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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

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JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL



**THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND: A STEP BACKWARD IN
"JOINTNESS"**

by

Mark R. Hirschinger

Colonel, United States Army



**THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND: A STEP
BACKWARD IN "JOINTNESS"**


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
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
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ABSTRACT

The Unified Command Plan established the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as a separate and distinct four-star combatant command dedicated to advancing joint doctrine and principles while addressing the future challenges of our Nation. The deliberate efforts of USJFCOM serve to promote, implement and sustain “*jointness*” and Goldwater-Nichols legislation. USJFCOM joined a host of key sustainers of jointness including visionary leaders, key legislation, institutional elements, and operations. While Department of Defense (DoD) has made great progress toward inculcating a joint warfighting ethos among the Services, there is much left to do to capture the effectiveness achieved this decade and ensure it does not fall prey to the traditional inter-service rivalries witnessed in previous post-war draw downs. Recent DoD guidance initiated the dissolution of USJFCOM suggesting that joint operations are now performed as a matter of culture and practice. This paper explores joint transformation and the sustainers of jointness focusing on the key institutional role of USJFCOM. The author will prove that to operationalize and sustain joint transformation, a command like USJFCOM is necessary. Furthermore, a new command is proposed, “JFCOM-lite,” retaining key functions, addressing future roles and missions and the critical element of senior leadership to advance the Joint Force.

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INTRODUCTION

On the heels of the 1980 debacle in the Iranian desert (Operation Eagle Claw) and the less than stellar 1983 rescue of a few medical students from the island of Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury), Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, mandating a level of interservice cooperation previously unknown inside the US military, except perhaps in the last years of World War II. Mere legislation, however, does not usually change the beliefs or actions of traditional military institutions. Thus, despite its drubbing of the Iraqi forces during Operation Desert Storm (1991), analysis of this conflict and others during the last twenty years indicated the US military was not as joint as most defense experts knew was both possible and necessary.

In 1998, the Defense Department moved to correct this lack of “*jointness*” by establishing the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in a deliberate effort to promote, implement, and sustain jointness and the foundational aspects of doctrine, training, and interoperability implied in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. USJFCOM joined a host of key sustainers of jointness including visionary leaders, key legislation, institutional elements, operational commands, and actual tactical application. While DoD has made great progress toward inculcating a joint warfighting ethos among the services, there is much left to do to capture the effectiveness achieved this decade and ensure it does not fall prey to the traditional interservice rivalries witnessed in previous post-war draw downs.

Thus, it is surprising that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has called for the closure of USJFCOM, arguing that the services had achieved an unprecedented level of jointness over the last nine years. Such a move fails to acknowledge the record of

interservice fighting over resources and missions that accompanied previous post-war periods of military and economic retrenchment (e.g. post-World War II, post Operation Desert Storm) and the natural inclination of organizations to focus on their own, limited priorities. Moreover, Gates' call to close USJFCOM misses the point: Sustaining and advancing "jointness" is an evolutionary journey not an endstate. Granted, like any other large organization, the shortcomings and concerns reference USJFCOM should be addressed. However, the author will prove that USJFCOM should be retained and "re-missioned" as "JFCOM-lite" due to the likely retention of most of its subordinate elements, the marginal savings of disestablishment, and the significant loss of credibility and continuity focused on joint operations.

(Note: While this thesis does include historical reference, it is not a case study. The disestablishment process and the anticipated closure of USJFCOM is ongoing and will not be finished before this paper is completed. As a result, this paper does not attempt to chronicle all events regarding the USJFCOM disestablishment effort. Rather, this thesis serves as a dialogue about "jointness" and the leaders, legislation and institutions that support it).

CHAPTER 1: “JOINTNESS”: A JOURNEY NOT AN ENDSTATE

The Defense Secretary’s proposal to disestablish United States Joint Forces Command misses the point.¹ While it appears that the Services have achieved an unprecedented level of “jointness,” advancing and sustaining this condition across the force is a dynamic effort, requiring continuous engagement. Jointness represents both a process and a philosophy supporting cooperation and synergy among Military Services and their prerogatives. Senator Lieberman, a senior member of the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC), expressed similar concerns during testimony in September 2010 regarding Secretary Gates’ decision: “... I don’t believe we’ve accomplished the mission of guaranteeing jointness in our military, which is fighting jointly. And, I wonder, if you’re going to disband this command, where else are you going to do it?”² Change in the Joint Force is ongoing because the inputs are not static: New technologies, threats, and resourcing levels all yield new opportunities and challenges.

Complex, sustained transformation over time in organizations like the Department of Defense is, indeed, a continuous process. Colonel Mark Czelusta of the George C. Marshall Center captured this idea best: “In its purest sense, transformation is neither an end state, nor a modernization program, nor a rapid advancement in technology. Rather,

¹ From this point forward, the current United States Joint Forces Command will be identified as “United States Joint Forces Command,” “U.S. Joint Forces Command,” “USJFCOM,” or “JFCOM.” The proposed organization in this thesis will be referred to as “JFCOM-lite” or “new JFCOM.”

² U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department Of Defense Efficiencies Initiatives*, September 28, 2010, 16.

transformation is a *process*, rooted in a deliberate policy choice, which involves changes in military organizations, cultures, doctrine, training, tactics, and equipment.”³

One of the premier Army visionaries of the post-Vietnam era, Donn Starry, also recognized that “change is a constant for today's Armed Forces. With frequently shifting requirements as well as advancing technology, it is imperative that any reform contribute to a force's ability to operate on the battlefield.”⁴

Sustaining and advancing jointness is an ongoing, transformative effort; it is journey not an end state.⁵ Continuing to evolve joint operations is complex due to the constant challenges of interoperability (equipment, training, etc.), the tension of Service parochialism and culture, and continuous competition for finite resources.

How do we preserve and advance what we have gained over the last 20 years? Multiple sustainers of the Joint Force contribute to this effort, including institutions, senior leaders, legislation and actual operations. Institutions like USJFCOM play a central role as one of the principle sustainers of joint force training and principles. The establishment and ongoing efforts of USJFCOM as a Combatant Command sends a clear signal to the entire force that jointness is an enduring, essential task, but one requires resources and leadership. Joint Forces Command ensures a premium is placed on jointness supporting training, concept development and doctrinal efforts across the force.

³ Mark Czelusta, “Business as Usual: An Assessment of Donald Rumsfeld’s Transformation Vision and Transformation’s Prospects for the Future,” 4, http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/-MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_18-en.pdf (accessed 20 November 2010).

⁴ U.S. Army War College, Selected Readings, Volume II, Course I, Strategic Leadership, *To Change an Army* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, July-August 2001), 191.

⁵ Erik W. Hansen, “Goldwater-Nichols – Failing to Go the Distance,” 25 March 2008, 2, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479113&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2011).

U.S. Joint Forces Command Disestablishment: What are we saving and why USJFCOM?

What is the DoD really saving by “disestablishment” and why U.S. Joint Forces Command? The broad justification for the Department of Defense budget cuts was outlined through several statements and news releases including one in August 2010: “[Secretary] ... Gates announced a series of initiatives designed to reduce overhead, duplication, and excess in the Department of Defense, and, over time, instill a culture of savings and restraint in America’s defense institutions. These initiatives represent the latest of the Secretary’s efforts to re-balance the priorities of the department and reform the way the Pentagon does business.”⁶

Undoubtedly, we are facing tremendous budget deficits and challenges within every department and function of our government. According to the November 2010 Debt Reduction Task Force report, “In 2020, the federal government will pay \$1 trillion – 17 percent of all federal spending – just for interest payments.”⁷ As debt and entitlement costs grow exponentially, pressure to decrease defense spending will amplify.

The Secretary of Defense should be credited for acknowledging the dilemma and leading fellow cabinet members in addressing spending issues. Gates’ initial plan is to cut the defense budget by \$100 billion dollars over the next five years. However, a closer look at the disestablishment of USJFCOM reveals negligible savings especially given the likely retention of multiple command functions. Knowing that his decision would be scrutinized by numerous lawmakers, business leaders and “think tanks,” many believed

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, News Release, *Sec. Gates Announces Efficiencies Initiatives*, No. 706-10, August 09, 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13782> (accessed 15 February 2011).

⁷ Pete Domenici and Alice Rivlin, *Restoring America’s Future: Reviving the Economy, Cutting Spending and Debt, and Creating a Simple Pro-Growth Tax System*, (Washington DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, November 2010), 11, <http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/BPC%20FINAL%20REPORT%20FOR%20PRINTER%2002%2028%2011.pdf>, (accessed 20 January 2011).

Secretary Gates chose to make the closure decision privately, reinforcing his authority and retaining the initiative while avoiding the impact of external analysis.⁸ According to a report by the Congressional Research Service, "... several of the [Defense Secretary's] initiatives involve only relatively small amounts [of money], including changes in OSD, the elimination of ASD NII, BTA, and JFCOM ... [and]... many functions of ASD NII, BTA, and JFCOM will, as Secretary Gates said, have to be managed elsewhere, so net savings from those measures are very hard to estimate."⁹ The Lexington Institute's Loren Thompson made similar observations about the DoD's recent cuts: "I suspect that a lot of these savings are not going to materialize even though they are already being booked."¹⁰

Multiple figures have been cited regarding Joint Forces Command budget and personnel numbers. Secretary Gates' original figures included a USJFCOM budget of \$240 million, 2,800 military members and civilian employees and 3,000 contractors.¹¹ However, more accurate statistics are likely found on JFCOM documents which differ from the Secretary's numbers regarding both budget and personnel: \$703 million dollar annual budget, 1,491 military personnel, 1,533 civilian employees, and 3,300 contractors.¹² The President's FY2011 budget request detailed \$733.3 billion for national defense including \$548.9 billion for administrative, non-combat operations of the DoD

⁸ WVEC Television, Inc, "JFCOM Closing Spurs Creation of Va. Commission on Military and National Security Facilities," WVEC.COM, <http://www.wvec.com/news/military/Military-command-in-Norfolk-to-be-eliminated-100268549.html> (accessed 15 March 2011).

⁹ Congressional Research Service, *Preliminary Assessment of Efficiency Initiatives Announced by Secretary of Defense Gates on 9 August 10*. (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 2, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/efficiency.pdf>, (accessed 20 February 2011). Note: The Business Transformation Agency (BTA) is responsible for the DoD's business operations modernization; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration), (ASD NII), is the principal OSD staff assistant for the development, oversight, and integration of DoD policies and programs relating to the strategy of information superiority. Both organizations were included in the Defense Secretary's cuts proposed in the "Efficiencies Initiatives" announced August 09, 2010.

¹⁰ Marcus Weisgerber and Kate Brannen, "Gates Details \$13.6B in DoD Cuts: But Some Projected 'Savings' Not What They Seem" *Defense News*, March 21, 2011, 1.

¹¹ Congressional Research Service, *Preliminary Assessment of Efficiency Initiatives*, 5.

¹² *Ibid.*

and \$159.3 billion for ongoing military operations, bringing the total request to \$708.3 billion.¹³ Even using the higher USJFCOM figure of \$703 million and assuming that all of the command's functions are completely discontinued, which will not be the case according to Secretary Gates, disestablishment of USJFCOM amounts to less than one tenth of 1 percent of the FY2011 DoD budget request. Recent statements by the new USJFCOM Commander, General Raymond Ordierno, cite even lower potential savings of "more than \$400 million a year."¹⁴

Given the relatively small amount of savings, why target USJFCOM? Several factors supported the rush to disestablish of Joint Forces Command. First, USJFCOM was clearly discredited by a recent Defense Business Board (DBB) presentation in July 2010 to Secretary Gates.¹⁵ Broad in scope and compelling, the DBB's outbrief combined foreboding budget statistics with leading questions and recommendations about the composition and future of our military force. USJFCOM was highlighted in the report focusing on the Command's workforce composition and multiple subordinate command elements. The significant number of contractors assigned to USJFCOM was cited as highly questionable and a negative aspect of the command, especially when compared


¹³ The remaining balance of the defense budget is \$25.1 billion for defense-related activities by agencies other than DoD. Defense: FY2011 Authorization and Appropriations, November 23, 2010, see <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41254.pdf>, summary page.

¹⁴ Bill Bartel, "JFCOM will Shut Down in About 10 Months, Commander Says," *The Virginian Pilot*, January 11, 2011, <http://hamptonroads.com/2011/01/jfcom-will-shut-down-about-10-months-commander-says> (accessed 15 March 2011).

¹⁵ Defense Business Board, *Reducing Overhead and Improving Business Operations Initial Observations, power point briefing*, July 22, 2010, <http://dbb.defense.gov/MeetingFiles/presented.pdf> (accessed 15 December 2010).

with other combatant commands (Figure 1). The DBB’s conclusions appeared to bolster Gates’ effort to streamline DoD bureaucracy regardless of the savings.¹⁶

Figure 1



Source: Defense Business Board, *Reducing Overhead and Improving Business Operations Initial Observations*, power point briefing, July 22, 2010 <http://dbb.defense.gov/MeetingFiles/-presented.pdf>, slide 30. Depicts self-reported Combatant Command work force figures by type.

Second, many believe that after years of sustained combat, the U.S. military is an effective joint force leaving USJFCOM without a mission. The Defense Secretary made that point as part of a 9 August 2010 statement discussing JFCOM disestablishment:“... propelled by decades of operational experience, the U.S. military has largely embraced jointness as a matter of culture and practice, though we must always remain vigilant

¹⁶ U.S. Congressman J. Randy Forbes, “Virginia Delegation Challenges Recommendation to Close JFCOM,” U.S. Congressman J. Randy Forbes website, <http://forbes.house.gov/News/Document-Single.aspx?DocumentID=203166> (accessed 15 December 2010).

against backsliding on that front.”¹⁷ Secretary Gates attributed sustained operations as the driver in achieving an effective joint force. While he cautions against “backsliding,” his guidance now is to apply far less personnel capital and, by extension, emphasis on the Joint Force.

As local, state and congressional lawmakers sought answers about JFCOM’s closure, “philosophical” reasons were cited by the Secretary, namely, the importance of cutting redundant military staffs and headquarters.¹⁸ Expressing frustration regarding the lack of fiscal analysis and transparency, Congressman Forbes of Virginia stated that the minimal data he did receive appeared to be “back-filled analysis” compiled solely to support closure.¹⁹ Predictably, though, much of the initial and most publicized reaction of the Virginia delegation centered on the fear of significant job loss and resulting local economic hardship, playing perfectly into the Secretary’s hand.²⁰ Local economic impact was a primary theme in Senator Webb’s 27 September 2010 press release regarding USJFCOM disestablishment:

We are concerned that [DoD]...has yet to brief...our delegation, [the] Governor...or any local...officials about the potential impacts this closure and the reduction in contract support will have on the Commonwealth and our military readiness as a whole. As a result, we have no information... to quantify...effects of your proposal in such areas as its fiscal and local economic implications.²¹

¹⁷ Robert Gates, “SECDEF Statement August 9, 2010,” <https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Documents/-Policy/Efficiencies%20Statement%20As%20Prepared.pdf> (accessed 10 December 2010), 6.

¹⁸ Daily Press.com, “JFCOM closing is ‘philosophical,’” Daily Press, http://articles.dailypress.com/2010-09-08/news/dp-nws-jfcom-nato-20100908_1_joint-forces-command-pentagon-virginia-officials (accessed 15 January 2011).

¹⁹ Defense News, “DoD Failed To Analyze Possible Savings of JFCOM Closure: Lawmakers,” Gannett Government Media Corporation, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4809055-&c=EUR&s=TOP> (accessed 8 January 2011).

²⁰ U.S. Senator Jim Webb, “Sens. Webb, Warner: Still No DOD Analysis for JFCOM Closure,” Jim Webb U.S. Senator from Virginia website, <http://webb.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/-09-27-2010-02.cfm>, (accessed 15 December 2010).

²¹ Ibid.

