The United Nations and Military Interventions: Factors for Success and Ability to Lead in Comparison with an International Coalition

A Monograph by
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The United Nations and Military Interventions: Factors for Success and Ability to Lead in Comparison with an International Coalition

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Numerous UN military interventions have taken place in the post-Cold War era. Some stand out as failure: stability efforts did not succeed and UN forces were often incapable of protecting the people. Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia come to mind. These missions have been well documented, but are such failures representative of UN military interventions in the post-Cold War era? This question warrants an assessment of the UN’s ability to lead, or in other words to plan, manage, direct and support military interventions.

This monograph will perform this assessment by determining which factors really impact the success or failure of post-Cold War military interventions, and by comparing the ability of the UN to lead such interventions with that of an international alliance or coalition. It will be argued that the UN has in fact proven to be no more or no less effective than international coalitions, operating under the legitimacy of a UN resolution, in leading military interventions to success in the post-Cold War era. Only two factors greatly influence the outcome of any such interventions: the political will of the international community and the regional adversaries’ interest in achieving a sustainable peace. Of these two factors, the latter is the dominant variable, and must be the focus of international efforts when setting the conditions for mission success.
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Abstract

Numerous UN military interventions have taken place in the post-Cold War era. Some stand out as failure: stability efforts did not succeed and UN forces were often incapable of protecting the people. Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia come to mind. These missions have been well documented, but are such failures representative of UN military interventions in the post-Cold War era? This question warrants an assessment of the UN’s ability to lead, or in other words to plan, manage, direct and support military interventions.

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Introduction


There were numerous UN military interventions in the 1990s, but these three missions stand out from the crowd in the memory of the international community. Stability efforts failed, and UN forces too often were incapable of protecting the people. These missions have been well documented, but are such failures representative of UN military interventions in the post-Cold War era? This question, coupled with the financial and human costs of such interventions, warrants an assessment of the UN’s ability to lead, or in other words to plan, manage, direct and support military interventions.

This monograph will perform this assessment by determining which factors really affect the success or failure of post-Cold War military interventions, and by comparing the ability of the UN to lead such interventions with that of an international alliance or coalition. It will be argued that the UN has in fact proven to be no more or no less effective than international coalitions, operating under the legitimacy of a UN resolution, in leading military interventions to success in the post-Cold War era. Only two factors greatly influence the outcome of any such interventions: the political will of the international community and the regional adversaries’ interest in achieving a sustainable peace. Of these two factors, the latter is the dominant variable, and must be the focus of international efforts when setting the conditions for mission success.

This monograph contains five sections. First, a review of the UN Charter and its Chapters relevant to military interventions will be undertaken. The next section will build on the extensive UN intervention literature to sketch a quantitative analysis of post-Cold War robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement military interventions. The results of this analysis will in turn provide the basic building blocks of this monograph’s theory, its operational variables and ways to measure them. Six interventions considered relevant to argue the thesis will then be studied: these case studies are representative of success and failure for both UN and coalition interventions and were undertaken within a complex political, social and military environment while within the legitimacy of a UN resolution. Once the case studies’ analysis is
completed, a synthesis of their results will be conducted with a view to validate this monograph’s theory and thesis.

The UN: Politics and Military Interventions

The UN is an international organization established on October 24th, 1945. Its basic commitments are to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, and promote human rights. The UN is best known for its peacekeeping, peace-building, conflict prevention and humanitarian efforts, but also works on a wide range of issues such as international development, environment, refugee protection, disaster relief, and promoting democracy. Its charter established six principal organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat.¹

The UN is a political organization. Even though its charter embodies the core values of peace, justice and collective security, the UN member-states exercise political power through its organs and bodies based on their own values, needs and national interests. As a result, states interests and foreign policies are the major factors shaping UN policy. The UN enjoyed a renaissance when the Soviet Union collapsed, which made achieving consensus for action easier within the Security Council. The UN’s decision-making process however remains very limited when its most important member-states display divergent policies and lack political agreement. Furthermore, its resources tend to be overstretched by the sheer number of interventions required in the world.²

Peacekeeping has evolved over the years as one of the main tools available to the UN to maintain international peace and security. From a military intervention perspective, the main UN body is the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), whose mission is “to plan, prepare, manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations, so that they can effectively fulfill their mandates under the overall authority

of the Security Council and General Assembly, and under the command vested in the Secretary-
General.\(^3\) DPKO assists in maintaining international peace and security by providing direction to UN
peacekeeping operations and integrating the efforts of UN, governmental and non-governmental entities
involved in the conflict. Each peacekeeping operation has a mandate provided by the Security Council
and containing specific tasks, but all operations thrive to alleviate human suffering and set the conditions
for sustainable peace through institution-building. Post-Cold War mandates and associated tasks include
preventing the outbreak or spill-over of conflict, stabilizing a conflict following a ceasefire, assisting in
implementing peace agreements, leading the transition to stable governmental institutions, reforming the
security sector, and disarming and reintegrating former fighters.\(^4\)

During the Cold War, peacekeeping operations typically involved the following tasks: observation,
monitoring and reporting, supervision of ceasefire, or acting as buffer between conflicted parties. At the
end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping evolved to meet the demands of a changing political and strategic
environment. UN robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement military interventions became complex
multidimensional operations aimed at implementing comprehensive peace agreements while laying the
foundation for sustained peace and stability.\(^5\) The post-Cold War era provides for complex multi-
dimensional peacekeeping operations often taking place after violent internal conflicts whose functions
are to create a secure and stable environment, facilitate the political process by promoting reconciliation
and helping build institutions, and installing a framework that will allow regional coherence and
coordination. These functions imply tasks such as supporting law enforcement institutions, protecting
vital resources, providing humanitarian assistance, and promoting human rights and rule of law. These
military efforts are normally integrated within a larger peace-building effort involving both UN and non-
UN actors and aiming at a sustainable peace. The basic principles of peacekeeping are consent of the
parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except for self-defense or defense of the mandate. Legitimacy

\(^4\) Ibid.
and credibility are also important factors for success. Planning for peacekeeping operations normally assumes there is a peace to keep, and requires a clear and achievable mandate with resources (troops, equipment and funds) to match. It also requires integration with national authorities, the population, and UN as well as non-UN actors.6

Peacekeeping differs from conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peace-building, and the lines between peacekeeping and peace enforcement are often blurred. Peacekeeping is normally associated with Chapter VI of the UN Charter and aims at supporting the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement through pacific settlement of disputes. Peace enforcement is normally associated with Chapter VII of the UN Charter and focuses on actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. Peace enforcement is normally invoked by the Security Council when dealing with volatile post-conflict situations in which the state cannot provide for security, stability and public order.7 The following definitions help distinguish between the various types of peace operations:

“Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace”.8

“Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a

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7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority”.

Robust Peacekeeping is “the use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process”.

For the purposes of this monograph, UN military interventions are defined as robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations, authorized by the UN Security Council, conducted under the direction of the UN Secretary-General, and planned, managed, directed and supported by the UN DPKO and the Department of Field Support. Conversely, non-UN military interventions are defined as robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, sanctioned by a UN Resolution but planned, managed, directed and supported by a multinational alliance or coalition.

This monograph will determine whether military alliances or coalitions (non-UN interventions) are better suited than UN interventions to intervene, in the name of the international community and under UN legitimacy, to restore stability in a conflicted region. The theory and thesis of this monograph is limited to post-Cold War UN and non-UN military interventions belonging to the robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement categories. UN peacekeeping observation missions and coalition occupation of sovereign states not sanctioned by the UN (for example Iraq 2003) rest outside the scope of this monograph.

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9 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
Quantitative Analysis: Post-Cold War Interventions

The international community has conducted numerous UN and non-UN robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement military interventions since the end of the Cold War. Table 1 provides a synopsis of all such interventions undertaken since 1991. Each intervention is defined as either UN or non-UN.

