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A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in areas with unstable or limited security, usually following open hostilities. The PRT utilizes all instruments of national power and is intended to improve stability by strengthening the host nation government’s ability to provide security to its citizens and deliver essential services. First created in 2002, PRTs have been implemented in Afghanistan and Iraq to enable stability through integrated civil-military operations and enable traditional diplomatic and development programs to operate. The organization and leadership of a PRT often differs from team to team with a variety of civilian and military members serving in a range of capacities.

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PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS: WHO'S IN CHARGE?

by

Candace C. Eckert

Commander, United States Navy
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Candace C. Eckert

Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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20 May 2011

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Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting School
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Civilian involvement in stability operations is a critical enabler for transition from military to civilian control as it provides tangible evidence of the importance of civilian leadership, demonstrates integrated civilian/military operability, and can enhance operational effectiveness in the eyes of the host nation. Host nation leaders benefit from observing and working closely with other civilians while developing a strong, stable, and sustainable civil society.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Figures .................................................................................................................. iii
Acronyms ........................................................................................................................... iv

I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

II. From Pacification to Stabilization ............................................................................... 4
    Pacification, Counterinsurgency, and Stability Operations ................................ 5
    Vietnam (1960-1975) .......................................................................................... 6
    Panama (1988-1990) ......................................................................................... 14
    Haiti (1993-1995) ............................................................................................. 15
    Creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams .................................................. 17
    Afghanistan (2002-2011) .................................................................................. 19
    Iraq (2005-2011) ............................................................................................... 23
    Analysis of CORDS and PRTs ......................................................................... 29
    History’s Lessons Learned................................................................................ 31

III. Civilian and Military Guidance ................................................................................. 34
    U.S. Interagency Policy .................................................................................... 34
    U.S. Department of Defense Doctrine .............................................................. 39
    International Policy and Doctrine ..................................................................... 43
    The Command and Control Challenge ............................................................. 45
    Summary ........................................................................................................... 48

IV. Defining Success ....................................................................................................... 49
    Interagency Assessment Tools.......................................................................... 49
    Afghanistan and Iraq ......................................................................................... 51
    Host Nation Perspective .................................................................................... 53
    Sustainability .................................................................................................... 53
    Summary ........................................................................................................... 54

V. Answering the Leadership Question ......................................................................... 55
    The Value of Military Leadership .................................................................... 55
    The Importance of Civilian Leadership ............................................................ 58
    Personalities Matter .......................................................................................... 62
    Summary........................................................................................................... 65
VI. Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 66
VII. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 68
Appendix A. Afghanistan PRT Locations ............................................................................. 70
Appendix B. Iraq PRT Locations .......................................................................................... 71
Appendix C. Suggestions for Further Study ........................................................................ 72
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................... 75
Vita ....................................................................................................................................... 85
TABLE OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CORDS Organization within COMUSMACV</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Afghanistan PRT Models</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nominal Iraq PRT Organizational Chart</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Integrated Approach to Stability Operations</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRONYMS</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>AID</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
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<td>Civilian Response Corps</td>
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<td>Integrated Civil-Military Action Group</td>
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<td>IMS</td>
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<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MNC-I</td>
<td>Multinational Corps – Iraq</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multinational Forces – Iraq</td>
<td></td>
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<td>MPICE</td>
<td>Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments</td>
<td></td>
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<td>MSSG</td>
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<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

For centuries, developed nations have used civilian and military forces to support countries struggling in the wake of warfare or other crises, both natural and man-made. This support is currently defined as stability operations: “Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted … in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”¹ Because the military is often the first entity able to respond with significant resources, their initial leadership and presence can create an important stabilizing effect, but this role should be temporary: The objective is to transition responsibility to the host nation’s government or international organizations for longer-term development activities.

Combined civil-military (civ-mil) entities are often utilized during stability operations, but the structure and methods are often created or reinvented for each instance with very little application of history’s lessons-learned. Civilian involvement and close engagement with host nation leaders is a crucial enabler for transition, however interagency partners are often relegated to a secondary role by the military, subsequently limiting the effectiveness of these important contributors.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are interim civ-mil organizations designed to operate in areas with unstable or limited security, usually following open hostilities. The PRT utilizes all instruments of national power and is intended to improve stability by strengthening the host nation’s ability to provide security to its citizens and

deliver essential services,² thus enhancing its legitimacy.³ First created in 2002, PRTs have been implemented in both Afghanistan and Iraq to enable stability through integrated civ-mil operations and create opportunities for traditional diplomatic and developmental programs to operate.

Current PRTs have inconsistent personnel structures at both the working and leadership levels: Some are led by civilians while others are led by uniformed members of a coalition partner’s military. This thesis argues Provincial Reconstruction Teams should be led by civilians, as this demonstrates civilian/military interoperability and leverages local relationships previously forged by the regional military commander, thus enhancing overall effectiveness of stability operations and accelerating the transition from military to civilian control.

Combining the study of historical accounts of civ-mil partnerships in pacification and stability operations over the past fifty years with recent experiences in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, this document draws on interviews with civilians and military members who have served with or on PRTs, including the author’s own experiences in Iraq as a military member of the Ninewa PRT and subsequent observations of the Anbar PRT. Further synthesis includes U.S. and international policy and doctrine, ultimately substantiating the importance of civilian leadership for PRTs.

This thesis does not question the ability of the military to effectively lead these teams; there are many examples of effective military leadership resulting in positive results. The larger question is whether the military should lead these teams, and if equal or greater

results can be achieved through civilian leadership. While at times critical of some PRT leaders, it is by no means the intent of this thesis to minimize the difficult and routinely dangerous work of these civilians and military members, nor does it call into question their dedication. If anything, their efforts are a testament to the amazing results that can be accomplished when a group of individuals come together in the name of freedom.
II. FROM PACIFICATION TO STABILIZATION

Of the hundreds of military operations conducted by the U.S. military through the course of American history, a significant amount of them are now considered “stability operations.” The United States’ experience in Vietnam provided valuable experience conducting operations “among the people,” including a formal integration of Department of State civilians with Department of Defense military members in a program known as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). While CORDS provided “valuable lessons that helped shape contemporary approaches to stability operations,”\(^1\) some of the elements of civilian and military leadership have been lost, forcing the U.S. to relearn these specific lessons in subsequent operations.

In the ten years following the fall of the Berlin Wall, more than fifteen stability operations were conducted by the U.S. Army, and the United States’ 21\(^{st}\)-century wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reveal a disturbing global trend: “The collapse of established governments, the rise of international criminal and terrorist networks, a seemingly endless array of humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty.”\(^2\) The importance of future stability operations is further reiterated in two of four priority objectives outlined in the 2010 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report’s Defense Strategy (i.e. Prevent and deter conflict and Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies).\(^3\) In order to prepare for these future stability operations, an examination of civilian-military (civ-mil) operations in Vietnam, Panama, and Haiti identifies recurring themes and associated lessons learned.

\(^1\) U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-1, 1-2.
\(^2\) Ibid.
Pacification, Counterinsurgency, and Stability Operations

Before reviewing specific civ-mil operations, it is appropriate to define three terms frequently used in conjunction with irregular warfare and other conflicts: Pacification, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. Pacification is “a complex task involving military, psychological, political, and economic factors … to achieve an economically and politically viable society in which the people [can] live without constant fear of death or other physical harm.” Generally associated with Vietnam, it is sometimes used interchangeably with counterinsurgency.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is “the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes.” In contrast to conventional warfare, “non-military means are often the most effective elements,” and military forces are in a supporting role. In COIN operations, the military becomes “a delivery system for civilian activity: their role is to [provide] … protection and stability to allow the government to work safely with its population and for economic revival and political reconciliation to occur.”

Stability operations, or stabilization, are military missions conducted “in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure

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reconstruction, and humanitarian relief,”⁸ and can be performed during military campaigns and/or following natural or man-made crises.

**Vietnam (1960-1975)**

The United States’ efforts in Vietnam in the early 1960s were designed to help the South Vietnamese government prevent Communist takeover using civilian advisors;⁹ the ultimate goal was to achieve “an economically and politically viable society in which the [Vietnamese] could live without constant fear of death or other physical harm,” and this would be accomplished utilizing “military, psychological, political, and economic factors.” Created in 1962, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), was responsible for all U.S. military policy, operations, and assistance, which included providing military advisors to assist the South Vietnamese in combat operations as well as other elements such as budgeting, training, and logistics.¹⁰

Vietnamese Pacification involved both civilian and military advisors; the civilian advisors represented multiple U.S. Government (USG) entities and were loosely controlled by the U.S. Embassy while military advisors reported to MACV. General William Westmoreland, MACV Commander, felt strongly that pacification efforts should be integrated into one organization with MACV as the “executive agent,”¹¹ but the U.S. Ambassador, Maxwell Taylor, felt the embassy should retain its coordinating role, choosing instead to initiate and chair a Mission Council consisting of the heads of all

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⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Instruction 3000.05, 1.
¹¹ Ibid., 83.
U.S. agencies in South Vietnam, including the military commander.\textsuperscript{12} Although Westmoreland believed this council “was an excellent vehicle for coordination,” it did not effectively prioritize actual execution of pacification efforts. This lack of specific direction from a single leader cost the United States and South Vietnam “a year or more,” falling behind what could have been accomplished with a single organization.\textsuperscript{13} Frustrated, Westmoreland cited “the complete dependence of a provincial pacification plan upon the integration of the military and civilian effort;” he felt it was “abundantly clear that all political, military, economic, and security (police) programs must be completely integrated in order to attain any kind of success in a country which has been greatly weakened by prolonged conflict.” Further stressing “it would be disastrous… to attempt some artificial division of our effort into a military hemisphere on the one side and a civilian hemisphere on the other,” he noted the Viet Cong “have learned this lesson well. Their integration of effort surpasses ours by a large order of magnitude.”\textsuperscript{14}

Secretary of Defense McNamara and Professor Henry Kissinger of Harvard University both felt the Department of State was devoting insufficient “executive and managerial ability” to pacification efforts, resulting in fragmentation of effort\textsuperscript{15} among the various civilian agencies. Once again, the U.S. Ambassador (now Henry Cabot Lodge, returning to Vietnam for a second time in July 1965) felt the existing organizational structure was adequate, refusing to make any changes in spite of


\textsuperscript{13} Westmoreland, \textit{A Soldier Reports}, 83.


