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TEXT - Microsoft Word

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Welcome to the December 2010 issue of IO Sphere Journal. I would like to say congratulations to all the Information Operations professionals across the globe who worked to make 2010 an extremely successful year for IO. No doubt, 2011 will be just as important to the profession of Information Operations and set the stage for even greater change and challenges in the future. Those challenges will most certainly be met and in the end make IO better, stronger, and even more critical to the profession of warfighting.

This issue of IO Sphere is titled “IO in the Fight.” At the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) we believe that IO is always in the fight. From the beginning of planning through the completion of any operation IO must be planned for, resourced, executed, assessed, and evaluated the same as all other aspects of military operations. In the age of lightning speed communication and an ever connected and wired world, the need for well-planned and executed IO is more important than ever. From the tactical to the strategic, IO is and will remain “In the Fight.”

As a supporting IO organization, the JIOWC has remained engaged in operations around the globe in support of various warfighters.

The JIOWC remains focused on the warfighter. Currently, the JIOWC team is helping counter Taliban propaganda in Afghanistan that was focused on recruiting Afghan children as suicide bombers. The success of the counter propaganda effort was featured in international news outlets. In addition, there is tremendous work being undertaken in the JIOWC Electronic Warfare Directorate (EWD). Current efforts include multiple endeavors focused on different aspects of EW. The Electromagnetic Battlespace Management Project includes EW experts in the military, academia, and industry and is focused on normalizing Joint Electromagnetic Operations.

Additionally, the EWD is participating in a full accreditation program for a National Electromagnetic Opposing Force or OPFOR program (NEOP) with the objective of providing realistic electromagnetic environment training for the warfighter. This effort is integrated with several key service and joint organizations and units and will have generational benefits to EW warriors and their supported commanders. There are very few organizations that are more focused on being “In The Fight” than the JIOWC EWD.

The JIOWC Operations Security (OPSEC) Directorate is likely one of the busiest organizations in the DOD. They have been involved in enhancing OPSEC in both US and allied organizations. Over the past year the OPSEC Directorate has trained 932 OPSEC program managers, supported 10 separate Combatant Commanders and provided support in 6 countries in the War on Terror. They are on the frontlines and completely “In the Fight.”

Across the IO community, there were great efforts in 2010 and it is almost certain that 2011 will match or pass the great work completed in 2010. U.S. and Allied Information Operations professionals in all aspects of national and international security are in the fight at all levels of conflict from the tactical to the strategic. Adversaries of freedom and international security are also fighting in the information domain. The 21st century is the century of information. We are unique as information warfighters in the age of information. The successful application of the military element of national power for strategic interest and international security depends on the IO community being better than our adversaries. We have always been up to that task and will be there in the future. Therefore, IO is and will remain “In the Fight.”

Have a great 2011!

Mark H. Johnson, SES
Director, JIOWC
Department of Defense

Mark H. Johnson, a member of the Senior Executive Service, is the Director of the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Subordinate to the US Strategic Command, the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center is the lead component for Information Operations and Strategic Communication in support of US national security objectives. The Command’s 420 personnel support the development of global effects and provide IO/SC planning in support of USSTRATCOM mission areas of strategic deterrence, space, and cyberspace operations.

Mr. Johnson served in the US Army from May 1979 to June 2008, achieving the rank of Colonel. Prior to his active duty retirement, Mr. Johnson was the Deputy Commander, Joint Information Operations Warfare Center. He is a master parachutist.
The Joint Futures Group at U.S. Joint Forces Command is exploring the topic of narratives at the instigation of former US Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, who had raised this issue with General James Mattis, USMC, at a recent Transformation Advisory Group session. Speaker Gingrich’s intent was to bring a greater coherence to DoD communication efforts, a theme recently echoed by ADM Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What we are hoping for is to stimulate discussion on the utility of this concept as an overarching strategy that guides the efforts of Joint IO, Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, and engagement plans. A major contributor to this effort was Dr. Steven Corman, Director of the Consortium for Strategic Communication at Arizona State University, and we invite you to view their work at http://comops.org.

The underlying assumption of the Battle of Narratives is that words, images, and symbols affect politics and society. For example, the 13 Colonies’ Declaration of Independence from Great Britain was not just words written on paper, but words that influenced the way people thought and the way people fought. In just the same way, a YouTube video or dissemination of a compromising picture can wield disproportionate influence over a susceptible population; the pictures of Abu Ghraib are perhaps the preeminent example of how images may be incorporated into narratives which in turn have a profound impact on U.S. strategy and goals.

The possibility that such an operating context might exist – what we term the Battle of Narratives – has gained increasing currency in 2010, propelled primarily by our experiences in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operation. Of concern to a joint force commander is how to understand the nature of this space (what are the other’s and our own goals and supporting stories), what capabilities are needed to engage offensively and defensively in this space, and who or what can be affected by these capabilities. All of this must be encapsulated in a coherent mission analysis and operational plan. To create this operational plan, one must first understand the Battle of Narratives in detail. This means understanding: what engaging in the Battle of Narratives accomplishes; what functioning effectively in the Battle of Narratives operating space entails; and why identifying the leaders and decision makers (be they political or tribal) against whom the Battle of Narratives is waged is fundamental to success. In essence, the Battle of Narratives provides the context from which we derive our strategy for operating in the cognitive dimension.

Within the context of this article, a narrative is a system of stories that is pertinent to the audience and the times, contains a reason or motive to take certain actions or adopt certain positions, has a goal or end state, and is enduring over time and space. When stories are told or visually presented to achieve political objectives, a new operating space emerges where the competition may be less about coercion through violence, where the competitors are both state and non-state actors, and where the result is the perception of a cognitive victory or defeat over the opposing narrative. The dominance of a particular narrative then has real impact on the politics and people surrounding a crisis or conflict.

A central question, though, is “why have a concept that describes narratives at all?” One point of view is that having an overarching communication and engagement strategy for an operation is a necessity; it represents how we will use words, actions, and images to affect cognition. It is the way we use information to underpin our success. The Battle of Narratives / communication strategy can also provide guidance for activities in the physical domains that are intended to have effects in the cognitive dimension. In addition, when the competition reaches its culmination, what we have said, shown and done
will clearly establish why we’re right and truthful… and why the adversary is both wrong and a liar.

To execute the Battle of Narratives, Joint Public Affairs Operations, Information Operations, Public Diplomacy, and the key leader engagement plan derive their context and receive guidance from the communication and engagement strategy. They then become the tools for organizing, executing, and monitoring the Battle of Narratives / communication strategy. Their activities must be nested within that strategy, and the communication and engagement strategy must in turn be nested within the commander’s campaign plan. The first role of the Battle of Narratives is to provide a worldview and analytic framework for the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) and the mission analysis (MA) portion of the Joint Operation Planning Process. Traditionally, the JIPOE and MA frameworks focus on understanding an adversary’s physical order of battle, meaning the weapons of war available to conduct lethal operations. Lethal operations usually occur during phases two and three of the implementation of a commander’s plan. In the other phases though, the focal point is the population. Moreover, what the population thinks, says and how it acts is more important than how many tanks and airplanes they have. In the non-combat phases of an operation, there will primarily be a struggle of ideas expressed through images and words, reinforced through force presence and posture. These ideas are employed actively and passively based on a society’s or a movement’s strategic goals; those goals can best be found in the narratives they tell to both influence the fence sitters among them and deter their adversaries. An illustrative example of the complexity of the Battle of Narratives is the ongoing war of ideas between Venezuela, Columbia, Cuba, Bolivia, and the United States over the relative merits of global capitalism and the socialist “Bolivarian revolution.” Each of the actors, as well as important onlookers (such as Brazil) have differing goals, objectives, and frames of reference at play.