Measuring an intervention’s success is difficult. For the purposes of this monograph, *mission success* is defined as whether the region’s stability was restored during the intervention and sustained post-intervention. Indicators of regional stability include improved security and decreased violence, resolution of the conflict’s disagreements and reconciliation, improved effectiveness of a representative government and its institutions coupled with a perceived decrease in corruption, and renewed economic growth and reconstruction. Using these indicators, the result of each intervention is loosely assessed as either ‘success’ or ‘failure’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission success</th>
<th>UN interventions</th>
<th>Non-UN interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNAMIC UNTAC Cambodia (1991-93)</td>
<td>INTERFET East Timor (1999-00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNAMSIL Sierra Leone (1999-05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ONUB Burundi (2004-06)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mission failure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Non-UN interventions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNFROFOR Bosnia (1992-95)</td>
<td>NATO KFOR Kosovo (1999 – now)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNOSOM, UNITAF Somalia (1992-95)</td>
<td>NATO ISAF Afghanistan (2001-now)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNAMIR Rwanda (1993-96)</td>
<td>AU AMIS Darfur (2004-07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNMIH (and three others) Haiti (1993-00)</td>
<td>AU AMISOM Somalia (2007-now)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MINURCA CAR (1998-00)</td>
<td>EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2007-now)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MONUC Congo (1999-now)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNMEE Eritrea and Ethiopia (2000-08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNMIL Liberia (2003-now)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNOCI Cote d’Ivoire (2004-now)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MINUSTA Haiti (2004-now)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNMIS Sudan (2005-now)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNAMID Darfur (2007-now)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Post-Cold War Robust Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Interventions

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12 William J. Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 1-29. This case studies book is the culmination of a series of UN peacekeeping projects undertaken by the Henry L. Stimson Center. The comprehensive literature research conducted as part of these projects provides a critical, non-partisan and broad overview of post-Cold-War UN interventions and ways to measure their relative success. For more information on the Henry L. Stimson Center, refer to http://www.stimson.org.
Note: The Table 1 intervention data was collected from three web sources: the UN, NATO and CIA World Factbook websites. The UN and NATO websites were used to identify the robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement interventions, whereas the CIA World Factbook website was used to complement the UN and NATO websites and help in loosely assessing each intervention as either success or failure, using the aforementioned mission success definition and indicators.  

An analysis of Table 1 provides the following insights. First, UN interventions are more common than non-UN interventions: 17 UN interventions and eight non-UN interventions have taken place since 1991. Also, UN interventions are perceived as having failed more often than not: 12 UN interventions are perceived as failure, whereas five UN interventions are perceived as success. This translates into a 29.4% success rate. Finally, non-UN interventions are also perceived as having failed more often than not: five non-UN interventions are perceived as failure, and three non-UN interventions are perceived as successful. This translates into a 37.5% success rate.

The difference between the UN and non-UN intervention success rates is not significant, but neither is it mathematically negligible. However, the methodology used to assess intervention success or failure was not rigorous, and the sample size is too small to allow hard conclusions to be drawn from such a small success rate difference. As a result, this quantitative analysis alone cannot tell whether UN military interventions are more effective than non-UN interventions to resolve conflicts in the post-Cold War era.

A qualitative analysis is therefore required. In order to compare UN and non-UN interventions, the factors that are believed to be critical to mission success or failure must first be captured by a theory, measured and analyzed through case studies, and synthesized with a view to validate the theory. These are the next steps of this monograph.

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Theory and Variables

Table 1, although not sufficient to reach any hard conclusions on the relative effectiveness of UN interventions, does however provide a start to build a theory. Identification of the post-Cold War robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement interventions provides the means to isolate the factors, or operational variables, which may affect mission success or failure. Without going through a detailed case study analysis of each intervention, a preliminary survey of the literature documenting the interventions in Table 1 indicates that five factors may have influenced mission success or failure.

The first factor is the political will of the international community to set the conditions for mission success. This is a recurring factor that seems to have had a significant impact on mission success or failure in most interventions. For example, successful interventions in UNAMSIL Sierra Leone (effective cooperation between the UN and the regional and international actors),\textsuperscript{14} IFOR Bosnia (full-scale military and civilian intervention),\textsuperscript{15} and UNTAC Cambodia (durable international backing of a multidimensional peacekeeping intervention)\textsuperscript{16} benefitted from significant international community support. Conversely, many missions seemed doomed from the start by the absence of international resolve: UNAMIR Rwanda (utter failure to react to drastic changes in the operating environment),\textsuperscript{17} UNOSOM Somalia (constant international political discord),\textsuperscript{18} UNPROFOR Bosnia (international political disagreements and bickering on how to address the problems),\textsuperscript{19} MONUC Congo (recurring mandate failure to protect the population and reform the Congolese armed forces after over 10 years of intervention),\textsuperscript{20} and UNAMID Darfur.

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\textsuperscript{14} Andrea Kathryn Talentino, \textit{Military Intervention After the Cold War: the Evolution of Theory and Practice} (Ohio University Press: 2005), 200-238.
\textsuperscript{15} Talento, 178-199.
\textsuperscript{16} Durch, 135-191.
\textsuperscript{17} Durch, 376-389.
\textsuperscript{18} Durch, 311-353.
\textsuperscript{19} Talento, 162-182.
UN/African Union hybrid intervention with very limited aims)\textsuperscript{21} provide cases reflecting this fundamental intervention flaw. The political will of the international community therefore appears to be both a common and a key operational variable, and will be further defined as part of this monograph’s theory.

The second factor is the regional adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace. This also is a recurring factor that seems to significantly affect mission success or failure in most interventions. For example, ONUSAL El Salvador (military stalemate that drove the adversaries to negotiate),\textsuperscript{22} ONUMOZ in Mozambique (shared weariness of bloodshed and instability),\textsuperscript{23} ONUB in Burundi (political willingness to share power due to population exhaustion),\textsuperscript{24} IFOR in Bosnia (weariness and military culmination of adversaries)\textsuperscript{25}, and INTERFET in East Timor (inducement of Indonesian compliance through international law)\textsuperscript{26} were all interventions in which the adversaries had something to gain in the cessation of hostilities and the ensuing peace. Conversely, UNOSOM in Somalia (animosity and mistrust between warlords),\textsuperscript{27} UNPROFOR in Bosnia (deep-rooted nationalistic fervor and ethnic mistrust),\textsuperscript{28} all UN missions in Haiti (unwillingness of the political elite to share power with the people)\textsuperscript{29}, and ISAF in Afghanistan (Taliban’s steadfast refusal to negotiate)\textsuperscript{30} were interventions in which at least one adversary

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Durch, 69-102.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Durch, 275-310.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Larry Wentz, \textit{Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience} (United States Department of Defense Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1998), 9-34.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Jean Krasno, Bradd C. Hayes and Donald C.F. Daniel, \textit{Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations} (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 141-168.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Talentino, 95-126.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Talentino, 162-177.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Talentino, 129.
\end{itemize}
had limited interests in the prospects of sharing power and achieving a sustainable peace. The adversaries’ interest for peace therefore appears to be a common and key operational variable that will also be further defined as part of this monograph’s theory.

The third factor is the sheer complexity of the region’s operating environment. Each intervention is different, and some are undertaken in environments that are more complex than others: more actors have a stake in the intervention, which increases the number of inter-dependencies and muddies the water in terms of the second and third order effects of any friendly action. As a result, all operational approaches to resolve the regional conflict may end up creating new difficult and compelling problems and uncertainties.\textsuperscript{31} ISAF in Afghanistan (weak central government, extensive corruption, poppy trade and criminal gangs, and Pakistan safe haven),\textsuperscript{32} MONUC in Congo (highly volatile security situation in mostly failed regions pitting undisciplined Congo forces and militias based across borders),\textsuperscript{33} and UNAMID in Darfur (un-cooperating Sudan government, unregulated militias from both Sudan and adjoining countries, and famine)\textsuperscript{34} provide examples of highly complex environments. This operational variable appears to be relevant to many interventions, and will be further discussed.

The fourth factor is the training and equipment readiness and the employment limitations of the military troops undertaking the intervention. The military forces of the contributing nations should possess the capability to achieve their mission and mandate and execute all their given tasks. Limitations in terms of equipment and training can seriously hinder the tactical capabilities of the participating military forces. Furthermore, any caveat from the contributing nations restricting the employment of their forces can also hinder tactical effectiveness. For example, the troops making up interventions in Africa

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{32}] Seth G. Jones, \textit{Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan} (Santa Monica, CA: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2008), 1-5.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
are mostly contributed by African states and their equipment and training are often less capable than Western nations’ armies.\textsuperscript{35}

The fifth and final factor is the bureaucracy of the intervention’s lead organization, which can negatively affect mission success. In particular, the UN has a poor reputation in terms of its inability to overcome its own bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{36} Common indicators of bureaucracy within an intervention include delays, funding issues, logistical problems, organizational decisions driven by internal politics rather than military necessity, and blind faith in the intervention’s mandate. One must however separate the lead organization’s bureaucracy from the inertia of the international community to make hard decisions and take decisive action, as the latter is covered by the first factor (the political will of the international community). An example of inept lead organization bureaucracy was the inability of the UN and DPKO to react to evidence of the incoming genocide by raiding weapons caches during UNAMIR in RWANDA.\textsuperscript{37}

From this preliminary literature survey, the first two factors are clearly dominant in terms of affecting mission success or failure, albeit their importance relative to one another remains to be determined. Conversely, the last two factors only recurred occasionally and their impacts appear to have been limited to the tactical level. As a result and for the purposes of this monograph’s theory, the latter two factors are deemed inconsequential in terms of mission success or failure. In other words, despite the occasional tactical impacts of the military forces’ limitations and the lead organization’s bureaucracy, no correlation is believed to exist between these factors and mission success or failure. This conclusion will however be further examined during the case study analysis with a view to either confirm or infirm this early statement.

