

COMPETENT, CONFIDENT AND AGILE? A STUDY OF THE U.S. ARMY
LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS MODEL AND ITS APPLICATION
FOR U.S. ARMY COMPANY COMMANDERS

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General Studies

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

COMPETENT, CONFIDENT AND AGILE? A STUDY OF THE U.S. ARMY LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS MODEL AND ITS APPLICATION FOR U.S. ARMY COMPANY COMMANDERS, by Captain Aleksander Jankov, 112 pages.

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In order to make the LRM more applicable for the U.S. Army company commanders it needs to be revised and adjusted to incorporate mission command as the overarching leadership philosophy of the U.S. Army. Likewise, FM 6-22 needs to be adjusted to align more with the other U.S. Army doctrines. Otherwise, FM 6-22 risks becoming an obsolete tool for the U.S. Army company commanders.

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ACRONYMS

ACPME	Army Center for the Professional Military Ethics
BOLC	Basic Officer Leadership Course
C1	Change number 1.
C2	Command and control
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CASAL	Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey on Army Leadership
CCC	U.S. Army Captain Career Course
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COP	Combat Outpost
FM	Field Manual
FSO	Full Spectrum Operations
GWOT	Global War On Terror
ILE	Intermediate Level Education
IMS	International Military Students
JP	Joint Publication
LRM	Leadership Requirements Model
MC	Mission Command
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia (1992-1995)
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Company command is the most demanding job in the Army. It's the toughest job you'll ever have as a captain, one of the toughest jobs you'll have during your career. Company command can be lonely. But remember, you weren't selected to be a company commander to win a popularity contest. The Army selected you because you've shown you're a leader who has potential and can complete the mission.

— BG John G. Meyer,
Company Command: The Bottom Line

A lead in

The conundrums of command and leadership have been the topics of scrutiny in many a book, thesis and doctoral dissertation. The Chinese military philosopher and strategist Sunzi wrote in 500BC that a competent commander must stand for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness, while another of the great Chinese military philosophers, Wuzi, emphasized that the commander should focus on five matters: administration, preparation, determination, prudence and economy.¹ Colonel S.L.A. Marshall, on the other hand, wrote in his extensive research on U.S. Army soldiers in the Second World War that it is more important for the commander to train ~~how~~ to assess” rather than ~~what~~ to assess.” Thus it seems that from the ancient Chinese focus of personality traits, Marshall, in 1947, focused on what can be perceived as doctrine and how doctrine should be trained.² Finally, in 2006 the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22,

¹Chen-Ya Tien, *Chinese Military Theory: Ancient and Modern* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1992), 35-39.

²COL Samuel L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (Oklahoma, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947).

Army Leadership upheld the core leader competencies through what Army leaders “are” and what they “do.” The U.S. Army doctrine seemingly has incorporated both the Chinese perspective of virtues and Marshall’s focus on doctrine.³

Company command is the highest level in which an officer leads soldiers directly. On the battlefield the company commanders are followed and obeyed because they are respected for their courage and resolve, for their ability to find the way to achieve the objective, and for their care for their people.⁴ After company command, the focus shifts from direct leadership of individuals to organizational leadership of unit command.⁵ In 2011, the U.S. Army has been at war for nearly a decade since the Global War on Terror (GWOT) was launched as a response to the attacks on Washington, DC and New York City. Today, the Army has battle-seasoned soldiers and officers who, more than the previous generation, have experienced the true nature of warfare. This collective experience must have had an impact on the company commanders and their leadership.

³U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), A-1.

⁴General Sir Rupert Smith, “The Young Officer Joins His Regiment,” In *Tanker om Militært Lederskap i Utvikling* [Reflections on military leadership in a time of changes], The Norwegian Military Academy (Oslo: Norwegian Army, The Norwegian Military Academy, 2008), 12-14.

⁵Roger H. Nye, *The Challenge of Command* (Fresh Meadows, NY: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1986), 39-40.

The operational environment

The beginning of the 21st century has been defined as the era of persistent conflict. The Operational Environment⁶ the U.S. Army is likely to operate in will be affected by globalization, technological improvements, migration and demographical changes, urbanization, scarcity of resources, the physical environment, the threat of proliferation of WMDs and instable political entities.⁷ General Sir Rupert Smith, the former Commander of UNPROFOR, has characterized the post-modern battlefield as war amongst the people, and asserts that this will significantly affect how force is being applied in the 21st century.⁸

The future application of force is likely to take on six characteristics that differentiate the post-modern operational environment from that of the Cold War era. First, the ends for which force is being applied have changed. The military end state no longer constitutes a point where the overall political ambition has been reached; rather it is more likely to be defined as the conditions that need to exist in the operational environment, in which an outcome might be discussed and decided. Second, the war will be amongst the people and not on an isolated and sterile battlefield. Third, the conflicts will likely be protracted or even timeless. Fourth, the preservation of the force will be

⁶Operational Environment is defined as: A composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), xvi.

⁷U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 1-1.

⁸Gen Sir Rupert Smith, *Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York, NY: Random House Inc, 2008), 19.

more important than achieving hard objectives.⁹ Fifth, the technological and organizational inventions of the industrial war will be brought into play in new and previously unimagined ways, rather than in their traditional application. Last, most belligerents in the conflicts of the 21st century will be non-state actors.¹⁰

In this increasingly complex environment, the U.S. Army must train soldiers and units, and deploy them across the globe to execute Full Spectrum Operations.¹¹ The fight amongst the people is the squad and platoon leaders' war. How these are trained and empowered will affect the strategic outcome of the application of force to a larger extent than in a conventional war.¹² With all of the above in mind, the leadership challenges of the company commanders appear increasingly complex and worthy of a thorough study. This thesis focuses on the leadership of the company commanders.

The thesis and its framework

The thesis is not about the broad concept of leadership, which can be defined as ~~the~~ the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization;”¹³ instead, it is about

⁹This is especially true in the Western world.

¹⁰Smith, *Utility of Force*, 272-307.

¹¹Full Spectrum Operations is the Army's operational concept and the core of the Army Operations doctrine. It is defined as a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously, as a part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. FM 3-0, 3-1.

¹²David Kilcullen, ~~F~~Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency,” *Small Wars Journal* (2006): 3-4.

¹³FM 6-22, Glossary-3.

direct leadership at the company level in the U.S. Army. Direct leadership is the level of leadership where the leader is close enough to affect the subordinates through one-on-one communication. Traditionally it is assessed that the highest level in the Army where direct leadership is applied is in the company.¹⁴ This is, of course, an imprecise statement, as the Chief of Staff in a Division staff exercises direct leadership on his staff members, or at least on his closest subordinates. The company, however, is the last level where the officer leads the unit through direct personal relations with the individual soldier; whereas from battalion command onwards, the officer leads units. This becomes especially true in the post-modern operational environment of the 21st century.

U.S. operations in 2010 are influenced by the concept of Full Spectrum Operations with emphasis on Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Stability Operations.¹⁵ COIN operations and the description of COIN campaigns vary dramatically from the paradigm of the conventional and linear battles. The focus on COIN has come about since 2006 and, as the FM was written in 2005, there is a risk that company commanders do not apply the leadership as prescribed by FM 6-22. Furthermore, data from the annual survey conducted by Center for Army Leadership (CASAL) in 2009 suggests that company grade officers are the least likely cohort to read FM 6-22.¹⁶

If the company commanders apply leadership differently than doctrine prescribes, this might have spillover implications on aspects like mission execution and the

¹⁴FM 6-22, 3-7.

¹⁵FM 3-0, vii-viii.

¹⁶Center for Army Leadership, —Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL)” (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 2009).

development of junior officers, as the doctrines of the U.S. Army are interwoven and mutually dependent. As the U.S. Army doctrine on operations, FM 3-0, *Operations*, and the *Army Leadership* doctrine describe concepts and procedures that depend on each other, the execution of operations might be alternated if the leadership that is applied differs severely from what doctrine prescribes.

While research on the theory of military leadership and the personal experiences of officers and other military leaders abound, there seems to be a shortfall when it comes to describing what traits and competencies are ultimately applied in American Army units. An extensive search in the databases of the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) strengthens this perception, and it appears that the majority of the resources on leadership and company command are qualitatively researched through interviews and other personal narratives. These narratives can serve as valuable sources, but their application is limited as they represent only one soldier's point of view.

Likewise, there is abundance of leadership manuals, instructions and books. Even the internet blog center CompanyCommand.mil has developed into a hub of discussions on company command and how to apply direct leadership.¹⁷ While starting off as an initiative by former U.S. Army company commanders, it has now earned the respect and official standing a professional forum like this should have.

Doctrinally, the leadership requirements in the U.S. Army are described in FM 6-22. Applied leadership in the U.S. Army should theoretically be the practical application of FM 6-22. The research question of this thesis is thus: Is there correlation

¹⁷<http://CompanyCommand.army.mil>, started off as CompanyCommand.com, but is now to be found on the US. Army Knowledge Online system.

between FM 6-22 and what is applied at the company grade level in the U.S. Army? The research of this study seeks to investigate the correlation, or the lack of such, between FM 6-22 and how company commanders of the U.S. Army assess their role as commanders and leaders. This examination will identify how big a gap there is between the perceived practice of direct leadership and what doctrine prescribes. To understand the research problem it is important to understand the variables that define this study (see figure 1).



Figure 1. Relationship matrix of the variables of doctrine, training and theory and applied direct leadership at the company grade level
Source: Created by author.

The logical first question to consider is whether there are major discrepancies between FM 6-22 and the “real world?” If there are such discrepancies, why do they exist? One reason might be because the doctrine is not applicable, that it is unsynchronized with other doctrines, or that it is just poorly written. Another might be that there is a non-existent or weak correlation between the doctrine and what is taught

and trained throughout the Army. Lastly, it might be a result of the change in the operational environment that has gradually taken place since 2001.

The second question that derives from the main research question is; how well does FM 6-22 match the expectations, experiences and understandings of the company commanders and how well does the doctrine fit the Operational Environment? A logical follow on to this account would be to look at the leadership training of the company commanders, not only through the formal academic training in Reserve Officers Training Corps, Officer Candidate School, or the U.S. Military Academy, but also through their operational training in preparation for battle. How do company commanders train the leadership skills of their junior officers?

The hypothesis of this paper is that the U.S. Army Leadership Doctrine (FM 6-22) Leadership Requirements Model (LRM) fits fairly well with the applied leadership of the U.S. Army company commanders. A discrepancy exists between the LRM and how company commanders assess their role and functions. This disparity is primarily a result of how the LRM has been developed to accommodate all levels of leadership in the U.S. Army, the operational environment, the master-learner relationship between leaders in the battalions and the influence other U.S. Army doctrines have on the applied leadership at the company grade level in the U.S. Army.

This thesis will focus on identifying any gaps between the doctrine and the applied direct leadership at the company grade level. Furthermore, it will seek to explain some of the reasons behind the potential discrepancies. The theoretical framework of the training and preparation of company commanders in the U.S. Army which constitutes the third main variable in the research model will be thoroughly discussed in chapter 2. The

methodology of the research will be outlined in chapter 3. The main research is centered on a comparison between FM 6-22 and what is actually applied at the company grade level. The former data will be attained by dissecting the doctrine, while the latter will be acquired through a survey on applied leadership at the company grade level. For the survey research component, a randomly selected portion of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Intermediate Level Education (ILE) 11-01 cohort of the U.S. Army CGSC serves as the selected sample from the entire population of company commanders in the U.S. Army. The research will be directed at giving quantifiable answers to questions on applied leadership style, leadership values and approaches to the training to and coaching of junior officers. The results will be compared with the Core Leader Competencies and Leader Attributes listed in FM 6-22. Pending the results of the survey, the project will seek to identify possible issues that may need to be addressed the next time FM 6-22 is being revised.

There is, of course, a possibility that this research will determine that a sound correlation exists between what the company commanders perceive as their application of direct leadership and what is prescribed in doctrine. Furthermore, the research may reveal that the theoretical framework in the training manuals and books on direct leadership logically tie the three corners together. The discussion of how the operational environment has influenced the training of junior officers and why the doctrine is applicable is still valuable, at least as a starting point for a future comprehensive study of the entire triangle.

Assumptions and limitations

The project entails several assumptions and limitations. The study assumes that there is an inter-doctrinal correlation within the Army, and that the doctrinal hierarchy is nested. A consequence of this is that a study on how, or even if, the various FMs nest together has not been conducted. There will always be some degree of nesting inaccuracy as the doctrines are constantly being updated.

The primary limitation of this study is that a survey-based thesis always carries the inherent weaknesses of the survey tool through to the analysis. Additionally, the project does not set forth to revise the American doctrine. It must be seen more as an attempt to analyze the company commander through the lens of FM 6-22. Whether recommendations on future considerations for the FM can be identified hinges entirely on the results of the survey.

