

GLOBAL RESERVE COOPERATION

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAMELA L. MCGAHA
United States Army National Guard

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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GLOBAL RESERVE COOPERATION

by

Lieutenant Colonel Pamela L. McGaha
United States Army National Guard

Colonel Michael McCrea
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

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During the past decade, the United States, its allies, and partner nations have greatly increased their reliance on Reserve Component forces. This global transformation provides a timely opportunity for the U.S. to join in building an international Reserve community that can collectively set and accomplish common security goals for the future. The U.S. National Guard is well positioned to lead this engagement effort due to its depth of transformation experience, unique domestic operations expertise, and long and respected history of international partnerships. This paper: (1) suggests a possible framework for further advancing the Reserve capabilities of partner nations in the Asia-Pacific region, and (2) discusses important change management concepts, informed by U.S. lessons learned, for countries that are modernizing strategic-based Reserve systems.

GLOBAL RESERVE COOPERATION

The world is constantly watching the United States, but the United States needs to watch the world.

—Henry Kissinger ¹

During the past decade, the complex global security environment has influenced the massive transformation of the United States Army Reserve Component forces in their roles and missions. Simultaneously, other allied and partner nations have also greatly increased their reliance on Reserve forces and experienced significant achievements. The United States has a vested interest in stronger, more capable foreign defense establishments of allied nations and other friends. As such, the U.S. should view the global Reserve transformation as an opportunity to expand international cooperation, foster imaginative ideas, and assist with optimizing the U.S. military presence around the world. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Honorable Dennis M. McCarthy, recently remarked:

The forward defense of the United States is best accomplished through the broad cooperation of partner nations. Strong partnerships that enable the COCOMs and our partner nations to enhance hemispheric stability and security are essential to mutually confront and defeat common security challenges. Focused regional security cooperation is crucial to building interoperability among partner nations before security challenges mature into direct threats. Coalitions and regional partnerships among willing nations deter aggression and extremism and provide the underlying conditions for success if military action is required.²

An enlarged and coordinated international Reserve community can, at a minimum, build cohesion and interoperability amongst member nations; but perhaps more importantly, it can collectively set and accomplish common security goals for the future. As the U.S. Department of Defense evaluates a full range of security

cooperation options, they can capitalize on the U.S. National Guard's (USNG) depth of transformation experience, unique domestic operations expertise, and long and respected history of international partnerships. The USNG can utilize its lessons learned to advise select countries in their Reserve transformations, nominate and support countries as regional Reserve leaders, and champion additional Reserve forums to promote other countries' abilities to share worldwide security responsibilities. Lastly, this new strategic-level engagement concept fits well for trial in the Asia-Pacific region, a area of great geopolitical importance, with the Australian Army Reserve (ARes) leading the collaborative outreach effort.

History of U.S. National Guard International Engagement

USNG security cooperation efforts have been enormously successful, to date, mainly through bilateral engagement with select international militaries around the globe. The core bilateral program is the State Partnership for Peace (SPP), an Army and Air National Guard exchange program, which has grown over 25 years to provide enduring links with 62 nations.³ The Army National Guard (ARNG) also has a long history of individual and small unit exchanges with the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, Italy, Norway, and France. Lastly, bilateral efforts newly include Agribusiness Development Teams (ADT), which focus on natural resource development in Afghanistan. Together, these key programs have built enduring relationships, with foreign military personnel and civilians alike, grounded in shared interests and mutual trust earned over the past two decades.

