

## THE MULTI-DISCIPLINARY COMMAND TEAM IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

BY

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USAWC CLASS OF 2011

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# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved*  
*OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 14-03-2011			<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Strategy Research Project		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b>	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b>  The Multi-Disciplinary Command Team in Counter Insurgency Operations.					<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>	
					<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>	
					<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b>  Colonel Wilfred S. Rietdijk					<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>	
					<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>	
					<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>  Colonel Michael McCrea Department of Command, Leadership, and Management					<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013					<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>	
					<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Distribution A: Unlimited						
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> <b>Only a work of the United States Government is not subject to copyright. The author is not an employee of the United States Government. Consequently, this document may be protected by copyright.</b>						
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Internal conflicts in failed states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan seem to develop into and are subsequently characterized as complex problems. Being in command of organizations dealing with these problems is an almost impossible task for one single human. The immense complexity asks for a larger and wider range of skills. Based on the apparent successes in recent conflicts, there is support that specific leadership teams are an answer to the challenges of commanding in a complex environment. Because of their multi-disciplinary character, these leadership teams are called "multi-disciplinary command teams" (MDCT) and they often consist of diplomats and military personnel. This paper researches the skills, competencies and behavior that are needed to function within an MDCT in a Counter Insurgency environment. In the Leadership Primer, 3 <sup>rd</sup> edition, The United States Army War College (USAWC) defines skills, competencies and behavior for strategic military leaders. Those skills will be compared with the State Department career competencies. Also both organizational cultures are compared. Based on the similarities and differences, I draw conclusions and make recommendations for the USAWC and the State Department.						
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Leadership, Diplomacy, Competency, Insurgency, State Department, Afghanistan						
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>	
<b>a. REPORT</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> UNCLASSIFIED	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> UNCLASSIFIED			<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b>	
			UNLIMITED	32		



USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**THE MULTI-DISCIPLINARY COMMAND TEAM  
IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS**

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## ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Wilfred S. Rietdijk

TITLE: The Multi-Disciplinary Command Team in Counter Insurgency Operations

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 14 March 2011      WORD COUNT: 5,695      PAGES: 32

KEY TERMS: Leadership, Diplomacy, Competency, Insurgency, State Department, Afghanistan.

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Internal conflicts in failed states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan seem to develop into and are subsequently characterized as complex problems. Being in command of organizations dealing with these problems is an almost impossible task for one single human. The immense complexity asks for a larger and wider range of skills. Based on the apparent successes in recent conflicts, there is support that specific leadership teams are an answer to the challenges of commanding in a complex environment. Because of their multi-disciplinary character, these leadership teams are called “multi-disciplinary command teams” (MDCT) and they often consist of diplomats and military personnel. This paper researches the skills, competencies and behavior that are needed to function within an MDCT in a Counter Insurgency environment. In the Leadership Primer, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, The United States Army War College (USAWC) defines skills, competencies and behavior for strategic military leaders. Those skills will be compared with the State Department career competencies. Also both organizational cultures are compared. Based on the similarities and differences, I draw conclusions and make recommendations for the USAWC and the State Department.



## THE MULTI-DISCIPLINARY COMMAND TEAM IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Diplomats are just as essential to starting a war as soldiers are for finishing it... You take diplomacy out of war, and the thing would fall flat in a week.

—William Penn Adair Rogers<sup>1</sup>

The work of statesmen, diplomats and soldiers has become heavily connected over the last centuries. Their role and craftsmanship is different, but they share the same goals, being involved in matters of war and peace. Nowadays, professors call the current wars “conflicts” and scientists describe the nature of conflicts as “complex”. There is no clear solution, nor a clear approach towards either one. Problems and solutions seem to be connected and only incremental decision-making is somehow getting leaders to another level within the conflict, but not necessary closer to a solution or final stage. A way to deal with the difficult issues of leading organizations dealing with complexity is to combine expertise through the whole organization. If the ill-structured problem is a Counter Insurgency issue, like an intra state war combined with nation-building, most of the times military leaders, statesmen and diplomats are combined in a multi-disciplinary command team.

There have been previous ideas of combining several sets of skills within leadership teams. Some were based on the Clausewitzian theory of trinity. He stated:

...composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.<sup>2</sup>

The first element is connected to the people, the second one to the military and the third element is connected to the government. If these three elements are determining the nature of war, equal representation of the connected organizations or groups should be part of the leadership team conducting or preventing war. Historically, most military operations were led by a single leader, based on one of the oldest principles in war, unity of command.<sup>3</sup> Great military philosophers like Napoleon Bonaparte based their command philosophy on it. However, although not too many people argue that war in itself has changed, the nature of war has changed dramatically. The complexity and speed or tempo, along with the irregular use of force and the total/global character of current conflicts impose monumental challenges on strategic leaders.

