ARNG Division Headquarters in an Era of Persistent Conflict

A Monograph
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AY 2011-1

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Department of Defense (DoD) employ the eight Army National Guard (ARNG) division headquarters (HQ) on a regular rotational basis for overseas contingency combat missions thus providing relief to the Active Component (AC) division HQ. With proper resourcing for training and equipment, ARNG division HQ are capable of providing relief for AC division HQ from the stress of multiple rotations. With a predictable deployment schedule, the eight ARNG division HQ can increase the operational division HQ in the AC by 80 percent. Effective access to ARNG division HQ as an operational force is essential to reducing the repeated deployments of AC division HQ.

The Army is under stress from repeated deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and is limited to ten AC division HQ to fill operational command and control missions. Nine of the ten AC division HQ have a total of 30 deployments between September 11, 2001, and December 2010, for operations in OEF and OIF. By comparison, during this same period, only two of the eight ARNG division HQs deployed in support of OIF. As of December 2010, the AC had 50 percent of their division headquarters deployed with three division HQ in Iraq and two division HQ in Afghanistan. This monograph will answer the question: should the Department of Defense (DoD) employ the eight Army National Guard (ARNG) division headquarters (HQ) on a regular rotational basis for overseas contingency combat missions thus providing relief to the Active Component (AC) division HQ. With proper resourcing for training and equipment, ARNG division HQ are capable of providing relief for AC division HQ from the stress of multiple rotations. With a predictable deployment schedule, the eight ARNG division HQ can increase the operational division HQ in the AC by 80 percent. Effective access to ARNG division HQ as an operational force is essential to reducing the repeated deployments of AC division HQ.
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Abstract

ARNG Division Headquarters in an Era of Persistent Conflict by Major Patrick D. Cornwell, U.S. Army National Guard, 52 pages.

The Army is under stress from repeated deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and is limited to ten AC division HQ to fill operational command and control missions. Nine of the ten AC division HQ have had a total of 30 deployments between September 11, 2001, and December 2010, for operations in OEF and OIF. By comparison, during this same period, only two of the eight ARNG division HQs deployed in support of OIF. As of December 2010, the AC had 50 percent of their division headquarters deployed with three division HQ in Iraq and two division HQ in Afghanistan. This monograph will answer the question; should the Department of Defense (DoD) employ the eight Army National Guard (ARNG) division headquarters (HQ) on a regular rotational basis for overseas contingency combat missions thus providing relief to the Active Component (AC) division HQ. With proper resourcing for training and equipment, ARNG division HQ are capable of providing relief for AC division HQ from the stress of multiple rotations. With a predictable deployment schedule, the eight ARNG division HQ can increase the operational division HQ in the AC by 80 percent. Effective access to ARNG division HQ as an operational force is essential to reducing the repeated deployments of AC division HQ.
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The capabilities of our active forces must be improved substantially through modernization and improved readiness. At the same time, we are placing increased emphasis on our National Guard and Reserve components so that we may obtain maximum defense capabilities from the limited resources available. The strengthening of the National Guard and Reserve Forces, as well as the new order of partnership is an integral part of the total force planning approach that is fundamental to the new strategy.¹

Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense, 1972

These prophetic words by Melvin Laird describe perfectly the current situation faced by our Department of Defense (DoD). Division headquarters (HQ) within the Army National Guard (ARNG) have the capabilities and capacity to augment the Active Component (AC) deployment cycle for overseas contingency operations. ARNG division HQ have a history of performing stability operations such as Bosnia and Kosovo in support of the National Military Strategy during this era of persistent conflict. The discussion that follows addresses these issues in detail and leads to the recommendations based upon understanding the role the ARNG fills as an operational reserve force for the United States. The question is; should the Department of Defense (DoD) employ the eight Army National Guard (ARNG) division headquarters (HQ) on a regular rotational basis for overseas contingency combat missions thus providing relief to the Active Component (AC) division HQ operational stress.

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. Army has been fighting an Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) starting first with Afghanistan in 2001 and then Iraq in 2003. The Army is under stress from repeated deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and is limited to ten AC division HQ to fill operational command and control missions. The DoD conducted a Bottom Up Review

(BUR) of defense policy in 1993 to review future force structure after the end of the Cold War.\(^2\)

In 1994, based on the BUR, Secretary of the Army Togo D. West Jr. and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan directed the reduction of the Army to ten AC division HQ.\(^3\) As of December 2010, the AC had 50 percent of their division headquarters deployed with three division HQ in Iraq and two division HQ in Afghanistan. In contrast, from September 11, 2001, through December 2010, only two ARNG division HQ deployed in support of overseas contingency operations. ARNG division HQ provide an operational command and control element for both combat operations or homeland security and provide training oversight for ARNG brigades. Based on the current Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model, Reserve Component (RC) units are to deploy on a cycle of once every six years. As a cohesive part of the operational force, ARNG division HQ can provide forces to ensure the AC can sustain operations and meet the requirements for overseas operations. Effective access to ARNG division HQ as an operational force is essential to reducing the repeated deployments of AC division HQ.

The DoD continually struggles with the role and resourcing of their reserve component forces. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird’s emphasis on increasing capabilities of the National Guard with limited resources is just as relevant today as it was in 1972. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is currently challenged with trying to create efficiencies within the DoD while balancing the needs of the armed forces. Overseas contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are stretching the Army and its division HQ to the limit based on the failure to meet the timelines originally outlined in the ARFORGEN cycle. Secretary Gates released a memorandum on August 16, 2010, which directed a series of initiatives to promote efficiencies


within the DoD.\textsuperscript{4} The initiatives require the DoD to reduce duplication, overhead, and instill a culture of saving. According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, the greatest threat to the security of the United States is the national debt.\textsuperscript{5} With the current economic environment that includes a depressed housing market, high unemployment, and low economic growth within the United States, ARNG division HQ provide a sustainable option to assist the Army to meet its goals.

The analytical methodology of this monograph begins with a review of the existing body of research on the AC and ARNG force mix and provides a case study on the deployment of the 34\textsuperscript{th} ID division HQ to Iraq. This paper consists of five chapters with an introduction and conclusion. In chapter 1, the focus will be on the historical background of ARNG, its role within the “total Army” and how the ARNG contributes to the national military strategy of the United States. Included in this chapter will be a review of the transition of the ARNG from a strategic reserve to an operational force and the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) deployment cycle. Chapter 1 will conclude with an analysis of the “total” Army in this era of persistent conflict. Chapter 2 contains a literature review to examine the role of ARNG division HQ and document the analysis of published material on the research question. Chapter 3 will analyze the variety of overseas deployments that ARNG division HQ have completed during last 10 years through December 2010, and document the capability of ARNG division HQ as an experienced operational force. Chapter 3 will also explore the cost benefits of maintaining an operational headquarters in the RC, especially considering that since 316,000 ARNG Soldiers have experience in mobilizing to support overseas contingency operations; it seems only logical to use

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{4} Robert M. Gates, “SUBJECT: Department of Defense (DoD) Efficiency Initiatives” (memorandum, Department of Defense, August 16, 2010), 1.}

their experience.\textsuperscript{6} Chapter 3 will conclude with a description of what makes an ARNG DIV HQ unique with the diversity of their staff, civilian work experience, and the ability to use the National Guard Bureau for cross leveling of unique specialties. Chapter 4 will provide an in-depth case study of the 34\textsuperscript{th} ID DIV HQ of the Minnesota Army National Guard (MNARNG) as an operational HQ in Iraq. The 34\textsuperscript{th} ID is the most recent ARNG division HQ to deploy to a combat zone and provide command and control for four AC brigades in Multi-National Division – South (MND-S). Chapter 5 will identify the limitations and constraints to deploying ARNG division HQ after a decade of contingency operations. This chapter will look at the range of training levels in the ARNG, the friction between ARNG and AC command relationships, and conclude with examining the effect of continuously deploying Citizen Soldiers. The monograph will conclude with recommendations on whether it is feasible and acceptable to incorporate ARNG division HQ in a planned deployment cycle.

**BACKGROUND**

**ARNG Historical Background**

The earliest English colonies in North America established militia, which evolved over the last 374 years into the modern day National Guard.\textsuperscript{7} Part-time soldiers, who make up what is known today as the ARNG, have defended their communities since 1636 when English settlers in Massachusetts Bay organized militia companies to defend themselves from Native Americans.\textsuperscript{8}

The relationship between the ARNG and the AC has been long, complex, and sometimes divisive. Both organizations have joined forces during times of conflict to ensure victory for the


\textsuperscript{7} National Guard, “About the National Guard,” National Guard, http://www.ng.mil/About/default.aspx (accessed September 09, 2010).

United States. To understand the ARNG and the complexities of integrating with the AC requires reviewing the historical background of the ARNG and the policy decisions that affect the use of the ARNG.