Furthermore, the research will mainly revolve around the two variables of doctrine and the applied leadership, and compare and contrast these two elements. There will not be an exhaustive study of the training manuals and theoretical framework for the leadership training in the Army. This is beyond the scope of the MMAS and is left for others to complete.

Finally, in the Norwegian Armed Forces there is no non-commissioned officer corps. The Norwegian officer is expected to cover both the functions of the officers and the NCOs. Consequently, as a Norwegian officer, the thesis author risks not fully comprehending the role of the non-commissioned officers in the U.S. Army in general and the role of the Company First Sergeant in particular. There is always a risk that cultural peculiarities at either side of the cultural barrier emphasize unimportant traits or

overlook important ones. The quantitative nature of the research seeks to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the people who have actively contributed to the collection, collating and integration of data in this thesis have also contributed with cultural sanity checks and advice. The cultural differences cannot, however, be completely erased.

In the next chapter, the literature review is designed to give the reader an overview of what has already been written on direct leadership. The purpose of chapter 3 is to introduce the reader to the methodology that drives the research of this MMAS, while chapter 4 is aimed at the analysis of the research question. Here the reader will find an analysis of FM 6-22 and the operational environment, together with a comparative analysis between FM 6-22 and the results of the survey. Chapter 5 is dedicated to summing up the analyses and concluding. In that final chapter the reader can also find the recommendations that have been derived from the analysis.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Leader development is accomplished through combat, operational experiences, lessons learned, individual and collective training, assessment and feedback.

—LTC Stephen Quinn, “Junior Officer Leader Development in an Era of Persistent Conflict”

General observations

The striking aspect about LTC Quinn’s quote from the *Army Posture Statement* in 2007 is not what he refers to as the main sources of leadership development, but the fact that the leadership doctrine is not mentioned in his entire monograph. In order to research the topic of applied leadership, it is important to get an oversight of what research is available in the field of leadership. This chapter will focus primarily on a review of the theories and manuals for leadership development in the U.S. Army. The review will not be exhaustive, as there is more written on leadership in the Army than is physically possible to capture within the limits of this thesis. In the following, the focus will thus be on the literature that has been identified as important to build the third leg of the tripod in the research model. This is the realm of the models, manuals and instructions on leadership and leadership development. Moreover, it will also discuss relevant literature that enables the readers to understand the ensuing analysis.

The literature that has been identified can be categorized into three main groups. These categories are doctrine, relevant theoretical and instructional literature on direct

leadership, and supporting literature.¹⁸ In addition to this comes literature on research methodology, specifically related to quantitative research. The correct processes for selecting a research population and how to sample that population will be dealt with in the methodology chapter, as this literature does not have bearing on the actual research question. This chapter will initially look at direct leadership with reference to U.S. Army doctrines other than FM 6-22 Army Leadership. Next, it will discuss direct leadership through the lenses of various studies, reports and instructional manuals. Finally, it will point at some important problems and gaps, where additional research might be needed and thus pointing on to the analysis of the MMAS.

U.S. Army Field Manuals 3-0, 5-0, 6-0, 7-0, and 3-24

One of the issues that must be addressed when analyzing the U.S. Army Leadership doctrine and its application is the hierarchy of doctrines. In the U.S. Army several doctrines address leadership and command. In viewing questions of command through the lenses of some of these other doctrines, it becomes evident that trends of leadership and command stem from more sources than only FM 6-22. In the doctrine of operations, which was published in 2008 the leadership views of FM 6-22 are reflected in the chapter on the “Elements of Combat Power.”¹⁹ Direct leadership at the company grade level, however, is distinguished from leadership in general as it entails command authority. Command is exercised by commanders in the Armed Forces over subordinates

¹⁸Supporting literature in this paper is monographs, articles and reports that seek to enforce a point in doctrine or leadership theory, or conversely that it seeks to argue the contents of either the doctrine or the theory.

¹⁹FM 3-0, 4-2.

by virtue of rank or assignment. It is lawfully vested in the respective command authority and it includes aspects like leadership, authority, responsibility and accountability.²⁰

A leadership function that holds primacy in FM 3-0, *Operations*, FM 5-0; *The Operations Process*; FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*; and FM 6-0, *Mission Command* is the concept of mission command. Although it entails the word command this is more a leadership philosophy than a reflection of authority. Mission command is the philosophy of decentralized conduct of operations, where subordinates are given latitude to operate more independently than in traditional military structures. Mission command entails the explicit expressing of the commander's intent, which states the purpose of the task ahead and the conditions that are to be reached in order for a mission to be considered a success.²¹ This appears to be a function of operations, but in reality it is a way of exercising leadership in a unit.

Mission command cannot function if there is distrust between the company commander and the subordinate leaders and soldiers. Likewise, mission command involves for the company commander to accept more risk in the execution phase of operations. This might not be easy to carry through. Conversely, it is a discussion in itself, if or to what extent mission command is being executed at company level, or if the direct style of leadership, which is normally linked to company command entails too much hands on leadership to be called mission command. Moreover, this is likely to fluctuate from company type to company type.

²⁰FM 3-0, 5-4/5-5.

²¹FM 3-0, 3-6.

The current Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine was published in 2006 and emphasizes small unit tactics and mission command. The doctrine advocates that in COIN it is vital to decentralize execution. This involves a heavy element of countering moral complacency and frustration that normally builds up in protracted operations. The ethical dilemmas of the commander are highlighted and given more emphasis in COIN doctrine than in any other of the U.S. Army doctrines. In COIN four leadership qualities are emphasized above all others. These are initiative, patience, presence and courage.²² From this a multitude of leadership challenges can be derived, but they invariably return to the question of mission command: how to organize for intelligence; how to seize the initiative and hold on to it; how to disregard rank and replace it with talent, to name a few.²³ Kilcullen wrote about this at a time when both FM 3-24 and FM 6-22 were being produced. His thoughts however were incorporated in FM 3-24 as “A Guide for Action.”²⁴ These aspects of Army leadership are not captured in FM 6-22, but they represent vital and ever-present sides of the direct leadership challenges of the company commander on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Another important element of the doctrine hierarchy is Full Spectrum Operations (FSO). In FM 7-0, *Training for FSO*, the Army training and leader development model is introduced as a tool to explain how the Army trains leaders for FSO.²⁵ An Army leader is

²²U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 7-1/7-10.

²³Kilcullen, 2006, 2-5.

²⁴FM 3-24, Appendix A.

²⁵U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 3-5.

a person of character, presence and intellect.²⁶ In FM 7-0 the commander's role in training is reflected through a set of characteristics that translates the Army leadership attributes into tangible elements of what a leader does. Army commanders are competent in their profession and can successfully employ their units. Their insight provides them with the knowledge to train, employ and command soldiers with confidence and agility in the modular Army as a part of the overall unified action.²⁷ Commanders are capable of exercising mission command on their level and possess cultural astuteness. While caring for their subordinates, they are courageous, industrious and manage risk effectively.²⁸

Meshed, the doctrines of operations, counterinsurgency, mission command and training for FSO constitute a major source of influence on the company commander. Direct leadership transcends all these doctrines and, interestingly enough, the five doctrines discussed herein are remarkably consistent and mutually supporting in their focus on leadership attributes and core leader competencies. One challenge is the transcending focus on mission command as the preponderant leadership philosophy of the Army.

Furthermore, the doctrines all revolve around the need for leadership to be conducted in the current operational environment, as the focus on FSO and COIN demonstrates. The likelihood of company commanders looking to these important documents for guidance on issues of direct leadership is thus high, and this might

²⁶FM 6-22, 2-4.

²⁷FM 3-0, 1-10; Unified action is the synchronization, coordination and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

²⁸FM 7-0, 3-4/3-5.

produce a vacuum between the doctrines that focus on operational matters and the leadership doctrine.

Direct leadership through the lenses of various studies,
reports and instructional manuals

Doctrine is theory. It is a clean, predictable, quantifiable, small grey area. Reality is a dirty, confusing, conflicting, ambiguous, large grey area. Schools grade you on your knowledge of doctrine; your boss grades you on results. Do not confuse the two grading scales.²⁹

In this section theory on direct leadership, portrayed through lenses other than the doctrinal ones will be discussed. This literature abounds and the diversity of approaches is endless. Some focus on an instructional form, like Brigadier General John G. Meyer in his book *Company Command, the Bottom Line*. Others, such as Major Jason M Pape and LTC Gerald Sewell, seek to discuss command and leadership related topics by scrutinizing the leadership philosophy of the Army and certain parts of FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*.³⁰

One common trait of the majority of these texts is that they focus on three important leadership drivers. These are situation (operational environment), roles and personality. One of the most conclusive sources is Technical Report 200801 of the U.S. Army Center for the Professional Military Ethic (ACPME) which is located at the U.S. Military Academy. This report uses behavioral psychology to determine five important roles of the commander. They should be intelligence coordinators, tactical warfighters

²⁹Major (R) John Chapman, *Muddy Boots Leadership* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006), 159.

³⁰Major Jason M Pape, "Reassessing Army Leadership in the 21st Century," *Military Review* (2009): 95-102.

and commanders, proficient diplomats and negotiators, tactical civil-affairs coordinators, and troop or unit leaders.³¹ While this report focuses primarily on what a commander does, it also precurses a phase four and a phase five in the research, which will deal specifically with what a commander is.

The personality realm of direct leadership is widely discussed by many authors on direct leadership. One common theme in the personality sector is the focus on the difference between coercion and commitment. Most literature acknowledges that a commander needs a bit of both, and that this is, of course, dependent on the situation. Chapman associates commitment with leadership, while he infers that commanders exercise command and thus rely on compliance. His main argument in his book *Muddy Boots* revolves around the theme of how to invest your personality in commitment, so that when you need compliance it will flow naturally. BG Meyer emphasizes the importance of a leadership philosophy, which should guide you in your duties as company commander. Meyer discusses virtues as patience, decentralized execution and caring.³²

Brigadier General “Doc” Bahnsen dares to express what many others do not state explicitly. In the book *Leadership: The Warrior’s Art* he emphasizes the importance of charisma in command. Here the concept of command presence is discussed through the metaphor of personal gravitation. Why is it that some commanders seem to gain unity of effort merely by being present? Why is it that some commanders attract good people? He

³¹Army Center for the Professional Military Ethics. Technical Report 200801, *Defining Roles and Attributes of Effective and Adaptive Tactical Leaders for the Current Operating Environment* (West Point, NY: U.S. Army Center for the Professional Military Ethic (ACPME), 2008), 20-25.

³²BG John G. Meyer, *Company Command: The Bottom Line* (Alexandria, VA: Byrd Enterprises Inc, 1994), 19-22.

argues that in times of change and exceptional demands, charismatic leaders will prevail because of three factors. They are normally extremely sensitive to environmental constraints and they possess the capacity of being able to exploit previously unidentified potential. Concurrently, they are exceptionally skilled in describing the visualized end state, toward which the entire organization will navigate. Finally, they are asymmetric in their approaches to achieving the goal and setting the conditions that define success.³³

An important contribution in discussing trends and traits of army leadership is offered by Major Pape in the journal *Military Review* in 2009. His focus differs from the others in several interesting points. He discusses the importance of the master-learner relationship that develops at all levels in the U.S. Army. Pape's argument revolves around the leadership doctrine and more precisely the doctrine's inability to explain why the U.S. Army leadership philosophy is the way it is. It is, according to Pape, easy to state what the philosophy is, and this is one of the weaknesses with the doctrine.³⁴ In the changing operational environment, good leaders learn to lead from other good leaders. This is especially true in the direct level of leadership that is exercised between platoon leaders and company commanders. Thus, Pape asserts the relationship between superior and subordinate leaders as one important aspect of leadership and leadership development. Our ability to continue to develop our subordinate commanders and leaders, and to let ourselves be guided by good examples superior to us, is the most important leadership quality, according to Pape.

³³BG John C. "Doc" Bahnsen, "Charisma," in *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*, by Christopher Kolenda (Carlisle, PA: The Army War College Foundation Press, 2001), 259-263.

³⁴Pape, 96.

Furthermore, he claims that if the U.S. Army does not refine its leadership philosophy, it will continue to create an officer corps of followers and not leaders. In addition, he raises many relevant questions on qualities of leadership that are less evident in FM 6-22 than he would have liked. “No plan survives the first enemy contact,” he argues, is really a cover for a lack of ability to lead by mission orders and end state conditions. It is easier to resolve problems through direct micro-management and thus it is a coveted fall-back position for commanders who are uneasy about letting tight control slip away.³⁵

Pape creates a well-founded argument, and in effect he is not disagreeing with other theorists on this. He expresses his views in contrast to FM 6-22, while the others more purposely discuss the right conduct of direct leadership and command. Both Chapman and Meyer emphasize the importance of delegation, firmness and fairness.

