NATO Regional Capacity Building: The Foundation for Success in the Counter-piracy Campaign

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A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

Operation Ocean Shield (OOS) is a demonstration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) ongoing commitment to countering piracy. Unlike preceding operations—Operations Allied Protector and Allied Provider, OOS has broadened its scope to include capacity building of regional naval forces as one of its objectives. NATO capacity building efforts seek to enable regional partners to effectively counter piracy and to facilitate the transition of responsibility for counter-piracy operations to these states. However, current NATO efforts in capacity building are falling short of this goal. Capacity building of regional naval forces only includes training and occurs infrequently—during pre-scheduled port visits. In order to achieve its objectives, NATO should create a naval training center that develops the capacity of regional naval forces, facilitates dialogue and cooperation, and utilizes existent frameworks. This paper examines these three areas and offers ways in which a NATO naval training center could provide assistance to regional partners, specifically African nations, in developing the requisite capacity to counter piracy and to facilitate the transition of its mission.
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by

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Signature: //signed//  
16 April 2011
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Abstract

Operation Ocean Shield (OOS) is a demonstration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) ongoing commitment to countering piracy. Unlike preceding operations—Operations Allied Protector and Allied Provider, OOS has broadened its scope to include capacity building of regional naval forces as one of its objectives. NATO capacity building efforts seek to enable regional partners to effectively counter piracy and to facilitate the transition of responsibility for counter-piracy operations to these states. However, current NATO efforts in capacity building are falling short of this goal. Capacity building of regional naval forces only includes training and occurs infrequently—during pre-scheduled port visits. In order to achieve its objectives, NATO should create a naval training center that develops the capacity of regional naval forces, facilitates dialogue and cooperation, and utilizes existent frameworks. This paper examines these three areas and offers ways in which a NATO naval training center could provide assistance to regional partners, specifically African nations, in developing the requisite capacity to counter piracy and to facilitate the transition of its mission.
Introduction

Since 2005, piracy has been a threat to the free-flow of maritime commerce and vital resources throughout the world. The number of pirate attacks off the Somali coast, alone, has increased from 35 attacks in 2005 to 219 attacks in 2010. This increase in attacks has been accompanied by an increase in cost to the global community. Ransoms paid in 2010 cost businesses $238 million as compared to $150,000 in 2005. The total estimated global cost of maritime piracy, according to 2010 estimates, ranges from $7 to $12 billion annually. The forecast for 2011, both in number of attacks and associated costs, is anticipated to be even higher. Due to globalization, piracy cannot be viewed as an isolated, local problem since its economic effects transcend international boundaries and it occurs in the waters near countries that lack the capacity to address this threat.

Operation Ocean Shield (OOS) is a demonstration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) ongoing commitment to countering piracy. It is the third operation—following Operations Allied Protector and Allied Provider—in its campaign to address the piracy threat in the global commons, specifically off the coast of Somalia. OOS is currently being conducted by Standing NATO Maritime Group-2 (SNMG-2) and is comprised of four ships from the Alliance—De Ruyter (Flagship-Netherlands), Eastern Snare

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(Denmark), TCG Gaziantep (Turkey), and USS Laboon (United States). Unlike preceding operations, OOS has broadened its scope to include regional state capacity building as one of its objectives:

A novelty is that the Alliance has broadened its approach to combating piracy by introducing a new element to its mission: it is currently exploring ways in which it could offer, to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities.

Before continuing this discussion, it is important to define the term, “capacity building.” Anne Philbin of the Ford Foundation defined “capacity building” as the "process of developing and strengthening the skills, instincts, abilities, processes and resources that organizations and communities need to survive, adapt, and thrive in the fast-changing world.” The focus of NATO regional capacity building efforts is on the first part of her definition—developing “the skills, instincts, abilities, and processes” of regional naval forces in order to counter piracy.

