

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04 May 2011		2. REPORT TYPE FINAL		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Reintegration of Those Who Wish Us Harm - Should We?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Jason B. Tussey Paper Advisor : Col White, Tim				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.					
14. ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to provide operational planners the necessity for conducting reintegration planning at the onset of combat operations. Reintegration of former combatants following armed conflict is necessary to ensure the survival of the newly formed society. This new society will have new leadership, goals, and objectives but without the full accounting of actions taken by both friendly and enemy during the conflict, the society will not succeed. This paper utilizes lessons learned from the American Civil War, World War II, Iraq, and Afghanistan as examples of 'what to do' and 'what not to do' with respect to reintegration. These lessons learned will benefit operational planners during the development, implementation, and execution of future reintegration policies. This paper explains that failure to include reintegration, in conjunction with the supported government, as a critical component early in operational planning can result in mission failure. Finally, based on lessons learned, this paper outlines four critical points to facilitate future reintegration operations.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Reintegration, Reconciliation, American Civil War, World War II, Iraq, Afghanistan					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 23	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

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Newport, R.I.**

REINTEGRATION OF THOSE WHO WISH US HARM – SHOULD WE?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

04 May 2011

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to provide operational planners the necessity for conducting reintegration planning at the onset of combat operations. Reintegration of former combatants following armed conflict is necessary to ensure the survival of the newly formed society. This new society will have new leadership, goals, and objectives but without the full accounting of actions taken by both friendly and enemy during the conflict, the society will not succeed. This paper utilizes lessons learned from the American Civil War, World War II, Iraq, and Afghanistan as examples of ‘what to do’ and ‘what not to do’ with respect to reintegration. These lessons learned will benefit operational planners during the development, implementation, and execution of future reintegration policies. This paper explains that failure to include reintegration, in conjunction with the supported government, as a critical component early in operational planning can result in mission failure. Finally, based on lessons learned, this paper outlines four critical points to facilitate future reintegration operations.

INTRODUCTION

During the American Civil War, the Northern States were fighting against the Southern States to maintain equal rights for all men regardless of color and for National unity. The conflict pitted brother against brother, friend against friend – the result, following almost four years of vicious fighting never before seen, was a country shrouded in revenge and apathy against the other side that prevented universal appeasement. If not for a reintegration plan that required the dedication, deliberation, and understanding of national leaders within both the government and military, the America of today would not exist.

In order to prevent future conditions of social turmoil and/or additional hostile actions, re-integration of hostile combatants must be part of overall campaign planning and execution. Reintegration of former combatants following armed conflict is necessary to ensure the survival of the newly formed society. This new society will have new leadership, goals, and objectives, but without the full accounting of actions taken by both friendly and enemy during the conflict, the society will not succeed. FM 3-07 defines reintegration as the process through which former combatants, belligerents, and dislocated civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local populace¹.

In accordance with JP 3-24, the new society's government must initiate the reintegration process and use military forces to assist with both developing and executing the process². Reintegration is a detailed process that includes the disarmament and disbanding of

¹ U.S. Army, *Stability Operations*, Field Manual (FM) 3-07 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2008), 6-107.

² U.S. Joint Publication, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 5 October 2009), VI 19 - 20.

warring groups. Not including reintegration during any operational war plan will result in failure to provide stability for the new government to survive following conflict.

Multiple terms are used to describe reintegration, specifically reconciliation, reconstruction, and the encompassing acronym DDR (disarmament, disbanding, and reintegration). All things equal, the concept remains consistent concerning the actual effects. Modern history has proven where reintegration succeeded and where it failed. This paper will provide analysis of how reintegration succeeded following the American Civil War and in Germany following World War II. Additionally, this paper will describe the process future joint operational planners must utilize to ensure reintegration is not only achieved, but successful in establishing the new society following major combat operations.

COUNTER ARGUMENTS

Many would argue that reintegration is not the responsibility of the winning force because of the financial drain, time of commitment, and number of resources. Supporting the viewpoint reference financial constraints, “the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ADM Mike Mullen has publicly stated the national deficit is the biggest national security threat”³. Their viewpoint is the new society has been provided the time and space to establish their own rules/laws and therefore reintegration of former combatants and society reconstruction is their responsibility. Similarly, they would argue for immediately returning all soldiers and national assets home following surrender or, for contemporary operations, the end of major combat operations. FM 3-07 states reintegration is a critical component of post conflict

³ MR Y, *A National Strategic Narrative*. Woodrow Wilson Center. Preface. Anne-Marie Slaughter (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 2011), 3.

hostilities to ensure established stability allowing governance the ability to provide population support and control⁴.

