Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) has a focused mission, to provide chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management (CM) operations, a mission it has never conducted. The potential consequences of the use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) or CBRNE event within the borders of the United States present a particular problem that requires specialized response capabilities. But a special focus on WMD/CBRNE CM precludes JTF-CS from providing the more necessary mission of “generic” CM, especially at the operational level, which is to provide the bridge between the local/tactical response and national/strategic objectives. Outlining how CBRNE CM fits within the broader scope of civil support, and providing the right force and command structure shows how JTF-CS can better meet DOD’s mission to provide support to homeland security. The unique structure of JTF-CS can alleviate some of the complicated legal restrictions and policy constraints for DOD forces to provide civil support. Finally, a broadened mission would mean more opportunity for interagency interaction at the local, state, regional, and national level through exercises and joint training, which would enhance response actions should a disaster occur that exceeded a state’s capabilities, regardless of the incident being natural or manmade.
Joint Task Force Civil Support Should Broaden Its Mission Scope to Better Provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: ____________________

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Abstract

Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) has a focused mission, to provide chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management (CM) operations, a mission it has never conducted. The potential consequences of the use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) or CBRNE event within the borders of the United States present a particular problem that requires specialized response capabilities. But a special focus on WMD/CBRNE CM precludes JTF-CS from providing the more necessary mission of “generic” CM, especially at the operational level, which is to provide the bridge between the local/tactical response and national/strategic objectives. Outlining how CBRNE CM fits within the broader scope of civil support, and providing the right force and command structure shows how JTF-CS can better meet DOD’s mission to provide support to homeland security. The unique structure of JTF-CS can alleviate some of the complicated legal restrictions and policy constraints for DOD forces to provide civil support. Finally, a broadened mission would mean more opportunity for interagency interaction at the local, state, regional, and national level through exercises and joint training, which would enhance response actions should a disaster occur that exceeded a state’s capabilities, regardless of the incident being natural or manmade.
Introduction

The Department of Defense (DOD) devotes a significant effort into the prevention of the use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) against the United States, but it is not alone in this effort. While DOD leads the effort to provide for Homeland Defense, it plays a supporting and enabling role in Homeland Security, ceding this role to relatively newly formed (and aptly named) Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with the appropriate caveat that in case of a terrorist use of WMD, the lead role may be taken by the Department of Justice (DOJ). In the National Response Framework (NRF), the roles for these federal/national levels agencies (among others) are delineated. However, another key aspect of homeland security are the actions taken at local and state levels, and many of the issues that arise in these security actions occur when the local and state abilities are exhausted (or do not exist) and the federal government must take action. Besides the level of government that must provide for homeland security, there is a timeline for events to occur. Much of what DOD and DHS/DOJ do are attempts to prevent an incident from happening and preparations to mitigate the magnitude and scope of an incident should one occur. Local and state governments also take such efforts. In spite of such preparations, incidents do occur, be they the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, or natural disasters of the scope of Hurricane Katrina, and the key process for responding to such incidents is consequence management (CM).

CM is the realm of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as a part of DHS, and there are similar emergency management organizations within most states and local municipalities. But once an incident exceeds a state’s ability to manage, the next level is directly federal assistance, which leaves a gap if such an incident is still regionally constrained, such that a few states are impacted but the event is not national in significance. DOD is organized with
such a “gap bridging” hierarchy in mind, with the tactical, operational, theater/strategic levels of war. It is this operational level, somewhere between the local/state responders, and the national/federal response agencies, that the experience and methodologies of DOD commands can make the most impact in providing support. For such an occurrence, combatant commanders would likely form a joint task force (JTF), and design this force to best respond to the incident with the intent of returning the formed elements to their standard roles once the event has been terminated. DOD has a standing JTF capable of providing this level of response capability, but its mission is too narrowly focused. The Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) must broaden its mission set to better fulfill its given name as a significant method for the Department of Defense to conduct its missions for homeland security. Several units that might be subordinate to the JTF-CS during a national emergency have already begun reorganizing and broadening their mission sets as needed to conduct support to civil agencies. With foreseeable defense budget cuts in the near future, growth of the JTF-CS mission set will provide solid rationale for maintaining this unit’s direct capability to respond in the aftermath of a crisis to save lives, prevent further injury, and provide temporary critical support within the United States and its territories and possessions.