The former maxims of army leadership “be, know, do” have been replaced by “is” and “does” in FM 6-22. This is unfortunate, according to LTC Gerald Sewell. His discussion of emotional intelligence is well-placed among those who search for the “how to be” and the “why to do” in army leadership. His main argument is that emotional intelligence is the capacity for leaders to identify their own feelings and those of others, and that this is an important capacity when building strong teams.³⁶ The increased focus on self-development articulated in almost all of the writings on army leadership underscores the issues of emotional intelligence. Although the various leadership

³⁵Pape, 100.

³⁶LTC(R) Gerald Sewell, “Emotional Intelligence and the Army Leadership Requirements Model,” *Military Review* (November-December 2009): 93-98, 96-98.

discussions emphasize different factors and have different points of departure , they all seem to incorporate the importance of self-development in their discussions. The unreleased potential in self-development is identified as one noteworthy domain in the junior leadership development program that could be exploited more profoundly in the conditions of the current operational environment.³⁷

In the U.S. Army itself, reflections on the operational environment of the future and its impact on U.S. Army leadership are addressed in *A Leadership Development Strategy for the 21st Century*. This document is a response to TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, *The Army Capstone Concept 2016-2028*. In this strategy the Army advocates that leadership will adhere to three important domains that are thoroughly discussed in both Chapman's and Meyer's books. The first domain is that, in the future, Army leaders must be trained to manage the transition from the challenge of massing forces in compressed time to the challenge of operational complexity in extended time frames. The second domain is that the leaders of the U.S. Army must be capable of decentralized execution. The third domain is that they must be capable of framing ill-structured problems. To meet these challenges the leadership philosophies of mission command and operational design have been introduced to the force in Field Manual (FM) 1, *The Army*, FM 3-0, and FM 5-0.³⁸ Mission command is briefly mentioned in FM 6-22, but not emphasized to the same extent or with the same prominence as in the other doctrines.

³⁷Quinn, 19.

³⁸Center for Army Leadership, *A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, 2009), 3-7.

Across the spectrum of manuals and articles there seems to be a general consensus that the personal qualities of the commander are ultimately what makes a good or bad company commander. Meyer focuses his entire book on “you” and “your” qualities. His main argument is addressed already on the first page of chapter 1 of his highly informative and instructional book on company command and the role of the commander.

Chapter 1: Who’s in charge?
You are
And don’t ever forget it!³⁹

This is the entire chapter and if you read it as an aspiring company commander, this is the important takeaway. The rest is administrative information and techniques on how to succeed in what is advocated so eloquently in chapter 1. Chapman and Meyer place a lot of emphasis on what you do as a commander; Pape and Sewell are more concerned with how you do it. In contrast, the latter two are less practical and provide less specific advice and direction on how to solve the leadership challenges they both depict.

So what?

There seems to be a relatively succinct coherence in the available literature when it comes to the need for developing agile leaders and commanders, who are capable of exercising an array of flexible and adaptive leadership styles through the full spectrum of operations. Although some focus more on the problem than how to fix it, the main drivers through both the doctrinal U.S. Army documents and the more loosely affiliated literature

³⁹Meyer, 4-5.

that is available on direct leadership, remain relatively constant. The importance of what doctrine denotes as the operational environment and mission command is emphasized throughout the entire line of argument. This is especially well captured in *The Army Strategy For Leader Development In The 21st Century*.

However, these discussions do not unequivocally show that all available literature converges on all accounts. Pape and Sewell for instance focus on the importance of strong teams and how the development of these is the most important hinge point in the development of future leaders. Others, like Chapman and Meyer, are more concerned with the commander as a person, who does and is. Many books are available on how commanders actually applied leadership in combat. The examples they provide of company commanders who reflect on their actions as they retell their stories offer retrospective insight to anchor the theories presented. Company commanders like Todd Brown and Jason Conroy give convincing and perceptive views of the real world of company commanders. In the books *Battleground Iraq* and *Heavy Metal* they provide insight in the minds of the men and women, who serve as company commanders at the frontlines in combat. They also point to the fact that few, if any, of the studies provide analysis of how direct leadership is being applied at the company command level.

The conclusions that can be drawn from the available literature are diverse, but yet they appear valid. While the books by Chapman and Meyer do not conclude decisively, they provide guidance that transcends the entire tomes. Others, like Pape and Sewell, provide stronger arguments than the conclusions they draw. They seem to have a larger agenda than only guiding the company commanders in how to prepare and do their job. They address organizational issues in the U.S. Army at a large and do not limit

themselves to only the direct level leaders. Finally, the narratives on company command from the war on terror provide no fixed conclusions. They do, however, provide important points for the ensuing analysis of the collected data from U.S. Army company commanders, which will be part of the topic of the fourth chapter of this paper.

In total, the abundance of literature on direct leadership can be detected through the annexed bibliography. The supporting literature in this realm of leadership studies is perceivably unmanageable. It appears, however, that the literature available to investigate the application of FM 6-22 is sufficiently distinguishable to actually serve as supporting literature, and much will be directly employed to dissect the doctrine in chapter 4.

As a consequence of the thorough analysis of the selected literature, it is viable to conclude that, although much has been written and studied on leadership in the U.S. Army, little has been written on the actual application of leadership of the company commander. Consequently, it is viable to claim that there is a research gap in the realm of applied leadership. This perceived gap in knowledge, combined with an apparent dissonance between what is written on direct leadership and FM 6-22, paves the way for the ensuing analysis of data collected from U.S. Army company commanders.

Especially important is the apparent lack of convergence between the doctrine on army leadership and the five other doctrines mentioned herein. Their focus on the overarching themes of mission command, decentralized execution, the importance of the changing operational environment and the master-learner relationship being developed in combat operations between company commanders and platoon leaders are, to a lesser extent, themes that are important in FM 6-22.

In chapter 1, the problem was identified as a possible discrepancy between the doctrinally prescribed and the applied direct leadership. The perception of this dissonance has been highlighted in this chapter. In chapter 3 the focus will be on the methodology that has been employed to collect the independent data needed for the study of Army Leadership at the company level. Following the description of how data has been collected and processed, the significance of the data will be analyzed in light of FM 6-22 and the current operational environment. This will be done in chapter 4, together with a linkage back to the available literature on direct leadership. Chapter 5, “Conclusions and Recommendations” will point out which of the two legs in the research model that appears to have the greatest influence in the real world.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

An Army leader is anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.

— Field Manual 6-22, *Army Leadership*

In the introduction chapter the research question and supporting questions were thoroughly discussed. The literature review has revealed that there is a lot of written documentation on direct leadership, and how this literature is affecting the training and preparation of company commanders in the U.S. Army. In order to investigate, and compare and contrast applied direct leadership at the company grade level in the U.S. Army with what doctrine prescribes, it is important to clearly define the point of departure. It is virtually impossible to conduct research on this question without starting with doctrine. The U.S. Army has defined that FM 6-22 is the source of its leadership theory and it clearly defines what a leader ~~is~~” and what he or she ~~does~~.”⁴⁰ The overall ambition of this research paper is to compare and contrast the FM 6-22 with the expectations, experiences and understanding of how leadership is applied by company commanders in the U.S. Army. This chapter explains how the research has been conducted in order to create a red line from the thesis, through the research questions to the conclusions and recommendations.

⁴⁰FM 6-22, 2-4.

Based on existing theories of applied leadership as described in chapter 2 of this study and FM 6-22, a quantitative survey of company commands in the United States, has been conducted with the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) 11-01 cohort as the selected population. The research has been directed at giving qualitative and quantitative answers to questions on applied leadership style, leadership values and approaches to the training and coaching of junior officers. The cornerstone of the research has been to make the survey succinct and attractive enough to achieve two primary objectives. The first was that the survey should elicit data that are possible to analyze properly and effectively in support of the overall research. Secondly, the survey must attract the attention of the selected population in order to produce a valid sample and sufficient data. If the survey has failed to meet any of these two objectives, the research is likely to severely impair the subsequent analysis of applied leadership.

In his book on mail and internet surveys, Don Dillman lists four important sources of survey errors. These are sampling error, coverage error, measurement error and non-response error.⁴¹ The consequences of any of these errors might be that the survey might be perceived as invalid or at a minimum highly inaccurate. The construction of the survey was thus directed at reducing the likelihood of the four sources of inaccuracy through the conscious strive towards the two above mentioned objectives.

To reduce the probability of these four errors occurring extensively in this research, three heedful steps were employed in the creation of the survey. First, the identification of the survey population and sample is paramount to a well conducted

⁴¹Don A. Dillman, *Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method* (Danvers, MA: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2000), 9-11.

survey. The likelihood of accuracy and precision in a survey increase if the population and its derived sample are consciously chosen entities.⁴² The population the survey addressed was the company commanders of the U.S. Army, and by practicality the sample is the cohort of the CGSC in the class that started the study in August 2010, and who will graduate in June 2011. The class was composed of 1040 students, including 69 International Military Students (IMS) and another 146 representatives from other services in the U.S. Armed Forces and other government agencies, which left a population of 825 U.S. Army students.⁴³ From these, 306 students were randomly selected as the survey subjects from the entire school roster. In order to create a sample, where trends across the services could be identified, the survey was delivered to all military students, regardless of their service or nationality, who identified themselves as having held company command in a land force component. The accuracy given by the responses of the other services, however, would be far from the level of the U.S. Army sample. This has been recognized in the ensuing analysis.

One consequence of the random selection of students and the selection criteria for U.S. Army students for CGSC is that the U.S. Army students who were asked to take the survey represented a random selection of U.S. Army officers who have held company command. The sample will thus be representative for the population the research survey was intending to generalize (i.e. U.S. Army company commanders). To achieve a confidence level of 95 percent in the research of applied leadership at the company grade level in the U.S. Army, the survey required a sample of approximately 190 from the

⁴²Dillman, 194-207.

⁴³CGSS/U.S. Student Division, Data retrieved 3 November 2010.

entire population of 1452 company commanders in the U.S. Army at the time of the study,⁴⁴ and assuming that they represent a relatively homogenous population.⁴⁵

FM 6-22 served as the blueprint for the questions framing the questionnaire. A pilot study was then conducted consisting of a randomly selected sample of the survey population to ensure the survey was properly constructed to trigger appropriate reactions that would yield measurable data. Based on the feedback from this pilot group, refinements and adjustments were incorporated in the survey before it was distributed to the final survey subjects. Pilot group members were specifically excluded from the final sample. Appendix A contains the survey questionnaire as it was presented to the final survey subjects.

Finally, the survey period was selected in order to avoid the most hectic periods of study in the Intermediate Level Education program. This choice of research timing most likely reduced the percentage of non-respondents within the population sample and thus further increased the validity of the survey.

Concurrently, a thorough analysis of the Core Leader Competencies and Leader Attributes as listed in FM 6-22 and other relevant theory on direct leadership has been conducted. The analysis was aimed at preparing the comparison with the results of the survey, and to the subsequent discussion on the contrasting of the results with relations to the operational environment and the training and education of junior officers. This examination was an important element when the research sought to support or nullify the

⁴⁴Department of Defense FMS Web (accessed 7 April 2011).

⁴⁵Dillman, 205-207.

thesis, and without a thorough analysis of FM 6-22, it will be impossible to either support or disavow it.

The results of the survey have been separately analyzed with respect to the LRM and other literature available in order to create a foundation for the comparison between the real world and the LRM. The results of this analysis and the assessed level of leverage have been captured in a table which is intended to graphically display aspects where the LRM has and does not have leverage. This table provides an indication on how well the LRM fits with the company commanders in the current operational environment. In the analysis, the numerals 1-3 have been used to indicate how well the LRM and the survey results interact (1 being critically low and 3 being good correlation).⁴⁶ In this comparison, the numeral 2 indicates that the factor is deemed important by the sample of company commanders, but that it seemingly does not fully meet the prescribed standards of Appendix A to FM 6-22.⁴⁷ The analysis does not set out to discuss if the company commanders actually do what they say, and more importantly this MMAS does no evaluation of the company commanders' actual achievements. Rather, it discusses and compares their perception of their roles and functions with the doctrinally prescribed roles and functions.

The numbers provided have been given no weighting in this process, but it seems viable to claim that the "leads" factor holds preeminence towards the others. This is because of the importance of leadership that is emphasized in the other doctrines and which can be identified through the survey responses. This will be used as a way to create

⁴⁶FM 6-22, Appendix A: LRM.

⁴⁷Which is the LRM in detail.

tangible and useful conclusions and recommendations. The numbers provided are, however, deduced from a qualitative perspective and cannot be mathematically proven. This would have been too technical an approach to a set of variables that essentially are revolving around the elusive human mind.