\textsuperscript{15} Westmoreland, \textit{A Soldier Reports}, 255.
recommendations to do so. DoS’ inflexibility was further evident during a January 1966 conference in Virginia attended by representatives from Washington agencies and the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, during which “Washington officials displayed a conspicuous lack of desire to upset their own bureaucratic relationships.”16

In March 1966, President Johnson, named a single focal point for civilian pacification efforts, charging the National Security Council’s Robert W. Komer with “U.S. non-military programs for peaceful construction relating to Vietnam,” including “the mobilization of U.S. military resources in support of such programs.”17 This role gave Komer direct access to the President, which Komer felt was crucial, noting he would have “gotten nowhere” had he been in the State Department, as “one bureaucracy cannot manage several others.” Komer believed the military should own responsibility for pacification because only they had the “resources to do the job on a large scale” and were “infinitely more dynamic and influential,” advising the President that “the civil side appears reluctant to call on military resources, which are frequently the best and most readily available.” He further observed that DoD was a stronger advocate for pacification than State, adding “not that State didn’t understand it but the State people just weren’t doing anything.”18 Komer presented the President with three organizational structures to lead the civil and military pacification efforts. In two of them, military and civilian advisors were combined into one organization, on one hand led by the Department of State under Ambassador Lodge’s deputy, and on the other hand led by General

16 Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support, 18-20.
18 Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support, 27-28, 31-34
Westmoreland, which was Komer’s preferred solution. A third option maintained the separate civil and military chains of command.\(^{19}\)

The civilian departments continued to resist change and Ambassador Lodge opposed any shift of responsibility to the military “with the tenacity of a cocklebur in a horse’s tail.”\(^{20}\) President Johnson, unwilling to overrule the civilian agencies, gave them one more chance to demonstrate progress on the pacification front\(^{21}\) by creating the Office of Civil Operations (OCO), a formal integration of all civilian agencies under a single leader, Deputy Ambassador William Porter. While this forced the civilians to work together, it stopped short of the president’s initial requirement of a single leader because it did not incorporate military pacification efforts. OCO had ninety days to demonstrate its effectiveness, and while both Komer and McNamara expected it to fail, it was an important step forward in aggregating pacification efforts: Improving coordination among civilian agencies, it also enhanced coordination with the military and simplified communication with the South Vietnamese as they now received advice from only two entities instead of many. Nonetheless, “civilians and the military still had problems agreeing on operational priorities;” OCO did not meet the President’s expectations, and was disbanded. Westmoreland continued to argue for a single leader for pacification, noting “neither fragmented nor dual responsibility was the answer; leaders … might be ill-judged by history if they failed to devise more clear-cut organizational authority and responsibility.”\(^{22}\)

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 32.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 47.
The need for a single leader for all pacification efforts was finally acknowledged and acted upon: In March of 1967, President Johnson placed civilian and military pacification operations under MACV. Komer and Westmoreland worked together to develop the most effective structure, agreeing on unity of command with Komer reporting to Westmoreland as a deputy to COMUSMACV. Westmoreland recognized this civilian-military structure was “unusual if not unique in American military history” and it had the additional benefit of soothing concerns of civilian agency members who resisted military control. A National Security Action Memorandum was released on May 9th, 1967 and announced on May 11th by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker (Ambassador Lodge’s successor): The new organization, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), was to be led by Robert Komer under MACV, and Westmoreland gave it his full support.

CORDS placed “a single manager at each level from Saigon to district with one chain of command and one voice for dealing with the Vietnamese.” This was the first integrated civ-mil operation on such a large scale for the United States, and Komer was the first civilian to serve directly in a military command with responsibility for military personnel and resources. Civilians and military members were integrated throughout the chain of command, resulting in cases where a civilian’s performance report would be written by a military officer and vice versa. The CORDS organizational structure at the MACV level was generally repeated at the Corps levels with the CORDS leader serving

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23 Ibid., 47-49.
24 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 260-261.
25 Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support, 49-51, 62.
26 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 258-259.
27 Ibid., 260.
28 Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support, 66.
as a “full-fledged deputy to the American … senior advisor,” which created a certain level of autonomy, enabling civilians to “preserve their power and exploit their access to military resources and personnel.” Provincial Senior Advisors reported directly to the regional (Corps) CORDS Deputy, bypassing the Division commander as the division’s primary responsibilities were large-unit combat. The divisions provided “routine administrative and logistical support” and funding for civilians assigned to CORDS remained with their respective agencies.29

Roughly half of the provincial and district level managers were civilian and the other half military; a civilian manager “always had a military deputy and vice versa.” The determination of civilian versus military leadership was often made in light of local security: “Since security in the districts was often precarious, Westmoreland and Komer considered it better to have a military officer rather than a civilian at the district level, but

29 Ibid., 67-70.
30 Ibid., 58
in some more secure districts civilians headed the advisory teams.”31 The selection of leaders for each level was also based upon “the best man available, not whether he was military or civilian.”32 Komer reiterates the importance of the right person, stressing that CORDS needed flexible and imaginative leaders at all levels, not simply those who have fulfilled the typical criteria for previous promotions or who are most convenient for the institution.33

Komer’s perseverance and deliberate relationship with Westmoreland were fundamental to his ability to rapidly establish CORDS as an effective organization. While his personal political capital was increased by the fact he operated with the express approval of the President, he also worked to ensure robust relationships with McNamara, Westmoreland, and other officials, both in Vietnam and in Washington. Westmoreland continued to support Komer and CORDS, and in a November 6, 1969 interview, Komer said Westmoreland’s handling of CORDS “was one of the basic reasons why [it] worked. [He] deserves a great deal of credit.”34

In addition to Komer’s leadership and the relationships he cultivated, there was an open flow of communications throughout the CORDS organization. Although Komer reported directly to Westmoreland, Ambassador Bunker placed him on the Mission Council and appointed him to the Executive Committee, allowing Komer to “present his views directly to the [Ambassador], not filtered through a third person,” giving Komer the ability to use both military and civilian channels to apply pressure to agencies in both Saigon and Washington. At the field level, there were effective two-way exchanges of

31 Ibid., 70.
32 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 260.
33 Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, 155.
34 Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support, 76.
information between CORDS and district advisors with regular meetings in the field and in Saigon.\textsuperscript{35}

Komer and Scoville cite several successes resulting from CORDS efforts, specifically unity of the American pacification effort which improved cooperation between military and civilians (both American and Vietnamese) and provided an alternative to the presence of large numbers of American troops.\textsuperscript{36} Westmoreland’s recognition of the importance of unity of command was also a critical component: He ensured Komer had top-quality officers assigned to CORDS and often surprised some of his military staff by overruling them in favor of Komer, the civilian.\textsuperscript{37} While specific impact to military operations is difficult to measure, having a single, well-respected, and integrated staff within MACV positively influenced overall pacification efforts in a way that was not possible when it had been organized under “separate and often competing agencies and when the military had no direct overall responsibility.” CORDS’ achievements were “unquestionably far greater than any official in Washington, including President Johnson, could have expected.” The fact the President no longer had to be directly involved with pacification was one indicator, while CORDS’ continued operations until the American withdrawal in 1973 is another.\textsuperscript{38}

Vietnam was essentially a combined conventional and counterinsurgency war, and integration of CORDS into MACV placed responsibility for both efforts squarely with the military, creating a force multiplier by augmenting MACV with civilians focused solely on Pacification, thus freeing up military commanders to concentrate on the

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 76-77.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 80, 83.
\textsuperscript{37} Westmoreland, \textit{A Soldier Reports}, 262.
\textsuperscript{38} Scoville, \textit{Reorganizing for Pacification Support}, 81-82.
conventional strategy. CORDS enabled U.S. pacification operations using a single voice to the Vietnamese; established effective interagency coordination; and demonstrated civilians’ ability to work and lead effectively in combat conditions.

Panama (1988-1990)

Following Panamanian President Manuel Noriega’s annulment of Panama’s May 1989 election, assault on opposition candidates, and harassment of American citizens, the U.S. initiated Operation NIMROD DANCER in the spring of 1989. Largely a show of force, 1,900 combat troops and military police deployed to Panama to bolster security for U.S. citizens and property. On December 15, President Noriega declared war against the United States, and after further hostilities against American citizens in Panama including the killing of a U.S. Marine Corps officer, President Bush approved execution of Operation JUST CAUSE on December 17, 1989. Major ground combat operations lasted only five days following the U.S. invasion, forcing U.S. combat forces to quickly shift into peacekeeping mode; Operation JUST CAUSE terminated January 12, 1990, and Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY was initiated to conduct stability operations.39

Operational planning spanned 22 months40 but advance planning for stability operations under PROMOTE LIBERTY did not go well. Not considered an important element of the overall mission by senior officers of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the plan was not approved until the day the U.S. intervened in Panama and civilian agencies had been excluded due to

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compartmentalized planning. Initial command and control included an integrated interagency concept based on Vietnam’s CORDS organization, but General James Lindsay, Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), opposed the idea. Subsequently, an all-military support group was developed containing Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, Special Operations, and combat support forces.

The U.S. Military Support Group- Panama (USMSG-PM) was activated January 17, 1990 under the leadership of U.S. Army Colonel James J. Steele with the purpose of developing Panamanian infrastructures “which could be self-supporting and self-maintaining.”

Although the USMSG-PM achieved its objective of “facilitating the solid, long-term solutions to Panama’s political stability,” the lack of interagency involvement in the planning process resulted in “sluggish and inadequate responses” from civilian agencies. Additionally, the poor overall preparation for stability operations demonstrated the importance of civilian involvement in planning as well as the necessity for development of civilian “capabilities and standard operating procedures.”

Haiti (1993-1995)

Following the military coup overthrowing Haitian President Jean-Bertrande Aristide in September 1991, the international community pressured Haiti’s military

41 Ibid., 28, 63.
44 Ibid., 42.
leaders for three years to return President Aristide to power. On September 15, 1994, a U.S. mission led by former President Jimmy Carter departed for Haiti, ultimately convincing Haiti’s military leadership to resign. Following this agreement, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was initiated on September 19, 1994, involving the deployment of over 23,000 U.S. troops. During U.S. operations in Haiti, the size and scope of military stabilization missions grew rapidly, and a ministerial advisor team from the 358th Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade was deployed to assist the Haitian government until USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) and State Department efforts could gain traction. Although the U.S. military’s stability efforts are generally recognized as successful, they ultimately became extremely broad in nature, and “doctrine and personnel were not available to establish proper liaison with the myriad civilian organizations working in the country.”

Reviews of the advanced planning process for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY indicate the military operation was generally well conducted, but interagency planning was not. As with Panama five years earlier, this was a purely military operation and advance civ-mil coordination during planning phases was poor due to security classifications and compartmentalized planning, resulting in military planners

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47 U.S. negotiations were bolstered by the fact XVIII Airborne Corps units had already departed Ft. Bragg, NC, enroute Haiti, prepared to conduct a military invasion. Hays and Wheatley, Interagency, 6-17.


49 Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2003), 7-8. This monograph includes insights from 20th century post-conflict operations, including Haiti.

50 Hays and Wheatley, Interagency, 29.
“preparing for civil military operations without talking with their civilian counterparts.”

This compartmentalized planning also created an “ambiguous command and control relationship, … the absence of anybody in charge of the overall operation,” and lack of “a clear decision–making hierarchy”.

**Creation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

Early in 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy envisioned interagency stabilization teams comprised of Special Forces operational detachment Alpha (ODA) members, Civil Affairs operators, DoS, USAID, and non-governmental organizations which would build capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces and support governance, reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance. Concurrently, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers deployed to Afghanistan established Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLCs, often referred to as “Chiclets”) with the purpose of assessing humanitarian needs, implementing small-scale reconstruction projects, and establishing relationships with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and NGOs (non-governmental organizations) already in the field.