Units that are trained to provide specialized response, in this case, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) response, are inherently trained to provide “generic” response. The actions taken in any response are conducted by what would be considered tactical units, but once a certain threshold of magnitude and scope is reached, an operational level headquarters best manages such actions. This “middle level” of response, which does not exist in the structure of our government, is the best use of the capabilities of JTF-CS.
Counter Arguments

Defense of the homeland is DOD’s highest priority with the goal to identify and defeat threats at a safe distance from the homeland.\(^1\) The nation has been continuously at war since 9/11, and DOD forces, with coalition partners, have been conducting global operations to defeat such threats at their origins. The lack of a similar terrorist attack on US soil and regime change in rogue nations like Iraq and Afghanistan have justified the loss of blood and treasure devoted to such efforts. But this mission is not exclusive, DOD has the additional mission to provide homeland security in its ability to engage in emergency preparedness, and the primary method for this mission is civil support. Politicians are likely to turn to the first organized group they can find that has the culture and capability to get something done in the event of a crisis, so DOD must plan for this reality.\(^2\) The response to the consequences of recent natural and manmade disasters provides the most recent vivid example of such a requirement, well summarized by Dr. Paul Stockton from the Center for International Security at Stanford University:

The reality is that the military is constantly planning for low probability, high consequence events. The military may not want this mission, the DoD may not want to be in the lead—but that is all the more reason to plan for it. The costs of not doing so, as we have seen over the last few years, can be devastating. If there is anything that might be learned from events like 9/11 and Katrina, it is that shrewd planning—be it for prevention or response—is key to preserving our national security.\(^3\)

The formation of a CBRNE CM JTF presents significant organizational, operational, and training challenges that affect the commander’s ability to fuse a diverse group of key personnel with a varying degree of experience in joint operations, CBRNE CM, and interagency

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\(^1\) JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*, pg. I-1
\(^2\) McIntyre and Tussing, “Setting the Scene for Discussion of DoD’s Role in Responding to Catastrophe,” pg. 18
\(^3\) Stockton, “DoD and the Problem of Mega-Catastrophes,” pg. 31
cooperation, into a functioning organization. Conducting such operations within the United States, where legal factors and policy decisions complicate the response, further confounds the commander charged with this mission. However, most of these issues are not unique to CBRNE CM, and are present whenever DOD forces provide support to civil authorities. The expertise for CBRNE response is at the tactical level, therefore those units need the guidance of an operational level headquarters to ensure they are in compliance with the appropriate legal and policy frameworks. Additionally, subject matter experts from across DOD are available at every level in order to assist any commander with navigating the specific complications of CBRNE response. The JTF-CS can shoulder this legal burden, based on experience gained since its formation, and allow its subordinate commanders to focus on their immediate response tasks.

The use of military forces within the borders of the United States is a sensitive issue, and has restrictions outlined in the Constitution as well as Posse Comitatus Act and Insurrection Act. Regardless of DOD capabilities, a concerted effort must be taken to ensure there is not an undue “militarization” of any disaster response, irrespective of its instigation. This is actually one of the key advantages of JTF-CS, commanded by a two-star general/flag officer, in that can provide the appropriate nexus of commanding both Title 10 active duty personnel and Title 32 National Guards. Some might argue that this is not the appropriate command level for an “operational” level command, but it highlights the function of the command instead of the rank of the commanding officer. For example, in the response to hurricane Katrina, JTF-Katrina was commanded by LTG Honore (three-stars), but he only executed coordination with the Adjutant Generals of Louisiana and Mississippi, both major generals (two-stars). This relationship would

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4 JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management, pg. II-24
not change with JTF-CS as an equivalently ranked headquarters, and would have the added benefit of emphasizing the support role DOD forces have in any similar response.