Secretary Gates' announcement prompted vigorous debate on both sides with many applauding his audacity and resolve regarding budget cuts, while others questioned if JFCOM's mission was actually complete. The initial reaction of the Virginia delegation was perceived by some as a "not in my backyard" protest when considering defense cuts. Secretary Gates' position regarding USJFCOM gained instant credibility when the delegation's reaction was portrayed by some as protectionist versus a matter of national security.

The USJFCOM closure announcement also served as a highly effective strategic communications move regarding the budget for both the DoD and the Obama administration at large. The SECDEF's message, directed at Congress, the Department of Defense, our allies, military contractors and the American people seemed to say, I am dead serious about budget cutting; so much so, little is sacrosanct at DoD, including four-star level commands, of which, U.S. Joint Forces Command is certainly the most vulnerable. By virtue of function, one could understand why JFCOM would have few allies. Do the Combatant Commands and the Military Services want a peer level organization to exist that is always "looking over their shoulder" regarding training, acquisition, experimentation, lessons learned, etc..?²² Probably not, but visionary civilian and military leaders who backed the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 and the formation of USJFCOM saw the value of a competing, but supporting joint advocate given the high stakes of dollars, lives and risk in the balance.²³ Senior leaders

²² U.S. Government Accounting Office, *U.S. Atlantic Command: Challenging Role in the Evolution of Joint Military Capabilities GAO/NSIAD-99-39*, by Richard Davis, 6, <http://www.global-security.org/military/library/report/gao/ns99039.pdf> (accessed 10 December 2010).

²³ U.S. Congress, *House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, Panel on Roles and Missions: Initial Perspectives*, 112th Cong., 1st Sess., 2008, 6.

recognized jointness can fall victim to expedience when one is focused on a specific AOR, mission, and priority.²⁴

A number of “think tanks” and prominent congressional leaders outside the Virginia delegation expressed the same concern regarding JFCOM’s disestablishment. According to the House Armed Service Committee Chairman Ike Skelton, a 34 year veteran of Congress and prominent player during the Goldwater-Nichols hearings, “I am deeply concerned that the years of creating the joint culture and the enforcement thereof could go down the river and be lost ... as long as I am chairman, I'm going to do my best to make sure that that culture stays and that it is enforced. It's come at too much effort, not just by Congress, but by so many outstanding leaders who wear the uniform.”²⁵ Similarly, during a SASC hearing on 28 September 2010, Senator Ben Nelson, voiced concern: “I hope ... to bring together the elements of the military so that we eliminate stove piping and the protectionism of one branch of the government and its programs from the incursion by another branch of the military, that we’ll be able to maintain that jointness ... it’s not easy. Wasn’t easy, some time ago, or you wouldn’t—we wouldn’t have created the command to deal with it.”²⁶

Joint Forces Command’s disestablishment announcement also gained the attention of “think tank” organizations. Daniel Goure, vice president of the conservative Lexington Institute, stated that USJFCOM may be even more critical now given our nation’s fiscal crisis. While Dr. Goure praised the DBB’s focus on reducing overhead

²⁴ Ibid., 80.

²⁵ PilotOnline.com, “Pentagon Admits Savings Unknown if JFCOM Closed,” Virginia Pilot. <http://hamptonroads.com/2010/09/pentagon-admits-savings-unknown-if-jfcom-closed-0> (accessed 10 November 2010).

²⁶ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Department Of Defense Efficiencies Initiatives*, 111th Cong., 2d sess., September 28, 2010, 23.

and military staffs, he expressed concern about JFCOM's disestablishment, highlighting the Command's unique position as interagency (IA) integrator with a long range perspective across all the combatant commands:

the recommendation to eliminate JFCOM looks like a mistake. JFCOM serves a very useful and certainly unique role across the U.S. military. Its charter under the UCP allows it to cut across all the other major defense stakeholders to press for innovative and joint solutions. Alone, among the combatant commands, it is chartered to develop, test and disseminate joint operating concepts. By their very nature, the other combatant commands and even the services must focus narrowly on the problems of today and the needs of their particular institutions. Only JFCOM can take the broader, higher and longer range view. Also, JFCOM alone is capable of providing the intellectual, training and educational support for the integration of DoD activities with the other elements of national power.²⁷

The concerns of our congressional leaders and "think tanks" extend beyond the local economy and jobs to DoD capabilities, cooperation and readiness. Clearly, as Senator Nelson recognizes, jointness is not easy and JFCOM exists to ensure the military continues on a path towards it. Given today's budget climate, it is hard to argue with any cut in defense spending, but the dynamics of the JFCOM closure are unique. On face value, it does appear that we are "joint complete"; the DoD is probably more interoperable than ever after a decade of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan -- that makes the immediate case for closure more powerful. But this fails to acknowledge that jointness is really a journey, not an end state, impacted by operational experience, but shaped and sustained over time by our leaders and institutions like USJFCOM.²⁸ Unfortunately, we may sacrifice enormous value with USJFCOM's disestablishment with little fiscal savings to show for it.

²⁷ Daniel Goure, "Should Joint Forces Command Be Eliminated?" Lexington Institute, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/should-joint-forces-command-be-eliminated-?a=1&c=1171> (accessed 10 December 2010).

²⁸ Erik W Hansen, "Goldwater-Nichols – Failing to Go the Distance," 2.

CHAPTER 2: ADVANCING THE JOINT FORCE

“Jointness”: A Definition and Why it is Important

Joint Publication 1-02 defines “joint” actions or operations as those, “... in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.”¹ Retired General Anthony Zinni provides a more descriptive definition of “jointness” as the, “ability to blend the powerful capabilities each service brings to the battlefield in a way to achieve the maximum effectiveness and efficiency.”² Joint operations are team operations often defined by levels of cooperation and interoperability. In the fight, jointness is the integrated and synchronized use of all applicable tools allowing us to exploit our strengths across each phase of engagement. But true jointness extends beyond the battlefield as a constant, evolutionary effort. To be effective, for example, it must reflect how we develop capabilities, train for operations, and share information. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized the importance of the Joint Force throughout the 2011 National Military Strategy stating that, “... we will maintain a whole, Joint Force that retains quality people, sustains and develops the right capabilities, and maintains a sustainable tempo to effectively mitigate operational, institutional, force management, and future challenges risk.”³

As Secretary Gates alluded to in his August 2010 statements, the U.S. Armed Forces have advanced significantly in the last two decades as a joint force. Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom provide multiple cases of successful Service de-

¹ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C., amended through 30 May 2008), 243, <http://www.militarynewsnetwork.com/publications/militaryterms.pdf> (accessed 5 March 2011).

² Anthony Zinni and Tony Koltz, *The Battle for Peace*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 139.

³ U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011*, (Washington, D.C., 8 February 2011), 18.

confliction and cooperation particularly in the tactical domain. For example, the effective use of the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in support of U.S. Central Command provided a mechanism to integrate and synchronize air power with the commander's plan.⁴ Since the 1990s, a generation of young officers have been developed to begin to think and operate jointly. Our progress as a joint force has been hard-fought. However, like most significant transformation processes, it has been enabled through multiple, supporting efforts including institutional, policy and legislative reforms.

Why does advancing and sustaining jointness require changes in U.S. Code, DoD policy and military institutions to support effective integration? Jointness is an unnatural state. Military members are assessed, trained, and developed almost exclusively through Service institutions; the building blocks of our joint force are the Services and their core mission competencies. As a result, individual Service traditions, perspective and missions wield powerful influence on requirements and resources.

While key to our effectiveness as a force, Service culture and priorities can be an impediment to joint integration. Unlike the individual Services, there is no engrained "joint culture."⁵ Hence, institutions, leaders, and policy must act as a surrogate to advance the Joint Force and Service cooperation. A survey of the past reveals repeated efforts to support and later enforce joint progression of the military through the actions of visionary leaders and key measures like the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the establishment of Joint Forces Command.

⁴ Stephen O. Fought, Col O. Scott Key and USAFAWC Seminar Six, "Airpower, Jointness, and Transformation," *Air & Space Power Journal*, Winter 2003, 46, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/air-chronicles/apj/apj03/win03.html> (accessed 15 December 2010).

⁵ David Fautua, "The Paradox of Joint Culture," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 2000, 86, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfq/1626.pdf> (accessed 10 November 2010).

Joint Evolution and Reform

United States military history is replete with examples of jointness in organizations and operations with some effective and others futile. In 1903, following the Spanish-American War, the War Department and Department of the Navy formed the Joint Board, a group of Army and Navy leaders and planners that met periodically to foster cooperation and plan joint operations. While a significant step forward, the board functioned more as an advisory committee lacking authority to effect real change.¹

Despite the stalemates of trench warfare, World War I marked improved cooperation between the Army and USMC elements. The introduction of close air support was also significant and illustrative of the power and future potential of combined arms.² Following World War I, the value of this collaboration was acknowledged as the Service Secretaries agreed to revive and redesign the Joint Board with a more robust planning capability. The Joint Planning Committee acted as a supporting staff. However, the difficult issue of authority was still not addressed leaving this board with no more legal power than its predecessor.³ As a result, while its 1935 document, “Joint Action of the Army and Navy,” provided an opportunity for dialogue and a source of basic joint doctrine, it was widely ignored despite increasing tension and preparation for the Second World War. Historian Charles Kirkpatrick explains the inadequacy of coordination and joint doctrine in his examination of the first major campaign, Operation Torch:

¹ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1980), 269.

² John J. McGrath, *Fire for Effect: Field Artillery and Close Air Support in the US Army*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press), 46, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/mcgrath_fire.pdf (accessed 10 December 2010).

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff website, “Origin of Joint Concepts,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, <http://www.jcs.mil/page.aspx?id=12> (accessed 10 December 2010).

the procedures for joint action in 1941 consisted of an intentionally vague set of generalizations that preserved the independence of each armed service as much as possible. Ideally, military and naval commanders would cooperate in the conduct of joint overseas operations, developing their own [service] plans...The agreed-upon procedures suited a simpler world in which both services envisioned military operations aimed...at security of the Western Hemisphere. The militarily and politically complex war that came in 1941 overwhelmed such prewar assumptions.⁴

Though necessity overcame Service parochialism in some cases, like the Marine Corps landings in the Pacific, the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Normandy campaign in Europe, “the problem of joint actions was not settled during World War II, nor in the years immediately after the war.”⁵

Addressing significant reorganization and reform issues, like those revealed during World War II, require credible and tenacious leadership. The personalities and events of the War set the stage for historic reform.⁶ Dr. Frank Trager of New York University observed that, “we have seen, from time to time leadership capable of effecting change in policy came from civilians, from the military itself, or from a fortuitous combination of both. The experience during and immediately after World War II proved to be no exception.”⁷ With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, our leaders initiated one of the most important defense reorganization efforts in our history. This key legislation, however, required incredible fortitude and years of effort by one of the country’s legendary military figures and statesman.

⁴ Charles E. Kirkpatrick, “Joint Planning for Operation Torch,” *Parameters* (Summer 1991), 76, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/1991/1991%20kirkpatrick.pdf> (accessed 10 December 2010).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Realizing the importance of a joint-focused officer corps, General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz guided the creation of the Armed Forces Staff College in 1946.

⁷ Frank N. Trager, “The National Security Act of 1947: Its Thirtieth Anniversary,” *Air University Review*, November-December 1977, 2, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/-aureview/1977/nov-dec/trager.html> (accessed 22 November 2010).

Personalities and leadership do matter. Even as we faced the challenges of war, General George C. Marshall was looking forward towards reform and the future potential of joint operations. He was able to introduce his ideas about the proper structure of the military as early as 1943 because “... he was and is a revered figure in American history and that he was a great man gave weight to his views. His concern rose out of what he rightly anticipated to be postwar and inter-service differences and rivalries; the loss or decline of national interest in military affairs so clearly exhibited after [WWI]; and the difficulty in postwar peacetime to gain acceptance for a balanced defense program.”⁸ General Marshall’s views fueled the discussion over issues like command and control, Service Chief roles, department unification, and weapons standardization. Debate continued with growing intensity until the National Security Act of 1947 was passed.⁹ Subsequent amendments supported further change in 1949, 1953, and 1958.¹⁰

Clearly, creating and sustaining unity of action across the force could not be accomplished from within the military alone. The National Security Act of 1947 was a significant legislative step in the right direction. It created the National Military Establishment (NME) unifying the Services under a single department while re-enforcing civilian leadership roles by creating secretary positions for the new Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.¹¹ This act also created the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency, formalizing standing executive level defense and intelligence mechanisms.¹² Yet, disagreement and debate persisted, prompting the

⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰ Ibid., 3.

¹¹ Stephen A. Cambone, “*A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning*,” (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1998), 228.

¹² Trager, “The National Security Act of 1947: Its Thirtieth Anniversary,” 6.

Defense Secretary to convene a conference in Key West, Florida in March 1948, "... over the roles and missions of the Services ... [to work] out a detailed statement of functions of each Service and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."¹³

Often, attempts to build consensus, like the Key West Agreements, have been met with limited success as Service interests compete with joint cooperation. The Services are tasked to maintain their unique craft and specialized knowledge to execute operations within their domain. While a particular Service may be a better match for a specific role, there are multiple examples of fierce competition for missions and greater stature. Inter-service rivalry and the evolution of the United States nuclear weapons program illustrate some of the challenges.

Following World War II, the United States encountered a new strategic predicament that included nuclear weapons, a "Cold War" with the Soviets, and global responsibilities. The sweeping changes of recent defense legislation and budget cuts, extraordinary nuclear technology, and an emerging bi-polar world combined to reinforce Service rivalry instead of defuse it. At a time when jointness and Service cooperation was critical, basic unity of effort appeared lacking even with dialogue like the Key West Agreements. Dr. William Niskanen, with the CATO Institute, described the Service dynamics, highlighting some actions of the naval forces:

Through the end of World War II, the Army, Navy, and (Army) Air Force each had a single primary mission ... After [the] War ... separation of mission responsibilities broke down as a consequence of rapid development of military technology and the ... character of the potential military opposition. Each of the services developed forces in new mission areas as a hedge against changes in strategic concepts and military technology. An attempt to limit inter-service competition was made in the Key

¹³ Joint Chief of Staff, Historical Division, *History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1977*, 5 http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/reading_room/268.pdf (accessed 20 November 2010).

West agreement ... but this agreement was rapidly - and understandably - undermined ... The Navy, whose position was threatened by the absence of a significant Soviet surface navy, was most successful in broadening its mission base. They developed an effective contribution to the strategic offensive forces, first with the carrier air forces and subsequently with the Polaris missile submarines ... The Marines have been partly transformed from a navy-supported assault force to a more independent, sustained land-combat force. The carrier air forces have been reoriented to provide tactical air support for land combat in all theaters.¹⁴

Technology is always advancing, presenting new tools and challenges to the force. Nuclear weapons technology generated an astounding, new mission to monitor, deter, and deliver, as necessary, incredible destruction. Each Service competed for mission control and delivery. “The Air Force wanted to drop them from land-based bombers...Navy from carrier-based [forces]...and all three of the services invested ...in...development...of nuclear-tipped ballistic rockets and cruise missiles. Several other technologies - surface-to-air missiles, helicopters...were also significant...since their use did not fit neatly within...functional boundaries of...existing military departments.”¹⁵

Employing new technology in an efficient and effective manner requires cooperation and trust among the Services. The impact of cyberspace operations and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) technology presents a similar dynamic today as the Services compete for missions and resources. For example, recent Service competition between very similar ISR platforms, the Army Sky Warrior and the Air Force Predator, illustrates that advancing joint interests and cooperation can be just as contentious now as it was 60 years ago. As the Government Accounting Office

¹⁴ William Niskanen, as quoted in Stephen Enke, *Defense Management*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 5-6.

