Canada’s 2009 Northern Strategy: Cold War Policy in a Warming Arctic

A Monograph
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**Title**: Canada’s 2009 Northern Strategy: Cold War Policy in a Warming Arctic

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**Abstract**: Canada has failed to complete the job of nation building north. The peculiar circumstances of the Cold War have profoundly shaped Canadian perceptions of the North, and the 2009 Northern Strategy remains one more appropriate to the context of the Cold War than the current milieu. Through an analysis of Canada’s Cold War Arctic strategy and policy, this monograph identifies the historical drivers of Canada’s Northern strategy. It uses Jeffrey Herbst’ framework for describing why African states failed to consolidate state power in Africa to explain why Canada failed to extend state power North. It describes the current Arctic context and analyzes Canada’s 2009 Northern Strategy. It concludes that Canada’s 2009 Northern Strategy remains hostage to Cold War conceptions of the Arctic. Canada continues to emphasize the military as the means of asserting northern sovereignty through providing security, often at the expense of necessary governance and economic development. It emphasizes the development of security capabilities more appropriate to a Cold War conventional threat, rather than the more likely contemporary threats. Canada must develop a more balanced approach to extending her sovereignty north and allocate the necessary resources if she is going to protect and advance her interests there.

**Subject Terms**: Canada, sovereignty, security, Arctic, Arctic Policy, Canada’s Northern Strategy, Cold War History, Canada-US relations, Arctic territorial disputes, Jeffrey Herbst, Extension of state power, Northern governance and development, Northern security, Arctic conflict.
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Abstract

CANADA’S 2009 NORTHERN STRATEGY: COLD WAR POLICY IN A WARMING ARCTIC by MAJOR Daniel R. Bobbitt, Canadian Armed Forces, 95 pages.

From its founding Canada has been an Arctic nation, and has both claimed sovereignty over much of the region and viewed itself as an Arctic power. Despite this, the twentieth century has witnessed minimal development and resource allocation to this region, and Canada has failed to complete the job of nation building north. The peculiar circumstances of the Cold War have had a profound effect on shaping Canadian perceptions of the North, and for fifty years allowed Canada to largely neglect the area with little consequence. In 2009, the Canadian government issued a new Northern Strategy intended to provide a coherent vision and guidance to refocus attention north, and promote the region as a stable and prosperous region responsive to Canadian interests and values. Although circumstances have changed with the end of the Cold War and greater accessibility to and competition for Arctic resources, Canada’s Northern Strategy remains one more appropriate to the context of the Cold War than the current milieu. While talking of the new Arctic environment, Canadian policy continues to think of it in Cold War terms. As a result, Canada’s conception of the challenges faced in extending development and governance in the Arctic and the strategies to overcome these challenges are in some cases no longer relevant.

Through an analysis of Canada’s Cold War Arctic strategy and policy, this monograph identifies the historical drivers of Canada’s Northern strategy and summarizes trends in the associated Canadian policy goals and objectives. The monograph also examines the factors which discouraged Canada from extending State power North during the Cold War, using the framework developed by Jeffrey Herbst to explain why African states often fail to consolidate their state power. It examines the Cold War dynamics of the assessment by Canadian leaders of the costs of state expansion north, the nature of Canada’s Northern boundaries and established buffer mechanisms, and the nature of the Arctic geo-political system to explain why Canada failed to extend governance and development north. It concludes that Canada’s 2009 Northern Strategy remains hostage to Cold War conceptions of the Arctic and the requirements necessary to assure Canadian sovereignty and security. Canada continues to emphasize the military as the means of asserting northern sovereignty through providing security, often at the expense of necessary governance and economic development. The 2009 Northern Strategy emphasizes the development of security capabilities more appropriate to a Cold War conventional threat, rather than the more likely contemporary threats of unregulated economic activity, criminal enterprises, illegal infiltration and terrorist activity. It also continues to view the United States as the primary threat to Canadian Northern sovereignty, a perception that both inhibit closer Arctic cooperation with this most important ally and the resolution of several maritime disputes. Finally and perhaps most ominously, the Canadian government has continued the Cold War tendency to promise much but deliver little, and many of the projects proposed under the 2009 Northern Strategy were cancelled or remain unfunded. While Canada could get away with this approach in the Cold War, it is unlikely that circumstances will be as forgiving in the new Arctic context. The monograph concludes that Canada must develop a more balanced approach to extending her sovereignty north, and allocate the necessary resources if she is going to protect and advance her interests there.
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Section One: Introduction

From its founding Canada has been an Arctic nation, with some 40% of Canada’s landmass and 19000 islands lying north of the 60th parallel. Canada has always claimed sovereignty over her Arctic territory and views itself as an Arctic power. Despite the fact that most Canadians consider the Arctic region to be intrinsically Canadian and part of their national heritage, her interest in and attention towards the Arctic has ebbed and flowed over time. The overriding theme however has been one of general neglect save in time of crisis. While Canadian governments have consistently recognized the importance of Arctic sovereignty, they have traditionally done little to support their claims, employing an ad-hoc and reactionary approach to securing the Arctic and asserting sovereignty. On the whole, the twentieth century has witnessed minimal development and resource allocation to this region, and Canada has failed to complete the job of nation building North as it did in the West in the last century.

Canada has continued this approach despite continuing and intensifying territorial disputes over Arctic territory and resources. The confluence of climate change, allowing access to previously inaccessible regions of the Arctic, and the discovery of significant Arctic petroleum and mineral reserves in a world increasingly short of these resources makes control over the

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1 Canada, Department of National Defence, Canada Command Backgrounder: The Canadian Forces in the North (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, August 17, 2009), 1.

2 Canada. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and Non-Status Indians, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2009), 1; Shelah Grant, Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 2010), 288. A 2010 Arctic security poll of Canadians conducted by Ekos Research indicated that most Canadians see the Arctic as the cornerstone of Canada’s national identity and 54% think it should be the dominant foreign policy priority. Interestingly, more than 40% of the respondents think that Canada should take a “firm line in defending its sections” of the Arctic and over 75% of Canadians feel that the Northwest Passage should be regarded as an internal Canadian waterway. Ekos Research Associates, Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey (Ottawa: Ekos Research Associates, 2011), http://www.ekos.com/admin/articles/2011-01-25ArcticSecurityReport.pdf (accessed January 26, 2011).

Arctic region increasingly desirable and competition for this control increasingly fierce. Within this context, an effective Arctic strategy which provides for the security and development of Canada’s North is no longer merely desirable but is an imperative.

The peculiar circumstances of the Cold War have had a profound effect on shaping Canadian perceptions of the North, and for fifty years allowed Canada to largely neglect the area with little consequence. Although circumstances have changed with the end of the Cold War and greater accessibility to and competition for Arctic resources, Canada’s Northern Strategy remains one more appropriate to the context of the Cold War than the current milieu.

There was little incentive for Canada to extend governance and development northward during the Cold War. The harsh climate and low population density made developing the resources there expensive and provided little in the way of short-term returns. While other circumpolar nations extended their government, economic and social control into their Arctic regions in response to competition and threats from neighboring states, there was no such incentive for Canada.\(^4\) In fact, during the Cold War the primary threat to Canadian northern sovereignty came not from an adversary or international rival, but from her closest ally, the United States. In an unusual twist, it was also the United States who also provided primarily for the defence of Canada’s northern flank. In so doing, it virtually guaranteed Canada’s sovereignty from other competitors and reinforced the Canadian tendency to dedicate minimal resources to its North. In essence, Canada had to dedicate only enough security to prevent the United States from

\(^{4}\) Richard Sale and Eugene Potapov, *The Scramble for the Arctic* (London: Frances Lincoln Limited Publishers, 2010), chapter 3. In Scandinavia, Sweden and Norway faced the Russians on their Northern borders throughout the Cold War and Finland was to fight both the Germans and Soviet Union Armies in World War II and then attempt to retain control of its territories in the face of a much stronger Soviet Union. In North America, the United States Arctic was invaded by Japan in World War II and faced a potential Soviet threat across the Bering Strait and into Alaska. Of all the circumpolar straits Russia has faced the most serious and sustained threats to its northern territories, including an invasion by Western Armies following World War I.
believing it had to take over defence of the Arctic in order to protect against the Soviets using the north as an avenue of approach into their heartland.

This monograph argues that Canada’s 2009 Northern Strategy, while driven by the recognition of the changing environmental and geo-political context in the Arctic, remains heavily influenced by Canada’s historical experience during the Cold War. While talking of the new Arctic environment, Canadian policy continues to think of it in Cold War terms. As a result, Canada’s conception of the challenges faced in extending development and security in the Arctic and the strategies to overcome these challenges are no longer relevant at best and counterproductive at worst. While external forces tended to drive Canadian Cold War policies, the current context brings with it new problems and possibilities that require a re-conceptualization of the Arctic and a more effective integration of domestic and international priorities, security concerns and development efforts. The reactive, crisis-management mentality that characterized Canadian northern strategy through the twentieth century will not allow Canada to take advantage of new opportunities while mitigating risk. Canada must change the way in which it views the Arctic and what it means to be an Arctic nation if it is to make the most of emerging opportunities brought on by a more permissive environment. As several prominent academics have so succinctly put it “If Canada faces a twenty-first century challenge to its northern future, it is entering the battle with twentieth century perspectives and nineteenth century credibility.”

Methodology

This monograph examines Canada’s Arctic strategy during the formative Cold War years from the end of World War II until 2010, breaking down the analysis into the Cold War period

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6 Coates et al., 7.
from 1945 to 1992 and the contemporary era from 2000 to 2010. It traces the development and
evolution of Canadian strategy and activities in the North, including Canadian, perceptions,
interests, motivations, and intentions. The Cold War analysis will identify the historical drivers of
Canada’s Northern strategy and summarize trends in the associated Canadian policy goals and
objectives. It will examine the factors which discouraged Canada from extending state power and
development North during the Cold War using the framework developed by Jeffrey Herbst in
States and Power in Africa. This approach examines three dynamics to describe and assess how
a state consolidates its power over distance: the assessment of the costs of expansion by state
leaders, the nature of boundaries and associated buffer mechanisms established by the state, and
the nature of the regional state system.

The examination of the modern era will identify and assess changes to the Arctic context,
including a changing climate, resource and geo-political changes. The 2009 Northern Strategy
and associated Foreign Policy Statement are examined in order to trace elements that address
historical drivers and those developed because of the changing Arctic context. Finally, it provides
a qualitative assessment of these elements to conclude to what extent Canada's strategy is bound
by past influences that may not be relevant in today's context and provide recommendations for
changes to Canada’s Northern Strategy.

There is a significant body of work devoted to the twentieth century history of Canada’s
North. There are several good narratives that provide a broad overview of the region’s history,
such as Farley Mowat’s Canada North Now and Pierre Berton’s The Arctic Grail. Until
relatively recently, the majority were written from a very nationalist perspective, boosting the

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7 Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control
8 Ibid.
9 Farley Mowat, Canada North Now (Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart, 1976); Pierre Berton,
perception of the Arctic as a barren inhospitable region that belongs to Canada by right of exploration and encouraging the bold assertion of Canadian sovereignty in order to access Arctic resources. This view is perhaps best summed up by former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s statement in 1985 that the Arctic was Canadian “lock, stock, and icebergs.” Foundational academic works include Morris Zaslow’s *The Opening of the Canadian North, 1870-1914* and *The Northward Expansion of Canada, 1914-1967,* both of which provided an outline of the history of the region which has formed the basis of much subsequent writing. Both works provide a comprehensive summary of the history of the region, but are conservative in their analysis and approach the subject from a southern perspective, focusing on the motivations of southerners in expanding northward. Despite this limitation, the works are extremely valuable as a concise overview of the history and historiography of the region.

More recent histories of the Arctic have stressed both the sweeping transformation of the Arctic due to the increased American presence and the overall effect of increased Northern activity on the Arctic peoples and environments. Coates and Morrison’s works, particularly *The Land of the Midnight Sun* and *Canada’s Colonies,* best represent this increased emphasis on the role of aboriginal people and the consequences of increased activity on the fragile Arctic environment.11

Despite this increase in scope and a shift to a more environmental and native focused perspective, twentieth century Arctic history has by and large been dominated by the debate over the sovereignty versus security equilibrium in immediate postwar Canada. The crux of this debate centers on how much sovereignty Canada was willing to give up in order to gain guaranteed

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security from the United States. On one side are scholars such as Shelagh Grant, Rob Huebart and Adam Lajeunesse, who argue that while Canadian governments have recognized the importance of Arctic sovereignty, they have been unwilling to dedicate the political capital or resources necessary to backup these claims.\(^\text{12}\) This school of thought argues that successive apathetic governments and a distracted populace failed to give the Arctic the attention it deserved save for brief periods when sparked by a significant catalyst, such as the *Manhattan* or *Polar Sea* transiting the Northwest Passage. Even then, the reaction was generally short-lived and aimed more at placating the populace then affecting substantial change.\(^\text{13}\) As a result Rob Huebert argues “…other nations have openly sought to advance their Arctic claims, often at the expense of Canada’s position…”\(^\text{14}\) This outlook posits that “Canadian policy has never matched its rhetoric.”\(^\text{15}\) Further, Canadian assertions of sovereignty have been ad-hoc and reactionary, lacking both coherency and the attention it deserves. This perspective argues Canada neglected her obligations to the North, including failing to take advantage of the human and economic resources of the region or to establish a presence that would deter foreign claims to maritime access and resources.

Most advocates of this view see the substantial U.S. activity in the Canadian Arctic during the Cold War as stepping in to fill a security void due to the lack of Canadian presence in the face of the Soviet threat – Canadian neglect encouraged American action. Shelah Grant has ascribed more sinister motives behind American defence activities in the region however, particularly amongst U.S. military planners. She argues that the American were willing to


\(^\text{14}\) Huebert, *Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World*, 5.

\(^\text{15}\) Lajeunesse, *Lock Stock and Icebergs*, 2.
encroach on Canadian sovereignty to achieve their security ends. Grant argues the American presence there can be attributed to “(U.S.) strategists’ long-term plans for the Arctic region and the Pentagon’s influence on the U.S. government” This perception has gained increasing popular credence, thanks to recent media political activist statements that have raised concerns about the American intentions in the North.

Writers such as William Morrison, Gordon W. Smith and Whitney Lackenbauer, who have painted a more benign portrait of bilateral cooperation, best exemplify the countervailing school of historical thought. Morrison argues that “on balance, it is difficult to fault the Americans, unless one assumes a priori that everything the United States does in its foreign policy is malevolent.” While these authors recognize that Canadian policy has at times been reactive and driven by outside forces, they also claim that shrewd Canadian politicians and accommodating U.S. officials allowed for the successful management of American activities in the Canadian Arctic. Far from loss due to dereliction, Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security was actually enhanced and extended in the twentieth century. They point to the fact that in exchange for allowing American military presence in the Canadian Arctic Canada was able to

17 Grant, Polar Imperative, 285.
19 Morrison, “Eagle Over the Arctic,” 64.
21 Lackenbauer, From Polar Race to Polar Saga, 9.
obtain legal recognition of Canadian ownership of the Arctic Archipelago without having to dedicate Canadian resources to occupy the territory. 22

A third perspective on the effectiveness of Canada in balancing Arctic sovereignty with security and the drivers of Canadian Arctic policy is provided by Nathanial Caldwell in his book *Arctic Leverage*. 23 He argues that although small, Canadian occupation of the Arctic coupled with a determined and loud response to any transgression of what Canada perceived as her territory effectively secured Canadian Arctic sovereignty. He goes on to argue that Canada effectively used access to the Canadian Arctic as leverage in order to gain a larger voice in the continental defence relationship with the U.S. out of proportion to their military contribution. 24

Much like the historical perspective, current views in Canadian Arctic strategy and activities are divided into two broad camps, with some calling for bold, immediate action to assert Canadian sovereignty in the face of threats both to the delicate Arctic eco-system and to continental security generally. Others warn that alarmist reactions have often brought more harm than benefit to Northern peoples like the Inuit, the people most directly affected by Arctic activities. They argue there is no immediate crisis and urge a more measured approach to Canadian Arctic security based on international cooperation, economic development and improved governance. While there is no consensus on the best way forward or even the severity of the problem, all agree that there is a need for the Canadian government to do more in order to effectively extend Canada’s authority over its North. The difference lies primarily in their emphasis on where this effort should be directed.