\textsuperscript{35} LGen Romeo Dallaire, \textit{Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda} (Random House Canada, 2003), 444.


\textsuperscript{37} Dallaire, 141-151.
This leaves the third factor, the operating environment’s complexity, to consider in this monograph’s theory. Whereas one cannot belittle the importance of operational complexity in locations such as Afghanistan, it can however be argued that complexity is a very broad characteristic that can be narrowed down into more specific variables. In fact, complexity directly affects the two dominant operational variables already discussed. By creating uncertainty, complexity undermines the will of the international community to show resolve, make hard decisions and take decisive action. It also creates numerous alternatives for creative adversaries to achieve dubious objectives and gain regional power, thus undermining their interests in a sustainable peace. In other words, this monograph postulates that complexity is an environmental characteristic whose main symptom is to reduce the political will of the international community and the adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace. Complexity is too broad to be defined as a stand-alone operational variable affecting mission success or failure. It is instead being defined by its two symptomatic operational variables.

This monograph therefore theorizes that only two factors directly contribute to the success or failure of any UN-sanctioned military intervention in the post-Cold War era. The combined impact of these two factors is vital to enable mission success, and trumps the impacts of all other factors. The first contributing factor is the political will of the international community to set the conditions for intervention success. This implies that the military intervention’s success is enabled by a positive and proactive international political environment, including a mission mandate that is either suitable to resolve the perceived situation on the ground or that can be changed when the situation evolves. The political will of the international community is shown by the willingness of the world’s powerful states to set aside their differing political agendas and agree on timely, pragmatic and effective solutions to resolve the conflict. In short, the lead organization is equipped with an adequate mandate and sufficient military forces, is enabled by the simultaneous application of other instruments of national power in the conflicted region, and possesses the ability and flexibility to overcome changes in the operational environment.

The second contributing factor is the interest and willingness of the regional adversaries to make and sustain peace. In the post-Cold War era, both state and non-state actors are often empowered with
significant influence on a region’s security and stability and effectively become powerful stakeholders. The motivation and interests of these powerful adversaries to agree to share power and sustain a peaceful regional environment have a major impact on mission success.

This theory of the factors that contribute to mission success or failure provides an interesting yet obvious insight when comparing the effectiveness of UN and non-UN military interventions in the post-Cold War era. Indeed the two factors that directly contribute to mission success or failure, the political will of the international community and the regional adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace, are independent of the organization leading the intervention. As a result, this monograph’s conclusion and thesis should come as no surprise: UN interventions are no more or no less effective than non-UN interventions in achieving mission success in the post-Cold War era.

The Case Studies

Qualitative Measures

A qualitative analysis using case studies is required to validate this monograph’s theory and compare the relative effectiveness and future success probability of UN and non-UN interventions. But before moving on to the case studies, the qualitative measures that will be used to compare the operational variables must first be determined. These measures are found in Table 2, in which a ‘positive’ assessment indicates that the variable under study had a positive impact and contributed to mission success, a ‘neutral’ assessment indicates that the variable did not contribute to either mission success or failure, and a ‘negative’ assessment indicates that the variable negatively affected the mission and either jeopardized its success or contributed to its failure.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Qualitative Measures</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political will of the international community</td>
<td><strong>Mandate</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Positive</strong>: Mandate reflected the tactical situation, was modified if the tactical situation changed, and generally set the conditions for mission success through its flexibility and relevance&lt;br&gt;<strong>Neutral</strong>: Mandate shortfalls may have hindered tactical military operations, but ultimately had no impact on mission success or failure&lt;br&gt;<strong>Negative</strong>: Mandate hindered military operations and contributed to mission failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace</td>
<td><strong>Positive</strong>: Adversaries’ strategic objectives and desired end state are generally aligned with the UN Resolution’s objectives and end state, and/or tactical conditions are unfavorable, thus providing an incentive for all adversaries to work towards a sustainable peace&lt;br&gt;<strong>Negative</strong>: No incentive exists to encourage the negotiation of a sustainable peace by at least one of the adversaries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Mission success (as a direct result of the military intervention) | **Regional security and stability**<br>**Success**: Improved and enduring regional security and stability, decrease in violence<br>**Failure**: No change in security and stability, or situation worsens<br>**Government and institutions**<br>**Success**: Representative government and institutions perceived as effective and less corrupt<br>**Failure**: Government and institutions still perceived as ineffective and corrupt<br>**Post-intervention economy and reconstruction**<br>**Success**: sustained economical growth and reconstruction<br>**Failure**: no economical growth and limited to absence of reconstruction | **Table 2. Qualitative measures for the study variables**


Selection and Methodology

The selected post-Cold War interventions must be representative of both success and failure. Given that the overall post-Cold War intervention success rate hovers around 33% (refer to Table 1), two out of the six selected case studies achieved mission success. The selected interventions must also be representative of both UN and non-UN interventions to enable comparison. As a result, the selected interventions consist of not only a mix of UN and non-UN interventions, but also include regions that were subjected to both UN and non-UN interventions. The case studies must also be well documented (data rich) while providing where possible extreme values in the two factors contributing to mission success or failure. Finally, the selected interventions must display a willingness to target conflicted regions where the operating environment was complex, thus providing more variables and effects to study and consider. 38 As such, the selected case studies for this monograph are the following:

1. ONUMOZ Mozambique 1992-94, a successful UN intervention where the adversaries were eager to achieve a lasting peace.

2. UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II Somalia 1992-95, a failed intervention in a complex environment that contained both UN and non-UN periods, and in which both the international community’s political will and the adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace were limited.

3. UNAMIR Rwanda 1993-96, a failed UN intervention in which the political will of the international community was absent.

4. UNPROFOR Bosnia 1992-95, a failed UN intervention in a complex environment in which the adversaries had no interest in achieving a sustainable peace and in which the international community’s political will was limited.

5. NATO IFOR Bosnia 1995-96, a successful non-UN intervention in a complex environment that provides a direct comparison with UNPROFOR and in which the adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace increased at the same time as the political will of the international community.

6. NATO ISAF Afghanistan 2001-now, a failed non-UN intervention in a highly complex environment in which at least one of the adversaries has no interest in a sustainable peace despite significant political will by the international community to achieve mission success.

Through a controlled comparison format, the case studies will serve four purposes. First, they will test the theory by confirming that its dependent variables, the factors that contribute to the success or failure of any military intervention in the post-Cold War era, are indeed the two aforementioned factors. In effect, the case studies will validate the theory by establishing the importance of antecedent conditions on mission success through controlled comparisons. The case studies will also provide the means to assess the importance of these two factors relative to each other and the impacts on mission success when these variables are in conflict, ie high levels of political will by the international community coupled with adversaries’ low interest for a sustainable peace, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{39} Third, the case studies will allow an assessment of other factors that may have contributed to mission success or failure. Finally, the case studies will allow a qualitative comparison between UN and non-UN interventions with a view to determine which, if any, provides the most effective option to set the conditions for mission success.

Each case study will be methodically depicted through a short intervention summary, a qualitative assessment of the theory’s variables, and final thoughts focused on validating and improving the theory. In addition to the theory’s two key variables, the case studies will also consider any variables deemed possibly relevant to this particular intervention’s success, including but not limited to the military troops’ readiness in terms of training, equipment and caveat, and the lead organization’s bureaucracy. This further analysis will provide the means to determine whether additional factors contribute to mission success or failure in a more significant manner than portrayed by this monograph’s theory.