While ARNG bilateral programs are strong and successful, multilateral efforts have received much less emphasis. International Reserve information sharing occurs mainly amongst American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand (ABCA)

Forum members. Military exercise participation is substantial, with 25,000 ARNG Soldiers in 104 partner countries last year,⁴ but it is a collective venture between Active and Reserve Component forces and inherently difficult to measure only National Guard effectiveness. Therefore, to increase its multilateral contributions, the National Guard is investigating several potential Military Engagement Team (MET) pilot programs for implementation in Fiscal Year 2013 including regionally aligned brigades, Special Forces groups, and new specialized teams.⁵ These Security Assist and Advise Teams (SAATs), modeled on the successful ADT program, will orient regionally, rather than by country, and will specialize on National Guard core competencies such as Disaster Preparedness, Chemical/Biological Consequence Management, and Border/Port Security.⁶ While these potential new MET programs may considerably expand operational support to Geographic Combatant Commanders, this approach does not fully capitalize on the strategic-level contributions of the National Guard nor leverage the Reserve capabilities of partner nations.

The USNG, along with the Reserve elements of many allies and friends, have significantly grown in strength, capabilities, and importance during the past twenty years. Nations worldwide no longer consider Reserve organizations as only strategic assets for major wars. For instance, a recent study by the Strategic Studies Institute reports that “to ensure the ready availability of reserve units for homeland security and other priority missions, many countries – including Australia, China, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom – have developed high-readiness reserve components.”⁷ The study further concludes that “since the United States will continue to engage with these

military powers – in cooperation, conflict, or both – the U.S. defense community needs to keep abreast of these developments and differences.”⁸

Asia-Pacific Regional Importance

In particular, additional engagement in the Asia Pacific region is vital given the tremendous economic growth and strengthening of government institutions over the past several decades. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted the importance of Asia’s continued rise by remarking, “There is no question that, in the future, even more than in the past, the safety, security, and economic well-being of the US will be increasingly linked to Asia.”⁹ Moreover, strategic challenges including instability on the Korean peninsula, trade security concerns, and China’s rising regional influence cannot be solved by one country alone. As such, the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Commander lists “Strengthen and Advance Alliances and Partnerships”¹⁰ as the first focus area in the Theater Strategic Guidance. The USNG can assist this effort by supporting regional Reserve leaders, advising growth Reserves, and enhancing regional security architectures.

Asia-Pacific Reserve Engagement Framework


Due to the shifting balance of power in the region, many Asia-Pacific countries are building their Reserve organizations, with varying levels of sizes, spending levels, and capabilities (Table below).

Country	Armed Forces (000) *	Estimated Reservists (000) *	% Reserve of Total Armed Forces
Australia	55	20	27%
Bangladesh	157	0	0%
Brunei	7	1	13%
Cambodia	124	0	0%
Fiji	4	6	60%
India	1325	1155	47%
Indonesia	302	400	57%
Japan	230	42	15%
Korea, South	687	4500	87%
Laos	29	0	0%
Malaysia	109	52	32%
Maldives	0	0	0%
Mongolia	10	137	93%
Myanmar	406	0	0%
Nepal	96	0	0%
New Zealand	10	2	17%
Papua New Guinea	3	0	0%
Phillipines	120	131	52%
Singapore	73	313	81%
Sri Lanka	161	6	4%
Taiwan	290	1657	85%
Thailand	306	200	40%
Timor Leste	1	0	0%
Vietnam	455	5000	92%
* number represents thousands			

Asia-Pacific Active and Reserve Strength (2010)¹¹

The following discussion suggests how the USNG could further support the USPACOM Strategic Guidance and the concurrent efforts of allied nations and partners seeking to build regional capacity in a cost-effective manner. First, nations with the most established Reserves, either in size or capabilities, will be termed Leading Reserve for the purposes of this manuscript. Australia, India, and Singapore currently have the most established Reserves in the Asia-Pacific region. Nations with Reserves of growing importance are termed Partner Reserve. Japan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia have Reserves either growing in size or capabilities. Lastly, nations with limited or no Reserves are termed Emerging Reserve. Leading

Reserve countries (e.g. Australia) formally pair with Emerging Reserve countries to provide introductory advice on Reserve Component development and training in requested areas. The USNG assists this process by (1) providing Leading Reserve countries with exportable engagement packages such as the State Partnership for Peace, New Horizons exercise, and the Agribusiness Development Teams, and by (2) facilitating Senior Service College-level exchanges for Reserve officers between the U.S. and Leading Reserve countries. For Partner Reserve countries (e.g. Indonesia), the USNG provides senior advisors (Colonel and above), with strategic-level experience, to advise on more advanced Reserve Component issues. Determination of category and pairings should closely consider Reserve capabilities, defense treaties, cultural linkages, and national interests. The Figure below demonstrates this potential Asia-Pacific Reserve engagement concept.