¹⁵ Fred Thompson, “Management Control and the Pentagon: The Organizational Strategy-Structure Mismatch,” *Public Administration Review*, Vol.51, No.1, 1991, <http://www.willamette.edu/~fthomps/MgmtCon/Strat&Struct.html>, (extract of this article accessed 10 December 2010).

concluded, “no one in DOD was exercising effective control over the Services’ competing programs. Finally, after 3 years of bickering, [OSD] had heard enough. On June 13, 2007, Deputy Secretary England issued a memorandum upholding [Army] procurement rights for the Sky Warrior, but directing the two Services to form a ‘joint integrated product team.’”¹⁶

In 1949, the response to similar inter-service rivalry was more power for the Secretary of Defense. The National Security Act of 1947 was amended modifying the National Military Establishment to create the Department of Defense and recognize its executive department status.¹⁷ This amendment was very significant as the powers of the Defense Secretary were enhanced making his office the focal point for, “... coordinating the activities of the three Services.”¹⁸ It elevated the Secretary’s status as the principal defense adviser to the President, while the three department secretaries and military chiefs were relegated to a second tier status.¹⁹

Despite this legislation, the inter-service competition that troubled General Marshall continued to flourish. For example, the Bradley-Vandenberg Agreement of May 1949 actually formalized the duplication of roles between Services as the Army vied to maintain small aircraft; this remains a point of contention still today.²⁰

Even as conflict loomed on the Korean peninsula, Service competition continued.

¹⁶ Del C. Kostka, “Moving Toward a Joint Acquisition Process to Support ISR,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 55 (4th Quarter 2009), 70, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-55/11.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2011).

¹⁷ Joint Staff. J-7 JETD, *Joint Officer Handbook, Staffing and Action Guide*, (Washington, D.C., August 2010), 92, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/joh_aug2010.pdf (accessed 5 March 2011).

¹⁸ Trager, “The National Security Act of 1947: Its Thirtieth Anniversary,” 6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Ian Horwood, *Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2006), 21, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA460480&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, (accessed 10 December 2010).

Fortunately, magnificent leadership provided both vision and a joint solution. For example, the Inchon landing in September 1950 was a remarkable success and example of joint cooperation. General MacArthur's leadership and vision of joint capabilities and potential was the decisive factor at Inchon. "During this period there was a great deal of infighting between the Services, yet MacArthur seemed to have a greater appreciation of the advantages of utilizing each Service's strengths than his peers ... The theater commander [General MacArthur] was ahead of his time in integrating the efforts of the Services."²¹

While the Inchon landing served as an example of successful jointness at the tactical and operational level, the 1950s remained a tumultuous time for the Department of Defense. With the exception of the minor reforms of 1953, it had been ten years since the last major defense act in 1947 and the "... defects of organization, as well as continuing inter-service friction over roles and missions, required executive and congressional decision-making."²² Several key issues served as a catalyst for action. Following the Korean War, the strategy of "Massive Retaliation" threatened the Army's existence as a principle force."²³ On October 4, 1957, the Soviets launched "Sputnik," the first successful manmade satellite, shocking both the American public and leadership.²⁴ Visionary leader and prophetic defense reformer, President Eisenhower made his intent clear to Congress in his State of the Union message in January, 1958. The stage was set for reform.

²¹ Edward W. Sheehan, *Operational Logistics: Lessons from the Inchon Landing Course Report*, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1996), 9-10.

²² Trager, "The National Security Act of 1947: Its Thirtieth Anniversary," 7.

²³ Enke, Stephen. *Defense Management*, 6.

²⁴ Trager, "The National Security Act of 1947: Its Thirtieth Anniversary," 7.

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 established clearer lines of authority, extending the power and influence of the Secretary of Defense to shift, eliminate or consolidate roles and missions. The Act also, "... clarified the chain of command from the Commander in Chief to the service chiefs, and to them acting jointly."²⁵ In addition, concern over Sputnik and independent Service acquisition was certainly reflected in the act's creation of the new Office of Defense and Research and Engineering (DR&E) whose Director "... was given direct authority to approve, disapprove, or modify all R&D programs of the Department. Key programs in ballistic missiles and satellites ceased to be separately managed by the military services. The ... Act explicitly stated that the DDR&E was equal in status to the service secretaries and ... occupied the number three position in the DOD."²⁶

With the advent of the Vietnam War, little seemed to change regarding Service jointness. Few operations involved joint forces, and ground units were usually separated by Service and mission. "Even air operations, which are easily integrated, were divided by firm boundaries separating areas of employment into Navy, Air Force, and Marine. This led to many instances of aircraft being jeopardized by surface to air missile sites located in another Service's area of responsibility."²⁷ This same separation was true among Service intelligence staffs for much of the war. According to Major General McChristian, the intelligence chief for the Military Assistance Command/Vietnam

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Defense Science Board Task Force, *The Roles and Authorities of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering*, (Washington, D.C.: Defense Science Board, October 2005), 29, <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA440086.pdf> (accessed 15 November 2010).

²⁷ Mark A. Alred, "Analysis Of Joint Doctrine: Should it Remain Directive," (thesis, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1995), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995-/AMA.htm>, (20 November 2010).

(MACV),“ ... in this conflict, all US intelligence organizations were not centralized under the MACV commander.”²⁸

The rivalry of the skies continued to escalate during the Vietnam War. Technology and trust (lack of) plagued the Army-Air Force relationship as air mobility became a center piece of ground force tactics. The Army’s “airforce” grew exponentially as rotary wing operations and assets gained prominence and Service competition intensified. “Always the subject of hostility from the Air Force, the crystallization of the Army’s ... airmobility forced the Air Force to respond with its own alternative airmobility concept. Ultimately, the Army’s version won ... but the realization of the full Army ... vision ... proved too rich for ... McNamara.”²⁹

As the Vietnam War progressed, however, the impact of sustained operations and experience yielded some significant joint efforts. As in the past, battlefield necessity seemed to trump some Service parochialism and became a driver of joint operations. For example, increasingly complex air operations led to more cooperation and jointness among the Services. In the case of the “Linebacker” campaign against North Vietnam, it featured Air Force and Navy strategic bombing and close air support combined with naval gunfire to blunt the North’s offensive.³⁰ Similar to U.S. joint successes during World War II, the crucible of sustained operations seemed to compel joint solutions.

Ingenuity and the pursuit of success on the battlefield can promote jointness among the Services, but often it is after needless deaths and mistakes. Wartime

²⁸ Joseph A. McChristian, *Vietnam Studies: The Role of Military Intelligence, 1965–1967* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974), 157.

²⁹ Ian Horwood, *Interservice Rivalry and Airpower in the Vietnam*, 37.

³⁰ Phillip S. Michael, *The Strategic Significance Of Linebacker II: Political, Military, and Beyond*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 6, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA414163> (accessed 10 December 2011).

operations can advance and support jointness, but it is only one of several key sustainers of the Joint Force. Military and civilian leadership also play a significant role in promoting jointness and shaping the joint force.

Civilian leadership took on greater prominence during the Vietnam War. Robert McNamara, the longest serving Defense Secretary in U.S. history, adopted centralized planning for the military on functional instead of Service lines. A number of his department unification programs promoted information sharing, efficiency and even joint action. For example, he combined the Army's Strategic Army Corps with the Air Force's Tactical Air Command to form Strike Command and required Service compiled intelligence be shared with the Defense Intelligence Agency.³¹

Yet, McNamara's unification efforts seemed primarily focused on civilian control vice promoting jointness among the Services. Efficiency and the science of force posture and war became paramount as "... he seemingly did not absorb the non-quantifiable arts of politics and war-making."³² Centralization and unification are not synonymous with jointness. The Joint Force as we understand it today is defined by Service competency and integration, not just cost savings and efficiency. McNamara's centralization efforts, "... produced a dangerous imbalance in civil-military relationships and policy-making ..." setting the stage for future Goldwater-Nichols reform.³³

As the Vietnam era came to a close, the Services sought to redefine their roles and tactics in the face of tumbling budgets, low morale, and the Soviet threat. The determination and vision of key leaders charted this new course. None more remarkable than the US Army, specifically Generals Depuy and Starry:

³¹ Trager, "The National Security Act of 1947: Its Thirtieth Anniversary," 10.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

With the able assistance of ... General Starry ... DePuy wrenched the Army from self-pity and recrimination about its defeat in Vietnam into a bruising doctrinal debate that focused the Army's ... energies on mechanized warfare against a first-class opponent. Critics might argue correctly that the result was incomplete, but they ought not to underestimate how far the Army had to come just to begin the discussion. AirLand Battle Doctrine would not and could not have existed had the "active defense" not been imposed on the unwilling Army of 1976.³⁴


Post-Vietnam reform and joint efforts truly took hold in the early 1980s. The development and implementation of concepts like AirLand Battle fostered dialogue and a cooperative effort between the Air Force and the Army in areas like joint attack and joint force development.³⁵ Similarly, the U.S. Navy and the Army worked closely together to enhance strategic mobility, most notably pre-positioned war stocks and new Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) initiatives.³⁶ Credible senior leadership guided this progress in jointness compelling cooperation and enforcing doctrinal and policy change to help sustain it. Most significantly, the U.S. faced a formidable threat, had a specific mission to defeat the Soviet Union, and a President in Reagan who funded military expansion, which lessened the pressure on the Service to compete with each other. Figure 2, extracted from a 1987 Army pamphlet, highlights these efforts and indicates they were new emphasis on Joint cooperation.

³⁴ William DePuy, *Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy First Commander, U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command, 1 July 1973*, edited by Donald Gilmore and Carolyn Conway, compiled by Richard Swain (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, CSI, 1994), vii, http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/swain3/-swain3_pt1.pdf (accessed 20 January 2011).

³⁵ Department of the Army, *The Joint Force Development Process*, Army Pamphlet 525-15, (Washington D.C.: 15 Jun 1987), 2-3, http://www.apd.army.mil/jw2/xmldemo/p525_15/main.asp (accessed 5 March 2011).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

Figure 2



Source: 1-1 Jointness Cooperation P. 2, Army Pamphlet 525-15, "The Joint Force Development Process" 15 Jun 1987, http://www.apd.army.mil/jw2/xmldemo/p525_15/main.asp.

While significant improvement was made in joint concept development and programs following the war, the operational force was still not postured, equipped or trained in jointness. Visionaries like Starry and Depuy were advancing joint initiatives, but they needed legislative and institutional support to realize true progress.

A collection of military missteps finally caught the attention of Congress, highlighting the need for defense reform. Lack of communications, joint training and interoperability were evident in each successive failure from, "...the Vietnam War, the *USS Pueblo*, the *Mayaguez*, the failed Iranian hostage rescue, the Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut, and finally the Grenada invasion."³⁷ The Iranian hostage operation proved especially troubling since it revealed a lack of readiness so profound that, "... even six

³⁷ Erik W. Hansen, "Goldwater-Nichols – Failing to Go the Distance," 3

months of organizing, planning, and training could not overcome institutional deficiencies.”³⁸

Though military members often find innovative ways to overcome stovepiped Service command and control (C2) architecture and other barriers, even relative successful operations, like Grenada, illustrated significant integration issues. Now infamous, after action reports, “like the soldier who used the commercial telephone to request C-130 gunship support and the Ranger officer who dialed the Grand Anse Campus to see if the students he was to rescue were still there, “indicated to our leadership that interoperability and jointness of the force was not a priority and would have to be imposed on the Services.”³⁹

James Locher III, former senior Senate staffer for the Goldwater-Nichols Act and recent assistant secretary of defense, provided an unvarnished appraisal of the Defense Department at the time:

The Pentagon badly needed reform. The military bureaucracy had tied itself in knots since World War II...decision making had become so convoluted, fiefdoms so powerful and inbred...and chains of command so entangled that the military hierarchy had repeatedly failed the nation. Third-rate powers and terrorists had humiliated America. Tens of thousands of troops had died needlessly. Unprecedented levels of defense spending were not making the nation more secure. Goldwater and Nunn were resolved to fix this dysfunctional system. The fiefdoms were equally determined to preserve their power and independence.⁴⁰

It was against this backdrop that the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, also known as “Goldwater-Nichols,” was signed into law.

³⁸ James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2002), 46.

³⁹ Stephen E. Anno and William E. Einspahr, “Extract from Command and Control and Communications Lessons Learned: Iranian Rescue, Falklands Conflict, Grenada Invasion, Libya Raid,” 46, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/lessons/c3_lessons.pdf (accessed 10 November 2010).

⁴⁰ Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 5.

Goldwater-Nichols Legislation

In the words of “Goldwater-Nichols” principal architect, Senator Barry Goldwater, the defense establishment “is broke, and we need to fix it.”⁴¹

Despite the glaring operational miscues and failures of the last four decades, the path to Goldwater-Nichols passage was not a smooth one. Once again, it was evident that advancing jointness required visionary leadership from both civilian and military quarters. In fact, it took, “...criticism from a sitting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to bring about major reorganization.”⁴²

Nearing retirement after four years as CJCS, General David Jones published an article entitled, “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change,” detailing a series of proposed reforms to expand joint training and experience and enhance the CJCS position and authorities. General Jones was a strong advocate of jointness particularly how it relates to professional development and assignments. “More officers should have more truly joint experiences at more points in their careers--and should be rewarded for doing so. There should be more interchange among Services, as Eisenhower advocated, and preparation for joint assignments should be significantly upgraded. The joint educational system should also be expanded and improved.”⁴³ General Edward Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, soon joined General Jones supporting his reform efforts while announcing even more drastic measures regarding the role of the JCS.⁴⁴ These senior leaders voiced their concerns at House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearings in February, 1982.

⁴¹ Greg H. Parlier, “The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986: Resurgence In Defense Reform and the Legacy of Eisenhower,” *Air University Review*, September-October 1985. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1989/PGH.htm> (accessed 15 January 2011).

⁴² Peter W. Chiarelli, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1993, 71, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jfq1102.pdf (accessed 10 January 2011).

⁴³ David C. Jones, “Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Spring 1982), 148.

⁴⁴ Chiarelli, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols,” 71-72.

The testimony of General Jones captured the attention of a new member of the HASC,

Ike Skelton:

I look forward to testifying on these budget issues, however, there is one subject I would like to mention briefly here. It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars and weapons systems; we must also have an organization which will allow us to develop the proper strategy, necessary planning, and the full war-fighting capability. We do not have an adequate organizational structure today ... at least in my judgment.⁴⁵

However, the new Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, did not support General Jones' reforms and he was not alone.⁴⁶ Testimony and debate continued for nearly 5 years as the, "... Pentagon and the Reagan Administration opposed reform. Every uniformed service saw a simplified chain of command from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, down to a CINC with command of cross-trained services as a threat to their traditional prerogatives."⁴⁷ Essentially, the critics were skeptical of jointness, asserting that Service authority and capabilities need to be nurtured, not centralized and subsumed by joint bureaucracy. Yet, even after the end of his tenure as the CJCS and subsequent retirement, General Jones remained committed to major DoD reorganization and reform supporting eventual Goldwater-Nichols passage.⁴⁸

Controversial reform like this requires tenacity from both military and civilian leadership.

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols Act) of 1986, sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols, sought to fundamentally redesign the Department of Defense power structures, enhancing the role

⁴⁵ U.S. Congress, House, *Panel on Roles and Missions: Initial Perspectives*, 2008, 16-17.

⁴⁶ Erik B. Riker-Coleman, *Political Pressures on the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Case of General David C. Jones*, (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Chapel Hill, 2001), 17, <http://www.unc.edu/~chaos1/jones.pdf> (accessed 18 January 2011).

⁴⁷ U.S. Congress, House, *Panel on Roles and Missions*, 2008, 17. Note: The term CINC (Commander-in-Chief) referred to the Commander of the Combatant Command, now referred to as the Combatant Commander (CCDR).

⁴⁸ Erik B. Riker-Coleman, *Political Pressures on the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 17.

of the CJCS and the unified commands while reducing the influence of the Services.⁴⁹ The supporters of Goldwater-Nichols sought to enforce jointness across the force after repeated operational failures and inadequate cooperation among the Services. Legislation was needed to address joint requirements instead of focusing solely on individual Service priorities. Visionary leaders like General Jones and Senator Goldwater remained committed to this sweeping reform despite the objections of most senior uniformed military and DoD officials.⁵⁰

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act finally passed with widespread support in both the House and Senate. The objectives of this landmark legislation include:


- (1) to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department of Defense;
- (2) to improve military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense;
- (3) to place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands;
- (4) to ensure that the authority of the unified and specified commanders is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of those missions assigned to their commands;
- (5) to increase attention in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning;
- (6) to provide for the most efficient use of defense resources;
- (7) to improve joint officer management policies; and
- (8) otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Ike Skelton, *Whispers of Warriors: Essays on the New Joint Era*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2004), 28.