In civilian society, during the 1970's some companies began to shift towards multi-disciplinary boards when leading companies, due to the associated complexities of globalization. Companies could reach out to global markets, but local cultural skills and knowledge proved to be decisive attributes that often led to success. To combine the global scale and local knowledge, multinational boards were more commonly established, but rarely was the overall coordination effort divided between individuals.

There are a few exceptions. The United Nations (UN) has sometimes put a dual key<sup>4</sup> decision-making system into action, like in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission in Bosnia Herzegovina. The civilian leadership of the UN-mission had a veto on military airstrikes in certain areas. This caused fundamental friction during the Serbian attack in 1995 of the enclave Srebrenica, where it proved to be very difficult to convince the UN leadership that the air strikes, requested by NATO,

were necessary. The dual key system was abandoned after this incident. In many NATO countries, the senior national military leadership has been quite skeptical towards MDCT, because of the negative experiences in the past. Despite of all the skepticism, most international military structures have accepted MDCTs as their main leadership format. Coalition organizations like the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and the former Multinational Forces (MNF) in Iraq, the North Alliance Treaty Organization (NATO) and the US Armed Forces Unified Commands have integrated diplomats in the top and structure of their organizations. But, to avoid the dual key issues, most organizations have mandated specific decision areas towards the members of an MDCT. Vetoes are non-existent in the current organizations.

The establishment of an MDCT as a leadership team has deep and extensive consequences for its members. Although there are no vetoes, the members have the internal pressure to agree with each other on major decisions and policy. However, diplomats tend to disagree with the military on a regular basis. In 2009, US Ambassador to Afghanistan Eikenberry openly disagreed<sup>5</sup> with the McChrystal Counter-insurgency strategy without notifying any of the military leaders in advance, causing major friction within the military-diplomatic relationships in Afghanistan and Washington DC.

MDCTs are a major item nowadays. Senior US leaders state that the military within the COIN-environment should not take over the role of diplomats and try to build nations. However, individual strategic military leaders should still be capable of pulling it together when nobody else is able.

This paper will investigate how members of an MDCT may differ in their approach towards complex problems and what friction that can create. In support of this

attempt, we will first describe the theory of competency-based development and what role organizational culture plays in the behavior of strategic leaders. Secondly, we will go into one of the reasons why the MDCTs exist: the COIN-environment. It is this complex environment that asks so much from an organization, that MDCT leadership is most needed. Thirdly, we will describe and compare both the formal competencies and the informal organizational cultures of both organizations. The differences will be analyzed from which we will draw our conclusions. Lastly, we provide recommendations for the USAWC and State Department for future consideration and exploitation.

This paper will not focus on internal leadership challenges, or on the accountability issues towards domestic political leadership. Although enormous tasks and responsibilities, these factors are not the reason why MDCTs need to exist. They have always been present in any organization and political environment.

#### Individual behavior, competencies and organizational culture

Every individual is unique by nature. Yet, organizations want to influence people towards effective behavior for their own purposes, and thus contribute to their organizational goals. In the mid eighties, the famous sociologist Henry Mintzberg came up with an organizational model<sup>6</sup> that many sociologists have based their theories upon. He stated that any organization consists of only six elements. His sixth element is Ideology, the core of the organization, defining wanted behavior and performance based on corporate values. This element of Mintzberg theory inspired another sociologist, Richard Boyatis,<sup>7</sup> to establish models of intentional change; using a layered model to describe influences from the deepest level (personality) to the visible level (behavior).




Figure 1. Layers of personality according to Richard W. Boyatis.

The theory connected to this model, as Boyatis explains, is that to change a layer, you must change an underlying layer. So in order to change behavior, competencies, attitudes or personality have to change first. The most effective and profound changes are made when multiple levels are affected. The worldwide adopted theory of competency management<sup>8</sup> is based on this principal. Intentional change became very popular and needed as organizational changes kept coming at a higher pace at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

However, the model is not only used for change. In most organizations, the formal organizational values are laid down in competencies, roles, organizational charts etc. They are formally described and used to determine whether members are promotable and/or function according to certain standards, and therefore, influence

people to behave in a certain effective way. Both the State Department<sup>9</sup> and Department of Defense (DOD)<sup>10</sup> have extensive career precepts and competency models. To a large extent, they determine or define individual behavior within the organization.

Apart from the more formal side of the organization, the less formalized, but of equal influence, is the informal part of the organization: its organizational culture. This comprises the attitudes, experiences, beliefs and values of an organization. The organization sociologist Cheri Ostroff defined three groups of dimensions<sup>11</sup> that determine organizational culture within companies that influence individual behavior: the Affective dimension, the Cognitive dimension and the Instrumental dimension. According to Ostroff, rewards and incentives are important influences on individual behavior, in a positive and negative way. On top of that, perceived success of the organization is an important factor in the affective dimension. Growth, autonomy and effectiveness are important factors in the cognitive dimension. In the instrumental dimension, individual freedom, career opportunities and limits (described in career precepts) are an important set of factors. The model, based on Ostroffs theory, shows that the same set of competencies, in a different organization, will lead to different behavior. (see figure 2.)