Asia-Pacific Reserve Engagement Framework

Lastly, the USNG should integrate into Asia-Pacific security architectures that address the shared interests of multiple countries such as maintaining regional stability and countering organized crime, terrorism, and piracy. Potential entry points for

multilateral discussions on enhanced Reserve contributions are the (1) Shangri La Dialogue held annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, (2) ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM), and (3) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In the absence of inclusion in these formal multilateral security forums, the USNG can also liaise with ad hoc Asia-Pacific coalitions that are increasingly emerging to deal with traditional and non-traditional security threats. A recent multi-year study on regional security and conflict management noted:

Unlike traditional approaches to security management, such as collective defence or collective security, which involve formal obligations to undertake joint action in response to the actions of an aggressive state, today's cooperative ventures seem to involve improvised strategies of collective action, often in response to one or more of a wide array of diverse security challenges.¹²

As example of this innovative partnering, the Australian Reserves hosted an inaugural conference in 2010 entitled the Asia South-Pacific Region Reserves Capability Forum. Delegates included 38 participants from New Zealand, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan. Senior officers within this newly formed joint organization meet next in 2012 when Malaysia hosts the second conference.¹³ This event demonstrates that nations recognize the growing importance of Reserve contributions, and that nations, otherwise not prone to multilateral discussions, are willing to convene on Reserve opportunities. Cooperative forums such as this are naturally beginning to form, and the United States has a timely opportunity to effect the development, leadership, and goals of other such forums worldwide. USPACOM is a region of central importance that includes several strong Reserve nations, a robust Theater Security Cooperation program, and limited "critical failed

state” countries¹⁴ and, therefore, seems well suited to trial this new, creative international engagement concept.

Leading Reserve Nation: Australia

A country well positioned in the Asia Pacific region to lead this engagement initiative is the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Over the past seven years, the ADF has progressively transformed the missioning, structure, and resourcing of its part-time Army Reserve (ARes) forces to enhance Reserve contributions towards national security. ARes now augments Active forces across an expanded range of missions including domestic security and disaster response within Australia, as well as regional stability operations abroad in the Solomon Islands and East Timor. Much like the U.S. experience over the past two decades, the modernization of a mainly strategic-based Reserve brings enormous change across all institutional systems. Known complexities are difficult enough to synchronize across a large organization; but less obvious barriers, such as strong cultural biases, parochialism, and lack of consensus, can prove even more damaging to lasting organizational change. Thus, a formal change management plan, informed by lessons learned from the U.S. Reserve transformation experience, may prove helpful for ARes to avoid similar missteps and to accelerate its contributions towards national security.

An organization’s ultimate success or failure largely rests upon its leaders’ ability to anticipate the future operating environment and to shape the organization for continual adjustments. In 1987, General Donn A. Starry captured this enduring feature by reminding, “Change is constant, unceasing, and ever-accelerating. Change is inherently confusing, upsetting; change is dysfunctional.”¹⁵ Renowned Harvard professor John Kotter has studied hundreds of organizations in order to discover why

firms fail in change efforts. He concluded after decades of research “needed change can stall because of inwardly focused cultures, paralyzing bureaucracy, parochial politics, a low level of trust, lack of teamwork, arrogant attitudes, a lack of leadership in middle management, and the general human fear of the unknown.”¹⁶ These barriers are powerful if left unaddressed and, coupled with enormous pressure for immediate results, will almost certainly derail even the best-intended reform program.