Another potential area for furthering our understanding of others may be found in that of a “common (cognitive) understanding” as reflected in religious or philosophical beliefs. Although not widely considered a common space and little researched, the concept of a common understanding, or a “human commons,” as reflected in religion has become of national security interest because of attempts of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other violent non-state actors and movements to control the “commons” of religious belief for the purposes of armed conflict. The struggle for the “human commons” therefore becomes part of the national security threat faced by the United States.

What we mean by a “human commons” is a cognitive commons in which all humans share a basic understanding of such concepts as the sanctity of life, respect for family, and, to some degree, the ownership of personal property. These concepts appear present in all human societies. No known human society sanctions wanton destruction of its own people. Common moral proscription includes murder, rape, and theft. These are crimes in all societies and cultures, even in those in which certain portions of the population commit all three. Historically, these moral proscriptions originate from religion rather than rational thought alone. Justice for such crimes is also a common attribute, stemming from an innate human desire for revenge, which is tempered in some, but not all, religions, philosophies, and cultures. Development of “just war theory” and its non-Western equivalents has been a psychological necessity in order to justify the killing of an enemy in wartime, which would be proscribed under other circumstances.¹

In considering the “human commons” concept, we initially examined the global media as a common space. U.S. policy assumes that strategic communication should be directed at print, broadcast and internet media. This makes considerable sense since the will of Western societies has become the center of gravity for modern war. Strategic communication may be an effective tool in trying to gain...
or maintain public support in allied or partner nations. But this creates a significant dilemma, since freedom of expression is a centerpiece of American style democracy, and any action that smacks of governmental manipulation or control of the news is widely condemned. Since such is not true in authoritarian / dictatorial states where manipulation is a primary function of the ruling party, democracies enter the contest to protect their center of gravity with a severe disadvantage.

However, there are many societies in which the Battle of Narratives is conducted, such as Afghanistan, that do not necessarily have exposure to global media. In effective dictatorial states that can prevent exposure to the global media by a majority of its citizens—ranging from Chinese censorship of criticism and channeling of protest, to North Korean total isolation—the Battle of Narratives is largely already over and won, no matter what is reported in global media. Therefore, it would appear that global media is a common only within the Western world of liberal democracies. Looking out to the near future, technology will soon allow one to manipulate any and all images and video, leading the people who are consuming the narrative to have to wonder, “What is reality?” or “Who do I believe?” Put another way, the question may not be “will there be information narratives out there?” but “who and what can the world believe?”

A narrative-based analysis should then lead to development of planning guidance for all of the elements deployed to execute the communication and engagement strategy. There are four areas that must be understood in order to correctly develop the context of the narrative and planning guidance:

• How does your adversary naturalize his objectives; that is, how does he frame and explain his ideology and make his ideas seem fixed and natural to members of a culture? An example is the tradition of the Gilzai warriors in Afghan culture, and how the Taliban uses that tradition to legitimize themselves as the historical defenders of Afghan society and culture, while simultaneously delegitimizing the Karzai government and foreign forces.

• An adversary’s ideology will always have inconsistencies, so analysts must discover how they obscure those inconsistencies in order to smooth their narrative. A prime example is Al Qaeda’s obscuration of Koranic prohibitions on the killing of innocents, especially fellow Muslims. Al Qaeda goes to extensive lengths to obscure their failings, and this is probably the one issue non-supporters take them to task for the most.

• Structuring the narrative gives it form and substance. Structuring favors the way of doing things and perpetuates a narrative (ideology) within a society or culture. The JIPOE must describe this structure in order to identify its weak points.

• Universalizing presents the interests of a privileged group as the interests of everybody. In the United States CEOs of major corporations make 380 times the average wage of those working in those corporations,

Images are a Critical Component of the Communications Process
Source: Author
but there’s little to no objection to this in society because it’s considered a necessary thing to fuel our economy. It’s also an aspirational goal of every worker to be able to make that kind of money – you can’t condemn what you secretly desire.

All of these efforts should feed into a narrative centric campaign design (the communication strategy), created with the interagency and, where possible, host nations and Allies.

A properly constructed communication and engagement strategy should ensure the following:

- Central to our success in this domain is to appreciate that our strategy must be about their narrative and not only about “selling” our ideology to the target audience. Although we are partial to our own narratives, and reinforcing our narrative may be useful in building support among culturally-similar countries or other partners, we must work within the context of an adversary’s narrative structure to influence, alter, manipulate, or confound them from within.

- It’s preferable for an audience to adopt a narrative based on their goals that are also acceptable to the wider world. Put another way, the intent is for the “others” to adopt a narrative (goal) that is agreeable to regional partners and neighbors, and the U.S. and her allies. For example, Islamic societies striving for the “jihad” of perpetual self improvement and piety before God is preferable to those societies adopting the Salafist “jihad” of annihilating all Jews, Christians and other non-believers.

- Be original in describing the adversary. Stereotyping is of no help in this type of analysis; cultural understanding is very important.

- We also desire the “others” to view U.S. actions as legitimate and acceptable to them. Our narrative in this contest of words has to express our goals and intentions as they relate to their goals and intentions, not, “we think you’d be much happier if you became more like us,” which is also known as imperialist propaganda.

- Wherever possible, our strategy must push at their ideological functions.
  - Challenge their assumptions, beliefs and meanings.
  - Target their contradictions.
  - Engage key leaders and groups.
  - Breach their structures.

- Incorporate the five characteristics of an effective narrative in the strategy and ask the following question. Is the narrative consistent, credible, persuasive, persistent, and pervasive (C2P3)?

- In cases involving insurgency, the strategy must be designed to help build the perception of legitimacy between a civil population and the national government.

- Finally, our strategy must provide the necessary guidance to avoid handing our adversaries stories that validate the bad things they are saying about us, or giving them new bad things to say about us.

- The actions of the joint force at the tactical level should reflect national strategic themes and messages. There must be constancy of actions and message from the President of the United States to the soldier’s words and actions on the streets and throughout the countryside of a host nation.
Other considerations related to campaign design and execution are:

- Adopt a posture of strategic “listening.” This activity is continuous and is focused on determining what their stories are, and the concepts and narratives that drive behavior. Ask the question what are the other guy’s “talking points” and how do we use them in our own planning?

In addition the following questions must be asked and answered.

- What is the overarching narrative that defines and legitimizes U.S. operations and engagement overseas? Do we have a “positive” narrative? Does our narrative support their aspirations and our national interests at the same time? What are the limits of “narrative” in our pursuit of national interest? “We are one of many.” Is it better for the U.S. forces to follow than to lead?

- Narrative construction and maintenance is going on all the time, and over extended periods. Strategic patience and persistence is key.

