AN EVALUATION OF COUNTERINSURGENCY AS A STRATEGY FOR FIGHTING THE LONG WAR

BY

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Disclaimer

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The single greatest national security question currently facing the U.S. National Command Leadership is how best to counter violent extremism. The National Command Leadership has four broad strategies through which it may employ military forces to counter violent extremism: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism. The Long War is anticipated to continue for decades, perhaps generations. Thus, it is imperative to select the best strategy or strategies for employing military forces. Based on historical lessons in combating terrorism, the best strategy is efficient and sustainable and avoids overreacting, acting incompetently, or appearing to be either over reactive or incompetent. Counterinsurgency is neither efficient nor sustainable from a militarily, economic, or political perspective. Counterinsurgency is a high risk strategy because it is a large, highly visible undertaking through with the U.S. may easily overreact, act incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or incompetent. Counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism are each both efficient and sustainable from a military and economic perspective. However, counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism each have inherent political concerns, hazards, or constraints. It is less likely the U.S. will overreact, behave incompetently, or be perceived as overreacting or incompetent through engaging in counterterrorism, support to
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I. INTRODUCTION

The single greatest national security question currently facing the U.S. National Command Leadership is choosing the best, sustainable strategy to combat Al Qaeda and its affiliates.\(^1\) The U.S. national strategy against Al Qaeda is far broader than the Department of Defense’s mission.\(^2\) Nonetheless, DOD’s contribution to the fight is substantial, both in terms of resource allocation and the net effect in reducing the Al Qaeda threat.\(^3\)

The National Command Leadership has at least four broad means of employing military resources in the overall strategy to combat Al Qaeda. These choices include conducting counterinsurgency, waging counterterrorism, supporting insurgency, and strengthening antiterrorism. This paper focuses on counterinsurgency because that is the strategy through which the U.S. has expended the greatest level of military resources since September 11, 2001. The paper also briefly highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the other three strategies.

Counterinsurgency does not appear to be a wise, long term strategy for the U.S. to employ in combating Al Qaeda. As discussed in detail below, focusing U.S. military resources on counterinsurgency ignores historical lessons in successfully combating terrorism and fails to utilize military resources in the most efficient, sustainable manner possible.

II. DEFINING AND BRIEFLY EXPLORING COUNTERINSURGENCY, COUNTERTERRORISM, INSURGENCY, AND ANTITERRORISM

Counterinsurgency, or “COIN,” is defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”\(^4\) Counterinsurgency is well known from its use during the latter stages of the second U.S. war in Iraq and from General McChrystal’s 2009 recommended best means to prevail in Afghanistan.\(^5\)
The most notable characteristics of counterinsurgency are its indirect approach to combating terrorism and its cost. Counterinsurgency focuses on the local civilian population, seeking to secure the population from the enemy and to obtain popular support through effective governance, including public services, eventually defeating insurgents or making them irrelevant.

Counterinsurgency’s high cost is partially because of the large number of counterinsurgents required to provide security. Large expenditures for personnel, equipment, and materials also are required for civil works programs to support the host government. Counterinsurgency conducted in a remote, rugged, insecure area, such as Afghanistan, increases costs exponentially, based on transportation and transportation security costs. Ideally, counterinsurgency should be conducted by the “whole of government” and non-governmental organizations, not merely military forces. In practice, DOD has conducted the vast majority of the U.S. government’s portion of the counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan for a variety of reasons, including DOD’s resources and ability to operate in unsecure environments.

Counterterrorism is defined as “operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.” Reported U.S. counterterrorism operations include missile strikes from unmanned aerial systems “drones” and Special Operations raids against “high value” targets, including senior leaders. Many counterterrorism successes are publically unknown because they are classified. Counterterrorism also includes non-kinetic efforts to secure weapons of mass destruction, including those held by non-allied countries, to deny these weapons to terrorists. Counterterrorism is conducted by DOD, especially the Joint Special Operations Command and Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and also by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Insurgency is the inverse of counterinsurgency, namely, “[t]he organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.”\textsuperscript{13} This definition includes the overthrow of legitimate and illegitimate governments. Almost immediately after September 11, 2001, the U.S. openly supported an Afghanistan insurgency, the Northern Alliance, against the Taliban, which tolerated or supported Al Qaeda. The U.S. more quietly provided military aid to insurgents including the Mujahedeen who fought Soviet military forces entering Afghanistan beginning in late 1979. Since 2002, U.S. support to insurgency as a means of fighting terrorism has received little public discussion.

Antiterrorism is defined as “defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces.”\textsuperscript{14} The Department of Homeland Security is the primary U.S. federal antiterrorism agency. DOD can and does support domestic antiterrorism efforts. DOD contributions to the U.S. antiterrorism efforts include providing armed National Guard soldiers in airports shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks and providing support to other government agencies for high profile events, such as Presidential inaugurations and Super Bowls.\textsuperscript{15}

\textbf{III. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS}

Four questions are worth considering before examining counterinsurgency as a strategy to combat Al Qaeda. First, do historical lessons suggest an appropriate U.S. strategy to combat Al Qaeda? Second, for how long will the U.S. be fighting the “Long War” against Al Qaeda? Third, what does Al Qaeda need to function, and especially what does Al Qaeda need to function effectively in killing Americans and destroying their property? Fourth, why should the National Command Leadership conduct a cost benefit analysis in selecting a particular military strategy?
A. What Historical Lessons Exist Regarding Combating Terrorism?

Historically, the vast majority of all terrorist organizations fail to achieve their objectives and cease to exist.\textsuperscript{16} National victories against terrorists have been achieved not by winning, but through long term patience and avoiding losing.\textsuperscript{17} Terrorists, by a disproportionate amount, lack the resources of the state they are attacking. This disproportionate lack of resources is why terrorists fight through terrorism – they lack the means to fight conventionally.\textsuperscript{18} Since terrorists lack the strength to defeat a more powerful state, they must rely on the state to make significant strategic mistakes, eventually defeating itself.\textsuperscript{19}

The most important rule in fighting terrorism is to avoid being perceived as over reacting.\textsuperscript{20} The perception of overreaction can make a terrorist organization’s claims appear more legitimate, delegitimize the government which is perceived to be overreacting, or both.\textsuperscript{21} As a terrorist organization gains legitimacy, it gains resources: people join its ranks and provide financial support. As a terrorist organization gains strength, it may also gain state support through the principle of “the viable enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

A government which is perceived to be overreacting stands to lose domestic popular support, support from its allies, and potentially even the loss of allies. The loss of domestic support makes domestic antiterrorist actions more difficult. For example, the loss of domestic support may make it difficult to increase law enforcement powers that may reduce civil liberties. The loss of domestic support also makes it more difficult to obtain a consensus for subsequent international action. The loss of allied support or allies makes actions against the terrorist organization more costly and more difficult, or possibly even impossible. Without allies, the costs of international actions cannot be shared. Actions within a strong country’s borders may be prohibitively costly or impossible without that country’s consent or cooperation.
The second most important rule for a government fighting terrorism is to avoid being or appearing to be incompetent. An incompetent government squanders resources, opportunities, or both. A government that appears to be incompetent stands to lose popular support and its allies’ support. As noted above, diminished domestic popular support makes internal and foreign initiatives more difficult to accomplish; diminished allied support or lost allies makes international actions more costly or impossible.

B. How Long is “Long”?

There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

– Sun Tzu

Inherent in any strategy to win the “Long War” is an understanding of how long a period of time the U.S. will be at war with Al Qaeda and its allies. When did the Long War begin? From the U.S.’s perspective the Long War began on September 11, 2001. From Al Qaeda’s perspective the Long War began many years before 2001.

Of course, no one knows when the Long War will end. Reasonable estimates are that the long war will last for decades. Michael Howard states the Long War “may well take decades, perhaps as long as the Cold War.” Major General (Retired) Robert Scales has stated that the Long War “might last a generation.” These estimates are in keeping with historical lessons, since terrorist campaigns that surpass initial hurdles are typically measured in decades, not years. If these estimates are correct, in a best case scenario the war is not yet at the half way mark, and may have only just begun.