**JTF-CS Composition**

JTF-CS is a joint command led by an Army National Guard Major General on federal active duty. The staff is multi-component with active, reserve, and National Guard service members from all five services, as well as civilians and contractors. Collectively, the command possesses expertise in a wide range of functional areas to include operations, logistics, intelligence, planning, communications, and medical services. In 2008, JTF-CS received OPCON of the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF), which is DOD’s initial response force for a CBRNE incident. The CCMRF is composed of three task forces with specific response missions: operations, medical, and aviation. TF Operations is a brigade-sized task force conducts initial response, decontamination, surveying, monitoring, and marking an incident site, engineer support, sustainment, mortuary affairs, and transportation. TF Medical is also a brigade that conducts patient decontamination, ground and rotary wing patient evacuation, veterinary support, medical logistics, and exposure monitoring. TF Aviation assumes control of rotary wing aviation and conducts casualty and medical evacuation, air transport, and search and rescue. It should be noted however, that of all the tasks previously listed, only decontamination, surveying, monitoring, and marking an incident site, and exposure monitoring have primarily a CBRNE focus. During the National Guard deployment to American Samoa following a tsunami in September 2009, applicable CCMRF capabilities were used.

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5 Domestic Operational Law Handbook, pg. 46  
6 Le Jeune, “Consequence Management: Steps in the Right Direction?” pg. 6
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had planned for the requirement of three CCMRFs to be trained and ready for response in 2008, but only two became available by 2010, one active and one reserve component. The reserve component is being phased out, and ten homeland response forces (HRF), aligned with the ten FEMA regions, were to be stood up in lieu of two CCMRFs in an attempt to meet changes required by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This reorganization was an attempt to “rebalance forces to reflect the reality that response activities will usually be directed by the governor at the state level and the need – if absolutely necessary – to federally command and control responses to multiple, simultaneous events.”

Additional assets that can be used by JTF-CS for its CBRNE CM mission are listed in Appendix A of FM 3-11.21/MCRP 3-37.2C/NTTP 3-11.24/AFTTP(I) 3-2.37, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures For Chemical, Biological, Radiological, And Nuclear Consequence Management Operations*, (JTF-CS is a listed asset). Most of these assets are specialized teams through battalion-sized elements, and with the exception of ARNORTH, JTF-CS, and the 20th Support Command (CBRNE), can not take up an operational level headquarters for a response in the United States.

**DOD, WMD, CBRNE, and Homeland Security**

The DOD protects the United States through the distinct missions of Homeland Defense and Civil Support (as part of Homeland Security), but these missions are interrelated and often have overlapping roles and responsibilities. DOD is the designated Lead Federal Agency with responsibility for Homeland Defense, and often conducts this mission with the support of other federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of

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7 Le Jeune, “Consequence Management: Steps in the Right Direction?” pg. 4
Transportation (DOT). Homeland Security is the national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. For these efforts, DHS or the Department of Justice (DOJ) will usually be the Lead Federal Agency to be supported by DOD (and other federal agencies) as requested. DOD provides civil support for domestic emergencies and designated law enforcement activities. In this construct of Homeland Defense, Homeland Security, and Civil Support, there is a mixture of DOD authorities under Title 10 USC, Title 32 USC, and Title 14 when considering the utilization of the US Coast Guard under DOD or DHS lead. An additional constraint on DOD forces comes from Title 18 USC, Section 385, Posse Comitatus Act, which places limits on the use of military personnel for civilian law enforcement barring listed exceptions or per the Constitution or Act of Congress. However, DOD support may be authorized in support of a lead federal agency in accordance with the Economy Act, Title 31 USC, Section 1535, which does not require a Presidential declaration.

This paper will focus on a specific sub-element of Homeland Security, or Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), in the realm of Consequence Management (CM). CM is action taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. This is different than Crisis Management (CrM) which predominately is the responsibility of DHS or DOJ due to its law enforcement nature. One of the primary policy instruments that provides the basis for how DOD may provide CS is in the United States is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) (Public Law 100-107), which set the

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9 JP 3-28, Civil Support, pg. GL-8
10 JP 3-28, Civil Support, pg. GL-6
policy of the Federal government to provide an orderly and continuing means of supplemental assistance to state and local governments in their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage that result from major disasters or emergencies. Under the Stafford Act, the President may direct DOD to support disaster relief in one of three different scenarios: a Presidential declaration of a major disaster, a Presidential order to perform emergency work for the preservation of life and property, or a Presidential declaration of emergency.\(^\text{11}\)

In the midst of this complicated legal and military environment is where JTF-CS operates (see Figure 1\(^\text{12}\) for a representative, not all-inclusive graphic of this legal paradigm). JTF-CS is under operational control (OPCON) of US Army North (ARNORTH), which serves as the Standing Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) under US Northern Command (NORTHCOM). NORTHCOM was established in 2002 to provide command and control of DOD Homeland Defense efforts and to coordinate DSCA. JTF-CS was originally formed under US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in 1999, and transferred to NORTHCOM upon its establishment. JTF-CS has a very specific mission set in providing civil support, focusing exclusively on the planning and integration of DOD support for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) consequence management operations.