Current NATO efforts in regional capacity building are falling short of this goal. Regional capacity building of African nation coast guard and naval forces is conducted in “a non-persistent manner and is limited in scope.” The only capacity building program, currently undertaken by NATO, is training. Training indigenous naval forces only occurs during pre-scheduled port visits, by one of the ships assigned to SNMG-2, with limited

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10 Interview with commander from NATO MANW N51 Branch Head, US Element XO, NATO Northwood, UK, 4 April 2011.
11 Interview with commander from NATO MANW N51 Branch Head, US Element XO, NATO Northwood, UK, 4 April 2011.
interaction outside of that venue. A secondary objective of NATO’s efforts is to enable the transition of its counter-piracy mission to regional partners. However, many of these potential partners lack the capacity to assume this mission. Given the limited scope of NATO’s capacity building efforts, both of these objectives—countering piracy and transitioning its mission—will be difficult to realize. In order to achieve these objectives, NATO should create a naval training center that develops the capacity of regional naval forces, facilitates dialogue and cooperation, and utilizes existent frameworks.

In accordance with the mission scope of OOS, this paper will offer “ways” in which a NATO naval training center could assist regional partners, specifically African nations, in countering piracy by developing the capacity of naval forces, facilitating dialogue and cooperation between and among the Alliance and other partners, and utilizing existent frameworks. Although the African Union (AU) is comprised of 53 nations, only the nations of Kenya, the Seychelles, and Tanzania will be used as illustrative examples for NATO capacity building efforts. The lack of political will of Alliance members to take the necessary steps to address piracy is a key challenge that NATO must overcome. However, only by expanding current efforts to include more extensive and enduring capacity building programs, can NATO effectively counter piracy and set the conditions necessary for the transition of its counter-piracy mission to capable, regional partners. As a note for the reader, while the focus of the paper is on Africa, the “ways” included in the discussion are globally applicable albeit with the realization that capacity building efforts must be tailored to specific regions and potential partners.

12 Interview with commander from NATO MANW N51 Branch Head, US Element XO, NATO Northwood, UK, 4 April 2011.
13 Interview with commander from NATO MANW N51 Branch Head, US Element XO, NATO Northwood, UK, 4 April 2011.
Developing the Capacity of Regional Naval Forces

Since 2005, Somali pirates have extended operations across the Indian Ocean using “mother ships.” “Mother ships” enable pirates to expand their area of operations, both in distance and duration, while making detection more difficult by the patrolling vessels of the Alliance (OOS). Figure 1 illustrates the expansion of pirate operating areas over the past five years. The Somali-based piracy area of operations encompasses an expanse of the Indian Ocean the size of Western Europe, thus requiring more force presence.  

Colonel Richard Spencer, British Chief of the EU’s naval forces, stated this concern, “Policing this area would require five times as many warships as the task forces can muster.”

Figure 1. Expansion of Pirate Operating Areas

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Given the vast expanse of the pirate operating area, no one nation has the forces available to adequately patrol and provide the requisite security in this large amount of space. The development of regional naval forces is vital for enabling regional partners to contribute to international counter-piracy efforts, such as OOS, thereby increasing the force to space ratio making these efforts more effective and efficient. In an interview with a U.S. Navy reporter in 2007, Admiral Michael Mullen, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), articulated the need for maritime cooperation, encapsulated in the Global Maritime Partnership initiative, in order to generate a larger force structure needed to address the emergent threats of the 21st century:

We face, as we do with maritime nations around the world, common challenges at sea, whether it’s weapons of mass destruction, piracy, fisheries violations, protection of our economic sea-lanes, which are so vital to all of us. It’s all part of this 1,000-ship navy, which is taking root in the Pacific as it is in other places around the world.

The development of regional naval forces is vital for protecting local ports and coastlines, international straits, and chokepoints through which the preponderance of maritime traffic transits. Piracy aims to disrupt the flow of maritime traffic in these key areas. In 2010, piracy activities had a significant effect on the maritime commerce transiting into and out of the ports of the African nations of Kenya, the Seychelles, and Tanzania. Kenya and the Seychelles lost $414 million and $6 million, respectively, to piracy.

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activities. Although exact figures detailing Tanzanian losses attributed to piracy are unknown, maritime shipping, transiting into and out of these ports, was under the constant threat of pirate attacks.