Extremely applicable in today's budgetary constraints, the cost of reintegration following armed conflict has many non-believers simply asking why and how much. Their claims and fears are not without justification, especially when one considers that the U.S. has spent \$1.1 trillion supporting the Global War on Terror since September 11, 2001 with \$751 billion and \$336 billion allocated to Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively⁵. The monetary cost is immense with any reintegration plan, but the alternative will be even greater if the resulting society returns to a state that requires additional combat operations to achieve stability within a particular region.

Therefore, within this paper, the reader must remain open minded in understanding that even though reintegration will be expensive and former combatants with American blood on their hands will be granted amnesty – it is necessary to ensure the resulting society is stable and able to provide governance with opportunities for the population. History shows multiple times where the investment of American capital in the form of troops, equipment, and money following armed conflict supporting reintegration policies prevented further conflict. Not only should the non-believer heed the lessons learned, but it is imperative that operational planners include reintegration planning at the very beginning of future war plans.

⁴ U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2006), 3-3.

⁵ Amy Belasco, *The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other global War on Terror Operations since 9/11* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 57.

DISCUSSION

The American Civil War

During the American Civil War, efforts to reintegrate the seceded southern states began almost immediately once hostilities started⁶. At the time, reintegration was aptly named reconstruction because there would be the need for reconstructing societal as well as physical beliefs. During the period 1863 to 1877, the U.S. Government debated, established, and changed many policies, but remained steadfast in believing that American unity must come through reconstruction. President Lincoln was able to understand the future problem the country faced, following the conflict between the states, and set about to establish not only the ideals but also the method for ensuring unity upon Union victory. This method included the freeing of slaves within the border states in a phased timeline, establishment of military governors over seceded Confederate states, increased privileges for those black Soldiers who fought for the Union Army and amnesty to all Confederate Soldiers who pledged an oath of loyalty to the Union⁷.

Most scholars argue that reconstruction was unsuccessful following the Civil War based on the many years it took to unite the country – arguably not until the 1960's. That is the historical view, but the real lesson learned is that President Lincoln understood there would be problems following conflict and began planning early to execute a plan of reintegration. History shows repeatedly that amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation (AR2) are essential in the overall healing of a society following major conflict, and the Civil War

⁶ Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Business (1863 – 1877)* (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1988).

⁷ Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Business (1863 – 1877)* (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1988).

was no different⁸. Throughout the reconstruction process, there were evolving criteria that proved true in both historical and current reintegration systems. These major criteria include government at the center of the process, economics to support the population, and military to enforce system rules.

Government served as the guiding force for Civil War reconstruction. Radicals and conservatives within the United States Congress debated strongly for many years on exactly how the country would look at the conclusion of war. During this period, Congress passed the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution that, in essence, served as the cornerstone for the entire reconstruction process through the mid-1960s⁹. The process was neither simple nor short by any means. Consequently, multiple American Presidents were charged with not only continuing the process but also with adjusting it based on the individual state requests and objections. When considering today's political challenges with health care and budget concerns, one can only imagine rebuilding a country with mutual hatred still rampant, while simultaneously passing laws that freed the slaves, guaranteed full citizenship to all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and gave the right to vote to any person despite race, color, or servitude.

Similar to the political challenges, the economic situation throughout both the North and South was in shambles following four years of war. In addition, with the passage of the 13th Amendment and a Union victory, the slave labor was not available as many within both southern and northern states were accustomed¹⁰. These two situations combined created

⁸ John J. McDermott, "Reconstruction and Post-Civil War Reconciliation." *Military Review* 89, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 67-77.

⁹ Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Business (1863 – 1877)* (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1988), 251 – 253.

¹⁰ John J. McDermott, "Reconstruction and Post-Civil War Reconciliation." *Military Review* 89, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 67-77.

economic strife amongst the public. The Southern economic machine was in total collapse at the conclusion of the Civil War and with no more “free” labor provided by slaves, costs to produce were at an all-time high. The United States Government provided limited economic assistance to the southern states during the period 1865 – 1875, and this created significant issues for the reintegration of former southern combatants as productive citizens within the new society¹¹. Ultimately, economics proved to be central to the overall reconstruction period due to ensuring the new society had the equity to rebuild itself, the money capital to give former combatants jobs to contribute to the system, and the incentive for men to become successful contributors to overall society success.