\(^{11}\) JP 3-28, *Civil Support*, pg. F-2

\(^{12}\) McIntyre and Tussing, “Setting the Scene for Discussion of DoD’s Role in Responding to Catastrophe,” pg. 16
JTF-CS would primarily conduct this mission within NORTHCOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR), but has the ability to respond anywhere in the United States or its territories and possession by agreements with US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and US Pacific Command (PACOM).

Of note is the fact that “JTF-CS has not been assigned any missions other than CBRNE consequence management response.”\(^\text{13}\) It maintains this exclusivity with the understanding that the forces, equipment, and experience required to effectively respond to a CBRNE incident are unique. Few might argue the point that the special units within DOD have capabilities that would not be matched by civil authorities, particularly in responding to a terrorist CBRNE incident. However, a closer examination of where JTF-CS fits within the National Response Framework (NRF) and how joint doctrine depicts the appropriate response to a CBRNE CM will show that the uniqueness of JTF-CS does not lie in its CBRNE expertise but more in its ability to operate in the complex legal and “operational level of war” context that sets it apart from any other joint task force and can demonstrate its necessity to providing a major element for HS.

Joint Publication 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), sets forth doctrine to govern joint CWMD operations and provides the basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations.

WMD are defined as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons or devices capable of a high order of destruction WMD and/or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. CWMD does not include countering the employment of high-yield explosives (HYE).\(^\text{14}\)

Although there are slight difference in the terminology between CBRNE and WMD, in CM, the terms are more interchangeable. JP 3-40 further translates strategic guidance for CWMD to the

\(^{13}\) Joint Task Force Civil Support, “Frequently Asked Questions”
\(^{14}\) JP 3-40, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, pg. I-1
operational level of war in order to leverage the six joint functions (command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment) into eight military mission areas (MMA). These include: Weapons of Mass Destruction Security Cooperation and Partner Activities, Threat Reduction Cooperation, Weapons of Mass Destruction Interdiction, Weapons of Mass Destruction Offensive Operations, Weapons of Mass Destruction Elimination, Weapons of Mass Destruction Active Defense, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense, and Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management. JTF-CS, by its own mission set, limits itself to conducting only one of eight MMAs, WMD CM (although CBRN Passive Defense is related and may be accomplished through combined, joint, and interagency training with civil authorities). An operational level JTF should not be so specifically limited to less than 25% of the doctrinal mission areas.

JP 3-40 prescribes that while joint CWMD operations may require specific forces, one must plan on the unique use of conventional forces or other government agencies (OGA) to accomplish CWMD tasks. CWMD actions and activities must not be planned or executed in isolation but must be integrated throughout the range of military operations. CWMD planning is not a separate process; it is the integration of WMD-specific knowledge, experience, and capabilities into the existing joint operation planning process (JOPP). JTF-CS provides learned expertise in force planning to select (source and tailor), prepare, integrate, and deploy forces and capabilities required to accomplish CBRNE CM related missions. It should use this experience in force tailoring and deployment to broaden it scope beyond CBRNE to full-spectrum CM operations.

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15 JP 3-40, *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*, pg. IV-4
Joint Publication 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management, prescribe the manner in which DOD conducts CBRNE CM across the range of military operations, in support of civil authorities, and in support of a foreign request. Since JTF-CS is tasked only for support relating to homeland security (except for planning staffs to be discussed later), this paper will focus on that aspect of CBRNE CM. The three levels of war, tactical, operational, and strategic, simplify the links between national strategic objectives, through the operational or military objectives, down to tactical actions and tasks. However, in today’s world of almost constant, real time communications, a single tactical action may have consequences at all levels, which is exacerbated in operations involving CBRNE with their potentially strategic repercussions. A similar breakdown of levels of response actions is discussed in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as part of the National Response Framework (NRF) and the tiered response for joint forces as outlined in JP 3-41.