While the Kenyan and Seychellois naval forces receive training from the U.S., India, and France, their capacity in countering piracy is limited. Kenya maintains only two fast attack craft that can range up to 2,000 nautical miles (nm). While these ships could contribute to the international presence off the Somali coast, their primary mission is coastal defense—“protection of its 500 km coastline.” Moreover, due to the small size of its naval forces, the principal concern for the Kenyan Navy is its “ability to guarantee vessels free right of passage into and out of Kenyan waters.” The Seychellois Coast Guard has only two vessels capable of extended operations, a type FPB 42 large patrol craft (3,000 nm range) and a SDB MK 5 (1,000 nm range); its remaining craft are suited for only coastal

Both nations offer only limited ability in countering piracy, and will need further assistance in developing increased capacity if they are to contribute markedly to an international counter-piracy campaign on the high seas.

The Tanzanian Navy has no capacity to address the piracy threat outside of its contiguous zone. According to their senior naval commander, naval operations are “limited to operating 20nm from the shore.” Most importantly, they do not currently have the capacity to generate “an offshore capability and no adaptive ability to fill this gap.”

While the capacity of the Kenyan, Seychellois, and Tanzanian navies still needs to be further developed, they do offer some advantages in the counter-piracy campaign. The proximity of Kenya and Tanzania to Somalia and the central location of the Seychelles off the African continent provide NATO with potential partners who are well-situated for containing and addressing Somali piracy in the region.

The Kenyan Navy offers NATO a foundational counter-piracy capability on which to build. Jane’s Defense Review characterizes the Kenyan Navy, although small, as “the best equipped force on the East African coast.”

counter-piracy operations in its littorals, the Kenyan Navy does not participate in international counter-piracy efforts. In partnering with these forces, NATO could further develop Kenyan capacity to counter piracy as well as improve interoperability with the Alliance. This would facilitate the expansion of Kenyan naval operations from the littorals to the high seas, once increased naval force structure was developed.

The Seychelles has demonstrated a willingness to work with the international community; it was “the first east African nation to actively participate in counter-piracy efforts off the Somali coast after May 2009.” The Seychellois Coast Guard will “nearly double its size...as a result of equipment donations and increased funding from India, the UAE, and other nations concerned about piracy in the region.” While NATO does not currently maintain an enduring capacity building program; it does, however, conduct “sporadic” training with the Seychellois Coast Guard. By instituting a more enduring training arrangement, NATO would greatly improve Seychellois Coast Guard capabilities and enhance its interoperability with the Alliance.

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33 Interview with commander from NATO MANW N51 Branch Head, US Element XO, NATO Northwood, UK, 4 April 2011.
Tanzanian naval leadership has expressed a desire to join international efforts in countering piracy.\textsuperscript{34} As part of the African Stabilization Force (ASF), Tanzanian leaders are “attempting to achieve greater cooperation through the sharing of limited resources and from targeting their activities.”\textsuperscript{35} Tanzania is seeking to partner with anyone who could assist it in developing the capacity to protect vital Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs).\textsuperscript{36} While NATO is not currently engaged with Tanzania, Tanzanian desire to partner with the international community provides a significant opportunity for NATO to promote and foster Tanzanian development with even a modest capacity building program tailored for SLOC and coastal defense.

A NATO naval training center that facilitates capacity building of partnered nation naval forces is warranted. Currently, no such establishment exists.\textsuperscript{37} This naval training center could be modeled after current NATO efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it has the established training missions—NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A).\textsuperscript{38,39} These training missions seek to develop the

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\item \textsuperscript{37} Interview with commander from NATO MANW N51 Branch Head, US Element XO, NATO Northwood, UK, 4 April 2011.
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professionalization and capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), respectively.\cite{40} This same model can be applied in the creation of a naval training center that develops the professionalization and capabilities of naval forces—both critical components for combating piracy. Training and education serve to create a common-link and enhance the interoperability between and among the Alliance and regional partners. This effort would have a global application since participation would not have to be limited to only African nations; it could also facilitate the naval development of other regional partners. Initial funding for this endeavor could be distributed among Alliance members, following a vote at the North Atlantic Council, and then subsidized by regional governments who seek to take advantage of this training opportunity for their indigenous naval and coast guard forces.\cite{42}

While a naval training center could be used to develop the capacities of regional naval forces to conduct a variety of missions across the spectrum of conflict, its primary focus, in the counter-piracy campaign, would be on the constabulary mission.