⁵⁰ U.S. Congress, House, *Panel on Roles and Missions*, 17-18.

⁵¹ Richard M. Meinhart, *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 6-7.

Figure 3



Source: Bob Hume, Unified Command Plan (UCP), Department of Distance Education, 2009, https://dde.carlisle.army.mil/documents/courses_10/ppt/2208-UCP.ppt, slide 5.

Collectively, these objectives promote jointness while helping to simplify the chain of command and Service responsibilities (Fig 3). Congress was especially concerned about establishing clear lines of authority given recent problems. The Vietnam War provides ample “lessons learned” regarding command structures and authorities. As Representative Skelton observed, the mandates of Goldwater-Nichols set conditions to prevent similar elaborate and convoluted command relationships.

The chain of command during ...Vietnam ... was anything but clear and simple. While ...Westmoreland ... ran the ground war in South Vietnam, the Navy ran its own air operations over the North, as did the Air Force. And while the Air Force ran tactical aircraft ... Strategic Air Command maintained its own chain of command through the [JCS] ... for B-52 missions ... in the North. In other words, operational coordination was a nightmare. American military leaders violated one of the fundamental principles of war, unity of command. Goldwater-Nichols corrected the problems of Vietnam by strengthening the authority of the theater commander. Thus, in the war in the Gulf...Schwarzkopf, commanded all forces in the theater ... whether Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force. The military buzz word for

this ability to fight ... in a unified fashion is *jointness*. Unlike ... Vietnam, the effort was coordinated by a single commander in the theater running the entire show. Goldwater-Nichols made this unity of effort possible.⁵²

Like past leaders and U.S. military reform efforts since World War II, Goldwater-Nichols provided guidance and direction in an attempt to *impose* jointness on reluctant Service departments. Changes to combatant command authorities, Service responsibilities, education and promotion requirements all impacted advancement of the Joint Force. Goldwater-Nichols was a necessary step in the evolution of jointness.

Post Goldwater-Nichols and Beyond

*"The task we face is as complex as any national security challenge in our lifetimes. We will not succeed if people view this effort as the responsibility of a single party, a single agency within our government, or a single country."*⁵³ Secretary of State Clinton

The critics of Goldwater-Nichols reform have been proven largely incorrect, especially regarding strategic level command and control. "The fear that the services would lose their core competencies if forced to coordinate or that an Army General could not command Air Force assets never materialized."⁵⁴ Since passage of Goldwater-Nichols, the United States military has made significant progress as a joint force. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry noted the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation: "It dramatically changed the way ... American forces operate by streamlining the command process and empowering [the Chairman] and the unified commanders. These changes paid off in ... Desert Storm, in Haiti, and today in

⁵² Ike Skelton, *Whispers of Warriors*, 28-29.

⁵³ U.S. Department of State, "Embassy of the U.S., Kabul, Afghanistan: Remarks by Ambassador Eikenberry in Ft. Leavenworth, KS," U.S. Dep. of State, http://kabul.usembassy.gov/remarks_1106.html (accessed 15 March 2011).

⁵⁴ U.S. Congress, House, *Panel on Roles and Missions*, 17.

Bosnia.”⁵⁵ This success was hard-fought and sustainment of Goldwater-Nichols will require the attention of leaders and our institutions. Changes in technology, the strategic environment and available resources, all impact the progression or regression of the Joint Force. Change is constant and applies to jointness as well.

To be effective, jointness must extend to multiple functions and echelons with future technology and adversaries in mind. To that end, acquisition, joint procedures, interoperability and training must be integrated across tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. While enactment of Goldwater-Nichols reform set some of the basic conditions supporting the Joint Force, history has shown that legislation alone cannot sustain and advance jointness. It requires visionary leadership at senior levels shaping policy, institutional support and implementation efforts. General Colin Powell, one of the most influential U.S. military figures of the last half century, provided that leadership.

A true joint advocate, General Powell used the office of the Chairman to reorganize the combatant commands. Based on his experience during Operation Desert Storm and given the end of the Cold War, “... General Powell ... took the initiative in creating a CONUS-based command designed to deal with contingencies and perform the function of joint force integrator ... Powell selected US Atlantic Command (USACOM), in which all Services would be represented.”⁵⁶ By October 1993, USACOM was expanded to include all Service components -- Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Air Combat Command (ACC), Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT), and Atlantic Fleet

⁵⁵ James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols”, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1996: 10-17, 15, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0834.pdf (accessed 15 January 2011).

⁵⁶ Ronald H. Cole, Walter S. Poole, James F. Schnabel, Robert J. Watson and Willard J. Webb, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999*, (Washington, D.C: Joint History Office, 2003), 6.

(CINCLANTFLT).⁵⁷ Backed by General Powell’s leadership, USACOM was, “ ... promised to open a new chapter in the evolution of the joint system.”⁵⁸

Powell seemed to recognize that while legislation and leadership could jump start jointness, institutional support, like USACOM, would help “operationalize” and sustain it across the force. With the re-designation of a four-star combatant command (USACOM) as the military’s joint advocate, the Chairman established immediate credibility for joint initiatives. Others also shared General Powell’s emphasis and vision of a joint force.

The independent Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) released a report in May 1995 detailing over 100 recommendations, calling for reform beyond Goldwater-Nichols, and arguing, “... that the terms of the roles and missions debate should focus on the needs of the ... (CINCs), on the capability of their forces to carry out joint operations ... not on the capabilities of the individual Services.”⁵⁹

The CORM also concluded that the Defense Department’s structure contributed to multiple, competing visions based on Service specific interests and the diverse, regional “CINC” perspectives. The Commission also advised General John Shalikashvili, the new Chairman, to present a unified “vision” for joint operations.⁶⁰

The CORM’s recommendations led the Joint Chiefs to release *Joint Vision 2010* (JV2010) in 1996.⁶¹ The intent of JV2010 (and the subsequent Joint Vision 2020 published in 2000) was to provide a joint, comprehensive vision across Service and

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul S. Frederiksen, *America’s Uncertain Approach to Strategy and Force Planning*, Working Draft for Review and Comment, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 16, <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0607cordesman.pdf> (accessed 10 January 11).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

geographic command boundaries; a critical step forward, advancing Department of Defense jointness. This recognition of the complexity and numerous functional domains of jointness further reinforced the role of institutional support, like USACOM.

With increasing terrorist threats and concerns regarding progress of the joint force, General Hugh Shelton, continued this effort directing a study of the next Unified Command Plan (UCP):

After considering CINC recommendations, Joint Staff proposals and a ... study titled UCP 21, Shelton decided to give a redesigned USACOM the lead on a variety of joint issues ... Accordingly in the UCP [29 September 1999] ... USJFCOM replaced USACOM ... and would serve as the lead joint force integrator, the lead agent for joint force training, and the DOD executive agent for joint force experimentation.⁶²

General Shelton's intent was clear - further empower joint progress in name and by specific function. With the authority of the UCP, the United States *Joint Forces Command* was now the lead for joint training, integration and experimentation.⁶³

The need for institutional support like USJFCOM was apparent. Well over a decade after Goldwater-Nichols passage, numerous examples of operational and tactical miscues pointed to the need for more joint emphasis. In his article addressing lack of joint operational progress during the 1990s, Douglas McGregor commented on Service component control of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in the Balkans:

NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in March 1999 began [with] the largest UAV deployment by Western forces since the Gulf War. Linking UAVs to CAOC via satellite illustrated the value of an effective joint system for coordinating operations with service air platforms and distributing imagery across services. The fact that most UAVs (except Air Force Predators) belonged to ground units raised questions on joint management, control, and direction of these vehicles. Without a joint operational architecture embracing theater

⁶² Ronald H. Cole, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999*, 7.

⁶³ Italics added for emphasis by the author.

forces, such questions were largely reduced to a fight among services for control and were not resolved.⁶⁴

Rapidly advancing technologies like UAVs still present challenges regarding acquisition, control and interoperability among the Services. In 2009, Del Kostka observed in *Joint Forces Quarterly* that the, "... DOD [still] does not have a joint, cohesive process to define and validate ISR requirements or efficiently acquire new systems to support warfighter needs."⁶⁵ Joint acquisition and interoperability issues impact all of the Services.

In 1998, the Navy had to replace a battle group as the individual vessels were not interoperable: "The new Aegis cruiser, with the latest state-of-the-art systems, could not communicate reliably with the older systems due to poor configuration management and the failure to backfit. Here, the Navy could not communicate with itself, let alone with other services or allies."⁶⁶

Lack of joint training and interoperability plagued the Army's aviation-based Task Force Hawk in Kosovo in 1999. Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Owens made these observations:

The Apaches were unable to integrate ... with assets such as ... E-8 JSTARS...EC-130 Compass Call ... and the F-16CJs equipped to defeat Serbian air defenses ... Sixteen years after Grenada—during which Army ground troops ... [were] ... unable to communicate with Navy carrier aircraft providing critical close-air support ... the Army and Air Force assets rushed to Kosovo still could not communicate with one another ... No one has ever seriously envisioned including Army aviation into a theater strategic air campaign. Everybody trains, organizes, and equips to their service

⁶⁴ Douglas A. Macgregor, "The Joint Force - A Decade, No Progress," *Joint Force Quarterly* Winter 2000-2001, 21, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0727.pdf (accessed 12 December 2010).

⁶⁵ Del C. Kostka, "Moving Toward a Joint Acquisition Process to Support ISR," 70.

⁶⁶ Ellen Maldonado, *Matching Investment to Strategy: Preparing the Department of Defense for the Future*, 9, (Washington D.C.: National War College, 2001), <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?A-D=ADA445170&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf> (accessed 12 December 2010).

doctrine ... When the services come to a war, they come with their service doctrines, not a joint doctrine.⁶⁷

To his credit, Admiral Owens' assessment of joint training and interoperability was brutally honest. Hard lessons from Grenada were not shared and properly "operationalized" prior to Kosovo. Forces were "rushed" into place without adequate training and communication assets. He even acknowledges that the air campaign was not able to accommodate Army aviation assets, particularly since Services "come with their service doctrine, not a joint doctrine."⁶⁸ Admiral Owens, himself, makes the case for USJFCOM and the need for joint training, doctrine and interoperability.

Since its establishment in 1999, USJFCOM has facilitated joint transformation through concept development and experimentation, advocating joint requirements, promoting interoperability, conducting joint training and simulation and providing global force management solutions.⁶⁹ In a statement before congress in 2005, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of USJFCOM, Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, provided multiple examples of USJFCOM programs and processes designed to advance and sustain jointness:⁷⁰

- We have created... a real time Lessons Learned capability which provides immediate support for the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) and insights into capability gaps which need immediate action. Based on our Lessons Learned ... we have submitted a number of packages of change recommendations to immediately address capability shortfalls.
- Every major DoD wargame since May 2003 has been run as a Joint game co-sponsored by a Service and Joint Forces Command ... This has

⁶⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul S. Frederiksen, *America's Uncertain Approach*, 19.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 18.

⁷⁰ Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., *Advance Questions for Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., USN, Nominee for the Position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 2005, 7-8, http://www.global-security.org/military/-library/congress/2005_hr/050629-giambastiani.pdf (accessed 15 November 2010).

resulted in the further development of the “common joint context” which further informs all Joint and Service concept development work.

- We have focused Joint Training on preparing the Joint Task Force[JTF] Commander and his staff to execute real world joint operations, with a special emphasis on mission rehearsal exercises ... preparing for [OEF/OIF] ... we assisting in the training of the majority of [JTFs] around the world and conduct staff assist visits to help current joint commanders.
- We have increased the training of new flag and general officers in an expanded CAPSTONE Joint Operations Module ... In addition we have created new [JTF] Headquarters training for 2- and 3-star officers and senior enlisted leaders.
- We have worked to ... improve our processes to source the capability requirements of the Combatant Commanders. Working closely with ... (CCDRs) and the Joint Staff to execute Joint Forces Command’s Primary Joint Force Provider Mission.
- We have continued to work on joint interoperability, with a particular focus on Joint Command and Control (JCC). Using our Joint Battle Management Command and Control Authorities ... we have worked with the Services and (CCDRs) to improve all aspects of [JCC], issued a detailed Roadmap, and are executing our first program ... Deployable [JCC].
- We have drastically increased our work with Allies .. visibly demonstrated by the growth in...Liaison Officers [LNO] assigned... Just two years ago we had 11 Foreign [LNOs] from 5 countries ... now there are 55 officers from 33 countries.

This brief extract from Admiral Giambastiani’s statement provides examples of functions or training that promote interservice coordination. These activities impact all Services, especially in several key areas supporting combat: mission rehearsal exercises, “Lessons Learned” programs, senior leader training, force provider coordination, joint interoperability programs, command and control concept development and partnership outreach which all shape the Joint Force.

As a functional command, USJFCOM is not focused on a specific geographic region or adversary. Looking across the operations of fellow combatant commands and JTFs, Joint Forces Command acts as a global joint synchronizer, sharing best practices, training joint doctrine and procedures, and advocating for joint capabilities. Four-star combatant command status gives USJFCOM credibility and access to engage as a full partner. But, as Admiral Giambastiani made clear, joint transformation is never complete. Promoting and sustaining Service de-confliction, interoperability and, ultimately, interdependence is an ongoing effort.

So what is the future of Goldwater-Nichols reform and joint transformation? Recent events indicate many opportunities to improve the Joint Force. For example, the planning and execution of one of the most important operations in Afghanistan reveals the need for continued focus on jointness.

Communications, coordination and planning among the Service components was lacking from the start of Operation ANACONDA. A comprehensive Air Force case study stated that inadequate synchronization of land and air elements was evident at all levels.⁷¹ In the beginning of February 2002, planning for ANACONDA commenced without proper integration of the air component until the end of the month. General Michael Moseley, Combined Forces Air Component Commander, stated, "... 'if you exclude a component from the planning...that will provide the preponderance of support, logistic and kinetic, then you will have to live with the outcome of this not playing out very well.'"⁷² The study also noted this separation in planning continued as ground

⁷¹ Department of the Air Force, *Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, February 7, 2005), 114, <http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-060726-037.pdf> (accessed 5 March 2011).

⁷² Ibid.

rehearsals and air preparation remained independent, with each component, “Working hard on their pieces of the battle ... there was little component initiative to reach out to the other to enhance coordination and effectiveness.”⁷³ As execution of ANACONDA began, previous independent Service operations appeared to hinder full understanding of the limitations and challenges of the Afghan theater:

ANACONDA began without a shift in ... mindset for operations in theater. Previous operations had not made the limitations clear. Special ... forces relied on well-equipped controllers...[for]...CAS and...interdiction strikes a few at a time ... Marines at Kandahar faced opposition but brought their own air control net. When ... Army forces prepared for ... ANACONDA, the deficiencies in ground communications and air control had not been fully exposed and remedied.⁷⁴

Continuing to address operational and tactical challenges described above is at the heart of successful jointness. But, what else looms in the future? The relationships and roles of the interagency indicates a likely course of reform.

The realities of a post 9/11 world and our counter-insurgency efforts of the last decade reveal shortcomings in IA coordination and integration. A true need exists to transform the interagency to promote coherent, unified action across all elements of national power. The authors of the “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” reports highlight specific interagency issues as key areas for reform.⁷⁵ These functions include:

- Institutionalize strategic planning for national security
- Increase USG unity of effort in interagency operations
- Enhance “jointness” among interagency personnel
- Build operational capacity in non-DoD personnel
- Elevate homeland security and integrate it with national security

⁷³ Ibid.,118.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 115-6.