Figure 2. Ostroffs behavioral model for organizational culture and behavior.

Subconclusion: Organizations aim to influence the quality and set of skills of people by a formal set of competencies, used for selection, assessments and promotion.

Furthermore, the unofficial organizational culture plays an important role in how people behave professionally.

The complexity of COIN operations and the need for an MDCT

According to the draft version of BG McMaster's Army Operating Concept, fighting a protracted war against a counterinsurgency is one of the new strategic tasks of the US Army.<sup>12</sup> The Field Manual 3-24 defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to

weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency.<sup>13</sup>

In the past, many approaches have been used to fight an insurgency. The most successful ones are those that are based on a visible separation of the people and the insurgents, thus defining the protection of the population and the promotion of the government's legitimacy as centers of gravity.<sup>14</sup> The use of weapons against insurgents might be necessary, the protection of the population needs to be the center of the effort.

The lack of strategic success using the direct approach of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan leads one to believe that while "hunt and kill" operations are effective at weakening the insurgent, it fails ultimately to protect the people from the insurgent's influence. The local population blames the security failure of the local and state government, therefore undermining its legitimacy. Because of this, a more environmental approach of insurgency was developed during 2007 and 2008. The United Kingdom, Canada as well as the Netherlands all had their versions of COIN documents, based on environmental influence. Key to this approach is to harden the environment against external insurgency influences, while enabling the government to connect with, protect and support the people within the same setting. Influencing a complete society needs a plenary government approach with skills far above any single organization. Since the complexity of this influence is enormous, it is assessed to be an ill-structured complex problem. For example, in southern Afghanistan, both the insurgent and the people live in the same environment. There are four major components in South Afghanistan: a security component, a government component, a

social component and an economic component. (figure 3).

# The Environment



Figure 3. Dominant components in the Southern Afghanistan society.<sup>15</sup>

Before analyzing each component, it is necessary to look at the society as a whole. Societies are complex systems, interacting with all internal components in a humanoid way.<sup>16</sup> This means that all inputs, influencing and shaping a part of society, will have an impact on the whole of society and on all other components. It cannot be viewed as an individual or complicated system, where the problems and parts of system can be isolated and explained. The most important conclusion is that the organization dealing with environmental influencing cannot make partial decisions about a specific piece of the society and sectors of society cannot be split up amongst members of the MDCT. This means that all decisions have to be made by the MDCT as a whole, as a functioning board, interacting and deciding as one body.

Although societies act as a humanoid system, it is useful to look at the individual components in order to develop a better and more profound understanding, which includes a higher level of cultural awareness and an in depth understanding of the roots of certain problems.

We start with *the security component*. In an unsafe environment, this is the basis of the legitimacy of any government. In Pastunwali,<sup>17</sup> providing security is the essence of leadership. If not provided, leaders lack any form of legitimacy and are often replaced. Due to the corrupt police and active Taliban movement, the local government often fails to bring even a low level of security to the people in south Afghanistan, causing major legitimacy problems. Without government efforts, supported by ISAF, the Taliban controls the local governmental security forces, due to corruptness. In all cases of any case, the Taliban is the provider of security, with Taliban militia. To correct this, a functioning security apparatus under government control, that earns the trust of the people, is essential. Partnering, mentoring and monitoring, combined with education and a secure salary-system are the keys to a legitimate government. Sub conclusion: Extensive knowledge of military and police organizations, civil primate and command and control is needed.

Next is *the government component*. Legitimacy for a government can be obtained in many ways. Western states tend to put a democratic election as the highest source for legitimacy, but in many countries the key foundation for a legitimate government can be found in the degree it can provide for its people. In southern Afghanistan the government is largely unsuccessful in providing for its people. The aforementioned corruption is a reason, but 94% illiteracy and absence of human capital

are also major factors. What complicates the situation even more is that historically, the rural areas have never experienced any form of central government. If legitimacy is the key to counter an insurgency, a workable and accepted form of government that combines the strengths of the tribal systems and connects those to the official government should be developed. Key problems such as corruption and tribal influences should be kept at an acceptable level. Sub conclusion: extensive knowledge of government building, civil governing of institutions, nation building, third world environments (incl. corruption and illegal shadow economies) and building of human capital is needed.