- Define success for the DoD, and for the overall “comprehensive approach.” Decide on your indicators, but don’t overwhelm yourself (and the intelligence community) with too many.

- Be counterintuitive. Contrary to intelligence training, sometimes seeing adversaries recruiting at gunpoint is a “good” sign – that is, a sign that their narratives are not motivating the target audience.

To recap, the purpose of competing in a Battle of Narratives is to diminish adherence to one narrative and foster adoption of an alternative narrative, which is compatible with the goals, and objectives of the United States and its allies. Competing effectively will require us to rethink how we gather and synthesize the information we need to properly prepare to engage in the cognitive dimension. In this competition, the field of battle consists of global and local media environments, cyberspace, and human social networks. The weapons are stories, ideas, themes, and memes, delivered in weaponized form through television, radio, weblogs, message boards, books, and pamphlets. The objective is the minds of a targeted population. Effective competition in this arena will also require recognition that in the Battle of Narratives, the length of the battle is likely measured in decades and we must be prepared to endure, or face the consequences of our failure to endure.

Footnotes:


2. The question remains as to whether “Battle of Narratives” has a much greater effect on Western societies with their greater access to multiple sources of information, but with democratic governments that are much more greatly influenced by this information, or whether “victory” over the narrative can have even a more profound effect when it occurs in the dominant channel or an information starved society.

3. Briefing to USJFCOM Seminar on Battle of Narratives, given by Dr Steven Corman, Consortium for Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, given September 15, 2009.

Acknowledgements: My thanks to Mike Miller, ThD, of the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center for his insights, help, and advice, and to Mr. Sam Tangredi of Strategic Insights for his words on the “human commons”, an idea whose time may have arrived. Our deep appreciation to Dr. Steven Corman, Director of the Consortium for Strategic Communication for providing the major insights and structure to this paper, and we hope it is of some use to his continuing work on Strategic Communication. My thanks also to Ambassador Len Hawley, Institute for Peace, for his ideas on narrative centric operational planning.

David Sadowski is a civil servant with USJFCOM’s Joint Futures Group, which is responsible for publication of the Joint Operating Environment. He has an extensive background in air operations, strategic and operational planning, information operations and joint concept development and experimentation.

ONE STOP COLLABORATION

A JOINT AND INTER-AGENCY INFORMATION OPERATIONS (IO) AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION (SC) COMMUNITY OF INTEREST.
https://www.intelink.gov/wiki/IO_Link
Pakistan as the Key to Afghanistan’s Stability
by
Mr. Gary R. Hanson

Editor’s Note: Mr. Hanson’s topic selection for this article is not only relevant to the current conduct of operations in Afghanistan, but also to the importance of IO in that critical part of the world at a critical time in what is becoming one of the United State’s longest wars. This is a perfect article to illustrate “IO in the Fight” and that IO is often the center of the fight.

Pakistan is critically important for regional stability and the U.S. has adopted a strategy that relies on the diplomatic, economic and information instruments of national power as the primary tools to achieve U.S. security goals in Pakistan. The U.S. Department of State will lead the implementation of a strategy that focuses on developing partnerships with the Pakistani people, government, military and civic institutions. Carefully orchestrated and synchronized defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) and strategic communication1 could play an important role in achieving long-term U.S. security goals in Pakistan. The U.S. may conduct counterterrorism operations to meet obligations to secure the U.S. homeland. However, these operations are not included in the aforementioned strategy and are not discussed here.

This article explains why Pakistan is important to U.S. security along with a discussion of the relevant parts of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. Next is a brief review of the situation we face in Pakistan with the population, government, and military. Finally, there is a discussion of feasible DSPD and strategic communication applications to support the U.S. strategic partnership with Pakistan.

Why Pakistan is important to the United States

The administration’s Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization strategy was developed because the security of the United States and the safety of the American people are what’s at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The administration views the threats posed by violent extremist organizations (VEO) in Afghanistan and Pakistan as interrelated. The strategic end state for the region is to dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan as interrelated. The strategic end state for the region is to dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future. VEOs enjoy safe haven in Pakistan where they plan and conduct attacks against the U.S. homeland, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan.2 The U.S. National Security Adviser, Retired General James Jones underlined the critical importance of Pakistan security when he said the “risk of instability in a nuclear-armed Pakistan at a time when al-

US Military Information Support Operations in Afghanistan
Source: defenseimagery.mil
Qaida seeks nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction and would use them is not acceptable.”

There are three main elements to the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stability Strategy. First, pursue a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Afghanistan that focuses on protecting the population and building the capacity of Afghanistan security forces. The second element is a surge focusing on civilian development, governance, and humanitarian assistance so the government of Afghanistan can take advantage of improved security resulting from the COIN campaign. Third, initiate an effective partnership with Pakistan to strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target VEOs that pose a threat to the region and U.S. interests. This article focuses on the Pakistan portion of the strategy.

Details of the Pakistan Elements of the Strategy

There are three main objectives to the whole-of-government approach to developing a new partnership with Pakistan. The first objective is to address immediate energy, water, and related economic crises, thereby deepening our partnership with the Pakistani people and decreasing the appeal of extremists. The second objective is to support broader economic and political reforms that are necessary to put Pakistan on a path towards sustainable job creation and economic growth, which is necessary for long-term Pakistani stability and progress. The final objective is to help Pakistan build on its success against militants by eliminating extremist sanctuaries that threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, the region, and people around the world. The supporting initiatives to the three main objectives are (1) security assistance to support Pakistan’s COIN campaign against VEOs, (2) communications programs to empower Pakistani’s to discredit VEOs, (3) strengthened U.S.-Pakistan people-to-people ties, and (4) enhanced bilateral government-to-government dialogue.

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009 contains the majority of programmed resources for the implementation of the Pakistan strategy. The EPPA of 2009 provides a five year, $7.5 billion foreign assistance program ($1.5 billion annually) that focuses on programs that benefit the people of Pakistan and triples the current level of foreign assistance to Pakistan. The EPPA of 2009 improves the Government of Pakistan’s capacity to address the country’s most critical infrastructure needs by investing $3.5 billion in high-impact, high-visibility infrastructure programs. The legislation helps the Pakistan government address basic needs and provides improved economic opportunities in areas most vulnerable to extremism by investing $2.0 billion on focused humanitarian and social services. Major components include funding for post-crisis humanitarian assistance ($500 million) and increased access to quality education and health services ($1.5 billion). The last major component of the EPPA of 2009 is designed to strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to pursue economic and political reforms that reinforce stability through government capacity development programs. This includes $1.0 billion for improved national and local governance and $1.0 billion for improved security and legal Institutions.

In breaking with past U.S. practices, development assistance is now the primary source of assistance to Pakistan, relegating military assistance to a secondary role. Security assistance programs are funded year-by-year based on a series of conditions that determine if Pakistan security forces are 1) making a concerted effort to prevent VEOs from operating within Pakistan, 2) denying sanctuary to VEOs to launch attacks outside of Pakistan, and 3) are not materially interfering with the political or judicial processes in Pakistan.