In the first camp are scholars such as Whitney Lackenbauer and Andrea Charron, who believe that there is no immediate security crisis in the North and that Canada’s best policy is one

24 Ibid., 90-95.
focused on multi-lateral cooperation and diplomacy coupled with domestic development and governance efforts. Lauckenbauer asserts that there is no conventional military threat in the Arctic and suggests misunderstanding and popular media drive current alarmism. They do not see the need for large investments in additional security capability, and argue that a focus on security detracts from the long-term development of Northern capacity and governance. In a similar vein, the Canadian Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence also believe that there is little or no military threat to Canadian security, and argues that disputes over Arctic sovereignty will be settled through the use of diplomacy, not gunboats. In addition to a more balanced whole of government approach, this school also advocates the need for Canada to “embrace its northerness,” arguing that the only way to build the national will necessary to consolidate Canada’s control over the North is to reframe Canadians conception of their identity as a Northern Nation.

In the opposing school of thought, we find other regional experts such as are writers like Rob Huebert, Ken Coates and Elinor Sloan. Huebert argues that the warming Arctic and resource potential have and will continue to transform the Arctic from a neglected backwater into a region of major international importance and potential conflict. Huebert urges strong and immediate action to address the evolving situation, including a much more robust Canadian Arctic presence including the acquisition of capabilities to monitor and project power to the region. He argues


29 Rob Huebert, “The Rise and Fall of Canadian Arctic Security,” in Defence Requirements for Canada's Arctic (The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2007), 23.
that, official protestations and commitments to the contrary (such as the 2008 Illulisat Declaration), since 2000 the world has witnessed a steady militarization of the Arctic with every other Arctic state developing combat capable Arctic forces. He believes that at the root of this Arctic arms race lays uncertainty over the resolution of ongoing territorial disputes, and has the potential to lead to tension over access to resources. He argues that Canada should pursue a policy of encouraging cooperation in order to pre-empt a spiraling arms race while preparing for conflict through strengthening ties with allies and military capital acquisition.  

Most scholars acknowledge that Canada lacks the security capability to counter conventional threats in the Arctic. In her book *Security and Defence in the Terrorist Era*, Elinor Sloan advocates increasing Canadian military capabilities, primarily surveillance and maritime interdiction, to both guarantee Canadian sovereignty and regain credibility and influence with the United States.  

The question of sharing responsibility for the defence of North America has loomed large in Canadian security studies. Among the most influential work on the subject is “Providing and Consuming Security in Canada’s Century” by Desmond Morton. Morton argues that traditionally, Canada has only allocated sufficient resources to the defence of North America to prevent the United States from feeling it has to take unilateral action to defend the continent – what he calls “defending against help.” In 2010, Lietenant-Colonel Lovegrave applied Dr Sutherland’s three invariants of Canadian foreign policy to the current context, arguing that its proximity to the United States and historically strong ties with them continue to be among the

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30 Rob Huebert, *The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment* (Calgary AB: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2010), 22.


most important factors shaping our security and foreign policy.\textsuperscript{33} As Dr Sutherland did, he goes on to argue that in the post 9/11 world Canada has little choice but to strengthen its alliance and ties with the United States, and that despite concerns over the impact this has on Canadian sovereignty by and large this relationship has greatly strengthened Canada’s security and by extension sovereignty.\textsuperscript{34}


\textsuperscript{34} Lovegrove, 13 and 18-19.
Section Two: Canadian Northern Strategy, World War II and the Cold War Years

“should a third world war occur, its strategic center will be the North Pole.”

USAAF General H.H. Arnold

“the Arctic is to us what the Mediterranean was to the Greeks and Romans – the center of the world.”

Colonel Bernt Balchen, Polar Aviator

Despite the fact that many Canadians have always considered the Arctic as inherently Canadian, there has been an ebb and flow in Canada’s interest in the Arctic for nearly 200 years. In the twentieth century, perceptions of its military and strategic importance have evolved as the geo-political situation and technological developments have made control of the region more important and access easier. Initially the North was simply ignored. After early efforts to find a Northwest Passage proved fruitless, there was little attention given to what was considered a barren and inhospitable land. Later, by the mid-1930s, it was perceived as a strategic barrier more formidable than either the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans. During the Second World War and the Cold War, the area came to be seen as an approach, initially to Europe and Asia, and later to the heartland of North America. In contemporary Canada, the North is seen as having intrinsic value and as such is deserving to be watched protected and, if necessary, defended.

Canada began expressing a true interest in the Arctic Archipelago and Northwest Passage in 1880, when Britain officially granted the Northern territories to the Dominion of Canada. The 1898 Klondike Gold Rush served to heighten this interest and drove the first major government

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36 Grant, *Polar Imperative*, 286.

presence in the Canadian North. The 1906 summer traverse of the Northwest Passage by Norwegian Roald Amundson highlighted both the potential of the passage for shipping and the fact that others were interested in the region. In 1909, a plaque was installed on Melville Island by famed Quebecois seaman Joseph Bernier, captain of the Canadian government ship Arctic, announcing Canada’s sovereignty over the entire Arctic archipelago between 60 and 141 degrees of West longitude, and extending from the mainland of Canada to the North Pole. Despite this, for the first half of the twentieth century most Canadians viewed the Arctic as the “land of tomorrow,” an area to be claimed but developed at some time in the future. Although Canada did settle Norwegian and Danish territorial claims in her favor in the 1920s, for much of the early twentieth century the North was largely ignored with the exception of minor exploratory expeditions and a scattered Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) presence. By the mid-1930s Canadians began to perceive the Arctic as a strategic barrier more formidable than the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, a barrier whose climate and isolation alone would serve to insulate Canada from Europe and Asia.

During World War II and subsequently the Cold War, technological developments and the fact that the Arctic lay on the boundary between adversaries forced Canadians to revise this view. The Arctic came to be perceived as a vulnerable approach route, initially to Europe and Asia and subsequently to the United States. The advent of planes and surface ships capable of traversing the distance from northern Asia and Europe to Canada coupled with the rise of

40 Caldwell, Arctic Leverage, 11.
41 Kenneth C. Eyre, “Forty Years,” 292; Lackenbauer, From Polar Race to Polar Saga, 4.
42 Kenneth C. Eyre, “Forty Years,” 292.
Germany and Japan in these regions highlighted the importance of defending the northern regions. Throughout the twentieth century, despite the varying perceptions of the utility of the Arctic and the resources devoted to its exploration and security, there remained an enduring sense among Canadians that asserting ownership over the Arctic was important and that, contrary claims notwithstanding, the Arctic Archipelago and surrounding maritime waters belonged to Canada.

World War II was the first era to see major defence activities in the Arctic, when both the Axis and the Allies realized its strategic potential and new technologies permitted military operations in its southern fringes.\textsuperscript{43} The Germans established secret weather stations in Greenland and Northern Canada and fought several major naval and air engagements off the coast of Norway, as well as sailing the first warship from Germany to the Pacific using the Northeast Passage along the northern coast of the USSR.\textsuperscript{44} Of particular concern to American military planners was the defence of Alaska, threatened by Japanese buildup in the North Pacific.

These concerns were well founded, and Arctic combat operations in World War II included the Japanese occupation of the islands of Attu and Kiska, repelled at the cost of significant American, Canadian and Japanese casualties.\textsuperscript{45} Canadian military planners were more concerned about the potential conquest of Great Britain by Germany and the consequent loss of British maritime and air support to North American continental defence from subsequent Axis attacks. Canadians recognized they lacked the resources to defend the continent on their own. The


\textsuperscript{44} Wilhelm Dege, \textit{War North of 80: The Last German Arctic Weather Station of World War II}, trans. William Barr (Calgary, University of Alberta Press, 2004); Huebert, \textit{The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment}, 2.

recognition that the Arctic’s harsh isolation no longer provided a shield led the two countries to
sign the Ogdensburg agreement in 1940, which provided for the shared defence of North
America.46

The Second World War was to bring the first large-scale militarization of the Canadian
North, made possible by a significant investment of US dollars and significant infusion of
American troops and technical expertise. The combined American/Canadian military construction
of the Northwest Highway System in 1942 and the North West Staging Route were major
engineering feats that, combined with an existing system of airstrips, was instrumental in
expediting the development of the Yukon Territory and contributed to the defence of Alaska.47 In
addition to this massive project, by 1945 the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions of North America
were dotted with new radar installations, weather stations, airfields, naval bases and even an oil
pipeline, most of them constructed and manned by the United States. By 1943, there were some
33,000 American soldiers and civilians in the northwest, a number that exceeded the Canadian
population of the Northwest Territories and the Yukon combined. The American troops and
civilians referred to themselves as the “army of occupation.”48 These bilateral defence efforts
were to have a more lasting and significant effect on Canadian concerns about Northern
sovereignty and security then the short-lived Japanese invasion. In fact, the Canadian North was
used as an approach during World War II not by the Axis powers, as was initially feared, but by
the United States projecting its power in the global conflict.49 The influx of American capital,
resources and personnel caused many Canadians, including Prime Minister Mackenzie-King, to

46 Coates et al., 55-56.
47 David Bercuson, “Continental Defense and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-50: Solving the Canadian
Sovereignty”, in The Cold War and Defense, ed. Keith Nielson and Ronald Haycock (New York: Praeger
48 Shelah D. Grant, Sovereignty or Security, 124; David Bercuson, “Continental Defense and
Arctic Sovereignty”, 153.
49 Eyre, “40 Years,” 294.
worry that the United States would take advantage of wartime exigencies to establish a permanent Arctic presence and undermine Canadian sovereignty.\(^{50}\) These fears were somewhat alleviated when the US departed at the end of the war, with Canada reimbursing the United States for the cost of constructing much of the infrastructure left behind.\(^{51}\)

This relatively amicable departure, coupled with the fact that post war agreements ensured that further rights of access would only be achieved through bilateral negotiations that provided assurances of Canadian territorial control, has led some to argue that Canadian sovereignty over the North emerged unscathed after World War II.\(^{52}\) Nonetheless, concern remained that the United States would take over defence of the Arctic and exclude Canada from the picture, and there was a growing awareness amongst Canadian policy makers on the interdependence of Arctic security and sovereignty.\(^{53}\) Although American activities in the Canadian Arctic were for the most part undertaken only with the official approval of the Canadian government, they created a precedent in that they acknowledged America’s right of access to the Canadian Arctic for continental defence.

The dawn of the Cold War immediately following World War II saw the Arctic gain new prominence in the minds of Canadians and their government, and renewed pressures on Canada to balance sovereignty concerns with security imperatives.\(^{54}\) Geography drove much of this increased interest. The Arctic now formed the front line of the boundary between Cold War superpowers, with Canada and Denmark sandwiched between the two adversaries.


\(^{52}\) P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "From Polar Race to Polar Saga, 5.

\(^{53}\) P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "From Polar Race to Polar Saga, 17.

\(^{54}\) Adam Lajeunesse, *Lock Stock and Icebergs*, 2.
Figure 1: Polar Projection of the Circumpolar Region

The Canadian Arctic lay below the most direct air routes between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and above the shortest submarine approaches to North America. Canadian policymakers recognized this new threat, and a worried Prime Minister King remarked, “...if there is another war, it will come against America by way of Canada from Russia.” Despite recognition of the Soviet threat, Canadian fears over American usurpation of Arctic sovereignty remained. Throughout the Cold War, Canadian policy makers attempted to walk a delicate tightrope to balance these competing imperatives. As a result, early Cold War Canadian Arctic sovereignty statements were often deliberately vague and ambiguous, particularly concerning maritime claims, in an effort to obtain U.S. security assistance on Canadian territory without forcing dialogue on contentious territorial issues. Canada’s inconsistent views and emphasis on sovereignty often confused the U.S., and her reluctance to devote resources to its security were the cause of consternation amongst American strategists.

The Americans were right to be concerned about the Canadian ability to defend the Arctic. Although the Canadian military had demonstrated the ability to operate military forces in the Arctic through a series of post-war exercises, at the onset of the Cold War the Canadian permanent security presence in the Arctic was limited to only 111 widely dispersed Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). By the spring of 1946, the Americans began to pepper the Canadians with defence proposals aimed at improving the defence of the Arctic.

Canada and the US undertook several major projects in the Canadian North commencing in the 1950s and continuing into the next decade. The most ambitious was the joint Distant Early

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60 Peter Kikkert, 23.
Warning (DEW) Line, an 8000 kilometre comprehensive radar chain to detect Soviet bombers extending from Alaska to Baffin Island (and later Greenland) along the North American continental land mass (70 degrees North latitude) completed in 1957. At the same time, a string of airstrips and communications facilities across the Arctic was constructed.\textsuperscript{61} Military engineers built bridges across the Ogilvy and Eagle rivers, commencing in the late 1960’s and terminating mid 1970s, which preceded the opening of the Dempster Highway to Inuvik. Concurrent with this work, the Canadian military established the Canadian Rangers, stood up in 1947 to serve as “the eyes and ears of the North.” Manned almost exclusively by Northern natives, this organization had limited practical but great symbolic success in asserting Canadian sovereignty over the North.\textsuperscript{62}

Although built with American funds and according to American specifications, through shrewd negotiation the DEW line agreement and subsequent Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) included guarantees of Canadian terrestrial sovereignty over the Arctic lands and islands of the archipelago.\textsuperscript{63} Despite official recognition of Canadian sovereignty, popular sentiment in Canada was highly critical of the perceived abrogation of sovereignty the comparatively massive American presence entailed. Both the political opposition and media suggested that Canada had ceded control over her North, one popular magazine editor going so far as to suggest that the DEW agreement “is the charter under which a tenth of Canada may very well become the world’s most northerly banana republic.”\textsuperscript{64} The Canadian government worked hard to downplay this perception, and in reality, the American activities posed little threat to Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago. The Americans needed Canadian cooperation

\textsuperscript{61} Coates et al, \textit{Arctic Front}, 88.


\textsuperscript{63} Nathaniel Caldwell, \textit{Arctic Leverage}, 35.

\textsuperscript{64} Ralph Allen, “Will DEWline Cost Canada its Northland?,” \textit{Maclean’s} (May 26, 1956): 16-17.
to counter the Russian threat more than they needed to own Canadian Arctic territory, and for the most part demonstrated a genuine willingness to observe Canadian regulations and generally accepted Canadian ownership. Despite popular protestations to the contrary and some continuing concerns over ulterior U.S. motives, by the end of the 1950s Canadian terrestrial sovereignty was largely unchallenged and guaranteed through a system of existing agreements which provided significant security benefits to the Canadian North for relatively little cost.

Control over Arctic waters was a different matter. Following World War II, there was a significant increase in state maritime claims. The general trend saw coastal powers, such as Canada, in conflict with maritime powers, such as the United States. Maritime powers feared that as coastal powers extended their jurisdiction it would interfere with access to the maritime global commons. This dynamic played itself out in the Arctic between Canada and the US, particularly over the status of the Northwest Passage and archipelagic waters and the ability of Canada to regulate activities in Arctic waters. In 1958 the USS *Nautilus*, a nuclear powered submarine, travelled to the North Pole under the polar ice cap, becoming the first of many submarines (predominately American and Soviet) to conduct active operations in the Arctic Ocean. In 1960 the USS *Sea Dragon* became the first submarine to transit to and surface at the North, followed by the first Russian submarine, *Leninsky Komsomol*, in 1962. The Canadian government did raise concerns over this submarine activity, but inconsistent messages throughout the late 1940s and 50s about exactly what Arctic waters it claimed undermined these protests.

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65 Adam Lajeunesse, *Lock Stock and Icebergs*, 7; David Bercuson, “Continental Defence and Arctic Sovereignty,” 166.