If the estimates listed above are correct, they suggest that the strategy the U.S. adopts in fighting the long war probably should be based on the historical precedents of success through long term patience. Thus, the strategy should focus on not losing, rather than winning per se,
and avoiding overreaction, incompetence, and the perception of either. Sustainability is also key; if the U.S. must be involved in a generational or multigenerational struggle, it is essential to keep the “burn rate” low.

C. What Resources Does Al Qaeda Need?

General David Petraeus, Commander, Central Command has stated publicly that Al Qaeda in Iraq needed eight categories of resources: Al Qaeda senior leader guidance, money, command and control, ideology, popular support, safe havens, foreign fighters, and weapons. Al Qaeda’s needs to strike Americans on U.S. soil likely would differ from Al Qaeda in Iraq’s needs in some ways, but many needs would be the same, even if they were satisfied differently. For example, the skills required for Al Qaeda operatives within the U.S. likely would differ from the skills required of foreign fighters in Iraq, as might the specific weapons they would use.

The greatest Al Qaeda threat on U.S. soil likely would be a biological, nuclear, or chemical weapon of mass destruction. To conduct a weapon of mass destruction attack on U.S. territory, Al Qaeda first would need the weapon itself. This would require purchasing, stealing, or building such the weapon, or some combination of these three means. Unless the weapon or all its components were acquired within the U.S., Al Qaeda also would have to transport the weapon or components into the U.S. Finally, Al Qaeda would have to transport the weapon to the target and employ the weapon. This would require at least senior leader guidance, money, command and control, ideology, terrorist operatives, and a weapon.

D. How Important is Efficient Resource Use?

Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain. – Sun Tzu
Critics of cost benefit analysis in national security matters argue that such calculations are inappropriate because a price for national security cannot be assigned or national security is worth any price. This argument has existed in the U.S. from the inception of cost benefit calculations in national security matters, beginning after World War II. Critics of cost benefit analysis in national security matters are wrong for multiple reasons. First, excessive spending for war is itself a potential national security threat to the U.S. Second, because resources are finite, it is essential to expend them in the most effective manner possible.

Regarding the national security threat excessive defense spending poses, military power ultimately derives from economic prosperity. Stated more bluntly, power is per the golden rule: he who has the gold rules. The U.S. did not defeat the Soviet Union through direct military conflict, but Soviet leadership decisions to spend more on defense than the Soviet Union could afford may have played a significant part in the Soviet Union collapse. Al Qaeda might lead the U.S. to spend more money fighting it than the U.S. can afford to spend. The estimated financial cost to conduct the September 11, 2001 attacks was about $500,000. A reasonable estimate of the U.S.’s financial cost to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan through 2008 is between $1 trillion to $3 trillion. In February, 2009, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence testified, “The primary near-term security concern of the United States is the global economic crisis and its geopolitical implications.” He also concluded that defending the nation at a reasonable financial cost is necessary for U.S. national security.

Second, even assuming the Long War is a “war of necessity” and not a “war of choice,” the U.S. must still make wise choices about how it fights the war. The world is a very large place, and there are a large number and variety of people who would like to harm the U.S. Over 90 million Muslims largely agree with Osama bin Laden’s world view. Those who lack the
ability or will to harm the U.S. directly can contribute financially and in other ways to Al Qaeda. Moreover, the U.S. faces other threats. Both China and Russia pose a nuclear threat to the U.S., and other nations hostile to the U.S. may soon have the ability to strike the U.S. with nuclear weapons. Additionally, China is believed to have initiated cyber attacks against the U.S.  

IV. COUNTERINSURGENCY AS A STRATEGY

It likely is impossible to quantify exact Al Qaeda threat reduction benefits to the U.S. from specific counterinsurgency operations. Not knowing whether successful Al Qaeda attacks in the U.S. would have occurred if a counterinsurgency operation had not been conducted hinders quantification. Additionally, some Al Qaeda threat reduction information from counterinsurgency operations likely is classified. Consequently, this analysis evaluates the resources Al Qaeda needs to successfully attack the U.S. and the Al Qaeda resource reductions a counterinsurgency may provide through the force’s presence and by solving fundamental underlying problems in an unstable society.

A. Reducing Al Qaeda’s Means to Harm the U.S.

Counterinsurgency has immediate effects on some Al Qaeda resources and also has second and third order effects. Returning to the elements Al Qaeda presumably needs to operate, previously discussed in Section III C, Al Qaeda needs senior leader guidance, funding, command and control, ideology, popular support, safe havens, fighters, and weapons. How should a successful counterinsurgency affect each of these elements?

1. Senior Leader Guidance

Al Qaeda senior leaders do not appear to arise from the ills a counterinsurgency should fix. Osama bin Laden grew up in a wealthy family in Saudi Arabia. Ayman Al-Zawahiri was born to a prominent Egyptian family and is a doctor. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and are stable
states, with relatively legitimate governments, providing a middle of the world level of freedom and opportunity to their citizens. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are not Switzerland, but nor are they North Korea. Bin Laden and Zawahiri’s countries of origin and economic and professional status are relatively typical for Al Qaeda senior leaders.

It is possible that counterinsurgency operations might indirectly affect potential future Al Qaeda senior leaders indirectly through influencing their ideology. Specifically, western counterinsurgency operations might convince potential Al Qaeda senior leaders that western ideology, evidenced through “good works” in Islamic and other third world countries, is not evil. This idea is discussed in greater detail in the “Ideology” section below.

Information developed during counterinsurgency operations may lead to Al Qaeda leaders. Counterterrorism operations have killed a substantial number of deputies and middle level leaders. Intelligence sources that lead to these counterterrorism successes are classified, and there are reasons to speculate that the information leading to these successes did or did not come from counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. If counterinsurgency operations are the basis for intelligence successes, the intelligence would be at a very high economic, military, and political cost.

2. Funding

Criminal enterprises and some governments are believed to be the primary Al Qaeda funding sources. Criminal enterprises are believed to flourish in failed and weak states, so counterinsurgency has the potential to diminish or destroy one of the two primary funding sources for Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, counterinsurgency does not appear to destroy criminal enterprises, in either the short or long term.
In the short term, counterinsurgency tends to ignore or to strengthen major existing criminal organizations, and it also spawns new criminal enterprises. The indigenous population’s “hearts and minds” is the center of gravity for counterinsurgents. Because they cannot afford to alienate a large segment of the population, counterinsurgents are very hesitant to target criminal organizations that are supported by a significant segment of the indigenous society, even if the criminal enterprise causes substantial harm world-wide. For example, in Afghanistan counterinsurgents largely ignore rather than destroy poppy fields, which provide ninety-five percent of the world’s illicit heroin and up to $400 million to the Taliban.

Warlords have long controlled critical passes and roads in Afghanistan, exacting illegal payments from merchants seeking safe passage of goods. As previously discussed in Section II, counterinsurgency requires huge amounts of resources, and in Afghanistan logistics travel is over land, via roads controlled places by warlords and the Taliban. Illegal toll charges increase with the value of the commodities transported, and thus the counterinsurgency has vastly strengthened the existing warlord and Taliban criminal enterprises. Transportation contractors for DOD in Afghanistan received $2.2 billion during 2008-2009 from the U.S. and are generally understood to pay some percentage of the logistics contract funds to insurgents. If ten percent of the contracts were spent on “security” payments to insurgents to avoid attacks this would be $220 million for 2008-2009.