The third component is *the social component*. Southern Afghanistan is dominated by Pashtun tribes.<sup>18</sup> The key strength of these tribes, that overcame the mighty Russian army is unity combined with a fierce mentality. The Russians knew this, and since 1982 they tried to break the social tribal system, killing and capturing their key leaders. The mujahidin did the same with opposing tribes and from 1994 the Taliban made sure no tribal hierarchy of importance was established. The key to withstanding the influence of the Taliban, criminals or other external threats is the restoration of tribal tissue. The tribal hierarchy has been suppressed for more than 25 years. While still dormant, it has been functioning at a lower level. Restoring the cohesion is the main effort to empower tribal government. Sub conclusion: To foster tribal tissue and hierarchy, extensive cultural awareness, in depth knowledge of tribalism, of collective social systems and of Pashtunwali is needed.

Finally, we address *the economic component*. Afghanistan used to be an agricultural economy, which led the market in the exportation of raisins and fruits. The

word heroine did not appear in Dari until the 1970's. Opium existed a while longer, but the necessary chemicals to produce heroine were imported in 1972. Nowadays, the Afghan heroine production supplies 84%<sup>19</sup> of the worlds demands, and is creating a shadow economy with a volume that overshadows the official economy.<sup>20</sup> Due to international disagreement on policy, no real progress has been made in countering this complex problem. One hopeful initiative is the use of Afghan poppy for legalized medical use. Research and experiments by India and the USA estimate that the worldwide demand of legalized heroine lies around 10,000 tons. Afghanistan's production reached a maximum of 4,500 tons in 2006.<sup>21</sup> Efforts to replace poppy production by other crops have shown limited success, but will need to go on until a final solution is reached. Key to this problem is that the shadow economy needs to be eliminated to increase revenue for the legal government. That would also increase the possibilities for basic government functions. Sub conclusion: extensive knowledge of economic systems, corruption, private enterprising, counter drug activities and economic nation building is needed.

The key strength of the Taliban is that they fully understand this environment; they live in it and are able to dominate and control all elements. If challenged, they can abandon one of the dimensions and survive in three others. If pressed, they can survive while only holding the economic dimension for a limited time. It will need a long term, consolidated, sustainable effort in all dimensions at the same time to withstand Taliban efforts to penetrate society for a period of time, creating a window of opportunity for the local Afghani government to win their people over. The main conclusion about the environment is that influencing and bolstering it, requires extensive and diversified

knowledge. Leading this complex changing of all dimensions of society, a full range of competencies and knowledge is needed, which support the necessity of a multi-disciplinary command team.

Subconclusion for the environment: A successful approach of legitimizing a government is protecting the society from unwanted external influences. All dimensions of society need to be protected to give the government time to protect and win the people over. In order to effectively protect all dimensions of society, a multi disciplinary set of skills is needed. Multi-disciplinary command teams are a way of leading this all inclusive holistic approach.

Competencies comparison

Both the State Department and the military have an extensive description of their formal organizations. When compared there are several noted differences. The first and biggest difference is that the State Department describes their competencies<sup>22</sup> the same regardless if the position is at the junior, middle or senior level. The behavior differs per level, but there is an incremental build up throughout the whole career within the same competency. An example is how the State Department describes critical thinking.<sup>23</sup>

Entry level	Mid level	Senior level
<p>Identifies key information, central issues, distinguishes facts from opinion and relevant from irrelevant information.</p> <p>Identifies the strengths and weaknesses from various approaches.</p> <p>Outlines realistic options.</p>	<p>Isolates key points, central issues and common themes in a mass of complex information.</p> <p>Can determine the best solution or action from a range of options.</p> <p>Is objective in analyzing problems and judging people.</p>	<p>Analyses and defines complex policy issues clearly, in terms with permits to be dealt with in a practical way.</p> <p>Encourages staff to analyze solutions, propose options, giving constructive feedback.</p> <p>Correctly senses when it is appropriate to take risks</p>

Figure 4. Example of the State Department Departments description of competencies.

This allows the State Department officials to build upon earlier experiences and develop a more profound and internalized competency awareness. The military competencies<sup>24</sup> tend to differ when reaching the strategic level. When comparing the essential leadership competencies of both organizations, differences appear. The most significant competencies to be compared are listed below.

*Organizational size.* Clearly, the strategic leader within the State Department leads a smaller organization in comparison to the organizational size the military strategic commander leads. Ambassadors lead embassies, mostly an organization with a strategic tasking, that are typically staffed with less than 150 people. Military combatant commanders lead organizations with a capacity of several thousands. The most remarkable conclusion from the competency comparison is that the strategic State Department leader is focused on leading a small team, developing and focusing them on the environment, their foreign knowledge and skills to interact. The strategic military leader is focused on indirect leadership of large organizations, understanding all subsystems, but mandating internal leadership issues to lower levels within the organization.

*Different focus.* The State Department leader is mainly focused on the foreign environment he/she is immersed in. Foreign knowledge, interaction with foreign cultures and the ability to interact on all levels of a foreign society in order to look after or promote the national interest are accurately described in the career precepts. Military strategic leaders tend to focus on the interagency and integrate all government processes, interacting and negotiating internally.