**ONUMOZ Mozambique 1992-94**

*Intervention Summary.* Mozambique gained its independence in 1975. Rebels supported by neighboring countries Rhodesia and South Africa immediately initiated an armed struggle against the new

\textsuperscript{39} Van Evera, 49-88.
state government. In October 1992, wary of the long civil war, the rebel movement and the Mozambique government signed a General Peace Agreement. The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), made up of 7000 soldiers, deployed in April and May 1993 to monitor the truce and redeployed by January 1995 after general elections were held.40

Political will of the international community. The 16 December 1992 UN Resolution 797 established the ONUMOZ. The intervention’s ambitious mandate was divided into four components. The political and electoral components would lead the country towards general elections; the military component would monitor the ceasefire, separate and demobilize the rebels, disband or withdraw foreign and private armed factions, and maintain a secure environment; and the humanitarian component would integrate all humanitarian efforts, in particular the reintegration of displaced persons and refugees. The demobilization of the rebels led to a significant number of acts of banditry, a problem the UN mandate was not designed to quell and that was not addressed by the military component of ONUMOZ.41 Aside from the banditry issue, the conditions that led to the ONUMOZ initial mandate never changed; as a result, a modified mandate was not required and the political will of the international community to adapt to a changing environment was never seriously tested; powerful states were content to let the UN, armed with its initial resolution, bring the intervention to its successful conclusion. Countries were also slow to contribute troops to the intervention which led to numerous delays, however strong financial support from the international community and political support from neighboring countries improved the conditions for peace and stability in the country.42 Ultimately, the international community did not appear to be decisively engaged in Mozambique, but its slow responses never jeopardized mission success. The political will of the international community with respect to the ONUMOZ intervention is therefore assessed as Neutral.

40 Durch, 275-310. At its peak in March 1994, the UN force was composed of 6939 soldiers and observers from 24 countries, the majority of which contributed by Bangladesh, Italy, India, Zambia, Uruguay and Botswana.
41 Durch, 275-310.
Regional adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace. This factor proved to be the key enabler of mission success. The Mozambique government and rebels held their first peace talks in 1989, eventually leading to the 1992 General Peace Agreement. The government was tired of the brutal bloodshed and the country’s inherent instability. The rebels had lost the support of the neighboring countries and were facing an uncertain future in their struggle for power. This environment led both the government and the rebels to comply with the peace agreement, support the peace process and begin reconciliation within a ravaged country. Furthermore, both parties had gained considerable international leverage by tying foreign governments and investors to provide the resources required to build the country. The adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace is therefore assessed as very Positive.

Other contributing factor: Troop Readiness. UN troops were employed along the main transportation corridors. Their tasks focused on patrolling and monitoring these corridors, setting up check points, escorting convoys and securing food storage, weapons and UN sites. They also assisted in training the new national military force that was to replace the old Mozambique armed forces. The UN military forces were capable to undertake these tasks effectively. Renewed civil war never became a threat in Mozambique and ONU Moz forces were never tasked to challenge what quickly became the real security threat in the country: crime and banditry stemming from the inability to demobilize and disarm many fighters. It is difficult to assess the overall readiness of the ONU Moz military component since their very presence proved sufficient to maintain security: force was never used. For this reason, the readiness of UN troops to tackle the Mozambique challenges is assessed as Neutral.

Other contributing factor: the UN bureaucracy. The ONU Moz funding proved to be a challenge. For three months the intervention did not have an approved budget, and subsequent budget approvals were routinely late, thus constraining local financial transactions. Five trust funds were established and

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43 Durch, 275-310.
44 Krasno, Hayes and Daniel, 95.
45 Durch, 275-310.
managed by various UN organizations to supplement the approved budgets. Funding promised to the rebels to reinvent themselves as a legitimate political party was also delayed. The deployment of the UN military force was delayed until April and May 1993, a full six months after the ceasefire agreement was signed. The deployment of the UN civilian personnel was not only delayed, but failure to fill the approved positions led to a reduction in authorized strength. In February 1994, the deployment of over 1000 police observers could only be achieved by reducing the military force due to the added cost to the UN. These numerous fielding delays greatly affected the implementation timetable. For example, delays in fielding the military component led to a one-year delay in holding the general elections. These numerous bureaucratic hurdles were however compounded by the timely appointment of the Special Representative to the Secretary General, Italian Aldo Ajello, who proved to be a charismatic leader with great diplomatic and improvisational skills. In summary, UN bureaucracy and its inability to deploy forces and approve funds in a timely fashion jeopardized the peace agreement and could have led to mission failure during the period extending from December 1992 to May 1993. Fortunately and despite their tactical impacts, these bureaucratic failures ultimately did not affect the success of the mission. The impact of the UN bureaucracy on the intervention’s success is therefore assessed as Negative.

Mission Success. Mozambique achieved relative stability beginning with the peace agreement and through the successful multi-party elections of 1994. This stability led to a significant economic growth of 9% annually starting in the mid 1990s and spanning over a decade, one of the best economic performance in Africa during that period. More importantly, bloodshed has yet to resume in Mozambique since the ONUMOZ intervention. The mission is therefore assessed as a resounding success.

Final Thoughts. The UN intervention in Mozambique was crucial to the peace process by setting the conditions for the adversaries to work together towards resolving their differences. The UN Secretariat was overtaxed, under-funded, politically divided and painfully bureaucratized, and nations were not

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47 Durch, 275-310.
48 Krasno, Hayes and Daniel, 84, 96.
initially willing to contribute troops. These bureaucratic challenges and lukewarm international political will led to delays that came very close to derailing the peace process.\textsuperscript{50} The mandate however proved applicable enough for the UN troops, through their simple presence, to provide a secure environment once they got on the ground. And of course, the vital factor and key enabler to mission success remained the adversaries’ willingness and interest to achieve a lasting peace. In the end, the UN provided the visible presence required to set the conditions for stability and peace, thus allowing the warring factions to slowly but surely take control and responsibility for their future.

UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II Somalia 1992-95

\textit{Intervention Summary.} Somalia’s longtime leader, Siad Barre, left the country under pressure in January 1991. The collapse of his regime and the subsequent struggle to control the country led to a failed state, civil war, banditry and famine. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM) I deployed in September 1992 under a purely humanitarian mandate. It was followed in December 1992 by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), a US-led intervention of limited duration under UN Resolution 794 also equipped with a humanitarian mandate. UNITAF succeeded in providing some humanitarian aid but could not hand over a secure country to UNOSOM II in May 1993 under UN Resolution 814. UNOSOM II, despite a more robust Chapter VII mandate aiming at restoring peace and stability in Somalia, was also unsuccessful in quelling the violence. Despite various reconciliation agreements, clan violence escalated until the US, in 1994, and eventually the UN forces withdrew in March 1995.\textsuperscript{51}

\textit{Political will of the international community.} The Somalia intervention was characterized by three distinct mandates. The UN-led UNOSOM I deployed under a purely humanitarian mandate and was not effective in providing aid or addressing the root causes of the humanitarian crisis. UNITAF, a US-led coalition, followed soon after with a humanitarian mandate that also allowed the use of all necessary means to establish a secure environment. Even though UNITAF was not effective in addressing the root

\textsuperscript{50} Krasno, Hayes and Daniel, 83.

\textsuperscript{51} Talentino, 103-108.
causes of the humanitarian crisis, it was effective in quelling the violence in those areas it operated in and was able to provide humanitarian relief in Mogadishu and in the south of the country. The UN-led UNOSOM II replaced UNITAF and was unable to resolve the political crisis despite significant enforcement powers. The application of these enforcement powers, rather than resolve the crisis, led to an escalation of violence triggered by the manhunt for Aideed, the most powerful warlord in Mogadishu. Through its three mandates and distinct missions, the international community embarked on a new type of peacekeeping operation and sought to legitimize the country takeover through humanitarian and moral necessity. They also experimented with using military forces to coerce unwilling actors within a sovereign state to agree to internationally-administered peace, a significant shift from traditional peacekeeping. The mandates of both UNITAF and UNOSOM II reflected this vision, but proved inadequate for the Somalia situation. Furthermore, national interests and political considerations led to some counter-productive command and control relationships, in particular the UNOSOM II quick reaction force reporting to US Central Command rather than the to the local UN headquarters. Despite its efforts to adapt to the evolving situation through three distinct mandates, the international community proved incapable to set the conditions for success in Somalia. Powerful states disagreed on how to go about implementing the mandates, arguing about when to use force and when to negotiate, dictating caveats on the employment of their troops, and ultimately allowing political discord to undercut the intervention. In the end, the warlords simply waited for the UN to leave before resuming their efforts to achieve control of the country. The political will of the international community with respect to the three interventions in Somalia was lacking, negatively affected military operations, contributed to mission failure, and is therefore assessed as Negative.