⁷⁵ Author is referring to the “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 and 2 Reports”

- Strengthen advocacy of joint capability requirements⁷⁶

This report co-ops and expands the military term of “joint” operations applying it across the interagency (IA) with the goal of creating and sustain an operational IA capacity capable of effective planning, liaison, and deployment. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams of Afghanistan and Iraq are a prime example of this concept in action.⁷⁷

Sustaining and expanding that type of planning and expeditionary capability across the interagency enterprise requires leadership, institutional support, and legislation. President Bush supported this new form of jointness as he signed National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44) in December 2005 establishing DoS as the lead for government-wide civilian preparation for contingencies.⁷⁸ This directive also established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) as the lead to synchronize U.S. government initiatives regarding reconstruction and stabilization abroad.

In 2002, prior to NSPD 44, USJFCOM took the initiative and conducted development and experimentation with a concept known as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). Following their initial work, “... JROC approved JFCOM operationalizing JIACG prototypes [in the CCMDs]. Phased prototyping in 2003 and 2004 included ... successful testing of the JFCOM model in real world operations

⁷⁶ Clark A. Murdoch, Michele A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt M. Campbell, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase II Report*, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 15, http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/bg-n_ph2_report.pdf (accessed 12 December 2010).

⁷⁷ CENTCOM HQ/MacDill AFB Information & Resources, “USCENTCOM: PRTs look at way forward in Afghanistan,” USCENTCOM, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/what-we-do/prts-look-at-way-forward-in-afghanistan.html> (accessed 15 January 2011).

⁷⁸ Megan Garcia, “Driving Coordination: An Evaluation of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Military Affairs,” (master’s thesis, Goldman School of Public Policy, Univ of California-Berkeley, 2010), 5, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAC062.pdf (accessed 12 January 2011).

(ORHA, CPA, Haiti Operation – SOUTHCOM JIACG, and Unified Assistance – SE Asia Tsunami) [and] combatant command (CCMD) joint exercises ... ”⁷⁹

Like experimentation with many similar concepts, USJFCOM gained certain efficiencies by conducting the effort on a larger scale instead of individual combatant commands all performing their own testing. Implementation and training of JIACGs is also a complex endeavor considering all of the agencies and combatant commands involved. Reports indicate that there is still much to be done to develop this critical capacity in the combatant commands. “These innovations have had varying degrees of success. But fundamentally, they have all been piecemeal approaches, and none has solved the larger integration problem.”⁸⁰

The interagency challenge is three-fold: Culture, capacity, and “command.” The non-defense agencies do not share an integrated chain of command. Title 10 of USC 7 grants the Defense Secretary control of the DoD (subject to the President); the President does not have similar power over non-defense agencies except during temporary emergencies.⁸¹ As a result, funding, authorities and basic coordination can be very difficult across multiple agencies. While some incremental changes have occurred to facilitate IA coordination and readiness (e.g., NSPD 44), it is unlikely that wholesale structural and legal changes will be implemented. As a result, the integration of all the

⁷⁹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *Fact Sheet: Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), A Prototyping Effort*, 2, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jiacgfactsheet.pdf> (accessed 20 January 2011). Note: Responsibility for overseeing reconstruction in post-conflict Iraq initially fell to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). Established in early 2003, ORHA was headed by Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, U.S. Army (ret.). By June 2003, ORHA was subsumed, by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which is led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III.

⁸⁰ Clark A. Murdoch, et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase II Report*, 45.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 17.

elements of national power, "... must be accomplished within the constraints of the American political system – that is, in the absence of unity of command."⁸²

The Defense department's capabilities and sheer size dwarf the other IA partners. Interagency capacity for planning, liaison, and participation is limited. U.S. Joint Forces Command occupies a unique position to build this capacity as a common interagency training source with proximity to both the Services and IA partners concentrated in Washington D.C. In the conduct of this effort, deliberate teaming and training also supports mutual understanding of military culture and that of other interagency elements.

Achieving unity of effort under these circumstances is intensive and is built upon training and personal relationships. Even our allies recognize this challenge and opportunity in sustaining and advancing jointness. According to an Australian comrade, Brigadier General Michael Krause, "Future warfare will demand a **'beyond joint'** interagency approach that emphasizes ... multiagency operations in which naval and air forces play an important but supporting role. This will put increasing tension on our current understanding of 'jointness'."⁸³ The authors of the "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" summed this up best: "The bottom line is this: Interagency operations are the next frontier of jointness and one that the United States cannot afford to neglect."⁸⁴ As the military's principle joint advocate, USJFCOM recognized this early and has been on the leading edge of IA coordination, training and concept development for the past decade.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Michael G. Krause, *Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt*, Working Paper No. 132, (Land Warfare Studies Centre, Commonwealth of Australia 2007),4, http://www.army.gov.au/lwsc/docs/WP_132.pdf (accessed 12 December 2010). (note: Krause employed bold text for emphasis).

⁸⁴ Clark A. Murdoch, et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase II Report*, 49.

CHAPTER 3: JOINT TRANSFORMATION: MULTIPLE SUSTAINERS OF JOINTNESS

*“Transformation is a process – not an end-state ... our vision of how we want to operate in the future is constantly evolving as we learn more through experimentation, exercises and operations ...”*¹ Admiral Giambastiani

Since its inception, the Department of Defense has been struggling to advance jointness. Constant change in the strategic environment, new technology and resource availability all combine to make joint transformation an ongoing effort without end state. Given this complexity and the competing interests of the Services, jointness is not a self-sustaining condition. It is perishable and requires support.


This paper’s brief historical survey of war, reform and our forces, indicate that there are multiple sustainers of jointness. Leaders, legislation, operations and institutional support all promote the Joint Force. However, their influence is dynamic as one or more may emerge briefly to lead sustainment and progress in joint operations. For example, joint transformation and sustainment may take a new direction based on a surge in combat operations, the emergence of a visionary military leader, congressional reform or effective institutional support.

While our history reveals a cyclic progression and regression of joint operations, our interest lies in sustaining and advancing joint transformation among the Services regardless of current operations. To accomplish this, Service culture and proficiency must remain in balance with the requirements and implementation of the Joint Force. As noted by the authors of *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, phase 2*, “The key to ... [DoD] success is its people, and the people are loyal to their ... Service before the Department

¹ Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr., “Advance Questions for Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani”, 9.

... Services build and sustain the profession of arms in their respective domains of warfare ... While loyalty to the ... Services is a good thing and must be preserved, it does bring a parochialism that must be managed. This is the inherent challenge of ‘jointness’.”² To better illustrate this concept, Figure 4 portrays significant sustainers and detractors of joint transformation.

Figure 4



Multiple Sustainers of “Jointness”³

The Paradigm: Multiple Sustainers of “Jointness”

As the figure depicts, the evolution of “jointness” is a dynamic effort with numerous points of influence. One could identify hundreds of factors that influence inter-service jointness, but four key elements (large gray ovals) seem to have the greatest

² Clark A. Murdoch, et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase II Report*, 22.

³ This figure was designed by the author. However, the following Joint Forces Staff College faculty members were consulted for guidance and feedback: Bryon Greenwald, Ph.D., Keith Dickson, Ph.D., and Col Bruce Miller.

positive impact. Visionary leaders, institutional support, legislation, and operations all sustain and advance the Joint Force. While their role and level of influence changes over time, as represented by the small black arrows, the elements provide direction, support, reform or experience contributing to the state of inter-service jointness. When one of these elements is less active, the others will likely require more effort or emphasis. For example, with the expected reduction in combat operations in U.S. Central Command's region, more joint training and engagement by "institutional support" and "leaders" will be critical to sustaining and advancing jointness.

The shaded squares depict major actors or processes associated with each of the four key elements (large gray ovals). On the top, "visionary leaders" impacting joint transformation are represented by distinguished military and civilian figures. The element of leadership offers the greatest opportunity for rapid change as they can impact the formation and activity of other three elements and the Services.

On the right, under "institutional support," mechanisms like "USJFCOM" and Joint "PME" (Professional Military Education) have been created over time by leaders and legislation in order to implement, train, and enforce joint practices and policies. On the bottom, major "legislation" impacting military operations takes the form of "defense budgets" and "reform." Landmark legislation like Goldwater-Nichols and the National Security Act of 1947 set conditions and policy to promote and, in some cases, impose jointness on the force.

On the right, with ongoing "operations," "lessons learned" and "battlefield necessity" emerge as two sustainers of jointness. Most deliberate teaming among the Services is often driven by "battlefield necessity." Similarly, joint success and miscues

or “lessons learned,” are more evident and available when forged during combat operations. In the center, the Military Services (arrows), steeped in their culture and priorities, often counter joint transformation as they pursue Service specific capabilities and resources.

The combatant commands are represented by the dashed oval in the lower left corner. Their contribution to jointness varies in intensity and frequency since assigned forces and operations are dynamic. For example, USPACOM may assume more operations as USCENTCOM operations drawdown. The banner across the bottom of Figure 4 depicts the inverse relationship between intensity and scope of ongoing joint operations and the need for joint training (in the absence of extensive operations).

Each of the four key elements (large gray ovals) occupies a principle level of jointness. Broad policy and strategy is the domain of visionary leaders and legislation. In operations, the combatant commands sit at the nexus of strategic and operational execution; they provide unity of command focusing on a specific region or function. They direct the operational and tactical application of jointness by the Service teams. During peace and war, institutional support can cut across all levels from policy to tactical execution. U.S. Joint Forces Command, for example, supports implementation of leader policy and strategy, and joint operational training, while sharing lessons learned by developing future concepts for tactical execution. Application of this paradigm to both past and present, illustrates that joint transformation is dynamic as the impact of operations, leaders, legislation and institutions change.

Operations

Our history as a military force reveals both joint success and failure. WWII, the Korea Conflict, Vietnam, and more recent operations provide numerous lessons regarding command and control, interoperability, and Service integration in combat. Ongoing operations provide a “laboratory” for new techniques and procedures. Often, out of battlefield necessity, operations act as a driver, propelling new joint concepts and cooperation. The Pacific landings of WWII, MacArthur’s success at Inchon, Service cooperation during the LINEBACKER Air Campaign, and joint coordination elements like CENTCOM’s CAOC were conceived and refined with the demands of battle.

The lessons of combat operations are usually the most useful but also the most costly. Goldwater-Nichols pioneer and former CJSC, General David Jones, remarked, “Although most history books glorify our military accomplishments, a closer examination reveals a disconcerting pattern: unpreparedness at the start of war; initial failures; reorganizing while fighting; cranking up our industrial base; and ultimately prevailing by wearing down the enemy – by being bigger, not smarter.”⁴ General Jones’ observation provides insight as to why we should preserve and sustain the jointness achieved in battle.

There is no equivalent substitute for “real-world” operations. In this environment, military leaders and formations will often be driven to jointness by necessity as the best combination of capabilities and tactics is eventually applied. And, we learn from that success and failure, at least temporarily, as we employ new concepts, techniques, and technologies. But, our history indicates that extensive military operations are not without

⁴ Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, 15.

end. The sine wave of conflict produces brief sustainment signals for jointness as Services become accustomed to more cooperation and interaction during operations.

Secretary Gates attributed operations as the driver of the Joint Force as part of his 9 August 2010 statement announcing the disestablishment of USJFCOM: "... propelled by decades of operational experience, the U.S. military has largely embraced jointness as a matter of culture and practice..."⁵ Operations are a key sustainer of jointness.

However, as we face inevitable draw down with the completion of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, what sustainers of jointness will fill the void?

Visionary Leaders

*"Peacetime military innovation occurs when respected senior military leaders formulate a strategy for innovation that has both intellectual and organizational components."*⁶ Rosen, *Winning the Next War*

Visionary leaders often step forward to sustain and promote the Joint Force, especially during inter-war periods. Their unique position allows them to influence legislative direction and reform, while shaping institutional mechanisms. The previous chapters provide numerous examples of leaders, both military and civilian, who directed joint transformation. A highly respected and visionary leader, General Marshall witnessed operational success and failure during World War II and began his efforts to influence and guide significant joint reform as early as 1943.⁷ Five-star Army general and 34th President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was a true advocate of jointness both in and out of uniform. In his message to Congress in 1958 regarding the reorganization of the defense establishment, President Eisenhower noted, "... separate

⁵ Robert Gates, "SECDEF Statement," 9 August 2010, 5, <https://dap.dau.mil/policy/Documents/Policy/Efficiencies%20Statement%20As%20Prepared.pdf> (accessed 10 December 2010).

⁶ Stephen P. Rosen, *Innovation and the Modern Military: Winning the Next War*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 7.

⁷ Trager, "The National Security Act of 1947: Its Thirtieth Anniversary," 3.

ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort.”⁸

With each post war period, these leaders recognized that the world had changed. Our strategic environment was impacted both at home and abroad. After Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War, risk and opportunities and the state of the Joint Force were addressed with varied success. For example, following the end of the post Cold War period, Generals Powell, Shalikashvili, and Shelton recognized that in order to achieve the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols reform, institutional support like USJFCOM would be essential.

Looking at the role and considerable responsibility of these leaders warrants a word of caution. Cultivating leaders through education and opportunities to “think” is a deliberate decision. For example, after his second tour in Iraq, General David Petraeus was assigned to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas as the Commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center, “... a posting that many saw as a form of exile, far from the corridors of political power in Washington.”⁹ But, it was not without purpose. Like Generals Starry and Depuy before him, Petraeus had time and opportunity to reflect on his experience, ultimately revising Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, with the support of Marine Generals Amos and Mattis.¹⁰ Innovative and visionary leaders are key to strategy formulation for the Joint Force; we must ensure that we develop them and

⁸ Eisenhower Presidential Library & Museum Web Site Information, “Dwight D. Eisenhower Quotes” Special Message to the Congress on Reorganization of the Defense Establishment, 4/3/58, National Archives and Records Administration, http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/All_About_Ike-/Quotes/Quotes.html (accessed 10 December 2010).

⁹ Charles M. Sennott, The Petraeus Doctrine, *The Boston Globe*, January 28, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/01/28/the_petraeus_doctrine/.

¹⁰ John A. Nagl, “The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*,” <http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/841519foreword.html> (accessed 15 December 2010).

leverage their experience properly. Major General Robert Scales, refers to the "Petraeus Model" as a success story of allowing rising stars time and space to think during their careers.¹¹

Senior leaders, like Petraeus and Marshall bring credibility and prestige to their organizations and endeavors. The source of their success is often built upon personal relationships rather than authority. A review of history illustrates the impact of prominent leaders bringing about reform, particularly during inter-war periods and times of fiscal challenge. In addition, senior leaders guiding joint support commands like USJFCOM, add credibility and importance to joint transformation.

Without senior DoD leadership support of joint operations' constant evolution, jointness will take a back seat to Service parochialism. Leaders matter. Their role, in partnership with prominent civilians, establishes the framework for reform.

Legislation

Legislation provides the basic authorities and intent supporting joint transformation. Historically, it often attempts to impose jointness upon what seems to be an unwilling cast of Services. For example, Goldwater-Nichols legislation established clear lines of combatant command authority to conduct assigned missions.¹²

We have preserved the basic dichotomy of separate Services and joint operations in an attempt to achieve the best results. But this relationship requires constant tending, occasionally in the form of legislation and reform.

¹¹ Robert H. Scales, "Too Busy to Learn," *Proceedings* 136, no. 2/1 (February 2010), www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=2195 (accessed 22 January 2011).

¹² Richard M. Meinhart, *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 6-7.

Major transformation of any kind, whether in or out of the military, entails overcoming organizational inertia. Richard Rumelt addresses transformation in the corporate world, identifying “vested values” and interests as the greatest impediment to change, similar to the parochialism and culture of our Services.¹³ Dr. Allan Millett suggests that military reform is even more complex since it is applied across five distinct dimensions:

- the organization of the four services that comprise the armed forces and the network of civil, political agencies with which they work;
- technology;
- the social composition of the armed forces and the set of formal regulations and informal mores that determine social relationships in the armed forces;
- the nature and functions of officership in the armed forces; and
- the development of operational doctrine and tactics for force employment.¹⁴

The U.S. military is not a single company or discrete organization making transformation even more complex. Legislation and reform must be re-visited from time to time because the inputs to jointness are not static. “Watch dogs” must be in place to preserve what we have achieved and adjust based on new inputs.