The civil works aspect of counterinsurgency spawns new criminal enterprises. For example, development projects in Afghanistan before 2002 were so insignificant they did not merit exploitation by significant criminal enterprise. As development in Afghanistan grew following the overthrow of the Taliban, a new criminal enterprise developed to take advantage of it. Some fraction of the billions of dollars spent in Afghanistan for development is diverted to
corruption, much of it eventually flowing to warlords and the Taliban. Some estimates are that ten to fifteen percent of development funds end up with the Taliban.\textsuperscript{52} Similarly, in Iraq, billions of dollars in reconstruction funding could not be accounted for, and it is probable that a substantial fraction of the missing funds was lost to corruption.\textsuperscript{53}

It is doubtful that counterinsurgency reduces funding for criminal enterprises, and by extension to Al Qaeda, in the long term. A successful counterinsurgency transforms a failed or failing state into a weak state emerging from conflict. A weak state emerging from conflict lacks the resources or the motivation to fight entrenched, well funded criminal enterprises when there are many other more obvious, urgent priorities affecting the people. Moreover, strong links and even co-dependence between criminal enterprises and state governments may ensure that as long as the new government is in power, criminal enterprises that developed or expanded during the war will continue to flourish during peace.\textsuperscript{54} The narcotics and human trafficking enterprises in Albania and beyond during and after Bosnia-Herzegovina War provides a stark example of this phenomenon.\textsuperscript{55} Many similar examples exist in Africa, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo.\textsuperscript{56} Anticorruption measures in a post conflict society often lead to instability and renewed fighting which makes anticorruption actions against powerful criminal enterprises all the more unpalatable, both within the nation itself and internationally.\textsuperscript{57}

Thus, even if a counterinsurgency is successful, it is unlikely to extinguish entrenched, highly profitable criminal enterprises. The vast funding counterinsurgency operations provide to criminal enterprises, insurgents, and Al Qaeda is particularly troubling given the small amount of money necessary to finance serious terrorist plots.\textsuperscript{58}
3. Command and Control

Other than Al Qaeda cells whose purpose is to attack counterinsurgents, it is unlikely counterinsurgency operations will significantly disrupt Al Qaeda command and control. Al Qaeda operatives appear to be organized into discrete cells and command and control structures from the senior leaders to the cells may be indirect, infrequent, or electronic.\(^5\) Al Qaeda leaders appear to relocate when counterinsurgency operations begin in their locales, as evidenced by Al Qaeda leaders moving from Afghanistan to Pakistan as the insurgency in Afghanistan began in late 2001 and thereafter when the counterinsurgency commenced in earnest.\(^6\) Similarly, Al Qaeda in Iraq leaders moved from Iraq after the “awakening.”\(^6\)

Moreover, there is no command and control between Al Qaeda leaders and an increasing number of self-selected, self-radicalized, self-directed individual terrorists and terrorist cells. To the extent Al Qaeda senior leadership has influence over many of these “fellow travelers” the influence is indirect and electronic, such as through terrorist web sites or media broadcasts of video or audio tapes prepared by senior leadership. Some self-selected terrorists might work part way up the Al Qaeda chain of command to request and obtain a specific mission or to obtain training or direction in a self-selected mission.\(^6\) An Al Qaeda leader located in an area where counterinsurgency is being conducted who attempts to provide training to a self starter might have his efforts disrupted by counterinsurgents.

4. Ideology

Well executed, well perceived counterinsurgency strikes at the heart of Al Qaeda’s ideology. It is far easier for Al Qaeda to portray westerners and western ideology as evil to populations who are unfamiliar with the many positive aspects of western peoples and practices. Counterinsurgency provides personal contact between indigenous people, who Al Qaeda seek to
influence, and counterinsurgents whose ideology is said to be evil, but who are engaged in good works on behalf of the local people. Reporting, in the broadest sense of the word, extends the ideological effect of a counterinsurgency fought in a Muslim country to Muslims throughout the world.

At the international level both within and beyond the Muslim world, counterinsurgency has the potential to increase or decrease U.S. “soft power,” which Joseph Nye defines as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” Soft power is created through the attraction other governments or citizens may have to a country’s culture, political ideals, and legitimate policies. A counterinsurgency providing good works, for sincere purposes, during a just war, particularly through international organizations or in conjunction with other nations, may increase U.S. soft power. Objectively poor performance, not meeting expectations (reasonable or not), or international belief that an operation is unjust for any reason may diminish U.S. soft power rather than enhancing it. Increasing U.S. soft power is important because it increases the U.S.’s ability to obtain other nations’ assistance in fighting Al Qaeda.

For several reasons, it is no easy task to perform counterinsurgency well under the best of circumstances, even without interference from insurgents. General McChrystal’s description of the immense complexity involved in building one well, in a single village in Afghanistan suggests the overall task of conducting counterinsurgency in countries with radically different cultures from the West is nearly insurmountable, even in the abstract. A second, equally important, challenge is to convince an indigenous population that the purpose of the counterinsurgency is altruistic, not imperialistic or crusading. A third, great problem is finding capable, indigenous leaders who are focused on advancing the national interest rather than
enriching and empowering themselves and a small inner circle. Austere conditions because of non-existent or destroyed infrastructure and unrealistic expectations from the indigenous population round out the primary difficulties before considering the insurgents’ “vote.”

Of course Al Qaeda and other insurgents do not sit idly while western counterinsurgents do good works for the local populace and publicize counterinsurgency successes. Al Qaeda and other insurgents conduct operations against the counterinsurgents and those who support or are allied with the counterinsurgents. This causes at least three problems for counterinsurgency in the ideological realm, some of which may have strategic effects through broader consideration throughout the world, and all of which, if they defeat a counterinsurgency operation, have a profound negative strategic effect.

First, fighting between counterinsurgents and insurgents and Al Qaeda is “amongst the people,” killing local civilians and destroying their property. The number of local civilians who die during fighting between counterinsurgents and insurgents or Al Qaeda can be reduced by counterinsurgent combat strategies, but it cannot be eliminated. Each civilian death related to western forces’ operations may turn the family and friends of the victim, as well as the broader populace, toward the ideology terrorists espouse. Al Qaeda propagandists work to publicize deaths, blaming counterinsurgents alone for them, and work to discredit the overall effort, ascribing improper motives, such as a Christian conquest of the Muslim world.

Second, insurgents and Al Qaeda target those who align with or support counterinsurgents. This causes direct harm to those who are targeted and their families. The people also are indirectly, but tangibly, harmed when their local leaders are killed for aligning with counterinsurgents. Additional indirect harm flows from insurgents targeting nongovernmental organizations who have provided long term local aid. As expressed in a
Taliban “night letter,” written to mid level aid agency supervisor: “You are an American slave. You take money from Americans and work in a malicious campaign against Muslims, so we are warning you. . . . People who work with and are slaves of Americans are worth killing. You are all worth killing.” Negative repercussions within the international aid community, and beyond, from insurgents targeting aid agencies in response to counterinsurgency may delegitimize counterinsurgency ideologically.

Third, within the local and regional communities, counterinsurgent forces may be blamed for casualties caused solely and directly by insurgents or Al Qaeda. For example, General McChrystal describes how the death of thirty Afghan civilians whose bus struck an insurgent placed improvised explosive device (IED) may be blamed on counterinsurgents: but for the presence of the counterinsurgents, the insurgents would not have planted the IED, and the counterinsurgents did not prevent the IED detonation. Therefore, the counterinsurgents were to blame for the thirty civilian casualties. This sentiment, correct or not, may carry weight within the broader ideological debate.

The end result in a counterinsurgency may shape the ideology of “fence sitters,” both individuals and nations who might directly or indirectly support Al Qaeda, remain neutral, or support the U.S. Because of its resource intensity, counterinsurgency is inherently perceived as a major commitment and test of the will and competence of a nation that wages it. If Osama bin Laden is correct that “people . . . will like the strong horse,” the side that is perceived as having “won” a counterinsurgency stands to gain in its ideological followership and soft power. Thus, a nation or coalition that wages a counterinsurgency in a larger overall campaign stands to gain or lose in the overall campaign if it is perceived to have won or lost a specific counterinsurgency fight.
The Mujahedeen versus Soviet Union campaign illustrates the importance of perception in winning an insurgency-counterinsurgency. The Mujahedeen were perceived to have defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980’s. The fact that the Soviet Army was defeated by a coalition that included critical covert U.S. assistance, especially Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, did not become part of the common perception within the Muslim world. Consequently, as the ideology behind the Mujahedeen movement gained followership, the perception of bin Laden’s link to the success against the Soviets appears to have assisted him in extending Al Qaeda beyond an organization geared to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{72}

5. Popular Support

Popular support is necessary for more far reaching Al Qaeda ends such as establishing a radical international Islamic Caliphate or smaller versions of it. Consequently, as previously discussed regarding ideology, well conducted counterinsurgency operations that generate positive perceptions could effectively combat such far reaching terrorist ends. However, the probability of Al Qaeda establishing a radical international Islamic Caliphate appears remote, irrespective of any counterinsurgency operations.