The capability of regional naval forces to conduct the constabulary mission is of prime importance in countering piracy. By developing the capability of maritime nations to conduct the constabulary mission, maritime nations would be able to provide “maritime security, ensure freedom of navigation for others, and maintain sovereignty.”\cite{43}

Moreover, maritime nations have the responsibility, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of

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the Sea (UNCLOS), for the maintenance of their own Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). 44

The constabulary mission encompasses three principal tasks necessary for this maintenance: “enforcement of innocent passage, protection of maritime infrastructure, economic and law enforcement.” 45 Some of the capabilities required to accomplish these tasks are listed in Table 1. 46 By developing these capabilities in regional partners, NATO can set the conditions necessary for effectively countering piracy and transitioning its mission to capable, regional naval forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Detect and track local surface contacts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify surface contacts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contribute to recognized operational picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intercept surface contacts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Build operational intelligence picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operate in anchorages, port approaches, and ports</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter improvised small boat attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage hostile surface contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct boarding operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Escort detained vessels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct fishery and smuggling enforcement operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interdict pirate and terrorist vessels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table I. Tasks and Capabilities for Constabulary Mission. 47

The expansion of training forums is essential for increasing the capacity of partnered nation naval forces. In addition to scheduling training with host-nation naval forces during port visits, the embarkation of host-nation naval personnel on NATO platforms during OOS counter-piracy missions would provide valuable experience. This would enable partnered

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nation naval personnel to receive on-the-job training as well as provide them with a real-world context for follow-on classroom discussions. This venue would not require the re-allocation of already scarce assets to strictly capacity building missions. For example, SNMG-2 is comprised of only 4 ships and is required to conduct counter-piracy patrols over an extensive area. This course of action would facilitate the normal conduct of counter-piracy patrols while enabling SNMG-2 to conduct capacity building concurrently.

**Facilitating Dialogue and Cooperation**

The Malaccan Straits Security Initiative (MSSI)—an international counter-piracy effort between Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia in the Straits of Malacca—illustrates how the lack of dialogue and cooperation hinders efforts to effectively counter piracy. MSSI counter-piracy efforts were hampered by concerns about sovereignty, differences in the capabilities of naval forces, and apprehensions over the amount of involvement of outside actors. By using these issues to inform regional capacity building efforts, NATO could facilitate enhanced dialogue and cooperation that overcomes these challenges.

Concerns about sovereignty and the lack of trust between states reduced the efficacy of the MSSI. Joint patrols conducted by Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia were ineffective as these states “confined each other to conducting anti-piracy patrols only in their

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own territorial jurisdictions.” Moreover, these patrols were not synchronized in time and place and lacked a unified command structure; they were not “combined” patrols. As a result of these inefficiencies, the pirates would “attack in one state’s waters then find sanctuary in another’s because of these limitations.” The pursuit of pirates into another state’s territorial waters was not allowed under MSSI due to sensitivities about sovereignty that stemmed from a lack of trust between participating states. This lack of trust further exacerbated the problem of effectively countering piracy because it precluded intelligence sharing—“a vital component of counter-piracy operations.” For example, the lack of trust between MSSI states stalled efforts in creating an “Information Sharing Center as part of the Japanese-led Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAPP).” ReCAPP was part of the overarching MSSI.

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The differences in the capabilities of participating MSSI naval forces exacerbated the problems of coordination and the imposition of territorial restrictions on joint patrols. For example, “Indonesia had less than 100 operational vessels to patrol 3 million square km of archipelagic waters.” Because of this capability shortfall and the territorial restrictions imposed on joint patrols, pirates could operate unfettered in these waters without the threat of being pursued by either Indonesian or partnered naval forces. The differences in the capabilities of participating naval forces also hindered the coordination of joint patrols, “shipboard officers privately lament that bilateral coordination of these patrols amount to little more than exchanges of schedules.” This example illustrates the ineffectiveness of joint patrols when one nation doesn’t have the requisite capacity to cover its assigned area, thus providing sanctuary to pirates; it also further highlights the need for “combined” patrolling.