*Participation in policymaking.* A far larger amount of the State Department strategic leaders tend to execute national policy, directed by a small group within the Washington DC-based State Department bureaus. Their focus is to secure and look after the national interest and implement the attached national goals in their country of interest. Knowledge about implementation, adaptive skills to foreign cultures and advertising national policy goals are logical competencies that are stressed by the State Department. Military strategic leaders are focused on developing strategies as a member of a policy group. A fair amount of military at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level, the Combatant Command level and the JTF-level are involved in developing policy, strategy and directives for implementation. The competencies of the military are more explicit in skills needed for the development of policy than those of the State Department.

*Cultural awareness.* The key for the State Department senior service members is to achieve goals in the foreign environment they are part of and oftentimes reside in. All personnel are focused on understanding and shaping the foreign environment, basically from the moment a State Department employee enrolls as a junior service member until they retire. Besides developing language skills, the majority of their time outside the country is focused on foreign understanding and interaction. Consequentially, networking with foreign officials is developed to a far greater extent within the State Department. The military strategic leader is focused on the environment as well, but will be more internally aware of their own nation's government. There is a foreign focus, but not as continuous and consistent as the State Department officials have developed.

*Management competencies.* The State Department does not stress, nor focus on managerial qualities for the bigger part of a career. Only when a person becomes

deputy Chief of Mission, managerial qualities are required, sometimes a posting that causes a lot of trouble for the State Department personnel.<sup>25</sup> Military personnel have this qualities developed over a long period of time. The difference at the strategic level is that “hands on management” changes into a more “delegated management”.

*Dissent.* The State Department has described and explicitly stated how the organization and its strategic leader should deal with questionable decisions internally. Staff and personnel should be involved in constructive criticism and provide alternatives for decisions. The military has not made this as explicit. It assumes that all commanders, by providing the right command climate, master this type of behavior.

*Customer orientation.* The State Department trains all personnel to be customer-oriented; senior leader should create an environment that encourages customer oriented behavior. The direct interaction of the embassies, especially concerning consular duties, requires this attitude. The indirect attitude with respect for the knowledge and interest in the local population has not been made explicit in the military competencies. The focus on foreign culture is limited to understanding the environment for policy purposes only.

### Organizational Culture Comparison

Most sociologists agree upon the fact that informal culture is a more important and a bigger factor of influence in steering personnel’s behavior than the formal side of the organization. Cheri Ostroff splits the organizational culture in three dimensions: the affective, cognitive and instrumental dimension.

*The Affective Dimension.* In this dimension factors like loyalty to an organization, loyalties to leaders, personal preferences and social values are the pivotal parts. Also external rewards and the external perception of the organization play an important role.

**Loyalty to the organization.** In both organizations, there is a high level of loyalty to the overall organization and the small group to which one belongs. Both members of the State Department and the military are extremely proud of the service they provide to their country. However, all interviewed personnel mentioned a different perception from the American people of the State Department personnel. Where all military feel highly appreciated, the State Department members feel that they are under resourced and do not get the appreciation their service for the country deserves. The consequential underfunding plays the most important role.<sup>26</sup>

**Internal cohesion.** Members of the Foreign Service, the Foreign Service Officers (FSO) are perceived as a small in crowd, sometimes behaving elitist. There is an understanding that the FSO is a very small group, representing the United States in a foreign country. Because of the small group of diplomats, some elitism is understandable and needed.<sup>27</sup> Diplomats stress that this form of behavior mostly existed in the last century, and has become less and less appreciated. But this kind of cohesion is differing from the military, where a ground truth behavior is most appreciated.

*Providing for subordinates.* Within the military, it goes without saying that taking care of subordinates is one of the commanders and commander's wife's responsibilities. The State Department leaders have been more individualists, raised to work alone in groups, providing their own analysis, working their own contacts. Of course there are

many great leaders within the State Department that provide for all their staff, but it is not the automatism military leaders feel.<sup>28</sup>

**The influence and appreciation of the US Congress.** One of the reasons State Department explains why they are underfunded is because of the impact State Department has on the congressional constituencies. Unable to order big industrial purchases, congressmen are by nature less interested in the State Department than in the military. This creates a different appreciation of State Department, which is perceived as inferior to the military.<sup>29</sup>

*The Cognitive Dimension.* In this dimension, job related skills, knowledge, personal performance and incentives for performance play a vital role.