The transformation of these militia units into the modern ARNG began in the late nineteenth century and took the better part of one hundred years.\(^9\) The modern ARNG was the first component established within the United States armed forces. Following independence, the Constitution established a militia, which could defend the nation and reduce the need for a standing army. The Constitution authorized Congress to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia." The authors of the constitution recognized the importance of state’s rights and ensured that states could have a militia that would be under their control but also provide a force that was disciplined and available for federal use. The states maintained the authority to appoint officers and conduct training. One long-standing impediment to the full integration with the Army resulted from the perceived poor performance of National Guard units, officers, and soldiers throughout its early years from 1903 to 1917. Despite the significant contributions of the National Guard serving the citizens of the United States, the Regular Army during the early 1900s still harbored little respect for the National Guard.\(^10\) As late as the 1970s, the ARNG was still fighting the perception of just being "weekend warriors."

**Legislation**

A significant change in legislation helped shape the National Guard. The Militia Act of 1903, which was associated Congressman Charles F. Dick who was also the commander of the Ohio National Guard, was the catalyst for binding the AC and the National Guard throughout the

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\(^10\) Ibid., 11.
20th Century. The Militia Act is also commonly referred to as “the Dick Act.” With overseas territory expanding following the Spanish-American War, there was an increased demand for a larger Regular Army to help secure overseas possessions such as the Philippines, Alaska, and Hawaii. However, this was inconsistent with the traditional principles that America should not have a large standing Regular Army. In 1903, Congress passed the Dick Act, which organized all state militia into units of the National Guard. Most important, the act gave National Guard units increased funding for equipment and training, but required them to achieve federal standards for training and organization. The act was amended in 1908 to authorize the President to mobilize the National Guard and removed limits to geographic and mobilization time. This was also the beginning of what is now known as the National Guard Bureau and linked the National Guard formally to the War Department, which with the Navy Department eventually became the DoD. The Dick Act created conditions that would allow the National Guard to act as a strategic reserve and simultaneously as a domestic responder. In 1912, the United States Attorney General George W. Wickersham ruled that the National Guard as militia could not serve overseas; this essentially nullified the 1908 act. It took the National Defense Act of 1916 to change the relationship between the Regular Army and National Guard and provided the basic legal framework that lasted until after World War II.

12 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
**ARNG in Major Conflicts**

The ARNG provided the largest number of combat divisions to fight in World War I. In 1940, more than a year before the U.S. entered World War II, the ARNG mobilized and doubled the size of the AC. During the Korea conflict the ARNG mobilized more than 138,000 Soldiers. Mobilizations were much smaller after Korea and included the Berlin Crisis, Vietnam, and state mobilization for domestic civil support operations. Operation Desert Storm mobilized more than 63,000 ARNG Soldiers and was the beginning of a transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational force. For the period of the 1990s, the ARNG was busy supporting stability operations in Haiti, Sinai, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

**ARNG since 9/11**

September 11, 2001, brought a change to the paradigm of homeland defense for the ARNG and was the true start to using the ARNG to participate routinely and regularly in overseas contingency operations. A significant portion of the forces deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq came from the ARNG. During 2005, half of the maneuver brigades in Iraq were from the ARNG. This was the largest participation in combat for the ARNG since World War II. This marked a change in the ARNG from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve that validated an AC reliance on combat units from the ARNG. For the first time in the history of the ARNG, the 42nd division HQ commanded AC brigades in a combat zone when it deployed to Iraq. The 42nd ID from the New York Army National Guard (NYARNG) was the first ARNG division HQ to deploy to a combat zone since the Korean War. Following the success of the 42nd ID, the 34th division HQ from the Minnesota Army National Guard (MNARNG) deployed to Iraq, and

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18 Ibid.
assumed command of Multi-National Division – South (MND-S) along with command and control of four AC brigades.

**Total Force Concept**

The ARNG operates on less than 11 percent of the Army’s 2010 budget, yet makes up 32 percent of the Army’s personnel and 40 percent of the operating force.\(^\text{19}\) The disparity is even greater when you combine the ARNG and Army Reserve. The ARNG and the Army Reserve account for 51 percent of the total Army personnel while receiving only 16 percent of the Army’s 2010 base budget. The ARNG has lower personnel costs due to limited training days per year and fewer personnel entitlements than the AC. This is how the ARNG can efficiently use its personnel budget to provide a larger operating force. General Craig R. McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, based on the operations tempo since 9/11, concludes that the National Guard is an operational force, relevant and ready, requiring only a small percentage of the DoD budget and could assist the DoD with a cost-effective solution to their budget concerns. The Total Force Concept was the policy decision to reorganize the majority of combat support and combat service support units into the reserves after the Vietnam War. The ARNG had a limited role during the Vietnam War. This was more of a policy decision made by the political leaders and not a reflection of the ARNG’s ability to perform as an operational force. Since Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird introduced the Total Force Concept in 1970, the ARNG has enjoyed a greater partnership with the AC in defending America. In the simplest form, the concept dictates that the ARNG would bear a greater responsibility and involvement in overseas contingency operations. General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., United States Army Chief of Staff from June 1972 through his death in September 1974, saw that the lack of mobilizing the ARNG during the Vietnam War was

\(^{19}\) Craig R. McKinley, “The National Guard: A Great Value for America,” National Guard Bureau (July 2010), 9.
a mistake. The absence of ARNG mobilizations resulted in the lack of popular support from “hometown” America for the conflict in Vietnam. With the Total Force Policy, the President would be required to convince the American public that military force was necessary and require the support of the entire nation. The Total Force Policy goal was to obtain or increase popular support for military action with the commitment of the ARNG in future conflict. This policy would force future administrations to mobilize reservists for almost any contingency, thus ensuring “hometown” support for deployments.  

Operational Force

The challenges facing the United States today and in the future will require us to employ National Guard and Reserve forces as an operational reserve to fulfill requirements for which they are well-suited in the United States and overseas. For example, the National Guard often serves at the forefront of DoD operations. The associated incentive structure within the Reserve Component must be used to create easier access to those capabilities that are routinely in high demand.

Quadrennial Defense Review, February 2010

Since 9/11, the ARNG consistently has demonstrated its readiness and capability to make sustained assistance to overseas contingency operations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued DoD Directive 1200.17 on October 29, 2008, which clearly stated the intent to operationalize ARNG forces by stating: “the overarching set of principles and policies to promote and support the management of the Reserve Components (RCs) as an operational force.” Whereas much has been debated on the topic of whether the RC is a strategic or operational reserve, this directive clearly confirms that the RC is now an operational force. ARNG forces contribute

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operational capabilities to support the National Security Strategy with full spectrum operations. The ARNG is in a unique position to provide a connection between local communities and the national security policy. Secretary Gates understands that in order for the DoD to meet its requirements during an era of persistent conflict, it needs the ARNG to be an operational force that is readily available. Along with its operational combat power, ARNG units bring the support of their local communities to the war effort.

Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey Jr. directed an initiative to evolve the strategic reserve to an operational force back in 2007 as one of his seven initiatives. The definition of a strategic reserve is a force that does not expect to deploy unless there is a major conflict on a global scale. The ARNG served as a strategic reserve during the Cold War era. The ARNG provides the nation a force with operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet requirements across the full spectrum operations. In their operational role, ARNG units contribute to the total force according to the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. The ARFORGEN cycle provided predictability for the combatant commands, the AC and ARNG units, Soldiers, their families, and employers. The ARNG provides depth to the AC and is available for operational roles as needed. On August 3, 2010, General Casey confirmed that the ARNG is now an operational force. “We have made a huge change with the Guard over the last nine years. … None of us want to go back to having the Guard as just a strategic reserve.”