MSSI member nations were concerned over the involvement of outside actors in the region and limited the amount of international support for counter-piracy efforts. International support provided by Japan, the U.S., and other nations for the initiative was
limited to training and resources.\textsuperscript{63} Regional states sought to “prevent regional domination by any 1 power.”\textsuperscript{64} Even Japan, a regional leader in counter-piracy initiatives, was “similarly restricted to conducting training exercises with and providing resources to the littoral states.”\textsuperscript{65} This perception of outside power infringement on the sovereignty of regional nations reduced the efficacy of MSSI—“The littoral states will resist calls to increase meaningful cooperation which would result in a perceived reduction in sovereignty thereby creating ineffective anti-piracy initiatives.”\textsuperscript{66}

In order to address concerns about sovereignty, limited regional exercises, as part of OOS, would facilitate dialogue and cooperation, between and among NATO and African partners, and provide a foundation for trust on which to build. A regional exercise focused on combined patrolling, between the Kenyan and Tanzanian naval forces—due to their shared border—and a single ship from SNMG-2, provides a venue to enhance the interoperability of these forces in protecting their respective coasts and SLOCs against the piracy threat. Following the exercise, a roundtable discussion with component forces and respective leadership would prove useful in capturing tactical lessons learned. Furthermore, this “roundtable” would assist in identifying potential opportunities for future combined patrolling, examining other possible areas for cooperation—such as intelligence sharing, and setting the foundation for building trust and cooperation between these nations in order to

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enhance the efficacy of counter-piracy operations. A NATO naval training center would provide an enduring mechanism, or central hub, to schedule, plan, and facilitate capacity building exercises. The training center could compile tactical lessons learned from these exercises and apply them to future capacity building efforts.

Regional exercises could also have significant strategic effects. A NATO regional exercise geared towards countering piracy, although limited in scope, would facilitate the dialogue and cooperation necessary to develop influential relationships at the lower levels of government that may spawn cooperation at the higher levels as people advance in the ranks. This dialogue and cooperation between forces may not otherwise be possible because of the status of the relationship between governments. At a minimum, if open cooperation is not possible, any dialogue between forces would be advantageous. Dialogue at lower levels may be required to prevent misunderstandings that could potentially exacerbate tensions at the higher levels of government. For example, if the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments had a strained relationship, proper coordination and close relationships between Kenyan and Tanzanian naval forces could prevent a potential misunderstanding, such as the mistaken pursuit of pirates across jurisdictional boundaries, from exacerbating the tensions between respective governments.67 The forging of these types of relationships between forces prevents tactical misunderstandings from having long-lasting strategic effects.

Military cooperation can also promote regional stability by fostering cooperation in other areas—political, economic, and cultural. Development in these areas would contribute to regional stability by addressing many of the drivers of instability commonplace in Africa--

failing government institutions, underdevelopment, and demographic challenges. Moreover, deficiencies in these areas are the root causes of piracy—a criminal act that is driven by poor economic, political and security conditions. Most often, regional stability is directly correlated to the security situation. Regional stability is not only achieved by addressing the security situation, but through the development of the political, economic, and cultural institutions of each country that, collectively, comprise the region.

In order to overcome the limitations of joint patrolling, as illustrated in the MSSI case study, NATO emphasis on “combined” patrolling, as part of its regional capacity building efforts, would prove advantageous in increasing the efficacy of counter-piracy operations. Combined patrolling enables reciprocity in filling capability gaps of participating forces. For example, NATO facilitation of the combined patrolling of Tanzanian waters, by Kenyan and Tanzanian naval forces, would allow Kenyan naval forces to fill the distance limitation of the Tanzanian navy until it developed the requisite capacity to expand its operations. Likewise, the Tanzanian Navy could assist Kenya in patrolling its coastal waters while the small-sized Kenyan Navy focused its efforts further offshore. Combined patrolling would also ensure a unity of effort, by facilitating enhanced coordination, which is necessary to deny pirates safe-haven in the littorals of each of these nations.

As illustrated by the MSSI, regional nation concern over the involvement of outside actors needs to be considered when designing regional capacity building programs. NATO regional capacity building efforts need to respect the sovereignty and be limited to the desires of partnered nations. By being cognizant of partnered nation desires, NATO could best tailor

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a regional capacity building program that enhances partner capacity, fosters interoperability, and promotes mutual trust and cooperation with the Alliance and among regional partners.