Future national and sub-national radical Islamic governments, such as the pre September 11, 2001, Taliban in Afghanistan remain possible. Counterinsurgency might prevent such governments, but at considerable cost and strategic risk. Enthusiasm for radical Islam often declines rapidly among host populations, as evidenced in both pre September 11, 2001 Afghanistan and the Anbar area of post Saddam Hussein Iraq.\textsuperscript{73} As discussed briefly in Section V below, support to an insurgency in such a nation or sub-nation may be a less costly, less risky, but equally or more effective means of displacing a radical Islamic government that supports Al Qaeda.
Very small quantities of physical and human resources are required to conduct terrorist attacks with strategic effects within the U.S. Thus, popular support is not a prerequisite for Al Qaeda attacks that could cause great physical or psychological harm to the U.S. or potentially lead the U.S. into additional overseas military operations. Consequently, counterinsurgency cannot realistically prevent Al Qaeda attacks within the U.S. through denying Al Qaeda popular support.

6. Safe Havens

Counterinsurgency is regarded as greatly diminishing an area’s ability to serve as a safe haven for Al Qaeda. Large scale Al Qaeda training camps likely are impractical in areas where a counterinsurgency campaign is underway. Even more modest Al Qaeda undertakings potentially could become known to the local civilian populous and be reported to counterinsurgency forces, or discovered independently by counterinsurgent forces.

However, the significance of safe havens in enabling Al Qaeda operations is questionable. The strategic plan for the September 11, 2001 attacks likely could have been formulated in a variety of locations other than Afghanistan. After all, the tactical and operational planning for the September 11, 2001 attacks was undertaken in U.S. flight schools, the first class sections of domestic commercial aircraft, as well as a variety of other locations in the U.S. and Germany. Similarly, it appears that much if not all of the Madrid and London mass transit bombings were planned in Spain and England respectively. Moreover, Al Qaeda has used the internet as a virtual sanctuary from which to carry out activities that were formerly carried out from Afghanistan before 2002. A friendly third world government, failed state, ungoverned area, or under governed area is not a prerequisite for terrorist strategic, operational, or tactical planning.
To the extent ungoverned or under governed territory enables Al Qaeda, it is a mistake to believe the U.S. or a coalition of nations can eliminate all ungoverned or under governed areas of the world. The 2009 Failed State Index lists sixty states as critical or in danger of failing.\textsuperscript{79} Moreover, many nations regarded as generally sound contain ungoverned regions. For example, Mexico, which is neither critical nor in danger according to the 2009 Failed State Index, contains significant regions over which the national and state governments lack control.\textsuperscript{80} Moreover, transforming a failed or failing state into a weak state does not destroy Al Qaeda elements within the state. Instead, there is reason to believe that weak states are significantly more conducive for Al Qaeda than are failed states.\textsuperscript{81}

Al Qaeda members may move from areas in which counterinsurgencies are being waged to areas in close proximity, such as moving from Afghanistan to western Pakistan. Proximity presumably is beneficial for Al Qaeda leadership associated with opposing a counterinsurgency, particularly in an area with limited means for electronic communication, such as Afghanistan. In such cases, the area in which the counterinsurgency is being waged (Afghanistan) may serve as a base for operations against Al Qaeda in the adjoining area (western Pakistan). Similarly, intelligence developed in the area where the counterinsurgency is being waged may help in identifying and locating targets in the adjoining area. For Al Qaeda members who move from areas in which counterinsurgency campaigns are underway to unrelated regions (from Afghanistan to Yemen, for example) the counterinsurgency likely has only temporarily disrupted the Al Qaeda member’s work.

Because of its high cost and large intrusive footprint on the countries in which it is practiced counterinsurgency is not suitable as an overall strategy to disrupt Al Qaeda by keeping its members perpetually on the move. Al Qaeda already has cells in an estimated sixty
countries, and the U.S. and its allies could never conduct counterinsurgency operations in the vast majority of these countries to displace Al Qaeda.

7. Fighters

“Fighters” for Al Qaeda encompasses people with a wide variety of skills, just as “soldiers” include people whose primary mission is combat, combat support, or combat service support, with a wide variety of specific duties within each category. Al Qaeda operatives align approximately with “combat” soldiers. “Combat” Al Qaeda operatives include spies, kidnappers, gunmen, suicide bombers of various types, bomb placers, remote bomb detonators, and body guards. Al Qaeda also employs “combat support” members such as planners, trainers, and bomb makers, as well as “combat service support” members such as recruiters, propagandists, and electronic information technologists.

Some Al Qaeda fighters and potential recruits live in areas where counterinsurgencies are being waged or might be waged. On balance, a well executed counterinsurgency would be expected to kill more Al Qaeda members and dissuade more potential members than it inadvertently recruits for Al Qaeda through collateral casualties and serving as a basis for Al Qaeda propaganda. Of course the reverse likely is true for a poorly executed counterinsurgency.

Assuming counterinsurgencies are well executed, it is still unclear how significant they are in reducing important fighters for Al Qaeda. Areas in which counterinsurgencies are waged presumably have significant numbers of certain types of combat and combat support personnel, as well as a few specific types of combat service support personnel. For example, Afghanistan is a superb location for Al Qaeda to obtain gunmen who are well trained for infantry operations in Afghanistan. Similarly, men with rudimentary bomb making skills may be available there.
However, Afghanistan likely is not a good area for Al Qaeda to obtain sophisticated propagandists, skilled cyber hackers, accomplished information technologists, or those whose skills would be useful in producing any variety of a weapon of mass destruction or transporting a weapon of mass destruction into the U.S. Moreover, operatives who are highly skilled in infantry operations in Afghanistan do not necessarily have skills that would translate even to a Mumbai style attack in the U.S.\textsuperscript{84} Such operatives would first have to make their way into the U.S. and then obtain the necessary weapons and other equipment, not an easy task for a person who only speaks Pashtu or Dari and who can neither read nor write any language.\textsuperscript{85}

Thus, while places in which counterinsurgencies are waged are excellent locations for Al Qaeda to obtain fighters who are skilled in fighting local counterinsurgents, these fighters’ skills likely do not translate to different missions or similar missions in significantly different environments. Once the counterinsurgents have departed the area, Al Qaeda likely will have limited use for large numbers of narrowly skilled, indigenous fighters.

8. Weapons

Biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose the greatest destructive capability against the U.S. A sophisticated cyber attack on key U.S. infrastructure, particularly if timed to have maximum effect, also could cause great damage to the U.S. Do successful counterinsurgencies prevent Al Qaeda from obtaining or developing WMD or cyber warfare capabilities? The answer depends on where and when a counterinsurgency is fought.

The counterinsurgency fought in Iraq appears to have had no effect in reducing Al Qaeda’s access to WMD or cyber attack capability. When the U.S. invaded Iraq, Iraq had neither WMD nor WMD capability. Presumably, Iraq also lacked meaningful cyber attack
capability. Thus, because there was no WMD and no WMD or cyber capability at risk in Iraq, there was nothing to secure.

As was the case in Iraq, the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan had no direct effect in reducing Al Qaeda’s access to WMD or cyber attack capability. Afghanistan has never possessed either WMD or capabilities for WMD. Afghanistan’s neighbor, Pakistan has a significant nuclear arsenal and mid range ballistic missiles. Advocates of a 21st century “domino theory” argue that if the Afghanistan counterinsurgency fails, instability and Al Qaeda’s return to robust operations in Afghanistan will destabilize Pakistan and place Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal at risk.