52 Talentino, 105-107.
54 Al-Qaq, 90.
55 Durch, 311-353.
Regional adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace. Somalia is populated by nomadic and historically hostile clans that possess limited political unity and sense of nationalism. As a result, historical lack of trust ensured that political reconciliation of the warring clans was not likely to succeed without strong mediation and external guarantees. Furthermore, clan identity, affiliation and culture took precedence over nationalism, thus greatly reducing trust towards the UN vision of a strong central Somali government. Animosity and mistrust between warlords, especially Aideed, and UN forces greatly hindered the reconciliation process. UNOSOM II gradual transition towards national political reconciliation as its primary objective therefore had a negative impact on the warlords’ willingness to achieve a sustainable peace: this vision simply went against their sense of identity and history and did not meet their primary interest of achieving high levels of political power. The Somali warlords’ interest in a sustainable peace is therefore assessed as Negative.

Other contributing factor: Troop Readiness. 27 and 36 countries contributed troops for UNITAF and UNOSOM II, respectively. Some troop readiness issues were encountered during the two missions. For example, a few national contingents performed local negotiations and distributed bribes, unbeknownst to UN headquarters, in an effort to improve local conditions but sometimes going against the greater UN intent. This showed the low readiness of national contingents to nest their tactical efforts within the greater UN intervention intent. As well, the tragedy involving the Pakistani contingent, in which 25 soldiers were killed in a June 1993 firefight in Mogadishu, could arguably have been less deadly had the Pakistani soldiers deployed with armored vehicles. This absence of armored vehicles was frequent among most contributing contingents. Nevertheless, the UN troops in Somalia were generally adequately trained and equipped for their humanitarian and aid delivery security tasks, and their readiness is assessed as Neutral.

Mission Success. Despite the fact that the Somalia intervention saved countless lives, violence aiming at the control of Somalia and especially Mogadishu continued during and especially after the

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56 Talentino, 95-126.
57 Durch, 311-353.
departure of the UN forces. To this day, Somalia remains a failed state controlled by local militias despite numerous international attempts to resolve its issues. The mission is therefore assessed as an utter failure.

**Final Thoughts.** Initial efforts by the UN in its Somalia intervention focused on the humanitarian crisis and did not address the root causes of political crisis and conflict resolution. Under UNITAF, the US-led military force focused on securing the delivery of humanitarian aid and expected UN institutions to focus on political reconciliation. Under UNOSOM II, the use of force to address both the humanitarian crisis and the political reconciliation was not sufficient to carry out the mission mandate in the face of increasing violence. The old peacekeeping concepts of adversaries’ consent and UN neutrality and impartiality were consciously set aside for UNOSOM II, to no avail. As a result the various Somali warlords, although engaged by the UN, never had any serious interest in achieving a lasting peace under a central, internationally-led government. This combination of ambitious mandates, coupled with international political discord on how to implement them and amid an environment where warlords had little to gain from the UN end state, led to a disastrous mission failure. It is also interesting to note that the challenges faced by UN interventions (UNOSOM I and II) and non-UN intervention (UNITAF) in Somalia were similar and led to the same disappointing results.

**UNAMIR Rwanda 1993-96**

**Intervention Summary.** The government of Rwanda and a rebel force, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), engaged in civil war from 1990-93. The subsequent August 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement led to the deployment of a neutral UN peacekeeping force under Resolution 872, UNAMIR, to assist with the implementation of the agreement. This included the sharing of power through a transitional government between the country’s two ethnic groups (Hutus and Tutsis), the holding of elections and the return of refugees. In April 1994 however, the murder of the country’s president had a dual impact: the civil war

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58 Talentino, 108.

59 Talentino, 108-122.
resumed, and a genocide instigated by extremist Hutu militias occurred. The genocide lasted three
months, resulting in the murder of approximately 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Meanwhile, the
UN proved unable to adapt to the change in situation and, as a result, UNAMIR could not adapt to the
new environment and provide protection to the people of Rwanda during that three-month period. The
war and genocide ended when the RPF took control of the country in July 1994 and formed a new
government.\textsuperscript{60}

\textit{Political will of the international community.} UNAMIR was designed as a small, neutral force
responsible to assist the willing parties to achieve a durable peace in accordance with the Arusha Accords.
Its tasks were to contribute to security, monitor the security situation, investigate alleged noncompliance,
and undertake humanitarian tasks. Furthermore, the use of force was limited to self-defense.\textsuperscript{61} Following
the murder of the President in April 1994, it became obvious that the mandate was no longer relevant to
the situation on the ground, and yet the UN Security Council voted to reduce the mandate and the force.
Despite genocide evidence, mandate escalation would not happen until 17 May 1994. However, this
expansion fell short of a Chapter VII UN intervention and, most importantly, did not lead to increased
troop levels on the ground until after the civil war and genocide were over. The international community,
notably the US, delayed troop deployment action due to costs, lack of political will and limited strategic
interests in Rwanda. France deployed troops in Rwanda, but its troops, while authorized by the UN
Security Council, remained outside UNAMIR control and aimed at achieving humanitarian ends as well
as France’s own national objectives rather than the neutral UN mandate.\textsuperscript{62} In summary, given its limited
mandate and military strength, UNAMIR had no ability to gain the initiative and prevent the genocide.
Simultaneously, the UN and international community failed to display the decision-making, political will
and deep pockets required to fix UNAMIR’s mandate, rapidly deploy troops in Rwanda, and set the

\textsuperscript{60} Durch, 367-369.

\textsuperscript{61} Durch, 376.

\textsuperscript{62} Durch, 376-389.
conditions for success. The complete absence of political will by the international community to adapt to the drastic change in the Rwandan situation and avert the genocide is effectively summed up by the UNAMIR Commander, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire. He titled his book on the tragic Rwandan events *Shake Hands with the Devil: the Failure of Humanity in Rwanda.* The political will of the international community with respect to the UNAMIR intervention is therefore assessed as extremely Negative.

*Regional adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace.* The Arusha Accords did not reflect the real interests of the adversaries. President Habyarimana wanted to retain power rather than reconcile with the RPF. The Arusha Accords were imposed on him under threat of cutting off funding and represented the political defeat of his regime. As a result, he played political games, including fueling ethnic hatred, in order to achieve his political aims. The Hutu extremists wanted to permanently resolve the long lasting ethnic conflict by simply wiping the Tutsis out of existence, and developed the means to achieve this objective. The RPF wanted more power and wished to maintain their military readiness in case the peace process did not work out. The UN failed to recognize the fundamental interests and will to act of the antagonists, especially the Hutu extremists, and as a result equipped UNAMIR with a misguided mandate and failed to react when evidence of the incoming genocide started to appear. The adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace, in particular the radical Hutus who spearheaded the genocide, is therefore assessed as Negative.

*Other contributing factor: troop readiness.* The UNAMIR authorized strength was 2548 military personnel. The vast majority of the troops were contributed by Belgium, Bangladesh, and Ghana. The main limitations of the force were its authorized strength, rules of engagement and light equipment. Once the civil war resumed and the genocide began in April 1994, there simply were not enough UN troops

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63 Durch, 396.
64 Dallaire, xi-xviii.
65 Al-Qaq, 110-111.
66 Durch, 396-397.
with the required rules of engagement and equipped with robust weapons and vehicles to make a positive difference in Rwanda. Furthermore, the troops in country that could have made a difference starting in June 1994, the French troops, had their own mandate and did not report to UNAMIR.67 In the end, the limited number of troops, their weak rules of engagement and their light equipment were a direct reflection of an obsolete mandate. The root cause of the problem was not a failure to deploy ready troops since incoming events could not have been predicted by contributing nations; it was rather a failure by the international community to show the will to quickly adapt to the changing environment. Despite the obvious tactical impacts of troops being ill-equipped and in insufficient numbers to influence the tragic events of Rwanda, troop readiness is not considered to ultimately have affected mission failure and is therefore assessed as Neutral.