One could also argue that the surge of General David H. Petraeus, commanding general of Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), OIF 2007, would not have been possible without the support of ARNG units. 1/34 BCT, from the MN ARNG, is an example that demonstrated the commitment, capability and contribution of ARNG units in support of the surge in the spring of 2007. 1/34 BCT had its tour extended by four months for a total deployment of sixteen months. This

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deployment stands as the longest combat deployment for any unit, RC or AC, in OIF. With the lack of deployments for ARNG division HQ it appears that the AC has forgotten about ARNG division HQ as an operational force in overseas contingency missions such as OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

**Stress on the Total Army**

While AC Division HQ make up a small percentage of the total Army, they are not immune to the stress from repeated deployments. ARNG division HQ represent a significant portion of key operational leadership and 44 percent of the total Army division HQ capability. The U.S. Army is in its ninth year of sustained combat since the start of OEF, followed by OIF, with no realistic end in sight. Many people, military leaders, respected “think tanks,” former general officers, and elected officials, have voiced concerns about the impact of sustained operations on the Army. To demonstrate the concern on this topic, the Secretary of Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army published their goals in the 2010 calendar year and the number two and three goals were to “continue efforts to restore balance” and “sustain Soldiers, civilians, and families.” The Army is attempting to balance the demands and stress from the last ten years of combat while aggressively improving support to Soldiers and their families. These goals clearly illustrate the concerns that top leaders in the Army have about the stress of repeated deployments on the force. The fifth and sixth goals are to “implement the Army leadership strategy” and “refine the Army of the 21st Century.” Over half of the calendar year 2010 goals specifically mitigate the risks of an Army stressed from sustained combat.23 The burden of war during the last nine years has weighed heavily upon the Army and the strain of multiple deployments is evident on both Soldiers and their families. The *Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, Suicide Prevention*

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Report 2010 (HP-RR-SPR), reported that in fiscal year 2009, the Army had 137 AC suicide deaths, with 239 across the total Army to include RC Soldiers. Forty-three percent of all suicides were RC Soldiers. High-risk behavior resulted in seventy-four drug overdose active duty deaths during this period. Suicide attempts present an additional concern with 1,713 Soldiers attempting suicide during the same period. According to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter W. Chiarelli, high risk behavior is a leading cause for these disturbing statistics. Binge drinking, substance abuse, drinking while driving, and reckless behavior is all considered high-risk behavior.

The increased OPTEMPO caused by OEF and OIF, has caused the ARFORGEN cycle to be adjusted multiple times. The result is multiple deployments for Soldiers for an increased length of time. This has caused the Army to continue to try to balance the stress and still preserve the readiness of the force for future contingency operations. The outcome is that Soldiers, their families, communities, and employers experience the full effects of the stress caused by the current OPTEMPO. The leaders in an AC division HQ have the same stressors that ultimately affect their decisions and capabilities to wage war. While deploying ARNG division HQ represents a small fraction of the total army, it represents a significant portion of key operational leadership, 44 percent of division HQ capability, which could help to ease the stress on AC division HQ.

ARFORGEN

In 2006, to relieve the building pressures of persistent conflict, the Army established a rotational readiness model, called ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN, in its present state, cannot fulfill its intended deployment rotation goals for AC division HQ. The AC simply does not have enough AC division HQ to meet the demand in Iraq and Afghanistan. In theory, ARFORGEN should be able to provide a predictable number of division HQ to the available pool that meet the training level requirements and are ready to deploy for a specified mission. However, as of December
2010, ARFORGEN has only deployed two ARNG division HQ since 9/11. At this time, ARFORGEN manages ARNG units as a part of the operational force. The objective for the ARNG is to supply manned, trained, and equipped units for deployment. The ARFORGEN is the method designed to produce qualified and prepared forces for combatant commanders at sustainable rotational levels. The ARFORGEN process, shown in Figure 1, is a force management tool that cycles units through three pools: Reset, Train/Ready, and Available.


**Figure 1 ARFORGEN Model**

ARFORGEN ensures that every deploying unit, whether AC or RC has the highest readiness possible prior to deployment. The Army assesses unit readiness by measuring the unit’s status of equipment, personnel, and training level. ARFORGEN is a structured process for generating AC and RC forces that progressively increase their readiness over time. The ARFORGEN model provides a way to resource and prepares units to conduct full spectrum operations in a predictable rotational deployment schedule. This process allows Army leadership to source deployment rotations while maintaining a reserve capability for any new contingency operations. Essentially, ARFORGEN transformed the mobilization process from a Cold War

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construct of tiered readiness based on mobilizing personnel to fill force structure, to a cyclic readiness posture as indicated in Figure 2. The evolving nature of ARFORGEN will allow units to increase their readiness levels as they move across force pools. Fully incorporating ARNG division HQ into the ARFORGEN is necessary for ARFORGEN to succeed in reducing stress on the AC division HQ.25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Posture</th>
<th>Steady State Conditions</th>
<th>Surge Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AC Rotation Goals</td>
<td>1:3 (Example: 9 months deployed and 27 months training in a 3 year cycle)</td>
<td>1:2 (Example: 1 year deployed and 2 years training in a 3 year cycle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC Rotation Goals</td>
<td>1:5 (Example: 1 year mobilized and 5 years demobilized in a 6 year cycle)</td>
<td>1:4 (Example: 1 year mobilized and 4 years demobilized in a 5 year cycle)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 AFORGEN Cycle26

The ARFORGEN model has three force pools through which each unit progresses during its cycle. The reset phase begins when a unit returns from deployment and consists of Soldier reintegrating back into their families, employers, and communities. The train/ready phase includes collective training and a gradual increase in training readiness. An ARNG division HQ is focused on tailoring their annual training period to focus on their mission essential task list (METL). The METL objective is to perform as an operations level HQ providing command and control to Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) in full spectrum operations. Once an ARNG division HQ is in the available pool, they are participating in mission rehearsal exercises, conducted by the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), as both “white cell” players, or once mobilized as


the primary training audience prior to deployment. During the available period, the division HQ is at its highest state of readiness and is either scheduled or available to deploy worldwide and provide command and control for full spectrum operations. ARNG units train within the ARFORGEN process to prepare for deployments and reduce the length of post-mobilization training time.

**AC Division Headquarters Deployment History since 9/11**

While the Army has transitioned to a modular force based on Brigade Combat Teams, the needs for divisional levels of command and control continues to exist in this era of persistent conflict. Operations in Afghanistan surged during 2010 to the point where there are two AC division HQ now serving as Regional Commands. Operational demands in Iraq require three AC division HQ and this requirement is likely to continue for the near term. An interesting fact is that of the 10 AC division HQ, only the 2nd ID division HQ has not deployed in support of OIF or OEF. This is understandable considering that the 2nd ID is based in South Korea and facing an unpredictable threat in North Korea. In compiling the statistics of deployments for AC division HQ, one fact to highlight is that deployment lengths are not standard. Deployment lengths for division HQ can vary from a minimum of six months, up to a maximum of 15 months. A division HQ can expect to deploy for twelve months “boots on ground.” The statistics displayed in Figure 3 show that nine AC division HQ have a total of 30 deployments between September 11, 2001, and December 2010, for operations in OEF and OIF. By comparison, during this same period, only two ARNG division HQs deployed in support of OIF. The utilization ratio for AC division HQ is 3.3 deployments per division in comparison to only two deployments for all eight ARNG division HQ during the same period.  

Employing the eight ARNG division HQ on a ratio of

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27 AC divisions have deployed 30 times divided by 9 divisions which equal 3.3 compared to ARNG division HQ that have deployed 2 divided by 8 divisions which equals .25.
1:4\textsuperscript{28} would help reduce the deployment stress on AC division HQs and provide the Army with division HQs in the available pool for surge capabilities. ARNG division HQ are clearly underutilized in comparison to their AC counterparts.

**Figure 3 – AC Division HQ Deployment Statistics for OEF and OIF since 9/11.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>OIF</th>
<th>OEF</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1\textsuperscript{st} Infantry Division</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Division</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3\textsuperscript{rd} Infantry Division</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division</td>
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<td>25\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1\textsuperscript{st} Armored Division</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1\textsuperscript{st} Cavalry Division</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne Division</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Deployments</strong></td>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

This literature review will examine the ARNG’s role in supporting the AC and the status of the “Total Army.” The analysis of government publications, periodicals, and research studies provides the material to reach conclusions and make recommendations. The evidence is presented chronologically and establishes the roles and capabilities of the ARNG. This study will examine the relationship between the ARNG and AC and explain how ARNG division HQ could augment


\textsuperscript{29} Statistics derived from official division web sites.
the AC overseas contingency deployment rotation cycle to perform as an operational command and control HQ thus providing relief to the AC division HQ operational stress.

The U.S. Army sponsored the report *Stretched Thin: Army forces for sustained operations* published in 2005 by the Rand Corporation and authored by Lynn E. Davis, et al. The purpose of their study was to examine the availability of AC and RC combat unites by studying the potential operational requirements, force structures, and policies governing the availability of RC forces. Davis, et al. describe the difficult decisions the total Army faces in this era of persistent conflict and how this could affect the future size of the Army, force structure, and policies governing both AC and RC forces. Davis, et al. clearly state that there is no solution to ease the growing stress on AC units from frequent deployments. One of the options emphasized in the study recommended that the AC rely more on ARNG forces. Lynn E. Davis, et al. acknowledges that a long-term policy fix for the stress on the AC would be to increase reliance on the RC forces.

A requirement for relying heavily on the RC is to ensure that the ARNG is funded and equipped to perform as an operational force. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2005 established the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. Congress tasked the Commission to report on the roles and missions of the reserve components. The final report published on January 31, 2008, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational force*, contained six major conclusions. These six conclusions were Creating a Sustainable Operational Reserve; Enhancing the Defense Department’s Role in the Homeland; Creating a Continuum of Service: Personnel Management for an Integrated Total Force; Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available Operational Reserve; Supporting Service Members, Families, and Employers; Reforming the Organizations and Institutions That Support an Operational Reserve. The commission stated that there was “no reasonable alternative to continued increased reliance on the National Guard and Reserves, as part of a total operational force, for missions at home and abroad.” The independent Commission concluded that DoD
should use RC units to create an operational force that would be fully trained, equipped, and ready to respond in support of the AC in overseas contingency operations.