Removing these obstacles and organizational defenses requires a combined effort from the Australian Regular Army (ARA) and ARes. Today’s global security imperatives and tomorrow’s uncertain threats require a paradigm shift to a well-trained and well-equipped ARes force that is capable of an even-widened range of missions. However, unlike American dependence on Citizen-Soldiers, Australian historian Jeff Grey noted in 2004, “in Australian practice there has been no tradition of reliance upon reserve or citizen-force soldiers in times of national emergency.”¹⁷

Recent History of Australia Army Reserve

The ADF has achieved important gains during the past decade to enable this emerging operational Reserve concept. First, enacted legislation removed barriers against Reservists deploying overseas. Additional legislation now protects the employment and financial status of both Reservists and their employers. Lastly, the ADF created, trained, and resourced a small number of high-readiness reserve formations capable of immediate domestic response. Yet, as Professor Gray concludes, “these are necessary first steps, (sic) but they will not, by themselves, change a pattern that is at least half a century old.”¹⁸ The transformation from a strategic to a more operationally enabled ARes may not be easy or immediate;

however, potential ARes contributions towards increased national security far outweigh the previously perceived political and operational risks.

Reserve Transformation

The Australian government, its citizens, and the Defence force must first agree that the ARes status quo is unacceptable. Regarding the government, it appears that civilian policymakers recognize the need for change, as both the 2000 and 2009 Defence White Papers direct an increasing amount of value from Australia's Reserve forces. With regard to public support, it is difficult to precisely gauge the current comfort level for ARes contributions; but generally, Australian citizens have not actively opposed Reservists' service in operational contingencies, peacekeeping missions, or aid to civilian authorities in several recent natural disasters. Lastly, and perhaps most problematic, though, is the continuing debate among the ARA, ARes, and supporting Defence organizations on the future direction of Reserve forces. Some proponents call for revolutionary change, others for incremental evolutionary change, while hard-line opponents cling to the status quo, steadfastly anchored in past traditions. Like the American post-Vietnam transformation experience, the ADF has a window of opportunity to break through this internal impasse while tenuous governmental and public support remains positive for Reserve transformation.

The Kotter change management model proposes that breaking through these barriers requires a deliberately sequenced, multi-step process that begins with an urgent call to action. "A majority of employees, perhaps 75% of management overall, and virtually all of the top executives need to believe that considerable change is absolutely essential."¹⁹ If this consensus does not exist, as in the current state of the ADF, leaders must resort to bold actions. As a starting point, ARes requires a

transparent audit of all unit readiness levels, retention rates, trainee wastage trends, and fiscal performance measures. In early 2010, all Brigades within 2^d Division were below 70% effective strength,²⁰ a category measuring the percentage trained (completed initial entry training) of the unit's authorized personnel level. Issues affecting these rates include capped establishment levels, training pipeline capacity, length of required training, and lack of required service obligations.

The ARA and ARes share responsibility for these issues, resulting in formations, which are not reasonably accessible for either domestic or overseas operations. The 2nd Division's priority formations, the High Readiness Reserve (HRR) and the Reserve Response Force (RRF) teams, do have high readiness rates and immediate accessibility; however, for a truly effective operational Reserve, this same readiness reporting and assured access must exist for more ARes units. Conducting this organizational diagnosis, and publishing the assessment results, while risky, should build consensus that the status quo is unacceptable and should mobilize stakeholders to shatter the current mold.