*Other Contributing Factor: the UN bureaucratic rigidity.* Upon its arrival in Rwanda, it soon became clear to UNAMIR that genocide preparations were under way. Using information from a credible informer, UNAMIR military forces under General Dallaire planned to seize the initiative and raid various weapons caches in Kigali, the capital. This plan was firmly denied by UN headquarters in New York, who ordered Dallaire to immediately suspend the operation and simply advise the President of the weapons cache locations. Deterrent action was simply not authorized under the Chapter VI UN intervention. Furthermore, no support was provided by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General in Rwanda, who remained noncommittal and advocated doing nothing, as per the mandate.68 These ill-advised decisions were taken before the genocide began, and therefore cannot be blamed on the international community’s lack of political will. They were a direct reflection of the lead organization following its mandate faithfully and disregarding evidence and necessity from the military commander on

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67 Durch, 379-396. UNAMIR had been designed with the objective of overseeing the Arusha Accords of which both the Government and the Rebels were signatories. When the situation on the ground changed after the death of the President, the UN personnel strength, equipment and rules of engagement proved totally inadequate for the task of protecting the people from genocide.

68 Dallaire, 141-151.
the ground. The UN bureaucracy therefore may have affected the failure of the mission and is assessed as Negative.

Mission Success. UNAMIR could only stand and witness the genocide of approximately 800,000 civilians during a three month period in 1994. Even though the situation in Rwanda later improved once the RPF gained control of the country through violence, UNAMIR cannot take any credit for these improvements. The mission is therefore assessed as an utter failure.

Final Thoughts. The Rwanda situation in 1994 provides a vivid example of utter failure by the UN and the international community to display the political will to react swiftly and decisively to drastic changes in the environment. Other factors also contributed to mission failure: the lack of interest by radical Hutus to achieve a sustainable peace and the refusal of UN headquarters to take pre-emptive action when signs of the genocide started to appear. These contributing factors however pale in comparison with the impacts that international politics had on mission failure.

UNPROFOR Bosnia 1992-95

Intervention Summary. Many factors led to the break-up of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. The death of Tito, the subsequent rise of ethnic nationalist leaders, ethnic tensions rooted deep in history, and the country’s economic crisis of the 1980s all played an important role. After the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, the ethnically-mixed Bosnia declared its own independence in February 1992. UNPROFOR, the UN force mandated to enforce the ceasefire in Croatia under Resolution 743, established its headquarters in Sarajevo (Bosnia) in March 1992 to act as a deterrent against ethnic violence. Deterrence failed as war erupted in Bosnia in April 1992, taking the form of military campaigns using both conventional and paramilitary forces and leading to refugee crisis, ethnic cleansing and the Bosnian Serb siege of Sarajevo. In June 1992, UNPROFOR’s authorized strength and mandate was enlarged to include provisions for aid to Sarajevo and was accompanied by severe economic

69 Dallaire, 510-522.
sanctions on Serbia. This was followed by additional UNPROFOR mandate increases over time, including escort of humanitarian relief, protection of safe areas and monitoring of weapons exclusion zones, none of which came with additional troops. The UN-led intervention ended in December 1995 as IFOR took over.

**Political will of the international community.** The war in Bosnia began in April 1992 while UNPROFOR, despite its headquarters in Sarajevo, was only mandated to support the Croat/Serb peace agreement. There was no peace agreement in Bosnia and therefore UNPROFOR had no mandate for Bosnia. It took over two months for the UN to provide a limited Bosnian mandate for UNPROFOR and, despite many efforts at peace negotiation, three years before a peace agreement was finally signed in Dayton in November 1995. In the interim, UNPROFOR forces did not possess the strong mandate, aggressive rules of engagement and military strength to significantly affect the security and stability situation in Bosnia. In fact, UN troops were often taken hostage in retaliation to NATO air strikes in 1994 and 1995, and merely watched when heavy fighting resumed in 1995 in the Krajina, Tuzla and Sarajevo, and when Bosnian Serb forces massacred the male population of Srebrenica in 1995. By July 1995, all of the UN-declared safe areas had fallen, with the exception of Gorazde. The international community showed little commitment to end the conflict militarily; early efforts focused on diplomatic and humanitarian efforts, which was reflected in the weak UNPROFOR mandate. Only as time went by did the international response become more aggressive, and this through NATO, starting in 1994, rather than the UN. There also were significant policy disagreements between UN troop contributing nations, who were concerned with the security of their troops on the ground, and the US who advocated a policy of air strikes and equipping/training the Bosnian forces to even out the forces. Sorting out these disagreements took a long time and led to an extension of the conflict over time. As early as September 1992, well-known US diplomat Richard Holbrooke assessed the international reaction to Bosnia as

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70 Talentino, 162-177.
71 Durch, 223-232.
72 Talentino, 162-182.
inadequate and warned, ultimately to no avail, that boldness and strength were required to preclude a dire tragedy. In summary, US lukewarm involvement, political disagreements, and bickering between powerful states on how to tackle and resolve the conflict in Bosnia led to the fielding of a UN force that was not set for success in terms of mandate, military strength and rules of engagement. As a result, the adversaries were able to work around, and in many cases bully, the UN forces to achieve their territorial and ethnic cleansing objectives. The political will of the international community to leverage UNPROFOR with a view to quickly end the conflict in Bosnia is therefore assessed as Negative.

*Regional adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace.* Throughout the war, the Serb, Croat and Bosnian leaders manipulated the underlying issues of self-determination, formation of a state out of its ethnic nation, and protection of their own ethnic minorities in other republics to their political advantage to justify their atrocities. These ends were perceived as vital by both the political leaders and a majority of the population, and for this reason there was limited interest for peace. In particular, the early success of the Bosnian Serb forces to seize 70% of the Bosnian territory proved to be detrimental to peace: Bosnian Serb leaders ultimately only went to the negotiating table when Croat and Muslim counter-offensives reduced this percentage to 50%. Reconciliation between Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs was also a significant challenge given the war’s past and ongoing atrocities. Furthermore, the military weakness of UNPROFOR provided another incentive to resolve the conflict militarily rather than diplomatically. In summary, the three Bosnian ethnic groups may have had some level of interest in a sustainable peace, but the absence of international political resolve and the military weakness of UNPROFOR created a situation where a military solution was perceived as more effective than a diplomatic one, thus denying the incentive for peace. The adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace is therefore assessed as Negative.

*Other contributing factor: troop readiness.* UNPROFOR reached 22,500 military troops in September 1994, which were contributed by 21 nations. However, the UNPROFOR consecutive and increasing mandates in Bosnia were not accompanied by the required increase in military forces. As a

73 Holbrooke, 39.

74 Talantino, 162-177.
result, and regardless of the adequacy of troop training and equipment, the military forces on the ground were not sufficient in numbers to perform even the limited mandated humanitarian and protection tasks effectively. In the end, the international community needed to increase the number of troops and adopt aggressive rules of engagement in order to yield influence in the Bosnian conflict; any limitation in terms of troop readiness or caveat was strategically insignificant when compared with this fundamental problem.\(^{75}\) UNPROFOR troop readiness is therefore assessed as Neutral.

*Mission Success.* UNPROFOR achieved some successes, including the opening of the Sarajevo airport to humanitarian supplies and the provision of other humanitarian services throughout its intervention. It could be argued that UNPROFOR also assisted with setting the conditions on the ground that allowed the Dayton negotiations to take place, but this was probably the result of NATO beginning more robust actions in Bosnia. Furthermore and for over three long years, UNPROFOR was unable to stop the fighting and quell the ethnic cleansing on all sides, could not deter Serb aggression, and of course failed to protect the population in the proclaimed safe area of Srebrenica.\(^{76}\) The mission is therefore assessed as a failure.

*Final Thoughts.* The failure of the international community to achieve consensus and quickly authorize a heavy intervention in Bosnia effectively set the conditions for failure and kept UNPROFOR from having a decisive impact on the conflict. UNPROFOR never was given the tools required to provide a secure environment in Bosnia. As a result, no incentive was imposed on the adversaries to lay down their weapons and come to the negotiating table with a real intent for peace. Military muscle was required to settle the conflict, and only the transition to a much more robust international NATO force would ultimately set the conditions for security to take root in Bosnia.\(^{77}\)

\(^{75}\) Durch, 235-244.

\(^{76}\) Talento, 162-177.

\(^{77}\) Talento, 178-188.