This recognized need for stabilization teams resulted in creation of the Provincial Reconstruction Team, or PRT, an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in areas with unstable or limited security, usually following open hostilities. The PRT utilizes all instruments of national power and is intended to improve stability by

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strengthening the host nation government’s ability to provide security to its citizens and deliver essential services.\textsuperscript{54} At its simplest, “a PRT is a civilian and military partnership.”\textsuperscript{55}

In November 2002, the first PRT was established in Gardez, Afghanistan, which included “a robust force protection component and representatives of U.S. government civilian agencies.” By June of 2005, 22 PRTs were established, 13 led by the U.S. and 9 led by NATO’s International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF); “this multinational program was characterized by an emphasis on flexibility, a proliferation of national models, and an ad hoc approach to security and development.”\textsuperscript{56} On November 11, 2005, the PRT concept was expanded to Iraq when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made an unannounced trip to Mosul, inaugurating Iraq’s first PRT.\textsuperscript{57}

Key elements of the long-term strategy to develop a host nation’s capabilities and enable military forces to withdraw, PRTs are considered combat multipliers for military commanders and force multipliers for other USG development agencies engaged across the stability sectors. “A PRT assists local communities with reconciliation while strengthening the host-nation government and speeding the transition to self-reliance.”\textsuperscript{58} Although PRTs are key to the long-term strategy, stabilization of an area cannot be achieved by the PRT alone; a combination of military and civilian efforts are required to

\textsuperscript{55} U.S. Department of the Army. \textit{PRT Playbook}, 24-25.
\textsuperscript{56} Perito, \textit{PRTs in Afghanistan}, 1-2.
\textsuperscript{58} U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, F-1.
reduce conflict while developing local governance, essential services, rule of law, and economic capabilities. PRTs have three essential functions, governance, security, and reconstruction, and the military’s primary purpose is to provide organizational and logistics resource capabilities as well as force projection to penetrate insecure areas.60

**Afghanistan (2002-2011)**

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) continues to combat an insurgency while “simultaneously rebuilding its infrastructure to become a strong sovereign state no longer requiring assistance from … other nations,” and PRTs are viewed as key to the success of this effort.61 When introduced in Afghanistan, U.K. PRTs were “originally designed to extend the reach of the government beyond the capital,” and had three objectives: “improve security; extend the authority of the government; and to promote reconstruction.”62

However, when looking at PRTs throughout the country (see Appendix A), there is “no agreement within the U.S. government or between the U.S. and its allies on how PRTs should be organized, conduct operations or what they should accomplish.”63 While this lack of oversight enables “beneficial flexibility, it also [results] in an ad hoc approach to Afghanistan’s needs for security and development.” Without a single, overarching strategy, guidelines for civil-military relationships, or agreed-upon measures of effectiveness, a PRT’s “national character” and priorities become evident based on the

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59 Ibid.
61 Ibid., Foreword.
nation leading the PRT. By October 2005, three models had emerged, known as the American (U.S.-led), British (U.K.-led), and German models,\(^64\) as depicted in Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead Nation</th>
<th>Average Personnel</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Area of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>50-100 (3-5 civilians)</td>
<td>Military commander</td>
<td>Emphasis on Quick Impact Projects</td>
<td>Generally volatile areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>100 (30 civilians)</td>
<td>Civilian lead</td>
<td>Emphasis on capacity-building</td>
<td>Ability to operate in volatile areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>400 (20 civilians)</td>
<td>Dual leadership (one military, one civilian lead)</td>
<td>Emphasis on long-term sustainable development</td>
<td>Generally more permissive areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 Afghanistan PRT Models\(^65\)

**American Model**

Staffed with 50-100 personnel, American PRTs are led by a U.S. military officer, generally the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, with civilian advisors from DoS, USAID, and USDA.\(^66\) Due to the dominant military influence in U.S. PRTs, security sector reform generally receives the bulk of attention “to the virtual exclusion of the development of governmental institutions” resulting in “very little” direct development of Afghan capacity.\(^67\)

In addition to capacity development, reconstruction efforts have often been conducted to “demonstrate goodwill and encourage a favorable reaction” to PRT presence, but unfortunately, PRT involvement in reconstruction projects has been a source of confusion and frustration for many NGOs, some of which “refused to have direct contact with PRTs, fearing retaliation from insurgents.”\(^68\) NGOs representatives

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\(^64\) Perito, *PRTs in Afghanistan*, 2-3.


\(^66\) Perito, *PRTs in Afghanistan*, 4.

\(^67\) Hughlett, *Good Governance Matters*, 23.

\(^68\) Perito, *PRTs in Afghanistan*, 9.
also argue military members are not well-versed in long-term development and “PRT projects often competed or conflicted with NGO projects, undermining relationships developed with Afghan communities.”

PRT commanders set the priorities for PRT projects to be funded using DoD monies, and NGO criticisms are evident when these funds are used for “hasty construction of buildings without reference to the Afghan government’s capacity” to support them. According to Ms. Michelle Fazo, a USAID grantee and NGO leader who worked with multiple PRTs between 2005 and 2009, “The lack of military/ PRT interaction with local authorities, population, leaders, other agencies and United Nations (UN) before choosing to develop a project resulted in military leadership making project decisions without taking into account the needs of the local populace.” Conversely, USAID, whose core competency is development, utilizes their Quick Impact Program (QIP) funds for projects “consistent with the Afghan government’s national priorities.”

**British Model**

Staffed by 60 military and 30 civilian personnel, British PRTs are led by civilians from the U.K.’s Stabilisation Unit, thus recognizing the “explicitly political aims of stabilisation (aiming to promote peaceful political processes).”

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69 Ibid., 10.
70 DoD funding is primarily from Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) and DoD’s Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Action (OHDACA) Program.
73 Perito, *PRTs in Afghanistan*, 9-10.
for example, the civilian leading the PRT outranks the senior British military commander.\textsuperscript{76}

The Helmand PRT includes civilians from the U.K., U.S., Denmark, and Estonia, and works closely with the U.K. Helmand Task Force. Viewed by ISAF as “the model for how a PRT should operate in Afghanistan,” because of its truly integrated civ/mil interagency approach using civilian leadership,\textsuperscript{77} it is focused on capacity building, working to a province-wide plan “agreed between the government of Afghanistan and its international partners covering politics and reconstruction, governance, rule of law, security, economic and social development, counter-narcotics and strategic communications.”\textsuperscript{78}

\textbf{German Model}

“Strictly bifurcated” between its military and civilian components,\textsuperscript{79} the German model is the largest with 400 or more personnel. Civilian presence is provided by up to five representatives from each of three German ministries (Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Economic Cooperation and Development), and led by a diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Each component is assigned a group of tasks, and the military commander and civilian diplomat work closely together to harmonize efforts between the two entities. The Czechoslovakian PRT in Logar province is structured along the lines of the German model with dual civilian and military leadership. According to Kristyna Greplova, the Media Officer for Logar PRT, “The Commander of the military unit is

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{77} Major Guy Balmer, U.K. Royal Marines, email message to author, February 16, 2011.
  \item \textsuperscript{78} United Kingdom, \textit{National Security Strategy 2010}, 100-101.
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Perito, \textit{PRTs in Afghanistan}, 3.
\end{itemize}
responsible for the overall security of the missions and the security of the civilians, and the Head of the civilian section … is responsible for the reconstruction and development projects.”

Although the two components retain separate leadership, the German model is credited with “reaching an integration level that had never been achieved” by closely linking the military’s work in security sector reform with civilian capacity building efforts.

**Iraq (2005-2011)**

Former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, brought the PRT concept to Iraq from his previous assignment as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. According to Joint Cable 4045, the mission is to “assist Iraq’s provincial governments in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, to promote increased security and rule of law, to promote political and economic development, and to provide the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.” As in Afghanistan, Iraq PRTs have three Lines of Effort: Governance, Security, and Reconstruction, with the objective of increasing Iraqi capacity in each area. “The emphasis is on shaping the political environment rather than building infrastructure.”

A fundamental difference between U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq is the fact U.S. PRTs in Iraq are led by Department of State (DoS) civilians while those in Afghanistan are led by U.S. military officers.

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80 Kristyna Greplova, email message to author, February 28, 2011.
82 Perito, *PRTs in Iraq*, 1.
84 Perito, *PRTs in Iraq*, 2, 7-8.
The primary reason for this was that the PRTs in Afghanistan were supposed to transition from military to DOS control. However, because of manning and funding problems, this never happened. So, when Multinational Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) ... [planned] the first nine PRTs, they made sure that DOS took charge from the outset.  

The first three PRTs (Mosul, Kirkuk, and Hillah) were staffed from existing Regional Embassy Offices (REOs), “the functional equivalent of U.S. consulates.” The PRT Leader was a senior DoS Foreign Service Officer and other civilian members of the PRT included advisors for Rule of Law (DoJ), Agriculture (USDA), Economic Development (USAID), and Governance (USAID Contractor), as well as Provincial Action and Public Diplomacy Officers from the State Department. 

Military members included the Deputy Team Leader, MNF-I Liaison Officer, Engineering Officer (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), Civil Affairs, and security support, for a total of 36-51 members as shown in Figure 3. In practice, the actual composition of PRTs varied widely “based on maturity, local circumstances, and the capacity of U.S. agencies to provide personnel.”

Designed to operate as one team with the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) within whose operating area they fell, the PRTs received guidance from both the U.S. Ambassador and the Multinational Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) commander. “The BCT would take the lead for security issues while the PRT leader [had] responsibility for political and economic issues.” As part of the operational surge in 2007, Embedded PRTs (ePRTs) were created to use a “decentralized approach to reach out beyond the central...

86 Perito, PRTs in Iraq, 2, 4.
87 U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) or U.S. Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team (RCT).
88 Perito, PRTs in Iraq, 2.
government.”

Incorporating fundamentally the same functions as the PRT, ePRTs engaged with district or city officials helping them create linkages back to their respective provincial government. President George Bush attributed much of the progress in Iraq to the PRTs, noting that they “bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance.”

In addition to the U.S., PRTs were led by three other coalition partners: The U.K. (Basra), South Korea (Erbil), and Italy (Dhi Qar), each with their own structure. The

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90 Ibid.

91 U.S. Department of the Army, *PRT Playbook*, Appendix C.
U.K. PRT in Basra was established concurrently with the first U.K. PRTs in Afghanistan\textsuperscript{92} and followed the same civilian-led model. Unfortunately, conflicts between senior personnel arose due to a number of factors, including slow deployment of personnel, funding delays, absence of clear guidelines regarding the PRT’s role and objectives, and the British Army’s unwillingness to fill the gap created by the lack of civilians.\textsuperscript{93} Originally staffed by the South Korean military; the Erbil PRT operated from the generally secure area of Iraqi Kurdistan; the Korean military’s role was in support of civilian and NGO involvement in the area. This PRT subsequently transitioned to a Regional Reconstruction Team led by the U.S. The Dhi Qar PRT is led by an Italian civilian diplomat and is staffed by civilians from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. DoS. Supported by the U.S. Army,\textsuperscript{94} the Dhi Qar PRT generally follows the U.K. model with a civilian leader and duties split between the civilian and military entities. The U.S. now leads all Iraq PRTs with the exception of Dhi Qar, and a summary of Iraq PRTs is captured in Appendix B.