Both independent “think tanks” and the DoD recommended that the ARNG could assist the AC as an operational reserve, but the recommendations do not specifically recommend a deployment schedule for operational level HQ. The 2010 Army Posture Statement is an unclassified summary on the Army’s current state to include its roles, missions, accomplishments, plans, and programs. The intent for the report is to emphasize the Army posture prior to budget testimony before Congress by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army. This statement focuses on the effort to rebalance the Army. The plan to rebalance the Army contains four imperatives: Sustain the Army’s Soldiers, Families, and Civilians; Prepare forces for success in the current conflict; Reset returning units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments and contingencies; and Transform to meet the demands for the 21st century. According to the statement, the Army has made significant progress on these initiatives but is still not in complete balance. Critical information outlined is this posture statement is the ARFORGEN plan to supply forces for overseas contingency operations. The posture statement proposes that each force pool (Reset, Train-Ready, and Available) consists of a corps operational headquarters, five division headquarters, including two from the ARNG, twenty brigade combat teams including three or four from the ARNG, and 90,000 enablers of which half would be comprised of RC Soldiers. Each pool of forces would be capable of full spectrum operations once the Army reaches a steady-state ratio of time deployed of 1:2 for AC forces and 1:4 for reserve component forces. This force mix could support future operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The SecDef delivered the report to Congress on February 1, 2010, which framed the strategic policy for the DoD and established precedence for resource investment. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a legislative mandated review on the DoD strategies and policy. The QDR 2010 provided a strategy with four objectives: Prevail in today’s wars; Prevent
and deter conflict; Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; Preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. Clearly, the SecDef was looking to increase cost savings while maintaining an all-volunteer force and ARNG division HQ are a key player in this strategy. For the purposes of this monograph, the most important strategic goal is to preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. The QDR 2010 accurately acknowledged that RC forces are included in the operational total force and ARNG Soldiers today expect to serve periodically on active duty. The report clearly stated that using the ARNG in deployments is a way for the DoD to create efficiencies, reduce costs, and contributes to the sustainability of both the AC and RC forces. Lastly, the QDR 2010 acknowledged that the RC are an untapped resource and the DoD will “conduct a comprehensive review of the future role of the RC in supporting the AC.”

The one critique of the QDR 2010 is that it does not specifically define future missions for the RC. The defense strategy outline in the QDR requires RC forces seamlessly integrated within the total force. This requires ARNG division HQ integrated within the AC deployment cycle as seamless total force supporting overseas contingency operations.

To support an operational reserve, the Army needs to ensure a predictable deployment cycle and the DoD needs to fund training and equipping of the ARNG. The report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) by John Nagal and Travis Sharp, titled An Indispensable Force: Investing in America’s National Guard and Reserves and published in September 2010 highlighted the importance of understanding the role of the RC. This report identifies that supplemental defense appropriations, from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, continue to finance the operational functions of the ARNG. The problem Nagal and Sharp identify is that this funding source for the RC will decline as the conflicts decline. Funding the RC is necessary.

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31 Ibid., 54.
to maintain these forces as an operational relevant force. Nagal and Sharp recommend that the DoD fully fund the operational RC through a base budget and not using the supplemental account. This would lead to institutionalizing the role of the RC within the National Military Strategy. Nagal and Sharp conclude that the DoD has taken steps to improve the RC since 2008 commensurate to the responsibility that they share for the defense of the nation. However, it will take years of continued investment in training and equipping of the RC to reach the capabilities envisioned for 21st century conflicts.

In response to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates mandate for the military services to create efficiencies and cut costs, General Craig R. McKinley, Chief of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) authored the report The National Guard: A Great Value for America published in July 2010. Within the report, General McKinley highlights that the ARNG comprises 40 percent of the Army total force. Additionally, the report expresses that ARNG Soldiers possess a unique blend of civilian and military skills, creating a dynamic and effective force in full spectrum operations. The National Guard carries out a dual mission, which includes both domestic and overseas operations at a cost to the nation of only five percent of the DoD base budget.

History shows that the ARNG division HQ can perform in overseas deployments with the proper training and equipping. William M. Donnelly, a historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, authored the book titled Under Army orders: the Army National Guard during the Korean War in 2001. Donnelly chronicles the use of the Army National Guard during the Korean War and documents the effectiveness of the units called to duty to fight in Korea. Donnelly focused his study on the 45th ID from Oklahoma. Donnelly determined that success for the 45th ID division HQ was based on their amount of training, the quality of experienced

Soldiers, and adequate equipment. The 45th ID HQ performed their mission in a combat zone with no discernable differences from their AC colleagues.

This literature review establishes a historical precedent for the use of the ARNG as an operational force assisting the AC during a time of stress on the total force. Lynn E. Davis, et al. confirmed that since 2005, the Army has struggled with maintaining forces during sustained combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2010 QDR acknowledged that the ARNG provides critical forces and skills necessary to ensure the AC possesses the capabilities to sustain operations and meet the requirements for overseas operations. Nagal and Sharp gave a unique perspective of the dilemma of future budget constraints on the DoD and the need to fund the ARNG as an operational reserve. General McKinley highlighted the cost effectives of using the ARNG as an operational force and solution to some of the budget constraints that the DoD is sure to experience in the future. William Donnelly provided the past historical evidence that an ARNG division HQ can perform as an operational level command in overseas combat zone and reduce the stress on AC division HQ.

This literature review links how sustained operations since 9/11 have stressed the AC and required the transformation of the ARNG from a strategic reserve to an operational force. In this era of persistent conflict, the ARFORGEN cycle does not utilize the capabilities of employing ARNG division HQs in a regular deployment cycle to support the AC. The 2010 QDR confirmed that the ARNG provides a critical role of support to the AC. With the current national debt crisis, the DoD and NGB understand the need to utilize their resources in an efficient manner. NGB authored a report specifically to confirm the value of using the ARNG in contingency operations as an efficient use of DoD funds. Lastly, William Donnelly documented the historical precedence of utilizing ARNG division HQ to support overseas combat operations. Future studies should look at the question of why more ARNG division HQ are not deploying for overseas contingency operations to relieve stress on AC division HQ and documenting measures of performance and effectiveness for division HQ deployments.
**ARNG DIVISION HEADQUARTERS— An Experienced Force**

"The story from the inside the Army National Guard is that every Soldier has either reenlisted or volunteered to be a part of the Army National Guard since 9/11. We are nine years into two wars and we have an excess of Soldiers, and that's a great story about the Army National Guard and its family programs."  

MG Raymond Carpenter, Acting Director Army National Guard

**Overseas Deployment Experience**

In 1950, the 45th ID from the Oklahoma National Guard, mobilized for duty in the Korean War. It was one of two ARNG division HQ to see action in the Korean War, with the other being the 40th ID division HQ from the California National Guard. Officers ranging from company grade to field grade brought combat experience from WWII. In December 1951, the 45th ID was the first ARNG division HQ to receive combat orders to deploy to the Korea. The 45th ID engaged in numerous battles in the Old Baldy Area that included the infamous Pork Chop Hill. Chinese forces never broke through the 45th ID’s perimeter. At the end of 1952, regular Army Soldiers and draftees began replacing the ARNG Soldiers of the 45th ID, who redeployed after their two-year mobilization was complete. The 45th division HQ remained in Korea until the end of the war, though it was just the flag, since most of the ARNG Soldiers had long since redeployed. With the signing of the peace accord, the 45th division HQ rotated back to the U.S. to

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35 Ibid., 102.

demobilize. The Korean War deployment of ARNG division HQ differed from that of WWII. In
WWII, ARNG division HQ were mobilized for the duration of the war. The Korean War
deployment of the 45th ID provides an example of an ARNG DIV HQ deploying for a two-year
tour to a combat zone that closely resembles the current deployment policy for ARNG Soldiers.