**Utilizing Existent Frameworks**

There are several existent frameworks that a NATO naval training center can utilize in order to build regional capacity and facilitate enhanced dialogue and cooperation between and among the Alliance and regional partners in order to counter piracy. Those frameworks are: Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE), NATO support to the AU (NS-AU), and NATO’s Mediterranean Security Dialogue (MSD).

SHADE provides NATO with a venue through which it can further enhance regional dialogue and cooperation. It is “primarily a military meeting focusing on the issue of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin.”

Participants include: the Coalition Maritime Forces (CMF), EU naval forces, NATO, China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Yemen, Seychelles, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and “other nations in the Somali region impacted by piracy.” Chairmanship of SHADE is currently “rotated between CMF, the EU, and NATO.” SHADE has several objectives, “promote tactical level coordination between naval forces operating in the area, educate each other on ongoing operations, and maintain pressure on Somali pirates.” Through SHADE, NATO could further promote regional dialogue and cooperation by advocating for the partnering of SHADE member naval forces

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with African naval forces (i.e., Kenya and Tanzania) in order to further develop their capability to counter piracy. Another option is the embarkation of African naval personnel on the naval vessels of SHADE member nations. Both of these courses of action would promote further cooperation between the AU and the international community and potentially create the aforementioned strategic effects resulting from cooperation in other, non-military areas.

NS-AU provides a framework for capacity building efforts that can be refocused to address the piracy threat.\textsuperscript{74} Currently, the NS-AU framework is land-focused with NATO providing support to AU operations in Somalia and Darfur.\textsuperscript{75} This support is focused on increasing the capabilities of the ASF, through training and capacity building support, in order to conduct peace-keeping operations on the continent.\textsuperscript{76} Additionally, NATO provides air- and sea- lift for these forces.\textsuperscript{77} The NS-AU offers a framework that can be expanded to include training, partnering, and support to regional naval forces, such as Kenya, Seychelles, and Tanzania, with sourcing for capacity-building for these nations being decided upon by the North Atlantic Council, the decision-making body of NATO.\textsuperscript{78}

The Mediterranean Security Dialogue (MSD) is a framework between NATO and several Mediterranean countries, to include several states on the African continent—Egypt,
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, focused on regional security cooperation. The objective of the MSD is “to increase understanding of NATO’s policies and activities and get a better appreciation of the security interests and perceptions of the countries involved.” While the focus of the MSD is political, it also “seeks to foster practical cooperation” encompassed in its “Work Programme” which includes military activities.

Under the MSD, NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) trust funds can be “established in favor of Mediterranean Dialogue countries.” Participating states, under this program and in coordination with NATO, could “take the lead in sponsoring and developing the project proposal and in identifying potential contributors. Trust fund contributions could include funding, equipment, or contributions in kind.” Moreover, under this program, the “partner country that benefits directly from this project is expected to take an active part in this work and to provide maximum support to the project within its means.”

The MSD offers a framework that can be expanded to include other African countries—Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania—in order to address the issue of piracy. By expanding the MSD to include these nations, a PfP trust fund could be established for

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80 It is important to point out that Mauritania does not possess a coastline on the Mediterranean Sea thus illustrating the feasibility of expanding the MSD to include other non-Mediterranean nations.
building the capacity of their naval forces. Since MSD beneficiaries are expected to take an active part in the project, the corollary to this, once the requisite capacity of these naval forces were developed, is future African leadership of counter-piracy operations. This would enable the eventual transition of counter-piracy operations from NATO to regional partners. Most importantly, the MSD venue allows participating African nations to be funded by a mechanism—PfP funding—normally only relegated to existing partners or current members of the Alliance.\footnote{North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Security through Partnership,” NATO brochure, 2005, \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/sec-partnership/sec-partner-e.pdf} (accessed 28 February 2011), 28.} Thanos Dokos, Director of Studies at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), articulated the need for greater NATO commitment to the MSD initiative, “If NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative is to succeed, NATO will have to devote greater financial resources to it.”\footnote{Thomas Dokos, “Developing Coordination between the EMP and NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue,” in The Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Security Dialogue, ed. Martin Ortega (Paris, France: Institute for Security Studies-Western European Union, March 2000), 46. Online at the following URL: \url{http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ014.pdf} (accessed 09 April 2011).} This vignette creates expanded partnership for the Alliance with non-European nations, as well as enables regional capacity building in order to address the threat of piracy.