Leadership and Vision

The next essential step is to "create the guiding coalition"²¹, a group of leaders with the power and skills necessary to lead the change. This senior team is intent only on advancing the long-term health of the organization, with no room for self-interest or parochialism. Essential qualities of coalition members include authority, expertise, credibility, and strong leadership, supported by a contingent of managers to keep change efforts under control and on track.²² In the ADF, this coalition should have senior-level representation, with a minimum rank of Major General, comprised of internal stakeholders including the Chief of Army, Forces Command, 2nd Division

Command, Training Command, and Cadet Reserve and Employer Support Division, along with external stakeholders such as the Defence Reserve Association. Due to differing ARA and ARes perspectives, loyalties, and misperceptions, the coalition may benefit from deliberate actions to increase trust, respect, and mutual understanding. To this end, the coalition may consider developing a network of knowledgeable associates in external agencies to ensure they have the most current information and context surrounding discussion topics. Most importantly, coalition members must build and maintain consensus amongst ADF and external stakeholders throughout the transformation. This task requires their artful skills of persuasion, negotiation, and compromise. Leadership expert John Gardner advises:

The hierarchical position of leaders within their own system is of limited value, because some of the most important tasks require lateral leadership – boundary crossing leadership – involving groups over who they have no control. They must exercise leader like influence beyond the system over which they preside. They must do what they can to lead without authority.²³

Strong leadership, respect, and trust amongst guiding coalition executives, and a shared objective for the best possible defense force are essential to sustain major organizational change.

The Australian Chief of the Defence Force entrusts this respected team of leaders to collectively develop and deliver the ARes vision for the future. When complete, the vision statement should be a single, organizing principle that unifies, organizes, and guides all subsequent organizational decisions. An effective vision clarifies how the future will be different from the past, and it inspires and empowers people to make that future a reality. Jim Collins, author of Good to Great, developed a framework that the coalition could use to initiate an ARes vision development workshop.

The “Hedgehog Concept is a simple, crystalline concept that flows from deep understanding about the intersection of the following three circles: (1) What you can be best in the world at, (2) What drives your economic engine, and (3) What you are deeply passionate about.²⁴ His suggested three questions, along with an additional analysis of the strategic military environment and government mandates, provide a logical starting point to uncover common threads.

ARes force decisions must, first and foremost, support the directives and parameters established by civilian policymakers, based upon the national security outlook, to best supplement the required overall ADF defense posture. For instance, Australia’s 2009 White Paper “Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030” highlights the changing distribution of power in the Asia-Pacific area, increasing tensions between major regional powers, and the rising strategic significance of the Indian Ocean region. The guiding coalition must accurately envision the necessary qualities for an effective ARes force amidst rapidly changing security threats, constrained resources, shifting public attitudes, revolving governments, and increasing global pressures. Lastly, strategic environment discussions should also evaluate trends, including societal, international, demographic, technological, and environmental, and their projected implications towards the ARes force.

In addition to strategic environment considerations, the ARes vision should blend the most beneficial aspects of cost effectiveness, appealing roles and missions, and most useful core competencies. Reservists, with their dual role of both Citizen and Soldier, likely have unique skill sets gained from private sector careers such as engineering, law enforcement, logistics, information technology, and medical and legal

professions. A recent U.S. example that capitalizes on unique Citizen-Soldier technical expertise is the Agribusiness Development Team, an ARNG team of agriculture and business experts now in use throughout Afghanistan. Additionally, China has formed special reserve information warfare units drawing on the country's civilian information technology experts. These are examples of technical and professional contributions where Reserve Component forces have a comparative advantage over Active forces. Informal unit surveys of skills and certifications can give ADF leaders an initial understanding of unique ARes capabilities until the civilian employment database, currently under development, is completed. Lastly, Reservists also bring long-standing relationships within their communities, with civilian authorities, legislators, and employers, and inherent situational understanding of the local area that is critical during time-sensitive domestic emergencies.

On the other hand, it is incumbent upon the coalition to openly acknowledge and discuss ARes' limitations. Civilian employment brings unique planning considerations for the most cost-effective use of Reservists. As such, Reservists provide the highest financial value when train-up time is low and when mission duration is short and not recurring. Training costs, therefore, favor Reserve usage when proficiency and qualification standards require less collective training. Additional considerations include managing civilian employer implications effectively to limit unnecessary strain, costs, and potential negative public opinion.