Even though all U.S. PRTs in Iraq are led by DoS civilians, there can be a wide variation in leadership styles, as demonstrated by the author’s experiences with PRTs in Mosul (Ninewa) and Ramadi (Anbar). Between March 2006 and March 2007, two


extremely effective senior FSOs served in succession as Leader of the Ninewa PRT.\textsuperscript{95} Both of these FSOs worked very closely with U.S. Army Division leadership (101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne (Air Assault) and 25\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Divisions), resulting in collaborative and highly successful relationships with BCT Commanders and Brigade staffs. These civilian PRT leaders also effectively led and managed their civilian and military PRT team members, creating a cohesive, well-operating organization.\textsuperscript{96} The Ninewa PRT was known as “the best damn PRT in Iraq,”\textsuperscript{97} whose results included establishment of the Mosul branch of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq,\textsuperscript{98} eliminating the need for suspected terrorists to be transported to Baghdad for trial, creating judicial transparency in the province. This had the second order effect of “increased cooperation from members of the community regarding the reporting of weapons caches and safe houses for terrorists once the court began to return verdicts.”\textsuperscript{99}

Conversely, the relationship between the Anbar PRT leader and the U.S. Marine Corps II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (II MEF(FWD)) was closer to that of a Political Advisor (POLAD) than the leader of a force multiplier, creating an entirely different dynamic and resulting in II MEF(FWD) effectively assuming leadership of the Rule of Law capacity development function.\textsuperscript{100} II MEF(FWD) facilitated Iraqi capability to conduct criminal court trials in Anbar province, enabling the subsequent completion of

\textsuperscript{95} Cameron Munter (2005-2006; now U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan) and Dr. James A. Knight (2006-2007; now U.S. Ambassador to Benin).

\textsuperscript{96} Author’s experience as Mosul PRT Rule of Law Section Leader from April 2006-March 2007.

\textsuperscript{97} General George W. Casey, Commander, Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I).

\textsuperscript{98} U.S. President, “Fact Sheet: Expanded PRTs”.


\textsuperscript{100} Author’s experience as the II MEF(FWD) Judicial Advisor from March-August 2007.
over 550 hearings in a period of 90 days, thus reinstating the Iraqi criminal justice system’s operational capability.\textsuperscript{101}

Although not directly linked to PRTs, the Joint Interagency Task Force – Iraq (JIATF-I) was created in April 2008 by Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus (then the MNF-I commander) to address strategic issues that are not addressed by civ-mil entities such as the PRTs. The Task Force brought together representatives from USAID and the Departments of State, Energy, and Homeland Security in a “smart power”\textsuperscript{102} planning team designed to create mechanisms to enable interagency cooperation on a strategic level. JIATF-I was a much-needed opportunity for the military and civilian elements of the USG to work closely with one another on strategy design and implementation. Analyzing problems on the ground and coordinating with their respective agencies, members of JIATF-I developed courses of action and proposed strategies to be included in the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) which was approved by General Raymond Odierno and Ambassador Crocker in December, 2008. JIATF members subsequently helped convert the strategy into reality by finding opportunities to utilize items such as essential services, border security, and diplomacy (soft power tools) to achieve operational objectives. Prior to establishment of the JIATF, interagency plans for Iraq were “a collection of inputs from government agencies that had little contact


even though their work often overlapped,” ¹⁰³ resembling interagency efforts in Vietnam before the introduction of CORDS.

**Analysis of CORDS and PRTs**

Many parallels have been drawn between CORDS, generally regarded as one of the most successful civ-mil stabilization operations, and PRTs. The PRT Lines of Effort (governance, security, and reconstruction), are very similar to CORDS’ mission areas, however, CORDS operated under unity of command while all PRTs function through unity of effort, reflective of the increased complexity of whole of government and comprehensive approaches.

Looking beyond essential functions and operating mechanisms, there are essentially five different models for these civ-mil entities: CORDS, British, German, U.S. (Afghanistan), and U.S. (Iraq). The German and U.S. (Afghanistan) models integrate civilian and military capabilities in order to accomplish their missions, but civilian and military members remain in fundamentally separate groups; additionally, the German model’s robust civilian team is in stark contrast to the U.S. (Afghanistan) model with only 3-4 civilian advisors. The British and U.S. (Iraq) models, led by civilians and supported by the military, demonstrate the ability for civilians to effectively lead and operate in the midst of a military environment. While CORDS teams were led by civilian or military members, depending on the person and the environment, their structure more closely aligns with the British or U.S. (Iraq) model.

The leadership difference (civilian versus military) is the greatest functional difference between U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq; directly affecting the culture of

¹⁰³ Ibid. 28-30.
the PRT and influencing everything they do, specifically priorities and level of effort. Ms. Patricia De Gennaro, an adjunct professor at New York University’s Department of Politics and a subject matter expert for the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command Center for Intelligence, observes that in Iraq PRTs, “the civilian component gets more support from the military chain of command at higher levels. In this way … USAID and DoS lead the majority of the projects that are developed. In Afghanistan … the civilian component seems to have a secondary role.”

Lacking depth of experience in long-term development practices, military leaders often place primary emphasis on security at the expense of stability operations.

Italian Army Captain Mattia Zuzzi cites failures of military PRT leaders ranging from simply dismissing the potential value of civilian agencies assigned to their PRT to not understanding cultural norms of the host nation and the associated importance of building relationships prior to asking “sensitive questions and expecting cooperation.”

Military efforts can create the perception “that the military sometimes overstepped and created, rather than solved, problems in the civilian reconstruction effort.” This may be attributed to military leaders’ familiarity with and reliance upon unity of command which can result in minimizing the importance of relationships with peers, subordinates, and local civilians. These differences are exacerbated by the fact PRTs had very little strategic guidance and direction, placing a heavy burden upon the PRT leader and relying

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105 Ibid., 78.
on that leader’s experience and training to develop the necessary strategies to achieve desired objectives.

History’s Lessons Learned

The preceding reviews are but a glimpse into the tremendous amount of data available on stability operations over the past fifty years, and there are numerous lessons to be learned from the valiant efforts of civilians and military members performing this arduous and important work. Vietnam revealed the importance of integrated civ-mil efforts at all levels of pacification operations while Panama and Haiti demonstrated that a lack of integrated interagency planning can result in poor civilian participation and support of stability operations. Recognizing that each conflict is unique, several issues surface repeatedly despite the differences in specific circumstances. The lessons most relevant to this thesis are the importance of personalities, effective civ-mil relationships, and the fact civilians can and do lead effective teams in stability operations.

Inherently human-oriented, stability operations cannot be conducted remotely as they rely on face-to-face engagement with host nation civilians and leaders; consequently the personalities of those leading and conducting these engagements have a direct impact on operational success. Additionally, in order to develop host nation institutional capabilities, leaders in stability operations must have a long-term perspective balancing indigenous capacity development with short-term reconstruction tasks.

The importance of the right people in stability operations’ leadership roles is strategically important as exemplified by Komer’s continued work to develop relationships across agencies coupled with his specific relationships with Westmoreland,
McNamara, and President Johnson, all of which were significant elements of the overall success of CORDS.

Insurgencies have increased the importance and complexity of integrated civ-mil operations which have evolved over the past fifty years. Militaries have traditionally been a “hard power” entity used for offensive and defensive operations, but today’s COIN operations require the military to conduct full spectrum operations, integrating stability operations with traditional military tasks.\(^{107}\) This broad scope of operations further demands effective relationships among all entities involved in order to ensure unity of effort.

As demonstrated by CORDS in Vietnam, U.K. PRTs in Afghanistan, and U.S. PRTs in Iraq, civilian diplomats can effectively integrate with their military counterparts, even when working under dangerous conditions, thus creating high-performing teams with remarkable results that likely could not have been achieved otherwise.

In addition to the lessons repeated between stability operations, there are examples of “reinventing the wheel” \textit{within} a single war: Deborah Robinson, a U.S. Department of State FSO who served for sixteen months in a US-led PRT in Afghanistan voiced her frustration with the lack of institutional memory within a PRT: “We keep relearning the same lessons. I’m reading now in military journals about the recent opening of the Mizon District Center, and I did that exact thing in 2006; we reinvent the wheel over and over and claim success over and over. It’s heartbreaking.”\(^{108}\) This lack of continuity of effort is an example of retarding capacity development rather than building it. The Host nation quickly learns they do not have to perform the difficult tasks

\(^{107}\) Full spectrum operations are further discussed in the U.S. DOD Doctrine section of Chapter III.

\(^{108}\) Robinson, interview.
of managing and maintaining institutions; they can merely operate them until the next personnel rotation at the PRT. Once the new personnel are in place, the host nation simply has to request the institution be reopened or restarted, and the PRT is more than happy to achieve a “new” milestone. This harkens back to Vietnam’s lessons as cited by Robert Komer in his discussion on the lack of institutional memory: “We don’t have twelve years’ experience in Vietnam. We have one year’s experience twelve times over.”109

109 Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing, 67.
III. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY GUIDANCE

In order to understand civilian and military entities’ roles in reconstruction and stabilization efforts, it is important to review their guidance. This chapter reviews U.S. and international policy and doctrine for stability operations with a focus on the relationship between civilian and military roles, specifically leadership responsibilities.

U.S. Interagency Policy

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations,\(^1\) articulated the Clinton administration’s policy for complex contingency operations (CCO) management. Unfortunately, “it had become easier for DOD to coordinate its efforts with NATO than with the U.S. Department of State,” so PDD-56 was written to capture effective processes from previous operations and retain lessons learned.\(^2\) Recognizing the potential need for civilian and/or military involvement, PDD-56 formalized the requirement for integrated civ-mil planning and operations, noting that the use of the military is not always the best solution for CCOs.\(^3\)

On December 7, 2005, President Bush superseded PDD 56 with National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” with the objective of improving “coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign

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\(^1\) PDD 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, issued May 1997, defined complex contingency operations as peace operations (e.g. NATO’s peace accord implementation in Bosnia), humanitarian intervention (e.g. Operation Provide Comfort, 1991), and foreign humanitarian assistance operations (e.g. Operation Sea Angel, Bangladesh, 1991).


states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.” NSPD-44 specifically addresses stability operations and outlines U.S. policy for responding quickly and effectively to “promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law” while enabling other countries to exercise sovereignty over their own territories. NSPD-44 tasks the Secretaries of State and Defense to “integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans “ and to “develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels.”