The current Afghanistan domino theory appears as flawed as the 20th century communist version. First, there is insufficient evidence that the Afghanistan insurgents will attempt to overthrow the Pakistan government. During the years it was in power, the Taliban made no attempt to overthrow the Pakistan government. Al Qaeda’s announced strategy requires defeating the U.S. before attempting to overthrow secular Middle East governments, and Al Qaeda made no attempt before or concurrent with the September 11, 2001 attacks to attack the Pakistan government.

Second, counterinsurgent activities in Afghanistan and supporting Pakistani actions appear to have been the catalyst for terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Thus, the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan appears to be a destabilizing rather than a stabilizing force in Pakistan.

Third, regardless of the Afghanistan counterinsurgency outcome, it is highly improbable that the Taliban and Al Qaeda can overthrow the Pakistan government, if they seek to do so. The Pakistan military and intelligence service are both highly capable, and believe, based on their actions in Afghanistan and western Pakistan, that India threatens Pakistan far more than the
Taliban and Al Qaeda. It is unlikely Pakistan will control the Federally Administered Tribal Area of western Pakistan, but Pakistan has never controlled this area, and the area has not been an existential threat to the Pakistan government and is unlikely to be so in the future. Unless the Pakistan military is defeated, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are safe from terrorist organizations.

In short, it is possible that counterinsurgency might reduce Al Qaeda’s access to the weapons that could most harm the U.S., but that has not been the case so far. Counterinsurgency is most useful in unstable second or third world countries that are less apt to possess WMD, WMD production infrastructure, and accompanying delivery systems necessary to strike the U.S. Personnel with the skills to build and use WMD within the U.S. or to launch cyber attacks against the U.S. are also rare in the areas counterinsurgencies are fought. Thus, as a general proposition, counterinsurgency is unlikely to deny Al Qaeda the weapons that would most harm the U.S.

B. Costs to the U.S. in Employing Counterinsurgency to Combat Al Qaeda

Conducting counterinsurgency operations has an effect on the U.S., and this effect is equally as important as the effect counterinsurgency operations have on Al Qaeda. As discussed in Section III above, the Long War likely will be a decades-long endeavor and the keys to prevailing are conducting the war in an efficient, sustainable manner, avoiding defeat more than achieving victory, by avoiding overreaction, incompetence, and the perception that the U.S. is either overreacting or incompetent in prosecuting the war against Al Qaeda.

It is highly unlikely the U.S. can continue to conduct the Long War at its present pace for decades to come. To be sustainable, the war must be sustainable economically, politically, and militarily. At the present time it is questionable whether the present pace for conducting the Long War is sustainable in any of these three aspects, much less sustainable in all three aspects.
Moreover, even if the Long War were sustainable in its current mode, the continued use of counterinsurgency still would not be the best strategy for the U.S. to employ. Waging counterinsurgency entails twin risks. First, waging repeated counterinsurgencies is likely to make the U.S. appear to be overreacting to the damage Al Qaeda has done and the threat it poses. Second, waging counterinsurgency runs a great risk of failure, making the U.S. appear to be incompetent.

Regarding overreaction, the presence of a small to moderate U.S. force in Saudi Arabia allegedly first prompted bin Laden to target the U.S.91 The continued presence of large numbers of U.S. and allied forces in a series of Muslim countries, operating under the express purpose of transforming the hearts and minds of the indigenous populations could easily be seen as an imperialist overreaction or a modern day crusade against the Muslim world.92

Regarding incompetence, waging counterinsurgency is a very high risk strategy because it does not employ U.S. strengths, and ultimate success is far from U.S. control. From an economic perspective, it places an enormous burden on the nation, not only in physical resources, but also in lives lost, physical and mental damage to many returning service members, and the lost productivity of mobilized Reserve and National Guard service members. Federal government spending may also distort markets.

From a domestic political perspective, the American people are notoriously hostile toward long wars involving large numbers of troops, large expenditures, no significant battle victories, and unclear or vacillating objectives. Regardless of whether U.S. operations in Afghanistan are or are not in similar to the Vietnam War, the fact that such comparisons have been seriously considered by many Americans, including at the highest levels of the U.S.
government, highlights the difficulty of sustaining domestic political for counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{93} Coalition counterinsurgency partners share similar domestic political problems.\textsuperscript{94}

From a military perspective, counterinsurgency does not allow the U.S. to employ its overwhelming technological superiority. Massing fires and maneuvering large elements is nearly irrelevant in a counterinsurgency. Instead, very large numbers of culturally and linguistically capable troops are the key elements of military power. Moreover, conventional military power is only one element in a counterinsurgency campaign, and it is not the critical element. The key, creating a viable government accepted by the indigenous people is primarily a Department of State (DOS) mission, requiring DOD support. Unfortunately, the U.S. interagency process is far from seamless, or even efficient. Even if DOS and DOD each perform well, and perform well together, creating a successful indigenous government is beyond their control. In the typical military campaign, the complication is the enemy’s “vote.” In counterinsurgency, the enemy has a vote, the indigenous government has a vote, and the people have a vote. Winning all three elements to prevail in the counterinsurgency presents a high risk of failure for the U.S., with failure carrying grave consequences.

V. ALTERNATIVES TO COUNTERINSURGENCY FOR WAGING THE LONG WAR

As noted in Section II above, military resources may be used in three other broad categories in addition to counterinsurgency: counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism. A discussion of each of these three strategies as they might affect the eight categories of resources Al Qaeda needs to attack the U.S. exceeds the scope of this paper. Instead, this section will use the shorter framework offered Section III A above. Specifically, this section will examine the strategic utility of counterterrorism, support to insurgency, and antiterrorism in conducting the Long War in a way that avoids losing by being sustainable,
avoiding overreaction, avoiding incompetence, and not creating the perception of either
overreaction or incompetence.

A. Counterterrorism as a Strategy

Counterterrorism operations fit within what Michael Howard describes as “[t]he qualities
needed in a serious campaign against terrorists – secrecy, intelligence, political sagacity, quiet
ruthlessness, covert actions that remain covert, above all infinite patience . . . .”95 Moreover,
counterterrorism can be conducted in conjunction with counterinsurgency or support to an
insurgency, as well as concurrently with antiterrorism. Counterterrorism can be conducted by
both DOD and the CIA. Counterterrorism can be conducted where the U.S. has a substantial,
formal military presence, such as Afghanistan, and where the U.S. lacks a military presence,
such as Pakistan. Counterterrorism can be conducted remotely via unmanned aerial systems
(drones) and directly by U.S. personnel, from the air, ground, or sea. These characteristics make
counterterrorism a versatile, flexible strategy that may be useful for a variety of missions in a
variety of areas.

1. Benefits of Counterterrorism

Compared to counterinsurgency, offensive counterterrorism uses minimal total resources
and is extremely sustainable. Drones, a large and rapidly increasing component of the U.S.
counterterrorism strategy, 96 are inexpensive to build, operate, and maintain compared to
conventional aircraft. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) forces are a precious, limited
resource, but unlike counterinsurgency, which is a relatively “all or nothing” proposition and
needs to be an “all” effort to succeed, counterterrorism operations may be modulated depending
on available resources. For missions that cannot be achieved via drones, conventional aircraft, or
offshore missiles, if the supply of JSOC forces is too small, then these forces can be reserved for
the highest value targets only, passing up relatively high value targets. Defensive
counterterrorism, such as the work conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, is
similarly easily modulated, depending on the perceived threat and available funding. The U.S.
should be able to sustain counterterrorism operations for generations.

Offensive counterterrorism is a very precise, limited strategy compared to
counterinsurgency and, thus, has a much smaller chance of constituting an overreaction. Where
counterinsurgency entails tens if not hundreds of thousands of troops stationed in a foreign
nation, the total counterterrorism force is exponentially smaller and not stationed prominently or
hostilely. Both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism occasionally, mistakenly target innocent
civilians or kill innocent civilians in the process of targeting insurgents or terrorists. It is unclear
whether counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations kill more innocent civilians, but the
numbers may be comparable.\textsuperscript{97} Defensive counterterrorism, because it is preventative and non-
violent is very unlikely to be over reactive.