While security assistance is not the primary focus, the U.S. plans substantial investments to help Pakistan security forces wage a COIN campaign against VEOs. The security assistance program includes training and equipping civilian law enforcement, the North West Frontier Province security forces, and the Pakistani Military. Funding also includes Coalition Support Funds (CSF) to reimburse Pakistan for expenses incurred supporting U.S. and ISAF in Operation Enduring Freedom. For FY2010, excluding CSF, security assistance to Pakistan amounts to $1.155 billion.

Countering extremist propaganda is a critical pillar of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy that includes the following initiatives: expand U.S. media outreach, alter misperceptions about U.S. policy, build communications capacity to link the government and people of Pakistan, and empower indigenous voices to counter extremist propaganda.

The final element of the strategy is the Strategic Dialogue convened at the foreign minister level that will manage all facets of the enhanced partnership with Pakistan.

Pakistan Public Perceptions

“Pakistanis appear to be more distrustful of the United States than they are of al Qaeda. Indeed, about 80 percent of Pakistanis recently polled said that al Qaeda’s principle aim is standing up to the United States, and 57 percent support that goal. In that same survey, more than 52 percent blamed the United States for the violence wracking the country, compared to 15 percent who blamed various militant groups.”

The Pakistani public is anti-American for a litany of reasons. There is a pervasive view in the Muslim world that the U.S. is at war with or hostile towards Islam and “does not respect their views, values, identity and the right to determine their own affairs.” Pakistanis greatly dislike U.S. foreign policy due to support for Israel and “failure to secure a Palestinian state,” “cultivating India as a robust strategic partner,” and the U.S. led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Pakistan’s also view the U.S. commitment to democracy with suspicion because of past support to Pakistani military dictators ul Haq and Mussaraf, leading

“For instance, six out of every ten Pakistanis who have a favorable view toward bin Laden and al-Qaeda said their opinion of America would significantly improve if the United States increased educational, medical and humanitarian aid to Pakistan, as well as the number of visas available to Pakistanis to work or study in the United States.”
Pakistan’s to conclude that democracy is only convenient when it fits with the security goals of the U.S. Bolstering this view is the fact that the majority of U.S. assistance to Pakistan goes to its military complex, strengthening the military’s role in the state to the detriment of civil institutions.21

Other grievances include U.S. decisions to cut off arms sales to India and Pakistan during their wars in 1965 and 1971, and the U.S. position during the 1999 Kargil crisis that was seen as favoring India.22 Additionally, Pakistan’s believes the U.S. abandoned the region after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, leaving Pakistan to deal with a web of VEOs and drug trafficking networks.23 One of the most strongly held viewpoints is that past nuclear and weapons sanctions were unfair to Pakistan and were only imposed when Pakistan was no longer needed to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan.24

Several recent issues negatively affect U.S.-Pakistan relations. Opinion surveys from 2008 and 2009 show extremely low support for unilateral U.S. military action inside Pakistan while Pakistanis express a strong preference for negotiated resolutions with VEOs as an alternative to military strikes. It is important to understand that increased attacks on VEOs drive increases in negative attitudes of U.S. policies.25

Pakistan Civilian Government and Military Leaders

Pakistan’s civilian government and military leaders view their security situation differently than does the U.S. Pakistan’s “archenemy” is India and their security competition is fueled by the dispute over Kashmir and Pakistan’s relative weakness in military and economic power compared to India.26, 27 Consequently, Pakistan is not motivated to transform from a conventional military focused on India into a military force calibrated to fight a counterinsurgency against VEOs. In contrast, the U.S. sees VEOs as the as the primary threat to Pakistan’s security.28

Pakistan is acutely concerned about their security situation in South Asia should the U.S. withdraw from the region, fearing a repeat of the U.S. abandonment that occurred after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. Pakistan insists on retaining Afghanistan in their sphere of influence and views Afghanistan as strategically important in their security competition with India. Consequently, Pakistan views with great suspicion all of India’s activities in Afghanistan.29, 30

Pakistan appears to be unwilling to completely jettison support for militant groups organized as part of their security policy in Kashmir, India and Afghanistan, 31, 32 Pakistan demonstrated they will act against VEOs that are a direct threat to the Pakistani government.33 At the same time the U.S. is convinced that Pakistan is tolerant of some Pakistani-based VEOs that conduct attacks in Afghanistan.34 A major policy disagreement between Pakistan and the U.S. is the use of VEOs to further its security goals in Afghanistan, India and Kashmir.35

Information Operation Application and Strategic Communication Example

The recommendation below examines an area where DSPD could feasibly support the U.S. partnership with Pakistan that account for elements of the strategy that need to be implemented while accounting for the hurdles we face with the Pakistani public, government and military leaders. Also highlighted is effective strategic communication by senior U.S. official supporting the U.S. strategy for Pakistan.

Implementation of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy suggests a web-based information source as a key program to support U.S. goals in Pakistan. DSPD may be the best alternative to operating and managing such a web-based information repository in support of whole-of-government objectives in Pakistan.

To review, key elements of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy include a new communications effort to serve as a credible source for journalists, respond more quickly to misinformation and work aggressively to alter misperceptions regarding U.S. policy. A method to achieve these objectives would be for the U.S. to develop and maintain a web-based information repository that contains comprehensive information about U.S. assistance programs including current progress as well as a forthright discussion of any problems. To be credible this information source must be timely, accurate, and contain complete information to bolster support for development assistance programs. The primary external audiences are the vibrant Pakistani press, scholars, civil society, aid organizations, and the people of Pakistan. Ubiquitous access to a rich and accurate web-based information source will help build trust directly with the people of Pakistan as well as within the media and civil society.

This web-based information source will also be an effective tool for discrediting misinformation about assistance programs by supplying U.S. officials with up-to-date information when interacting with Pakistani officials, the public, and the media. The Pakistani media will also have access for use in their reporting, as will scholars and researchers. Finally, individual Pakistani’s can use the information to learn the truth about U.S. programs and draw informed conclusions about U.S. commitment and intentions.

The U.S. must not be shy about taking credit for Pakistan assistance programs and must clearly explain the benefit to

US Army Soldier in Afghanistan
Source: defenseimagery.mil
people and the long-term improvements to the economy, infrastructure, and civil society institutions. Simultaneously, essential contributions by Pakistani government and civil society organizations must be highlighted and amplified to build indigenous institutional credibility.

Pakistan’s are asking precisely for the types of whole-of-government assistance embodied in the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy and opinion polls indicate the public view of the U.S. will significantly improve while popularity of VEOs will likely deteriorate when these programs are implemented. Shifts in public sentiment will result from the assistance programs showing respect for the views of the people in addition to their direct benefits.36

It is imperative the U.S. undertake a concerted effort to ensure Pakistani’s understand U.S. programs and work diligently to keep them abreast of progress and a web-based information source is the ideal vehicle for that. Based on past success with similar endeavors, information operations professionals, fulfilling a DSPD role, have demonstrated the ability to successfully implement this vital element of the strategy.37

President Obama, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Clinton are demonstrating how strategic communication should be practiced. All officials involved with the U.S. strategic partnership with Pakistan require the same level of discipline and excellence. The most senior leaders in the U.S. government are effectively communicating the purpose, goals, and programs in the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy.

Strategic Communication

“America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be unleashed.” President Obama, December 1, 2009.