**Leadership and crisis handling.** Inherent within the military culture is the military commander's authority to issue orders to subordinates. Orders, particularly when dealing with the power to kill, often endanger lives. Therefore, it is imperative that those orders must be obeyed. At the strategic level, the leadership competency promotes a more participative style when dealing with external partners. Internally, generals have an intrinsic power that makes negotiating most of the time unnecessary. Under crisis, military leaders resort to their intrinsic ability to make decisions and subsequently, issue orders. The State Department leadership style is very different. Without executive powers, the decision making style is based on consensus. Influencing, patience and negotiating skills are vital to achieve your goals.<sup>30</sup>

**Decision-making.** Given the executive character of the organization, the military leaders strive to make decisions swiftly, which increases the amount of time available for planning and execution by subordinate levels. Throughout their career, military

decision makers are trained to think in time and space, thus allowing subordinate levels enough time to do their jobs. In the flat State Department organization, a decision is postponed to the latest moment in order to evaluate the maximum amount of information. Execution is relatively quick and often outsourced.<sup>31</sup>

**Environmental understanding and external orientation.** Both organizations stress the fact that the strategic leader has to be externally oriented. Then again, there are substantial differences. The military strategic leader is focused on the environment within his/her area of responsibility. It is aimed at interagency relations, other governmental organizations and political parties and institutions like the US congress. The State Department employee is focused on foreign environments. Their main job is interacting with that environment, understand it, be able to talk to and interact with it in order to look after national goals and interests. Throughout their career, this external focus remains a central theme, formally and informally appreciated by superiors and the organization.

**Openness to ideas.** The State Department senior employees tend to find the military conservative and not open to ideas that seem to be “outside the box.”<sup>32</sup> Diplomats conclude that this conservative nature is a result of methodical drills, the ever present regulations and the large and bureaucratic organization. “What the military seems to find thinking outside the box is actually very in the middle.”<sup>33</sup> The State Department officer regards himself as a more open thinker, analytical and more educated.

**The status and influence of education.** The State Department junior FSO-employees have an average age of 32 when they enter the Foreign Service. They

typically have a master's degree and most of them have had a previous corporate career. They receive a thorough basic education after entering the State Department. For the remainder of their career, internships are the only method for further development, which the State Department clearly sees as a deficiency. Due to the small size of the State Department and the numerous position vacancies, the time for education is very limited. In contrast, the military exposes their service members to a lifelong learning trajectory, and graduation is required for future promotions for strategic level positions. This allows the strategic leadership to influence other members within the military. State Department personnel see this as one of the strongest points of the military organization.

*The Instrumental Dimension.* The instrumental dimension deals with the tools that are used in the profession, the amount and use of technology, the resources, the nature of the organization and where the power of the organization is derived from. It is in this dimension where we find the more significant differences.

**Budget.** The nature of the State Department is fairly limited. "As for the 2010 budget, we are seeking funding in the amount of \$52.8 billion, which breaks down to \$16.4 billion for State operations and \$36.4 billion for foreign assistance. This enables us to have a few people and to use only our brain, that's it."<sup>34</sup> This is a major contrast to how the US armed forces are funded. "President Barack Obama today sent to Congress a proposed defense budget of \$663.8 billion for fiscal 2010."<sup>35</sup> The executive powers of the military create a completely different, far more executive task oriented organization than the "people centric" State Department.

**Character of the Organization.** By law, the military has the monopoly on the use of (deadly) force of the nation. The execution of this power cannot be outsourced. The nature of any military tends to be executive, because of this. The State Department has the exact opposite position. It is representing the nation's leadership, and executes large development programs around the world. That task is by nature suitable to be outsourced, as practiced by most foreign services around the world. This automatically focuses on a more policy based organization.<sup>36</sup>

### Conclusions

The COIN environment has placed leaders for immense and complex problems. The current effort includes shaping and influencing the environment. There is support that this method is effective. By closing off societies from external pressure and making them less vulnerable for threats, external influences are countered, at least temporarily. This gives the legitimate local government time to win the hearts and minds of their own people, proving that they are a legitimate, caring leadership.

Influencing a society is a complex problem, which requires many diversified qualities to be managed and applied. Societies react like humanoid systems to impulses, evaluating all impulses, and by nature largely unpredictable. This complex behavior necessitates the MDCT to act as one body, unable to limit influence to isolated parts of society, but always influencing the whole.

State Department officials, mostly Foreign Service Officers work together with the military in this challenging environment. Their organizations differ in task, in formal and informal organizational culture, in size and in social values. All those differences result

in contrasting behavior, creating misunderstandings while cooperating. The most significant differences are listed below:

*Rapid decision-making versus postponing of judgment.* There is a fundamental difference in decision-making and speed. The flat State Department organization is used to postponing decisions. The military tend to jump to a decision, knowing that after a decision is made, the executive part needs to be planned and prepared, leaving maximum time for subordinate levels.

*Managerial qualities and executive mindset versus individual intellectual focus.* The military has been exposed to complicated and complex problems. State Department officials have almost no experience in organizing complicated matters. Systems' thinking is underdeveloped, which can lead to friction commanding large executive organizations like COIN-forces.