Subsequently, the results have been analyzed with regard to the operational environment, mission command and the master-learner relationship in the battalions. The survey results have been quantitatively compared with the tenets of mission command. Here the emphasis has been put on whether the responses provided by the company commanders are in line with, neutral to or in discord with the nine identifiable tenets of mission command.

Chapter 1 of this thesis briefly described the shift in the operational environment that has come about during the last decade of persistent conflict. The paper does not set out to analyze the operational environment in detail; rather, it describes the elements of the environment that have undergone substantial changes in the given timeframe. This narrative is important to demonstrate why there is a possible dissonance between FM 6-22 and the trends in applied leadership among the company commanders.

This thesis focuses on comparing the results of the survey with the Core Leader Competencies and Leader Attributes from FM 6-22. Through this comparison the study seeks to investigate the application of FM 6-22 in the U.S. Army, at the company grade level. By comparing the doctrine and what company commanders actually do, substantial evidence is provided to conclude that the LRM presented in FM 6-22 fits fairly well with the applied leadership of the U.S. Army Company Commanders. The potential disparity is primarily a result of how the LRM was developed, the operational environment, the

master-learner relationship between leaders in the battalions and the influence other U.S. Army doctrines. In the conclusions, it has been important to identify possible issues that should be addressed the next time FM 6-22 is revised. The key output of the study is thus to identify potential discrepancies between the LRM and how the company commanders evaluate their role and function, and to conclude on how this potentially might be addressed and adjusted.

The introduction, literature review and methodology have been described in order to set the stage for the analysis. The next chapter will focus on the core of this thesis. Initially an analysis of the LRM will describe to the reader what the Leader Attributes and Core Leader Competencies are, how they were developed, and what they represent in the doctrine. Subsequently, the chapter compares and contrasts FM 6-22 and the results of the survey, using the operational environment as the conditions in which leadership is applied. This comparison will produce conclusions and recommendations that will be presented in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Accordingly, Myer [the Commander of C Company] was forced to focus on managing air support (CAS), indirect fire assets, and MEDEVAC assets during the major part of the action. This limited his direct influence on tactical decisions.

— The Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute,
Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan 2008

FM 6-22: The Leader Attributes and Core Leader Competencies

FM 6-22, *Army Leadership* divides the leadership requirements in two fundamental compartments. As can clearly be seen in Figure 2 attributes that describe what a leader is are displayed on the left hand of the model, while the competencies that constitute the core actions of a leader are displayed on the right.




Figure 2. The Leadership Requirement Model

Source: Created by Author using data from Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), A-1.

The process behind the Leader Attributes and Core Leader Competencies is meticulous. The roots of the current leadership doctrine can be traced back to the first U.S. Army leadership doctrine from 1946.⁴⁸ Since then, the manual has developed steadily through eleven reiterations and, in a comparison conducted by the U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences in 2004, 29 of the 33 leadership requirements recur consistently through the 1999 edition of FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*.⁴⁹

In the 1999 edition of FM 22-100 the framework for leadership attributes and competencies was the structured leadership requirements model, known as the “Be-Know-Do model.”⁵⁰ That model formed the chassis of what later evolved into the Leader Attributes and Core Leader Competencies model in FM 6-22 (2006). The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Technical Reports 1148 (2004) and 1199 (2007) contain the supporting research and validation of the Core Leader Competency model. As the institute concluded in the 2007 validation report, the Core Leader Competency model is not an exhaustive description of leaders’ competencies and cautioned that such models should be used primarily to guide the organization in its leader development.⁵¹

⁴⁸United States Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences. Technical Report 1148: *Competency Based Future Leadership Requirements* (Arlington, VA: United States Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2004), 6.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 10-12.

⁵⁰U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1999), 1-6.

⁵¹United States Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences. Technical Report 1199: *A Criterion-Related Validation Study of the Army Core Leader*

However, Technical Report 1199 points out a weakness that is relevant to this study. The inter-correlation between the various competencies represents both strength and weakness in the model. The strength is that as the model sets out to describe leadership, and in leadership it is important that the competencies overlap and connect. On the other hand, the validation group was not homogenous; rather, it consisted of leaders from several layers within the organization. These leaders were assessed by the competencies and not in correlation with their direct or indirect influence on people.⁵² Consequently, it seems virtually impossible to determine whether the model really applies to direct leaders.

The Core Leader Competencies in FM 6-22 are derived directly from the doctrinal definition of leadership, which by Army definition is to “influence people by providing purpose, motivation, and direction while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”⁵³ From this definition it is possible to extract three core tasks that describe what a leader does. These three tasks are leading people and organizations, accomplishing missions, and developing organizations. From this discussion the extended purpose or implied task can easily be identified as developing individuals as they are part of the organization, building teams and ensuring unity of effort within the unit. These overarching objectives apply to all leaders in the U.S. Army whether the team leader or

Competency Model (Arlington, VA: United States Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2007), 32.

⁵²Ibid., 26-27.

⁵³FM 6-22, 1-2.

the commanding general. In FM 6-22 these Core Leader Competencies have been reframed as “leads,” “develops” and “achieves.”⁵⁴

Army leaders communicate task and purpose to their subordinates. This can be done either in the form of direct communication or by leading by example.

Organizational leaders often find themselves in a position where they do neither. Their communication is indirect and the organizations they are tasked to inspire and spur for success likely will never see them take action, because their job does not involve it. Thus, it becomes important to exert influence beyond the limits of one’s own sphere of direct communication and chain of command.⁵⁵

Leaders foster teamwork, cohesion and loyalty. To achieve this, they must create a learning environment in their units. The environment will promote initiative from subordinate commanders and develop their leader skills, as well as core military proficiencies and interpersonal skills. Likewise, the leader should actively participate in the intrapersonal development of his subordinates by allocating time for counseling and reflection amongst his junior leaders. Leaders express and enforce expectations from their subordinates, while at the same time accepting failure as an arena for further professional development.⁵⁶

In order to accomplish all this, a leader must initially look inward and maintain both physical and mental well-being. Leaders constantly seek to expand their knowledge and proficiencies to include technical and tactical matters that affect the unit and the

⁵⁴FM 6-22, A-1.

⁵⁵Ibid., A-2/5.

⁵⁶Ibid., A-5/8.

subordinates. By doing so, they set the standards by which the unit is run, and demonstrate the commitment that every Army leader needs in order to excel in this profession. To lead from the front implies demonstrating the importance of personal and organizational developments for the well-being of the unit and its individuals.⁵⁷

Army leaders achieve results. This is ultimately their *raison d'être*. If they were not able to accomplish missions, reach objectives and fulfill intents of their organization, they would be replaced without regard to how much they had developed their subordinates or themselves. The results derive from the leader's ability to optimally lead and develop the organization and its individuals. In this process, the leader must organize, coordinate and prioritize activities. A well-defined balance between planning and execution provides the organization with the task, purpose and direction it needs to be successful.⁵⁸

As can be easily detected, there is a strong correlation between the Core Leader Competencies. An organization cannot prosper in the long run without proper leadership. The appropriate mix of vision, guidance and development is a prerequisite for any successful organization. However, as it was portrayed in chapter 2, for the direct leader the entire process becomes profoundly more up-close and personal. At the company level, the results are more dependent on the leader's ability to exercise direct influence on the processes than is the case in larger organizations. The company commander, as a direct leader, should be in close proximity to any critical situation and should be able to exercise direct influence on the outcome. The degree to which he needs to get involved is

⁵⁷FM 6-22, A-5/8.

⁵⁸Ibid., A-8/9.

highly dependent on his ability to provide vision, task and purpose to his unit, and on how he has developed his team. The leaders' ability to exercise that direct influence on how missions are accomplished in their units is often described as the qualities a leader has as a person. The U.S. Army Leadership doctrine refers to these features as Leader Attributes.⁵⁹

The Leader Attributes describe what an Army Leader ~~is~~.” The set of characteristics that make up the personality of any human being will define how they behave, interact with others, and how they align with the physical and social environments to which they are exposed. The Leader Attributes do not comprise an exhaustive list of possible personality attributes. That list would have been too long, too technical and too complicated to have any practical value to leaders and leadership development. Generally the Leader Attributes are divided into three categories. These are the internal factors that form the mental chassis of the leader, how they are perceived by their surroundings and what intellectual capacities they add to the equation.

At first glance, the three may seem hard to distinguish properly. They are arguably inter-related and complementary, but not redundant. The character part of the attributes describes what value system the Army expects from an officer. The Army values, the Warrior Ethos and an innate desire to care for other people, clearly reflect the intrinsic relationship between values and personality the Army expects of its leaders. The presence element reflects how these values should manifest themselves in the bearing and demeanor of the Army leaders. The ability to exhibit military bearing, being physically fit, and to display confidence and resilience are attributes that build on the values and

⁵⁹FM 6-22, A-10/11.

guide the leader in how to adhere to the Army value system. Finally the intellectual capacity is the realm where the Army leaders are expected to exercise sound judgment and innovation, while interacting actively with their superiors, peers and subordinates to strive for mission success. This intellectual capacity should ensure agile and complete leaders with extended knowledge in all aspects of Army life.⁶⁰

Demographics

The survey was conducted over a period of two months from December 2010 through January 2011. The main reason for this extended period was the CGSC Winter Break, which lasted from 18 December 2010 to 3 January 2011, disrupting classes and the continued research for two weeks. The technical details of the survey, to include anomalies and potential sources of inaccuracy have been addressed in chapter 3. A total of 84 responded to the survey from a sample of 306 persons, randomly selected from the 11-01 cohort of the U.S. Army CGSC. From the 84 respondents, 69 identified themselves as U.S. officers, out of which 61 were U.S. Army. Out of the 69 officers, 61 identified themselves as having held command in a company or a unit equivalent to company. Although modularity has been part of the Army since 2005, only 26.23 percent identified their Brigade Combat Team. This can be either a consequence of unawareness from the respondents or a healthy reflection of the composition of the cohort. Among the sample, 62.3 percent of the company commanders have been deployed on operations. The majority of these (84.62 percent) had been deployed to Iraq as company commanders, while Korea and Afghanistan are mentioned as other deployment areas. One response did

⁶⁰FM 6-22, A-10/11.

not specify the deployment location. There is an array of reasons why this is the case, ranging from a technical slip to a likelihood of the operation being classified beyond the scope of this research. The majority (66 percent) of the deployed company commanders reported that their company had been directly engaged in combat during their deployment. One in every ten respondents in this survey was female. The earliest recorded deployment as a company commander in this survey was in 2003, while the latest deployment was in 2009. This leads to an estimated latest re-deployment in 2010. The oldest respondent in this survey was born in 1961 while the youngest was born in 1979. The age span of this survey is thus 18 years, although the majority of the respondents cluster around 1974-1978 (approximately 46 percent). All combat arms are represented in the replies.

Observations

FM 6-22 defines the Leader Attributes and Core Leader Competencies as what a leader ~~is~~” and what a leader ~~does~~.” Yet, amongst the company commanders, there is surprisingly little focus on the competency of achievement. While this may be an indication that they are not interested in results, it may also be that they are merely more concerned with mastering the process as a means to achieve. This might, in fact, be perceived as a positive trend. Similarly, 62 percent of the respondents emphasized leadership as the company commanders’ primary duty.⁶¹ The exercise of authority was identified as the least important duty of the commander. This might well be because the majority of the company commanders expect the soldiers to respect them based on rank

⁶¹Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 20.

and position, and consequently the need to exercise authority becomes somewhat superfluous. Likewise, being a leader and tactical commander vastly outweigh other roles a company commander needs to fulfill simultaneously on operations. This apparent focus on the leader role seems to be an important element of the image of good company commanders.⁶²

Analysis of the LRM and the Company Commanders

Leader Attributes

Character

According to respondents, a warrior ethos and people are most important (47.37 percent), followed by mission (31.58 percent), constitution (15.79 percent), and country (5.26 percent). Systems were not deemed as the most important by any of the respondents.⁶³

Company commanders were cognizant of the values and deem them important. When asked for the three most important characters of a good company commander, 57 percent used one or more of the army values as the qualities preferred.⁶⁴ The most important value to the company commanders appears to be loyalty, which was picked by 58.5 percent of the respondents.⁶⁵ Furthermore, 23 percent of the respondents included loyalty in their list of the most important characteristics of good company commanders. However, 24 percent disagree with the statement ~~it~~ is never acceptable to bad-mouth

⁶²Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 10.

⁶³Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 9.

⁶⁴Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 12.

⁶⁵Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 8.

subordinates, peers or superiors.” This might only be because the respondents do not recognize bad-mouthing as being disloyal.