U.S. development assistance officials collaborated closely with Pakistani government counterparts to identify and prioritize assistance programs. More importantly, development assistance programs will be primarily implemented through Pakistan government institutions, non-government organization, and private sector companies that meet capacity, accountability, and transparency standards. While many entrenched Pakistani institutions may not appreciate the transparency and accountability

President Obama eloquently framed the future U.S.-Pakistan partnership in his 1 December 2009 speech at West Point. The Administration reinforced the President’s policy by publishing the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy and the Pakistan Assistance Strategy that included information on the programs and resources. A key program is the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue at the foreign minister level, convened on 24 March 2010, which demonstrates U.S. commitment to a strategic partnership with Pakistan. These actions signal to Pakistan the importance of the bilateral relationship and the leadership role the U.S. State Department has managing the of whole-of-government partnership.

U.S. development assistance officials collaborated closely with Pakistani government counterparts to identify and prioritize assistance programs. More importantly, development assistance programs will be primarily implemented through Pakistan government institutions, non-government organization, and private sector companies that meet capacity, accountability, and transparency standards. While many entrenched Pakistani institutions may not appreciate the transparency and accountability

Afghan National Police Crisis Response Unit
Source: defenseimagery.mil
called for, the Pakistani people will appreciate such oversight as necessary to improving and transforming Pakistan intuitions. The structure and delivery of development assistance programs clearly demonstrate a whole-of-government approach of developing indigenous sustainable capacity to improve the lives of Pakistanis.38

The Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy and the long-term funding in the EPPA of 2009 place the needs of the Pakistani people and civil institutions ahead of the security services. These types of development assistance programs are what the Pakistani people desire. Past U.S. assistance programs focused on the Pakistani Army and other security institutions, often at the expense of civil institutions and development assistance programs. The structure of these programs communicates the U.S. commitment to bettering the lives of everyday Pakistanis.

As the U.S. implements a new strategic partnership with Pakistan, Secretary Gates played a key role by communicating U.S. expectations and the importance of Pakistan to regional security. While military assistance is not the primary focus of our new partnership with Pakistan, there is recognition that security is not achievable without appropriate levels of security assistance. When Secretary Gates visited Pakistan in January 2010, he was steadfast in communicating the U.S. position that all VEOs are a threat to the security of all nations. The Secretary enhanced U.S. credibility when he apologized for past actions and policies that saw the U.S. abandon the region after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. He dealt head-on with conspiracy theories that abound in Pakistan and clearly stated that the U.S. does not covet Pakistani territory nor is the U.S. intent on seizing their nuclear weapons arsenal. Secretary Gates and other administration officials complimented Pakistan on the actions they have taken against VEOs while recognizing their significant sacrifices.39 He made important announcements during his official visit that fulfill some of Pakistan’s request for remotely piloted surveillance aircraft and precision guided munitions for piloted aircraft.40 41 While these inducements do not meet all Pakistan’s request for armed remotely piloted aircraft and timely reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds, these programs clearly demonstrate an increased level of trust and commitment.42

Since the roll out of the Pakistan strategy, Pakistani officials indicate the trust deficit with the U.S. narrowed considerably and they recognize the U.S. is committed to a partnership based on mutual trust and respect.43 All U.S. officials involved in managing this strategic partnership should exhibit the same level of acumen demonstrated by U.S. leaders and capitalize on this momentum. These examples are instructive of disciplined strategic communication where intentions, plans, resources, actions and messages align.

Conclusion

Diligence, discipline and focus by the U.S. are the keys to the success of the strategic partnership with Pakistan. Disciplined and synchronized execution of the U.S. strategy supported by strategic communication will continue to play a critical role in the U.S. long-term partnership with Pakistan.

DSPD could contribute significantly to the success of the U.S. partnership with Pakistan through operation of a web-based information source that contains the latest information about the progress of U.S. assistance programs in Pakistan. The obvious benefits are increased outreach concerning U.S. programs to the media, civil society, and interested Pakistanis that can use the information to inform as well as counter misinformation and misperceptions about U.S. programs.

The U.S. whole-of-government approach contained in the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy is
the right prescription for Pakistan because it addresses the underlying conditions that fuel extremism. The intent is to unleash the potential of the Pakistani people and economy in order to create conditions that enhance the stability and security of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The diplomatic, economic and information elements of power focus on improving the lives of the people of Pakistan instead of military institutions. Through perseverance and commitment, the U.S. should be able to achieve regional security goals because the strategy is sound and properly resourced.

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Footnotes:
5. Statement of Kenneth Ballen House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 Nov 09 Terror Free Tomorrow.
16. Statement of Kenneth Ballen House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 Nov 09 Terror Free Tomorrow.
25. Statement of Kenneth Ballen before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 18, 2009.
32. NYTimes.com January 22, 2010 U.S. Offers Pakistan Drones To Urge Cooperation By Elisabeth Bumiller.
Joint Information Operations Education Programs
Sponsored by the Joint Command, Control and Information Operations School

The Joint Command, Control, and Information Operations (IO) School (JC2IOS) is one of four schools residing within the Joint Forces Staff College. The IO Division within JC2IOS conducts the Department of Defense’s only certified course for the education and training of Joint IO planners. The Joint Information Operations Planning Course (JIOPC) is a 4-week DOD-directed prerequisite for personnel assigned to joint IO planning billets and is taught at a classified level. Following orientation to the IO core, supporting and related capabilities in the first week, the students are broken into 6-10 person staff planning groups. The remaining 3 weeks of the course are spent in hands-on practical application using scenario based planning exercises.

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- Know Joint IO Theory and Doctrine and understand core, supporting and related IO capabilities and their potential effects in the operating environment
- Know and demonstrate individual proficiency in the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) and the completion of IO planning and execution products
- Graduate fully prepared to serve as a lead IO planner in a Joint IO or IO-related planning position.

The IO Division also conducts a 1-week Joint IO Orientation Course (JIOOC). The JIOOC can be taught in residence or conducted by Mobile Training Team (MTT). Past MTT audiences include multiple COCOMs, support to intermediate and advanced service PME, service IO education programs and inter-agency audiences.

The Joint Forces Staff College is the Accredited Institution for IO Education and is part of the National Defense University System. The JIOPC is the Joint Staff certified course for IO Training in U.S. Department of Defense.

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Somalia: Collecting Public Opinion in a Collapsed State
by Mr. Johnny Heald

Editor’s Note: Mr. Johnny Heald is from the United Kingdom and is the managing director of a British polling and public opinion company called ORB. His insight in this article is in the area of IO assessment and effectiveness. This always presents a challenge in IO and Mr. Heald’s specific experiences are very valuable to learn lessons for future operations and plans.

Introduction
Somalia is once again a key focus of attention for the international community. The increase in piracy and its threat to world trade combined with the advance of the Islamist insurgency Al Shabaab and its ability to strike beyond the Somali borders means that Somalia can no longer be ignored. If making progress in such irregular warfare requires an understanding of the population at stake, how do we gain this understanding in a country as inaccessible as Somalia? This article describes how research can be used to guide and evaluate IO and how polling agency ORB has been able to stand up a local research operation capable of carrying out this work. This is followed by a summary of a recent poll undertaken in Mogadishu providing unique insight into everyday life in this hostile environment.