Most significant in NSPD-44 are the responsibilities assigned to the Department of State: Designated the lead agency for reconstruction and stabilization, responsibilities cover the range of strategy, planning, and execution of stabilization and reconstruction operations. By placing the Secretary of State in the lead, this policy document forms the basis of civilian primacy for reconstruction and stabilization operations. NSPD-44 further tasks the Secretary of State with development of “a strong civilian response capability … to respond quickly and effectively.” To provide trained personnel to carry out these responsibilities, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice launched the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) under the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) on July 16, 2008. Comprised of Active, Standby, and Reserve Components, the CRC provides trained civilians to deploy (embedded with the military or operating independently) in support of reconstruction and stabilization (R&S)

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5 Ibid.
missions. These diplomatic first responders can provide or support U.S. diplomatic presence, and participation of other interagency partners enables the CRC to leverage available U.S. Government resources in a whole of government approach. As of February 11, 2011, over 1,000 federal employees from nine departments and agencies are represented on the CRC: Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, State, Transportation, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Building on the capabilities of S/CRS, the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) introduced the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), proposing “a new cadre of senior diplomats who have advanced training and experience in the area of conflict resolution and mediation and who could be deployed to critical conflict zones and at-risk weak states.” This executive-level capability will create a link to senior military officers, filling a leadership gap in stability operations. Furthermore, the 2010 QDDR notes the importance of diplomacy and civilian leadership not only with national government officials, but also with those at the provincial and local levels, especially once operations shift from coercion to persuasion.

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Civilian diplomats, “skilled in navigating local sensitivities and engaging political authorities” are the most effective tools for these conditions.\textsuperscript{11}

In order to conduct integrated planning, joint interagency field deployments, and joint civilian operations, the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization (IMS) was developed to provide flexible tools for policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and military commanders. Approved by the National Security Council in March 2007,\textsuperscript{12} it was structured to be activated by the Secretary of State upon direction from the President. The IMS consists of three components designed to augment and support existing entities in Washington, DC, at the Combatant Commands, and in the field:\textsuperscript{13} A Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group (CSRG), which is a decision-making body specific to the crisis with a planning and operations staff; an Integration Planning Cell (IPC) comprised of civilian planners integrated with relevant Combatant Commands (or equivalent multinational headquarters); and an Advance Civilian Team (ACT) to support Chiefs of Mission through deployed interagency field management, planning, and coordination teams. As designed, IMS has the potential to improve coordination and help ensure unity of effort in R&S missions,\textsuperscript{14} and although it has yet to be activated it should be sought in future integrated operations.

Beyond development of the CRC resource pool and planned expansion via the CSO, a Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction (Figure 4) was

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 130.
\item\textsuperscript{12} U.S. Department of State, “NSPD-44, Frequently Asked Questions,” 3.
\end{itemize}
published in 2009 by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI): A comprehensive model depicting the complexity of stability operations, it provides a foundation for analysis and prioritization of effort using five interrelated end states, the conditions necessary to achieve those end states, and seven Cross-Cutting principles that must be applied to all efforts supporting the end states.

![Figure 4 Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction](image)

When applying the framework’s end states to PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq, they are analogous to the PRT’s essential functions. The Framework’s Stable Governance and Safe and Secure Environment, Social Well-Being, and Sustainable Economy align directly with the PRTs’ governance, security, and reconstruction functions. It is important to note

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that only one of the five end states, *Safe and Secure Environment*, is enabled through traditional military means; the other four end states are civilian in nature, demonstrating the importance of civilian leadership and a comprehensive approach incorporating unity of effort.

**U.S. Department of Defense Doctrine**

To address the military’s role in stability operations, the DoD issued Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, entitled Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, on November 28, 2005, identifying stability operations as a core mission with “priority comparable to combat operations.”\(^{16}\) This was the first step in elevating the importance of stability operations within the DoD, with the second step occurring when DODD 3000.05 was superseded by DoD Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, Stability Operations, on September 16, 2009, directing the DoD to conduct stability operations with “proficiency equivalent to combat operations” in support of other U.S. Government agencies. Because stability operations can occur during any or all phases of conflict (See Figure 5) and are part of full spectrum operations,\(^{17}\) DODI 3000.05 discusses the importance of integrated civilian and military efforts to successful stability operations and places the DoD in a supporting role for civ-mil teams and other USG agencies’ stability operations and related efforts “aimed at unity of effort.”\(^{18}\) Although NSPD-44 established U.S. policy for civilian leadership, DODI 3000.05 recognizes there may be times when USG civilian agencies or other

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\(^{17}\) Full spectrum operations include offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-13.

\(^{18}\) U.S. Department of Defense, DODI 3000.05, 1-3.
international entities are unable to lead stability operations. In these cases, the DoD will take the lead “until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations.”

![Figure 5 Notional Operation Plan Phases versus Level of Military Effort](image)

Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, contains a small section introducing and discussing PRTs, noting they incorporate “combined military and civil efforts to diminish the means and motivations of conflict, while developing local institutions so they can take the lead role in national governance, providing basic services, economic development, and enforcing the rule of law.” Specifically noting that U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan are led by a military officer while those in Iraq are led by a DoS FSO, JP 3-57 does not state whether civilians or military should be placed in the

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19 U.S. Department of Defense, DODI 3000.05, 2.
lead. Because this publication was issued prior to NSPD-44 and DODI 3000.05, it does not address the fact DoS has the lead for stability operations.

The U.S. Army’s Field Manual for Stability Operations (FM 3-07) is a thorough work addressing the necessity of interagency integration to achieve unity of effort in a comprehensive approach. In its discussion of NSPD-44, it cites Department of State’s role as overall leader of the “effort to support interagency coordination and integration;” recognizes the need for civilian and military coordination to create conditions for “a stable and lasting peace;” and notes the importance of “coordination, integration, and synchronization” among military and civilian organizations. Further demonstrating linkages between stabilization operations policy, doctrine and other writings, FM 3-07 introduces an integrated approach to stability operations (Figure 6), bridging S/CRS’ essential tasks for post-conflict reconstruction (shown as Stability Tasks) to PKSOI’s Strategic Framework end-states (depicted as Stability Sectors), creating an integrated, whole of government approach to stability operations.

![Figure 6 Integrated Approach to Stability Operations](image)

Although PRTs were in place as early as 2002, guidance was not widely available until September 2007 when the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) published the

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22 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-16, 2-4.
23 Ibid., 2-5.
PRT Playbook (Handbook 07-34).\textsuperscript{24} While not a doctrinal publication, the Playbook references and reflects doctrine throughout, and any review of doctrine would be lacking if this product were not included.

When discussing reporting authority and the military’s role in the PRT, the Playbook notes that PRTs have two lines of reporting authority: One to the local military commander, whose authority extends only to force protection and sustainment, and the other to the Chief of Mission (COM), responsible for all other elements of the PRT. The Playbook further emphasizes, “above all, it must be understood that the COM is the executive agent responsible for all reconstruction efforts within the country where he is the principal U.S. Government (USG) representative,”\textsuperscript{25} which directly acknowledges the plenipotentiary authority of the Ambassador as stated in his letter of instruction from the President. This recognition of the Chief of Mission as the single authority in the country “ensures absolute clarity of purpose for all USG agencies,”\textsuperscript{26} and supports NSPD-44’s direction that DoS lead stabilization activities. Even though the PRT leadership position should be assigned by the COM, the handbook reflects DODI 3000.05’s recognition that DoS may not always be the most appropriate leader as “the environment of the province may dictate that an individual from another agency (Department of Defense or Department of Justice) takes the lead.”\textsuperscript{27}

From the overarching DoD Instruction down through doctrine (FM 3-07) and lessons learned (PRT Playbook), U.S. military publications are consistent with regard to the military’s supporting role for stabilization operations, leading only when civilians

\textsuperscript{24} U.S. Department of the Army. \textit{PRT Playbook}, Foreword.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 23-24.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
cannot, e.g. “until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations.”

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report also echoes this policy noting “the U.S. military is not the most appropriate institution to lead capacity-building efforts to enhance civilian institutions overseas.”

This consistent guidance is reinforced by USMC General James N. Mattis, Commander of United States Central Command, who asserts, “we work to ensure our military efforts at CENTCOM are firmly nested within the diplomatic initiatives of the State Department,” a modern-day affirmation of Clausewitz’ principle that warfare is a continuation of politics by other means.

**International Policy and Doctrine**

When looking beyond the United States, the United Kingdom has arguably the most comprehensive and accessible stability operations doctrine in addition to “unparalleled experience” resulting from their operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2010 U.K. National Security Strategy, delivered to Parliament by Prime Minister David Cameron in October, 2010, “sets out a ‘whole of government’ approach, based on a concept of security that goes beyond military effects” with an expectation for “seamless cooperation between the military and civilian agencies.”

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28 U.S. Department of Defense, DODI 3000.05, 2.
29 U.S. Department of Defense, QDR, 70.
30 General James N. Mattis, video teleconference (VTC) with Joint Advanced Warfighting School (U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL, February 17, 2011), cited with permission of General Mattis.
Also delivered to Parliament in October, 2010, the U.K.’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review\textsuperscript{33} points out the added costs “when we fail to prevent conflict and are obliged to intervene militarily.”\textsuperscript{34} In order to avoid the costs of late intervention, the U.K views the deployment of integrated civ-mil stabilization and capacity building teams “as a long-term investment in a more stable world.”\textsuperscript{35} These civ-mil teams are part of the U.K.’s Stabilisation Unit,\textsuperscript{36} created in 2007 to “work with countries to enhance their capacity for self-governance.”\textsuperscript{37} The UK's stabilisation efforts are comprised of two entities: The Stabilisation Unit, with its deployable Civilian Stabilisation group (CSG), and the Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG). Similar to the U.S. Civilian Response Corps, the CSG supports stabilization planning and selection, development, training, deployment, and management of civilians for stabilization operations.\textsuperscript{38} Future expansion of the CSG will be achieved by drawing on subject matter experts from “across the public, private and voluntary sectors” in order to enhance the U.K.’s crises response abilities. The military component of the Stabilisation Unit, the MSSG, supports the CSG with “planning teams to support military headquarters and functional specialists for reconstruction and development … especially where the security situation limits the deployment of civilian teams.”\textsuperscript{39}

In its Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, \textit{Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution}, the U.K. provides guidance into the employment of military forces

\textsuperscript{33} Delivered to Parliament every five years.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), established in 2004, was the predecessor to the Stabilisation Unit. Teuten, “Stabilisation” speech, 31 January 2007.
\textsuperscript{37} United Kingdom, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “What is Stabilisation.”
\textsuperscript{38} United Kingdom, \textit{National Security Strategy}, 13.
\textsuperscript{39} United Kingdom, \textit{Strategic Defence and Security Review}, 25, 46.
in integrated stabilization operations and discusses the importance of a comprehensive
approach, linking the military with entities beyond the government, including “tribal
groups, religious organizations, and the private sector.” Additionally, when discussing
PRT operations, JDP 3-40 reinforces the value of civilian PRT leaders noting the military
often has “a short-term focus” while “civilian leaders shift the focus from security to
longer-term development.”

The U.K.’s use of the comprehensive approach recognizes the need for civilians at
the forefront of governance and development activities with the military in a supporting
role, responsible for security. In the same vein as U.S. doctrine, the U.K. recognizes
there may be cases when “the environment [is] so unsafe that only the military can
operate,” and further expects military commanders to recognize the need to “manage the
tension between immediate, visible security progress, and the longer term, sustainable
reconstruction and development of the state.”