Since February 2000, ARNG division HQ have deployed to the Balkans to support
stability operations. Without contributions from ARNG division HQ, the national military
strategy during the first decade of the 21st century would have encountered additional obstacles
and placed further stress on the AC. This is especially true with ARNG involvement in the
Balkan region. In the spring of 2000, the 49th Armored Division (AD) HQ, from the Texas
ARNG, assumed command of Task Force Eagle and Multi-National Division-North from the 10th
Mountain Division HQ. The 49th AD HQ provided command and control for Stabilization Force -
7 (SFOR 7), for U.S. forces deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was the first ARNG
division HQ to command and control an AC unit, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, since
WWII. Another first for the 49th AD HQ was the tactical control of coalition forces, which
consisted of a Nordic-Polish (NORDPOL) Brigade, a Russian Brigade, and a Turkish Brigade.
With the successful completion of the 49th AD mission in October 2000, the Army decided to task
SFOR rotations 9 through 16 to a combination of AC and ARNG Division HQ. 37 ARNG
divisions went on to command five of the next seven SFOR rotations:

- SFOR 10, 29th ID from Virginia ARNG
- SFOR 12, 28th ID from Pennsylvania ARNG
- SFOR 13, 35th ID from Kansas ARNG
- SFOR 14, 34th ID from Minnesota ARNG
- SFOR 15, 38th ID from Indiana ARNG

The SFOR mission concluded prior to the 42nd ID NY ARNG’s scheduled rotation to command
SFOR 16. Instead, the 42nd ID received a change of mission to support OIF in late 2004. The

37 Army News Service, “Army announces unit rotation plan for Bosnia,” December 4, 2000,
2010).
missions of the post-Cold War environment, coupled with downsizing of the Army in the early 1990s, necessitated the increased use of the ARNG division HQ units to assist in executing the national military strategy in the 21st century. Successful SFOR rotations were the foundation for ARNG division performing as operational level command and control HQ and relieving some of the stress on AC division HQ. According to Brigadier General H. Steven Blum, commander of the 29th ID, the performance of the 49th AD socialized the idea of deploying ARNG division HQ and making the AC much more comfortable with the idea. The outstanding performance of the 49th AD division HQ in Bosnia conduction peacekeeping operations laid the foundation for the 42nd ID division HQ deployment to OIF.

In July 2004, the Army ordered the rotation of units within OIF. OIF-3 would include the first deployment of an ARNG combat division headquarters for wartime service since the Korean War. On February 14, 2005, the 42nd ID (NY ARNG) assumed command and control of Task Force Liberty, relieving the 1st Infantry Division (1ID) and taking over responsibility for Multi-National Division North Central (MND-NC). Responsibilities of the 42nd ID, known as the “Rainbow Division,” included conducting full spectrum operations in the four provinces northeast of Baghdad to include As-Sulaymaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Salah Ad Din. The 42nd ID commanded two AC brigade combat teams, 1/3 and 3/3 BCTs from the 3rd ID, and also the 116th Infantry Brigade of the Idaho Army National Guard (ID ARNG), and the 278th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of the Tennessee Army National Guard (TN ARNG).


Major General Joseph J. Taluto, commander of the 42nd ID described their mission “the role of the Task Force Liberty in Iraq was to protect the democratic process while building up the capabilities and sustainability of the government of Iraq.” The Rainbow Division conducted a transfer of authority to the 101st Airborne Air Assault Division on November 1, 2005, and successfully redeployed after being on active duty for 20 months, commanding Task Force Liberty, and providing command and control for MND-NC. During the transfer of authority ceremony Lieutenant General John Vines, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) praised Task Force Liberty “The mission has been executed

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41 42nd Infantry Division, “42nd Infantry Division History.”
brilliantly. To the men and women of Task Force Liberty, I thank you for a job brilliantly done.”

General Richard A. Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) acknowledged the performance of the Rainbow Division at their homecoming ceremony: “I have seen the fruits of your success with my own eyes, I just returned from a week in Iraq, visiting the troops deployed there now. They are benefiting from your efforts and continue to rebuild damaged infrastructure and repair tattered civic institutions in a land long torn by conflict.” The deployments of the 49th AR division HQ and the 42nd ID division HQ set the precedence that ARNG division HQ have the capabilities and capacity to support the AC in overseas contingency operations. An added benefit from these extended deployments is the positive effect of creating cohesive and combat experienced headquarters in the ARNG.

Experience of ARNG Division Staff

The Citizen Soldier in today’s ARNG is a member of a unit that more than likely has deployed since September 11, 2001, and will likely deploy again within the next five years according the current AFORGEN model. Over half of all ARNG Soldiers are veterans with experience in both combat operations as well as stability operations. ARNG division HQ possess unique civilian skills in areas of business, law enforcement, health services, legal, industrial, and agriculture that augment their military specialties and provide a cost-effective, value added force for the AC. The ARNG division HQ staff is prepared, using their civilian skills and life

42 Anita Powell, “42nd ID hands over Iraq operations to 101st Airborne,” Stars and Stripes, November 2, 2005.


experience, to apply smart power methodology to international relations. Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond from Missouri emphasized the vital role that the ARNG plays in the future of soft power with this quote “Smart power recognizes that helping other societies become more stable makes Americans safer – and there is no entity in a better position to execute our nation’s smart power than the National Guard.” Smart power is the combined use of both hard and soft power, utilizing the elements of national power to influence international relations. The nature and temperament of ARNG division HQ are suited to command and control operations in a complex environment that can range from kinetic operations to stability operations. ARNG division HQ staff enjoy more years of service and less turnover that typically leads to greater continuity, unit cohesion, and combat proficiency compared to AC division HQ preparing to deploy.

Demographics from the 34th ID DIV HQ deployment to OIF in 2009 provide a sample of the high quality of the Citizen Soldiers in the ARNG and highlight their unique blend of education, life, and military experience. Over 29 percent of the 34th ID division HQ Soldiers deployed with college degrees, including eight with doctorates out of 1,023. The average age of a 34th ID division HQ Soldier deployed was 31 compared to the mean average of 28 for an AC Soldier, as per the Population Representation in the Military Services Report of 2008 published by the DoD. Thirty-two percent of the 34th ID division HQ were veterans of previous contingency operation deployments. Members of the 34th ID division HQ represented 284 communities from across the state of Minnesota and were augmented with Soldiers from 11 other states. Counterinsurgency and stability operations require a unique set of skills inherent to the 34th ID division HQ and their diverse set of civilian skills and life experiences.

Cost Benefit of ARNG

ARNG division HQ require 60 days of post-mobilization training prior to deployment for an overseas contingency operation. AC division HQ require a similar amount of preparation, equipping, and training to deploy. The United States is currently facing some of the most significant financial issues in its history. These issues range from the current economic crisis, national debt, Gulf of Mexico environmental disaster, and the fight against terrorism. As recently as October 13, 2010, more than 50 Representatives and Senators sent a letter to President Obama’s commission on deficit reduction, advising cuts to the nation's defense budget to aid in reducing the budget deficit. Secretary Gates recognized the significance of the current economic crisis and understood that the DoD budget will come under scrutiny not only from Congress but also more importantly the American public. On May 8, 2010, Secretary Gates directed the military services to review how they operate and to improve efficiencies in their organizations. As contingency operations in Iraq continue to drawdown, Congress is sure to look at the DoD budget for a peace dividend. The National Guard, which includes both the Air and Army Guard, conducted both overseas and domestic operations with just five percent of the DoD base budget.\textsuperscript{46} The dual mission operational force of the ARNG can provide the DoD with a cost-effective solution to their budget concerns.

Employing a force mixture of part-time/full-time Soldiers allows the ARNG to provide a cost-effective operational force. The fact is that a traditional part-time Soldier has significant less overhead costs until the DoD places the Soldier on an active duty status. The Department of Army (DA) validated the full time manning requirement for the ARNG in a 1999 manpower study. The ARNG’s current DA validated requirement is based on its former mission as a strategic reserve and does not reflect the current mission as an operational force. A constraint for

\textsuperscript{46} CSIS, “CSIS Commission on Smart Power,” Executive Summary.
the operational ARNG is that full-time staffing was budgeted for only 72 percent of authorized positions during FY10. In addition to the cost savings attributed to the part-time nature of the ARNG, significant cost savings is attributed to lower medical costs; virtually no cost for permanent change of station; fewer entitlements such as housing and substance allowances; lower base support costs.\(^\text{47}\) An ARNG Soldier, who costs significantly less than an AC Soldier, represents the most cost-effective way to contribute to the national defense of the United States. Despite their part-time nature, the Soldiers of the ARNG man a combat experienced operational force that repeatedly responds to combat, humanitarian, and domestic response missions.

For the foreseeable future, the DoD will be expected to maintain its capabilities and more than likely without budget increases and possibly budget cuts. Stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan require the skills possessed by an ARNG division HQ. As the DoD budget declines and fiscal responsibility is required, especially in light of the current economic situation, the ARNG is recognized as a cost-effective resource to maintain the capacity and capabilities of the AC. ARNG division HQ offer a cost-effective reservoir of unique knowledge, expertise, and talents often required in the current fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. A key issue in analyzing the cost effectiveness of the ARNG is that it has a dual mission to provide domestic support to civil authorities within the United States while contributing a significant amount of force in support of overseas contingency operations. The ARNG has the capabilities and capacities to perform as an operational command and control division HQ in a predictable deployment schedule. To maintain the appropriate level of readiness for mobilizations in this era of persistent conflict, the DoD must fully resource the ARNG. The ARNG provides an efficient and effective resource at an attractive, low cost.