**Counter-arguments**

The principal counter-argument to my thesis is NATO should not be engaged in regional capacity building because it lacks the political will to take the necessary measures to do it effectively.\footnote{Interview with commander from NATO MANW N51 Branch Head, US Element XO, NATO Northwood, UK, 4 April 2011.} Many members of the Alliance do not see piracy as a major threat and are therefore unwilling to make significant contributions—money, ships, personnel—to OOS.\footnote{Interview with commander from NATO MANW N51 Branch Head, US Element XO, NATO Northwood, UK, 4 April 2011.} Moreover, “to get all of the NATO members to sit down at a table and unanimously approve
tougher measures to disrupt the pirates is extremely challenging.”  

Both of these measures are deemed essential for effective counter-piracy efforts—“a vessel with an armed security team has never been pirated.”

From the lack of political will stems limited resourcing. OOS resourcing was “agreed to by NATO member nations but never followed through by the allocation of actual ships to the operation.” As a result, OOS had to be filled by SNMG-2 thereby creating a NATO force shortfall, when other requirements, such as Operation Odyssey Dawn, emerged. Because of NATO’s already limited forces, the expansion of OOS, to encompass more than patrolling, creates a greater force-to-space ratio problem as forces from SNMG-2 are further reduced in order to conduct capacity building—further enabling pirates to operate unfettered in more areas. Moreover, Alliance members are supporting two ongoing efforts—OOS and the EU’s Operation Aatlanta. These operations are competing for already scarce

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90 Interview with commander from NATO MANW N51 Branch Head, US Element XO, NATO Northwood, UK, 4 April 2011.
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96 Interview with commander from NATO MANW N51 Branch Head, US Element XO, NATO Northwood, UK, 4 April 2011.
resources and are hampered by the political friction between the EU and NATO. Admiral James Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), articulated:

> Political differences continue to hamper greater collaboration… Currently, NATO and the EU may conduct parallel military and civilian operations with no established or formal mechanisms for coordination and cooperation…However, we will not be able to deliver a complimentary, holistic effect without high level political agreement between NATO and the EU. 

Because of this ongoing friction, the likelihood of dual-hatted Alliance members providing more resourcing to OOS or to the creation of a naval training center is arguably, unlikely. 

The current disposition of African naval forces requires a significant effort from NATO. Closing the capacity gaps in the naval forces of African nations—such as Kenya, Tanzania, and the Seychelles—requires a significant contribution, in terms of resourcing and time, in order to develop the requisite capacity and to enable the transition of NATO counter-piracy efforts to these partners. Both of these variables, resourcing and time, as already demonstrated, are in short supply among members of the Alliance.

The refutation to this counter-argument is contained in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept. This concept, outlining NATO’s “way ahead,” calls for NATO to have greater cooperation with regional actors while participating in cooperative security efforts, “The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security through

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97 Interview with commander from NATO MANW N51 Branch Head, US Element XO, NATO Northwood, UK, 4 April 2011.
partnerships with relevant countries and other international organizations.” The Strategic Concept further articulates the reliance of NATO members on the uninterrupted transport of vital energy resources in the maritime domain to meet its needs. Moreover, the concept outlines NATO’s commitment to regional capacity building, “The Alliance will develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crises zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance.”

NATO has already demonstrated its willingness to act beyond its borders and develop local forces with its involvement in Iraq (NTM-I) and Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), and NTM-A). This same demonstration of resolve could be used to address piracy, which threatens NATO members by disrupting the flow of vital energy resources, by developing the capacity of regional naval forces. By developing this capacity, NATO enables the transition of its counter-piracy efforts to regional partners. Both of these items, developing local forces and enabling regional partners, are outlined in its Strategic Concept and provide justification for why NATO should participate in regional capacity building of African nations to counter piracy.