The Command and Control Challenge

Militaries operate within the construct of unity of command which is enabled by
command and control; however, expansion into a whole of government approach to
address the complex problems inherent in conflict prevention and response involves other
instruments of national power and requires collaboration between independent entities,
which does not align with structured military processes. This nested relationship is
depicted in Figure 7, which further extends to a comprehensive approach, integrating
“intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and

40 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-40, Security and
41 United Kingdom, National Security Strategy, 25.
private sector entities”\textsuperscript{42} operating in a cooperative manner. This comprehensive approach is recognized by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in acknowledgement that “military means alone cannot ensure successful crisis management.”\textsuperscript{43}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{comprehensive_approach.png}
\caption{Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations\textsuperscript{44}}
\end{figure}

While unity of command is necessary for military operations, it does not exist under whole of government or comprehensive approaches due to the involvement of numerous entities with differing charters, missions, and values. Civilian actors often work within a “loosely-knit web of bi- and multi-lateral engagement mechanisms,” and their levels of authority do not neatly align with military structures. In fact, some civilian organizations are “inherently dysfunctional with no clear lines of authority and a blurring of responsibilities” that do not neatly fit military structures and “can appear almost

\textsuperscript{42} U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-4, 1-5
\textsuperscript{44} U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 1-5.
anarchical” to those familiar and comfortable with unity of command. Therefore, whole of government and comprehensive approaches call for unity of effort: coordination and cooperation among all actors, toward common objectives even when the participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures. This unity of effort requires a shared top-down vision by all parties; elimination of institutional and bureaucratic barriers at all levels; willingness to compromise; and patience.

In order to implement the United States’ whole of government approach, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are linking DoD, DoS, and USAID in a “seamless relationship” in support of U.S. security by integrating defense, diplomacy, and development. Critical to success in stability operations, this integration is a paradigm shift in the interagency process, which will create a force multiplier. While the significant cultural differences between the U.S. Departments of Defense and State are discussed in writings such as Rickey Rife’s treatise, “Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus,” these departments must work beyond traditional organizational boundaries and demonstrate unity of effort “if we are to address the serious international challenges that our nation – and indeed our world – faces today.”

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45 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, JDP 3-40, 28.
47 Paul Melshen, “Old War/ New War: The War in Rhodesia 1965-1980” (Low Intensity Conflict lecture, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA, November 12, 2010); United Kingdom, JDP 3-40, 28. Cited with permission of Dr. Melshen.
49 Ibid.
Summary

The consistency between U.S. and international policy and doctrine is remarkable: Stability operations are to be led by civilian agencies with the military in a supporting role unless conditions prevent civilian involvement, in which case the military is to transition responsibility to civilian agencies as soon as possible. Civilian leadership lies at the very heart of U.S. policy outlined in NSPD-44, which identifies the need to “promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.” This expectation for civilian leadership specifically includes Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which are critical to building indigenous capacity and enabling the military to transition security and other stabilization operations to the host nation or other international agencies.
IV. DEFINING SUCCESS

A key element of stabilization doctrine is the transition to civilian leadership as soon as possible following combat or hostile actions requiring military leadership: Commanders are directed to utilize indigenous self-reliance as a key measure of success, basing transition planning on a combination of time and the achievement of realistic benchmarks. Developing these benchmarks and assessing progress against them is a combination of art and science: “Specific metrics should be designed, collected and subsequently analysed – that is the science part. Interpretation demands judgement, intuition, imagination and insight – art.”

Interagency Assessment Tools

The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was created in Vietnam to assess the effects of pacification, and as Robert Komer relays, “the whole question of how to find out and measure what was actually going on was one of the trickiest and most painful in this highly atypical war.” HES was “a crude measurement of several physically measurable security and development factors that American advisors could reasonably expect to validate,” and was useful for identifying trends. Intentionally designed to capture only quantitative data (e.g. percentage of school-age children in school), it was criticized for not capturing qualitative assessments and for being overly optimistic, it was, however, considered the best systematic reporting available from the field.

1 United Kingdom, JDP 3-40, 6-8, 11-32
2 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 262.
In attempts to create effective measurement tools for stability operations, several USG Departments collaborated with USAID, NGOs, and international entities, developing two frameworks for assessment: The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE, pronounced M-Peace).

The ICAF was developed by USG representatives from USAID and the Departments of State, Defense, Agriculture and Treasury; based on a workshop on Tajikistan, it was approved by the Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee (R&S PCC) in July, 2008. Although not a progress assessment tool, it was designed to create a common understanding of the issues surrounding violent conflict, which “should be part of the first step in any interagency planning process.” This enables a team to establish a baseline against which progress can be evaluated.

DoD, DoS, USAID, and the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) collaborated with international agencies, NGOs, and academia to develop the MPICE framework to evaluate conflict environments and the institutional capacity of indigenous governments. MPICE looks across five sectors (Governance, Security, Rule of Law, Economy, and Social Well-Being) to “identify potential sources of continuing violent conflict and instability and to gauge the capacity of indigenous institutions to overcome them.” These sectors align with the Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction end states (Figure 4, page 38) and fit nicely with the PRT’s mission areas of Governance,

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Security and Development. Providing multiple indicators of institutional capability that can be measured over time to assess progress, MPICE should be considered for application to PRT operations.

In addition to the ICAF and MPICE frameworks, the U.S. Embassy Kabul formed the Integrated Civil-Military Action Group (ICMAG) in 2008 to “better align the efforts of the different U.S. agencies operating in Afghanistan,” and help “translate U.S. national-level strategic guidance into actionable operational guidance for implementation in the field by PRTs and Task Forces.” In 2009, the ICMAG was replaced by Civilian-Military Planning and Assessment Section (CMPASS), reporting to the U.S. Embassy’s Political-Military Section and coordinating with the ISAF Plans Division (J5). CMPASS and the Interagency Provincial Affairs office are working together to create operational guidance and metrics for PRTs using the integrated Civ-Mil Campaign Plan.

**Afghanistan and Iraq**

The difficulty of conducting operations in volatile security environments, the high degree of variation between PRTs, and the lack of agreement on PRT goals make it difficult to develop specific metrics despite the stated importance of assessment cited by stabilization doctrine. Individual PRTs, however, often develop their own plans and assess progress against those plans. According to Deborah Robinson, U.S. Department of State FSO, one PRT leader established realistic objectives, enabling the PRT to achieve

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7 Ciara Knudsen, email message to author, April 14, 2011. Ms. Knudsen served as the ICMAG Executive Officer from 2008-2009.

great results utilizing unity of effort, while another PRT leader did not set objectives and consequently, the PRT “failed miserably.” A more structured approach was utilized by the U.K.-led Helmand PRT: Its plan was “reviewed every three months by the PRT in consultation with Regional Command Southwest, the U.K. Task Force Helmand, and the GIRoA.”

Despite the lack of standardized metrics, there are numerous accounts of PRT successes in both Afghanistan and Iraq, ranging from traditional reconstruction projects of schools, wells, and health care, to true capacity building such as Helmand’s District Community Councils empowering local representatives to determine the direction of development and security in their district, establishment of the Ninewa provincial terrorism court, bringing judicial transparency to the province, including trials of 173 suspected terrorists; improvement of Baghdad’s Provincial Reconstruction Development Council (PRDC), enabling successful local management of $110 million of projects; and establishment of effective communication between Baghdad’s central government and Anbar’s provincial leaders. While these successes are important, the importance of and need for assessment is addressed in stabilization doctrine and is critical to evaluating progress toward strategic objectives.

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9 Deborah Robinson, interview by author, Norfolk, VA, February 16, 2011. The failure to set objectives was not the only reason for the PRT’s poor performance; personalities and other leadership issues were also part of the problem.
10 Balmer, email.
12 U.S. President, “Fact Sheet: Expanded PRTs.”
14 U.S. President, “Fact Sheet: Expanded PRTs.”
Host Nation Perspective

Host nation reports are mixed, but an example of success from the perspective of local Afghan leaders is voiced by Helmand Provincial Governor Mohammad Gulab Mangal who commented, “the people of Helmand appreciate PRT contributions to the villages through security, the distribution of alternative crops, installation of bridges, the digging of wells, and building schools and clinics.” In contrast, Afghanistan’s president Hamid Karzai called for “the speedy dismantling of NATO-run provincial reconstruction teams” during the Munich Security Conference on February 6, 2011, saying they are “impediment[s] to the central government’s [ability to expand] its authority throughout the country.” He further noted that PRTs’ roles confuse people; “they ask who is in charge.” Admiral James Stavridis, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, responded by saying the PRTs “posed no challenge to the central government.”

Sustainability

The military’s propensity to simply pay for projects effectively retards governmental capacity instead of developing it, subsequently hindering the military’s ability to transition to traditional development entities (OGOs, NGOs, etc.). The fact it is often faster and easier to do things for the host nation than to help them do those things themselves creates short term successes at the expense of long term stability. Baghdad ePRT member, Blake Stone, observes that “efforts to build governmental capacity …

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15 U.S. Central Command, “PRTs look at way forward.”
often benefit from not leading with money.”18 This sentiment is reinforced by a Princeton University study that found Iraq’s civilian-led PRTs focused on development of processes and capabilities within bodies of the provincial government.19 Because the objectives of capacity development are to build individual and institutional skills such as self reliance and conflict resolution as well as management and administrative skills such as prioritization, planning, and budget management, the real work is most frequently accomplished through engagement and relationships rather than reconstruction.

Summary

Development of institutional capacity is a lengthy process and results may not be manifest for months or years. When this is coupled with the lack of specific goals and assessments, it is “difficult to determine whether PRTs are achieving success or whether better results would be obtained with another approach.”20 Despite the lack of quantifiable data, the overall assessment is that PRTs add value to stabilization operations and the use of PRTs “as civilian adjuncts to the military’s counterinsurgency operations has proven its worth during our military and diplomatic involvement.”21 Additionally, the importance and value of personal relationships in capacity development cannot be overstated, and civilian PRT leaders tend to place this in the forefront by leading through relationships rather than leading with money.

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18 Ibid., 157.
19 Nima Abbaszadeh, et al., PRT Lessons & Recommendations, 12.
20 Perito, PRTs in Iraq, 3.
21 Stone, Blind Ambition, 151.
V. ANSWERING THE LEADERSHIP QUESTION

The Value of Military Leadership

Policy, doctrine, and numerous examples place civilians in the lead for stabilization operations and PRTs, but it can be argued that a military officer is a better choice. Experience has shown security is an enabler for stabilization and other vital development cannot take place without it.\(^1\) In Vietnam, CORDS demonstrated the importance and value of civilian leadership in pacification efforts, but also recognized that military leadership may be more appropriate where security was precarious. Further reiterating the impact of security, Robert Perito asserts the military should lead PRTs because war zone operations are not State Department core competencies.\(^2\)

Historically, the Department of State and USAID have not always been able to fulfill the demands for personnel with adequate “experience, training, technical and professional skills, interpersonal relationship and team working abilities.”\(^3\) When evaluating civilian and military resource management in PRTs, Patricia De Gennaro, adjunct professor at New York University’s Department of Politics and subject matter expert for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Center for Intelligence observes the “different resource allocation procedures and different allocation of security escorts make the PRT as a two speed structure, where the military go faster and the civilians are often left behind.”\(^4\) From a resource perspective, the military clearly has more resources in the form of a larger pool of equipment which is designed to be used in

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\(^2\) Perito, *PRTs in Iraq*, 10.
\(^3\) Zuzzi, “Dynamics of Interagency Cooperation,” 89.
\(^4\) Ibid., 65-66.
expeditionary or unstable environments; and personnel who are trained to operate in those same environments.

