.S. CMO system with comparison to CIMIC in NATO, conducted by the junior coalition partners it is easy to notice some differences in terminology and holistic methodology concerning civil-military relations and some discrepancies in doctrinal approach to civil-military cooperation and collaboration during high intensive warfare and crises response operations.

But my research also presented and proved huge progress in the last decade in civil-military activities to build better relationships between civil actors and U.S. /NATO partners in Afghanistan, which helps to achieve unity of effort for security, stability, transition and reconstruction to ultimately achieve the desired political-military end state.

This thesis is confirmed by General Petraeus who stated at the during the Security Conference in Munich, Germany when he reminded everyone of the requirements of large civilian contributions, greater unity of effort between civilian and

military elements and with Afghan partners, and a comprehensive approach, as well as sustained commitment .⁴⁰ Later on, at the beginning of his command in Afghanistan, he suggested to enhance the unity of effort and underlined the importance of civilian-military cooperation, saying: "In this important endeavor, cooperation is not optional."⁴¹

Endnotes

¹ Admiral James G. Stavridis, U.S. Navy, and Colonel Bart Howard, U.S. Army, "Strengthening the Bridge: Building Partnership Capacity", *Military Review*, Volume 90, Issue 1, Jan/Feb 2010.

² *Instruments of national power* - all of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. (Joint Publication JP-1, p.I-1).

³ Christopher Ankersen, *Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations*, (Routledge, London and New York, 2008), p.240.

⁴ *The civil environment* - involves a myriad of ethnic, religious, ideological and capability drivers, which require sustainable solutions in societies ravaged by conflicts, disasters or humanitarian catastrophes. (NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine AJP-9), <http://www.cimiccoe.org/content/scope/doctrinal.php#introduction>, (accessed 30 September 2010).

⁵ *Remarks at Annapolis to the Graduating Class of the United States Naval Academy- June 7, 1961*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8181>, (accessed 20 October 2010).

⁶ Colonel Lewis G. Irwin, *Filling irregular Warfare's interagency Gaps*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 2009), p.1.

⁷ The new Joint Publications are as follows: the U.S. Doctrines - JP 1; JP 3-57; JP 5 and Field Manuals (FM 3-05.40, FM 5-0) and the NATO Doctrines - Allied Joint Publications AJP-1, AJP-3, AJP-5, and AJP-9.

⁸ Joint Publication JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, 8 July 2008, p.i.

⁹ *Ibid*, p.iii.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p.ix.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p.ii.

¹² Public Affairs Office at SHAPE, *Multinational Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Group HQ is officially established*, linked from SHAPE Home Page at "SHAPE News", May 5, 2009, <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2009/05/090505a.html>, (accessed December 05, 2010).

¹³ Civil-Military Co-operation Centre of Excellence, *CIMIC Field Handbook*, p.6, <http://www.cimic-coe.org/download/cfh/CIMIC-Handbook.pdf>, (accessed 28 October 2010).

¹⁴ AJP-9 (A), Chapter 2, 2009, p.2-1, http://www.cimic-coe.org/content/info/news_article.php?item=6 (accessed 15 November 2010).

¹⁵ Allied Joint Doctrine One (AJP-01) outlines the NATO strategy for establishing peaceful and secure environments across a wide spectrum of threats and challenges, ranging from armed conflict to humanitarian emergency, which could affect Euro-Atlantic stability. Modern conflict solutions demand for much more than just the defeat of the military opponent. NATO has identified a comprehensive approach as the most appropriate answer to these threats and challenges. Such strategic analysis creates the need for operational guidelines within this spectrum, AJP-9 (A), 2009, p.xi, http://www.cimic-coe.org/content/info/news_article.php?item=6 (accessed 15 November 2010).

¹⁶ AJP-9 (A), Introduction, 2009, http://www.cimic-coe.org/content/info/news_article.php?item=6 (accessed 15 November 2010).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid, p.ix.

¹⁹ Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with U.S. law, regulations, and doctrine. (JP 3-57, Preface, p.ii).

²⁰ "Government Counterinsurgency Guide", *Bureau of Political-Military Affairs*, Department of State, January 2009, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt/>, (accessed 28 November 2010).

²¹ "Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). A Prototyping Effort", *Fact Sheet 2010*, U.S. Joint Forces Command, p.1, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jiacgfactsheet.pdf>, (accessed 4 Dec 2010).

²² Lieutenant Colonel Terry R. Sopher, Jr., *Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGS), a temporary solution to a long term requirement*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 19 2005), p.4.

²³ Joint Publication JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 8 July 2008, p.II-31.

²⁴ "Government Counterinsurgency Guide" (Preface), *Bureau of Political-Military Affairs*, Department of State, January 2009, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt/>, (accessed 28 November 2010).

²⁵ "353d Civil Affairs Command Support to EUCOM 308th CA BDE and AFRICOM update", *briefing slides, 353d CACOM FY 08 Commanders Conference*, Motta di Livenza, Italy,

7 Feb 2007, Host for the Conference: CIMIC Group South (CGS), <http://popp.gmu.edu/Sands.pdf>, (accessed 2 December 2010).

²⁶ Captain Sean P. Walsh, U.S. Army, "Civil Affairs Proponency under a New Support Paradigm", *Military Review*, November-December 2010, p. 71. http://cdm15040.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p124201coll1&CISO_PTR=1112&CISOBOX=1&REC=9, (accessed 25 November 2010).

²⁷ FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 2008. 7-4.

²⁸ Captain Sean P. Walsh, U.S. Army, "Civil Affairs Proponency under a New Support Paradigm", *Military Review*, November-December 2010, p. 71.

²⁹ The Multinational Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Group is officially established on April 28th 2009, in Motta di Livenza, Italy. Military representatives of five NATO nations, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Romania and SHAPE signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishing the Civil-Military Cooperation Group. Announced in NATO News website, linked from SHAPE Home Page at "SHAPE News", May 5, 2009, <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2009/05/090505a.html>, (accessed December 05, 2010).

³⁰ Public Affairs Office at SHAPE, "Multinational Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Group HQ is officially established", linked from SHAPE Home Page at "SHAPE News", May 5, 2009, <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2009/05/090505a.html>, (accessed December 05, 2010).

³¹ Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III with Malcolm McConnell, *My year in Iraq, The struggle to build the future of hope*, Simon & Shuster, New York, 2006, p.11.

³² *Ibid*, p.12.

³³ *Ibid*, p.30-31.

³⁴ *Ibid*, p.24.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p.27.

³⁶ Colonel Fred Johnson, *Arrowhead Ripper: Adaptive Leadership in Full Spectrum Operations*, Carlisle Paper, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, p.7.

³⁷ Dr Donald P. Wright, Colonel Timonthy R. Reese, *On Point II, Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in operation Iraqi Freedom May 2003- January 2005*, (Fort Leavenworth Kansas, Combined Studies Institute Press, 2008), p.79-80.

³⁸ Alexander Woodcock, George Rose, and David Davis, "The Cornwallis group XI : analysis for civil-military transitions", Howard Roy Williams, *The transition from conflict to the Beginning of Reconstruction* (The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2007), p.33.

³⁹ J. Buchanan, M. Davis, and L. Wight, "Death of the Constant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach", *Joint Force Quarterly*, 1st Quarter 2009, p.92-96.

⁴⁰ General David Petraeus, *Remarks on the Future of the Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan*, <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/davidpetraeus45thmunichsecurityconference.htm>, (accessed 3 December 2010).

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