Finally, discussion should center on why Reservists initially enlist and subsequently choose to remain in service. It is essential to understand the motivational factors, over the course of a career, which attract and retain high quality personnel.

Possible reasons for ARes participation may include trade apprenticeship, opportunities for overseas service, camaraderie, diversity from civilian job, or national patriotism.

Mission development, in part, based upon the most appealing factors to Reservists, will reduce turnover rates, and likely attract ARA forces transitioning from Active service.

The current series of Reserve Modernization Workshops, initiated by the Director General Reserves-Army (DGRES-A) and attended by key ARA and ARes Brigadiers, serves as an important step to provide the guiding coalition the respective answers to these important questions.²⁵ As an example, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Dennis McCarthy, summarized the stated objectives for the U.S.

Reserve Components as directed in the National Military Strategy:

First, we must meet the needs of the services by describing plans that are sustainable to utilize the National Guard and Reserve (NG&R). By this, I mean plans that are sufficiently attractive in an all-volunteer environment, where the services can recruit and retain the right people. Second, we must meet the needs of the combatant commands by describing ways to utilize the NG&R and fulfill requirements across a spectrum of conflict – from engagement to warfighting to post-conflict reconstruction. Third, our plans must address the needs of the DoD by describing efficient and affordable contributions to national defense. Lastly, our efforts must sustain the needs of federal, state, and local leaders by describing effective ways to use the Reserve Component in homeland defense and consequence management.²⁶

The challenge for the guiding coalition is to synthesize these sometimes-contrasting objectives into a simple, engaging, and enduring ARes vision statement. Advertising executive Shelly Lazarus advises, “People don’t like being given messages but they love listening to stories.”²⁷ A clear, short message that everyone can repeat as a compelling story or image is critical. Along with an engaging message, an effective communication plan requires thorough stakeholder analysis and well-crafted strategies to reach all audiences. The new vision requires frequent and consistent broadcasting

via multiple channels and methods. It is difficult to gain understanding, acceptance, and commitment to a new organizational direction. Therefore, in short, the guiding coalition must communicate the new vision anywhere and everywhere using every effective channel and means in the communication inventory.

Lastly, nothing is more powerful than reinforcing actions from leadership. As such, senior ADF leaders can affect powerful change by backing up words with their own behavior. Motivational ADF actions could include modernizing ARes equipment at the same ARA fielding rates, reinvesting Reserve Reform Stream savings into ARes capabilities, or designating a fixed percentage of operational positions to ARes personnel to increase experience and proficiency levels.

Cultural Change

Tradition, however, is a very powerful force, and actions alone by the guiding coalition cannot root change in the organization. Lasting success in the long-term takes the majority of the organization to institute new practices and behaviors, essentially developing and adopting a new culture. Permanent cultural change is extremely difficult and requires constant reinforcement through reward programs and demonstration of visible success. True ARes transformation means addressing and eliminating the cultural divide between the Regular and Reserve forces. At present, no formal mechanism exists to gauge the extent of this palpable cultural gap. Therefore, at a minimum, the ADF should expand the annual Defence Attitudes Survey to include both ARA and ARes perceptions of one another. The subsequent recommendation is to conduct an independent survey across all ranks utilizing focus groups for a more comprehensive diagnosis of existing cultural biases, the driving factors, and their

organizational impact. Finally, these surveys can become the benchmark to formally measure progress as cultural change efforts continue.

As a historical example, the U.S. Active/Reserve cultural divide may have reached its pinnacle during the immediate years following Operation Desert Shield/Storm when National Guard roundout brigades did not deploy with their respective divisions. Independent studies highlighted Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) attitudes such as:

AC perceptions:

- The RC officer appears to be political, incompetent or untrained, and independent of AC absolute control, which frustrates the AC officer.
- If the RC officer were really dedicated, he/she would have gone regular rather than appear to serve as a “hobbyist.”