Additionally, specific observations of State Department Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) reveal skill sets that are “much too passive.”5 For example, the U.S. Department of State was slow to adapt to shortfalls in the Vietnamese government, continuing “normal diplomatic dealings … even when [the] government was falling apart.”6 In Iraq, information collection and reporting “were the professional stock-in-trade” of DoS PRT leaders; their ability to “plan, execute, and lead stability and reconstruction operations was painfully [absent] – it just was not a required skill set or core competency.”7 In the Southern Baghdad ePRT, State Department leadership did not effectively lead the civilian elements of planning and executing reconstruction efforts, resulting in observers questioning “why the department was put in charge of such critically important work in the first place.”8 Following his tour as a Battalion Commander in Kirkuk, Iraq, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Terry Cook noted the PRTs seemed capable, but were slow to take action. They would “observe and document, but were reluctant to help the Iraqis solve their own problems more aggressively.”9

It was not until pacification was moved under MACV Commander, General William Westmoreland, and subsequently integrated into a unified command structure that pacification efforts in Vietnam really took hold. The resulting organizational structure integrated civilians and the military into a single chain of command, directly

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5 Stone, Blind Ambition, 152.
6 Komer, Bureaucracy, 60-61.
7 Stone, Blind Ambition, 152.
8 Ibid., 157.
9 Lieutenant Colonel Terry Cook, U.S. Army, interview by author, Norfolk, VA, February 16, 2011.
linking pacification and conventional war efforts. Placement of a military officer in command of a PRT creates unity of command, thereby eliminating any question or doubt about lines of responsibility, authority, or accountability, and subsequently simplifying establishment, communication, and execution of priorities.

Beyond the internal issue of unity of command, a PRT led by a military officer may be perceived by host nation leaders as more important and more capable than one led by a civilian.10 According to U.S. Army Colonel Steve Baker, Afghans place the military “on a higher plane; more powerful and more respected.” When civilians and military members would both engage with Afghan civilians, the Afghans would generally direct the conversation toward the military officer.11 U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Halcomb agrees, noting, “Afghans working with coalition forces felt ‘empowered’ or ‘above’ other Afghans.”12 Beyond the issue of perceived power, there can be a second order effect of military leadership of PRTs: Because the need for stability operations is generally due to the host nation government’s failure to provide security and essential services for their people, mistrust of the military may run deep due to years, decades, or even generations of corruption and/or abuses of power. Seeing competent military leaders supporting and protecting the populace can demonstrate the trustworthiness of military personnel and build trust in the military as an organization.

From Vietnam to Afghanistan and Iraq, civilian entities have struggled to effectively lead stabilization efforts; these struggles, coupled with the military’s capabilities and resources, make military leadership seem to be a logical solution.

11 Colonel Steven Baker, U.S. Army, interview by author, Norfolk, VA, February 16, 2011.
Although there is no doubt the military can lead PRTs; the real question is whether they should.

**The Importance of Civilian Leadership**

U.K. and U.S. national policy, government directives, and military doctrine invoke civilian leadership for stability operations, thus enabling a whole of government approach in support of national security. However, there is an inconsistency between policy and practice, as observed by Patricia Gennaro: “The U.S. constitution gives the lead to DoS in foreign affairs, followed by the military. In Afghanistan, … the opposite is happening.”

In her Senate confirmation hearings, U. S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, emphasized the importance of investing in “our civilian capacity to conduct vigorous American diplomacy … [to] operate effectively alongside our military,” and further codified these concepts in the 2010 QDDR. Supporting Secretary Clinton’s position, U.S. Department of Defense Secretary Robert Gates advocates “a change in attitude in the recognition of the critical role that agencies like State and AID play” and the need for them to play a leading role.

Dr. James A. Knight, the U.S. Ambassador to Benin, recalls his time as the Ninewa PRT Leader, noting that civilian leaders provide options that may not have been previously available or credible when presented by the military, for example, promoting engagement in the political arena: “There is a way to

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14 Shapiro, “State-DoD Relations.”
see political advantages for [groups] that I’m trained to find; as an interlocutor, this is a natural function for DoS.”\footnote{16}

Ms. Ciara Knudsen, a DoS officer assigned to the U.S. Department of State’s office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), led S/CRS’ engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan and served in Afghanistan from 2007-2009 as a PRT mission planner. She notes that civilians working in arduous and dangerous conditions “changes the risk equation, but it’s what we do; I don’t think it’s a big issue.”\footnote{17} Civilians have served in these types of roles since Vietnam; however the size, scope, and ambiguity of today’s conflicts have created an incredibly high demand for their unique capabilities, subsequently magnifying any shortfalls and intensifying interagency struggles. Between January 2009 and August 2010, the number of U.S. civilians on the ground in Afghanistan tripled, reaching 1,100; widely recognized by Secretary Gates and senior military leaders as “an essential part of the civ-mil effort,”\footnote{18} and when combined with the U.K.’s successful CSG expansion and deployment, they demonstrate a significant improvement in civilian agencies’ ability to provide crises response resources to augment military operations. This expanded capability is further evidenced by transition of the $1.2B Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) from DoD to DoS in fiscal year (FY) 2011 and the fact DoS will assume responsibility for Iraq Police training in FY 2012.\footnote{19} DoS’ increased ability to manage

\footnote{16} Ambassador James A. Knight, telephone interview by author, September 27, 2010.  
\footnote{17} Ciara Knudsen, telephone interview by author, February 28, 2011.  
\footnote{18} Shapiro, “State-DoD Relations.”  
these critical programs coupled with their ability to perform capacity building creates a force multiplier that reduces the burden on U.S. forces.

The military’s primary role in stabilization operations is to provide security and enable the delivery of civilian support to governance and development. Reiterating the relationship between these three elements, Major Guy Balmer, U.K. Royal Marines, notes that while security enables governance and development, it alone does not solve the problem and “the military are not experts” in governance and development.20 This lack of expertise in long-term development results in military stabilization efforts becoming “supply-based rather than demand-driven.”21 Recognizing the unique complexities involved in civilian engagement, the military must remain “within the scope of [their own] core competencies and … not attempt to turn themselves into diplomats or politicians.”22 Although many military personnel adroitly fill stabilization roles and may be excellent ambassadors for their country, the military should not be the source of the diplomatic instrument of national power.

Additionally, the military’s “posture and … dress code sometimes negatively affect the perception of the local population,” which can create misunderstanding and “convey bad feelings to the local population.”23 Reflecting on his tour as a Battalion Commander in Kirkuk, Iraq, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Terry Cook observed

20 Balmer, email.
22 Rife and Hansen, Defense is from Mars, 15.
“influential leaders in the city are a helluva lot more comfortable with and receptive to a civilian face instead of an Army guy with an M-16.”

The U.K.’s 2010 National Security Strategy posits that military involvement in reconstruction can lead to a short-term focus as evidenced by Norwegian Army Major Finn Ola Helleberg’s observations in Afghanistan, citing military officers’ tendencies to focus efforts on the span of their units’ tours. While the implementation of quick-impact projects may create a sense of accomplishment, this myopic perspective can do more harm than good by encouraging the host nation to rely on external entities rather than develop self-sustaining capabilities and processes. This short-term focus can also mitigate the importance of relationships within and between organizations: As cited by Robert Perito in his report on PRTs in Afghanistan, NGO representatives in Afghanistan cite frustration with PRT project implementation methods that undermined the important relationships the NGOs had formed with Afghan communities.

Because stability operations require patience and endurance, the best approach may be observing and shaping rather than engaging in aggressive operations, and this seemingly relaxed or casual approach “can be difficult for a military which expects to deliver rapid, ideally decisive results.” For example, the USAID representative on an ePRT in Baghdad Province “tended to look at longer term, often multiyear projects,” which is reinforced by Major Helleberg who further observes “civilian agencies work in a

24 Cook, interview.
28 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, JDP 3-40, XII
6 to 15 year perspective. When this longer-term perspective taken by civilians is applied to the entire mission of a PRT, overall priorities will likely shift from security and short-term results to development of indigenous capacity, which is the heart of the PRT mission.

In his discussion of stability operations during the second battle of Fallujah, U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General John F. Sattler asserted the need for more of an interagency process: Recognizing the military must lead at the beginning due to the hostile environment, he believes “somewhere along the line, [operations must] morph from heavy military to 50-50 participation with other government agencies and then to the military in a supporting role.” This transition to civilian control is imperative to enabling military forces to withdraw, and civilian leadership of PRTs is a highly-visible example of that transition.

**Personalities Matter**

Vietnam’s lessons include recognition that “simply relying on the ambassador and the MACV commander to ‘work things out’ would not ensure pacification cooperation. A single civil-military focus on pacification was needed.” While some individuals are able to effectively “co-lead” organizations, this is highly dependent upon the right people at the right place at the right time, which is subject to a high degree of variation (or chance) and is not an effective organizational model; organizations generally function best when a clear leadership role is identified. Identification of a leader, however, does

30 Helleberg, “Wielding the Military Shield,” 60.
not guarantee success as both military and civilian PRT leaders have been cited for poor leadership. While the Department of State may have initially fallen short of providing adequate numbers of leaders with the requisite training and skills, Italian Army Captain Mattia Zuzzi observes failures of military PRT leaders range from simply dismissing the potential value of civilian agencies assigned to their PRT to not understanding cultural norms of the host nation and the associated importance of building relationships prior to asking “sensitive questions and expecting cooperation.”

When dealing with foreign leaders, one must be able to “understand and analyze the personalities of the contacts, with whom they work and seek to influence,” view issues through the lens of time, and be able to “fully explore options and to understand the consequences of choosing one option over the other in the ‘bigger picture’ context of the bilateral and multilateral relationship” with the country in which they are working. These capabilities are critical to success for diplomats, and equally applicable to PRT leaders. Reinforcing the importance of collaborative leadership, General Mattis attests, “we need leaders who can bring harmony and trust across service lines, interagency lines, and national lines. The impact to the mission is too great” to operate without these things.

In their work analyzing behavioral characteristics of military officers and Foreign Service Officers, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Rickey Rife and Department of State FSO Rosemary Hansen observed:

These two cultures are as alien as life forms from two competing planets, the warriors from Mars and the diplomats from Venus. Similar in many

33 Zuzzi, “Dynamics of Interagency Cooperation,” 78.
34 Rife and Hansen, Defense is from Mars, 12.
35 Mattis, VTC, cited with permission of General Mattis.
respects – professionalism, dedication, and competence – Martians and Venusians often have an antagonistic relationship. They are generally polar opposites in character, in approach to problem solving, and in worldview.\textsuperscript{36}

However frustrating these differences may be, they are valuable in the complex world of stability operations. For example, the ability to build on “an open exchange of ideas, concepts, and thoughts provided by all at the table – regardless of their position in the hierarchy,” combined with the “ability to communicate and to influence the actions of local leaders – not through force, but by using their intellect to persuade, i.e. diplomacy”\textsuperscript{37} are critically important when engaging with foreign leaders and working to develop institutional capacity. According to Rife and Hansen, these traits are typically demonstrated by DoS FSOs, but not generally displayed by the military.