To sustain an ethical command climate in the unit, the commander must establish the values that guide the unit’s actions. At the same time, the members of the unit must be able to create an environment that translates values into ethical action.⁶⁶ The Army has determined its values and these represent the minimum moral standard that should be embraced by all in the Army.⁶⁷ Most humans are inclined to view their own character, deeds and actions with higher esteem than may be warranted. To counter this tendency, ethical reasoning helps correct flaws by actively challenging the actual character instead of creating a naïve image of own infallibility. In this way, it is possible to continually self adjust and to adhere to the ethical standards that are expected in the organization.⁶⁸ This active ethical reasoning will likely sustain an ethical climate in the unit. Consequently, looking at the results from the survey it might appear that they believe there are various levels of loyalty or that loyalty is a quality which might be perceived as important to remember, but which is difficult to translate into ethical action.

The value deemed to be second most important is selfless service, which was picked by 40 percent of the respondents.⁶⁹ Both loyalty and selfless service are recurring

⁶⁶Pamela Raymer, Ed.D., “The Leader’s Role in Increasing Ethical Reasoning Ability of Followers,” in *Perspectives on Leadership*, ed. Col Garland Williams (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Management Staff College, 2008), 116-117.

⁶⁷FM 6-22, 4-15.

⁶⁸Raymer, 120-121.

⁶⁹Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 8.

themes in the examples of leadership philosophies provided.⁷⁰ This trend appears to be very systemic.

An interesting observation is that conceited, which was purposefully mingled into the Army Values, was picked by six officers to rank higher than number nine. This might not be a very important observation. However, it is interesting to see that, even though 40 percent of the respondents put selfless service on the top of the Army Values, some officers chose to rank conceited above Army Values. This was unexpected and could be something to investigate further as it might pertain to some qualities that are unintentionally cultivated in the Army; or it might be a result of important qualities pertaining to being composed and confident.

Taking care of soldiers is important to the company commanders. Empathy however is more about the propensity to experience something from another person's perspective, and to identify oneself with that person's feelings and emotions.⁷¹ The survey is not conclusive in this regard. There appears to be a propensity to be conducive, but the personal investment in the individual soldier seems to be less important for the company commanders.⁷² One could have expected the personal knowledge of each soldier to be more important to officers, who deem people 50 percent more important than mission and three times as important as the constitution.⁷³ However, they seem to view this primarily from a coaching perspective, and thus they appear less attentive to the

⁷⁰Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 23.

⁷¹FM 6-22, A-10.

⁷²Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 21.

⁷³Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 9.

situation from their subordinate's point of view. This may suggest that the company commanders have a tendency to see a personal problem from their own point of view, and provide guidance from this perspective.

Based on the survey and the definitions used in FM 6-22, there seems to be a medium degree of correlation between the LRM function "character" and what company commanders actually assess their role to be. The company commanders appear to be very well anchored in the Army Values. Likewise they appear fairly well committed to lead by the Warrior Ethos. However, there seems to be either a lack of maturity or limited conceptual understanding of empathy. In this case, the survey does not offer conclusive evidence, but suggests a possible trend that should be investigated further.

Presence

The company commanders are very aligned in their views on the position of the leader. He is present, he is in the lead and he knows what his unit does. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents included competence as one of the three most important characteristics of good company commanders.⁷⁴ The competence piece can obviously be viewed in various constellations, and the LRM puts competence both under what a leader does and what a leader is. There are clearly several forms of competence as well, ranging from military occupational specialty (MOS) to interpersonal and intercultural competencies. From the leadership philosophies provided in the survey however, it seems likely to assess that the company commanders primarily view competence as being proficient in the core duties of the unit. For instance, competency is held in higher esteem

⁷⁴Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 12.

than personal characteristics. In this respect it seems that the company commanders translated competence into a question on where a company commander should position himself to be a good leader.

A strong indicator on preferred leader positioning is evident as almost 87 percent cultivate the virtue of leading from the front. Likewise, more than 44 percent do not agree that it is advisable to withdraw to attend to administrative duties, while 73 percent did not feel that their superior spent too much time down in their company. These numbers are remarkable because they are very coherent in advocating a strong belief in the need to be physically present. On the one hand, this might be a positive trait of prevailing trends of leadership at the company level in the U.S. Army. As will be demonstrated in the continued analysis however, the company commanders tend to display extreme preferences for such qualities as control. Ultimately, the combination of a controlling mentality and the desire to be present may be counter-productive to other virtues that are prevalent amongst the company commanders. Important characteristics like encouraging initiative and teambuilding may suffer when the need for presence and control is overemphasized.

The numbers in the survey indicate that there are some general perceptions about what company commanders are. Sixty-eight percent expect their soldiers to respect them and, while this might be primarily a positive attribute if the respect is derived from personal characteristics and competency, 47 percent expect this respect to flow from rank and position. Furthermore, there seems to be a perception that the company commanders cannot display their weaknesses to their subordinates, yet only 34 percent feel it necessary to be the best soldier in the unit. Consequently, about half of the company

commanders will constantly strive to be best at everything in the unit, and they will be personally disappointed if they have to admit failure to the subordinates. This dichotomy, combined with the expectation of presence and competence is likely one reason why company commanders are constantly bogged down in work and that command takes a heavy toll on families.

Based on the survey and the definitions used in FM 6-22, there seems to be a medium to high degree of correlation between the LRM function “presence” and what company commanders actually assess their role to be. The commanders express traits of a culture where military bearing is important, and where it is important for company commanders to live by and enforce standards. Furthermore, being physically fit, expressing and demonstrating confidence and resilience all are fairly well accounted for in the survey. The factor of presence is the aspect of the LRM which seemingly fits the best with perceptions of the company commanders. Even more so, this is the only element in the description of what an Army Leader is where there are no factors that appear to be absent or insufficiently focused on by the company commanders.

Intellectual capacity

In an army where mission command is the preferred method of exercising command and control in operations, and in which decentralized execution and accepting risks are valued as important traits of good leadership the tendency to revert to tight control and checklists might represent a major obstacle.⁷⁵ This impression is enforced when the company commanders are asked whether they prefer doctrine or tactics,

⁷⁵FM 3-0, 3-6.

techniques and procedures (TTP).⁷⁶ Eighty-two percent of the respondents indicate that they prefer TTPs to doctrine, and while this might only be an indication of preference, it also indicates a desire to be succinctly guided. A reflection of this can be found in the company commanders' reliance on the mission checklists. Eighty-four percent indicated that they prefer to complete all checklists always.⁷⁷

Doctrine is not a prescription of what to think, but how to think. On the other hand, TTPs are succinct guidance on what to think and in what order.⁷⁸ The U.S. Army has two distinctly different control mechanisms. These are positive and procedural control. According to FM 3-0 procedural control provides the force with the most latitude, while the excessive use of positive control might develop into detailed command.⁷⁹ From observing the responses on questions on details (56 percent) versus broad lines (44 percent), and *ad hoc* (17 percent) versus organic (83 percent) it seems that the commanders prefer procedural control.⁸⁰

The opposing side of this is that the commanders also prefer creativity (70 percent), flexibility (96 percent) and empowerment (91 percent).⁸¹ In a tight procedural system, neither of these can be said to be observed. Furthermore, four in five prefer

⁷⁶Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 14.

⁷⁷Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 17.

⁷⁸U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 1-20/1-21.

⁷⁹FM 3-0, 5-13.

⁸⁰Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 13.

⁸¹Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 13.

agility to regulations.⁸² These are all elements of the philosophy of mission command, which in essence can be more easily conducted under positive control than procedural control. In this, it appears that although most of the company commanders desire flexible and creative arrangements, they are more comfortable with fixed organizations and detailed guidance.

Interestingly, the company commanders apparently still view the mission as more important than the intent, and 70 percent indicate that their mission is still important, even if an opportunity to accomplish the higher echelon end state occur.⁸³ In line with the philosophy of mission command the conditions that define success are called the end state and they represent the visualization of the battle space post battle. Consequently, the task given to the unit might be obsolete if the higher echelon end state is achieved. This quandary is most likely an undesired effect of the U.S. Army mantra “Mission first – Soldiers always!”, which is vested in the Warrior Ethos. Theoretically one might actually argue that the Warrior Ethos creates an interference for fully incorporating the philosophy of mission command in the force. On the other hand, one might argue that an inference like this is taking mission command too far. Either way, there seems to be a relatively unified perception amongst the company commanders on this.

FM 6-0 describes procedural control as effective in more static, clear and ordinary situations, while positive is more efficient in dynamic, unclear and complex situations.⁸⁴

⁸²Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 13.

⁸³Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 17.

⁸⁴U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2003), 3-20/3-23.

The philosophy of mission command and the operational environment, which was described in chapter 1 might thus be a reason for the tendency to prefer creative, flexible and agile solutions to rigid and directive solutions. From training like the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) and the Captains Career Course (CCC), the checklist mentality and preference of the organic and operating *modus operandi*, have been trained and inculcated. However, when these officers, assume command and take these procedures to fight in the contemporary operational environment, they experience a need for positive control and creativity. These responses seemingly are indications that the captains have experienced a different reality than that of their training.⁸⁵ Most officers feel safer when operating in a fashion that they recognize from training. It seems, however, that some of these lessons learned are already being incorporated into the training cycles of junior officers in the U.S. Army.⁸⁶ This will likely affect how the company commanders in the future address the same questions.

Based on the survey and the definitions used in FM 6-22, there seems to be a medium to high degree of correlation between the LRM function –“intellectual capacity” and what company commanders actually assess their role to be. The company commanders are very focused on creating relationships and taking care of their personnel. While the commanders seem to be meeting many of the requirements pertaining to creating a positive environment and developing others, they seem to have forgotten the

⁸⁵This observation does not include the pre deployment training units receive, but the more generic leadership and command training each individual officer has been through.

⁸⁶CPT Michael Fortenberry, –Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course: Platoon Leader Decision Making for the 21st Century,” *Infantry Magazine* (November-December 2008): 22-24.

importance of self-awareness and self-development. This last factor has been emphasized in the U.S. Army doctrines and other leadership literature. How this affects the development of units and field grade officers might be important to review, as well as mechanisms on how to make the junior officers more inclined to focus on self-development

Core Leader Competencies

Leads

Leading appears to be at the forefront of the company commanders' reasoning. Forty-seven percent answered that it is most important to lead and 37 percent answer that developing people and organizations is the most important function of the company commander. In operations exercising leadership is perceived to be even more important. Sixty-six percent of the respondents assess that the most important role of a company commander is to be a troop and unit leader. Combined with the role referred to in the survey as tactical warfighter and commander, these roles make up 95 percent of the two most picked roles of a company commander on operations.⁸⁷ Likewise, leadership is assessed to be overwhelmingly more important by the company commanders than authority, responsibility and accountability.⁸⁸

FM 6-0 however, does not distinguish between the four in terms of importance. Leadership is an element of the art of command, but neither of the elements engulfs or

⁸⁷ Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 10.

⁸⁸ Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 20.

excludes the others.⁸⁹ As was elaborated in chapter 2, command involves elements of authority, responsibility, accountability and leadership. Reflecting on the responses in the survey however, it appears that this is one of the issues where level of command and leadership affect which element which is perceived as prominent. A strategic leader is likely more concerned with accountability than is the direct leader, while the direct leader is more concerned with direct leader competencies.⁹⁰ In total, these responses illustrate the perceived importance of being up in the front and on top of things for a company commander in the U.S. Army.

Curiously, only 16 percent believe achieving is the most important function of a company commander. When counseling subordinate officers however, there seems to be little doubt on what is the most important. Only 16 percent discussed leadership topics with their subordinates in counseling, while 54 percent discussed the subordinate officers' achievements. Forty percent had personal development of the subordinate officer on the agenda.⁹¹ It is unknown whether some of the other answers were intended to address leadership but, in fact, many listed elements of the Leader Attributes as topics in their counseling sessions with subordinates. Rather than discussing what the leader ~~does~~ however, they discuss what a leader ~~is~~.

⁸⁹FM 6-0, 2-2/2-5.

⁹⁰FM 6-22, 3-7/3-8.

⁹¹Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 18: Estimate how many times per year did you have formal counseling with your subordinate officers (per officer)? What were the two most important issues you discussed with your subordinate officers in formal counseling (Key words)?

The Dutch anthropologist Geert Hofstede discussed this phenomenon in his extensive study on cultures. He divides the value systems into two correlated elements. These are nominated as desirable and desired elements of a culture's value system. The desirable is what people of a specific culture would address as important values if they were asked. The desired however, is what has real importance in the cultural system they represent. The desirable is mostly nominated in a collective form, while the desired is nominated in a personal form, as it pertains to me and what guides my actions. The desired is often identified through norms and guides to action, while the desirable is often what members of a culture would mention if they were asked to nominate what is important to them in specific situations. It is almost impossible for individuals of a certain culture to identify discrepancies between the desired and the desirable in their own cultures, and the differences might only be subtle.⁹²

The survey responses indicate that there is a potential for such a discrepancy in the U.S. Army culture. If leading and development really were the desired virtues of the U.S. Army value system, it would seem viable to expect these topics to be prevalent in counseling with subordinate officers. Interestingly however, the least important leadership function of the company commanders appears to be helping people learn.⁹³

Another important observation from the responses when it comes to leadership is the seeming desire not to be authoritative. Seventy-two percent of the respondents rank

⁹²Gert Hofstede, *Software of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and its Importance for Survival* (UK: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 8-10.