Institutional Support

*“...propelled by decades of operational experience, the U.S. military has largely embraced jointness as a matter of culture and practice, though we **must always remain vigilant against backsliding on that front.**”¹⁵ Secretary of Defense Gates*

Established by leaders and legislation, institutional support is a “watch dog” or caretaker of joint transformation. It provides routine mechanisms to promote jointness and “remain vigilant against backsliding ...”, as the Secretary Gates cautions. When

¹³ Richard P. Rumelt, *Precis of Inertia and Transformation*, (Norwell, Mass.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 8, http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty/dick.rumelt/Docs/Papers/berkeley_precis.pdf (accessed 18 January 2011).

¹⁴ Allan R. Millett, “Military Reform in America,” *Air University Review*, Sept-Oct 1985, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1985/sep-oct/mill.html> (accessed 12 December 2010).

¹⁵ Robert Gates, “SECDEF Statement,” 9 August 2010, 5-6. (Note: Bold highlight added by author for emphasis).

empowered, key elements like the Joint Staff, USJFCOM, doctrine and JPME provide continuity to sustain jointness. These elements also help foster buy in of joint concepts and operations through training, policy and education.

Functions and organizations like these are enabled when established by law or leaders. Goldwater-Nichols imposed joint training requirements and qualifications for promotion. Joint duty and JPME were finally enforced supporting education and assignment outside of Service requirements. Goldwater-Nichols also included mandates for doctrine development by the CJCS for the joint employment of forces.¹⁶ Each function provides support at a primary level: policy, strategic, operational and tactical.

Working with our senior leaders in Washington D.C., the Joint Staff provides an interface between policy and broad strategy regarding the Joint Force. Since its establishment in 1947, it has acted in an advisory capacity without executive authority over combatant forces.¹⁷ However, by virtue of geography and focus, it became apparent that effective institutional joint advocacy of reform like Goldwater-Nichols could not reside in the capital alone. According to the Government Accounting Office:

Until 1993, the lack of a joint headquarters to oversee the forces ... based in ... [CONUS] ... was long considered a problem that the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried twice to fix. The concept of a joint headquarters for U.S.-based forces resurfaced again at the end of the Cold War. In making a recommendation in 1993 to the Secretary of Defense ... General Colin Powell, said that such a command would bring greater focus to joint training and operations among continental U.S.-based forces. [These] forces, he said, needed to be trained to operate jointly as a way of life. Acting [on Powell's] ... recommendation, the Secretary of Defense assigned USACOM this responsibility in October 1993.¹⁸

¹⁶ Air University Library, "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," Public Law 99- 433, 99th U.S. Cong., October 1, 1986, USAF Air University, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/-awcgate/congress/title_10.htm (accessed 10 November 2010).

¹⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff website, "Origin of Joint Concepts," Joint Chiefs of Staff, <http://www.jcs.mil/page.aspx?id=12> (accessed 10 December 2010).

¹⁸ U.S. Government Accounting Office, *U.S. Atlantic Command, GAO/NSIAD-99-39*, 4.

While the JCS and Joint Staff issue institutional direction, USACOM, and later USJFCOM, provided a vehicle to “operationalize” jointness through training, doctrine and interface with combatant commands and the Services. J.E. Dyer, observed, “JFCOM’s utility ... has been unique: unlike the Joint Staff in Washington, its principal orientation is theory, application, and the lessons from combat — not on the Defense Department budget or the programming cycle.”¹⁹

The formation of USJFCOM as a combatant command also gave the pursuit and sustainment of jointness legitimacy; a four-star command, not beholden to any single Service or combatant command, focused purely on joint operations and perspectives. This position also allowed USJFCOM to look across combatant commands, interagency departments, and JTFs, sharing emerging practices and issues, all with an eye on seams and gaps between them. The USJFCOM perspective not only cut across regional commands, but into the future with products like the Joint Operating Environment (JOE).²⁰

The brief overview of recent U.S. military events in chapter two highlights the complexity of operations and the competing interests within the DoD. The rationale for creating USJFCOM was built on over four decades of Service rivalry and reform efforts not fully realized. While Joint Forces Command would benefit from greater scrutiny and some changes to organizational structure, should this critical trainer and “watch dog” be disestablished?

¹⁹ J. E. Dyer, “RE: JFCOM to Be Shut Down?” *Commentary Magazine*, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2010/08/10/re-jfcom-to-be-shut-down/> (accessed 20 November 2010).

²⁰ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The JOE: The Joint Operating Environment 2010* (Norfolk, VA: USJFCOM, 2010) http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive-/2010/JOE_2010_o.pdf (accessed 10 December 2010).

United States Joint Forces Command : Mission, Authorities and Leadership

U.S. Joint Forces Command is one of the Department of Defense's ten combatant commands. Headquartered in Norfolk, Va., USJFCOM performs joint innovation and experimentation, leads joint integration of capabilities, trains joint forces, leads development of readiness standards, and in concert with the Services, provides trained and ready joint forces to other combatant commanders.²¹ The four Service component commands assigned to USJFCOM include: U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia and U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia.²² The USJFCOM workforce is comprised of military staff, Government Service civilians, and contractors. As a functional, non-deploying headquarters focused on long-term transformation, USJFCOM utilized a smaller military staff leveraging a contract workforce for flexibility and continuity.


The Joint Officer Handbook depicts the USJFCOM organizational structure (see Figure 5) and lists thirteen supporting capabilities.²³

²¹ U.S. Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request Overview, February 2010, 7-5, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/fy2011_budget_request_overview_book.pdf

²² Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, *Joint Officer Handbook, Staffing and Action Guide*, (Washington, D.C., August 2010), 159, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/joh_aug2010.pdf (accessed 5 March 2011).

²³ *Ibid.*, 161-162..

Figure 5



Source: Joint Officer Handbook (JOH) Staffing and Action Guide Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, 1st edition, August 2010, p161-162 www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/joh_aug2010.pdf, Figure 29.

Other USJFCOM capabilities support specific knowledge areas important to continued transformation of the U.S. military and include:

- Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Center of Excellence, Creech AF Base, NV.;
- Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, Suffolk, VA.;
- Joint Fires Integration Interoperability Team, Eglin Air Force Base, FL;
- Joint Interoperability Division, Fort McPherson, GA;
- Joint Communications Support Element, MacDill Air Force Base, FL;
- Joint Deployment Training Center, Fort Eustis, VA;
- Joint Targeting School, Dam Neck Annex, Virginia Beach, VA;
- Joint Intelligence Operations Center, Naval Station Norfolk, VA;
- Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA;
- Joint Public Affairs Support Element, Suffolk, VA;
- Joint Systems Integration Center, Suffolk, VA;
- Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Dahlgren, VA;
- Special Operations Command-USJFCOM, Suffolk, VA.

The December 2008 Unified Command Plan (UCP) details USJFCOM tasks as a functional combatant command.²⁴ U.S. Joint Forces Command is assigned seven [general] responsibilities some of which are common to other combatant commands and include: directing their subordinate commands, force protection, readiness, and, providing trained joint forces, security cooperation and SSTR (stability, security, transition, and reconstruction) support to fellow CCMDs.²⁵

The UCP also assigned USJFCOM six specific, functional responsibilities reflecting the command's "... role in transforming U.S. military forces to meet the security challenges of the 21st century...", and include: Joint Force Provider, Joint Force Integrator, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation, Joint Forces Trainer, Joint Force Enabler, and JTF HQ Standards Development.²⁶

As the Joint Force Provider, USJFCOM is responsible for "... deploying trained and ready joint forces and providing operational and intelligence support from assigned forces ... recommending global joint sourcing solutions to the Chairman ... from all [sources] ... (except designated forces sourced by USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USTRANSCOM), and supervising the implementation of sourcing decisions."²⁷

As the Defense Departments Joint Deployment Process Owner, USJFCOM maintains, "... the global capability for rapid and decisive military force power projection and redeployment."²⁸ Performing the function of Joint Force Integrator, USJFCOM is responsible for:

²⁴ The draft 2010 UCP is being staffed at this time, reflecting approval of USJFCOM disestablishment by the President. Extracts from the 2008 UCP are shown here to detail current USJFCOM responsibilities.

²⁵ U.S. President, *Unified Campaign Plan 2008*, Washington D.C., 2008, 21.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 21-23.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 22.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

- (a) Providing recommendations to ensure integration of Service, defense agency, interagency, and multinational capabilities development.
- (b) In coordination with [CJCS] ... leading the development of joint concepts, requirements, and integrated architectures for joint command and control [C2] to ensure integration and interoperability from the tactical level through the interface with the global level.
- (c) In coordination with [CJCS] ... supporting the development of fully interoperable joint warfighting capabilities and concepts.
- (d) Supporting [CJCS'] joint doctrine program, including recommendations ... for the development, assessment, and maintenance of joint publications.²⁹

Joint Forces Command is also responsible to the Chairman for Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (CDE), “ ... leading and coordinating joint CDE efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies ... integrates multinational and interagency warfighting transformation and experimentation efforts to support joint interoperability and develop future joint warfighting capabilities.³⁰

As the Joint Force Trainer:

leads joint force training and is responsible to the [CJCS] for ... assisting combatant commanders [CCDRs], and Service Chiefs in ... preparations for joint and multinational operations... [and] the [CCDRs] Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation program. Conducting and assessing joint and multinational training for assigned forces. Leading the development and operation of joint training systems and architectures that directly support ... [CCDRs], Services, and defense agencies.³¹

As the Joint Force Enabler, “USJFCOM ... provides [CCDRs] joint enabling capabilities that streamline the rapid formation, organization, and sustainment of JTF headquarters by:

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., 22-23.

- (a) Establishing, maintaining, and certifying two standing joint force headquarters core elements capable of deploying on short notice to assist the geographic CCDRs, as requested.
- (b) Providing...reach-back support to fill immediate ... communications teams, personnel recovery expertise, intelligence... and public affairs augmentation.
- (c) Providing in-depth analysis of asymmetric threats.
- (d) Leading the collaborative efforts to assist CCDRs in training and certifying the readiness of JTF-capable headquarters.³²

And, as the lead for JTF Headquarters Standards Development, USJFCOM creates, “standards for certifying the readiness of designated JTF-capable headquarters, for recommendation to the Chairman.”³³

Each function of U.S. Joint Forces Command supports the Joint Force through transformation initiatives, sourcing solutions, concept development, experimentation, training, and rapid enabling capabilities. These responsibilities were assembled to gain the synergy of a common mission and focus guided by a four star level commander. While the other nine combatant commanders are tasked with specific geographic and functional responsibilities, only the USJFCOM Commander looks across the entire force with an eye on enhancing and sustaining jointness.

The wisdom of Powell and Shelton in creating USJFCOM as a four-star supporting joint institution makes more sense when considering the daily perspective and mission of the CJCS. The Chairman operates principally at the political level. He is the statutory military advisor to the National Security Council and the highest ranking

³² Ibid, 23.

³³ Ibid.

military officer in the DoD.³⁴ Although the Chairman does consider tactical and operational issues, his primary focus is at the policy level interfacing with our political leaders. Goldwater-Nichols is legislative policy, but daily implementation and monitoring is not. The Chairman may be responsible for jointness among many other key functions, however, operational support of and joint caretaker functions are difficult to accomplish when your focus is Washington D.C. and broad policy. Similarly, the Joint Staff, working with the Service chiefs, is better positioned to support joint policy and Service interface at military department level rather than the tactical and operational interface that has become USJFCOM's signature approach.

The sustaining functions of jointness codified in the UCP for USJFCOM include several key tasks that are CJCS responsibilities. For example, Joint Force Provider and Joint Force Trainer are Chairman functions that USJFCOM "operationalizes."

As **Joint Force Provider**, USJFCOM's responsibility is to create sourcing solutions for nearly all general purpose forces. USJFCOM's solution sets are coordinated with their own components, the Services and the combatant commands for CJCS approval. Joint Forces Command also acts as a neutral party since it is not an operational command.³⁵ For example, if these USJFCOM components were assigned to NORTHCOM, they may be more readily incorporated into NORTHCOM plans presenting some potential bias towards a particular sourcing solution. In addition, solution sets can be adjudicated, away from the Chairman, with USJFCOM's four-star level leadership to arbitrate among the Services. "In 2006, USJFCOM coordinated the deployment of more than 290,000 personnel in support of combatant commanders and

³⁴ National Security Council, "Home Page," <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/> (accessed 12 January 2011).

³⁵ U.S. Government Accounting Office, *U.S. Atlantic Command*, GAO/NSIAD-99-39, 9.

DOD support agencies.”³⁶ The CJCS himself described the global focus of Joint Forces Command to the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee in 2005: "Because today's security environment demands a global perspective ... Sec Def approved a new Global Force Management process and designated ... JFCOM as the primary Joint Force Provider. These changes will ensure the warfighters get the right forces from the right sources, focusing globally instead of regionally.”³⁷

As **Joint Force Trainer**, USJFCOM executes the CJCS joint exercise and training program coaching JTF and combatant commanders and their staffs. Events include mission readiness exercises and staff assistance visits to operations world-wide. Assistance and training also incorporates partners from interagency, multi-national, and nongovernmental organizations. This process supports the collection of lessons learned, best practices, and eventually doctrine, sharing feedback across the force. “In a typical year, USJFCOM coordinates and supports commanders through more than 70 joint training events, involving 46,000 participants.”³⁸ In testimony before Congress, LTG Robert Wagner, Deputy Commander, USJFCOM, commented on training, concept development and the partnership approach central to the Command’s mission:

[we are] responsible for training and deploying fully functional [JTFs] with the enabling capabilities to conduct coherently joint operations ... we assemble and deploy joint forces for the operational commander's use. We also focus on conceiving and developing the future joint force through our Joint Concept Development and Experimentation campaign...in close partnership with the joint community made up of

³⁶ U.S. Joint Forces Command, “USJFCOM as Force Provider,” USJFCOM, <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/forceprov.html> (accessed 15 January 2011).

³⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Senate Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, *Fiscal 2006 Appropriations, Defense: Hearing before the Committee on Senate Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense*, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 27 April 2005, http://web.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/congcomp-form/cong/s_testimony.html (accessed 15 December 2010).

³⁸ U.S. Joint Forces Command, “About Us,” USJFCOM, <http://www.jfcom.mil/about/about1.htm> (accessed 15 January 2011).

Combatant Commanders, Services, Inter-agencies, and Multinational partners.³⁹

Many USJFCOM initiatives link concept development, doctrine, training and support together. A key example from the 2008 UCP, is the **JTF HQ Standards Development**. As Joint Forces Command trainers interact with JTFs, new concepts and implementation efforts emerge. Tasked with developing effective JTF standards, USJFCOM leverages contact with all combatant commands and current JTFs to amass new ideas and what appears to work best in actual practice. This concept development and training effort has gone one step further with the **Joint Enabling Capabilities Command**. Within this team, deployable standing JTF capabilities exist to support short notice combatant commander needs.⁴⁰

Experimentation proposals often come from the challenges and ideas of the warfighters. As the lead for **Joint Concept Development and Experimentation**, USJFCOM employs, "... a two-path strategy. One pathway produces prototypes that enhance near-term joint warfighting. The other ... concepts that describe future warfighting methods and capabilities. On both pathways, JFCOM has established many productive experimental partnerships ... [like the] Combatant Commands, the Services, the Joint Staff ... [and] other Federal agencies"⁴¹ For example, USJFCOM's experimentation efforts included ... "working to 'optimize joint intelligence'-- allowing

³⁹ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, *Defense Department Transformation: Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities*, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 26 February 2004. http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/-concomp/form/cong/s_testimony.html (accessed 22 January 2011).

⁴⁰ U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Joint Enabling Capabilities Command," USJFCOM, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/com_jecc.html (accessed 15 January 2011).