\(^{47}\) CSIS, “CSIS Commission on Smart Power,” 9.
CASE STUDY: 34th ID OIF DEPLOYMENT

From May 20, 2009 until February 2, 2010, the Minnesota Army National Guard’s 34th “Red Bull” Infantry Division provided command and control of AC brigades in the southern third of Iraq. This case study will examine the 34th ID’s deployment to focus the research and harness fresh information from a recent and relevant ARNG division HQ deployment for an overseas contingency operation. The southern nine provinces of Iraq, known operationally as Multi-National Division – South (MND-S), is about the geographic size of Minnesota and is the largest division area of operations in Iraq. Headquartered at Contingency Operating Base Basra (COB BASRA), 1,023 ARNG Soldiers led a force of approximately 14,000 U.S. service members comprising four AC BCTs, an AC Combat Aviation Brigade, an ARNG Combat Aviation Brigade, and Navy and Air Force enablers that operated in nine Iraqi provinces over the course of 11 months. The 34th ID case study is a representation of the capabilities and experiences of an ARNG division HQ deployment to a combat zone. The conclusions and recommendations gleaned from this study are intended to apply to all eight ARNG division HQ.

Pre-Mobilization Training

In January 2008, the 34th ID division HQ received an alert order to deploy for an OIF rotation. The division HQ had 13 months to prepare before mobilization and 16 months until their Transfer of Authority (TOA) in MND-S. The 42nd ID, from the NY ARNG, was the most recent ARNG division HQ to deploy to OIF 03-05; however, mobilizations for ARNG units has significantly changed since 2003. The length of mobilization for ARNG units changed from a maximum of 24 months to 400 days. The policy change in 2007 was the result of the “surge” in Iraq and ironically was the consequence of an extended deployment from another MN ARNG unit. The 1/34 BCT was on Title 10 orders for more than 22 months in 2005 through 2007 and is recognized for having the longest brigade level deployment to Iraq, accumulating 16 continuous months in combat. The troop surge caused the 1/34 BCT to be extended for four additional
months in Iraq, leading to the longest ARNG deployment for OIF and a change in RC mobilization policy.

In January of 2007, Secretary Gates changed the Reserve Component Mobilization policy from 24 month mobilization to a maximum of 12 months. Previously, ARNG units could be mobilized for up to 24 consecutive months. Post-mobilization training was often lengthy, with some units, such as 1/34 BCT spending up to six months at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, before 12 months “boots on the ground” in Iraq. Instead of the six months that the 42$^{nd}$ ID division HQ had to train in a post-mobilization status, the 34$^{th}$ ID division HQ would now have to complete this training in 60 days. The adjustment to a shorter post-mobilization training period was primarily to reduce the stress of deployments on ARNG families and Soldiers and ensure that these units would only be gone from home for one year. The compressed training plan presented a challenge for the division HQ to form a cohesive team, especially in the collective task of function as an operational command and control headquarters. The 42$^{nd}$ ID had up to six months of post-mobilization training while the 34$^{th}$ ID had to accomplish the same training level in only two months. The chart depicted in figure 5 emphasizes the difference and significance between the 42$^{nd}$ ID and 34$^{th}$ ID preparation for deployment to OIF.
Once the 34th ID received alert notification, it started developing a manning structure and establishing the Deployment Manning Document (DMD). The DMD, similar to an MTOE, is the “by position” roster that is filled to meet mission requirements. Filling the DMD helps identify critical vacancies on the division staff. The 34th ID could fill open slots by posting vacancies on Guard Knowledge Online (GKO) to attract individual augmentees, requesting Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Soldiers from Human Resource Command (HRC), and cross leveling between MN ARNG units. Of the Soldiers deployed with the 34th ID division HQ, only 56 were from states other than Minnesota out of a total of 1,023 Soldiers. With the support of the NGB, GKO, HRC, and the MN ARNG the 34th ID established their DMD seven months prior to their mobilization date; this was the beginning of a methodology to create a cohesive and competent staff.

To train the division staff on collective tasks, the Division G3, Colonel Jon Jensen, coordinated with BCTP to have the 34th ID staff attend two significant training exercises prior to the mobilization date. The first training opportunity was to augment BCTP with Assistant Observer Trainers (AOT) for the 25th ID’s Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, in August 2008. The goal for 34th ID AOTs was to observe an AC division HQ staff functioning within the MRX and capture tactics, techniques, and procedures for implementation in the 34th ID standard operating procedures.

To build on the 25th ID MRX, the 34th ID participated in I Corps MRX at Fort Lewis, Washington, in October 2010. This was instrumental in developing the 34th ID’s readiness for two reasons. First, it expanded the training audience to include a functioning main command post with representation of all the WFFs. The most significant result of the I Corps MRX was the opportunity for 34th ID leaders and staff to interact and become familiar with their soon to be higher headquarters, I Corps. In Iraq, I Corps would serve as Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) headquarters and would command MND-S. The training conducted prior to the division mobilization laid the foundation for preparing the staff for the long road ahead and demonstrated that an ARNG division HQ, with preparation was perfectly capable of performing their mission in Iraq.

Post-Mobilization Training

On February 10, 2009, the 34th ID division HQ mobilized and reported to Fort Lewis, Washington, for post-mobilization training. The division HQ staff had the advantage of experience gained in the previous year of training, but would still need to prove its competency to 1st Army during an MRX at Fort Lewis. Over a quarter of the staff from the 34th ID division HQ had a previous deployment and several key leaders had OIF experience with the 1/34 BCT, also from the MN ARNG that deployed to Iraq for 16 months in 2006-2007 and performed the mission of a Security Force (SECFOR) Brigade. The 1/34 BCT established its headquarters at
COB ADDER in the Dhi Qar province in southern Iraq with several of its battalions spread throughout Iraq. This is the same area of operations that the 34 ID division HQ would command and control. BG David J. Elicerio, the Deputy Commanding General for Operations and COL Jon Jensen, G3, provided senior level experience from their tour with the 1/34 BCT during the OIF 06-08 rotation. Their experience, coupled with other veterans from previous OIF deployments spread across the staff provided situational awareness of southern Iraq for the CG. While this experience helped, many of the officers and non-commissioned officers were inexperienced in serving at the division level.

After 60 days of collaborative training, 1st Army validated the division staff for deployment to MND-S in April 2009. The objective for the post-mobilization training at Fort Lewis was to create a cohesive staff. To gain experience and situational awareness, the 34th ID established a unique relationship with the 10th MTN division HQ a full year prior to the RIP on May 20, 2009. At the suggestion of MG Michael Oates, Commanding General for the 10th MTN division HQ, the 34th ID and 10th MTN created an LNO mission that allowed the members of the 34th ID staff to establish relationships with their counterpart in the 10th MTN HQ. Five months prior to the mobilization date, each 34th ID war fighting function staff section embedded an liaison officer (LNO) with the 10th MTN division HQ to provide exposure on how an AC staff functions in a combat zone.

The partnership between the 10th MTN division HQ, an AC HQ and the 34th ID proved that an ARNG division HQ could partner and learn from an AC division HQ in a combat zone. The premier training event that validated the 34th ID division HQ ability to command and control MND-S was the MRX. BCTP facilitates this exercise to replicate the operating environment that portrays the same realistic operational tempo that the division staff would face in Iraq. The 10th MTN division flew several subject matter experts back to Fort Lewis to assist the 34th ID division staff with current information and the validation of the division’s standard operating procedures. The relationship between the 10th MTN HQ and the 34th ID HQ demonstrated that 34th ID
division HQ and AC HQ could work together in a close partnership. In building this relationship, the ARNG demonstrated that it was capable and ready to assume the MND-S mission from 10th MTN.

**Relief of 10th Mountain Division**

The RIP between the 10th MTN division HQ and the 34th ID was anything but routine. A RIP at the division level is a complex problem, increasing this particular RIP's complexity was the 10th MTN relief of MND-SE British forces in Basra on March 31, 2009 and movement of the newly formed MND-S headquarters from Camp Victory in Baghdad to Basra within 60 days of TOA with 34 ID. The 10th MTN assumed command of MND-SE from British forces on March 31, 2009 and established the newly formed division of MND-S.49 The 34th ID Commander, MG Richard Nash, directed that end state for the RIP would be a seamless transition that created no turmoil for subordinate BCTs for the first 30 days. The 34th ID division staff received directions to avoid any traditional “gaps and seams” in staff knowledge.50 With the extremely hard work of both the 10th MTN and 34th ID staffs, the RIP/TOA was completed with no significant impact on MND-S’s mission or their subordinate brigades. According to MG Nash the RIP/TOA was an outstanding success, “We were totally supported throughout our training from the AC/RC components and the efforts of so many made the RIP/TOA a total success and the stage for very rewarding first 100 days in Iraq without a loss of momentum to the programs and operations the 10th MTN HQ had in place.”51

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50 Nash et al., “LNO Missions,” 11.