67 This monograph defines coastal powers as those states that have maritime borders and are capable of exerting control of their adjacent maritime zone out to the limit of the Economic Exclusion Zone. Maritime powers are those that can project sea power globally.


69 Shelah Grant, *Polar Imperative*, 331-332.
While the Canadian Navy debated in the 1950s whether they should acquire nuclear submarines to assist in the bolstering of Arctic sovereignty claims, the idea was eventually discounted.\(^{70}\) The establishment of the Canadian Forces Station at Alert on the Northern tip of Ellesmere Island in 1958 went some way to solidify Canadian terrestrial claims, but did little to back up maritime claims.\(^{71}\)

The first explicit Canadian maritime sovereignty claims were made by the then Canadian Ambassador to the U.S., Lester Pearson, in 1946 on the basis of the sector theory, by which Canada claimed all ice and water within a pie-shaped sector extending from either coast to the North Pole.\(^{72}\) This was followed in 1956 by a decision of the St-Laurent cabinet to claim Arctic waters based on the “straight baseline theory,” which uses lines extended between outer headlands or fringing islands as the basis for maritime claims. Although the first precise Canadian claim with a clear legal foundation (the baseline method was widely recognized internationally while the sector method was not), this claim was not promulgated outside of the cabinet in an effort to avoid confrontation with the United States.\(^{73}\) In 1957, the Diefenbaker government raised the sector theory claim again once more, further confusing the international community as to Canada’s Arctic maritime claims. In addition to the inconsistency regarding sector and baseline claims, some government spokesmen claimed the Northwest Passage waters as territorial while others claimed them as inland waterways (having the same legal status as rivers), while still others applied the inland waterways claim to the entire Arctic Archipelago.\(^{74}\) This confusion and

\(^{70}\) Caldwell, *Arctic Leverage*, 44-45.

\(^{71}\) Michael Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic? Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North* (Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 2009), 102-103.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 42-44.

\(^{73}\) Ibid., 52-53.

inconsistency over what constituted Canada’s Arctic waters only served to weaken Canada’s claims.75

In 1953 in an effort to strengthen sovereignty claims over the land and waterways of the Arctic Archipelago, the Canadian government re-settled eight native Inuit families from northern Quebec to Resolute Bay and Grise Ford.76 Initially the re-location was claimed to be a humanitarian effort intended to save the lives of starving Inuit by providing them with new hunting grounds. It has since been widely recognized that it was a thinly veiled effort to solidify Canada’s sovereignty over the far North by establishing permanent settlements in heretofore-unsettled regions.77 While the immediate effects were minimal, the enduring presence of these two communities in Canada’s Arctic Archipelago has had a lasting effect by demonstrating effective occupancy over the North.78

Despite this limited occupancy, Canada’s inability to project naval power in the Arctic further weakened her maritime claims. In 1961, the Canadian Navy Brock Report highlighted the need for a “three oceans’ strategy if it were to exercise its sovereignty over the whole of the area it claimed, and even more so to enhance that claim.” The report’s urging for a “renewal of RCN (Royal Canadian Navy) activity in the Arctic archipelago as an urgent task” would remain unanswered for the remainder of the Cold War as Canada’s Naval priority shifted to NATO. 79

Following a decision by the Royal Canadian Navy to specialize in anti-submarine warfare to

75 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic?, 43.
76 Sale and Potapov, The Scramble for the Arctic, 92-3.
77. Frank J. Tester and Kulchyski Tammarnitt, Inuit Relocation in the Eastern Arctic 1939-63, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1994), 113-18. While the government maintains that the re-locations were made for purely humanitarian reasons, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs recommended that the government acknowledge the role played by the Inuit relocated to the High Arctic in the protection of Canadian sovereignty in the North. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Rights has declared the move one of the worst human rights violations in the history of Canada.
78 Sale and Potapov, The Scramble for the Arctic, 86-7.
address the Soviet Bloc threat to NATO Atlantic sea-lanes, the Navy divested itself of Arctic capability altogether in 1958. The single icebreaker, the Labrador, was transferred to the Department of Transport, and the RCN focused on operations in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. More generally, interest in the Arctic again waned in the 1960s, and military patrols were largely discontinued as budget cuts and successive organizational reform efforts distracted military attention. This trend was reinforced by the changing defence dynamic, as defence priorities shifted to missiles and outer space. As Colin Gray has observed, by the 1960s there was “…no military incentive to urge the Canadian Forces to be active in the North.” Canadian security policy of the 1960s was dominated by the “three N’s” of NORAD, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons, and the 1964 White Paper on Defence did not have a single reference to Canadian Northern security.

Two Cold War incidents serve to demonstrate Canada’s tenuous claims over her Arctic waters and her lack of capability to project capability to the far North to deter other nations and protect her sovereignty. Both the 1969 transit of the Manhattan and the 1985 transit of the Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage were to bring unwanted heat and light into the frigid Arctic and arouse, for a short time, popular Canadian interest in the Arctic.

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80 Coates et al., Arctic Front, 78.
81 Caldwell, Arctic Leverage, 45.
82 Colin Gray, Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance (Toronto: Clarke Irwin, 1972), 185.
83 Eyre, “Forty Years of Military Activity in the Canadian North,” 296.
In 1969, the Manhattan, an Exxon oil tanker reinforced for ice operations, transited through the Northwest Passage without formally requesting Canadian permission. Exxon conducted the voyage to “test the feasibility of shipping oil from Alaska’s Prudhoe Bay through the Northwest Passage to the eastern United States.” The USCG icebreaker Northwind escorted the Manhattan, and the exercise was perceived by many Canadians as a “deliberate challenge to Canadian sovereignty but also, by implication, to Canadian ownership of gas and oil resources which were believed to underlie these waters.” Despite Prime Minister Trudeau’s assurance that this was not the case, many Canadians contended that the government failed to provide any real protest to the violation of Canadian sovereignty by the US. The fact that Canada gave the voyage full concurrence and sent her most powerful ice breaker, the CCGS John A. Macdonald,  

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85 Grant, Polar Imperative, 348-349.

86 Mowat, Canada North Now, 46.

87 Caldwell, Arctic Leverage, 47.

to observe and assist was largely ignored by the critics who criticized the government for failing to make any real protest to the “violation” of Canadian sovereignty. The critic’s arguments were not entirely without merit however, as the fact remained that with or without Canada’s concurrence the Manhattan voyage would almost certainly have gone ahead.

The Canadian government seized on the popular interest in the incident and the obvious environmental implications of increased shipping traffic in the fragile Arctic to assert its control over the Arctic through regulation, pursuing functional rather than absolute control of Arctic waters. It succeeded in implementing the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) and subsequent amendment to the UNCLOS treaty, which recognized the state’s ability to regulate shipping within 100 nautical miles of shore in ice-covered areas. This was actually a shrewd move by the Canadian government, one that allowed them to impose functional control over use of the Northwest Passage and archipelagic waters without the need to force the issue of ownership, a claim that would almost certainly have forced a dispute with the Americans. The US State Department remained convinced that recognition of the Northwest Passage as an internal waterway would set a dangerous precedent that would “jeopardize the freedom of navigation essential for US naval activities worldwide”.

The AWPPA was as much about preserving US-Canadian relations as it was about environmental protection or Arctic sovereignty. It was however, a limited form of sovereignty that did not give carte-blanche to the Canadian government to control access to the Northwest Passage or archipelagic waters.

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89 Lackenbauer, From Polar Race to Polar Saga, 7.
90 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic?, 45.
92 Lajeunesse, Lock Stock and Icebergs, 8.
In addition to the AWPAA, the increased popular attention on the Arctic drove the government to, for a short time at least, pay more attention to its protection and control. The mechanism for extending Canadian control north was to be the military. The fact that the challenge to Canadian Arctic sovereignty was non-military in nature and mounted by Canada’s closest ally created a somewhat perplexing situation for the military. They struggled to define the most appropriate way to meet this challenge.94 The 1971 White Paper on Defence clearly articulated the importance of Canada’s North, stating that sovereignty challenges could arise from “territorial violations or infringements of Canadian laws” 95 Stung by the popular perception that Canada was incapable of monitoring and protecting the North, the tempo of military activities increased in the North in the early 70s.96 In 1970 naval vessels sailed into the Arctic for the first time in eight years, part of patrol program intended to reinforce Canadian sovereignty by “seeing and being seen.”97 The program was largely symbolic. Military surveillance and security operations were almost exclusively transient in nature and the government did not acquire any new equipment, such as ice capable ships reconnaissance aircraft, to increase the military Arctic capability.98

Canada also made some half-hearted attempts to clarify and claim ownership of the Arctic waterways in 1973 and 1975, proclaiming that the Northwest Passage was an internal, historic waterway. The fact that these claims for full sovereignty were made at the same time and

96 Lackenbauer, From Polar Race to Polar Saga, 7.
98 Eyre, “Forty Years,” 297.
over the same waters over which Canada was attempting to claim only functional control through the AWPAA was more than a little schizophrenic. In the end, Canada failed to press the claims forcefully and the US did not recognize the Northwest Passage as Canadian internal waters, continuing to argue it was an international strait.99 The Canadian government’s heightened interest in the Arctic waned as popular interest in it ebbed and other issues took centre stage. By the early 80s the symbolic Canadian Forces presence had once again slackened as budget cuts and other missions took precedence.100 The end result saw the issue of Canadian Arctic maritime sovereignty remained in limbo until the next crisis.

The second major test of Canadian sovereignty over its Arctic waters came in the summer of 1985, when the USCGS Polar Sea sailed the Northwest Passage from Greenland to Alaska, this time unaccompanied for much of the voyage by any Canadian vessel. The Americans did not intend this voyage as a test of Canadian sovereignty, and initially Canada supported the voyage with the understanding that it would not prejudice their divergent legal positions on the status of the strait.101 When news of the planned voyage was made public however, it quickly created a popular crisis over Canada’s control of the Arctic and raised the specter of US encroachment on what Canadians viewed as their sovereign waters.102 One Member of Parliament compared it to the “psychological rape” of Canada and the opposition leader called the voyage “…an affront to Canada.”103 It was this popular outcry more than any practical diminishment of sovereignty or genuine government concern over the effects of the voyage on of the legal status of the Northwest Passage that spurred a government response and was to create a crisis in Canadian-American relations.

99 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, 49.
100 Eyre, “Forty Years,” 298.
101 Bankes, “Forty Years of Canadian Sovereignty Assertion in the Arctic, 289.
102 Coates et al., Arctic Front, 114-115.
103 Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy: Canada and the United States in the Northwest Passage, (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 148; Coates et al., Arctic Front, 115.
arctic relations. Under intense public pressure, the government demanded that the Americans request permission to transit the strait, which the Americans refused to do. Unfazed by this, the government granted permission for the Americans to transit as if they had asked for it in the first place. Recriminations over who had asked whom what continued throughout the summer under increasingly intense and vociferous public debate.

Under mounting pressure, Canada’s Arctic maritime claims following the Polar Sea transit were for the first time public, unequivocal, and consistent, claiming complete sovereignty over the Northwest Passage rather than watered down functional control. On 1 January 1986 the government resurrected the straight baseline claim, announcing in Parliament that all the waters landward of the outermost islands of the archipelago were “Canada’s historical internal waters…” and “Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible.” Practically, this meant that all transits of the Arctic Archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, were subject to Canadian approval and not merely regulation. Europe and the US were quick to object to these claims, and it was only two years later that an agreement was brokered for future icebreaker transits.

To implement the muscular and public sovereignty claims, the government announced a series of programs intended to provide Canada with the capability to exercise effective control over its Arctic waters. These proposals continued the emphasis on the military as the department of choice to extend Canada’s sovereignty North by improving its ability to monitor and operate in the Arctic, a desire clearly articulated in the 1987 Defence White Paper. Key elements of the plan included plans for a large all season high arctic “Polar 8” icebreaker, the

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104 Rob Huebert, *Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World*, 17.
105 Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 114-115.
108 Eyre, “Forty Years,” 298.
acquisition of a dozen nuclear powered submarines, a permanent underwater sonar array, modernization and nationalization of the DEW line, construction of arctic military airfields and an Arctic warfare training center, new Arctic patrol aircraft and the resumption of regular military activities in the North. While ambitious, most of these initiatives remained just that. After a brief intensification of military activity, the end of the Cold War and calls for the peace dividend meant many of the capital projects were stillborn. The submarines were cancelled in 1989, the icebreaker in 1990, the patrol aircraft in 1991 and neither the Arctic warfare training centre or underwater acoustic array were ever built.

In addition to the end of the Cold War, the US “threat” to Canadian Arctic sovereignty was by 1988 significantly reduced. The US decided to build a pipeline to ship oil from Prudhoe Bay and no longer required the Northwest Passage to ship oil south. Under the 1988 Canada-US Arctic Cooperation agreement, it was agreed that future US icebreaker transits of the Northwest Passage would be preceded by a US request that Canada would, as a matter of course, approve. Both sides were clear that the agreement did not prejudice their respective legal claims over the strait or establish precedents for other maritime areas, a key provision necessary for American agreement. This established a relationship in which the issue of Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic did not obscure or hinder the Canadian-US bilateral relationship. In essence the position taken by both sides concerning access to Canada’s Arctic can be summed by paraphrasing David

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110 Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 125.


With the end of the Soviet threat across the Arctic front, a decline in US activity and agreements in place to regulate US activity, the crisis over Arctic maritime sovereignty had once again passed, and with it Canada’s imperative to deliver on its earlier promises. The response to this final Cold War crisis was consistent with Canada’s Cold War Arctic actions. Canadian policy, when it had a coherent one, was characterized by a crisis response mentality and the use of short-lived token symbols to demonstrate Canadian control over the Arctic. When the Canadian government perceived a threat to Arctic sovereignty, it combined unilateral legal claims combined with a heightened Canadian Forces presence to demonstrate both Canada’s legal right over the Arctic and the ability to maintain a presence there. These ad-hoc, reactionary measures, often accompanied by tremendous political bluster, revealed the lack of an enduring interest and capability to act in the Arctic. When the short-term crises faded, the government’s willingness to see through its proposed plans or resolve the policy ambiguity surrounding sovereignty claims also melted away.

Why were successive Canadian governments so reluctant to invest the necessary political capitol and resources to both solidify their claims to the Arctic and maintain an enduring presence in the North in the face of repeated crises? The reason lies in the peculiar circumstances of the Cold War and the effect this had on the calculus Canadian leaders used in determining whether the benefits gained from extending Canada’s state power north were worth the cost.

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Consolidation of Canada’s North During the Cold War

Canada failed to effectively complete the consolidation of state power in her Northern territories during the Cold War. Of all the circumpolar nations, Canada was and remains the poorest in exercising oversight over the Arctic and in the development of the capacity to control their Northern regions. Canada failed to both meet its responsibilities in governing the region and in developing its full potential.\textsuperscript{114} This failure, while not without consequence, had little practical effect on Canada’s claims to Arctic territory despite popular rhetoric to the contrary. Its most profound effect has been to inculcate a mindset of northern neglect and the belief that asserting Canadian sovereignty and exploiting the resources of the North can be done on the cheap.