During the Reconstruction period, leadership directed the Union military power to enforce both the plan and regulations established by the government. Military governors were selected as early as 1862 to assert control over southern states for reconstruction efforts¹². They ensured (sometimes with brutality) efforts to unite the states under one government were indeed working and provided civil control at a time of uncertainty. Although their methods were questionable in some regards, the overall effect and “hindsight” perspective proved not only their benefit, but also their absolute need for success. The Union military combat power and control enabled, albeit over time, the southern states to adjust, accept, and integrate the terms of reconstruction. W.E.B. DuBois described best what military control provided for the southern states (and specifically the freed slaves) in his article “Reconstruction and Its Benefits”: “In the midst of all these difficulties, the Negro governments in the South accomplished much of positive good. We may recognize three

¹¹ John J. McDermott, “Reconstruction and Post-Civil War Reconciliation.” *Military Review* 89, no. 1 (January/February 2009): 67-77.

¹² Allen C. Guelzo, *Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America* (New York, NY: Simon & Shuster Paperbacks, 2004).

things which Negro rule gave to the South: (1) Democratic government, (2) Free Public Schools, and (3) New Social Legislation.”¹³ Without military control and enforcement of reconstruction efforts, the process would have faced many more challenges, and the length of time for completion would have been far greater.

Using the American Civil War as an example of reintegration is not to question whether it worked -- which it eventually did -- but to use it as an example of where the planning, resourcing, and execution of reintegration is imperative following conflict. Due primarily to President Lincoln’s ability to foresee what would occur following the war, the U.S. successfully integrated former combatants (both Soldiers and leaders) back into American society as brothers and forged the relationship between the North and South that built the America known today.

World War II

Following WWII, the United States once again found itself responsible for reintegration following combat operations. Although it occurred in both the European and Pacific theatres of operations, for simplicity this paper will focus only on the European Theatre. Following the surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945, questions abounded amongst both political and military leaders on the reintegration of Germany’s society. At the center of this debate for the U.S. was General George C. Marshall, the former Chief of Staff of the Army during WWII and future Secretary of State. He developed the Marshall Plan (a.k.a the European Recovery Program) that primarily focused on providing economic aid to Germany and the numerous European countries ravished by almost seven years of constant war¹⁴. Europe (following WWII) was in complete and utter destruction as noted by Tony Judt:

¹³ W.E.B. DuBois, “Reconstruction and Its Benefits.” *American Historical Review* XV, (July 1910): 781 – 799.

¹⁴ “Europe 60 Years After the Marshall Plan,” *US Fed News Service, Including US State News*, 12 June 2008.

Photographs and documentary films of the time show pitiful streams of helpless civilians trekking through a blasted landscape of broken cities and barren fields. Orphaned children wander forlornly past groups of worn out women picking over heaps of masonry. Shaven-headed deportees and concentration camp inmates in striped pajamas stare listlessly at the camera, starving and diseased. Everyone and everything – with the notable exception of the well-fed Allied occupation forces – seems worn out, without resources, exhausted¹⁵.

This was the dilemma facing the Allies, specifically the U. S. Understanding this and seeing the need for reintegration, George C. Marshall developed a plan of economic aid, backed by U.S. government support and military enforcement, for the struggling European societies centered around 13.2 billion dollars to stimulate growth and prosperity¹⁶.

The U.S. government did not want to create America in Europe, they wanted to ensure they set the conditions for European societies to recover and provide for their populations. Utilizing money as politics to stimulate the economy while providing viable employment created space for government to function and proved the cornerstone for countries receiving Marshall Plan aid, especially Greece and France¹⁷. Whether the observer views the politics favorably or negatively, one cannot argue the Marshall Plan created the time and space for economic growth that supported rebuilding of previously established government institutions.

The economic impact of the Marshall Plan across Europe was in the billions of dollars, but further investigation illustrates not only the success of spending but also the application of control to support allied goals. Key to reintegration and understood by George C. Marshall, were the policy and procedures for ensuring the receiving society used assistance effectively. The discord that existed between France and Germany, starting after World War I, proved extremely important to overall German recovery. German imports and

¹⁵ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2005), 13.