RC perceptions:

- AC officers exude not confidence in, but flagrant disdain for RC unit leadership.
- The AC officer seems to possess arrogance toward, and an ignorance of, the RC.²⁸

Should the ADF survey results uncover similar damaging perceptions, it is then critical that leaders take deliberate steps to acknowledge deficiencies, eliminate unhealthy behaviors, and demonstrate shared commitment moving forward.

Alternatively, survey results will undoubtedly highlight many positive organizational culture aspects that are critical to preserve during transformation. For the new culture of mutual appreciation and confidence to stick, the ADF must then anchor and embed

the selected changes across all interdependent institutions such as doctrine development, operations, training, materiel, logistics, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).

The United States Department of Defense has considered and tested many flexible force structures to enhance the capabilities and interoperability between Active and Reserve Component elements, as well as to reduce attitude barriers. Examples of these integrated organizations have included: (1) blended units: permanent, multi-component units comprised of Active and Reserve forces in a single unit, (2) associate units: permanent relationship between two units, one Active and one Reserve, based together, sharing the same equipment set, with Reserve personnel augmenting the Active force during operational missions, (3) roundout units: paired Reserve units with under-structured Active higher echelon units for the purpose of training and deployment, either simultaneously or as a follow-on force, (4) tailored units: temporary, mission-specific organizations either rapidly assembled or designed for a deliberate contingency.²⁹ Additional integration programs have included the: (1) Integrated Divisions Program, (2) Bosnia Task Force Program, (3) Division Teaming Program, (4) Training Support XXI, (5) Active/Reserve Component Battalion Command Exchange Program, (6) Active Component Associate Unit Mentor Relationships Program, (7) Integrated Light Infantry Battalions Program, and (8) Force XXI heavy Division Redesign.³⁰ These integration initiatives have achieved varying levels of success, based on their intended outcomes, and may inform the ADF in force structure and cultural integration decisions. Clear measures of success, systematic data collection,

and follow-up analysis are essential for ARes to evaluate any trialed programs and recommend future policies.

Modernized Governance

Lastly, ARes could benefit from a formal command structure review to strengthen the new vision and culture, as well as enable greater organizational responsiveness, efficiency, and effectiveness. ARes senior leaders should have proper organizational placement to reinforce ARes value to all stakeholders and should be empowered with the necessary authority to unify and align ARes efforts. National Defense University professor Gregory Foster, in an early work analyzing the U.S. National Security Council, notes three important and enduring considerations regarding organization structure:

- Organization influences thought processes by determining who deals how with what issues. Assigning responsibility for a particular issue is a way of prescribing who is and is not permitted to even address it.
- A formal organizational structure institutionalizes and gives permanence to a pattern of relationships and a mix of actors that is intended to be more or less immune to whims of personality or changes in participants.
- The composition and placement of an organization project an image to outsiders of one's worldview. Organizational schemes, in other words, have symbolic content that, intentionally or not, may influence how others see us.³¹

GEN Craig McKinley, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the National Guard's first four-star general, recently remarked that:

access to senior decision makers, (involvement in) real time information exchange and critical fact gathering and delivery meetings, which we weren't in before, all now create an environment by which every day (sic) there is constructive dialogue between me, the chairman of the Joint

Chiefs, the vice chairman, the service chiefs and the combatant commanders.³²

As part of the command structure review, the ADF may also consider adding appropriate ARes touch points with civilian leadership to increase public engagement and dialogue with policymakers. ARes provides a unique bridge to Australian communities that the ADF can choose to better leverage through legislative liaison officers. U.S. examples of direct liaison connections with policymakers include the Legislative Committees in the Senate and the Congress, Professional Associations, Special Commissions, and the Reserve Forces Policy Board.