In many ways, Canada’s failure to consolidate her power and control over the North in the latter half of the twentieth century can be compared to the failure of post-colonial African states to extend their power over their hinterlands. In his book, \textit{States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control} Jeffrey Herbst provides a theoretical model to analyze the means a state uses to consolidate and extend power. This approach examines three dynamics to describe and assess how a state consolidates its power over distance: the assessment of the costs of expansion by state leaders, the nature of boundaries and associated buffer mechanisms established by the state, and the nature of the regional state system.\textsuperscript{115} According to Herbst, these dynamics and the pressure they exerted explain the very different outcomes in the consolidation of state power in Europe and Africa. Herbst argues that the high cost of extending power into the under-populated African hinterland, undisputed state boundaries established and guaranteed by post-colonial powers and international organizations, and a cooperative regional

\textsuperscript{114} Coates et al., \textit{Arctic Front}, 191.

state system that minimized competition all conspired to prevent African states from effectively consolidating their state power throughout their territories.\textsuperscript{116}

\hspace{0.25in} \begin{tikzpicture}
  \node[rectangle, draw] (A) at (0,0) {Costs of Extending Power};
  \node[rectangle, draw] (B) at (0,-2) {Nature of Boundaries};
  \node[rectangle, draw] (C) at (0,-4) {Nature of State System};
  \node[rectangle, draw] (D) at (2,-3) {Consolidation of Power over Distance};
  \draw[->] (A) -- (D);
  \draw[->] (B) -- (D);
  \draw[->] (C) -- (D);
\end{tikzpicture}

\textbf{Figure 3: Herbst' Possible Paths to State Consolidation}\textsuperscript{117}

Herbst' basic theory provides a useful framework with which to examine and explain Canada's efforts to consolidate and extend power into the North in the latter half of the twentieth century. The consolidation of Canadian state power north was limited by the high cost of Canada expanding control north, the lack of a clear and persistent threat, and a stable international context which fostered maintenance of the status quo created an environment which encouraged, and in some ways rewarded, Canadian neglect of the North. These factors inculcated an approach to Northern security and development based on rhetoric and crisis reaction. While Canada was able to get away with this approach during the Cold War, the current Arctic context will be less forgiving of this approach.

\textsuperscript{116} Herbst, \textit{States and Power in Africa}, 251-255.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 28.
Using Herbst’ three levels of analysis, this section will explain why Canada failed to effectively complete nation-building in the North, leaving the region politically, economically, socially and militarily on the periphery. It will show that the structural conditions that led to the path of state formation and institution building in the North of other circumpolar nations were absent or underdeveloped in Canada. It will focus on each aspect in turn before turning to the interplay of the three dynamics, where maximum analytical value lays.  

**The Cost of Extending Power North**

“There are too many countries in the world. Canada has too much geography.”

Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, 1936  

Much of the Canadian North is a harsh and inhospitable land. Canada’s almost four million northern square kilometers (km) comprise 40% of Canada’s landmass and is comparable in size to Western Europe, yet in 1945 the population was a mere 17,000, making it one of the least populous areas in the North. In the entire Arctic Archipelago, an area of over 800,000 square km and some fifteen islands including all of the Canadian regions of competing claims, the population in 1953 amounted to less than 3000 native Inuit and 300 non-natives concentrated almost exclusively on Baffin and Somerset Islands. By 1961, the population of Canada’s North had risen to a mere 37,626, giving the area a population density of less than 0.01 persons per square kilometre. Although the latter years of the Cold War were to see relatively large

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118 Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 27.
population increases, by 1981 the population was just under 72,000 and in 1991 at the end of the Cold War had risen to almost 90,000, reflecting a population density of just over 0.02 per square kilometre. Throughout the Cold War, the population of Canada’s North remained concentrated in either one of two main urban areas (Whitehorse or Yellowknife) or widely dispersed in a large number of extremely small communities. For much of the Cold War, well over half of the population of the Yukon was concentrated in Whitehorse, while the population of the Northwest Territories remained much more dispersed.

Figure 4: Canada’s Population Density

This extremely low population density was a product of the harsh terrain and extreme climate coupled with a lack of discovered and accessible resources. Canada’s Cold War North

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had few easy natural means of accessibility, and none that were available year round. During the Cold War, the vast majority of Canada’s North lay beyond the country’s transportation grid. The majority of the urban areas were located on the Arctic mainland, but access during much of the Cold War was limited to air, a small number of waterways navigable only during summer and over the winter ice, or a difficult and long route by sea. The Arctic Archipelago was even more inaccessible, with maritime access hampered by either permanent ice cover or drifting ice. As others have noted, it was the isolation of the North not the cold and snow, which made it such difficult a region to operate in. Developing infrastructure, whether transportation routes or civil such as power generation, housing and schools was also extremely difficult given the climate and isolation.

Although there were significant military infrastructure projects undertaken in World War II and the Cold War, the harsh terrain and extreme climate made the development of civil infrastructure and supporting state institutions expensive and difficult. The low population density provided little incentive or need for the Canadian government to establish state institutions in the Arctic beyond those, such as the DEW line, deemed imperative for the security of the country or North America. This cost was further driven up by the fact that throughout the Cold War, the North was a consumer rather than a producer of goods. The basic essentials of life, society and governance needed to be “imported” from the south, often at great expense. This included


127 It was 1979 before a road link was finished to Inuvik, and even that link was closed during the fall freeze and spring thaws. Statistics Canada, 2006 Community Profiles.

128 Eyre, “Forty Years,” 293.

everything from food to fuel, further increasing the cost of extending state power North and inhibiting population growth for all but the most essential personnel.

When taken together with the harsh terrain and extreme climate, the cost of investment in the institutions of state control in the North was simply too great given the paucity of return on the investment. It also fostered a “top-down” approach to Canadian settlement of the North, where settlement was reliant on either big business, of which there was little, or government programs, which were short-lived and focused on a security presence instead of governance and development.130

A Comparison to Alaska and the Soviet Union reveals pronounced economic and demographic differences that made the cost of Canada’s state consolidation more expensive than its northern neighbors, particularly the United States and Soviet Union. Of all the circumpolar nations save Greenland (Denmark), Canada’s North has by far the lowest population density. Canada’s population density of three per 100 square kilometres compared with the Alaskan density of 43 and the Russian of 46 is the single most important and obvious explanation behind Canada’s lag in extending state power north when compared to its neighbors.131 Alaska, with an area of 1.5 million square kilometres had a population of over 128,600 in 1950, including 26,000 military personnel.132 By 1970 the population of Alaska had grown to 300,400 and that of northern Russia to 1,508,700, a threefold increase since 1940.133 The rapid increase in Russian and Alaskan populations in the Cold War was due to large-scale immigration, driven by both huge government involvement, primarily military, and the exploitation of discovered natural

In both cases, in addition to denser populations Russia and Alaska were aided by better climates and existing natural and man-made transportation infrastructure. Much Alaska is in what is considered the “sub-arctic”, that the region above the 60th parallel but below the tree line. As a result, it enjoys a more hospitable climate than much of Northern Canada, particularly the Arctic Archipelago.\(^{135}\)

**Figure 5: 2004 Circumpolar States Northern Population Distribution**\(^{136}\)

\(^{134}\) Bogoyavlensky, “Arctic Demography,” 31-4.

\(^{135}\) Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 199.


resources.\(^{134}\) These denser populations made the cost of extending state power for Russia and the US considerably less than that for Canada. Russia extended her power North in the Cold War.
Alaska enjoys relatively easy access from the “lower 48” by sea and, once it was completed, the Alaska Highway, both of which made settlement and development much easier.\textsuperscript{137} The discovery of significant fossil fuels, particularly in Prudhoe Bay, a lucrative fishing industry and significant military activity fuelled immigration and large scale development in Alaska, so much so that by the 1970s Alaskans enjoyed a standard of living and infrastructure equal to that of the Lower 48 states.\textsuperscript{138} While military activity may be considered a cost, the discovery and exploitation of natural resources made the costs of nation building in Alaska considerably less than that of Canada.

The Soviet Union’s North dwarfed both Canada and Alaska in size and population, with an area of approximately 10.9 million square kilometres and a 1959 population estimated at over 2 million, concentrated in urban areas.\textsuperscript{139} The Soviet Union also enjoyed a long history of Arctic engagement and, within the government at least, a “Northern” mindset that recognized the value of the North and a willingness to exploit it.\textsuperscript{140} In Russia, Cold War immigration was, contrary to popular perception, largely voluntary. Development of the Russian Arctic was however, top-down driven and consisted of large-scale militarization and extremely rapid (arguably uncontrolled) resource development.\textsuperscript{141} Working with a larger starting population base, a more highly developed civil and transportation infrastructure (throughout the period the Northern city of Yakutsk alone had a population twice as large as the entire Canadian North), and with a huge amount of discovered and accessible resources, the work of extending state power North was well begun by the start of the Cold War and considerably easier.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{137} Wonders, \textit{The Arctic Circle}, 8.
\textsuperscript{138} Sale and Potapov, \textit{The Scramble for the Arctic}, 78.
\textsuperscript{139} Armstrong, Rowley and Rowley, \textit{The Circumpolar North}, 102, 136, 190 281.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 114.
\textsuperscript{141} Bogoyavlensky, “Arctic Demography,” 28.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 29.
One final aspect of the costs of extending state power that needs to be considered is the internal political cost. Although Canadians like to consider themselves a “Northern” nation and their country the “Great White North,” Canada lacks the northern outlook enjoyed by other polar states.\textsuperscript{143} Most Canadians have a “southern temperament” and have little connection with or interest in the North. Ninety percent of Canadians live within 100 miles of the US border and over two thirds are urban dwellers.\textsuperscript{144} While other nations have an established and substantial northern presence, that of Canada is minor and more transient.\textsuperscript{145} As a result, outside of crises, Canadian governments were unable to rally popular support for or even interest in Northern initiatives. For politicians, hitching their wagon to an Arctic horse was, short-lived crises aside, not worth the political capital. Throughout the Cold War the North remained the “Land of Tomorrow,” a region to be developed at some time in the future.

**Canada’s Arctic Boundaries and Buffer Mechanisms**

A second reason why Canada failed to extend her state power North during the Cold War was the nature of the Arctic boundaries and the role they played as a buffer mechanism in protecting Canadian sovereignty from external threats at little cost. In essence, Canada did not have to fight to establish or maintain her Northern borders from hostile powers or even deploy significant security capability to deter other states from threatening her border. As a result, Canada had little inducement to dedicate significant resources to maintaining an Arctic security presence or extending governance. In response to the threats that did exist during the Cold War, Canada was able to rely on the US for defence, a role the US was only too willing to undertake in order to ensure their own security from the USSR. Unlike the other circumpolar states, Canada lacked the threat of real or potential conflict, threats which provided other states with the

\textsuperscript{143} Coates et al., 197.


\textsuperscript{145} Bogoyavlensky, “Arctic Demography,” 31-5.
incentive to integrate their northern regions into the nation militarily, socially and politically.\textsuperscript{146} Instead, Canada’s North remained a frontier, while those of the US, the USSR and Scandinavia became integrated into the national fabric.\textsuperscript{147}

Canada was initially granted her Northern territories as a colonial gift from the Great Britain. With their borders fixed by an external major power, there was little requirement for Canada to extend the instruments of state control and defence to reinforce their claim to these new territories.\textsuperscript{148} In 1930, Norway ceded her territorial claims over portions of the Arctic Archipelago, putting to rest the only substantial competing legal claim over Canada’s Arctic land territory.\textsuperscript{149}

During the Cold War, Canada’s northern borders were virtually guaranteed thanks to three conditions. Firstly, the US recognition of Canadian sovereignty over the landmass of the Arctic Archipelago in exchange for Canada’s agreement to the construction of weather stations and the DEW and BMEWS lines.\textsuperscript{150} Secondly, the tacit pact between Canada and the US to “agree to disagree” on issues of maritime Arctic sovereignty, in particular the contentious status of the Northwest Passage. Finally and perhaps most importantly, the willingness of the US to provide the military forces, infrastructure and funding to defend the Canadian arctic (and by extension the continental US) from the Soviet threat. Although the American military presence was also viewed as a threat to Canadian sovereignty, it was offset by a combination of a Canadian military presence sufficient to prevent the Americans from taking sole charge of Arctic defence.

\textsuperscript{146} Eyre, “Forty Years,” 294.
\textsuperscript{147} Coates et al., 200.
\textsuperscript{148} Grant, \textit{Polar Imperative}, 158.
\textsuperscript{149} Sale and Potapv, \textit{The Scramble for the Arctic}, 86-7.
and shrewd treaty arrangements between Washington and Ottawa.\textsuperscript{151} Taken together, these conditions permitted Canada to secure her Northern borders with a token government presence, based initially on the RCMP and subsequently on the Canadian Armed Forces.

There were drawbacks to this approach however. Whereas the large and permanent military presence in Alaska and the USSR provided an artificial prop to their Northern economies and a crutch for infrastructure development, Canada’s small and transient limitary presence provided no such support.\textsuperscript{152} The risks associated with minimal development and governance was offset to a certain degree by the presence of a ready-made population – the Natives and Inuit – upon which to pin claims of occupation and use necessary to legitimize claims of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{153}

As a result of internationally recognized borders guaranteed and protected by one of the world’s superpowers, the lack of strong competing legal claims, and the existence of an indigenous population throughout much of the North Canada’s borders Northern borders were secured without the need to extend much of the apparatus of state control and with a minimal expenditure of resources.

\textbf{The Cold War International System}

In addition to the high cost of extending governance and development north and the low cost of maintaining her established Northern borders, the consolidation of Canada’s state power North during the Cold War was discouraged by the nature of the bi-polar international system. Engaged in a protracted conflict with a peer adversary, the US proved willing to provide for almost the entirety of Canada’s arctic security in exchange for minimal concessions. In fact, the US proved willing to grant concessions to Canada in exchange for the basing and transit rights

\begin{footnotes}
\item[151] E.K. Eyre, “Custos Borealis” (PHD dissertation, London University 1983), 301
\item[152] Eyre, “Custos Borealis,” 298.
\item[153] Sale and Potapov, \textit{The Scramble for the Arctic}, 92-3.
\end{footnotes}
they saw as necessary to defend the Arctic approaches to North America.\textsuperscript{154} Canada was careful to grant these rights only when coupled with guarantees of Canadian sovereignty, and used the American desire to wring official recognition from the US of their sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago islands.\textsuperscript{155} Without the threat of the Russian submarines, bombers and missiles attacking across the North Pole, it is unlikely that the US would have proven so amenable to these concessions and almost certainly would have posed a much more serious threat to Canadian sovereignty and control over the Arctic. The nature of the threat, consisting not of a land invasion but of submarines, bombers and later missiles, required less of a permanent presence in the Arctic, particularly as technology advanced and capabilities based farther south could detect and counter these threats.\textsuperscript{156} The fact that the Arctic was, for the Americans at least, a direction of attack and not a front to be held, further limited the permanent basing of military forces and the development of its supporting infrastructure.\textsuperscript{157}

In addition to a more willing US partner, the dynamics of the Cold War, with the two most powerful nations squared off across Canada’s Arctic, discouraged the activity of other nations in the region for fear of upsetting one of the superpowers. As a result, many of the most contentious territorial disputes were held in abeyance throughout much of the Cold War, and only recently are beginning to be resolved.\textsuperscript{158} The fact that there was little likelihood of the status quo being overturned served to further deter Canadian policy makers from expending the resources necessary to extend Canada’s state control North. Save for short-lived crises that were

\textsuperscript{154} Bankes, “Forty Years of Canadian Sovereignty Assertion in the Arctic,” 287.


\textsuperscript{156} Coates et al., Arctic Front, 65 and 75-77.

\textsuperscript{157} Eyre, “Forty Years,” 65-66.

\textsuperscript{158} Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, 128-129; Luke Harding, “Russia and Norway Resolve Arctic Border Dispute,” Guardian.co.uk, September 15, 2010.
consistently more flash than substance, the status quo protected Canadian sovereignty and control over its Arctic territories.

In conclusion, the bi-polar international system and the fact that Canada’s Arctic lay sandwiched between the two adversaries established an environment which encouraged Canada to rely on the US to provide for the defence of its North and discouraged other states from pressing claims in the area. Canada was thus able maintain state control over its Arctic without being required to maintain a permanent security presence or extend the supporting apparatus of the state over the region.