¹⁶ “Europe 60 Years After the Marshall Plan,” *US Fed News Service, Including US State News*, 12 June 2008.

¹⁷ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2005), 97.

exports following WWII were non-existent and the Marshall Plan directed that German imports/exports should be allowed, they should be supported by allied nations¹⁸.

Integral within any reintegration plan is providing jobs for former combatants and the economic support from the Marshall Plan did just that. Without the economic support from the U.S. to post war Europe, overall reintegration would not have been possible, thus establishing the conditions for another rogue leader or country to assume control of Europe. The economic benefits that came from the Marshall Plan provided hope, jobs, and a meaningful life not only for the population, but more importantly for the former German soldiers who wanted to return to their homes and provide for their families.

The United States military, along with its allies, occupied Germany following the surrender to provide control, peace, and enforcement of the reintegration plan. In 1942, identifying the need to interact with the population following the war, the Army instituted the first organized Civil Affairs section¹⁹. Critical to the overall success of occupation and the Marshall Plan was the pre-planning, combined with the understanding and anticipation that there would be additional requirements from the U.S. and its allies following the end of formal hostilities. As with the American Civil War, this foreshadowing provided the needed time for planning, deliberation, adjustments, and finally the application of reintegration plans to support the resulting new society.

Current Day Application

The reintegration process is very applicable in today's ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although ongoing since the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center

¹⁸ Ibid., 98.

¹⁹ Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990), 24.

towers and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, the U.S. has consistently not heeded lessons learned from previous successful reintegration efforts. As the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan show, when operational planners fail to establish formal exit strategies, quantifiable end states, or reintegration policies, the U.S. becomes responsible for ensuring stable societies exist that can sustain the hard earned victories. JP 3-24 elucidates that planners must accurately plan and execute detailed DDR plans to ensure new societies are able to function properly with respect to government, economics and security following hostilities or they will undoubtedly fail²⁰. Illustrating reintegration lessons learned from both the American Civil War and World War II, the wars still being fought in Iraq and Afghanistan can be viewed as exactly what not to do when the question “What Next?” is asked following major combat operations.

Iraq

Following the initial invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States and allies (also known as the Coalition) quickly defeated the Iraqi military in a true example of sound military strategy minus one aspect “what comes next?” Although the plan had established the Office of Reconstruction that would inject billions of dollars to rebuild Iraq following hostilities, there was no official plan for the reintegration of former combatants (specifically Iraqi military members)²¹. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established in May 2003, had orders to develop, execute and eventually transition power back to the new Iraqi government based on coalition goals of democracy²². Good in concept, but doomed to fail in execution primarily due to limited security within the entire country. During the initial

²⁰ U.S. Joint Publication, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 5 October 2009), VI 19.

²¹ Larry Diamond, “What Went Wrong in Iraq.” *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 5 (September/October 2004): 37 – 38.

²² *Ibid.*, 36 – 37.

invasion planning, a ‘less versus more’ plan was accepted by national leaders despite requests for additional United States military forces from the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Shinseki²³. The failure by the Coalition to establish legitimate and relative security inside Iraq, following major combat operations, along with the dissolution of the Iraqi Military created the conditions for recruitment of former Iraqi Soldiers and leaders by a growing insurgency against the perceived occupation of Iraq. Initially, with the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, the overall positive sentiment of the Iraqi population was due to their optimistic view of the future. Yet, as many watched on television, these feelings were soon replaced by major looting, sabotage, and heinous attacks against both civilians, Iraqi Security Forces, and Coalition troops which resulted in a country then governed by militias and the growing insurgency²⁴. The CPA conducted a “De-Baathification” policy aimed at preventing high-level former Baath Party members from holding positions in the new established Iraqi government²⁵. Therein is the primary reason for reintegration policy failure in Iraq – the Coalition, specifically the U.S., did not immediately begin finding meaningful ways for former soldiers and leaders once again to contribute to society. Even more so, they ignored the Iraqi social structure with respect to ‘Sunni versus Shia’, creating not only an insurgency against the occupation, but also sectarian tensions that prevented normal Iraqis from feeling secure with hopes of the future.