⁴¹ Robert Wagner and Stephen P. Perkins, "Joint Intelligence Transformation—Bridging the Gap," *Military Intelligence*, PB 34-04-3, Vol 30, Number 3, July-Sept 2004, 6, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/-2004_03.pdf (accessed 20 January 2011).

us to bridge the national to tactical gap. Specifically ... Joint Operational Intelligence Transformation (JOIT) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.”⁴²

As the lead of **Joint Force Integration**, USJFCOM has been called upon to guide the development of integrated concepts and capabilities across defense agencies, multinational partners and interagency teammates. As a result, much of the doctrinal drafting and concept responsibilities of the CJCS fall on USJFCOM.⁴³ As a four-star organization, Joint Forces Command is well positioned to lead the doctrinal process with each Service 3 or 4-star equivalent charged with managing their training and doctrine. It is a process that requires time, patience, and review of operational and tactical best practices across all the Services and our partners. Due to the wide variety of contributors and sources, this iterative effort fits well with the USJFCOM four-star command structure and mission set.

A more difficult task for USJFCOM and the DoD at large involves sourcing and determining Service requirements and joint capabilities. In the pursuit of funded requirements, the mandates of the Services and Joint Forces Command may run counter. Often, the source of conflict is competing Service requirements which USJFCOM seeks to solve. The principle impediment for Joint Forces Command has been limited budget authorities, typically having to persuade a Service to sponsor a joint solution. A recent example of conflict in Service driven acquisition, is joint command and control (C2), highlighted by the authors of the “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” reports:

The tension between joint needs and service-centric processes has already led some functions, such as special forces and missile defense, to migrate to department-wide entities. In those instances where the ... Services clearly fail to meet the needs of current and future [CCDRs],

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ U.S. President, *Unified Campaign Plan 2008*, 22.

the Secretary must be prepared to find non-Service entities that will. For example ... study team recommended that budgetary and acquisition authority for joint... [C2] should go to a new joint task force, because the ... Services had failed to produce truly interoperable joint C2.⁴⁴

Due to the criticality of the joint C2 function and the lack of a common solution, this function was recently assigned to USJFCOM.⁴⁵

Enforcing joint acquisition can be extremely difficult as reported by the GAO. In a 2008 study, it was noted that military acquisition continues to be dominated by the Services sponsoring over two-thirds of the capabilities proposals since 2003, “with little involvement from the COCOMs ... By continuing to rely on capability proposals that lack a joint perspective, DOD may be losing opportunities to improve joint warfighting capabilities and reduce the duplication.”⁴⁶ Key issues like this also gained the attention of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in their effort to address defense transformation. Regarding joint integration and acquisition, they advocate for more USJFCOM involvement and authorities going as far as, “... the more radical option of establishing a Joint Capabilities Command (with Title 10 authorities).”⁴⁷ Granting this wide ranging budget authority to USJFCOM or establishing a subordinate “Joint Capabilities Command” would likely bring about more joint solutions, however, it is inconsistent with the Services’ man and equip role. Another more palatable and

⁴⁴ Clark A. Murdoch, et al., *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Phase II Report*, 22.

⁴⁵ U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3265.01, Command and Control Governance and Management* (Washington, D.C., 22 September 2008).

⁴⁶ U.S. Government Accounting Office, *Defense Acquisitions: DoD’s Requirements Determination Process has not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities GAO-08-1060*, by Michael J. Sullivan, 2, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081060.pdf> (accessed 17 January 2011).

⁴⁷ Kathleen H. Hicks, et al. “Transitioning Defense Organizational Initiatives: An Assessment of Key 2001-2008 Defense Reforms,” November 2008, 68, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081112_transitioning_defense_organizational_initiatives.pdf (accessed 20 November 2010).

sustainable solution may be to systemically adopt individual programs, as was done with the assignment of joint C2 to USJFCOM.

Service competition for resources and capabilities will no doubt continue. A supporting institution like USJFCOM can seek commonality among Service requirements and sponsor joint critical programs on an as needed basis. Like previous periods of economic decline and interwar retrenchment, joint advocacy in acquisition will take on even greater importance, given today's fiscal realities.

USJFCOM's operating environment extends across all combatant commands, the Services, the interagency and coalition partners. Given this global mandate and a somewhat amorphous, but critical transformation effort like jointness, senior leadership has been key. Effective engagement requires the wisdom and presence of a highly experience leader to communicate intent and seize opportunity in such varied environments. Four star General Officers like Giambastiani, Mattis and Ordierno possess the credibility to develop these partnerships. Mattis explained in a statement to Congress the importance of relationships in this effort, when describing NATO transformation: "The command works closely with other ... agencies, non-governmental organizations ... allied ... coalition partners. We are as focused on coalition issues as we are on joint issues, and we provide a critical link to NATO through our co-location in Norfolk ... with NATO's Allied Command Transformation, the only NATO Headquarters on U.S. soil."⁴⁸ The partners that USJFCOM has built both within our government and among

⁴⁸ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Statement of General James N. Mattis, USMC Commander United States Joint Forces Command Before The Senate Armed Services Committee*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., 24 March 2009, 3, <http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/March/Mattis-%2003-24-09.pdf> (accessed 1 December 2010).

the coalition will also take on greater importance as budgets tighten and cooperation becomes much more of a necessity than merely a benefit.

Given the scope of the mission and the unique perspective of the command, USJFCOM provides a strategic vision few inside the military offer. For example, the JOE presents a view of emerging trends and future challenges.⁴⁹ Guided and shaped by four-star level leadership, the JOE is a foundational document supporting dialogue across civilian and military partners while informing Defense Planning and Programing Guidance (DPPG) addressing future capabilities. This type of strategic thought and engagement is rare; a theme recently addressed by MG (retired) Roberts Scales in, “Too Busy to Learn.” In his article, Scales laments that taking time to think and learn has been devalued. “Our culture has changed to value and solely reward men and women of action ... Spend too much time thinking and reflecting and the rewards system denies promotion and opportunities to command.”⁵⁰

Joint supporting institutions like USJFCOM offer opportunities for both junior and senior professionals to think. After years of combat and command in Iraq and Afghanistan, we can leverage the experience of four-star leaders like Mattis and Ordierno across all the combatant commands, various interagency departments and a host of coalition partners. For our senior leaders, USJFCOM can be a place of reflection about joint warfighting and the future, while still linked in and abreast of the current fight and the vortex of Washington D.C. It is an opportunity to reward and leverage critical thinking while developing more adaptive leaders. With disestablishment, this intangible value and opportunity will not be fully realized.

⁴⁹ U.S. Joint Forces Command. *The JOE: The Joint Operating Environment 2010*.

⁵⁰ Robert H. Scales, "Too Busy to Learn," *Proceedings* 136, no. 2/1 (February 2010), www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID=2195 (accessed 22 January 2011).

Yet, we must not ignore the nation's fiscal crisis and our responsibility as public servants to continually assess DoD institutions. The Defense Business Board's presentation to the DoD leadership in July 2010, identified USJFCOM as the Combatant Command with the largest overall staff featuring more contractors than any of the other nine headquarters, posing the question: "Are some of the Combatant Commands becoming "Contractor" Commands?"⁵¹ By virtue of function and manning, Joint Forces Command became its own worst enemy as sustainment of a voracious contract work force became self-fulfilling. In considering new concepts, lessons learned and best practices, all part of the Joint Forces Command's charter, well-intended contractors supplanted military efforts in the zealous pursuit of novel processes and concepts (and the next contract).

While this effort can be of value as we consider new operational approaches and techniques, the aggressive "proponency" of several prominent concepts became manpower draws in and of themselves across the force.⁵² As noted in a recent article by retired Colonel Bob Killebrew, "Semi-official concepts like "rapid, decisive operations" and "effects-based operations" have contributed to doctrinal confusion over the past decade and haven't made many friends for the command."⁵³ Advocacy of Effects-Based Operations by USJFCOM staff was finally reined in by the new commander, General James Mattis.⁵⁴ This public repudiation did little for the reputation of USJFCOM.

⁵¹ Defense Business Board, *Reducing Overhead and Improving Business Operations Initial Observations, power point briefing*, July 22, 2010, slide 30.

⁵² Huba Wass de Czege, "Systemic Operational Design: Learning and Adapting in Complex Missions," *Military Review*, January-February 2009, 3:12, 12.

⁵³ Bob Killebrew, "Goodbye, JFCOM," *Armed Forces Journal*, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/11/4783736> (accessed 12 December 2010).

⁵⁴ Small Wars Journal, "Memorandum for U.S. Joint Forces Command, Subject: Assessment of Effects Based Operations, 14 August 2008," Small Wars Foundation, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/-2008/08/assessment-of-effects-based-op/> (accessed 10 March 2011).

Given the DBB's observations and the country's fiscal challenges, one can understand why the Defense Secretary would target Joint Forces Command. The Secretary is right to look across the DoD for savings, challenging us to evaluate programs, processes and organizations to justify their purpose and expenditures. Periodically, "shaking up" our institutions can be a very positive effort so long as it is done with an eye toward history and why the organization was created in the first place.

His directive to disestablish Joint Forces Command last August served as a wake-up call to military leaders and contractors alike. In response to the Secretary's bold move, however, Max Boot, a Senior Fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, commented, "Certainly, JFCOM, like all military bureaucracies (indeed all bureaucracies, period), has its share of fat. But it also performed some important functions that will have to be done by someone, whether the command exists or not. The budget savings from this move will hardly do much to reduce the Pentagon's budget, much less to close the government's growing budget deficit."⁵⁵

While President Obama did approve the "disestablishment of the United States Joint Forces Command ..." on January 6th of this year, it is clear that many of the core missions of USJFCOM will remain.⁵⁶ According to a newspaper summary of General Ordierno's public statements on 10 January 2011, "His plan would eliminate one-third of the Command's 77 functions."⁵⁷ A subsequent news report on 9 February 2011 reported: "A two-star general officer will lead the new organization from Norfolk-Suffolk as

⁵⁵ Max Boot, "JFCOM to Be Shut Down?" Commentary Magazine, <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2010/08/09/jfcom-to-be-shut-down/> (accessed 20 November 2010).

⁵⁶ Barack Obama, "Presidential Memorandum -- Disestablishment of United States Joint Forces Command," *White House Press Office*, 6 January 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/06/presidential-memorandum-disestablishment-united-states-joint-forces-comm> 6 January 2011 (accessed 10 March 2011).

⁵⁷ Bill Bartel, "JFCOM will Shut Down in About 10 Months, Commander Says" *The Virginian Pilot*, January 11, 2011.

deputy director for operational plans and joint force development on the Joint Staff. Joint Forces Command will be disestablished as a four-star combatant command by the end of August, and all personnel moves will be complete by March 2012.”⁵⁸

While the specific details and cost analysis of the USJFCOM transition team have not been released to the public, the retention of a majority of the command’s missions illustrates that jointness may be more fragile and require more emphasis than indicated by the Secretary’s comments in August.⁵⁹ Hence, “disestablishment” in this case is really a “reorganization” effort and offers an opportunity to address the unit’s core missions as well as organizational structure.

Clearly, all U.S. government departments should consider “belt tightening” and streamlining their organizations, given our budget crisis. Taking a hard look at USJFCOM is essential. However, removing Joint Forces Command’s four star leadership and assigning the command’s mission to the Joint Staff, ignores history and the need to leverage all the sustainers of jointness.

⁵⁸ Cheryl Pellerin, “Odierno Details Joint Forces Command Disestablishment Plans,” *American Forces Press Service*, Feb 9, 2011, <http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/-storyarchive/2011/no020911.html> (accessed 10 March 2011).

⁵⁹ Multiple requests by the author to the USJFCOM transition team for information regarding disestablishment were denied (ex. details including specific budget and expense data by staff section).

CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS: Proposed Command -- “JFCOM-Lite”

*“Perhaps more than ever before, the United States requires joint military forces able to function and succeed across a wide geographic and operational spectrum. Moreover, military forces must be capable of working effectively with a range of civilian and international partners.”*¹ 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

In support of Secretary Gates’ intent to, “... instill a culture of savings and restraint in America’s defense institutions², a “JFCOM-lite” command should remain as a combatant command, but shed unessential functions and reduce overhead.³ This reorganization effort should consider four areas: Staff consolidation, core functions, new priorities and senior leadership.

It is not within the scope of this thesis to address all staff section reductions and efficiencies; however, an effort should be made to comply with the Secretary’s guidance to downsize. U.S. Joint Forces Command employs a “J-staff” concept when a more efficient model might include functional consolidation. Similar to the notation found on the “U.S. Joint Forces Command Disestablishment Implementation Information Bullets,” I recommend support staff consolidation and reduction by 50%.⁴ This includes billets for the headquarters staff, J1, J2, J5, and J6. All should be combined to form a Joint Staff Support Element (JSSE) for the commander to conserve manpower.⁵ The J1 Manpower and Personnel Directorate should focus on human resource matters, particularly

¹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010) <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.pdf> (accessed 2 March 2011).

² Robert Gates, “SECDEF Statement,” 9 August 2010, 2.


³ See Figure 6 for proposed organizational chart.

⁴ Virginia.gov-Secretary of Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security, “U.S. Joint Forces Command Disestablishment Implementation Information Bulletin,” Office of the Governor Robert F. McDonnell, <http://www.commonwealthpreparedness.virginia.gov/docs/USJFCOM-Info-Bulletin.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2011).

⁵ Ibid.

personnel assignment, performance reviews and awards.⁶ Local Service components must be leveraged to the greatest extent to provide any other functions to individual personnel particularly finance, quality of life, and military retention. Local civilian management agencies must also be leveraged to a greater degree with the downsizing of J1's capacity to support and recruit government employees. After the closure of Fort Monroe, Virginia, two Civilian Personnel Advisory Centers (CPAC) will still remain (in Norfolk and Fort Eustis, VA) to provide expanded service in close proximity to JFCOM.⁷

Figure 6



Organization: "JFCOM-lite" (author's proposal)

⁶ U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1)," USJFCOM, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/abt_j1.htm (accessed 15 January 2011).

⁷ Fully Automated System for Classification, "Look up CPAC All Locations," HQDA, https://acpol2.army.mil/fasclass/lookup/lookup_cpac_region.asp (accessed 10 January 2011).

The J2 Intelligence Directorate (J2) Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) should become principally an Intelligence Liaison Staff section focused on one key area: timely intelligence updates enabled by a focused intelligence liaison network.⁸ The Intelligence Liaison Staff should maintain a viable intelligence liaison network with limited representation at each combatant command, the Joint Staff and the DIA. This network is designed to answer JFCOM command and staff requests for information in support of joint initiatives and training. The intent is not to maintain a separate analytical capability at JFCOM, but to partner and leverage existing assets in DoD. Recommend formal transfer of the following functions to each respective staff element: joint intelligence training and education to the J7, intelligence capability development functions to J9 and select augmentation to the “Intelligence-Quick Reaction Team” assigned to the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)⁹

The J5 Strategy and Policy Directorate should become a Plans Section and focus on four key areas: future internal plans for the command, synthesis of national and command strategy, the foreign liaison and exchange program, and congressional engagements and response.¹⁰ Joint Futures Group (J59) functions like strategic assessment should be absorbed by the concept development staff; this includes useful products like the JOE and their contributions to the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)¹¹

⁸ U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Intelligence Directorate (J2)," USJFCOM, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/abt_j2.htm (accessed 24 February 2011).

⁹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, http://www.-jfcom.mil/about/com_jecc.html (accessed 15 Jan 11).

¹⁰ U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Strategy and Policy Directorate (J5)," USJFCOM, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/abt_j5.htm (accessed 15 January 2011).

¹¹ U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The JOE: The Joint Operating Environment 2010*.