Lastly, the Strategic Concept illustrates NATO’s understanding of the importance of enabling regional partners to provide for their own security. By enabling its partners to counter piracy on their own, NATO would reduce its requirement to provide forces to fill

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their capacity gaps. Moreover, by resourcing a naval training center that builds regional capacity, there would no longer be an open-ended commitment for the Alliance to continue OOS or to develop a successor operation once it expires at the end of 2012.\footnote{North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Topic: Counter-piracy operations,” 17 February 2011, \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm} (accessed 17 February 2011).}

**Conclusion**

Current NATO efforts in OOS are falling short of achieving its stated objectives—effectively countering piracy and building the capacity of regional naval forces in order to transition the responsibility for its counter-piracy mission to regional partners. Capacity building efforts are hampered by a lack of political will of Alliance members to take the necessary steps to address piracy. This lack of will has resulted in an ends-means mismatch that has contributed to NATO’s inability to effectively respond to an increase in pirate attacks in 2010. The number of pirate attacks is forecasted to get worse in 2011. An increase in pirate capabilities, such as the use of “mother ships,” has expanded the Somali-based piracy area of operations compounding an already existent force-to-space ratio problem facing NATO and the international community.

In order to achieve its stated objectives, NATO needs to reinvigorate its efforts by creating a naval training center that develops the capacity of regional naval forces, facilitates dialogue and cooperation between and among the Alliance and regional partners, and utilizes existent frameworks to fund and promote regional capacity building efforts. By developing the capacities of regional naval forces, NATO can assist in bridging the gap between current and requisite naval force structures needed to contain Somali-based piracy. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept provides credence to an increase in effort for OOS. By augmenting the naval capacities of African nations, such as Kenya, Tanzania, and the Seychelles, NATO can
take advantage of states that already possess a foundational counter-piracy capability on
which to build. Furthermore, these nations have already expressed a desire to participate, or
are already involved, in ongoing counter-piracy efforts and provide a good starting point for
a reenergized capacity building program. Only by expanding current efforts to include more
extensive and enduring capacity building arrangements—both epitomized in a naval training
center—can NATO effectively counter piracy and set the conditions necessary for the
transition of its counter-piracy mission to regional partners.

**Recommendations**

NATO should create a naval training center that manages capacity building efforts,
enhances interoperability between and among the Alliance and regional partners, and
facilitates dialogue and cooperation necessary for forging regional partnerships. A naval
training center would reduce the need for continued spending on ongoing counter-piracy
operations, such as OOS, and would ensure a long-term NATO contribution to counteri
piracy and other potential threats to maritime security. NATO should expand current
counter-piracy capacity building efforts to include: partnering, embarking host-nation naval
personnel on Alliance vessels, conducting regional exercises, and utilizing existent
frameworks—all of these programs would fall under the purview of the training center.

NATO should assign 1 ship from SNMG-2 to partner with Kenyan, Tanzanian, or
Seychellois naval forces and patrol that nation’s littorals. This would facilitate building trust
and cooperation while enhancing host-nation interoperability with the Alliance. Moreover,
this course-of-action would enable capacity building of the host-nation naval forces to be
conducted concurrently with patrolling.
As part of port visitations, NATO vessels should embark host-nation naval personnel on OOS patrols. This would further increase the operational experiences of host-nation personnel as well as contribute to their training. Following the patrol, NATO personnel should conduct a debrief with embarked host-nation staffs to cover tactical lessons learned as well as helping them to identify future training plans that could further enhance their own capabilities. Captured lessons learned should be forwarded to the naval training center in order to create a training library. Lessons learned could then be referenced and used to inform future capacity building programs or training evolutions.

NATO should conduct a limited, counter-piracy exercise, focused on combined patrolling, with Kenyan and Tanzanian naval forces. This would help these nations overcome some of the challenges associated with counter-piracy operations, as illustrated by the MSSI example, as well as fill the capability gaps of each of these forces. By conducting a “roundtable” discussion following the patrol with participating forces and respective leadership, NATO could help build trust between these nations paving the way for future cooperation.

Lastly, by utilizing/expanding existent frameworks such as SHADE, NS-AU, and MSD, NATO could use these frameworks to further develop the capacity of regional naval forces and facilitate dialogue and cooperation. NS-AU and MSD provide potential funding mechanisms for capacity building efforts.


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