Counterterrorism should pose a vastly lower risk of acting in an incompetent manner
compared to counterinsurgency. Both offensive and defensive counterterrorism decisions are
made at a very high level, and the total number of decisions to be made is small.\textsuperscript{98} On the other
hand, the total number of decisions that must be made daily during a counterinsurgency is orders
of magnitude greater than for counterterrorism, and average decision makers in
counterinsurgency, including “strategic corporals,” are vastly junior to counterterrorism decision
makers.\textsuperscript{99} Not surprisingly, inane actions with strategic, negative consequences such as the
torture at Abu Ghraib and the use of a Quran for target practice occurred during
counterinsurgency operations, not counterterrorism operations.
In terms of international or domestic perceptions of overreaction or incompetence, an overarching consideration for both offensive and defensive counterterrorism operations is the publically quiet manner in which they are conducted. Many offensive counterterrorism operations are publically unknown because they are conducted with great stealth and are highly classified. The overall outline of many defensive counterterrorism operations is available, but these activities do not generate headlines because of their bureaucratic nature or classified status.

2. Costs of Counterterrorism

The most significant costs for counterterrorism appear to be intangible, potential costs, rather than quantifiable costs that are evident today. Offensive counterterrorism operates in a legally murky realm, and often is referred to as “extra judicial killing,” “unlawful killing,” “assassination,” or “murder.”

Through its counterterrorism operations the U.S. may be moving toward forging new customary international law regarding how a nation may pursue members of a terrorist organization that does not follow the law of war and whose members reside in an area that lacks a functioning government, or where the government is incapable or unwilling to take action against the terrorist organization or its members.

The process of making new customary international law is slow and uncertain. If the international community concludes that counterterrorism operations as currently practiced by the U.S. are illegal, counterterrorism operations may be unsustainable based on a perception that they are inherently an overreaction because they are illegal. If a consensus emerged that U.S. counterterrorism operations were illegal and the U.S. ignored international law and continued its counterterrorism operations, the U.S. would risk the loss of allies and soft power and create a strategic communications bonanza for terrorist organizations. Similarly, counterterrorism or specific counterterrorism measures might be seen as inherently so odious that they might serve as
a basis to recruit terrorists who are willing and able to harm the U.S. There is some evidence that predator drone strikes might have served as a catalyst for the attempted May 1, 2010, Times Square car bombing.¹⁰¹

Covert action, even if legal, also carries significant potential strategic risks for a democratic nation. George Kennan asserted that clandestine operations are out of character for the U.S. because they “conflict with our own traditional standards and compromise our diplomacy in other areas.”¹⁰² Kennan did not rule out ever conducting clandestine operations, but believed regular, routine covert operations were fundamentally corrosive to what the U.S. stands for as a nation. United States’ military operations long have been shaped to a greater or lesser degree by public opinion, subject to the press’ access to information and its opinion of the justness of a given war. A virtual absence of public information to enable public debate on a counterterrorism war waged covertly could lead decision makers to routinely authorize or direct military action that would be unacceptable to an informed public.

Counterterrorism in governed areas without at least the tacit permission of the foreign sovereign may be unsustainable based on such actions being perceived as an overreaction. For example, Israeli Mossad agents killed a “senior field operative for Hamas” in Dubai, apparently without either the express or tacit permission of the Dubai government.¹⁰³ Negative international reaction appears to have been enhanced because the Mossad agents used forged British and German passports in conducting the counterterrorism operation, but the incident highlights the risks and potentially unsustainable use of counterterrorism which is perceived as an overreaction.

The use of counterterrorism in foreign nations with only tacit, conditional permission from the foreign sovereign also may be problematic. Unclassified sources postulate that U.S. drone attacks in Pakistan have the Pakistan government’s tacit approval and support, with the
proviso that the Pakistan government will never publicly acknowledge that it has authorized U.S. drone attacks in western Pakistan, and the Pakistan government reserves the right to condemn any particular U.S. drone attack that creates excessive collateral damage. Whether an arrangement such as the one the U.S. may have with the Pakistan government regarding drone attacks within western Pakistan is sustainable in the long term remains an open question.

B. Supporting Insurgency as a Strategy

In late 2001 and early 2002, U.S. support to an insurgency, namely the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, almost immediately succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban government, which had supported or tolerated Al Qaeda and refused to surrender its members to the U.S. after the September 11, 2001 attacks. The success of the U.S. support to the Northern Alliance in displacing the Taliban government suggests that support to insurgency is worthy of consideration as a means to employ military power in fighting the Long War.

1. Benefits of Supporting Insurgency

Low economic and military costs, in dollars spent, U.S. service members’ lives lost or harmed, and equipment destroyed or degraded are the primary benefits of supporting an insurgency against a hostile government, compared to invading, occupying, and waging counterinsurgency. The process of routing of the Taliban militarily in late 2001 and driving it from power was achieved with minimal U.S. casualties, using air power and a relatively small number of special forces ground troops. Al Qaeda’s assassination of Ahmed Shah Masoud, the Northern Alliance commander, on September 9, 2001, suggests Al Qaeda may have feared the U.S. might provide support to the Northern Alliance after the September 11, 2001, attacks as a means of attacking Al Qaeda. Covert, rather than open military assistance to the Mujahedeen drove the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in the 1980’s. Based on the experience in
Afghanistan, there is also a basis to believe that open, direct U.S. support to an insurgency might result in rapid results.

The potential for the U.S. to displace a hostile government through support to an insurgency at a minimal economic cost and with few U.S. casualties, carries with it a number of potential benefits in fighting the Long War. First, it should deter foreign governments from supporting Al Qaeda or tolerating Al Qaeda and its affiliates openly operating in their countries, and it may make foreign governments more apt to surrender terrorists who have attacked the U.S. Nations typically harbor or sponsor terrorist organizations based on pragmatic rather than altruistic reasons, and likely are focused upon the stability of their regime. A viable, low cost, low casualty strategy available to the U.S. to displace a regime significantly alters the calculation of whether it benefits a foreign government to harbor or sponsor Al Qaeda.

Second, harkening back to Section III A above, support to insurgencies meets the criteria of fighting in a manner that avoids losing. From an economic and military perspective, support to an insurgency is sustainable for a very long time. From a perception point of view, supporting an existing insurgency against a regime is less likely to be perceived as overreacting than is invading a nation, occupying it, and attempting to refashion the nation to the U.S.’s liking. The danger of appearing incompetent in supporting an insurgency that fails is substantially smaller than the danger of appearing incompetent in invading, occupying, and waging a counterinsurgency. Insurgencies are apt to fail, and investing in one is a vastly smaller undertaking than major combat operations in Iraq or U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
2. Costs of Supporting Insurgency – “Sleep with Dogs, Awake with Fleas”

Support to an insurgency does entail political risk. First, there is risk in supporting an insurgency that may be perceived as being no more legitimate than the government it displaces, for example, the Northern Alliance displacing the Taliban. In such a case, if international and domestic audiences perceive the U.S. as being sufficiently aggrieved, as was the case in late 2001 and 2002, support to an illegitimate insurgency fighting an illegitimate government likely will be perceived as acceptable. On the other hand, if the U.S. is not perceived as being sufficiently aggrieved, the perception of support to an illegitimate insurgency may be hostile.

As noted above, if an insurgency the U.S. openly supports fails, there is some element of incompetence that will adhere to the U.S. Covert support, in theory, might reduce the stigma of incompetence, but in practice, it likely is difficult to keep significant covert assistance to an insurgency secret.