**The Dynamic Interplay of the Three Factors**

The preceding has examined how the high cost of extending state power north, the low cost of maintaining Canada’s Northern boundaries and the stable bi-polar international system all conspired to discourage Canada from completing the job of nation building in her North. These factors did not act in isolation from each other, but interacted in a dynamic and reinforcing manner. The harsh, inhospitable climate and low population density served to ratchet up the costs of extending governance and development north, while at the same time the fact that the US guaranteed Canadian boundaries and provided for the defence of the region provided little incentive for Canada to bear this cost. Despite this, Canada was able to maintain and extend her control of the Arctic Archipelago during the Cold War by taking advantage of the Cold War international system and the US need to defend the Northern approach to their homeland. Through shrewd negotiation and an unwavering insistence that the Arctic was “Canadian”, successive Canadian governments were able to “…hang on to the north, expand (their) claims to include archipelagic waters and incrementally entrench (their) claims in international law.”

Thus, Canadian governments were able to take advantage of the peculiar circumstances of the

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Cold War to maintain control of the Arctic while dedicating few resources to its governance and development. The question is, will this approach remain appropriate in the twenty-first century?

**Canadian Cold War Conceptions of the Arctic**

This section will examine the major drivers of Canadian Arctic strategy from World War II to the end of the Cold War in 1992. An analysis of the history presented earlier reveals several trends that came to dominate Canadian policy and both popular and official perceptions of Arctic security and sovereignty during the period. For the most part these guiding principles proved successful in establishing and even improving Canadian sovereignty and security in the North, a fact often glossed over by those who would malign Canada’s Cold War Arctic policies.\(^{160}\) As will be seen in the analysis of the most recent Arctic Strategy however, these conceptions would continue to influence current Canadian perceptions of the Arctic and the development of the 2009 Arctic Strategy long after they had ceased to be relevant to the changed circumstances.

Foremost amongst the enduring Cold War conceptions was an emphasis on the United States as the primary threat to Arctic sovereignty, despite the fact they were also our closest ally. This arose out of the tension inherent in balancing sovereignty with security in cooperating with the United States for continental defence. Realizing that the defence of the North American continent required a robust security presence in the north beyond what Canada could provide alone, Canada reluctantly accepted an American military presence in the Canadian Arctic.\(^{161}\) From the American perspective, they felt bound to defend Canada almost regardless of whether or not Canadians wished to be defended in order to ensure their own continental security.\(^{162}\) Despite their benign intentions (few now seriously argue that the US harbored territorial

\(^{160}\) Lackenbauer, *From Polar Race to Polar Saga* 5-6.

\(^{161}\) Bercuson, “Continental Defense and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-50,” 154..

\(^{162}\) Robert J. Sutherland, “Canada’s Long Term Strategic Situation,” 202.
ambitions over Canada’s Arctic), throughout much of the Cold War Canada was as nervous about U.S. activity in the North as they were Soviet.\textsuperscript{163} The central dilemma for Canada in this relationship was how to defend the continent against the Soviet Union while at the same time protecting Canadian sovereignty against the United States.

Canada was to address this challenge through the dual approach of careful negotiation and by providing just enough security to ensure the US did not unilaterally take over continental defence. Canada was to implement a policy of quiet diplomacy and negotiated bilateral agreements, characterized by deliberate ambiguity on Arctic territorial claims and “agreeing to disagree” with the United States on issues of sovereignty. The overriding principle was to avoid provoking a political confrontation with the U.S. and forcing Canada to commit resources to back up concrete sovereignty claims.\textsuperscript{164} While for the most part this approach protected Canadian sovereignty, it also kept the resolution of territorial disputes in limbo and encouraged other states to test Canadian resolve, at several points provoking crises. One of the results of this tactic is that many of the maritime disputes remain unresolved. This experience led Canadian policy makers to encourage a policy of deliberate ambiguity when it came to Arctic sovereignty claims and the tendency to let sleeping dogs lie when it came to Arctic sovereignty and territorial disputes.

The second motivation behind Canadian Cold War Arctic strategy was resource based, driven by the desire to dedicate the absolute minimum defence capabilities towards securing the Arctic. Canada devoted just enough resources to prevent the U.S. from taking unilateral action to defend the northern approaches to North America – what Desmond Morton terms “defending against help.”\textsuperscript{165} Thus, the means Canada dedicated to Arctic security were determined not by the threat from her Cold War adversary, but rather by the more subtle desire to minimize the

\textsuperscript{163} Bankes, “Forty Years of Canadian Sovereignty Assertion in the Arctic,” 290.
\textsuperscript{164} Coates et al., \textit{Arctic Front}, 123.
assistance from her Cold War ally. It can be argued that this approach was based on a pragmatic assessment of actual needs and did prevent Canada from dedicating inordinate resources to the defence of the North. As Jack Granatstein has observed “…the benefits of taking the American road far exceeded those of striving for expensive neutrality or a penurious independence.”¹⁶⁶

However, this road led to a lack of Canadian capability and presence in the Arctic throughout the Cold War. These “barely enough” approaches were not without cost, and in fact were to prove inadequate when seriously challenged. As a result of ambiguous territorial claims and a lack of organic surveillance and security capability in the Arctic, Canada was forced into a policy of ad hoc crisis response measures in reaction to a number of northern incursions, such as the Northwest Passage transit of the Manhattan in 1969 and the Polar Sea in 1985. These incidents both raised the perception of the Arctic’s importance in the minds of Canadians while simultaneously demonstrating the impotence of the Canadian government to secure her Arctic possessions and the ambiguity of Canadian claims. The fact that public outrage was relatively short-lived and the consequences of this lack of capability minor, encouraged Canadian governments to continue the policy of securing the Arctic on a shoestring budget. They established a perception that just enough was good enough, and failures to provide for the development and security of the North could be made up for in the event of a crisis by a short-term political and military arctic “surge.” As Rob Huebert has noted, Canada’s ability to get a “free ride” during the Cold War fed apathy towards the region and discouraged the development of instruments and policies needed to properly protect Canadian interests.¹⁶⁷


More ominously for the future, it also encouraged a trend whereby Canadian leaders promised much but delivered little. After both the 1969 Manhattan transit and the 1985 Polar Sea transit, the Canadian government announced wide-ranging programs that emphasized increased northern presence, surveillance and development in the North. Following Manhattan, the Canadian government issued both a wide-ranging strategy for Northern development and a Defence White Paper that emphasized the protection of Northern sovereignty. The 1969 Canada’s North: 1970-80 was issued as the cornerstone document integrating northern policy, and is eerily similar to the 2009 Northern Strategy. Like the modern version, it rests on four broad policy objectives for the North: a higher standard of living for northern residents, the maintenance and enhancement of the northern environment, economic development and Canadian sovereignty and security in the North.\(^{168}\) It was supported by public calls for “…the opening up of the Canadian Arctic region for development.”\(^{169}\) Neither its promises nor those of the 1971 Defence White Paper were followed through, and by 1980 popular and official attention and resources had shifted to other priorities.\(^{170}\) Even the government’s sovereignty flagship, the AWPPA, was poorly resourced, relying on a voluntary registration and reporting system for ships transiting the Northwest Passage.\(^{171}\) Similarly, the majority of the programs called for following the 1985 Polar Sea transit were also unfulfilled. As previously discussed, of the he initiatives promised in the 1987 Defence White Paper only those that did not cost money ended up being implemented.\(^{172}\) Canada thus maintained its ad hoc, reactionary approach to maintaining sovereignty in the North.

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\(^{168}\) Eyre, “Forty Years,” 296-7.

\(^{169}\) Quoted in Thomas Tynan, “Canadian American Relations in the Arctic: The Effect of Environmental Influences Upon Territorial Claims,” The Review of Politics 41 no. 3 (July 1979): 415-16.

\(^{170}\) Lajeunesse, Lock Stock and Icebergs, 8.

\(^{171}\) Grant, Polar Imperative, 356.

\(^{172}\) Huebert, “Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World, 17.
Despite tremendous bluster, actual development and activities in the North remained temporary, transient and largely symbolic.

Canada’s Cold War experiences were to inculcate several other perceptions in the minds of Canadians. The fact that the US was both the greatest threat and guarantor of sovereignty encouraged a largely bi-lateral as opposed to multi-lateral focus for Canadian policy-makers on issues related to the Arctic.\(^{173}\) While this made a certain sense in the Cold War context, with Russia a clear adversary and the United States the single largest player in the North, it also served to discourage cooperation with other circumpolar states during the Cold War. The only notable Arctic territorial negotiations outside those with the US during the Cold War were with Denmark in 1973, when Canada and Denmark defined the boundary between Greenland and the Arctic Archipelago.\(^{174}\) In terms of international relations, Canada’s Arctic policies were viewed almost exclusively in terms of Canada-US relations. There are obvious implications for this viewpoint in a post-Cold War world where a variety of Arctic and non-Arctic states are actively engaging in Northern activities.\(^{175}\)

In addition to the bi-lateral nature of Canada’s view of the Arctic, during the Cold War most Canadians tended to view the North as a flank to be protected vice an area with intrinsic value in and of itself.\(^{176}\) This viewpoint, encouraged by the perception of the North as a wasteland too harsh to be vulnerable to a land attack or develop, was a contributing factor in the lack of economic and infrastructure development in Canada’s North. From a defence perspective, the bomber and missile threat provided little incentive to establish permanent bases or military infrastructure beyond the necessary early warning sites. There was never any serious thought to

\(^{173}\) Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 205-7.
\(^{174}\) Grant, *Polar Imperative*, 357.
\(^{175}\) Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 206.
\(^{176}\) Ibid., 65.
Russian hordes advancing across the ice cap. As one Canadian military officer was to put it when referring to the threat of invasion “…from a military point of view, nowhere to go, and nothing to do when you get there.” 177 From an economic and development perspective, the fact that expectations of resource wealth and expectations were often disappointed in the Cold War years reinforced this view of the Arctic as a flank. It was simply too expensive and risky to develop resources in Canada’s North given the paucity of infrastructure, poor natural lines of communication and the harsh environment. 178 As previously noted, Canada’s presence in the North fell far short of circumpolar norms during the Cold War, and this included the development of resources. The Red Dog zinc mine opened in Alaska in 1971 and Prudhoe Bay on the Alaskan North Slope began serious production in 1968. The USSR has had significant industrial activity in its North since the 1930s. Canada failed to exploit its Northern resources in a major way until the 1990s with the opening of the Raglan mine in Northern Quebec, Voisey Bay in Labrador and, later in 2008, the start of significant diamond mining in the Northwest Territories. 179 Taken together, these circumstances led to the perception of the Arctic as a barren front that needed to be protected and whose value lay in the depth it provided for continental defence instead of an area which had an intrinsic value and was worth developing.

This trend was reinforced by the fixation, particularly amongst policy makers, on sovereignty loss rather than developing the potential of the area. As previously discussed, Canada largely neglected the Arctic save for brief periods of intense activity in response to perceived sovereignty threats. As a result, activity in the North was focused on demonstrating and re-affirming ownership vice developing the region’s potential. For the majority of the Cold War, successive Canadian governments were to use the military as the department of choice for

177 Quoted in Grant, *Polar Imperative*, 66.
178 Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 193 and 211-12.
demonstrating Canadian interest in and control over the Arctic.\textsuperscript{180} While there was talk of governance and development, most notably in the 1969 \textit{Canada’s North: 1970-80} document, these policies were never seriously implemented during the Cold War. Instead, Canada relied on its military, as limited as their presence was, to demonstrate the occupation and control of territory necessary to back up their legal claims to Arctic lands and waters.\textsuperscript{181} The fallout from this was to discourage the more costly and longer-term investments in governance and development.

In summary, the peculiar circumstances of the Cold War were to shape Canadian conceptions of Arctic security, sovereignty and development. Canadian leaders came to associate issues of Canadian Arctic security with the limitary threat posed by Russia, a threat largely countered by an American presence in the North. The very presence which guaranteed their security caused Canadian leaders to associate threats to Canadian Arctic sovereignty with their closest ally, the US. Throughout the Cold War, Canada took a largely passive reactionary approach to the North, deliberately making ambiguous claims over their Arctic boundaries and failing to press claims forcefully for fear of creating conflict with their American benefactors. Canada came to see the military as the “means of choice” in asserting and demonstrating Canadian control of the Arctic land and waterways, but were uncertain of how best to employ the military when the most significant threat to sovereignty came from their closest ally. Canada largely failed to pursue long-term governance and economic development throughout the Cold War. Through experience, Canadian leaders came to believe that a “barely enough “approach to Arctic sovereignty and security, reinforced by a flurry of rhetoric and short lived activity in the face of crises, would serve to protect Canada’s Northern interests. Finally, focused on its

\textsuperscript{180} Coates et al., \textit{Arctic Front}, 120.
\textsuperscript{181} Lackenbauer and Kikkert, \textit{The Canadian Forces and Arctic Sovereignty}, 5-7.
relationship with the US, Canada became fixated viewing the Arctic through a bi-lateral lens, and failed to encourage or exploit relations with other nations and international fora.
Section Three: Canada’s 2009 Northern Strategy

“Canada’s Arctic is central to our national identity as a northern nation. It is part of our history. And it represents the tremendous potential of our future.

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2007

“You don’t defend national sovereignty with flags, cheap election rhetoric nor advertising campaigns. You need forces on the ground, ships in the sea and proper surveillance.”

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2005

In 2009, the Canadian government released a much-anticipated new Northern Strategy. This strategy was preceded by several years of increasing emphasis by the minority Harper government on the Arctic, including its mention in several successive throne speeches and highly publicized tours by national leaders of the Arctic, usually coupled with the announcement of new programs or funding. A key component of this message was asserting Canada’s position and identity not just as an Arctic country, but also as a circumpolar power and key player in international discussion about the world's Arctic regions. The release of the new strategy was driven by recognition among Canadian policy-makers that the changing circumstances of the circumpolar world required a new approach if Canada was to effectively affirm her sovereignty

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183 As quoted in Lackenbauer and Kikkert, The Canadian Forces and Arctic Sovereignty, 3.


and secure her territory. Paradoxically, while recognizing the new realities, the Canada’s Northern Strategy remained heavily influenced by Cold War perceptions of the Arctic.

This section will be broken down into two parts. First, it will examine the changing context of the Arctic and how this encouraged Canada to develop and implement a new Northern strategy. It will then describe Canada’s 2009 Northern Strategy, supporting Arctic Foreign Policy Statement and resource commitments.

Following the end of the Cold War, Canadian policy-makers found themselves facing an increasingly complex context in the Arctic. Rather than a single, clear threat to Northern security, Canada found itself facing a number of more nebulous, confounding and long-term threats. With the end of the stabilizing influence of the Cold War to deter state and non-state actors from activity in the North, the number of intrusions into the Canadian Arctic increased while Canada’s ability to detect and intercept them decreased.\(^\text{186}\) US security activity no longer presented the threat to sovereignty it once did (the last American intrusion into the Canadian Arctic was the 1985 *Polar Sea* incident), however with the end of the Soviet threat Canadians could no longer assume that the north would be protected by the Americans. In fact, following the end of the Cold War until very recently, the US largely refused to participate in efforts to improve international cooperation in the region.\(^\text{187}\) Canada’s waning interest followed the global trend, and in the years immediately following the Cold War, interests generally declined in the Arctic as countries withdrew from a region that was no longer on the front line of conflict and were distracted by crises in other parts of the world as international relations adjusted to the end of the Cold War. In

\(^{186}\) Teeple, “A Brief History of Intrusions into the Canadian Arctic,” 45-68.

the Arctic, most nations shifted their focus from military concerns to constabulary duties, such as fishery patrols and environmental protection.\(^{188}\)

Radical transformation of the Arctic was to refocus Canadian, and indeed international, attention on the Arctic region in the new millennium. There were three main factors contributing to the new emphasis in the North in the new millennium: climate change, resource discovery and development in a world increasingly hungry for them, and geopolitical transformation. The mutually reinforcing trends of global warming and resource scarcity, both of which appear likely to accelerate in the future, stimulated increased interest and potential for conflict in the Arctic over its mineral and fossil fuel deposits.