NATO IFOR Bosnia 1995-96

*Intervention Summary.* The efforts of UNPROFOR in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995, while certainly not successful, still enabled a military situation on the ground that set in place the conditions for meaningful negotiations to take place and eventually be accepted by all parties. As a result, the Dayton Accords were signed in December 1995. The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR), the Alliance’s first attempt at robust peacekeeping, was mandated by UN Resolution 1031 and began its efforts in Bosnia in December 1995, taking over from UNPROFOR.\(^78\)

*Political will of the international community.* The IFOR mandate provided the means to use military force to set the conditions for success and end the conflict. The mandate also enabled reconstruction of the Bosnian institutions under international control and provided the first example of international nationbuilding at work. The Dayton Accords contained 11 annexes, including military aspects, regional stability, force and ethnic separation, civilian reconstruction, national constitution, human rights, police and refugees. The military troops were tasked to supervise the separation zones, disarm civilians, monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces, remove mines, and ensure freedom of movement.\(^79\) This mandate proved adequate to the situation on the ground and was further enabled by robust rules of engagement under Chapter VII (peace enforcement) of the UN Charter.\(^80\) As a result, IFOR forces quickly achieved their military and security objectives of aggressively separating the belligerents and enforcing the ceasefire.\(^81\) In summary, after three years of fighting and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the international community finally decided it had had enough with limited interventions, flexed its muscles under American leadership, and showed political will and resolve. Through the Dayton Accords and the IFOR intervention, a full-scale military and civilian intervention was undertaken that clearly set in place the

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\(^{78}\) Talentino, 178-188.
\(^{79}\) Talentino, 178-199.
\(^{80}\) Wentz, 27.
\(^{81}\) Holbrooke, 216.
conditions for success.\textsuperscript{82} The political will of the international community, as shown by the Dayton Accords and the IFOR intervention, is therefore assessed as Positive.

\textit{Regional adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace.} Military culmination, achievement of limited territorial and ethnic-cleansing objectives, and the long-awaited international political resolve led to a much increased interest and willingness towards peace by all adversaries. This willingness was in clear display when all parties, including the Bosnian Serbs through its Serb representative, decided to sign the Dayton Accords.\textsuperscript{83} Despite the deep and lingering mistrust between the three ethnic groups, the adversaries’ interest in negotiating and implementing a sustainable peace is therefore assessed as Positive.

\textit{Other contributing factor: troop readiness.} IFOR’s Operation Joint Endeavour was authorized 60000 military troops contributed by, at its height, 36 NATO and non-NATO countries. The IFOR troops were generally well trained and well equipped for Cold War scenarios, and the presence of the pre-eminent military world power, the United States, added significant credibility to the military force.\textsuperscript{84} However, there is no indication that the high troop readiness level of IFOR forces contributed in a significant manner to mission success; the renewed political will of the international community and the adversaries’ desire for peace were the key factors. IFOR forces’ troop readiness is therefore assessed as Neutral.

\textit{Mission Success.} Clear international political guidance and will, robust rules of engagement and NATO’s military flexibility, adaptability and command and control capabilities collectively put in place the conditions for IFOR success in Bosnia. As a result, the Dayton Accords military objectives were quickly achieved and provided a stable environment in which the long process of reconstruction and reconciliation could finally begin.\textsuperscript{85} The mission is therefore assessed as a success.

\textsuperscript{82} Talentino, 178-199.
\textsuperscript{83} Wentz, 9-34.
\textsuperscript{84} Wentz, 3.
\textsuperscript{85} Wentz, 409.
Final Thoughts. IFOR achieved success, whereas UNPROFOR failed. But can this success be attributed to the conditions under which the interventions took place, or to the relative effectiveness of NATO’s ability to lead a military intervention when compared to the UN? The biggest difference between IFOR and UNPROFOR was the political resolve underlying the credibility of the IFOR military intervention. This credibility that force would be used was instrumental in getting the adversaries to immediately comply with the Dayton Accords and brought stability to the region. There is no doubt that IFOR’s mandate and its ability to use military force was a big improvement over UNPROFOR’s mandate and rules of engagement. On the other hand, IFOR deployed following the signature of a peace agreement whereas UNPROFOR had no peace to keep or enforce in Bosnia. Furthermore, the adversaries in Bosnia were both wary of war and had achieved at least some of their terrain and ethnic-cleansing objectives by the time the Dayton Accords were signed. Such was not the case in 1992 when UNPROFOR began operations in Bosnia. In summary, as IFOR took over from UNPROFOR in December 1995, all the necessary factors were rapidly converging towards the conditions required for successful military operations and a stable and secure environment. These favorable conditions were independent of the lead organization’s ability to direct and support their respective intervention; there is therefore no evidence in these two case studies that NATO is superior to the UN in terms of leading a military intervention.

NATO ISAF Afghanistan 2001-now

Intervention Summary. The UN Security Council Resolution 1386 in December 2001 created the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Initially led by the US, ISAF eventually came under NATO command in August 2003. Its mission was initially limited to the Afghanistan capital, Kabul, but over time expanded throughout the country in four stages. The latest UN Resolution 1883, passed in 2008, requires NATO to disarm the Taliban, reform the judiciary, train the Afghan national security

86 Wentz, xix.
forces, provide a secure environment for the elections, and support the government’s counter-narcotics efforts. The mission’s purpose is to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan.  

*Political will of the international community.* The ISAF mission is proving to be a stern test of international political will and is important for NATO’s future as a credible Alliance. It requires commitment to the deployment and long-term sustainment of a significant number of troops operating in a complex environment in a distant land. Issues include domestic lack of support for the mission, a weak and corrupted central Afghan government, a very slow buildup of Afghan security forces, and disagreements among Alliance members on such various issues as the number of troops to be raised, national caveats on the employment of troops, ways to counter narcotics, and means to enable improved governance and reconstruction despite an absence of security. The most significant issue however remains the sheer number of troops required to provide stability and security to enable reconstruction and improved governance in the face of a growing insurgency sustained from the Pakistan’s safe havens. However, 42 countries have contributed 71,000 troops to ISAF; despite the unending thirst for more troops in Afghanistan, this number still provides a testament to the international commitment to the ISAF mission. Furthermore, ISAF is enabled by a flexible mandate, is equipped with robust rules of engagement, and remains the main military effort of many powerful western states, in particular the US and the United Kingdom.  

The political will of the international community to achieve success in Afghanistan is therefore assessed as Positive.  

*Regional adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace.* The extraordinary conditions specific to the Afghanistan Theater are shaping the interests of the adversaries and are having an impact on mission success, or lack thereof. These conditions include a historically weak central government, rampant corruption throughout the national institutions and security forces, the influence and funds associated with the poppy trade and criminal gangs, and of course the presence of the Pakistan safe haven. The ability of

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88 Morelli and Belkin, summary, 3-22.
ISAF to shape the capacity of the Afghan government and its security institutions while enabling local governance and denying the insurgents their support base in Pakistan is crucial to mission success. The latter factor is of particular importance. Whereas the Pakistan government does not endorse or support the Taliban, it has been unable (or unwilling) to deny the insurgents their support base in the Pakistan tribal areas, thus providing them the external support required for survival.\textsuperscript{89} As a result, the Taliban enjoy a safe support base which greatly limits their interest in peace. As a recent strategy, President Karzai has publicly and covertly tried to engage with senior Talibans, but with very limited success. The Taliban in turn have rejected any peace overtures from the Afghan government, have called these efforts futile propaganda, and have repeatedly stated the complete removal of international forces as a pre-requisite to begin peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{90} This condition is unacceptable to both NATO and the Karzai government, even though the United States support Karzai’s peace talk efforts.\textsuperscript{91} The Taliban’s intransigence and their taking advantage of the extraordinary Afghan conditions therefore dictate that the adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace be assessed as Negative.

\textit{Other contributing factor: troop readiness.} ISAF is led by the world’s pre-eminent military power, the United States, and as such its troops have credibility in their training, equipment, and capacity to adapt to the ever-changing tactics of the insurgents. Limitations exist for many countries in terms of equipment, in particular helicopters, armored vehicles and counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) equipment. As well, some nations have dictated operational restrictions on the employment of their troops (national caveats), for example no combat missions, or no deployment in dangerous parts of Afghanistan. Still, ISAF is working around these constraints and limitations by employing troops in locations and tasks

\textsuperscript{89} Jones, 1-5.
suitable for their respective equipment, training and caveats.\textsuperscript{92} ISAF troop readiness is therefore assessed as Neutral.

\textit{Mission Success.} The security and stability conditions in Afghanistan have not significantly improved since 2001. Furthermore, no peace has been seriously negotiated with the Taliban, let alone been agreed upon. Even though the mission is ongoing and only the future will tell of its ultimate success, as it stands the mission is assessed as a failure.