Somalia
Somalia has been without an effective central government since President Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991. Years of fighting between rival warlords and an inability to deal with famine and disease have led to the deaths of up to one million people. Unemployment is rife and the infrastructure of the country nonexistent. This turmoil has proved fertile breeding ground for political factions. Religious extremism has also come to the fore in this environment of disarray.

Despite numerous attempts to reach a peaceful solution, Somalia has remained in a state of civil war for almost twenty years. Since the US intervention in the 1990s, and the infamous incident of the US soldiers’ bodies being dragged through Mogadishu, international attention has rarely focused on Somalia. Recently, however, both piracy and the Islamist insurgency Al Shabaab have focused the world’s attention once more on the collapsed state.
Islamist Insurgency
There is a genuine fear that the country could soon fall into the hands of Islamist group Al-Shabaab, a group that claims to have links with Al Qaeda. Al-Shabaab is at war with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), which supports the frail TFG. Al-Shabaab currently controls most of southern and central Somalia and the majority of the capital, Mogadishu. The recent simultaneous bombing of the Ugandan capital, Kampala, demonstrated Al Shabaab’s intent and ability to strike outside of the Horn of Africa.

Piracy
Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden has seen a dramatic increase over the past few years and more recently, the pirates’ terrain has expanded increasingly further from Somali shores, deep into the Indian Ocean. It has been estimated that in 2008, total ransom payments were between US $18-30 million. According to the Kenyan Foreign Minister, it is estimated that pirates received $150m in ransom payments in 2009. Drive through the Somalia settlement of Eastleigh in Nairobi and there is evidence of this money leaving Somalia.

The Role of Research
The role of research in a communications campaign is threefold: to develop the campaign and its messages, to determine the most effective method of delivery and to evaluate the success of the campaign.

Campaign Development
Prior to implementing outreach activities (whether related to aid activities, media outreach, or other forms of engagement) qualitative research, often in the form of focus groups, offers an opportunity to test ideas and messages on representatives of the target population to ensure the objectives of the proposed activity are realistic on-the-ground and achievable. All too often, we have witnessed untested messages released to foreign, target audiences that fail to resonate, that backfire, or which otherwise do not reach their intended audience or worse still, serve only to depress or agitate the target audience. Testing messages and strategy prior to implementation is one way of ensuring success of a communications strategy.

Campaign Delivery
Once messages have been tested and proven, research can be used to determine the most effective way to communicate the message to the target audience. Research should create a profile of the target audience e.g. where they live, how they spend their spare time, their media preferences, who their role models are etc. Multi-variate analysis of the data can deliver a segmentation of the audience, enabling specific targeting. In Somalia, segments broadly fall into three categories – those who are supportive of the Al Shabaab narrative (anti), those who reject it (base) and crucially, those who are susceptible to it (swing). With any campaign, the aim is to grow the base by getting the swing to change their opinion/behavior (Fig. 1).

This picture of the target audience is then used to determine the most effective way to communicate the message to the target audience. This may, for example, involve a media channel and an opinion formerly found popular and credible amongst the target audience. Sometimes less obvious or more specifically targeted methods of relaying messages are identified including free concerts, college lectures or sponsored sports events.

Campaign Evaluation
Evaluating the success of a campaign through polling involves two types of measurement: Measures of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effect (MOE).

- MOPs – how successful the campaign was in delivering the messages to the target audience
- MOEs – determine whether a campaign enables the desired effect and creates the desired impressions in the minds of the target audience

Evaluation of a campaign requires baseline measures of opinion amongst the target audience. Opinion polling provides this initial baseline measure of attitude, experience and opinion from which we can measure subtle or larger shifts in public attitudes from thereon in. This baseline, combined with a second post-campaign survey provides data-driven measures of performance and effectiveness (MOE, MOP).

Figure 1 : Segmenting the Target Audience

Base

Swing

Anti
The initial wave of survey results also provides a vital benchmark for strategic planners, indicating the locations of ‘sympathetic’ or ‘problematic’ segments within the general population, as well as the specific concerns or preferences of these segments.

**Polling in Somalia – The Challenge**

As a research agency, ORB is experienced in polling in post-conflict environments. The agency has been tracking public opinion in Iraq since 2005 and currently tracks opinion in Afghanistan. Working in these areas ORB has developed methods to address issues including interviewer safety, outdated demographic information, and suspicious authorities.

Conducting a survey in a collapsed state in which state and non-state actors, still fight for power issues new challenges not experienced elsewhere. Most importantly, these include how to work in a country that is inaccessible to Westerners and has no established research infrastructure to utilize and secondly how to work in areas under the control of opposing sides.

In most post-conflict environments, there are organizations with experience, if only limited, in carrying out research. When collaborating with local research organizations ORB is able to provide extra training and careful handholding through the process. This ensures that the quality of the data is equal to what one would insist on when polling in the West. In Somalia, no existing research infrastructure exists and the majority of the country is off limits to Westerners. This meant to undertake any polling; ORB would need to stand up its own Somalia operation.

The second main challenge lies in the need for an opinion poll to be truly representative of the population. To achieve this accurate measure of public opinion all members of the public have to have an equal chance of being included in the survey. This means carrying out interviews in areas regardless of which faction is currently in control of the area. In the case of Mogadishu, this also means interviewing in the vast IDP camps.

Polling can also be dangerous. By insisting on a truly random sample, we are aiming to give everyone an equal opportunity of being selected for the survey. However, it also means that the interviewer has no idea who lives behind the door of the house/tent. Asking a stranger a question about politics, religion, and violence can put the pollsters life at risk. Interviewer safety remains the number one priority.

**ORB’s Solution**

ORB collaborated with a Somali based NGO which has been operating in the country for almost 20 years. The NGO is known and trusted by Somali communities across the country and respected by members of the TFG and Opposition groups. Without this level of trust and brand recognition, it is highly debatable as to whether or not polling could have taken place. Collaborating with the NGO has enabled ORB to interview in 15 of the 16 districts in Mogadishu, as well as 5 coastal cities to the north, and to undertake multiple rounds of focus groups throughout Mogadishu and up into Puntland.

**Standing up the Operation**

In July 2009, ORB held its first training course for Somali interviewers. With Mogadishu and much of Somalia off limits for westerners, the training course was held in neighboring Djibouti. A group of twenty Somalis was flown up to Djibouti to attend the one week course in conducting face to face interviews. The course covered all aspects of random sampling, interviewing techniques and quality control procedures. During the training, the team practiced their interviewing techniques amongst the Somalis living in Djibouti under the guidance of ORB staff. A number of those who passed the course were selected to be survey managers who would then train and manage small teams of interviewers in Somalia whilst those with a stringent eye for detail became quality control managers to ensure the survey work was undertaken according to ORB’s standards.

**Further Challenges**

Although the questionnaire had been previously agreed with the NGO’s management board it was the first time many of the trainees had seen the survey instrument. A number of trainees were uncomfortable with the idea of walking around Mogadishu with questionnaires asking people about Al-Shabaab and religion. The course was conducted during a period of heightened conflict in Mogadishu where Al-Shabaab had made recent gains, including some of the interviewers’ home districts. This unease was heightened with the sharing of a video clip via the trainees’ cell phones of Al-Shabaab carrying out the amputation of a man’s feet. There were also unforeseen issues raised of interviewing Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in camps in which there is no private space in which to conduct an interview in confidence without other people listening in.