⁹³Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 16.

authority as the least important issue of being a company commander.⁹⁴ Furthermore, when asked to choose, the company commanders invariably chose factors related to commitment rather than compliance. The only exception to this was when they were asked to differentiate between consensus building and direction. It seems that consensus building postures as too democratic in this context and 54 percent chose direction.⁹⁵

Based on the survey and the definitions used in FM 6-22, there seems to be a medium degree of correlation between the LRM function “leads” and what company commanders actually do and assess their role to be. The commanders are very cognizant of the importance of leading others, which consumes much focus from them. While they seem to be meeting many of the requirements pertaining to leading by example and communication, it appears that they either deem extending influence beyond the chain of command unimportant or too intangible to devote too much attention. How this affects the development of units and field grade officers might be important to review, as well as mechanisms on how to make the junior officers better understand the importance of a balanced inward and outward focus in their activities to influence their surroundings.

Develops

Developing subordinates, organizations and self development are activities that are deemed important by the company commanders. Thirty-seven percent assess that this is the most important objective of the company commander.⁹⁶ Teambuilding is

⁹⁴Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 20.

⁹⁵Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 22.

⁹⁶Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 15.

recognized by a vast majority as a core leader task and of eight possible leadership activities, teambuilding was picked as the most important by 39 percent of the respondents. Moreover, none of the respondents considered teambuilding to be the least important activity.⁹⁷ The importance of good interpersonal relations to make teams work well appears to be very well incorporated with the company commanders. Ninety-eight percent of the respondents weight teamwork more heavily than personal growth, and teamwork and teambuilding are both recurrent themes of the respondents' leadership philosophies.⁹⁸

The development of subordinates has an ambiguous position with the respondent company commanders. To help people learn is recognized as the least important of the eight leadership activities of the company commander.⁹⁹ On the other hand, 63 percent of the same group disagrees with the statement that it is more important to accomplish tasks than to help people learn. Likewise, 57 percent assess that it is more important to coach than to accomplish.¹⁰⁰ As it has been discussed earlier, the results pertaining to accomplishments are somewhat dubious and should probably be investigated further.

The company commanders are, however, fairly certain that their counseling and mentorship are imperatives for the subordinate leaders. Seventy-six percent believe that their subordinate platoon leaders are good because of the training and advice that have

⁹⁷Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 16.

⁹⁸Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 22.

⁹⁹Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 16.

¹⁰⁰Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 17 and 22.

been provided by them.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the activities of mentoring and supporting the professional growth of subordinate officers and NCOs are both assessed to be fairly important leadership activities for company commanders.¹⁰² Furthermore, the number of formal counseling sessions the company commanders report that they have conducted with subordinate officers is relatively decent. They range from one to twelve, but the average number is 4.68 sessions per officer. That represents a frequency greater than once every three months. Depending on what type of company in question, the company commander has counseling sessions with 4 to 8 subordinates if he only counsels those directly reporting to him. That leaves the average company commander with approximately 28 sessions per year. This number provides a clear indication of the value the company commanders give to developing their subordinates.¹⁰³

From these two extremes it is viable to assess that company commanders do a lot of development activities. It is impossible from the survey results to conclude whether the company commanders wholeheartedly value the development sessions with subordinates. The results fluctuate too much to draw those conclusions. There seems to be a dichotomy between duty and appreciation, which indicate more a tendency to provide counseling because it is required, rather than because the commanders genuinely believe it will strengthen their organizations. Interestingly, very few of the company commanders

¹⁰¹Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 11.

¹⁰²Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 16.

¹⁰³Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 18.

emphasized their relationship with their former company commanders, when asked to assess what prepared them the most for company command.¹⁰⁴

The LRM emphasizes the importance of self preparation. This includes the leadership activities of maintaining self awareness and expanding own knowledge. The company commanders in this survey are not consistent when responding to these questions, but a tendency is that they value these activities to a lesser extent than other leadership activities.¹⁰⁵ As it was pointed out in the literature review, self-development is an important leadership activity and the lack of conscious self-development represents a deficiency in the leadership training of junior officers in the U.S. Army.¹⁰⁶

It is especially interesting to note that although 45 percent of the company commanders appear to value expert-level proficiency in all unit-level tasks, they also seem to have a detached approach to self-development.¹⁰⁷ A total of 87 percent of the respondents replied that knowledge and competency are more important than a strong will.¹⁰⁸ In this domain there seems to be a discrepancy between the LRM and what the company commanders do. The answers in the survey support Quinn's argument that there is unconsciousness with regard to self-development.¹⁰⁹ The reason for this might be found in how the officers assess their own preparation to command. Fifty-four percent

¹⁰⁴Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 19.

¹⁰⁵Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 16.

¹⁰⁶Quinn, 19.

¹⁰⁷Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 17.

¹⁰⁸Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 11.

¹⁰⁹Quinn, 19.

answered that the most important preparation was done through personal experiences. This might be true, but the important element that needs further investigation is whether the reflection was systematic and under counseling. If the lessons learned were adopted unconsciously, they most likely had little value to the subsequent performance as company commander.

Based on the survey and the definitions used in FM 6-22, there seems to be a medium to low degree of correlation between the LRM function “develops” and what company commanders actually do and what they assess their role to be. While the commanders seem to be meeting many of the requirements pertaining to creating a positive environment and developing others, they seem to have forgotten the importance of self-awareness and self-development. This last factor has been emphasized in the U.S. Army doctrines and other leadership literature. How this affects the development of units and field grade officers might be important to review, as well as mechanisms on how to make the junior officers more inclined to focus on self-development.

Achieves

As discussed earlier, there seems to be dichotomy between seeking results and valuing the process to develop the organization. This appears especially evident in the gulf between what qualities the company commanders desire and the qualities they discuss with their subordinates in formal counseling sessions. The split of the results between coaching (57 percent) and accomplishing (43 percent) might actually be a reflection of these conflicting values.¹¹⁰ When the same officers were asked about

¹¹⁰Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 22.

counseling of subordinates however, the split was precisely the opposite. Fifty-four percent discussed accomplishment, while only 40 percent focused on personal development of the subordinate.

The definitions used in FM 6-22 on what getting results entails might explain some of this divergence in the company commanders' views on this. In FM 6-22, getting results includes, not just accomplishing the mission, but also removing work barriers, making feedback part of the work process, and recognizing and rewarding good performances. Furthermore, it also involves the ability to execute plans and exploiting opportunities.¹¹¹ The attention the doctrine devotes to the process behind the accomplishments, as being part of the actual performance can potentially be traced in the survey when the commanders are asked to prioritize between certain factors. For instance, the commanders at a 72 percent to 28 percent rate prefer to execute plans rather than developing them. Likewise, they seek to foster commitment rather than resorting to compliance on a day to day basis in a company.¹¹²

To some extent this might also be a reasonable explanation for why 42 percent of the commanders deem it most important, from a set of important knowledge areas for a company commander, to have knowledge of the unit's capabilities.¹¹³ Curiously, none of the commanders reverted to external factors when they assessed what knowledge is most important for a company commander. Both cultural awareness and knowledge of the enemy situation were left unchecked by the respondents. It seems viable to conclude that

¹¹¹FM 6-22, A-9.

¹¹²Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 22.

¹¹³Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 21.

they make this assessment partially because they also prefer practice (85 percent) to theory (15 percent),¹¹⁴ and operating (66 percent) to employing (33 percent).¹¹⁵

It seems that the company commanders focus a lot on getting the desired results from their units, probably even more than the survey numbers might indicate. For instance, the commanders were asked to rank leadership activities. From the eight possible activities, 61 percent of the company commanders chose teambuilding as the most important or second most important activity, while encouraging initiative from all levels in the company was chosen by 52 percent.¹¹⁶ Both these activities are especially relevant to the “achieve” element of the core leader competencies.¹¹⁷

Based on the survey and the definitions used in FM 6-22, there seems to be a high degree of correlation between the LRM function “achieve” and what company commanders actually do and assess their role to be.

The Company Commanders and the LRM: Compare and Contrast

A core focus of this MMAS is to determine whether the LRM guides the company commanders in their duties, or if they are more guided by the operational environment, superiors and other elements of doctrine and leadership literature. As already described in the literature review and highlighted in the analysis of the LRM and the results of the survey, there are many aspects where the company commanders seem well-guided by the

¹¹⁴Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 13.

¹¹⁵Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 14.

¹¹⁶Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 16.

¹¹⁷FM 6-22, A-9.

LRM. However, in order to properly assess the application of the LRM in the real world, it is necessary to directly compare and contrast the LRM with the results of the survey. The combination of the analysis of the LRM and the survey will give indications on how well the LRM fits with the direct level leaders. In the following analysis the numerals 1-3 have been used to indicate how well the LRM and the survey results interact (1 being critically low and 3 representing a good correlation).¹¹⁸

The numbers provided have been given no weighting in this process, but it seems viable to claim that the “leads” factor holds primacy over the others. This is because of the importance of leadership that is emphasized in the other doctrines and which can be identified through the survey responses. The numbers are however deduced from a qualitative perspective and cannot be mathematically proven in the analysis.

The number indicated has thus been derived from the discussion of the survey results and the overall score would provide an estimate on how well the LRM fits with what the company commanders do, and it should thus provide an indication on how big the gap is between the LRM and the real world.

As can be identified from table 1, it appears that the LRM only fits well with the company commanders’ responses in five of 20 domains. It appears though that the LRM is met by and at a large, but there are shortcomings in the applicability for the company commanders. This is especially true with the domains where there seems to be critically low coherence between the LRM and the company commanders’ view on applied direct leadership.

¹¹⁸FM 6-22, Appendix A: LRM.

Table 1. The LRM Comparison Matrix

The LRM Comparison Matrix		
LRM		REAL WORLD
OVERALL CORRELATION		2.2 (73%)
LEADER ATTRIBUTES		
• CHARACTER		2
	ARMY VALUES	3
	EMPATHY	1
	WARRIOR ETHOS	2
• PRESENCE		2.25
	MILITARY BEARING	3
	PHYSICALLY FIT	2
	COMPOSED & CONFIDENT	2
	RESILIENT	2
• INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY		2.2
	MENTALLY AGILE	2
	SOUND JUDGEMENT	2
	INNOVATION	2
	INTERPERSONAL TACT	3
	DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE	2
CORE LEADER COMPETENCIES		
• LEADS		2
	LEADS OTHERS	3
	EXTENDS INFLUENCE BEYOND THE CHAIN OF COMMAND	1
	LEADS BY EXAMPLE	2
	COMMUNICATES	2
• DEVELOPS		1.67
	CREATES A POSITIVE ENVIRONMENT	2
	PREPARES SELF	1
	DEVELOPS OTHERS	2
• ACHIEVES		3
	GETS RESULTS	3

Source: Created by author using data from Appendix A Survey and Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), A-1.

The operational environment

In the study on the U.S. Army fighting in the WANAT the effects of the operational environment in the current fight are well demonstrated. A constant lack of combat power through a mission overstretch constrained the company commander Captain Myer throughout the entire deployment. His main mission was to secure Combat Outpost (COP) Ranch House and COP Bella, using them to separate the Anti-Afghan Forces from local communities while beginning to stabilize the security situation in the Waygal Valley to the extent possible.¹¹⁹

It is likely that the current operational environment pushes the leaders into paradigms that they had not thought through in training. For instance, the fault line between decentralization and empowerment can be viewed as a function of the operational environment. Most of the company commanders want to be at the receiving end of flexible and adaptable orders and regulations. They do, however, often revert to control mechanisms that fall within procedural control. The terrain and the situation do not permit detailed face-to-face control, and thus the concept of decentralized and locally empowered companies and platoons emerges. It is not primarily a product of an organizational evolution and development, but rather a sense of necessity which is forced upon the company commanders because of the composition of the operational environment.

The operational environment is hardly recognized as a component that affects leadership in FM 6-22. The answers in the survey however clearly indicate that certain

¹¹⁹The Staff of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute (USACSI), *Wanat: Combat Action in Afghanistan 2008* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 40.

traits of the applied leadership are determined by the operational environment and its effect on friendly forces. The leadership requirements in COIN however are well captured in FM 3-24. Thus, the LRM seems slightly at odds with the real world, despite an apparent intent for the model to be timeless. Timelessness may be an unreachable goal, even in leadership principles.