Not until late 2006 would the Coalition inside of Iraq begin to see signs of progress with respect to reintegration – or reconciliation as they referred to it. Following the addition or “surge” of American combat forces and institution of a semi-working Iraqi national government, the overall security situation was stable enough that disillusioned young men

²³ Ibid., 34.

²⁴ Ibid., 42-43.

²⁵ Ibid., 43.

began to envision futures of peace and prosperity. Consistent with the Clear – Hold – Build concept from FM 3-24²⁶, the Coalition, along with the newly trained Iraqi Security Forces, fought hard to establish conditions affording reconciliation time and space to work.

Coalition planners at the operational level failed to recognize the divisive separation between the differing sects within the Iraqi population – specifically the rift between Sunni and Shia.

In 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, backed by the U.S., instituted a plan of national reconciliation that included amnesty for insurgents not guilty of targeting civilians, change to the old ‘De-Baathification’ program, national reconciliation conference for all interested parties (specifically the tribes), and a promise to clean all ministry personnel affiliated with Shiite Militias²⁷. Finally, Iraq was on the path to stability and peace among the population despite their differences. Coalition commanders and planners at the operational and strategic level finally joined the political leadership within Iraq in developing a concise, deliberate, and executable reintegration plan that included the critical requirements of government, economics, and military to support transitioning the new society into a functional, self-sustaining entity.

Afghanistan

Prior to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States along with additional NATO forces was committed to an ongoing two-year war in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban regime that supported the Al Qaeda (AQ) operatives who carried out the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on America. In late 2001, the U.S. conducted an invasion of Afghanistan to capture senior AQ leaders and defeat the Taliban regime

²⁶ U.S. Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, October 2006).

²⁷ Lionel Beehner, “Impediments to National Reconciliation in Iraq,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, January 2007, 2.

supporting AQ training, funding, and recruiting. Yet, unlike President Lincoln in the Civil War and George C. Marshall in World War II, the U.S. Government did not have foresight to see a plan of reintegration was needed following initial mission completion. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, "I don't buy the argument that Afghanistan was starved of resources - I don't think the U.S. government had what it needed for reconstructing a country. We did it ad hoc in the Balkans, and then in Afghanistan, and then in Iraq²⁸." Once again, the operational planners, and even those at the highest level within the National Security Command, failed to realize the requirement for an Afghanistan reintegration plan following combat operations.

Despite initial successes, Afghanistan failed to achieve unity and governance among the disparate population following the defeat of the Taliban regime. Separated by arduous terrain (just as much as the differing human terrain), Afghanistan became a country without effective leadership, no recognizable military or police forces, and unable to provide necessities for its people. This gave rise to an insurgency fueled by former Taliban members and warlords fighting for control. Further, Taliban numbers began to swell as the local citizenry joined due to lack of productive jobs, inability of government support, and tribal leader's views²⁹. Within two years, the U.S. shifted its focus to the Iraqi invasion resulting in reallocation of assets, manpower, and most importantly money from Afghanistan. Between 2005 and 2006, the investment of money to Afghanistan decreased 38% despite the growing insurgency and Afghanistan government failure to provide for its population³⁰. This decrease in money, combined with minimal numbers of security troops from the U.S. and other NATO

²⁸ David Rohde et al., "How a Good War in Afghanistan Went Bad," *New York Times*, 11 August 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/> (accessed 23 April 2011).

²⁹ "Bringing the Taliban Back Into the Fold," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 28 December 2009.

³⁰ David Rohde et al., "How a Good War in Afghanistan Went Bad," *New York Times*, 11 August 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/> (accessed 23 April 2011).

countries, created the conditions for Taliban and insurgent elements to consolidate and reorganize amidst not only the terrain, but the population as well. Despite the continued claims of supporting Afghanistan with a reconstruction policy similar to the “Marshall Plan”, it became very clear that limited resources and focus on Iraq had placed the Afghanistan campaign at a lower priority among senior U.S. officials³¹. This shift in priority resulted in a stagnation of progress with respect to the mission in Afghanistan until 2010 when the U.S., heeding the lessons learned from Iraq, conducted a “surge” of American military to create the space for implementing a reintegration policy sanctioned by the Afghanistan government and backed by the U.S.³². The increase of military members and financial support, along with renewed support to the Afghanistan government officials (that included a deliberately planned reintegration policy) would deny Taliban and insurgent elements freedom of maneuver, and give those wanting to end the fighting a way to reconcile with respect. Providing former combatants the option of peace and prosperity, while at the same time contributing to the local villages/communities, met the requirements of any reintegration policy in allowing those who no longer wish to fight the opportunity to live their lives³³. The final chapter of the Afghanistan reintegration plan has not been written, but essential to the overall success remains the three critical elements of any reintegration plan. Host nation government development and support, economic support that provides reconstruction of civil services while providing job opportunity for former combatants, and military execution of the plan that establishes the security needed for the total plan to work³⁴. The current

³¹ Ibid.