Climate change is perhaps the most radical of these changes and the one with potentially the most far ranging effects. While climate change is a global phenomenon, it is recognized as being the most intense in the Arctic region, with the Arctic temperature rising at nearly double the rate of the rest of the world.\(^{189}\) The 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, produced at the direction of the multi-national Arctic Council, concluded that the Arctic climate is warming rapidly and this trend will likely accelerate.\(^{190}\) The report anticipated several key impacts because of this warming, including reduced sea ice that would ease marine transport and access to resources, and the disruption of ground transportation, buildings and infrastructure due to thawing permafrost.\(^{191}\) Between 2005 and 2009, the loss of sea ice was more rapid and widespread than even the 2004 report anticipated, as was the melting of snow and permafrost thawing over land.


\(^{189}\) Ronald O’Rourke, *Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issue for Congress*, (Washington: Congressional research Service, 2010), 8-9; Robert Corell *Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Statement* (Fairbanks Alaska: University of Alaska, 2004), 2-3.

\(^{190}\) O’Rourke, 4.

\(^{191}\) Ibid.
areas. Not only has the summer extent of sea ice reduced drastically, but the thickness of ice year round also decreased significantly. Whereas old or multi-year ice can be up to ten feet thick and requires special icebreakers to transit, new or single year ice is typically three feet thick or less and can be broken up by a much wider class of ships. As a result, as long as the Arctic Ocean melts in the summer, even when it freezes over in winter it remains much more accessible and melts much more quickly the following summer. Recent projections indicate that the Arctic Ocean may enjoy ice-free summers by 2030, however there is great uncertainty over the dynamics of climate change and melting ice, with some scientists predicting that the entire ice cover could melt within the next few years. Fuelling this uncertainty over the potential rate of warming is the ice albedo effect. Melting ice and snow cover leaves behind darker open water and exposed land, which tends to absorb more radiation and heat than ice or snow. In a vicious circle, this increased absorption increases warming, melting more snow and ice and exposing yet more water, further increasing the rates of melting. All this means that predicting the rate of melting is extremely difficult and prone to errors, particularly in the short term.

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193 O’Rourke, *Changes in the Arctic*, 9.
194 Ibid., 16-17.
Regardless of whether the Arctic Ocean is ice-free next summer or by 2030, the fact that more of it is open to navigation for longer due to melting and thinning ice has and will have a profound effect on the Arctic. It is almost certain that within the next ten to twenty years, the Arctic waters will be largely ice-free in the summer but will still ice over during the winter with first year ice.\textsuperscript{198} This change is literally transforming the physical environment of the Arctic, and has directly contributed to the increased interest in the Arctic regions. This increased interest stems from the potential for shorter (and therefore cheaper) transportation routes through the Arctic and the increased accessibility to the Arctic region itself a milder climate permits.

In 2008, the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route (the sea route along Russia’s northern coast) were both navigable for the first time by commercial shipping without the aid of icebreakers. Both of these routes, but in particular the Northwest Passage, have the potential to be extremely lucrative shipping routes. The Northwest Passage offers a route between Europe and Asia some 4,350 miles shorter than the Panama Canal, and some 3000 miles shorter between Northeast North America and Shanghai.\textsuperscript{199} The Northwest Passage has the potential to become an extremely lucrative shipping lane as the ice recedes and the risk from using the passage

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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Projected_Arctic_Sea_Ice_to_2100.png}
\caption{Projected Arctic Sea Ice to 2100\textsuperscript{197}}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{198} Arctic Council, \textit{Climate Change and the Cryosphere}, 14.

\textsuperscript{199} Huebert, “Canada and the Changing International Arctic,” 15
diminishes. Additionally, as ground-thawing makes overland transportation and infrastructure, such as pipelines, increasingly unreliable and expensive, energy companies may very well turn to the Northwest Passage as an alternative means of transporting resources out of the Arctic region. Finally, more open water means that Northern ports, such as that at Churchill Manitoba, will enjoy longer shipping seasons. Already there is a proposal for the opening of a shipping route between Murmansk and Churchill, which would reduce the shipping time from Russia to North America from 17 to eight days and reduce costs by as much as 90%.  

In addition to increased interest in the North due to the improved prospect of trans-Arctic shipping, climate change has had the effect of making the Arctic more accessible as a destination in and of itself. While this has resulted in a modest increase in tourist cruise line shipping, the biggest impact has been on the increased accessibility it affords to mineral and fossil fuel resources heretofore inaccessible or uneconomical. The fact that the warming Arctic has coincided with a looming global shortage of these resources and the discovery of potentially vast deposits of them in the North was the second driver that encouraged increased interest in the Arctic. Much of the Arctic has been revealed to be a treasure trove of untapped resource wealth which, thanks to global warming and improved technology, can now be exploited. The conjunction of new technology, easier access and the increase in resource prices have made once marginal fields now commercially viable.

This new context has led to increased interest and activity in the North. By 2008, Canada had opened up three diamond mines in the North, moving from a non-producer to the world’s third largest supplier of diamonds. Even more impressive are the known and potential fossil

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200 Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 150.
201 O’Rourke, *Changes in the Arctic*, 14.
202 Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 152.
fuel reserves in the North. Operating and proven reserves account for some ten percent of the world’s known petroleum resources. The 2008 US Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that the region may hold up to 25% of the world’s undeveloped oil and gas reserves, approximately ninety billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and forty-four billion barrels of natural gas liquids, with most of these deposits located in less than 500 metres of water and therefore accessible to drilling.\footnote{United States Geological Survey, “USGS Arctic Oil and Gas Report,” Geology.Com (July 2008), http://geology.com/usgs/arctic-oil-and-gas-report.shtml (accessed 1 March 2011); Byers, Who Owns the Arctic?, 90.} The report goes on to assert that “The extensive Arctic continental shelves may constitute the geographically largest unexplored prospective area for petroleum remaining on Earth.”\footnote{Kenneth J. Bird, Ronald R. Charpentier, Donald L. Gautier, David W. Houseknecht, Timothy R. Klett, Janet K. Pitman, Thomas E. Moore, Christopher J. Schenk, Marilyn E. Tennyson, and Craig J. Wandrey, “USGS Fact Sheet 2008-3049: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,” United States Geological Survey http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/, (accessed 1 March 2011).} While this report has been questioned by some, even the most modest estimates anticipate that as much as 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of her natural gas may be located in the Arctic.\footnote{Donald Gautier, “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic,” Science 324, no. 5931 (2009): 1175-79.}

Since the start of the millennium, development and extraction of these resources has occurred at an ever-increasing pace. Exxon has invested some 500 million dollars in polar exploration, British Petroleum over 1.2 billion and Russia is now spending between 17 and 40 million dollars a year to develop oil fields in the Barents Sea.\footnote{Rob Huebert “Canadian Arctic Security: Preparing for a Changing Future,” 18.} The fact that most experts anticipate that drilling in the Arctic will be possible year-round within 100 to 200 miles of the coast has greatly expanded the potential access to Arctic deposits.\footnote{“Northern Exposure,” Natural Gas Week, May 1, 2006.} These factors led to increased competition amongst corporations to be the first to discover and gain the rights to these valuable deposits and increased sabre-rattling between circumpolar nations as the potential of the
area is revealed and old territorial disputes are resurrected. Canada is involved in six of these territorial disputes.

Figure 7: Current Arctic Territorial Claims

In addition to disagreeing over the status of the Northwest Passage, Canada and the US have competing claims over a wedge of territory in the Beaufort Sea that may contain billions of

barrels of oil and gas.\textsuperscript{210} This territory is a 6,250 square kilometer stretch of sea north of the Yukon-Alaska border. Canada maintains that the boundary should be a direct continuation of the land boundary between Alaska and the Yukon, while the United States insists it should be drawn in relation to the coastline.\textsuperscript{211} Although this disagreement has been largely held in abeyance, with the opening up of additional oil fields in the Beaufort Sea as a result of global warming it has the potential to take on new life.

The second and most contentious Arctic dispute involving Canada involves the Lomonosov Ridge. Under the terms of the UNCLOS treaty, national waters include territorial waters out to 12 nautical miles (NM) from a nation’s coast, which are considered sovereign territory, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from 12 to 200 NM, where the state holds exclusive rights over the natural resources of the water column, ocean floor and seabed. Importantly for Arctic Ocean territorial disputes, the UNCLOS also accords coastal states sovereign rights over resource exploitation on adjoining continental shelves.\textsuperscript{212} The Lomonosov Ridge is a vast 1,800 kilometre underwater ridge running under the North Pole from Ellesmere Island to Siberia. Indications are that it may hold vast reserves of natural gas and oil. At present, it is unclear whether the Ridge is connected to the Asian continent at Russia, the North American continent in the Arctic Archipelago, Greenland or all or some of these locations.

Most Arctic countries, and in particular Canada and Russia, have initiated an intense program of ocean floor mapping in an attempt to determine to whose country the ridge connects.


\textsuperscript{211} Huebert, “Canada and the Changing International Arctic: At the Crossroads of Cooperation and Conflict,” 17.

\textsuperscript{212} Byers, \textit{Who Owns the Arctic}, 90-91.
and, as a result, who can claim ownership over the natural resources around it.\textsuperscript{213} This mapping is expensive and technically challenging. Canada has until 2013 to submit its claims to the UN for resolution and Russia 2009. While there is an international process under the UNCLOS to resolve this territorial dispute, the fact that claims require detailed survey has served to drive interest, activity and no small amount of hyperbole in Canada’s Arctic.\textsuperscript{214} In 2007, Russia planted their flag on the ocean floor, at the North Pole, claiming that “The Arctic is Russian.”\textsuperscript{215} The Canadian public and official response was quick and predictable, with the Minister of Defence arguing, “You can’t go around the world and plant flags and say we’re claiming this territory. Our (Canada’s) claims over our Arctic are well established.”\textsuperscript{216} The fact that Canada’s Arctic maritime claims are in fact not that well-established and just two years earlier Canadian soldiers had planted a flag on Hans Island claiming the disputed territory for Canada seemed lost on the Minister.\textsuperscript{217}

By 2005 it was clear that the vast resource potential of the Arctic, now made accessible through global warming and technological advances, coupled with Canada’s looming UNCLOS treaty submission deadline had conspired to encourage popular and political interest in Canada’s Arctic. There was a third factor that was to further transform the Arctic and direct Canadian eyes Northward once again, and that was the changing international rules and geo-political dynamic. Canada’s Arctic geo-political reality shifted in two major ways starting in the mid-nineties. Firstly, it shifted from a bi-polar to a multi-polar arena, with Arctic nations engaging in a multiplicity of forums in an attempt to further and protect their interests. Secondly, after initial

\textsuperscript{213} Coates et al. \textit{Arctic Front}, 160-64.

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid. The date for submission of UNCLOS claims is ten years after the country making the claim ratified the UNCLOS treaty.

\textsuperscript{215} Byers, \textit{Who Owns the Arctic?}, 88.

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid.

moves toward Northern disarmament, recent years have witnessed a resurgence in Arctic military activity. Arctic nations began increasing their military presence and activity in the North while continuing to claim benign intentions.

The end of the Cold War thawed the freeze on international cooperation in the Arctic at about the same time that climate change began warming the land and water. State cooperation was influenced by growing connections between Arctic regions in different countries, initially through aboriginal peoples. 218 The Inuit Circumpolar Conference encouraged other pan-Arctic political mobilization, starting with the signing by eight Arctic countries of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and culminating in the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996. 219 Largely brokered by Canada and initially opposed by the US, the council included eight states with provisions for special representation by aboriginal peoples. Mandated to promote Arctic cooperation, the Council has a deliberate environmental bent, emphasizing sustainable development, environmental protection, trade, cultural support and specifically forbidden from dealing with matters of military security. 220 Other multi-lateral forums which followed the Arctic Council include the Circumpolar Universities Association, the International Arctic Science Committee and Sciences Association. It continued into 2008, with the signing of the Ilulissat Declaration between the five maritime Arctic states. In this agreement, they agreed to work together within the framework if existing international law to resolve disputes through negotiations. 221 As Whitney Lauckenbauer noted “In less than two decades, the strategic isolation of the Cold War era gave way to impressive collaborative enterprises in governance, learning and

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219 Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 127.
221 Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic?*, 89.
This multi-lateral approach increased the scope of Canada’s involvement in the North following the end of the Cold War. It

Canada and much the other circumpolar nations’ initial response to this increased cooperation was to downgrade their military presence. The Canadian government widened its appreciation for security requirements from military issues to one that encompassed “…an array of social and environmental issues…linked to the aim of sustainable human development.”

Initial calls for radical de-militarization of the Canadian Arctic were halted when it was realized that the military had an important cultural and service provision (transport and search and rescue) role in the North, and their Northern presence served a valuable social role in tightening the bonds between Northern and Southern Canadians. Despite this, by 2000 Canada’s Northern military presence had declined to a small Northern headquarters incapable of coordinating more than nominal activity, four obsolete Twin Otter Aircraft and a small number of Aboriginal Rangers (a native surveillance militia). Despite a 2000 Arctic Capabilities Study which recommended increased surveillance and presence to counter emerging asymmetric threats, the government continued to let the military atrophy in favour of social and environmental programs.

The de-militarization trend was to change direction in 2005, when most Arctic states issued foreign and defence policy statements on the Arctic, something uncommon in the previous

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222 Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 130.
223 Ibid.
226 Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 133-34.
227 Ibid.
decade, and took steps to re-invigorate their northern military capabilities. While circumpolar states continued to talk publically of increased cooperation and the use of legal frameworks to resolve disputes, they also began to quietly increase their Arctic combat capability. 228 In 2008, Denmark issued a new Danish Defence Agreement that included plans for a new Arctic Task and Command, new ice-capable warships and deployed F-16s to Greenland, something heretofore not done.229 Similarly, between 2005 and 2008 Norway issued several policy documents that identified the North as the most important security region and directed the Norwegian Armed Forces to maintain a robust presence there.230 Russia is perhaps the most vocal and overt in the buildup of its Arctic military capability. In 2008, Russia released guiding Arctic policy document, *Principles of State Policy in the Arctic to 2020*, which directed the development of forces capable of operating in the Arctic, including submarines, the training of military forces for potential combat in the Arctic, and greatly increasing the number of Arctic military bases.231 In 2006 Russia completed the world’s largest and most powerful icebreaker in the world, a nuclear powered ship capable of operating in the high Arctic for years at a time.232

Unlike most other circumpolar nations, the US maintained strong military forces in the Arctic even after the Cold War. In 2009 the Bush administration issued a new Arctic Policy

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228 Huebert, *The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment*, 4


Statement that listed Arctic security as the number one concern. 233 This direction, while not resulting in the acquisition of new Arctic military capabilities, did institute a new focus across their forces on the Arctic, including increased Arctic exercises and an increased emphasis on the region from Northern Command, the command responsible for domestic defence and security. 234

While it is unclear whether the steps these countries are taking are to protect their existing arctic interests or in response to a perceived need to increase their capabilities in anticipation of future conflict in the region, the effect has been to increase Canadian popular and official government interest in and concern over the Arctic. 235 From 2005-2007, Canada issued a series of reports on defence and foreign policy which emphasized the need to improve its ability to defend its Arctic sovereignty and security and advocating an increase in the Northern military presence in response to increased activity and militarization. 236 Public statements by the Prime Minister during the same period also advocated improving the military presence and capabilities in Canada’s North, including plans for military icebreakers, an increase in military exercises, a high North deep water port and upgraded underwater and aerial surveillance capabilities. 237 In 2006, in his first post-election press conference, Prime Minister Harper emphasized Canada’s commitment to backing up her sovereignty claims stating, “The Canadian government will

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235 Ibid., 5.


defend our sovereignty.” Later that year, increasingly worried over the growing Russian presence in the Arctic, Harper clarified his concerns stating, “It is no exaggeration to say that the need to assert our sovereignty and take action to protect our territorial integrity in the Arctic has never been greater.” Public interest paralleled (and no doubt encouraged) the governments increased emphasis on the North, and a 2007 Leger Marketing Poll revealed that the vast majority of Canadians felt it important to do more to protect Canada’s Northern sovereignty. Only 10% indicated they were pleased with the status quo, and while most favoured diplomatic and legal approaches to protect Canadian sovereignty they still viewed the U.S. as the second greatest threat to Canada’s North. This trend culminated in the 2008 release of the Canada First Defence Strategy, which emphasized an increased role for the Canadian military in assuring sovereignty and security against “…challenges from other shores.” The general trend of increasing Arctic militarization had clearly been a contributing factor in Canada’s new Northern focus.