*Openness to ideas versus conservatism.* The State Department perceives the military as extremely conservative, while the military leaders consider themselves as "thinkers outside the box".

*Unity of command versus collective decision-making.* The State Department has almost no executive powers over sister agencies and is by nature amongst peers. This environment asks for participative decision-making, tying in all parties involved. Military leaders are brought up with unity of command, command climate, ultimate decision-making under crisis, ordering and obeying hierarchic levels of command. These two models could have serious impact on MDCT decision-making, especially under time pressure.

*Individualism versus teams.* State Department officials always work within embassies, but the nature of the FSO work is individualistic. The shortage of FSOs makes long preparations and education almost nonexistent. The military values teambuilding, personal contact and knowledge of team members prior to a mission.

*External appreciation versus under-resourcing.* The State Department perceives the constant under-resourcing and size restraints as a non-appreciation of the US-congress and the American people. This sometimes creates tension cooperating with the well resourced and widely appreciated military.

### Recommendations

The State Department and the military have different backgrounds and organizational cultures, mainly originating from the informal organizational culture. To a large extent, the root of the problems is unfamiliarity with the organizations of both partners. With the introduction of the total government approach and MDCTs, close cooperation needs to be created and integrated.

The recommendations are grouped around effects, inclining in impact and intensity.

*Inform.* This is a prerequisite that needs to be achieved between the organizations participating in MDCTs. There is a need for information and knowledge about each other's system and competencies. This can be achieved by studying, reading and transferring of information in general.

*Educate.* This level can be reached by intensive studying, group discussions, seminars, and a variety of interactive education. Key is that members of the participating organizations interface as often as possible.

*Cooperate.* The next level is cooperation. Members of each organization must spend time together, either briefly before a mission or sustained throughout their careers. Combined education, short time activities like teambuilding with all participants and exchange of organization members in Task Forces could help reach this level of cooperation. Also, short periods of integrated education (weekly seminars during the higher command courses) could significantly contribute to mutual education.

*Integrate.* This level is reached when members of each organization structurally cooperate together, exchange officers between the standing organization and have joint education and training. Staff processes from beginning to end are conducted together, planning and execution are integrated.

Therefore, my recommendation is to aim for the highest level of integration possible. Minimally, future strategic leaders need to be prepared at the level of cooperation in order to ensure chances of successful cooperation. This level will solve the knowledge gap for the short term and for missions, without major adaptations to the structure and the nature of the organizations.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> *Mildquotes*, <http://www.mildquotes.com/diplomacy-quotes-and-sayings/> (accessed on March 2, 2011). William Penn Ardair Rogers, American comedian of the 1920 – 1930.

<sup>2</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *zum Kriege*, transcript in English (Washington, DC: Princeton University, 1989), 89.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, FM 3 – 0 (Washington, DC:U.S. Department of the Army, February 27, 2008), appendix A. Unity of Command: *For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort. At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a manner that masses combat power toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command means that all the forces are under one responsible commander. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose*

<sup>4</sup> *Wikipedia*, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation\\_Deny\\_Flight](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Deny_Flight), (accessed on December 22, 2010). Dual key in UNPROFOR operation Deny Flight, the UN mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mandate described the following: .....that after 00:01 GMT on 27 April, specified military assets and installations would be subject to air strikes if any Bosnian Serb heavy weapons remained within a 20-kilometre exclusion zone around the centre of Gorazde. Regarding other UN-designated safe areas (Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa), the Council authorized air strikes if these areas were attacked by heavy weapons from any range. These other safe areas could also become exclusion zones if, in the common judgment of the NATO and UN Military Commanders, there was a concentration or movement of heavy weapons within a radius of 20 kilometers around them. These measures would be carried out using agreed coordination procedures with UNPROFOR (the so-called "dual key" system).

<sup>5</sup> Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars*, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 2010), 261. ... *The US Ambassador to Afghanistan has sent Secretary Clinton a cable outlining his "reservations about a counterinsurgency strategy...* without notifying Gen McChrystal or any military in advance.

<sup>6</sup> Henry Mintzberg, *The structuring of organizations*, (N.P: Prentice Hall, 1979), 54. He states in his theory that any organization can only consist of 6 parts: Strategic Apex (top management), Middle Line (middle management), Operating Core (operations, operational processes), Techno structure (analysts that design systems, processes, etc), Support Staff (support outside of operating workflow), Ideology (halo of beliefs and traditions; norms, values, culture).

<sup>7</sup> Richard E Boyatis, *The missing link between values and behavior*, (Cleveland: Department of Organizational Behavior, Weatherhead School of Management, 2000), 137.

<sup>8</sup> Ten Have and Partners, *Competency Management, changing organizations one person at the time*, (original in Dutch), (Amsterdam: Prisma Press, 2008), 12. Competency-based management methodologies develops a competency architecture for an organization. This architecture captures key competencies into a competency dictionary that is used to create career precepts. Competency based performance management is also used to identify and solve learning gaps.