The master-learner relationship

The survey does not provide conclusive results in the realm of the master-learner relationship. At best, it provides conflicting information that should be investigated further. However, there seems to be little question in the company commanders' view on their own influence on their subordinate platoon leaders. When asked about the platoon leaders and the platoon leaders' overall proficiencies, 76 percent stated that the platoon leaders were good because they had been guided, trained and advised well by the respondents.¹²⁰

These replies are in stark contrast to the survey that was conducted on the CAC blog in February 2011. In the CAC blog survey, 45 percent answered that the primary reason for people leaving the U.S. Army was leadership.¹²¹ Likewise, only 20 percent of the respondents recognized their former company commanders as the most important source of preparation for taking command. Curiously, the battalion commanders were recognized with nearly equal importance as 15 percent chose the battalion commanders as the most important source of preparation. However, most of the company commanders

¹²⁰Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire, 11.

¹²¹U.S. Army Combined Arms Center poll, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/> (accessed 9 February 2011).

indicated personal experience as the most important source of preparation for company command (54 percent). These responses might be an indication of a corps of company commanders and mid-level officers who are highly confident in their own capabilities and competencies, but who are also less capable of appreciating the value of others' experiences. They want to influence others, but they do not necessarily value the importance of being influenced by them in return. This may be caused by an apparent underestimation of the value of self-development as described earlier in this analysis; or it might be nothing more than a matter of preference.

The responses in this realm of the study go a long way to support the assumptions of Major Jason Pape. In his discussion on reassessing leadership in the 21st century, he advocates that the U.S. Army should continue to practice and teach leadership as it has been taught for decades. In his discussion he asserts that soldiers do not necessarily become good leaders because they have good leaders. He claims this is because the U.S. Army values current knowledge over continued learning and promotes decisions over consensus.¹²² This observation is very consistent with the answers in the survey and these managerial qualities certainly contribute to why the master-learner relationship is not as prevalent as had been expected. Specifically, these trends can be found in the realm of development and leading. Coaching and mentoring appear to be from the superior to the subordinate and not reciprocal. The lack of dialogue between equal peers might also inhibit the development of future leaders.

As it seems, the U.S. Army company commanders produce future leaders more in their own image and less as a development of personalities with diverse capacities.

¹²²Pape, 97.

Consequently, the master-learner relationship reinforces any disparity between applied leadership and the LRM, rather than mitigating the gap. There seems to be a need for more research in this realm.

The influence from other doctrines

Mission Command

Much has been written already of the importance U.S. Army doctrines other than the Army Leadership Doctrine on the leadership of the company commanders. The key factor here seems to be a lack of consistency between the various doctrines, specifically between FM 6-22 and the others. As was thoroughly discussed in the literature review, the doctrines that pertain primarily to operations all have extended elements of leadership incorporated. The responses provided in the survey also indicate an inclination to revert to leadership qualities that reflect mission command language. This is natural from an operational perspective in the current operational environment. In Afghanistan for instance, the rugged terrain, distances between bases, and the constant threat of attacks force commanders at the company and battalion levels to act more in accordance with mission command principles than was likely intended.¹²³

Both FM 1 and FM 3-0 emphasize the primacy of mission command as a leadership tool. In the C1 version of FM 3-0, the term “philosophy” is used to address the role of the commander in understanding, visualizing, describing and directing operations, and the concurrent activities of leading soldiers and assessing the situation as it

¹²³USACSI, 44.

progresses.¹²⁴ Likewise, leadership has earned the most prominent position in the newly published edition of FM 3-0. In chapter 4, addressing combat power, leadership still sits in the center, tying all the warfighting functions together. Mission Command has replaced Command & Control as a warfighting function. Consequently and more than before, leadership permeates how the U.S. Army wants run operations.

Mission command has been more comprehensively introduced and incorporated in the revised doctrine because the U.S. Army identified that the former concepts of command and control (C2) and battle command inadequately addressed the roles of the commander and the staffs in the contemporary operational environment. With mission command, the U.S. Army seeks to invigorate a propensity for decentralized execution. This should lead to increased trust both vertically and horizontally in the organization, to more effectively incorporate other stakeholders in the operations, while anticipating and managing transitions. To succeed in mission command, the commanders must be proficient in balancing the art of command and the science of control.¹²⁵ Mission command is thus always a combination of command and control. The former represents the art, while the latter the science part of being a leader in the U.S. Army.

There is a likelihood that, as officers evolve through the various ranks and levels in the U.S. Army, they will continuously develop their ability to balance between art and science. It is also likely that a young team leader with less experience will adhere more to science, while a senior officer at brigade and division level will lean more toward art,

¹²⁴U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Incorporating Change 1 (C1), *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 5-3.

¹²⁵FM 3-0 C1, 4-4.

leaving the science more to his staff. This study has only focused on the company commanders. While they still seem to cling to tangible checklists and a desire for succinct guidance, they equally appear to have embraced the creative and flexible ideas behind mission command. The results of this study may demonstrate a healthy progression in the leaders' mindset, from a control mentality toward decentralized execution. To this point, the study is incomplete and the further analysis in this realm is outside the scope of the thesis.

From FM 3-0 C1 one can derive nine prevailing tenets of mission command. These are decentralized C2, decentralized execution, continuous nesting of CONOPSs, anticipation, initiative, mission orders, agile mindset and acceptance of risk.¹²⁶ The survey has measured the company commanders' adherence to mission command. Table 2 illustrates how the company commanders assessed their functions and roles in relations to the tenets of mission command. Note that the terminology "MC +" and "MC -" refers to whether the responses correlate with the tenets of mission command.¹²⁷ For instance, 90.91 percent replied that they value empowerment over direction. As empowerment is a tenet of decentralized execution the replies favor the tenets of mission command.

¹²⁶FM 3-0 C1, 4-4.

¹²⁷MC+ being a good correlation between responses and the tenets of mission command.

Table 2. Mission Command and the Company Commanders

Mission Command and the Company Commanders					
Tenets of MC		Survey			Comparison
		MC +	Neutral	MC -	
OVERALL					0
Decentralized C2					
No = MC+	I always lead from the front.	7.89 %	5.26 %	86.84 %	-
No = MC+	I prefer to control operations personally.	47.36 %	23.68	28.94 %	+
Decentralized execution					
E = MC+	Directive vs Empowerment (E)	90.91 %	0	9.09 %	+
E = MC+	Operating vs Employing (E)	33.93 %	0	66.07 %	-
Disagree = MC+	If it is not the task of my company, it is not important.	89.48 %	5.26 %	5.26%	+
Nesting CONOPS					
Concensus = MC+	Consensus building vs Direction	46.30 %	0	53.70 %	0
Anticipation					
Agree = MC+	The adage " No plan survives the first enemy contact" is really just a lack of ability to envision the fight ahead.	21.05 %	13.16 %	69.79 %	-
Initiative					
Doctrine = MC+	Doctrine vs TTP	17.86 %	0	82.14 %	-
Adaptability					
Ad Hoc = MC+	Ad Hoc vs Organic	16.36 %	0	83.64 %	-
Flexible = MC+	Flexible vs Rigid	96.36 %	0	3.64 %	+
Adaptive = MC+	Adaptive vs Innovative	50.91 %	0	49.09 %	0
Mission Orders					
Broad Lines = MC+	Details vs Broad lines	44.64 %	0	55.36 %	0
Purpose = MC+	Purpose vs Task	72.73 %	0	27.27 %	-
Agile Mindset					
Creative = MC+	Creative vs Critical	69.64 %	0	30.36 %	+
Agility = MC+	Regulations vs Agility	81.48 %	0	18.52 %	+
Acceptance of Risk					
Disagree = MC+	It is important that my company follows all the mission checklists.	13.15 %	2.63 %	84.21 %	-
Agreed = MC+	As long as I reach the higher echelon end state, it is not important if my company accomplishes the task given by the same echelon.	13.51 %	16.22 %	70.27 %	-

Source: Created by author using data from Appendix A Survey and Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 4-4.

The survey questions have been categorized by tenets with which they best fit. From this analysis it can be deduced that in seven of the questions the company commanders replied as would have been anticipated in an army where mission command holds primacy, while in seven other areas they replied quite differently than would have been expected. In three areas the split was almost even. Overall there seems to be a statistical ambiguity toward the company commanders' adherence to the tenets of mission command, as they are prescribed in FM 3-0 C1.

With this in mind there seems to be a slight disconnect between the ambition of the U.S. Army central leadership's desire to invigorate leadership through the philosophy of mission command, and what is being practiced at the company level. There are many possible reasons for this. The philosophy of mission command is, in itself, a challenging concept to grasp. Furthermore, the U.S. Army appears to have introduced it throughout the force without fully addressing it in leadership training. Likewise, mission command does not hold primacy in FM 6-22, where it is only briefly mentioned. Even more so, philosophy is in itself an elusive term, which is extremely complicated to quantify. However, the U.S. Army's desire to change its leadership philosophy to mission command seems incontestable.

As has been highlighted earlier in the analysis, the company commanders, through their responses, invariably express that they want succinct guidance and direction. There seems to be a checklist mentality, paired with a desire for creativity, flexibility and empowerment. This might impede the implementation of mission command. The philosophy must be trained and commanders at all levels must adhere to the philosophy. If company commanders desire flexibility and empowerment, but are

being controlled by compliance with checklists and regulations, it is likely that they will demand the same checklist and regulation compliance from their platoon leaders and thus discourage flexibility and empowerment.

It is thus a problem that *Army Leadership* does not follow the other doctrines aptly. The usefulness of the LRM for the company commanders likely hinges on its perceived application in operations. If the leadership requirements highlighted in FM 3-0 and FM 5-0 are not the same as those advocated in FM 6-22, it is likely that the LRM will become an obsolete tool for future company commanders. The CASAL survey of 2009 illustrates this disparity. More than 35 percent of the responding company commanders replied that they do not use FM 6-22 at all. The remedy may be to create differentiated requirements focused on what kind of leadership they are intended to guide, or distinguished by level at which they are likely to be used. Another approach might be to align FM 6-22 more with the other doctrines. Specifically, the concept and philosophy of mission command must attract more focus in training and education of army leadership and thus a more prominent position in FM 6-22.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Mission command magnifies leadership in land operations. It illuminates the leader's responsibility to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. It provides commanders and staff with a philosophy for operating in an uncertain environment as opposed to trying to create certainty and imposing order and control over a situation.

— Field Manual 3-0 (C1), *Operations*

Is there correlation between FM 6-22 and what is applied at the company grade level in the U.S. Army? Figure 3 depicts the research model used to investigate this issue. The results have been detailed in chapter 4. This chapter will outline the conclusions and recommendations that derive from those results.




Figure 3. Relationship matrix of the variables of doctrine, training and theory and applied direct leadership at the company grade level
Source: Created by author.

The hypothesis of this paper is that the U.S. Army Leadership Doctrine (FM 6-22) Leadership Requirements Model (LRM) fits fairly well with the applied leadership of the U.S. Army Company Commanders. A discrepancy exists between the LRM and how Company Commanders assess their role and functions. This disparity is primarily a result of how the LRM has been developed to accommodate all levels of leadership in the U.S. Army, the operational environment, the master-learner relationship between leaders in the battalions and the influence other U.S. Army doctrines have on the applied leadership at the company grade level in the U.S. Army.

Conclusions

U.S. Army company commanders lead with virtues and values vested in the Army Values and the Warrior Ethos. In many realms the LRM fits well with what the company commanders assess their roles and functions to be. The overall assessment is that, although it fits fairly well, there are certain areas where the correlation is less than optimal. While the possible remedies for these shortfalls are numerous, this study has highlighted four important factors that influence the company commanders in a different direction than that of the LRM. These four are the operational environment, other U.S. Army Doctrines, the process behind the LRM and lastly the master-learner relationships in the battalions. The most diverging points seem to be within the factors of empathy, self-development and extending influence beyond the chain of command, while the correlation of company commanders' with the LRM was highest in the achieve realm.

The LRM was created to accommodate leadership at all levels in the U.S. Army. The validation reports produced by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences in 2004 and 2007 highlight this as a weakness. It seems thus that it is

virtually impossible to determine scientifically if the model applies to direct leaders. For instance, the operational environment is hardly recognized as a component that affects leadership in FM 6-22. The answers in the survey however clearly indicate that certain traits of the applied leadership are determined by the operational environment and its effect on friendly forces. This is well captured in both FM 3-0 and FM 3-24, where the effects of the operational environment are highlighted as important influencers in how commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead and assess the situations they are in. What appears to be an attempt to be timeless in the construction of the LRM seems slightly disconnected from the real world and, consequently, the company commanders.