In summary, Canada’s waning interest in the Arctic following the end of the Cold War was re-ignited in the early years of the new millennium by the confluence of global warming, the discovery of vast deposits of accessible natural resources, and the changing geo-political environment that emphasized international cooperation in the Arctic while at the same time witnessing its growing militarization. In response to these new realities, and under pressure from


an increasingly concerned public, the Canadian government released a new Northern Strategy in 2009. The Strategy acknowledged the new Northern context, stating “The North is undergoing rapid changes, from the impacts of climate change to the growth of Northern and Aboriginal governments and institutions. At the same time, domestic and international interest in the Arctic is rising…the enormous economic potential of the North is being unlocked.” 242 Three cabinet ministers, the Foreign Minister, Indian and Northern Affairs Minister and the Minister of State for Science, announced the new Policy on July 2009. The accompanying press conference emphasized cooperation and collaboration, a departure from the previous more confrontational government statements on Arctic policy, and it was no accident that absent from the Press conference was a representative of the Department of Defence. 243

The 2009 Strategy is built on four pillars: Exercising Arctic sovereignty, promoting social and economic development, protecting the North’s environmental heritage, and improving and devolving northern governance. The document’s goals reflect a comprehensive, whole of government approach to Canada’s North through wide ranging and aggressive policies, intended to assert Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic while addressing the need for jobs, housing and environmental protection. Under the Strategy, the government’s vision for the “New” North included more autonomous Northern governments, responsible and sustainable development,

Under the first pillar, exercising Arctic sovereignty, the strategy directed three major lines of action. Firstly, it emphasized strengthening Canada’s Arctic presence by “…putting more


boots on the Arctic tundra, more ships in the icy water, and a better eye in the sky.”244 Once again, the military was to be the means of choice to provide an Arctic presence. Practically, the Strategy called for establishment of an Army Training Centre in the North at Resolute Bay, expanding and modernizing the Canadian Rangers, a deep Arctic water port, a new polar icebreaker and supporting Arctic capable patrol ships, and satellite based wide area surveillance of the North through the RADARSAT II program. These new capabilities were to be coupled with regular sovereignty and security patrols and exercises.245 The second sovereignty line of action was “enhancing stewardship,” however here the Strategy offered nothing new, review of the AWPPA and NORDREG policies. The third line of action was “defining the Canadian domain and advancing knowledge of the Arctic.” Once again, this line offered nothing new, merely outlining the existing territorial disputes in the Arctic and pledging to “…seek to resolve them in the future in accordance with international law” and continue the ocean floor survey necessary for Canada’s UNCLOS claims246

Under the second pillar of the strategy, promoting social and economic development, the Strategy outlined three lines of action: supporting economic development, addressing critical infrastructure needs, and supporting Northerner’s well-being. Under social and economic development, the government established several programs to encourage and ease large scale business investment in the North, including establishment of an economic development agency for the North intended to funnel funding North and a new geo-mapping effort to tray and define the extent of natural deposits. As has been previously noted, one of the greatest inhibitors to the development of the North has been the lack of adequate infrastructure. While touting the importance of addressing infrastructure needs by working closely with territorial governments,

244 Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy, 9.
245 Ibid., 9-10.
246 Ibid., 13.
the infrastructure line of effort provided little concrete other than a new fisheries harbor at Pangnirtung.247 Under the third leg of this priority, supporting northerner’s well-being, the Strategy emphasized housing, health care and education but again, offered little new. Instead the Strategy merely summarized existing programs and highlighted the need for more to be done without offering specific initiatives or programs.248

The third leg of the Strategy, protecting Canada’s Environmental Heritage, was based on the dual goals of being a global leader in science and protecting Northern lands and waters. In terms of science, the Strategy emphasized the need for collaborative work with international organizations but offered little concrete beyond plans for the establishment of an Arctic research centre and an Arctic Research Infrastructure fund to upgrade other scientific facilities. To protect the environment, the Strategy outlined the creation of several new conservation areas and national parks and emphasized the ability of Northern communities to respond to pollution disasters, although it provided no new funding or programs in support of this. It also highlighted existing environmental laws which mandated rigorous environmental requirements, including post closure remediation, for any industrial development in the North.249

The final pillar of the Strategy, Improving and Devolving Northern Governance, laid out governmental plans to further devolve land and resource management to Canada’s three territorial governments and resolve outstanding territorial land claims with Canada’s Northern natives. The Strategy highlighted the previous successfully resolved land disputes and increasing native autonomy, but offered little new beyond a broad commitment to continue this evolution.250

247 Ibid., 17.
248 Ibid., 22.
249 Ibid., 24-28.
250 Ibid., 29-31.
The Northern Strategy concluded by highlighting the importance of working with international partners, particularly the United States and Russia, and through the Arctic Council to address areas of common concern, particularly economic development, indigenous issues and environmental protection.251 These guidelines were further amplified in 2010, when Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs issued the Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy. This Policy highlighted several important guiding principles for how Canada planned to implement her new Strategy on the international stage. Firstly, it confirmed existing disputes over Canada’s Northern territorial and maritime claims, but emphasized their “management” as opposed to resolution.252 It also declared that the Arctic did not require a new governance structure or legal framework, but could continue to be managed under the existing framework.253 In terms of promoting sovereignty, it emphasized the role of the Canadian Forces in maintaining the necessary Northern presence to enhance Canadian control and occupation.254 In terms of international cooperation, it emphasized continued relations with the US, stating, “The US remains our premier partner in the Arctic and our goal is more strategic engagement on Arctic issues.”255 It also encouraged increased engagement through the Arctic Council, and laid out plans to increase its functional capacity, strategic communications capability and most importantly increased use of the Council to develop multi-lateral policy and guidelines for Arctic nations.256 Finally, the Foreign Policy Statement downplayed the likelihood of military challenges

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251 Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy., 33-36.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid., 4-5.
255 Ibid., 23.
256 Ibid., 24.
in the Arctic and did not support the extension of multi-lateral security organizations, such as NATO and OSCE, into the Arctic region.257

Although touted as a new policy and released with much fanfare, in reality the Northern Strategy and supporting Foreign Policy Statement were little more than summaries of existing programs and policies. The icebreaker, arctic patrol vessels, northern training centre, deep water port and space surveillance satellite were all previously announced programs.258 Taken as a whole, the Strategy actually offered very little in the way of new programs or initiatives, and instead were for the most part a compilation of existing commitments, many of which had seen little progress. Most tellingly, the only new money allocated under the strategy was some $17 million to upgrade the fishing docks at Pangnirtung. The rest of the announced programs were actually already funded projects, or those still in the planning stages that had yet to receive Parliamentary or budgetary approval.259 Bound loosely together under four “equally important and mutually reinforcing priorities,” the government’s policy was accused by many of lacking a coherent vision or unifying goals.260

257 Canada, *Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy*, 24.
259 Grant, *Polar Imperative*, 443.
Section Four Conclusion

This section analyzes Canada’s 2009 Arctic Strategy and supporting Foreign Policy Statement to determine how well it caters to the new Arctic realities, and to what degree historical drivers influenced its development, assessing whether those influences are still valid in the new context. Even a cursory review of the Northern Strategy makes it apparent that much of the impetus for the government’s new emphasis on the Arctic came from a realization that the new realities of the region demanded a new approach. The Northern Strategy is clear that “…international interest in the North has intensified because of the potential for resource development, the opening of new transportation routes, and the growing impacts of climate change.” Despite this, it is equally clear that many of the policies and projects collected in the 2009 Canadian Strategy are based on the Cold War conceptions of the Arctic. In many ways, Canadian policy makers continue to think of the Arctic in Cold War terms, which are not appropriate to the new context.

Firstly, Canadian policy continues to emphasize security over development and governance as the key to effective sovereignty. Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy states “…in our Arctic foreign policy, the first and most important pillar toward recognizing the potential of Canada’s Arctic is the exercise of our sovereignty over the Far North.” It is clear from subsequent statements in the Northern Strategy and Foreign Policy Statement that from the government’s perspective “exercising sovereignty” means providing security. While security was undoubtedly the primary element of sovereignty during the Cold War when the North was threatened by Russia and Canada was required to maintain a security presence in the North in order to keep the Americans out, the contemporary Arctic context demands that other elements of sovereignty be given increased emphasis.

261 Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy, 5.
262 Canada, Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, 4.
In Canada’s 2009 Northern Strategy, sovereignty is reliant on an increased Northern presence, largely through the Canadian military (the “boots, ships and eyes”), and as a result, sovereignty continued to be conceptualized in terms of security – control and surveillance. While security in and of itself is not wrong and is a necessary enabler of sovereignty, the emphasis on “securitization” of Arctic sovereignty over development and governance is an unbalanced approach. Sovereignty entails more than just the ability to control a region, it also includes good governance and stewardship. A broad range of economic, social, infrastructure and governance development programs are integral to establishing and maintaining sovereignty. While these aspects are mentioned, it is clear that both recent Canadian policy and government public statements reflect an emphasis on security as the key component to sovereignty.

While this approach may have been relevant in the Cold War, where Canada’s Northern security was threatened by Russia and maintaining sovereignty in the face of a large American military presence required an emphasis on security, it is less appropriate to the current context. More emphasis on the development of Northern infrastructure, the provision of public services and perhaps most importantly the integration of the North into Canadian society at large would be appropriate in the current context. In this, the 2009 Strategy falls short. While it calls for increased investment in infrastructure and social services it provides few details and even less funding.

On 27 July, 2010, one year after the release of Canada’s Northern Strategy, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities released a report which found that Canada’s Northern communities lack the funding for adequate housing, health care and most importantly the

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infrastructure necessary to support future development and respond to the challenges of global warming. The report notes that the effects of global warming – the destruction of ice roads, settling roads and buildings due to melting permafrost and shore erosion due to melting ice – have made the poor Northern infrastructure even worse, and Canada’s infrastructure and social services lag far behind most other polar nations. The Northern Strategy fails to address this, largely due to an over emphasis on military spending and an under-emphasis on enduring development. In addition to the more obvious recommendations to increase funding and develop a long-term plan for infrastructure development, the report recommends leveraging military projects to expand and develop an enduring Arctic infrastructure that can support broad development and expand the Arctic footprint of the country.

The report is right to criticize the failure to take advantage of military spending to develop the North. As in the Cold War, Canadian military presence in the North under the new Strategy is minimal and largely transitory. The Strategy includes no plans to develop the Northern infrastructure to enable military operations and, as a by-product, support Northern development. The only military projects that could have also improved Northern community infrastructure, the Northern Training Centre in Resolute Bay and the deep-water port at Nanisivik, ended up being largely symbolic projects that contributed little. The Northern Training Centre, originally intended to be a permanent and large installation, is little more than a signpost erected in front of existing government research buildings that the military makes use of when the researchers do

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266 Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer, *On the Front Lines of Canada’s Northern Strategy* (Saskatoon Canada: International Centre for Governance and Development, 2010), ii-v, and 4-5.

267 Ibid., 7-10.

268 Ibid., 4-6.

269 Ibid., 20.
The selection of Nanisivik as the location for the deep-water port is an even bigger lost opportunity. Originally intended to be located at Iqaluit, where it would have contributed significantly to increased shipping and reduced the cost of living for a large community, it was instead located at Nanasivik, an abandoned mining dock in an area with no permanent settlement. The only real change instated by designating it a deep-water port was to hand it over from the Coast Guard to the Navy. In both of cases, the government lost an opportunity to both increase its security presence and improve civil infrastructure, both of which would have contributed to Canadian northern sovereignty.

Canada’s emphasis on security as the primary means of ensuring sovereignty continues to have a detrimental effect on development and governance in the North. As a result of this focus, Canada is continuing with the Cold War failure to extend the process of nation building to the North as it has throughout the rest of the country. It continues to lag behind the other circumpolar nations in its development and integration of its northern regions. It is interesting to note that the larger Canadian population does not share this government perception of security. A 2011 Munk School Survey revealed that most Canadians believe the environment and not security is the biggest issue facing the Arctic. More interestingly, Canadians view environmental and social security as the most important elements of protecting Canada’s Arctic. Traditional conceptions of national security as protection from threats posed by other countries and individuals, while important, ranked last in the minds of most Canadians when it came to Arctic

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270 Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic?*, 65. This was confirmed in conversation between the author and the officer in charge of developing the plan for the Training Centre, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Pickle in January of 2006.

271 Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic?*, 65.

272 Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 195.

security.\textsuperscript{274} There is clearly popular support for a shifting of official emphasis on the requirements of sovereignty should the Canadian government choose to reframe her conceptions and provide a more balanced approach.

The second Cold War conception to be carried over from the Cold War to the modern era was the emphasis on developing a military capability capable of countering a conventional military threat. Despite the fact that both the \textit{Northern Strategy} and \textit{Foreign Policy Statement} state the chance of military conflict are extremely small, it is the protective role of the military that is emphasized in asserting Canadian sovereignty.\textsuperscript{275} Most recognize that the security threat to Canada’s North is not likely to be another state, but is more likely to be unregulated economic activity, criminal enterprises, illegal infiltration or terrorist activity.\textsuperscript{276} The Canadian Conference of Defence Association identifies four broad security threats that would require a government response. While not intended to be exhaustive they include those most likely. The four scenarios are a large-scale rescue and evacuation, a terrorist attack, a sovereignty challenge (a foreign ship attempting to transit the Northwest Passage without permission) and civil unrest or domestic sabotage.\textsuperscript{277} While the military is appropriate to meet the challenges of these most likely scenarios as well as provide wide area surveillance, many of the plans outlined in the Strategy are more suitable for countering a conventional military threat. This is perhaps best exemplified by the planned acquisition of Arctic ships. Under the Northern Strategy, Canada planned to buy three armed arctic-capable heavy icebreakers, six to eight ice-strengthened “Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels” to enable Canada’s Navy to operate in the Arctic and a large heavy ice-capable


\textsuperscript{275} Canada, \textit{Canada’s Northern Strategy}, 13; Canada, \textit{Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy}, 4-5.

\textsuperscript{276} Teeple, “A Brief History of Intrusions into the Canadian Arctic,” 45-68.

\textsuperscript{277} Gary Rice, “Four Selected Intrusion Scenarios,” in \textit{Defence Requirements for Canada’s Arctic}, ed. Brian MacDonald (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2007), 67.
icebreaker for the Coast Guard.\textsuperscript{278} The Naval ships were intended to provide the capability to meet threats from foreign states.\textsuperscript{279} While much of this construction was delayed shortly after the release of the 2009 Strategy due to budget cuts, the fact that these programs were designed to counter state incursions into the Arctic is indicative of a government mindset more appropriate to the Cold War era than the current context. A more appropriate program, and one for less money, would have been to acquire a larger number of mid-sized multi-purpose Coast Guard icebreakers which could provide a more robust surveillance presence over a wider area.

Similarly, the fact that the Northern Strategy totally omitted plans to upgrade Canada’s Northern search and rescue (SAR) capability is indicative of the continuing conception of the Arctic as an empty Cold War front vice an active region. Currently, Canada’s Northern SAR capability consists of four old Twin Otter aircraft based in Yellowknife. C-130 aircraft can be used for Northern SAR, but it takes them six hours to reach the Northwest Passage from their base and they are capable only of dropping search and rescue technicians.\textsuperscript{280} None of Canada’s SAR helicopters are based in the North and there are no plans to purchase additional fixed wing SAR aircraft. Given the increased scale of Northern activity and the fact that this will only increase, this lack of capability is a serious gap. The current Commander of Canadian Forces in the North has openly stated that if there was a crash on Canada’s Ellesmere Island in winter, “We (the Canadian Forces) could not get there.”\textsuperscript{281} Basing helicopter SAR capability in the North, at least during the summer months, would directly contribute to Canadian sovereignty by demonstrating that Canada could respond to crises and provide appropriate services throughout its


\textsuperscript{279} Byers, \textit{Who Owns the Arctic?}, 64.