Response Framework

NIMS attempts to integrate federal, state, and local capabilities to manage a joint force response to almost any event, and breaks down operations into three levels: the field level, the regional level, and the national level. At this highest level, the Incident Advisory Council (IAC) is formed from representatives of DHS, DOD, OGAs, and NGOs as necessary for the type of incident. The National Operations Center would also execute its mission to facilitate information sharing and operational coordination. At the regional level, the regional response coordination center (RRCC) assists with managing the incident until a Joint Field Office (JFO) can be stood up at the field level. The field level is analogous to the tactical level of war, and is where the on-scene emergency operations management occurs.
Figure 2 shows the NIMS Framework as shown in JP 3-41. Note that the preponderance of DOD forces would be tactical level units at the field level, supporting a JTF that works for the Defense Coordination Officer (DCO) in the JFO. Maintaining a separate command structure shows the JTF commanded by the Combatant Commander (in this case NORTHCOM), which straddles the regional/national level of the framework. This framework works well while the incident remains small enough to be managed within an individual state, but as Hurricane Katrina showed in 2005, the lack of a true regional, or operational level, control element hindered response operations. This is the level where JTF-CS could provide the most assistance, bridging the gap between local/tactical response forces and NORTHCOM.

JP 3-41 establishes a tiered response plan that does not necessarily match the tactical/operational stratégic levels of war nor do they match the field/regional/national levels in
the NIMS framework. The designated tiers allow forces to be tailored to the situation and focused on providing only those resources that are beyond the capabilities of civil authorities. Tier One is for a small CBRNE incident having met criteria within CJCS CONPLAN 0500, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Situation (CONPLAN 0500), which have an impact on national level decision making but do not impact tactical operations. The joint planning augmentation cell (JPAC) from JTF-CS may provide assistance to augment the DCO for response planning and execution. JTF-CS is specifically trained and organized for response to Tier Two incidents, providing specialized units, supplies, and equipment along with enabling and sustaining forces. Additional JTFs may be established to manage the response, if necessary, and are referred to as JTF for consequence management (JTF-CM). Should the incident impact a wide geographic area, large population, or threaten national security, a Tier Three level incident may be declared. A Tier Three JTF may be formed in order to manage multiple JTFs in order to achieve unity of command. JTF-CS has the capability of fulfilling the role as the Tier Three command, as it has two JPACs to assist with the formation of JTF-CMs, as well as reach-back capability to acquire additional subject matter expertise.

differences and not meant to indicate mismatched guidance within the joint publications, but it does highlight one key aspect of what JTF-CS does accomplish, shaping operations, which in the homeland security sense is continuous situational awareness, preparedness, interagency coordination, and exercises. COL Richard Chavez, Director, Consequence Management at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Professor Bert B. Tussing, Director, Homeland Defense and Security Issues at the US Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership, wrote in an article outlining their concept of the role of DOD in disaster response, “it is in the best interest of the DOD and the country it serves to enable – to train, and to assist the leaders and supporting personnel of the DHS along paths we have already walked.”

Planning, and in particular, crisis action planning, is how JTF-CS can use their military experience to share such lessons learned with their interagency partners.

Focus on WMD

Ever since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the military has maintained a focus on the potential adversarial use of WMD, as it became known that such capability was a desired goal of Al Qaeda. During his remarks at the National Defense University in 2004, President George W. Bush stated, “The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of a secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.” The threat is highlighted in the National Defense Strategy in 2008, “There are few greater challenges than those posed by chemical, biological, and particularly nuclear weapons.” CWMD operations are discussed in National Security Strategies, Defense and Military Strategies, and combatant command posture statements. Parts of the CWMD arena will always remain classified, but WMD CM will always be in the public view. It’s still important, but perhaps there

17 Chavez and Tussing, “DoD – Not the Department of Disaster,” pg. 38
is too much focus on CBRNE CM and not enough on the grander scope “plain” CM. The Government Accountability Office noted that the 2005 DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support “discusses DOD’s civil support mission in the context of the department’s response to a weapon of mass destruction—DOD’s primary focus after the 2001 terrorist attacks—it does not address the breadth of civil support missions that DOD must be prepared to support subsequent to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.”\(^\text{18}\) JTF-CS is well suited to address this deficiency. A CBRNE event might be man-made or part of a natural disaster, of which most of the specialized skills reside in tactical level units that can respond regardless of the source of the initiating event. The difficulty lies in providing the appropriate joint functions to support these units to quickly transition back to their wartime missions.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