51 Ibid.
Multi-National Division – South

The 34th ID, headquartered at COB Basra, conducted their mission during a critical period of Iraq’s history. Their mission in the southern nine provinces of Iraq was to build civil capacity and transition security responsibility to the Iraqi security forces. This mission required the 34th ID division staff to support their AC subordinate brigades and enable them to partner with the Iraqi security forces. The division had three major objectives: to advise and assist Iraqi Security Forces to protect the citizens and defend the border with Iran; assist the Government of Iraq in developing civil capacity and economic capacity; and finally, establish conditions for a successful drawdown of U.S. forces in MND-S.

For 10 months, the 34th ID controlled U.S. forces in the southern third of Iraq. More than 1,023 ARNG Soldiers, mostly from the upper Midwest, comprised the division headquarters and provided leadership and direction to approximately 14,000 U.S. personnel in MND-S. The 34th ID conducted their mission during a unique phase of OIF, where on June 30, 2009, U.S. forces withdrew from Iraqi cities and the Iraqi Security Forces took the lead for security operations. The 34th ID captured over 100 violent extremists, forged new partnerships with the Iraqi security forces that enabled security and stability within southern Iraq, and conducted civil capacity building by funding over $190 million dollars in projects using the Commanders Emergency Response Program. The 34th ID reduced its basing footprint in MND-S and returned these bases to the Government of Iraq. 34th ID was present during the historic closing of the detainee facility at Camp Bucca to include the authorized release of detainees and closure of the facility. Finally, prior to the TOA the 34th ID began preparations for the Iraqi national elections and provided a working plan for the 1st ID. Through the professionalism of the ARNG Soldiers and support of

their hometown communities, employers, and families, the 34th ID division HQ completed their mission with success and honor.

**Transfer of Authority to 1st Infantry Division**

“This division (1st ID) is committed to the continuing partnership that was established by the 34th Division. We all have great respect for what the Red Bulls have done during their time here, and we wish them all the best as they go into the future.”

MG Vincent Brooks, Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division

The 34th ID division HQ completed their mission in Iraq with success and honor. Staff Major General Abdul Aziz Aswadi, Commanding General, 14th Iraqi Army Division, who was partnered with the 34th ID division HQ described his definition of success as "By working with our American friends in some areas, such as logistics and training, and with our internal partners in all matters of local security, we are achieving very good results here in our beautiful Basrah.”

The 34th ID division HQ proved to its AC brothers and sisters that an ARNG division HQ was capable of providing command and control of AC brigades in a combat zone. It was apparent that the division had earned respect when the 1st ID requested that 34th ID send a select team of staff officers to assist in their MRX conducted at Fort Riley in October 2009. A team of 12 ARNG Soldiers, led by 34th ID, Chief of Staff, COL Neal Loidolt, would spend almost three weeks assisting the 1st ID prepare for their upcoming mission to replace the 34th ID in MND-S. To continue the success of the LNO mission that the 34th ID used prior to conducting the RIP with 10th MTN, the 1st ID utilized a similar approach. The 1st ID deployed several key staff officers

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53 Christopher Carney, “Passing the Torch of USD-S,” *Danger Forward* (1st Infantry Division, February 2, 2010), 4. [http://64.78.33.72/about/pressreleases/DangerForward020210.pdf](http://64.78.33.72/about/pressreleases/DangerForward020210.pdf) (accessed on November 10, 2010). *Danger Forward* is the 1st Infantry Division newsletter.

two months early to gain situational awareness and to help the 1st ID avoid any gaps or seams in understanding the MND-S operational environment.

**LIMITATIONS to DEPLOYING ARNG DIVISION HEADQUARTERS**

**Diversity of Training Levels**

ARNG division HQ are capable of conducting the same missions as their AC counterpart with the exception of short-notice missions. ARNG and AC divisions do not maintain the same level of readiness. One could argue that an ARNG division HQ lacks the readiness rating of an AC division HQ. This is simply because an ARNG division HQ trains for a minimum of 39 days a year. ARNG units receive funding to conduct 48 unit-training assemblies, which consist of two per day, and 15 days of annual training per training year. Typically, an ARNG division HQ will have additional training opportunities, but is dependent on their status in the ARFORGEN cycle and available funding from NGB. However, an ARNG HQ has a superior cohesion of staff because they do not experience the turnover of staff during deployments like the AC. ARNG division HQ start filling their deployment roster once they receive the alert order one year prior to the mobilization date and the staff is fixed for the entire deployment. The alert order also provides additional funding to increase the support staff prior to mobilization and places Soldiers on orders for Active Duty Operations Support. For AC division HQ, it is normal that the staff will rotate in and out of a deployment due to normal requirements such as education or key development assignments. ARNG divisions HQ maintain individual and some section level skills for deployment but lack in collective training as an operational command and control HQ. One limitation to deploying an ARNG division HQ is the need to conduct training to increase their proficiency in commanding and controlling in a stressful environment. ARNG division HQ

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56 Nash et al., “LNO Missions,” 3.
receive the alert order one year prior to mobilization and this triggers additional funding, equipping and training opportunities. In theory, the ARFORGEN cycle and USR prepares all eight ARNG division HQ to deploy. In reality, the diversity of skills, personnel, and equipment available can create differences in the level of training within the ARNG. Several factors can explain the minor differences of the division HQ staff such as the population base of recruiting and experience or number of previous deployments for the staff. While recognizing these limitations, the solution in place is a formalized training program that begins up to a year prior to mobilization and continues with a certification process after mobilization of an ARNG division HQ.

The Combined Arms Center’s Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) prepares both AC and ARNG division commanders and staff for deployments. BCTP conducts combined arms training that replicates full spectrum operations within the current operational environment. BCTP develops mission rehearsal exercises (MRX), also known as warfighter exercises that prepare commanders and their staff with skills that are current and relevant to the theater of operations where they will deploy. ARNG division HQ training is cyclical according to the ARFORGEN cycle but takes a new level of intensity after the division receives an alert order. With the alert order, BCTP can begin the preparation of an ARNG division HQ prior to the mobilization date by developing a training strategy tailored to the needs to the division. Prior to the mobilization of a division, BCTP can conduct seminars to mentor commanders and staff to develop mission command instincts and skills specifically tailored to their overseas mission.


58 Nash et al., “LNO Missions,” 3.
Once mobilized an ARNG division HQ will participate in an MRX, at the mobilization site, that consists of a standard model of 12 days with a break of two days in the middle to conduct a midpoint after action review (AAR) and reset. However, ARNG divisions have the option to modify this training schedule to meet their training objectives. For instance, the 34th ID division HQ MRX modified the training schedule to include additional training on the two “off” days. BCTP supports realistic, stressful training for ARNG division commanders and staff to prepare them to conduct overseas contingency operations. Both AC and ARNG division HQ utilize the same collective training experience provided by BCTP within 60 days prior to deploying overseas.

**Friction between AC and RC HQ**

It is normal for AC and ARNG leaders to experience some friction and misunderstanding. The AC exists to fight and win the nations wars. The AC trains on a full time basis and their
leaders are understandably cautious to trust and respect ARNG leaders who train at a minimum of 39 days a year. ARNG leaders are proud of their relevant recent contributions to overseas deployments and want to be recognized for their capabilities and experience. During the Korean War, the 45th ID from the Oklahoma National Guard experienced these prejudices. One issue was the training support from the AC or lack thereof. Friction came from the highest levels of the Army, while deployed the 45th ID had to employ a creative information campaign to contest the attempts of GEN Matthew B. Ridgway, the U.S. Eighth Army commander, to keep the 45th ID in Japan and siphon off its Soldiers to AC divisions. Siphoning off troops from National Guard units was a sure way to cause friction since one of the great strengths of ARNG units is their cohesion. The majority of the 45th ID Soldiers hailed from Oklahoma, which has several armories located in small communities. This, required GEN Joseph L. Collins, then Chief of Staff of the Army, to intervene and forced GEN Ridgway to employ the 45th ID in combat on the Korean peninsula to prevent AC and ARNG tensions. Recent practice with OIF and OEF has been that an ARNG unit, usually at the BCT level or below is attached or placed in operational control (OPCON) to an AC HQ. The friction seems to fester with the belief that ARNG HQ are not as capable or experienced as AC HQ. Normally an understanding between the AC and ARNG HQ, to include staff officers and commanders, takes place that solves this uncomfortable phenomenon.