\textsuperscript{281} Byers, \textit{Who Owns the Arctic?}, 69.
territories. It would also enhance Canada’s sovereignty by providing another means to monitor and enforce Canadian laws in the North.

In addition to a focus on security at the expense of governance and development and an emphasis on military capabilities more appropriate to a conventional threat, it is clear that Canada continues to view the US as the primary threat to Northern sovereignty. The major cause of this is the continuing disagreement between Canada and the US over the status of the Northwest Passage. Canada continues to hold to the contention that the Northwest Passage are internal waterways, a claim reinforced by in her 2010 Arctic Foreign Policy Statement which states “...Canada controls all maritime navigation in her waters.” The same document, and several Arctic experts, also maintains that Canada should continue her policy of managing this dispute rather than resolve it, muddling through with the existing policy of agreeing to disagree.

It is in both Canada and the American’s interest to resolve this dispute instead of letting it simmer. As the former US Ambassador to Canada argued, the fact that ownership is unclear has created a situation where neither Canada nor the US are providing effective control over the passage, creating a security seam which terrorists could exploit. The US is unlikely to agree to Canada’s claim that the Northwest Passage is an internal waterway, not the least because Canada lacks the capability to effectively monitor the passage. Rather than simply “manage” the dispute in order to avoid conflict with the US, Canada needs to come to a cooperative agreement on the status of the Northwest Passage. This should include procedures and capabilities that

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282 Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic?*, 92.
284 Ibid., 9; Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic?*, 81.
permit the two countries to collaboratively manage the strait and establish a shared strategy for control, regulation and use of the increasing traffic passing through it. That Canada is unwilling to do this stems in great part from the lingering Cold War suspicion over American motives in the Arctic. The fact is that in the new Arctic context the most significant threat is no longer US encroachment on Canadian sovereignty, but the more amorphous threats of global warming, unregulated industry and non-state actors using the region to infiltrate onto the continent. Despite this, Canada’s rhetoric and policies remain focused on managing the threat to sovereignty from the US.

The focus on sovereignty through security, an emphasis on conventional military capability, and persistent suspicion of US motives are Cold War Arctic conceptions that continue to mold Canada’s contemporary policy. Perhaps the most significant Cold War influence on the 2009 Strategy however, was the continued inclination for the government to promise much but deliver little in the belief that positive action in the Arctic could be delayed. As previously noted, when confronted with a crisis in the North Canada tended to hurriedly devise an ad hoc response in reaction to public outrage. Once the public furor died down, Canada quickly shifted priorities, cancelling planned projects and focusing elsewhere. It is interesting to note that the 2009 Northern Strategy identifies many of the same requirements as the 1971 and 1987 Defence White Papers. Like the projects proposed under these policies, many of the government’s 2009 Northern Strategy proposals have already begun to be cancelled as the government fails to follow through on its plan.

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287 Byers, *Who Owns the Arctic?*, 83-85 and Appendix II provides recommendations from a joint working group that included the former American Ambassador on how to implement such a collaborative approach.

288 Coates et al., *Arctic Front*, 193 and 203.

289 Teeple, “A Brief History of Intrusions into the Canadian Arctic,” 45-68

290 Grant, *Polar Imperative*, 338.
In terms of military capabilities, the Canadian government allowed cost to be the primary driver in determining the locations and scale of both the Arctic Warfare Training Centre and the Deep Water Port. As a result, both are largely symbolic capabilities that contribute little to Canada’s security or Northern infrastructure. Similarly, shortly after the release of the 2009 Northern Strategy Canada indefinitely delayed the plans to build the ice-hardened Arctic offshore patrol vessels. Reminiscent of the 1990 decision to scrap plans to build the Polar 8 Icebreaker, plans for the new Coast Guard icebreaker have also been delayed, and to date no tender has been let to build the ship despite the fact that it is to be in service by 2017. Finally, a key component of Canada’s ability to monitor the Northwest Passage, the Northern Watch underwater surveillance program, was also suspended two days before the Strategy’s release. Thus, within two years of the Strategy’s release, many of the projects that underpin Canada’s plan to reinvigorate its ability to exercise control over the Arctic were cancelled or downgraded. As noted Arctic academic Rob Huebert noted in relation to the delay and cancellation of the 2009 Strategy programs “…it seems to be a habit for governments, both Conservative and Liberal, to pull away quietly from huge Arctic sovereignty projects they have rolled out... other federal projects in the Arctic could be at risk.”

It is not only the security projects which Canada has failed to see through to fruition however. While the 2009 Northern Strategy promised much in terms of infrastructure development and economic investment there has continued to be little follow through. While the

291 Ibid., 443.
292 Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans, Controlling Canada’s Arctic Waters: The Role of the Canadian Coast Guard, (Ottawa: Clerk of the Senate, April 15, 2010), http://www.parl.gc.ca/40/3/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/fish-e/rep-e/rep02apr10-e.pdf (accessed March 1, 2011).
295 Ibid.
northern economic development agency, CanNor, was established by the Strategy, its funding remains limited to $50 million dollars over five years, a paltry sum that will achieve very little.\footnote{296} Similarly, although the Strategy makes broad promises to deliver much on infrastructure and the provision of essential services, to date it has accomplished very little and allocated even less funding. The infrastructure deficit in Canada’s North is estimated at $400 million, yet to date Canada only intends to provide $100 million in infrastructure improvement and that has yet to be officially approved.\footnote{297} Canada’s Northerners also lack access to many of the essential basic services Canadians in the South enjoy. Again, although the Northern Strategy promises much to date it has failed to develop the programs or provide the funding necessary to improve the quality of life in the North.\footnote{298}

Despite these criticisms that Canada’s \textit{Northern Strategy} remains largely hostage to Cold War conceptions of the North, there are some positive indications that at least in theory Canada has realized the contemporary Arctic context requires a new approach. Although perhaps a decade too late, Canada has finally recognized that operating in the Arctic requires scientific data to back up her territorial claims and determine the full scope of the Arctic’s resource potential. The Strategy’s plans for a high Arctic research station are proceeding apace, with funding allocated and a site selected.\footnote{299} Similarly, both the proposed geo-mapping of the Arctic to


\footnote{298} Ibid., 4, 6, 14-15.

quantify natural resource deposits and the survey of the continental shelf in anticipation of Canada’s 2013 UNCLOS claim are being appropriately funded and carried out.300

Perhaps most encouragingly, Canada has continued with a much broader international engagement. Whereas during the Cold War Canada adopted a bi-lateral approach to Arctic issues with the US, it is now participating in, and in many cases leading a more multi-lateral approach to Arctic issues. In promoting this approach, the 2009 Northern Strategy and Foreign Policy Document recognize that advancing Canada’s northern interests in an era of climate change and the potential benefits and risks from Arctic resource exploitation requires cooperative mechanisms.301 In some ways, Canada is uniquely positioned to take advantage of these multi-lateral institutions to extend her influence. Canada is a founding member and continues to be a leader on the Arctic Council.302 She is a signatory to the Ilulissat Declaration involving the five Arctic maritime states, hosting their second meeting in Canada in 2010.303 Canada has and continues to use and abide by the provisions of the UNCLOS Treaty to regulate Northern activity. Her leadership in expanding the UNCLOS provisions to allow coastal states to enact laws against maritime pollution out to 200 NM in the Arctic is a prime example of how Canada can use international law to further her control and sovereignty over the North.304 As a middle power sandwiched between the US and Russia in the Arctic, Canada can use these institutions and her

301 Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy, 33-34; Canada, Arctic Foreign Policy Statement, 23-26.
304 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, 47.
position of respect on them from her strong tradition of developing and promoting international law. As Michael Byer notes “Canada is an Arctic country because of geography; it could be an Arctic leader because of international law.” Canada’s emphasis on the Arctic Council and other multi-lateral institutions are an appropriate response to the amorphous and non-state challenges currently facing Arctic nations.

In conclusion, much of Canada’s current Northern policy remains firmly wedded to Cold War conceptions of the Arctic. Despite the clear recognition in policy statements that the Arctic context has changed with the onset of global warming, the discovery and accessibility of vast natural resources and the increasing number of Arctic actors these trends and the end of the Cold War have encouraged, Canada continues to pursue a strategy more appropriate to the Cold War era. Canadian policies remain focused on sovereignty through classical military security. While the new policies talk in broad terms of governance and economic development, they in fact offer little and the emphasis, both in terms of resources and political capital, is on securing rather than developing the North. While security is a necessary element of sovereignty, this almost exclusive focus is preventing Canada from pursuing other avenues to enhance her sovereignty, avenues that would also serve to build northern institutions and the economy. Canada’s pursuit of military capabilities more appropriate to a state adversary instead of the asymmetric threats has served to degrade Canada’s ability to counter the more likely threats to her North.

In many ways, Canadian policy continues to encourage the view of the North as a flank to be protected vice an integral part of the nation that must be developed. In order to both secure her sovereignty and maximize the benefit from her northern region, Canada must complete the job of nation building north. Extending her governance, development and transportation

306 Ibid., 912.
infrastructure to this last Canadian frontier will go a long way to making Canada a northern nation and inculcating a “northern” mindset in her citizens.

Finally and perhaps most worrying, since the release of the 2009 *Northern Strategy*, the Canadian government has continued her traditional approach of promising much but delivering little. While extremely ambitious, the majority of the 2009 planned programs have been delayed or cancelled as Canada struggles with the realities of budget constraints and competing priorities. During the Cold War, this approach forced Canada to rely on ad-hoc reactionary approaches to Northern crises, as she failed to develop and stick to a long term plan that included development of the broad capabilities necessary to extend state power and development North. While Canada could get away with this approach in the Cold War, it is unlikely that circumstances will be as forgiving in the new Arctic context. The Arctic is no longer the vast untapped land of tomorrow, but is becoming a hothouse of competition. Canada must develop a more balanced approach to extending her sovereignty north and allocate the necessary resources if she is going to protect and advance her interests there.
Appendix 1: Definition of Terms

Listed below is a brief glossary of key terms relevant to this monograph. These definitions will assist the reader in understanding the strategic environment and analysis presented in this paper.

**Arctic region.** There is no one accepted definition for the Arctic. In order to maintain consistency with the official strategy under analysis, this monograph will define the Canadian Arctic as the Canadian government does, as “…extending from the Northern tip of Labrador all the way up the East coast of Ellesmere island to Alert (The Canadian Armed Forces Station on the Northern tip of the island), then tracing the western perimeter of the Queen Charlotte Islands South to the Beaufort Sea, and from there hugging the northern border of the Northwest Territories and the Yukon to the Canada-U.S. border at Alaska. All along the border, (Canadian) jurisdiction extends outward 200 miles into the surrounding sea…” This is essentially the entire Arctic Archipelago. For Arctic regions outside of Canada, this monograph will define it as that region extending northward from the tree line, with regions south of the tree line but still Arctic Circle (66°32’ N).

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307 The southern boundary is variously defined as north of the Arctic circle (66° 33’N); inclusive or exclusive of Hudson Bay or Ungava Bay; the waters off Nunavut, the Northwest Territories and Yukon, including or excluding northern Quebec and/or northern Labrador; north of the 10° C July isotherm; north of the continuous permafrost line; or the continuous tree line. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), a working group of the Arctic Council, defines the Arctic as “essentially including the terrestrial and marine areas north of the Arctic Circle and north of 62° N in Asia and 60° N in North America, modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, and parts of the North Atlantic, including the Labrador Sea. Canada, Transport Canada, “Seaway and Domestic Shipping Policy: Canadian Arctic Shipping Assessment,” http://old.pame.is/sidur/uploads/CASA%20Scoping%20Study-amsa.pdf; Internet (accessed November 20, 2010).

308 This definition was provided in a speech by the Canadian Prime Minster, Stephen Harper, in Iqaluit August 12, 2006. Canada, Prime Minister’s Office, “Text of Prime Minister’s Speech, Securing Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic,” Prime Minister of Canada Website (12 August 2006). http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1275 (accessed November 20, 2011). It is interesting to note that this public announcement by Canada’s leader on what constitutes Canada’s Northern territory differs from that indicated on the map in Canada’s 2009 Northern Strategy, which indicates that Canada’s territory extends to the North pole and the western boundary as a straight line extended from the Yukon-Alaska border to the North Pole. Canada. Canada’s Northern Strategy, 7.

309 Ronald O’Rourke, *Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress*, 3.
Climate change. A change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties (such as temperature or precipitation), and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity. This can involve both changes in average conditions (e.g. mean daily temperature) and in the variability of the weather.310

Global warming. A sustained increase in global average surface temperature. It is just one aspect of climate change. Warming of the current climate system is evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.311 The Arctic, and its shrinking summer sea ice, is at the centre of the current global warming controversy. The Arctic has been projected by several scientists to be ice-free in the late summer in most years as soon as the late 2030s.312

National waters. The waters under the sovereign jurisdiction of a nation or state. As codified by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). National waters include territorial waters out to 12 nautical miles (NM) from a nation’s coast, which are considered sovereign territory, and an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) from 12 to 200 NM, where the state holds exclusive rights over the natural resources of the water column, ocean floor and seabed. Importantly for Arctic Ocean territorial disputes, the UNCLOS also accords coastal states sovereign rights over resource exploitation on adjoining continental shelves.313

311 Ibid., 72.
313 Byers, Who Owns the Arctic, 90-91.
Northern Canada. Definitions of this region vary. As with the definition of the Arctic, this monograph will use the area as defined by Canada’s Northern Strategy. This recognizes Northern Canada as including all three Northern Territories including the entirety of the Arctic Archipelago and the Arctic Ocean extending outward from Canadian coasts to 200 nautical miles.\textsuperscript{314}

Northwest Passage: This passage is normally defined as the body of Arctic water between the Davis Strait and Baffin Bay in the east and the Bering Strait in the west linking the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans along the North coast of North America. There are five basic routes through the passage, two of which are the most readily passable.\textsuperscript{315} The Northwest Passage 5,000 kilometres (km) of waterways reduce European-Asian shipping routes by 8,000 km and east coast North American-Asian routes by 7,000 km over the Panama Canal route.\textsuperscript{316}

Security. The Oxford Dictionary defines security, applied in the international sense, as the ability of a state to protect against the aggression of another.\textsuperscript{317} Historically, security was framed in the context of a state’s military ability to defend itself or enforce its will on another state and is based on the state’s ability to utilize economic capabilities to build military power. It is intertwined with the notion of sovereignty in that exercising sovereignty requires security. Quite often, a state is willing to sacrifice sovereignty in order to reinforce security, most often through alliances with other states.\textsuperscript{318} More recent interpretations of security have expanded the concept beyond states and the military to include human (individual as opposed to state centric)

\textsuperscript{314} Canada. Canada’s Northern Strategy, 6-7.
\textsuperscript{315} Donat Pharand, Canada’s Arctic Water in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 187-189.
and environmental security. This monograph, unless otherwise noted, uses the term security in the more narrow sense of a state’s ability to defend itself and its territories unless specified.

**Sovereignty.** The *Oxford Dictionary* defines sovereignty as “complete power or authority.” For a state, this authority is tied to territory and implies freedom from interference by other states, freedom of action within its own territory including the imposition of governance and the rule of law, and the ability to exert authority. Sovereignty over uninhabited areas implies some form of presence or the ability to project presence as well as the responsibility to govern and administer. The Canadian conception of sovereignty over the Arctic is best expressed by the Canadian Library of Parliament’s 2006 report *Canadian Arctic Sovereignty* which states “…sovereignty is supreme legitimate authority within a territory… supreme authority within the territory implies both undisputed supremacy over the lands’ inhabitants and independence from unwanted intervention by an outside territory.”


320 *Pocket Oxford English Dictionary*, 1083.


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