Just as Komer’s perseverance and cultivation of relationships were key elements in his ability to rapidly establish CORDS as an effective organization,\textsuperscript{38} analysis of PRTs in Afghanistan revealed “personality, individual leadership style, and previously established relationships had inordinate influence on the effectiveness and impact of the PRT.” When the leader worked closely with their team members, the PRT “developed as a team with a common vision and sense of aligned purpose. In other cases, the PRT effort was fragmented.”\textsuperscript{39} It is this force of personalities that determines the level of collaborative effort and integration present in a PRT. The importance of personalities is

\textsuperscript{36} Rife and Hansen, \textit{Defense is from Mars}, 3.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 7-8
\textsuperscript{38} Scoville, \textit{Reorganizing for Pacification Support}, 76.
further reinforced by General Mattis who cautions: “Avoid understanding the importance of personalities at your own peril.”

**Summary**

There is no doubt the military is capable of leading PRTs as they have the capability and resources to do so, however, military leadership is not the best solution. Two of the PRT’s three functions, governance and reconstruction, are not military core competencies, reflecting the fact PRTs were specifically conceived with civilian leadership in mind, and more importantly, because the purpose of national involvement in stability operations is to “promote peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law.”

Furthermore, government efforts to build civilian capabilities through the U.K.’s Civilian Stabilization Group and the U.S.’ Civilian Response Corps, have closed the gap in personnel shortfalls, removing the argument that civilian agencies lack the capacity to fulfill leadership roles.

Beyond the element of civilian or military leaders, leadership style is also extremely important: PRT leaders must be collaborative, ensuring they recognize and utilize the capabilities of their team members, and understand the host nation’s culture and political dynamics as well as the complexities of international relationships; fundamentally embodying Stephen Covey’s principle of “seek first to understand, then be understood.”

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40 Mattis, VTC, cited with permission of General Mattis.
41 U.S. President, NSPD-44.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

This document’s examination of history, policy, doctrine, organizational capabilities, and operational experience confirms that civilian leadership for Provincial Reconstruction Teams is the preferred model as it demonstrates civilian-military interoperability, leverages local relationships previously forged by the regional military commander, and accelerates the transition from military to civilian control, thus enhancing overall stability operations. PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate the value of this civilian-led, military-supported structure as exemplified by the U.K. model in Afghanistan and the U.S. model in Iraq.

During the conduct of stability operations there will often be situations where the lack of security precludes a civilian presence, which also means the environment is not ready for a PRT. In these cases, the military should remain in the lead, actively seeking to transition to civilian leadership at the earliest feasible opportunity as directed by DODI 3000.05 and reinforced by General Sattler.

In addition to validation of the initial thesis, this research revealed the importance of leadership style, and Vietnam’s lessons are relevant here: Robert Komer advocated selection of flexible and imaginative leaders, not just those who have fulfilled the typical criteria for previous promotions or who are most convenient for the institution.¹ PRT leaders are responsible for a diverse group with a challenging mission and must not only understand the cultural and political landscape of the host nation, but must also actively employ leadership skills and create a cohesive, high-performing team. Operating in adverse, often dangerous circumstances, a key part of the leader’s job is to make

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¹ Komer, Bureaucracy. p155.
abnormal conditions seem normal: Leaders must recognize, understand, and leverage differences, and build upon the capabilities of their team to create a sense of camaraderie and enable unity of effort.
VII. CONCLUSION

Review of U.S. and international stability operations over the past fifty years has revealed several common themes: The importance of integrated civil-military efforts and the tension that often occurs due to differences in styles between the two entities; the force and effect of personalities on priorities, methods, and even success; and the differences in time horizons upon which civilians and military often base their expectations. From these themes several lessons can be drawn: Unity of effort is a fundamental element of stability operations specifically because of the importance of integrated civ-mil actions; civilians have demonstrated their abilities to effectively lead stability operations in dangerous environments; and key leaders in stability operations should be carefully selected.

Civilian leadership for Provincial Reconstruction Teams is the preferred model as this demonstrates civilian/military interoperability, leverages local relationships previously forged by the regional military commander, and accelerates the transition from military to civilian control, thus enhancing overall stability operations. This civilian-led model reinforces civilian control of the military, is a force multiplier for military commanders, is more favorable for NGO involvement, and encourages host nation civilian participation necessary for whole of government solutions, which is more sustainable in the long term.

Robert Komer’s advice still rings true today: Leaders must be flexible and imaginative, not just those who have fulfilled the typical criteria for previous promotions or who are most convenient for the institution; PRT leaders must be carefully selected and have a history of demonstrated excellence in negotiation, consensus building, and
communication. Stability operations require a long-term perspective which is typically not demonstrated by military officers; accordingly, civilian diplomats such as U.K. Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre (CSSC) and U.S. Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) are good candidates for PRT leadership roles as they maintain a long term focus, regularly deploy to risky, unstable areas, and understand the risks inherent in these assignments.

While history’s lessons are supported by policy and doctrine, they are not consistently applied as PRTs are led by a mixture of civilian and military leaders. Transition to civilian leadership for Afghanistan’s PRTs should become a priority element of ISAF’s plan to transition from military operations to traditional development activities, enabling subsequent withdrawal of combat forces. PRTs, currently led by thirteen nations, continue to improve stability by strengthening Afghanistan and Iraq’s ability to provide security to their citizens and deliver essential services. Operating in unstable environments, no single element determines their success or failure; they have all experienced successes and setbacks, regardless of whether they were led by a civilian or military officer, and their many successes are no doubt directly related to the hard work, creativity, flexibility, and courage of PRT members, those working with them, and the people of Afghanistan and Iraq.
APPENDIX A. AFGHANISTAN PRT LOCATIONS

As of March 5, 2011, there are 29 PRTs in Afghanistan led by 13 countries:¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>country</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Asia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Badakhshan</td>
<td>(Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Spain)</td>
<td>Ghazni (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baghlan (Hungary)</td>
<td>Helmand (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balkh (Sweden)</td>
<td>Herat (Italy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bamyan (New Zealand)</td>
<td>Jawzjan (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farah (US)</td>
<td>Kandahar (US)</td>
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APPENDIX B. IRAQ PRT LOCATIONS

As of March 5, 2011, the U.S. leads all but one of the 16 PRTs in Iraq:\(^1\)

- Anbar
- Dhi Qar (Italy)
- Kirkuk
- Ninewa
- Babil
- Diyala
- Maysan
- Qadisiyah
- Baghdad
- Erbil
- Muthanna
- Salah ad Din
- Basra
- Karbala
- Najaf
- Wasit

The Baghdad PRT coordinates five satellite offices (formerly ePRTs). The autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan is supported by the Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT), an all-civilian entity comprised of 20 civilians from DoS, DoJ, and USAID, which has satellite offices in the provinces of Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah.

All Iraq PRTs are scheduled to close in the Fall of 2011.\(^2\)


APPENDIX C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Through the course of research for this document, several related elements were identified as recurring themes. Although not central to this thesis, they are important factors in overall PRT operations and are offered here for consideration and/or further study:

a) **PRT’s role as a coordinator in security operations:** The PRT is most effective when serving as a coordinator between ISAF and local Afghan forces, rather than attempting to develop and mentor the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). This function is best filled by the better trained and resourced Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A).³

b) **Resources (people, facilities, logistics, etc.):** The U.K.-led PRTs and U.S-led PRTs in Iraq have security assets allocated to them, either from a private security contractor (U.K.) or the local maneuver commander (U.S.), enabling the PRT to set engagement priorities based on stabilization needs, rather than being overruled by the local military commander due to security tasking.

c) **Deconfliction of priorities:** Two methods were cited as effective tools to deconflict priorities either within the PRT or between the PRT and the local maneuver commander: A Board of Directors concept utilized by the U.S. BCT commander in Khost, in which leaders for each LOE (Governance- DoS, Agriculture- USDA, Development- USAID, Information Operations- PRT Commander, Security- Battalion Commander) would meet regularly to conduct short- and long-term planning, establish goals, coordinate meetings with Afghan

officials, and agree to the objective of those meetings. 4 Similarly, a joint targeting process was utilized in Paktika province in which the U.S. BCT commander conducted weekly targeting meetings to review short- and long-term goals and ensure priorities and resources were appropriately assigned. 5 These concepts are similar to the Integrated Command Group articulated in the PRT Playbook, 6 but this practice is not consistently applied. Robust implementation of these or similar processes ensure open communications and improve overall unity of effort.

d) **Integrated planning, deployment, and operations:** The Interagency Management System (IMS) can provide flexible tools for policymakers, Chiefs of Mission, and military commanders, and although it has yet to be activated, it should be considered for future integrated civ-mil operations.

e) **Assessment and measurement:** Utilization of Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) framework by PRTs to evaluate improvements in the institutional capacity of the host nation government.

f) **Personnel turnover:** The military prefers 100% turnover as it supports unit rotations, but this is not the best solution for civilians working closely with host nation civilians as time and critical knowledge are lost. While military security and logistics support personnel could continue to rotate as units, civilian rotations would ideally occur individually as each civilian finishes their tour, thus allowing other members of the team to retain cultural and organizational knowledge. As

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5 Baker, interview.
U.S. Navy Commander John Pestovic noted from his tour as the Khost PRT commander:

One thing the Afghans begged me to pass along to my superiors: “Please stop rotating people every six or twelve months. Every time you figure out how to work here in Afghanistan, you leave. The next guy arrives, spends three to six months learning what to do, then leaves. In the meantime we suffer because we go backward as much as we go forward with every new team.”7

7 Pestovic, email.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


VITA

Commander Candace Eckert enlisted in the Navy Reserve in 1985 and received a
Direct Commission in 1991; serving with Patrol Squadron 65, Naval Coastal Warfare
units, and Naval Special Warfare Group ONE, her deployments included Japan, Korea,
Hawaii, Alaska, Panama, Chile, Qatar, Bahrain, and Egypt.

Deploying to Kuwait from March to September 2004 with Mobile Inshore
Undersea Warfare Unit 103, she conducted port security and harbor defense patrols at
Mina Ash Shuaybah and Kuwaiti Naval Base. In January, 2006 she was detailed to the
U.S. Army’s 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion, with whom she deployed to Mosul, Iraq, as the
Rule of Law Section Leader for the Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team from April
2006 – March 2007. Subsequently ordered to Anbar province, she served as the Judicial
Advisor for II Marine Expeditionary Force (FWD) from March – August 2007.

Command tours include Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master
Station, Pacific (NCTAMS PAC) Detachment L, NAVCENT Mobile Integrated
Command Facility (MICFAC) Detachment 109, and Maritime Expeditionary Security
Division 13.

She holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Computer Science from California Polytechnic
State University, San Luis Obispo, California, and a Master’s Degree in Global
Leadership from the University of San Diego. Military training includes the U.S. Air
Force Joint Special Operations Staff Officer Course, U.S. Marine Corps Rear Area
Mobilization Civil Affairs Course.