<sup>9</sup> Harry W Kopp and Charles W Gillespie, *Career Diplomacy, life and work in the U.S. Foreign Service*, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 189.

<sup>10</sup> Prof. Stephen J. Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition*. (Carlisle: USAWC DCLM, 2010), 28.

<sup>11</sup> Cheri Ostroff, *The effects of climate and personal influences on individual behavior and attitudes in organizations*, (London: Elsevier science London, 1993), 208.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Draft version of The Army Operating Concept*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2010), Working group under direction of BG McMasters, *Tradoc PAM 525-3-1 the United Army Operating Concept 2016-2026*.

<sup>13</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Counter insurgency operations*. Field Manual 3-24 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, Department of the Army, 2006), 1-1.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 1-19.

<sup>15</sup> LtCol Wilfred S. Rietdijk, *Schaken op vier schaakborden tegelijk* (Amsterdam: Militaire Spectator, April 2008), 147.

<sup>16</sup> BG Huba Wass de Czege, *Systemic Operational Design, learning and adapting in complex missions*, (n.p.: Mission Review, April 2009), 3.

<sup>17</sup> *Wikipedia*, <http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pashtunwali> (accessed December 17, 2010). Pastunwali is a non-written ethical code and traditional lifestyle which the indigenous Pashtun people from Afghanistan-Pakistan follow. Some in the Indian subcontinent refer to it as "Pathanwali". Its meaning may also be interpreted as "the way of the Pashtuns" or "the code of life". Pastunwali dates back to ancient pre-Islamic times but is still widely in use, especially by the rural tribal society. It is not only practiced by members of the Pashtun diaspora but also by some non-Pashtun Afghans or Pakistanis who live in close proximity with Pashtuns.

<sup>18</sup> Encyclopedia Britannica, *Encyclopædia* (London: Society of Gentlemen, 2006), 1411. Pashtun tribes also spelled Pashtun, or Pakhtun, Hindustani Pathan, Persian Afghan, Pashto-speaking people of southeastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan. They constitute the majority of the population of Afghanistan and bore the exclusive name of Afghan before that name came to denote any native of the present land area of Afghanistan.

<sup>19</sup> "UNODC Annual Report 2008: Afghanistan Opium Poppy Cultivation," Afghan conflict monitor, (summer 2008), 19-23.

<sup>20</sup> Peter van Ham and Jorrit Kamminga, *Poppy for Peace, Reforming Afghanistan's Opium Industry* (Washington, DC: Washington Quarterly, 2006-2007), 69-81. The Afghan drug economy provides 87% of the world's demand on heroine and it is creating 60% of Afghanistan's national income. 2 million Afghans depend on heroin trade or production to support their daily life. Without the drug related national income, the Afghan economy would collapse.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Harry W Kopp and Charles W Gillespie, *Career Diplomacy, life and work in the U.S. Foreign Service*, (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008). Appendix 2 Career precepts.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 209.

<sup>24</sup> Prof. Stephen J. Gerras, *Strategic Leadership Primer, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition* (Carlisle: USAWC DCLM, 2010), 28.

<sup>25</sup> Ambassador Minister Counselor Ambassador Carol van Voorst, dep Commandant international Affairs USAWC, interview by author, Carlisle PA, January 11, 2011.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> LtCol Ryan McMullen, interview by author, Carlisle PA, January 12, 2011.

<sup>28</sup> Counselor professor John Fox, interview by author, Carlisle, PA, January 14, 2011.

<sup>29</sup> COL Aad Ooms, Army Attaché, Kingdom of the Netherlands in the USA, interview by author, Washington, DC, January 13, 2011.

<sup>30</sup> Minister Counselor Ambassador Carol van Voorst and Ryan McMullen, interview by author, Carlisle, PA, January 11 and 12, 2011.

<sup>31</sup> Counselor professor John Fox, interview by author, Carlisle PA, January 14, 2011.

<sup>32</sup> Minister Counselor Ambassador Carol van Voorst and Counselor John Fox, State Department employees, interview by author, January 11 and 14, 2011.

<sup>33</sup> COL Aad Ooms, Army Attaché, Kingdom of the Netherlands in the USA, interview by author, Washington, DC, January 13, 2011.

<sup>34</sup> Ambassador Minister Counselor Ambassador Carol van Voorst, dep Commandant international Affairs USAWC, interview by author, Carlisle PA, January 11, 2011.

<sup>35</sup> [www.defense.gov](http://www.defense.gov), <http://www.defense.gov> (accessed on January 11, 2011).

<sup>36</sup> COL Aad Ooms, Army Attaché, Kingdom of the Netherlands in the USA, interview by author, Washington, DC, January 13, 2011.