The Reserve Forces Policy Board, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the Reserve Components. The Board, created in 1952, acts independently to monitor, review and evaluate proposals, actions and situations impacting the National Guard and Reserve forces and reports annually to the President and Congress. The 24-member Board has a civilian chairman and includes the assistant secretaries for manpower and reserve affairs from the three military departments as well as regular and reserve component general/flag officers from each of the services including the Coast Guard. Board members represent a wide range of industry, business, professional and civic experience, in addition to their military expertise, which combined, provide the Secretary of Defense with a unique and independent body of senior officials to review and comment on Reserve Component programs and policies.³³

The Nation Guard and Reserve Caucus (GRC) is a Congressional Member Organization that serves as a forum for oversight and representation of U.S. Reserve

Components (RC). The Caucus articulates within Congress a defense philosophy that recognizes and endorses vital RC capabilities in the defense of the nation; it serves as a focal point for information related to RC roles and missions; develops substantive positions and proposals dealing with RC issues and agenda; and organizes member support for legislative initiatives dealing with RC, operations, programs, and policies. The GRC Steering Committee has two Co-chairs, one from the majority and one from the minority, as well as seven Vice-Chairs representing the Army and Air National Guard, and the Navy, Marine, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard Reserve. All members of Congress with RC interests, whether due to personal involvement, constituent interest, or geographical considerations associated with facilities, may petition for Caucus membership.

The U.S. Reserve Component has tremendous representation from professional organizations such as the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), the National Guard Enlisted Association of the United States (NGEAS), and the Reserve Officers Association (ROA). NGAUS, for instance, is a professional association of nearly 45,000 current or former Army and Air Guard officers. NGAUS was created in 1878 to provide unified Guard representation in Washington to obtain better equipment and training by petitioning Congress for more resources.

Lastly, special commissions also provide important reviews and audits specifically on RC directives to ensure proper transparency and oversight. As a recent example, the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2005 established the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. The commission was charged with identifying and recommending changes in law and policy to ensure

that the National Guard and Reserves are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to meet the national security requirements of the nation, now and in the future. Additionally, the Government Accountability Office provides routine reviews of RC performance and capabilities.

Successful transformation efforts in large organizations with interdependent systems, such as the ADF, require long-term outlook and commitment. The U.S. Army's transformation experience has arguably continued since Vietnam and, now in its third decade, may provide useful learnings for other countries. One recent study notes four imperatives from the U.S. experience:

- (1) Leaders within military organizations are essential.
- (2) Military reform is about more than changing doctrine, an organization must have appropriate training practices, personnel policies, organizations, equipment, and leader development programs.
- (3) Comprehensive change requires an organizational entity (i.e. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command) with broad authority able to craft, evaluate, and execute an integrated program of reforms.
- (4) The process of developing, implementing, and institutionalizing complementary reforms can take several decades, thus suggesting that stability in an organization's mission and resources can be important.³⁴

In the most rapid and recent segment of the U.S. Army's transformation, senior leaders published an annual Transformation Roadmap, along with Posture Statements for each Service, to communicate to a wide array of internal and external stakeholders. The ADF may benefit from similar documents conveying the overarching plan, the criteria to

guide efforts, goals to achieve, and milestones by which to measure progress. Such documents not only keep important principals informed, but also maintain the focus and commitment of the organization.

In conclusion, an organization's ultimate success or failure rests largely upon its strategic leaders' ability to align, vision, and change their organization. Senior military leaders must not only successfully manage today's demands, but also accurately envision tomorrow's complex security environment, along with the required changes to maintain competitive advantage. The Australian Army Reserve is well positioned in the Asia-Pacific region to enhance its nation's security efforts and lead other countries' Reserves towards greater regional contributions. The modernization of a mainly strategic-based Reserve brings enormous change across all institutional systems. Thus, a formal change management plan, informed by lessons learned from the U.S. Reserve transformation experience, may prove helpful for ARes to avoid similar missteps, accelerate its security contributions, and further reinforce the organization's leading status within the region.

Endnotes

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