³² “Bringing the Taliban Back Into the Fold,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 28 December 2009.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Joseph J. Collins, “Essay: Afghan Reconciliation,” *Armed Forces Journal*, March 2010, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/> (accessed 13 April 2011).

Afghanistan plan has all three, and it is now up to the former combatants to realize their future is more than fighting.

CONCLUSION

Both historical and current day conflicts prove the need for thoroughly planned and well-executed reintegration policies following armed conflict. In both the American Civil War and World War II, planners and leaders identified early on the need for a reintegration plan to follow major combat operations. Without doubt, the historian can look back in retrospect and debate the effectiveness and/or efficiency the plans contained. Although, that same historian cannot argue that without the diligence and steadfastness our country demonstrated in those two examples, they would know a much different world than today. The operational planner who fails to include reintegration at the onset of military planning is destined to extend the final phase of combat operations with both manpower and money. The host nation's government must sanction and execute the reintegration policy with U.S. assistance. The forms of assistance must include government training, economic support for reconstruction that will ultimately lead to job creation, and military support for enforcing rules while still maintaining stability within the newly created society. Failure at supporting a new society's reintegration plan with all elements of national power most assuredly will create further instability, and give rise to new challenges in the future.

The reintegration policy developed by the operational planner must focus on four separate points to ensure success: (1) Establishment of a secure environment (2)

Development of a legitimate government (3) Focus on economic and social rehabilitation and (4) Promotion of Reconciliation³⁵.

Establishment of a secure environment – Security is the most important aspect of any reintegration program. Security on the streets and amongst the population will serve as the catalyst for success. Without security, the plan is doomed to fail because the government will not retain the space to govern, the population will not trust in their government nor will they have the courage to seek a new life based on the unknown. Survival will mean choosing the path of least resistance.

Development of a legitimate government – Security is the most important aspect, but the legitimate government is the cornerstone of any reintegration plan. Perceived not only as legitimate, the host nation government, as in the example of Afghanistan, has to genuinely care and provide for its population. The government cannot meet all demands; it must remain grounded in laurels and resounded to build itself as a respected, legitimate entity amongst its population and the world.

Focus on economic and social rehabilitation – Following armed conflict destruction of physical and psychological attributes is expected. The assistance from the world community in assisting the new society is required to assure finite success. This assistance primarily comes in the form of money for reconstruction of buildings and social infrastructure. In addition, the population will be beleaguered following armed conflict because of continued stress from war. The confidence associated with social rehabilitation must be included as a means to motivate the population that they once

³⁵ International Labor Office(Geneva), *Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants*, (Switzerland: International Labor Office Publications, 2010), 172.

again have a future without conflict, in fact a future that is much more beneficial than the previous.

Promotion of Reconciliation – True reintegration plans must allow reconciliation of former combatants for inclusion back into the new society. These men and women fought for various reasons, but if they truly desire a new life without fear of death and want to pledge their support to the new government, then the new government must accept their promise. In addition, the U.S. must remove these individuals from targeting in order to support the entire process. Welcoming them into the new society and providing meaningful employment and/or employment training will not only provide the former combatants a means to provide for their families, but can also serve as a source of workforce for reconstruction of the new society.

JP 3-24 reiterates the point that reintegration must start early in the post conflict period, with both planning and execution, to stabilize the society and allow former combatants a means to once again become productive members within the resulting society³⁶. Doctrine established the parameters for establishing reintegration plans, history shows how to and how not to execute reintegration plans – it is now up to the commanders and operational planners to not only include reintegration, but make it a priority during the onset of military planning during the next conflict. Reintegration will be required.

³⁶ U.S. Joint Publication, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 5 October 2009).

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