\textit{Final Thoughts.} Afghanistan provides NATO with a significant test that is challenging its ability to build and sustain the required political will within a complex, long-term, counter-insurgency, protracted conflict. Despite relatively limited political and bureaucratic interference over military operations coupled with significant political will by the international community to achieve success, the utter lack of interest by the Taliban to make peace and their effective strategy and tactics are proving a significant deterrent to ISAF military success. Furthermore, the extraordinary conditions specific to the Afghanistan operating environment are also having a significant negative impact on mission success.

\textbf{Synthesis}

A holistic approach is required to validate this monograph’s theory and thesis. This section will synthesize the results of the case studies with a view to refine the theory and answer the research question of whether non-UN military interventions are more effective towards achieving mission success than UN interventions. More specifically, the following questions will be answered: Are the theory’s two dependent variables really the only key factors that dictate mission success or failure, or are there additional factors that consistently affect military intervention success? Does each factor contribute equally to mission success or failure, or should their relative importance be weighed? And are there indications that non-UN interventions are more effective, in other words more likely to achieve mission success, than UN interventions?

\textsuperscript{92} Morelli and Belkin, 3-22.
To assist in the synthesis discussion, Table 3 provides a summary of the case studies’ qualitative assessments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Will of International Community</th>
<th>Adversaries’ interest in Sustainable Peace</th>
<th>Troop training, equipment and caveats</th>
<th>Lead Organization Bureaucracy</th>
<th>Mission Success</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ Mozambique</td>
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<td>Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM I, II, UNITAF Somalia</td>
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<td>Negative</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR Rwanda</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR Bosnia</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Failure</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR Bosnia</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Success</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF Afghanistan</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Summary of the qualitative assessment of the case study variables

*Note: The Table 3 data comes directly from the previous section’s case study analysis. Table 3 is only meant as a quick reference guide to display the conclusions of the case studies.*

The first question to consider is whether the theory’s two dependent variables are really the only factors that dictate mission success or failure. The six case studies were consistent in terms of factors leading to mission success or failure. In all cases, the main cause of mission success or failure could be attributed to one or both of the two key factors: the political will of the international community and/or the adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace. Whenever one or both of these factors was assessed as
having a negative impact towards mission success, the intervention failed. Whenever both factors were assessed as being neutral or having a positive impact on mission success, the intervention succeeded. This conclusion appears to confirm this monograph’s theory: the success or failure of post-Cold War military interventions hinges on the interplay of two factors, the political will of the international community and the adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace.

For two interventions, another factor was identified as having possibly contributed to mission failure: the UN bureaucracy. For ONUMOZ in Mozambique, the UN bureaucracy was a significant tactical-level factor whose strategic impacts were thankfully mitigated by the adversaries’ strong willingness for peace. Nevertheless, systemic UN bureaucratic mismanagements with respect to funding, deployment of military forces and deployment of UN civilian personnel caused delays that could have derailed the success of the mission. The mission however achieved success, and one can argue that the impacts of UN bureaucracy were overshadowed by the positive effects of a much more powerful operational variable, the adversaries’ willingness for peace. For UNAMIR in Rwanda, the same UN bureaucracy factor negatively affected mission success when UN/DPKO leadership in New York refused to take seemingly reasonable steps to preempt the genocide before it began. Could decisive and pre-emptive action by UNAMIR, supported by UN headquarters, have succeeded in preventing the genocide? One can only speculate, but given the lack of international interest towards the ills of this small country and the adversaries’ reluctance to share power, any action by the UN at that time would have been very unlikely to deter the genocide and improve the probabilities of mission success. It is therefore argued that UN bureaucracy, while often a factor at the tactical level, is unlikely to have a significant impact towards mission failure. Its negative effects will likely be thwarted by more important operational variables, namely the political will of the international community and the adversaries’ interest for a sustainable peace.

The case studies also clearly reveal that the military troops’ readiness in terms of equipment, training and caveat is not a factor that contributes to mission success or failure. There simply is no evidence of correlation between troops’ readiness and mission success or failure.
The theory’s two operational variables are therefore the key factors that dictate mission success or failure. A closer look at Table 3 however stresses the need to assess the contribution to mission success of these two operational variables relative to each other. Is one factor more dominant than the other? Table 3 clearly pinpoints a simple fact: in all case studies, there was a direct correlation between mission success and the adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace. Not so for the political will of the international community, as shown by the Afghanistan case study.

It should first be noted that these two operational variables are not independent from one another. The political will of the international community, through its actions and display of resolve in a conflicted region, can clearly influence and shape the intent and courses of action available to the adversaries. Furthermore, the case studies have shown a clear correlation between mission success or failure and these two variables, albeit the adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace offers a more direct and complete connection. These statements lead to two logical conclusions. First, despite the small sample size, one can conclude that the adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace is indeed the dominant factor that contributes to mission success or failure. A scenario where all adversaries possess a significant interest for peace would become an economy of force intervention where the international community likely would have to show only limited will, resolve and efforts to achieve success. Conversely, a scenario in which at least one of the adversaries has no interest in peace would require an abnormally strong commitment and will from the international community to set the conditions for success (Afghanistan, for example). Second, the connection between the two key variables provides a clear focal point for the international community’s efforts. Indeed, international political will must focus on the adversaries, with a view to enhance their incentives and prospects for peace and set the conditions to enable their ultimate reconciliation. Such actions will magnify the effects of international involvement and will therefore improve the probabilities of mission success by targeting the dominant variable that contributes to mission success.

In summary, the two key factors of political will and interest for peace have been shown to be critical and relevant towards mission success or failure in all interventions. Both factors seem to directly
contribute to mission success or failure, but a negative assessment on only one of them is sufficient to greatly reduce the probability of success for future interventions. Furthermore, the dominant factor appears to be the adversaries’ interest in a sustainable peace. As a priority, the international community should therefore focus its will and efforts towards setting the conditions for the adversaries to buy into the reconciliation and peace process. Failure to provide reasonable peace incentives to the belligerents appears to be a formula for mission failure, regardless of other international efforts. Conversely, a conflicted region in which all adversaries possess a significant interest in achieving sustainable peace could potentially become an economy of force intervention for the international community. Two of the case studies have also shown that the UN bureaucracy (Mozambique and Rwanda) possess the potential to affect the intervention at the tactical level, but is unlikely to ultimately derail mission success. Bureaucracy is omnipresent in all interventions and creates tactical challenges, but the case studies indicate that its impacts remain of limited strategic importance and are not key enablers of mission failure. Finally, the case studies have shown that the readiness of the contributing nations’ troops is irrelevant to mission success or failure.

The last question to ponder is whether there are indications that non-UN interventions are more effective, or in other words more likely to achieve mission success, than UN interventions. The answer to this question constitutes the crux of this monograph. The case studies showed that there is no apparent correlation between mission success and which organization is planning, managing, directing and supporting the intervention. The well-publicized UN bureaucracy was not a significant factor in the success or failure of robust peacekeeping of peace enforcement military interventions in the post-Cold War era. Rather, the ultimate success of any intervention depended on the international political will and especially in the adversaries’ interest for peace, two factors that remain mostly independent of the lead organization. As a result, UN interventions are no more and no less likely to achieve mission success than non-UN interventions.
Conclusion

This monograph offered a theory of post-Cold War military interventions claiming that mission success is attributable to only two dependent variables (or key factors): the political will of the international community and especially the adversaries’ interest and willingness to achieve a sustainable peace. The latter variable is the dominant factor in enabling mission success or failure, and should be the focus of the former’s efforts in setting the conditions for success through international will and resolve. This monograph also aimed to determine whether non-UN interventions are more effective than UN interventions in achieving mission success. The scope of the monograph was limited to UN robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement interventions, and UN-sanctioned interventions undertaken under the leadership of an international alliance or coalition.

The overall conclusion of this monograph is that despite the UN’s reputation of being limited by its own bureaucracy, the data provided by six case studies does not validate the statement that non-UN military interventions are more effective than UN interventions. There is no indication that an alliance such as NATO or an international coalition is more or less likely to achieve mission success despite its somewhat less bureaucratized organization. The key contributors to mission success remain two key factors that lie mostly outside the control of the intervention’s lead organization. Other factors thought to possibly influence mission success, the lead organization bureaucracy and the troops’ readiness, were in fact shown to be quite insignificant when compared to the two key factors. The UN therefore remains a viable option to lead future robust peacekeeping or peace enforcement military interventions, with the caveats that the international community displays the resolve to set the conditions for mission success and the adversaries possess an incentive to achieve a sustainable peace.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