Fortunately, through discussions with the trainees we were able to resolve these issues. Although the recruitment of respondents was strictly random, in the first survey we gave respondents the option of being interviewed at home or at a neutral location. More than two in three (70%) selected a neutral location. ORB decided to adopt the option of using a ‘safe house’ in which to conduct interviews. Rather than conducting the interviews at the respondent’s home an appointment was made the following day for the respondent to be collected from their home and transported to and from the safe house for which in return they received a cash incentive for giving up their time. This solution meant that there was less risk for the interviewer and that the respondent would feel more at ease and able to speak freely in a safe environment. In other areas outside of Mogadishu where the security situation is less unstable, interviews were conducted at the respondent’s home.

Internal Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp in Somalia

Source: Author
A joint certified Information Operations core capability course. Created to develop Electronic Warfare planning, coordination, and operations skills for personnel providing direct EW support to Joint Force Commanders and to enhance corporate EW knowledge for the joint warfighter. For more information call 210-977-6238 (DSN 969) or ewtraining@jiowc.osis.gov.
Focus Group Training - “Are two wives better than one?”

In addition to the interviewer training course a number of the team were trained in how to recruit and moderate focus groups. Following a day’s training in moderating techniques the trainees practiced their skills moderating focus groups with Somalis living in Djibouti under the guidance of the ORB trainer. Trainees were asked to choose topics of discussion and to encourage members of the groups to debate the issues openly, allowing each person to contribute their opinion. Topics selected included “Is having two wives better than one?” and “Should girls be educated?” ORB has since run a second training course in focus group moderation with Somalis from Mogadishu, Galkao and Garowe. Those who passed the course have since successfully recruited and moderated focus groups in their respective home cities.

Mogadishu Poll Findings

ORB’s research developing and evaluating communications campaigns is confidential and the findings remain the property of its clients. However, the agency released a poll in February 2010 amongst a representative sample of Mogadishans, releasing the data at a Dept. of State briefing. The results revealed a wealth of information about their living conditions, the security situation, governance and their thoughts on the future. The poll was conducted amongst a representative sample of 1,000 residents of Mogadishu and the IDP camps in the Afgoye Corridor. In Mogadishu, only one of the sixteen districts, Abdul Aziz, was excluded due to security concerns.

The average Mogadishan lives in an environment of high unemployment, where basic needs are, despite some efforts of the international communities, often unmet. They are regularly exposed to crime and violence due to raging conflicts amongst the many factions. Conflict is no stranger to the Mogadishans; there is a long culture of tribal clanism. However, the relatively new and alien nature of religious fanaticism, which cuts across tribal lines and family allegiance, has knocked Somalia off keel far more than the traditional nature of clan-related warring.

Almost one third of those we spoke to face a lack in supply of drinking water and food and two thirds rely on charity to fulfill their most basic needs. Over half lack shelter more than once a month and a similar figure were displaced at the time of interview. Reasons for this displacement include fleeing from indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas, general threat of violence, and specific threats to adults or children within the family that forced them to move.

Mogadishuians find themselves living under a cloud of terror due to political conflict and extremist factions scouring the streets punishing indiscriminately. A third witness killing or injury on a daily basis.

The poll found that unemployment affects nearly all Mogadishans with only 10% in full-time employment. Any sense of entrepreneurial optimism is hard to maintain in such
a situation and only a small minority are business owners in Mogadishu (3%). Tradesmen have had their livelihoods destroyed in the relentless chaos, ongoing conflict, and poor state of literally everything. Poverty and hopelessness create ideal recruitment conditions for Islamist and piracy groups.

**Hope for the future**
Despite the desperate situation, which has endured for twenty years, Mogadishans remain optimistic. Whilst the majority (53%) felt that the security situation in Somalia has deteriorated in the past twelve months, 70% believed that the security situation for Somalia as a whole would improve in the coming six months. For those who live a sustainable lifestyle (i.e. one which was not deteriorating) the main priority is to enable a stable government and security; this is also important for the majority though they have the more immediate need of putting hand to mouth staring them in the face.

**The Government versus the Al Shabaab**
Al Shabaab, whose presence is felt by every Somali in Mogadishu and presents an alternative method of rule to the TFG, is rapidly gaining ground through tactics of terror and religious exploitation. They are also regularly accused of exploiting the weakest sections of society, preying on the young and naive. The Opposition’s task is made easier in a time where people are grasping for an alternative solution to the incumbent government in order to remedy their country’s problems.

Overall, the majority of Somalis would like to feel hopeful that the TFG can gather sufficient strength and support to overcome the adversaries who are promoting extremist views and practices. The TFG is recognized as the most legitimate power in Somalia, but it is currently difficult to see how they will build up their forces and bring about peace. It is a positive finding that despite Al Shabaab’s increasing presence and influence, more people favor the UN, the TFG and AMISOM: 87% felt the UN was doing a good job compared to just 16% saying the same of the ‘Opposition’ (which is code word for Al Shabaab, something that we could not reference directly in the questionnaire as it may have endangered interviewers). The TFG received an 84% endorsement whilst AMISOM received 65%. A majority of 71% felt that if there were to be a winner

Q **Which of the following do you think is most necessary to achieve a stable government?**
*Base: n=1,000*

- Having a government that rules through Islamic principals: 44%
- Having a government that is chosen through elections: 31%
- Having a government that is supported by the international community: 24%
of the conflict in Mogadishu at the current time it would be the TFG although whether this is a dream or not remains to be seen.

When asked what would be the most important factor in forming a future stable government, having a government that rules on Islamic principles was the most popular answer given by 44% of respondents (though this should not be interpreted as extremist, or in line with any Opposition group). Indeed, from our qualitative work we know that one of the major concerns locals have with Al Shabaab is their ‘interpretation’ of Islam is something considered wrong or too harsh. Almost a third felt a government that is democratically elected should be a priority. People on both sides of the divide are keen to vote with the majority of both TFG and Opposition supporters saying they would vote for the President of Somalia tomorrow if they could.

Footnotes:
2. For the full results of the poll, a PowerPoint presentation of the results and a methodology report please visit ORB’s website. http://www.opinion.co.uk/Newsroom_details.aspx?NewsId=165

Mr. Heald became Managing Director of ORB in 2006 after eight years as Research Director. He has worked in research since graduating in 1992 and specialises in issues-based, international, consumer and socio-political research. He has also spent more than a decade conducting multi-country research in developing markets and presented research at conferences in Europe, the Middle East and the USA. Previously at Research International (RI), He was responsible for a 22 country quantitative study and spent six months running a consumer qualitative study in Central and Eastern Europe. Mr. Heald also conducted RI’s first ever studies in Albania, Syria and Moldova. In the UK, Mr. Heald has been an adviser to the Conservative Party and moderated more than 250 focus groups amongst undecided voters in the UK. He regularly features on BBC Newsnight moderating focus groups on a variety of issues.
The 2010 Worldwide Information Operations Conference (WWIO) in Chantilly, Virginia proved to be an eventful and productive event. Hosted by the Joint Staff Deputy Director for Global Operations (DDGO) US Air Force Brigadier General Rowayne A. Schatz Jr, the annual event is a collection of presentations from the various Information Operations (IO) stakeholders from the combatant commands and the services. It provides the opportunity once a year to come together and discuss the activities of the past year and the goals of the next year for IO.