JTF-CS is a unique organization with a highly complex mission, and success (or failure) in this mission would have dramatic impacts on civil-military relations since all actions would take place within the homeland. This is a critical element of homeland security, emergency preparedness and the support to civil authorities. In conducting such operations, DOD must balance the need to stop loss of life and property, while protecting the nation’s centers of gravity (the economy, federal government legitimacy, and overseas power projection).\(^\text{19}\) DOD has shown great resiliency, and ability to adapt to unexpected changes, and must continue to conduct its given missions for homeland defense and homeland security. An additional change that would enhance homeland security would be the expanding of the mission for JTF-CS, from being a specifically CBRNE CM focused organization to one with a broader “all hazards”

\(^{18}\) GAO, DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions, pg. 14
\(^{19}\) McIntyre and Tussing, “Setting the Scene for Discussion of DoD’s Role in Responding to Catastrophe,” pg. 18
consequence management command. This command can then use the military’s experience gained in the operational level of war to bridge the gap between the tactical/local actions with the national/strategic objectives, especially in light of the dramatic impact such local actions are quickly brought to the national and international stage in today’s media environment.

JTF-CS is also the probably the lowest level of command capable of handling the joint functions required to operate at this level. This can be an advantage, because it prevents command and control friction when coordinating with state Adjutant Generals, ensuring they are cooperative partners in problem solving. It also highlights the support role that DOD plays in providing homeland security missions. The potential for the JTF-CS commander to gain “dual status” and command both Title 10 and 32 personnel might alleviate potential gubernatorial concerns with the use of National Guard forces in a regional response.

DOD is not alone in adapting, and better organizing for changes to its mission. The recent storms and tornados that have killed hundreds across numerous states at the end of April 2011 did not require DOD assistance (this is not to say the National Guard was not deployed as part of their normal response missions). Considered to be “the deadliest natural disaster on American soil since Hurricane Katrina,” the government response from FEMA and related agencies has been praised. But what about the “mega-catastrophe,” the low-probability, ultra-high consequence event where multiple, geographically dispersed and near-simultaneous incidents produce mass casualties beyond what was seen in Katrina, such as an earthquake that decimates entire cities, or pandemic flu or other biological terrorism? Using JTF-CS at the primary domestic CM command allows for a scalability for such an event, as NORTHCOM’s

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20 Sack, Kevin and Williams, Thomas, “Government’s Disaster Response Wins Praise from Those Affected.”
21 Chavez and Tussing, “DoD – Not the Department of Disaster,” pg. 28
JFLCC is still available, as well its standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ), should such an event overwhelm the JTF.

The “what if’s” are not just an academic exercise; they are the very reason for some of the specialized units and equipment that are part of our armed forces. We cannot ignore the unlikely event of WMD use on American soil, and the technological proliferation of advanced technologies across the globe will likely mean such a threat will remain. However, such a singular focus is not always the best answer. DOD must maintain its complement of advanced CBRNE technologies and units, but such actions are inherently tactical in nature. The previously mentioned storm with numerous tornadoes creating death and destruction across multiple states can be similarly compared to a sophisticated, complex, terrorist attack; which while locally tragic, does not stress the systems that are in place to warrant DOD response. Even considering several nuclear devices, DOD supporting a whole of government response, is likely best served by the appropriate operational level headquarters, a function well suited to JTF-CS. Even in this “worst case scenario,” keeping the response at the appropriate level allows the higher commands of NORTHCOM and the government to focus on preventing other organizations from taking advantage of the situation.

DOD has never been tasked to provide CBRNE CM within the United States, but regularly provides support to civil authorities. Of the 40-60 Presidential Disaster Declarations declared each year, DOD has responded to support only a very few. Given an expanded mission, JTF-CS can use these few opportunities to better integrate its actions with its interagency partners and build relationships spanning the country to mitigate the issues that might arise should the unthinkable happen.

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22 Tussing, Threats at Our Threshold, pg. 4
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