Support to an insurgency is also risky in that the leadership characteristics that make for successful insurgent leaders likely do not translate well to a government of which the U.S. or the international community will be proud. Thus, when the U.S. supports an insurgency, it likely is best to immediately dissociate from the insurgency once it has seized power, limiting the problem of “guilt by association.” To the extent the U.S. seeks to influence a successful insurgency it has supported toward making democratic choices, this is best done via inducements from afar, treating the new government as an independent sovereign.

Likely the worst approach is to assist an illegitimate insurgency, continue to station forces in the nation, and be seen as propping up an illegitimate government or dictating its illegitimate actions. It is better to allow a new government to fail, even if this means a potential return of a government that previously harbored Al Qaeda or its affiliates. In such a case,
support to a new insurgency or counterterrorism measures in the country remain possible courses of action if Al Qaeda is allowed to return and operate openly.

C. Antiterrorism as a Strategy

It is difficult to imagine a rational U.S. strategy against Al Qaeda that does not include antiterrorism. The four primary antiterrorism issues are determining how much to spend, determining priorities, ensuring a rational and coherent federal, state, and local interaction, and determining how much and in what ways to employ military resources. This subsection will not attempt to answer these four complicated issues and will instead consider the overarching benefits and costs of antiterrorism as a strategy and specific benefits and costs of employing military resources for antiterrorism.

1. Benefits of Antiterrorism

Antiterrorism is an economically sustainable strategy. The resource commitment to antiterrorism can be modulated relatively easily. If resources or the perceived threat diminish, annual expenditures can be reduced by diminishing funding to the lowest priority antiterrorism measures, making pro rata cuts to all programs, or some combination of lowest priority and pro rata expenditure reductions.

The cost for individual active duty or mobilized service members stationed in the U.S. who are performing antiterrorism duties is far less than the cost of service members stationed in remote areas overseas who are performing counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, or support to insurgency missions, primarily because of the difference in logistical support costs. The savings for Reserve and National Guard service members who work at civilian jobs in local communities but are available for antiterrorism duties on an as needed basis cost only a fraction of what an active duty service member working within the U.S. costs.
Antiterrorism is a politically sustainable strategy. Because antiterrorism measures are within the U.S., they are subject to great scrutiny and great debate by the U.S. electorate and its elected officials. The U.S. democratic process minimizes the possibility of overreaction through antiterrorism actions. The modulation of antiterrorism based on the public’s tolerance for inconvenience and civil liberties infringements, versus safety, ensures overall perceptions of overreaction are remedied promptly. Antiterrorism also is unlikely to be perceived as an overreaction by foreign audiences, who experience the antiterrorism measures only if they travel, or attempt to travel, to the U.S. This greatly diminishes the foreign audience who may perceive U.S. antiterrorism measures as an overreaction. Additionally, it is universally accepted that nations may much more freely engage in actions within their borders that would be objectionable elsewhere.

Displays of governmental incompetence certainly are possible with antiterrorism measures, but unlike some other strategies, greater antiterrorism efforts should reduce the number of failures. Moreover, unsuccessful efforts to prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and to minimize the consequences of completed attacks evidence a lower level of potential error than failure to foresee threats at all or to undertake any measures to forestall or mitigate them. The potential for the perception of governmental incompetence both within the U.S. and abroad exists if there is a successful terrorist attack by Al Qaeda, particularly if the attack is serious. However, there appears to be a growing understanding both domestically and internationally that complete safety from all terrorist attacks likely is impossible.

From a military perspective, antiterrorism includes at least four key specific benefits. First, antiterrorism is potentially effective against an organization and individuals who cannot be deterred. Second, antiterrorism constitutes the final “layer” in the overall means of preventing
Al Qaeda from inflicting harm on the U.S. and its citizens. Third, antiterrorism serves as a means to limit the effects of any successful attack within the U.S. Fourth, some antiterrorism measures intended to prevent a successful Al Qaeda attack in the U.S., or to minimize the consequences of a successful attack, serve beneficial purposes in preventing or responding to other threats and events.

The effective Cold War strategy of mutual assured destruction succeeded because both the U.S. and Soviet governments placed a high value on the continued existence of their nations. It is unclear whether Al Qaeda would willingly end its existence in exchange for destroying the U.S. Members of Al Qaeda who successfully conduct suicide bombings are clearly willing to end their existence in the present world to achieve their missions. Antiterrorism measures that prevent Al Qaeda operatives from trading their existence for the existence of the U.S. or its citizens thus are an essential part of the U.S. war against Al Qaeda.

Antiterrorism also is essential as the last line of defense against Al Qaeda operatives who have not been dissuaded by counterinsurgency, destroyed by counterterrorism, or destroyed or controlled through support to an insurgency. If a terrorist bomb is analogized to an exploding soccer ball, antiterrorism is the goalie who prevents the proximate bomb from entering the U.S., or who covers the ball that has entered the U.S. before it explodes.

If or when a terrorist event occurs in the U.S., antiterrorism is the mechanism for managing and mitigating the event’s consequences, preventing a bad event from becoming far worse. In some ways the consequence management aspect of antiterrorism is a quasi second chance opportunity. After not preventing an Al Qaeda attack, federal, state, and local governments have an opportunity to respond promptly, competently, and courageously to help
survivors, avoid additional casualties, clean up the wreckage, and return an affected area to normalcy or as near normal as is possible.

Many antiterrorism measures that might prevent or mitigate the consequences of a completed Al Qaeda attack also are beneficial for preventing or minimizing the consequences of other potential or actual disasters, both manmade and naturally occurring. Terrorists who are not affiliated with Al Qaeda may be thwarted by antiterrorism measures, and for any attacks they complete, the quasi second chance consequence management principles apply. Many natural disasters and some human caused accidents cannot be prevented. The same consequence management systems that are beneficial for mitigating the effects of a completed terrorist attack are equally beneficial for mitigating disaster effects.

Military resources have the potential to be beneficially employed in both the preventative and consequence management aspects of antiterrorism. Forces with specialized training and equipment may be able to perform missions that civilian forces either cannot perform or that would require expending inordinate amounts of resources to obtain specialized equipment and training that rarely would be used. Military forces with specialized training and equipment may be beneficial for both preventing domestic Al Qaeda attacks and also responding to completed attacks. Military forces may also provide much larger numbers of personnel and larger quantities of logistical support more rapidly than non-military forces. Rapidly available, large numbers of forces, with substantial logistical support capability is particularly beneficial for the consequence management aspect of antiterrorism.

2. Costs of Antiterrorism

The greatest cost of antiterrorism is political. Domestic antiterrorism actions meant to prevent Al Qaeda attacks would be fundamentally incompatible with U.S. values that cherish
individual liberties if these actions transform the U.S. from a free, open society into a police state. Civil liberties activists see even changes such as the Patriot Act as a victory for Al Qaeda against the American way of life. Many antiterrorism actions designed to reduce domestic vulnerability to Al Qaeda attacks may been seen by many Americans as too costly to civil liberties, absent more severe Al Qaeda domestic attacks.

If transforming the U.S. into a police state is unacceptable to the American people, transforming the U.S. into a military state is at least doubly unacceptable. Consequently, the domestic use of military resources within U.S. antiterrorism measures is significantly constrained. The Posse Comitatus Act 108 places legal limits on the use of federal forces for police purposes, but political constraints based on the ideological underpinnings of the Posse Comitatus Act also impose constraints. A majority of the U.S. public was relatively comfortable with the presence of National Guard soldiers armed with M-16’s in airports in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Similarly, the use of National Guard and Army Reserve units during the post Hurricane Katrina response also was acceptable to the American people. Nonetheless, it is essential to never employ military resources in domestic antiterrorism efforts beyond what the American people consider to be acceptable.

Domestic antiterrorism measures may be substantially cheaper on a per service member basis than overseas deployments, but antiterrorism measures nonetheless carry a substantial economic cost. Additionally, the efficiency of domestic antiterrorism expenditures arguably is reduced by political considerations which may dictate the division of federal expenditures based on electoral considerations and political seniority and power, rather than based solely on an impartial weighting of vulnerability, probability of attack, and magnitude of harm from a completed attack. 109 Additionally, for each dollar expended, the bureaucracy necessary to
implement and monitor expenditures in a federal, state, and local system may exceed the bureaucracy necessary to implement and monitor military expenditures for counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and support to insurgency.