The J6 Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Directorate (J6) should become a Communications Staff Section focused on three key areas: JFCOM's network, coalition and interagency information sharing, and support to joint training through JKO and related distance learning tools.¹² Key deployable assets should be transferred to the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) to support short fuse geographic combatant command requirements.¹³

The core missions of a new "JFCOM-lite" can be derived from unit history, current mission requirements, and an eye towards future challenges. With our leadership recognizing the need to "operationalize" the mandates and intent of Goldwater-Nichols, United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) was charged with leading joint force transformation; the re-designation of USACOM as United States Joint Forces Command in October 1999 made it clear that jointness was a top priority of the Defense Department.¹⁴ While some more specific supporting functions have been added, the core missions and foundational role of joint advocacy have remained consistent over the last two decades – Force Provider, Joint Trainer and Joint Force Integrator.¹⁵

In an effort to sustain and advance the Joint Force, the new "JFCOM-lite" should retain the core, integrating roles from 1993: Joint Force Provider, Joint Force Trainer, and Joint Force Integrator. Currently performed by J3/4, USJFCOM, the Joint Force Provider mission supports Global Force Management and is a critical function aligning valid requirements with appropriate forces across the Services.¹⁶

¹² U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Directorate (J6)," http://www.jfcom.mil/about/abt_j6.htm (accessed 15 January 2011).

¹³ U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Joint Communications Support Element," USJFCOM, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/com_jcse.htm (accessed 15 January 2011).

¹⁴ Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul S. Frederiksen, *America's Uncertain Approach*, 18.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Kathleen H. Hicks, et al. "Transitioning Defense Organizational Initiatives," 12.

The separation of the process of requirement validation by the Joint Staff and proposed sourcing solutions by USJFCOM contributes to a balanced approach and result. Additionally, Joint Forces Command's CONUS-based Service components provide a majority of the forces for the sourcing solutions they craft with the Force Provider staff.¹⁷ All of these headquarters are based in the Hamptons Roads, Virginia area or in close proximity. Their location and partnership with USJFCOM promote familiarity and teamwork in support of joint force readiness and sourcing. Moreover, assignment of these Service components to a functional combatant command, like JFCOM, rather than the CJCS or the military departments complies with Goldwater-Nichols' intent regarding Combatant Command and CJCS authorities. The Chairman, "may not exercise military command over ... any of the armed forces."¹⁸ Additionally, retaining these forces under "JFCOM-lite" allows NORTHCOM (a CCMD considered to assume control of CONUS-based forces from USJFCOM) to remain fully focused on homeland defense while avoiding the politically sensitive issue of an: "... operational commander in CONUS having command of a million combatants."¹⁹

A critical link between Joint Force Provider and Joint Force Trainer are the enabling capabilities, like the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC). While not part of the original mission set, the JECC should be retained as the Joint Enabling Capabilities Team (JECT) and assigned to the Force Provider section. The JECT combines a requests for forces (RFF) solution with joint training capacity, as "JFCOM-

17 U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Operations, Plans, Logistics and Engineering Directorate (J3/J4)," USJFCOM, http://www.jfcom.mil/about/abt_j34.htm (accessed 15 January 2011).

18 Air University Library, "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," Public Law 99- 433, 99th U.S. Cong., October 1, 1986, USAF Air University, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/-awcgate/congress/title_10.htm (accessed 10 November 2010).

19 Butch Bracknell, "Letters to the Editor: Joint Force Provider," *Armed Forces Journal*, February 2011, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2011/02/5637406> (accessed 10 January 2011).

lite” team members deploy and work side by side and train JTF staffs. The other enabling support capabilities (less the JIOC and the JSIC) should also be retained as each helps sustain common joint functions including public affairs, communications, fires, unmanned systems, and deployment processes.²⁰

To streamline, but maintain a core function in sustaining jointness, recommend combining the current Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting Center (J7/JWFC), the Joint Experimentation Directorate (J9) and Joint Systems Integration Center (JSIC) into a single element. The Chairman’s exercise program requires deliberate engagement. The total Joint Force benefits from a common observer sharing lessons learned, supporting the training of JTFs and considering emerging concepts. In addition, regardless of USJFCOM’s fate, joint doctrine will still need to be revised, coordinated and published. All Service doctrine headquarters reside either in or close to the Norfolk area. A smaller J9 and JSIC section should still nominate joint acquisition solutions, but focus principally on specific joint programs with dedicated funding streams, like the current joint C2 program.²¹ “JFCOM-lite” would offer a unique perspective through exposure to all combatant commands and JTFs. For example, observing the practical application of each command’s information sharing efforts yields best practices for development. Continuing to seek a common solution for a critical effort like information sharing promotes troop proficiency, coalition “buy in” and understanding and operational responsiveness.

Properly applying the core functions of training, sourcing and integrating the force, requires senior leadership. In forming JFCOM-lite, this proven investment should

²⁰ Joint Staff, J-7 JETD, Joint Officer Handbook, Staffing and Action Guide, 161-162.

²¹ U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Instruction 3265.01*.

not be eliminated from the institutional support of joint transformation. Advancing jointness involves negotiation, influence and access. Due to his policy obligations, the Chairman cannot dedicate himself to this daily effort. The key players from Combatant Commanders and Service chiefs to coalition and interagency directors, each bring their own perspective, but all respond to four-star leadership and credibility. Given the complexities and separation of powers within our government, competing values and interests will always exist. We will never craft perfect budgets and authorities among ourselves much less when engaging external partners like allies. All of these factors make senior leadership at the helm of “JFCOM-lite” essential.

Besides facilitating the core functions of “JFCOM-lite,” a four-star commander also enables other tools to promote jointness. Perhaps the one most critical is partnership. Facing desperate fiscal challenges and an increasingly unstable and complex world, leveraging all partnerships: interagency, private organizations and coalition teammates, expands U.S. capacity and options in a resource constrained environment. Deliberate partnership efforts must become a cornerstone of U.S. engagement as force structure decreases and shaping and deterrence activities take on greater importance. As Commander, USJFCOM, General Mattis endorsed the importance of partnership highlighted in the 2010 JOE, “... the United States will need to sharpen its narrative of the unique vision we offer to the world and to inspire like-minded partners to strive and sacrifice for common interests. Alliances, partnerships, and coalitions will determine the framework in which Joint Force commanders operate.”²² One of USJFCOM’s most significant partnership efforts has been their active role with NATO’s Allied Command

²² U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The JOE: The Joint Operating Environment 2010*, 39.

Transformation (ACT) also located in Norfolk.²³ As part of NATO reorganization in 2002, ACT took on training and doctrine development similar to the role of Joint Forces Command. In fact, the organization was led by the USJFCOM commander until 2009. Given the ACT's location and mission, it represents a significant partnership opportunity for the U. S. Government and military; one that cannot be fully realized without four-star level leadership like that of the ACT.

In keeping with our nation's values and what has proven successful, we must advance and sustain our partnerships within the U.S. Government. Interagency cooperation and integration should be integral to effective strategy, planning and operations. However, implementing interagency coordination at the JTF and Combatant Command level is much more difficult than simply including it in a mission statement. Bernard Griffard, professor, U.S. Army War College, noted: "The operative words in the Combatant Command interagency coordination mission statements are "coordinate," "facilitate," "enable," "develop" and "synchronize" interagency support ... How to accomplish these tasks with the available manning, and how to address the interagency challenges over the horizon [has] generated extensive dialogue."²⁴ The collaborative approach and broad view of "JFCOM-lite" to support jointness can extend to interagency coordination as well.

"JFCOM-lite" can be the nexus; a meeting point among interagency partners, fostering continuity and a more complete understanding of, " ... the civilian elements of

²³ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services. *Statement of General James Mattis*, 3.

²⁴ Bernard F Griffard, *Combatant Command Interagency Directorate Symposium*, Issue paper, 8-10, (U.S. Army War College: Center for Strategic Leadership, October 2010), 4, http://www.csl.army.mil/us-acsl/publications/IP_0810_CCOM_IDS.pdf (accessed 22 January 2011).

national power-what Secretary Gates has called the-tools of soft power.”²⁵ In fact, the effort had begun as USJFCOM initiated several IA and partnership programs. In cooperation with USAFRICOM and USEUCOM, a key project is the Comprehensive Approach to Building Partnerships (CABP).²⁶ Before the Senate in 2009, General Mattis described other key initiatives including information sharing and situational awareness experimentation to encourage interagency participation:

Interagency shared situational awareness is an FY09 USJFCOM experimentation project to create an interagency common operational picture. The effort is addressing technologies, processes, organizational structures, and policy change ... necessary for creating, visualizing, and sharing information across the military and civilian branches ... To encourage interagency participation in military efforts, USJFCOM publishes the “Partnership Opportunity Catalog,” a listing of DoD exercises and training events that provide our government and non-government partners with opportunities to integrate and train.²⁷

“JFCOM-lite” can offer a number of advantages to increase and formalize this role as the advocate for “whole of government” education, implementation and best practices. During a recent interagency symposium at the U.S. Army War College, it was noted that each combatant command IA organization is different. According to a summary of the symposium, the differences in how each combatant command plans, promotes confusion regarding where interagency teammates are incorporated in the process. “This lack of consistency makes it hard for civilian partners to know how to approach and work with the individual combatant commands.”²⁸

²⁵ Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, Co-Chairmen, “The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century,” (Washington, D.C., Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, 2010), 4, www.usip.org/files/qdr/qdrreport.pdf (accessed 10 March 2011).

²⁶ Griffard, *Combatant Command Interagency Directorate Symposium*, 4.

²⁷ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Statement of General James Mattis*, 17.

²⁸ Griffard, *Combatant Command Interagency Directorate Symposium*, 5.

One should expect commanders to tailor their organization to their respective mission and area of responsibility; however, this highlights the need for training and a general orientation regarding IA engagement and best practices across all the combatant commands. Providing our interagency partners a general context for planning and comparing combatant command IA organizations promotes better understanding and agency support. Given most of the agencies' relatively small size, but significant demand by DoD for support, providing the interagency efficient training events that include multiple combatant command and IA teammates, optimizes their time and information exchange. The U.S. State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) would be an ideal companion organization with "JFCOM-lite" to expand training and IA engagement efforts.²⁹ Based on proximity to Washington, D.C. and JFCOM's continuous training engagement with all the combatant commands and JTFs, it is also uniquely positioned to provide IA leaders and actions officers a broad context for planning, greater understanding of IA roles, and a venue to explore the future of soft power engagement.

The next related future challenge, as described in the 2011 National Military Strategy, is to expand beyond the IA team to include public-private partnerships as part of a "whole-of-nation" approach.³⁰ Developing this concept and related training would be a logical next step and initiative for "JFCOM-lite" to explore. All of these partnership efforts are built on leadership and personal relationships, as we often must proceed with limited authorities and power. Whether fostering interagency cooperation or a coalition teams, mutual trust and credibility enable success.

²⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization," U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/> (accessed 15 March 2011).

³⁰ U.S. CJCS, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2011*, 21.

Exposure to all the combatant commands, JTFs and many coalition partners and agencies represents a unique perspective and opportunity. Like its predecessor, “JFCOM-lite” should be a place for strategic thought led by a four-star commander. Providing one of our premier senior leaders this platform and time to share their success (and failures) and thoughts on the future after years of combat, is a powerful way to benefit the force at large. Four star leadership of the senior education programs (USJFCOM’s Capstone, Keystone and Pinnacle seminars) and the JOE prompt learning and preparation in an uncertain world.³¹

Based on USJFCOM’s interface across the force and four-star level leadership, many recommended that the command be leveraged to enhance joint PME. As part of a congressional report released in April 2010, MG (ret) Robert Scales and others suggested that Joint Forces Command direct the, “... JPME courses or control NDU or, at least, Joint Forces Staff College.”³² The most recent independent QDR review published in 2010 went even further regarding PME proponentcy: ... there should be a Chief Learning Officer at the assistant secretary level ... In addition, a senior flag officer, perhaps most appropriately the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, should be designated as —Chancellor for all service PME institutions.”³³

³¹ The JOE is “*The Joint Operating Environment*” document that informs Concept Development and Experimentation. Capstone, Keystone and Pinnacle seminars are the principle USJFCOM education programs for senior leaders. Uniformed four star leadership of these seminars is even more important now with the dissolution of the Senior Mentor program originally designed to expose students to retired three and four star leaders sharing observations and lessons learned.

³² U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel*, 112th Cong., 1st sess., April 2010, 99, http://democrats.armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm-/files/serve?File_id=d4748d4a-b358-49d7-8c9a-aa0ba6f581a6 (accessed 10 December 2010).

³³ Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, Co-Chairmen. “The QDR in Perspective,” 77.

Based on the opinions of distinguished civilian and former military leaders, an opportunity is being missed. With the proper leadership, JFCOM is an ideal institution to foster jointness, and strategic thought while providing guidance and current operational lessons to our PME program.

By disestablishing USJFCOM, the Defense Secretary is inhibiting his own goal to “re-balance the priorities” of the Department; that rebalancing effort is inherent to JFCOM’s purpose particularly as the Services focus inward during post war periods.³⁴ Daniel Goure of the Lexington Institute made a similar point stating: “... the Secretary should consider giving JFCOM greater responsibility for enforcing jointness across the military. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center could be turned loose to look for redundant capabilities that could be eliminated.”³⁵ With the right leadership and mandate, “JFCOM-lite” could support the DoD’s efficiency efforts at a time when we need it most.

³⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, News Release, “Sec. Gates Announces Efficiencies Initiatives.”

³⁵ Daniel Goure, “Should Joint Forces Command Be Eliminated?” Note: Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) is a subordinate unified command of USJFCOM, located on the Naval Support Facility in Dahlgren, Virginia. JWAC’s mission is to support combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and other customers with technical solutions in order to carry out the national security and military strategies of the United States.

CONCLUSION

*“Looking to the post-Iraq and -Afghanistan future, [Defense Secretary] Gates warned, ‘It’s easier to be joint and talk joint when there’s money to go around and a war to be won ... It’s much harder to do when tough choices have to be made within and between the military services ... taking into account broader priorities and considerations.’”*¹
Washington Post March 7, 2011

Like many aspects of our government, the DoD is not built for efficiency. Rival interests and viewpoints make the work of defense policy and implementation somewhat chaotic.

While key to our effectiveness as a force, Service interests and culture can also be an impediment when the balance of Service capabilities and joint operations is upended. A survey of war, reform and our forces, reveal both joint success and failure over time and the impact of key joint sustainers. Leaders, legislation, operations and institutional support all promote joint operations. However, their influence can be dynamic as one or more may emerge to briefly lead sustainment and progress of the Joint Force. As current operations draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the other supporting elements will need to “pick up the slack” to support the gains made in jointness since Goldwater-Nichols.

Institutions like USJFCOM were created to provide continuity and “operationalize” jointness. Secretary Gates’ recent warning above in the *Washington Post* may be an indication of regret or acknowledgement of the vacuum left by USJFCOM’s disestablishment.²

Retaining a reorganized, but capable, four-star led combatant command like “JFCOM-lite,” sends a message that joint transformation is still ongoing and critical.

¹ Walter Pincus, “A Successor to Gates is a Quandary for Obama,” *Washington Post*, March 7, 2011.

² Ibid.

The stakes are only going to get higher as fiscal resources dramatically decline and Service competition escalates. For the joint journey to continue, key institutional sustainers cannot be left behind.

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2001 Graduate, Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

1987 Bachelor of Arts, Economics (Distinguished Military Graduate), Ripon College, Ripon, WI.

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (10 years) Colonel, United States Army.

Jul 10-present - Student, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, JFSC, Norfolk, VA.

Jun 08-Jun 10 - Observer/Trainer, J7, USJFCOM.

May 05-Mar 08 - Commander, 615th Aviation Support Battalion, 1st Cavalry, FT Hood, TX (includes 15 month combat tour in Iraq and humanitarian assistance operations (hurricane relief - Katrina and Rita)).

July 04-May 05 - Director, Dept. of Aviation Trades Training, USAALS, FT Eustis, VA.

Jun 02- Jun 04 - Commander, AVIM, 7-159th AVN, Geibelstadt, GE (includes 15 month combat tour in Iraq).

Jul 01-Jun 02 - Operations Officer, 7-159th AVN, Illesheim, GE.

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