Following closely in this argument is the introduction of mission command as the prevailing leadership philosophy and leadership tool of the U.S. Army. To grasp the philosophy behind mission command is itself a challenge. When it is not emphasized in FM 6-22, *Army Leadership* however, it becomes a less important leadership tool. Furthermore, the company commanders rarely use FM 6-22 and are thus being more influenced by such doctrines as FM 3-0, FM 5-0 and FM 3-24. These doctrines provide succinct guidance on how to plan, prepare and execute operations. The company commanders expressed conflicting priorities on the question of mission command. While they desire to be members of flexible, creative and decentralized organizations, they also express a desire for succinct guidance and tight control. Checklists and procedural control mechanisms are still highly valued. These elements do not necessarily pair well. The study has highlighted several important realms where FM 6-22, *Army Leadership* is not well connected with the rest of the of U.S. Army doctrines. This is especially true in the area of mission command.

The U.S. Army company commanders produce future leaders more in their own image and less as a development of personalities with diverse capacities and thus in discord with FM 6-22. Consequently, the master-learner relationship actually enforces any existing disparity between applied leadership and the LRM, rather than mitigating the gap.

Within the LRM certain important observations have been made. It seems as if it is a vice to express a desire for getting results. The practice, however, appears to be focused on achievement; this is the most important development topic the company commanders address with their subordinates. Likewise, they assess leading and developing as the most important roles of leaders, but they discuss these topics to a lesser extent with their subordinates than they address tangible results. A question one might ask is whether company commanders conduct counseling with their subordinates because they believe it is important for the development of their organization or because they have to?

Furthermore, the same can be said of the company commanders' view on the leader's position. They want to lead from the front, but the majority expressed that they cannot display weaknesses to their subordinates. However, they are also strong advocates of diminishing the importance of being the best soldier in the unit. It is virtually impossible to lead from the front without displaying deficiencies in certain areas. The question quickly surfaces; is the desire to lead from the front founded in a wholehearted belief that this is the best position from which to lead, or is it because they have been trained and indoctrinated that way through BOLC and CCC?

There seems to be a lack of conceptual understanding amongst the company commanders in the realm of empathy. They revert to sympathy in questions related to

empathy, and it seems thus that they focus more on how they would do it, rather than how the situation appears through the eyes of their subordinates. This difference is not unimportant in an army which puts people first. People are individuals and require individual solutions to challenges, and a lack of empathic qualities might actually impede organizational development and excellence. Likewise, the company commanders appear not to see the importance of extending influence beyond the chain of command. Conversely, they might recognize this as just another task and that you can only do so much. The consequence of this is that they do not emphasize this sphere of influence as important for the degree of success they achieved in their service as company commanders.

Recommendations

Although FM 6-22, *Army Leadership* is well-written and encompasses almost all aspects of army life and leadership, it is, however, not descriptive enough to guide young leaders in how to translate principles into action. Focus on mission command as the overarching leadership philosophy in the U.S. Army and the identification of separate LRMs for the three levels of leadership might rectify this discrepancy. The operational environment is highly complex and the actions taken by lower level leaders can have a more profoundly detrimental effect on the strategic level in the current fight than in most historical examples. Consequently, it is important to capture the experiences of the direct leaders in the 21st century and modernize the LRM to guide the leaders of tomorrow's fight. The following recommendations are based on this premise:

1. Review the LRM to make mission command the overarching leadership philosophy of the U.S. Army.

2. Review FM 6-22 Army Leadership in order to align it more with the other doctrines of the U.S. Army, and to more systematically incorporate the effects the Operational Environment have on leadership.
3. Review the LRM and identify if it is possible to create models that cover each of the levels of leadership. This might help company commanders further and guide them in the development of themselves and their subordinate leaders.
4. Review FM 6-22, *Army Leadership* to make it serve as a reference tool for direct level leaders. The doctrine is not really guiding the company commanders in central elements of their leadership and consequently they seek direction from other sources.
5. In order to further develop mission command as the overarching leadership philosophy, conduct research on how leaders in the U.S. Army mature their skills in balancing between the art of command and the science of control, related to level of leadership, span of control and years in service.
6. The LRM and its implications should be consistently indoctrinated and trained through what the U.S. Army refers to as a process of lifelong learning. This implies that all training institutions and units in the U.S. Army must use the same LRM and leaders would thus be developed in accordance with doctrine. Today's practice seems haphazard at best.
7. Specifically, in the realms of empathy, preparing self and expanding influence beyond the chain of command, more research should be conducted in order to determine why the company commanders' applied leadership seems to correlate so poorly with the LRM in these areas. With the findings, certain

actions should be taken to instigate commitment throughout the force to improve in these fields.

8. The question of to what extent the master-learner relationship affects the level of compliance with doctrine should be further studied to detect if the effect unveiled in this study also fits with other doctrines. Once determined, appropriate adjustments to leader training at all levels should be invoked in order to ensure that doctrine is taught and followed.

This thesis has focused on direct leadership in the U.S. Army. Specifically, it has examined important aspects of leadership as it is being applied by the company commanders. These officers are normally young captains, who are in an important transition period of their military career. The study, and its conclusions and recommendations will contribute to improving the awareness of what is being applied in the real world at the company level and to the integration of leadership concepts from doctrine to application.

GLOSSARY

Change number 1. A normal way of nomenclating revisions to FMs, without recognizing it as a new edition of the FM.

Combat Outpost. Small post, normally detached from higher echelon posts. These serve as safe havens and forward operating bases for company size units in COIN operations like for instance Afghanistan. They are dimensioned to host a company and supporting units.

Command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (FM-1-02).

CONOPS. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations (FM 1-02).

Field Manual. U.S. Army doctrine

International Military Student. Non U.S. officer who is a resident student at the Command and General Staff College Intermediate Level Education or School of Advanced Military Studies.

Joint Publication. U.S. Department of Defense Joint Doctrine

APPENDIX A

SURVEY ON APPLIED LEADERSHIP AT THE COMPANY LEVEL

Page 1

COMPETENT, CONFIDENT, AND AGILE?

My name is Aleksander Jankov and I am an International Military Student at the CGSC AY11-01. I am currently participating in the Master's of Military Arts and Sciences program. The following survey supports my research for this program.

The purpose of the survey is to collect data to examine the prevailing traits of applied leadership at the company grade level in the U.S. Armed Forces.

The survey takes approximately 10-15 minutes.

If you need to pause, please hit the save button in the survey. This will allow you to continue the survey later.

This survey is voluntary and you can discontinue at any time.

I appreciate your contribution and thank you for your candor in advance.

If you have any questions related to the survey or the thesis feel free to contact me at e-mail:

aleksander.jankov@us.army.mil

My CGSC QAO control number is: 11-039

Page 2

Are you a U.S. officer?

{Choose one}

- Yes
- No

In what service?

{Choose one}

- Army
- Air Force
- Navy
- Marine Corps

What branch, functional area, or career field?

{Enter text answer}

[]

Are you active, reserve or National Guard?

{Choose one}

- Active duty
- Reserve
- National Guard

Are you an International Military Student at the Command and General Staff College?

{Choose one}

- Yes
- No

Page 3

Have you been a company/battery/troop commander?

{Choose one}

- Yes
- No

Page 4

In what type of unit did you hold command?

{Choose one}

- HBCT
- IBCT
- SBCT
- Other (Specify at Brigade level) []

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Which of these words best describes you as company commander? (1 is the one that describes you the best and please rank all.)

{Rank the following from 1 to 9}

- Steadfast
- Obedient
- Considerate
- Valiant
- Virtuous
- Conceited
- Dependable
- Responsible
- Polite

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Which is most important?

{Choose one}

- Mission
- People
- Country
- Systems
- Constitution

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A Company Commander fills all the listed roles simultaneously. Rank the importance of these roles. (1 is the most important)

{Rank the following from 1 to 5}

- Intelligence coordinator
- Tactical warfighter and commander
- Diplomat and negotiator
- Tactical Civil-affairs coordinator
- Troop and unit leaders

Put yourself back in your seat as company commander and assess to what extent you agree with the following statements. 1 represents "Strongly disagree" and 7 represents "Strongly agree"

The company commander is the best soldier in the company.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

If I had it my way, my soldiers could grow beards.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

As a company commander I cannot show weaknesses to my soldiers.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

When my soldiers do something illegal or stupid, it is normal for me to explode in outrage.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

I expect respect to flow from rank and position.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

I believe the APFT is a good tool to measure resilience.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

I believe soldiers need a good yell every once in a while.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

To score higher than 300 on the APFT I believe is necessary to be a good leader.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

I think it is important for a company commander to withdraw to his office to do administrative duties.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree

- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

My First SGT is my most important colleague.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

The Platoon commanders in my company are good because of my training and advice.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

I do not appreciate that my soldiers do personal business in service time.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

My commander spends too much time in my unit.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

It is not important for me to participate in training as long as my platoon leaders are doing it.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

I always take the hill myself.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

I expect my soldiers to respect me.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

A Company commander looks good because he is good.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

I believe learning and adaptability are essential confidence building measures.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat

- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

In some situations I believe it is better to do nothing.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

I think a strong will is more important than competence and knowledge for a company commander.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

My subordinates draw more motivation from me than I from them.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

I always lead from the front.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly agree

In this quality or characteristics pair, which do you prefer in your role as company commander?

{Choose one}

- Flexible
- Rigid

In this quality or characteristics pair, which do you prefer in your role as company commander?

{Choose one}

- Theory
- Practice

In this quality or characteristics pair, which do you prefer in your role as company commander?

{Choose one}

- Directive
- Empowerment

In this quality or characteristics pair, which do you prefer in your role as company commander?

{Choose one}

- Regulations
- Agility

In this quality or characteristics pair, which do you prefer in your role as company commander?

{Choose one}

- Adaptive
- Innovative

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In this quality or characteristics pair, which do you prefer in your role as company commander?

{Choose one}

- Emotion
- Reason

In this quality or characteristics pair, which do you prefer in your role as company commander?

{Choose one}

- Operating
- Employing

In this quality or characteristics pair, which do you prefer in your role as company commander?

{Choose one}

- Science
- Art

In this quality or characteristics pair, which do you prefer in your role as company commander?

{Choose one}

- Doctrine
- TTP

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What is your most important objective as a Company commander? (Chose one)

{Choose one}

- Lead
- Develop
- Achieve

Page 16

Rank the importance of the following leadership activities with reference to your experience as company commander from 1-8. (1 is the most - 8 is the least important)

{Rank the following from 1 to 8}

- Teambuilding
- Expand knowledge
- Counsel
- Mentor
- Support professional growth of subordinate officers and NCOs.
- Maintain self-awareness
- Encourage initiative from all levels in your company
- Help people learn

Page 17

Put yourself back in your seat as company commander and assess to what extent you agree with the following statements. 1 represents "Strongly disagree" and 7 represents "Strongly agree"

On operations I always go in the first vehicle.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree

- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

My soldiers need to be motivated by me in order to function properly.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

It is important that my company follows all the mission checklists.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

If it is not the task of my company, it is not important.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

Successfully accomplishing tasks is more important than helping people learn.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

As a company commander I should be the expert in any task performed in my unit.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

As long as I reach the higher echelon end state, it is not important if my company accomplishes the task given by the same echelon.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

I prefer to control operations personally.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

The adage " No plan survives the first enemy contact" is really just a lack of ability to envision the fight ahead.

{Choose one}

- Strongly disagree
- Disagree
- Disagree somewhat
- Neutral
- Agree somewhat
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

Based on your experience as company commander, which of the pair elements did you prefer?

{Choose one}

- Develop plans
- Execute plans

Based on your experience as company commander, which of the pair elements did you prefer?

{Choose one}

- Consensus building
- Direction

Based on your experience as company commander, which of the pair elements did you prefer?

{Choose one}

- Commitment
- Compliance

Based on your experience as company commander, which of the pair elements did you prefer?

{Choose one}

- Enforce standards
- Encourage initiative

Based on your experience as company commander, which of the pair elements did you prefer?

{Choose one}

- Coach
- Accomplish

Based on your experience as company commander, which of the pair elements did you prefer?

{Choose one}

- Purpose
- Task

Based on your experience as company commander, which of the pair elements did you prefer?

{Choose one}

- Teamwork
- Personal Growth

Page 23

Did you have a leadership philosophy as company commander?

{Choose one}

Yes

No

State the most important elements of that philosophy using key words and a maximum of 200 characters.

{Enter text answer}

[]

Do you have one now?

{Choose one}

Yes

No

State the most important elements of that philosophy using key words and a maximum of 200 characters.

{Enter text answer}

[]

Has your philosophy changed after you ceased to be a company commander?

{Choose one}

Yes

No

Why did you change your leadership philosophy?

{Enter text answer}

[]

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Thank you for participating in this survey.

Your contribution is much appreciated.

Exit Page

Thank you for participating in this survey.

Your contribution is much appreciated.

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