In OIF, only two ARNG division HQ, the 42nd ID and 34th ID have commanded AC brigades. Naturally, the AC commanders and staff, at both Corps and BCT echelons, were skeptical of the capabilities of an ARNG division HQ. This was especially true in a combat zone, preparing for the June 30, 2009, security agreement between the governments of Iraq and the United States. Iraq is not the place for a Multi-National Division (MND) HQ to learn on their job. Once the AC HQ understood that, the 34th ID division HQ had previously deployed to both

60 Ibid., 102.
Bosnia and Kosovo, with 32 percent of the staff having multiple deployments the respect and collaboration followed. Until an ARNG division HQ proves its ability to command and control, it will have to contend with some parochialism from AC units. Acknowledging that the ARNG division leaders were initially outside of the network usually formed by the AC leaders, the open dialogue between the war fighting functions at all unit levels ensured that the mutual respect and fostered a positive command relationship. The senior leadership of the 34th ID division HQ followed the doctrinal answer from *Field Manual 6-22 Army Leadership* “Good leaders keep a finger on the pulse of their organizations by getting out to coach, to listen, and to clarify. They then pass relevant observations to their superiors who can assist with planning and decision making.” By incorporating ARNG division HQ into a predictable deployment cycle, an experienced ARNG division HQ can provide these positive characteristics to the total army effort in overseas contingency operations.

**Civilian Support for ARNG Deployments**

“There's no institution where things have changed more dramatically than in the Guard. We would not be anywhere close to where we are in terms of our execution of mission without the Guard and reserve.”

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen

If routinely employed in a rotational and predictable manner, ARNG Soldiers families, and employers will continue to support the ARNG as an operational force in support of overseas contingency operations. The Defense Science Board Task Force concluded that, based on their study, families, employers, and governors would support a deployment ratio of one deployment every five years. Employers appreciate the qualities of an ARNG Soldier to include the eight


Army values: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage. While ARNG Soldiers provide a valuable resource for civilian employers, their absence during deployments does create hardships, especially for small businesses. Once an ARNG Soldier deploys, their employer decides to either fill the vacancy temporarily or redistribute the workload to other employees. Either choice can cost businesses, through either additional expenses or loss in productivity. The uncertainty in deployments does contribute to stress on the employer. Deployments can also affect the morale of coworkers since they routinely face increased workloads due to a co-workers deployment. The deployment stress has a lesser effect on large companies that have the resources to absorb the absence, but is still a concern. The Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) is a DoD group tasked with a mission to increase and preserve employer support for the ARNG by recognizing companies that support the ARNG, increasing employers’ awareness of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), preventing discriminatory hiring practices, and mediating conflicts between Soldiers and employers. To mitigate the stress on employers, ARNG division HQ need to provide employers with a predictable deployment timeline and elicit support from both the ESGR and local elected officials.

Families of ARNG Soldiers also share some of the same concerns as employers. With a predictable deployment schedule and duration, families are better able to prepare and cope for the absence of a loved one. Fortunately, military families often exhibit the traits of patriotism, adaptability, and resourcefulness that help them succeed during a deployment.63 ARNG division HQ have a Family Readiness Group (FRG) that helps families prepare for a deployment and adapt to the separation through education. One challenge for the FRG is how to include families

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from cross-leveled Soldiers who reside from different states. Fortunately, technology, such as web sites, email, and Facebook provide mediums to communicate and assist families in distant locations. Each state also is responsible for creating a support network to assist families of deployed Soldiers. A relatively new concept, established in Minnesota is a program called Beyond the Yellow Ribbon provides information to help connect ARNG Soldiers and their families with community organizations that provide support, training, and resources. Programs, such as Beyond the Yellow Ribbon, act as a force multiplier for an ARNG division HQ that bond support from the local community to the ARNG Soldiers family to strengthen the resolve of both a deployed Soldier and their family at home. The Minnesota National Guard established Family Assistance Centers in geographical diverse locations to provide support to military families throughout the state. This is exactly the hometown support that General Abrams advocated in the total force concept.

CONCLUSION

The ARNG has a rich history of service to our nation. Since September 11, 2001, the ARNG’s service has transitioned from a strategic reserve to being employed as an operational force. As of December 2010, only two ARNG division HQ have deployed to Iraq since the start of OIF and none have deployed to Afghanistan in support of OEF. With the ARNG comprising eight of 18 division HQ, or 44 percent of the total division HQ available to the total Army, it is evident that the resources of ARNG division HQ are not being utilized for overseas contingency operations. The preponderance of evidence suggests that ARNG division HQ are capable and have the capacity to support the total Army in deploying for overseas contingency operations. ARNG division HQ should deploy to augment the AC overseas contingency deployment rotation cycle to perform as an operational command and control HQ thus providing relief to the AC division HQ operational stress. With resourcing for training and equipment, ARNG division HQ are capable of providing relief for AC division HQ from the stress of multiple rotations. The 34th
ID completed training and deployed to Iraq within 60 days of their mobilization date. As an integrated part of the operational force, the ARNG provides critical forces and skills necessary to ensure the AC possesses the capabilities to sustain operations and meet the requirements for overseas operations. Incorporating ARNG division HQ in a regular rotation deployment schedule, based on the ARFORGEN model, is an effective use of ARNG division HQ and would provide the DoD with an efficient and effective use of forces to sustain overseas contingency operations and relieve stress on the AC. With a predictable deployment schedule, the eight ARNG division HQ can increase the operational division HQ in the AC by 80 percent.

Effective access to ARNG division HQ as an operational force is essential to reducing the repeated deployments of AC division HQ. AC division HQ cannot sustain their current OPTEMPO in support of overseas contingency operations without integrating ARNG division HQ into the deployment rotation cycle. ARNG division HQ are trained, relevant, and ready to deploy. All current ARNG Soldiers and Officers who have enlisted, re-enlisted, or commissioned since September 11, 2001, understand their commitment, and have chosen to serve in this era of persistent conflict. These Citizen Soldiers provide the AC with a unique set of skills that combine civilian and military experience that apply to the full spectrum of operations. ARNG division HQ provide a cost-effective solution for the AC and DoD, which is especially valuable considering the current economic situation of the country. The current OPTEMPO, attributed to the 2007 surge in Iraq and the 2010 surge in Afghanistan has hampered the AC’s efforts to implement the ARFORGEN schedule. The AC has not utilized ARNG division HQ during the last 10 years to assist in relieving stress on AC division HQs. To confirm the lack of utilization, only two ARNG division HQs have deployed to OIF through December 2010. Since 9/11 the AC has failed to provide ARNG division HQ with a regular overseas deployment schedule. The only way to demonstrate there is a total Army is for the AC to support the use of ARNG division HQ for overseas contingency operations.
APPENDIX

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES - IRAQ
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09341-1430

Office of the Commanding General

February 2, 2010

Major General Larry W. Shellito
Adjutant General, Minnesota National Guard
Veterans Service Building
20 West 12th Street
Saint Paul, MN 55155-2098

Dear MG Shellito:

On behalf of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coastguardsmen of United States Forces-Iraq, I want to thank you for the tremendous service of 34th Infantry Division this past year. Their performance has been extraordinary. Through their actions, they demonstrated bravery and selfless dedication to the mission, the people of Iraq, and the United States of America.

The 34th Infantry Division worked diligently to support stability in United States Division-South area of responsibility. To secure the Iraqi populace the “Red Bull” Division conducted aggressive security operations resulting in the capture of over 100 extremists and the seizure of numerous weapons caches containing thousands of explosive projectiles and improvised explosive devices. They worked closely with the Iraqi Security Forces, forging close partnerships with both Army and Police units, building combat and enable capacity. They successfully integrated Iraqi Air Force and Iraqi Army elements in combined border interdiction and general security operations.

The 34th Infantry Division recognized, moreover, that a comprehensive approach is essential to success in Iraq’s complex and dynamic environment, and they worked not only to protect the Iraqi people, but also to serve them. Their leaders conducted more than 150 engagements with key Iraqi leaders and they also facilitated over a dozen meetings with Iraqi religious leaders. The Red Bulls invested in local sustainable business through the distribution of 123 micro-grants in the 2009 fiscal year, valued at over $380,000. Overall, they helped improve Iraq’s civil capacity and encouraged entrepreneurship through spending over $190 million in various projects funded by the Commander’s Emergency Response Program.

This work has not been easy, or without cost. Through their courage and unwavering determination, the Soldiers of the 34th Infantry Division have helped quiet the turmoil that consumed this nation, and the people of Iraq today are buoyed by a growing hope in a bright and prosperous future. They have brought a measure of stability to a people plagued by conflict, and have made their nation proud. It has been the greatest privilege to soldier with the 34th Infantry Division. For over 90 years, they have answered America’s call. I wish them a safe journey home and a joyous reunion with their families and loved ones.

With pride and gratitude,

Raymond T. Odierno
General, U.S. Army
Commanding
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Units Commanded by 34th Infantry Division during OIF 09-11 as Multi-National Division-South
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