VI. CONCLUSION

Success in the Long War is neither measured nor achieved merely by doing more, spending more, or involving more service members. Instead, success is measured and achieved by implementing the most efficient, sustainable strategies that allow the U.S. to maintain a given effort level for generations, even if the Long War continues only for decades. It is critical for the U.S. not to cause greater harm to itself in the process of attempting to destroy Al Qaeda than the harm Al Qaeda could cause to the U.S. Sustainability has three overall components; each is essential. The means used to wage the Long War must be economically, politically, and militarily sustainable.

The most efficient, sustainable strategies to combat Al Qaeda are counterterrorism and antiterrorism. Each has an important role in the overall strategy, subject to their inherent risks and limitations. Employed together, they form a complementary overall strategy, employing both offense and defense, attacking the enemy at a distance and defending both internationally and domestically. The U.S. must be mindful that the clandestine nature of counterterrorism does not become a means to engage in actions that are antithetical to American values. Many antiterrorism measures carry with them potential civil liberties concerns.

Support to insurgencies is a second tier strategy in fighting the Long War. It is economically and militarily efficient and sustainable, but it carries substantial political risks. It must be employed very carefully, mindful that insurgents, particularly those who have the greatest capacity to win, may be no better in many ways than the governments they replace, aside
from not supporting Al Qaeda. The greater the U.S. involvement in supporting an insurgency, the greater may be its international and domestic political responsibility for the insurgents’ actions after they become rulers. Enduring U.S. support to an insurgent formed government engaged in unsavory actions continues and deepens the political harm to the U.S.

Counterinsurgency is a third tier strategy because it is the least efficient, least sustainable strategy for the U.S. to employ in fighting the Long War. Counterinsurgency consumes enormous economic and military resources, whether executed well or poorly. Counterinsurgency consumes enormous political resources if executed poorly, and consumes a medium quantity of political resources if it is executed neither particularly well nor especially poorly. Counterinsurgency is a high risk strategy in terms of success, because its nature favors Al Qaeda and insurgent strengths and U.S. weaknesses. Counterinsurgency is also a high risk strategy because it is a very public endeavor in which the U.S. employs enormous total resources.

Endnotes:


7 *Counterinsurgency*, Army Field Manual 3-24, paragraph 6-1.

8 *Counterinsurgency*, Army Field Manual 3-24, paragraph 1-67 states that previous conflict planners assumed a ratio of ten or fifteen counterinsurgents per insurgent was required to prevail; currently a ratio of twenty to twenty-five counterinsurgents for every 1000 civilian residents is recommended.


10 For example a gallon of fuel for counterinsurgents in Afghanistan costs as much as $400.00 per gallon because of transportation related costs. Roxana Tiron, “$400 per Gallon Gas to Drive Debate Over Cost of War in Afghanistan,” *The Hill*, 15 October 2009; available at http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/63407-400gallon-gas-another-cost-of-war-in-afghanistan.

11 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, 130.

12 See, for example, “U.S. Drone Attack Kills 7 in Pakistan’s Waziristan,” *Reuters*, 17 Jan 2010 and “Al-Qaeda Somalia Suspect ‘Killed,’” *BBC News*, 15 Sep 09; available, respectively, at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SGE60G00V.htm and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8254957.stm

13 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Joint Publication 1-02, 266.

14 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms Joint Publication 1-02, 38.


22 Berry, “Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism,” 7, 10-11.

23 Sun Tzu, *Sun Tzu on the Art of War*, trans. Lionel Giles (Taipei: Literature House, 1964), 12. Sun Tzu implicitly admonishes a nation to minimize time spent at war. A corollary to this proposition is that if a nation is not able to control the time it spends at war, it should endeavor to minimize its costs in fighting the war.


27 David Petraeus, “Conversation with General Petraeus,” lecture, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 24 September 2009. A copy of General Petraeus’ slide discussing the elements Al Qaeda in Iraq needed to function is on file with the author.

28 Sun Tzu, *Sun Tzu on the Art of War*, 12.


31 This is part of Bin Laden’s announced strategy. See Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” *Foreign Affairs* 86 (May/June 2007): 24, 25.


33 Obama, *Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, 7 and Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, *The $3 Trillion War the True Cost of the Iraq Conflict* (New York: Norton 2008). President Obama stated the cost for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq through January, 2009, was an estimated $1 trillion. Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winning economist, and Bilmes believe the total cost for U.S. in the Iraq war alone is about $3 trillion.


35 *Current and Projected National Security Threats*, 44.
See Richard Haass, *War of Necessity War of Choice* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 9-10. Haass discusses the differences between wars a nation must fight and wars a nation chooses to fight and asserts that a cost benefit analysis is necessary for wars of choice.


Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, September 1999), 48-50; available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf. Perhaps the background of the typical terrorist senior leader reflects Maslow’s hierarchy; those who must focus their efforts on personal or family survival lack the ability or need to focus on more ethereal matters such as destroying or building civilizations.


63 Joseph Nye, Jr., *Soft Power the Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), x.

64 Nye, *Soft Power*, x.


74 *9/11 Commission Report*, 169. Improvements in homeland security since September 11, 2001 may have made many larger scale attacks more difficult and expensive. Small scale attacks, particularly by self-selected, self-radicalized, self-directed individual terrorists are inexpensive to conduct and difficult to detect or prevent.

75 Denying Al Qaeda a safe haven was a primary justification for the war in Afghanistan as announced by both President Bush and President Obama.


81 Ken Menkhaus, “Quasi-States, Nation-Building, and Terrorist Safe Havens,” *Journal of Conflict Studies* 23, no. 2 (2003); available at http://dev.hil.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/Fall03/menkhaus.htm. Failed states are inhospitable for Al Qaeda for many of the same reasons failed states are inhospitable for legitimate organizations. Additionally, failed states have the twin flaws, from Al Qaeda’s perspective, of lacking a diverse group of foreigners with which to blend and the lack of a sovereign which may impede U.S. counterterrorism operations. For detailed first-hand accounts of Al Qaeda’s difficulties in Somalia, see also, “Al-Qaeda’s (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point; available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII_pdf.asp.


83 Senior leaders were discussed at the beginning of this Section.

84 Al Qaeda had some difficulties bringing all its chosen operatives to the U.S. for the September 11, 2001 attacks under the comparatively lax security measures in place before September 11, 2001, and these operatives had some difficulty functioning despite some familiarization with western ways of life and proficiency in Arabic and some English. See 9/11 Commission Report, 215-249.


86 There appear to be no credible published reports that Iraq possessed meaningful cyber attack capabilities, and the absence of a successful attack on the U.S. or its coalition partners as they invaded Iraq also evidences the absence of meaningful Iraqi cyber attack capability.


90 Randy Manner, “Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Role of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” lecture, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 17 November 2009. Major General Manner, Deputy Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, stated that multiple safeguards exist to prevent terrorists from detonating a Pakistani nuclear weapon, if they gained access to it. Moreover, stealing a nuclear weapon for later use after working through the steps necessary to detonate it would require the use heavy equipment for multiple days to remove the weapon.


A large part of the difficulty of comparing the number of innocent civilians counterinsurgency and counterterrorism kill arises from the difficulty of determining who among the dead was an innocent civilian and who was an enemy. Wildly different statistics exist for the same events depending upon who is keeping score. See, for example, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of the Drone, An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010.”

Cloud, “CIA Drones Have Broader List of Targets.” According to Cloud’s article, President Obama has “streamlined” drone targeting in Pakistan by delegating approval authority down to the CIA Director.

General Charles Krulak, originated the phrase “strategic corporal” in "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Magazine*, January 1999. Krulak noted that in modern warfare, militaries and national governments would be judged based on decisions by very junior leaders.


109 Of course, political considerations may also dictate the expenditure of large sums for military hardware systems DOD does not believe are militarily beneficial, relative to their cost.