The 2010 conference proved to be as eventful as expected. General Schatz stated in his opening remarks, “The study of IO is over, it is time to move forward.” His remarks set the tone for a conference full of information about the “normalization” of IO across not only the joint force but services. General Schatz also highlighted the accomplishments of 2010 in IO. Most notably was the formation of US Cyber Command.

The highlight of the conference was the keynote address by Vice Admiral (Retired) John M. (Mike) McConnell. Admiral McConnell is the former Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and is currently a Vice President at the Booz Allen Hamilton Corporation. Admiral McConnell’s comments focused on the great work in the past year in Cyber Operations and the significant work that is yet to be done to provide the right level of security for our national interest in Cyberspace. “Bring cyber back to the forefront of the national agenda,” was the key quote and theme of Admiral McConnell’s presentation. His focus was specifically targeted at the vulnerabilities in cyberspace; the global financial system and money supply. He highlighted the need for an updated legal framework for military operations in Cyberspace as well as a new National Security Strategy that has a greater focus on the vulnerabilities and responses to Cyber threats.

In addition to the keynote addresses, the 2010 WWIO conference hosted presentations by the service IO organizations and the combatant command IO directorates. Specifically, US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) gave a short presentation focused on the change in terminology and way ahead for Psychological Operations (PSYOP). The new title for PSYOP is Military Information Support Operations (MISO). A new name and terminology for the forces and units that constitute the US MISO capability had not yet been fully determine by the time of the conference.

The 2010 WWIO conference set the scene for what is going to be a transformational year in 2011 for Information Operations. Changes in organizations and mission focus are inevitable. The conference is a tradition that helps the IO community navigate through those changes and develop doctrine and capability that enhance warfighting capability and command flexibility. The WWIO conference is critical to the IO community to collectively deal with the challenges presented by the ever-changing operational environment that affects IO. The 2010 version of the conference met the goals of the theme “Mainstreaming IO and Normalizing Doctrine and Operations.”
Succeeding at Strategic Engagement
“Empower and Decentralize”
by
Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Stock, US Army

Editor’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stock has served in a wide number of important and relevant positions. His experience alone makes his views on Strategic Engagement worth reading and understanding. This article describes communication strategy and engagement in military operations. The article is a great addition to the discussion about Strategic Engagement and Communications in Military Operations.

In its efforts to clarify and adapt a shared understanding of Information Operations (IO), the US Army has conceptually explored dividing IO into three areas or “dimensions.” One of these areas, referred to as Strategic Engagement, involves keeping friends at home, gaining allies abroad, and generating support or empathy for the mission in the area of operations. The target audiences include the general public, key actors, and third party supporters who, in the end, dictate the success or failure of military operations in today’s complex environment.1

Our adversaries have demonstrated an exceptional level of proficiency at strategic engagement. As a military force, we have failed to effectively come to grips with this concept and implement a proactive strategy or even successfully respond to enemy actions in a timely and effective manner. In order to persevere and ultimately prevail in the current struggle against extremist ideologies, we must correct this shortcoming and find more effective and responsive approaches to succeed at strategic engagement.

To formulate a more effective approach, we must first understand how our adversaries successfully dominate this realm. The observable advantages they possess include rapid dissemination, sympathetic propagation of messages, and little requirement for accurate portrayal of facts. The ability of our adversaries to execute these information actions faster than we can process them and respond cedes the initiative and keeps us constantly on the defensive. The decentralized structure of contemporary threat networks enables the comparative advantage they enjoy. Using a shared ideology and worldview, these extremist networks operate relatively independently and can make decisions to develop and execute information activities as they see fit. This lack of bureaucratic oversight, along with an offensive information mentality ensures that they get to the influence high ground being as US Army officers often say; “the fastest with the mostest.”2

In “The Starfish and the Spider” Ori Brafman discusses how decentralized organizations survive and thrive in our increasingly connected world. He outlines the challenges that hierarchical organizations face when attempting to compete with or defeat decentralized competitors. Finally, he articulates several strategies for reducing the capacity or defeating

US Military Police Walk Through Iraqi Police Station Prior to Classes on Crime Scene Investiation
Source: defenseimagery.mil
these decentralized organizations. The strategies include defeating your opponent’s ideology, decentralizing yourself or centralizing your opponent. Of these three approaches, decentralizing our information actions will allow a more rapid and agile response.

Institutionally, our military has operated with the concept of mission type orders. This concept allows for and encourages subordinate initiative in the pursuit of mission accomplishment. However, we do not necessarily practice this concept when it comes to our communication and information actions. We tend to have an institutional bias for centralization of our efforts to inform and persuade. By centralizing the production and approval of these various information actions, we unnecessarily hamper our ability to exploit fleeting opportunities or rapidly respond to mitigate consequences of enemy or friendly actions.

How do we go about decentralizing our strategic engagement activities and actions? The key is to empower our communication actors at all levels and decentralize the approval authority for production and dissemination of relevant information. This is not unlike how military practitioners have operated on the kinetic battlefield for the past century. To engage the enemy, we build engagement areas. Leaders give subordinates a task to accomplish along with a purpose or intent. Additionally, the higher commander provides selected control measures to orient and focus combat power. Armed with these tools, subordinate military leaders use their understanding of the environment, the current situation, and their professional military judgment to array forces and engage the enemy to achieve the designated objectives. This methodology can and should apply to strategic engagement and associated information operations.

The key to empowering subordinates is to establish the boundaries, and carve out “space” for the exercise of initiative. For a kinetic engagement, this includes the geographic boundaries, fire control measures, engagement criteria, and the desired end state. Once these limits have been set, the subordinate leaders are now empowered to act. They do not have to “ask permission” to engage enemy targets or adjust how they employ various military assets. The result is subordinate elements exercising independent initiative to proactively and reactively deal with the enemy threat. Translating this concept to strategic engagement is a relatively straightforward process. Boundaries and engagement criteria might include identification of key themes and messages, intent and desired end state of the engagement as well as limits on authorities for action. Once these elements are established, leaders and communicators, at all levels, are free to exercise their unique understanding of their particular environments and audiences to construct and employ various communication actions. The result is not unlike the actions of maneuver forces inside a kinetic engagement area: identify threats (and opportunities), focus / distribute information fires, and adjust communication actions based on enemy responses. The cumulative effects of individual and subordinate unit actions results in strategic impacts. All of these actions, initiated independently across the organization, work to achieve the desired end state.

In order to realize this cumulative effect, all communication actors must have a shared understanding of how to operate. This could be articulated in communication rules of engagement (ROE). Underpinning this “ROE” would be an understanding that every action is an opportunity to influence or persuade and the corresponding necessity to take advantage of every opportunity. It would also include the requirement to know

U.S. Army Gen. David H. Petraeus Speaks to ISF Forces in Afghanistan
Source: defenseimagery.mil
your respective constraints - your information “left and right limits.” With this foundation, the ROE spells out precepts for every information actor on the battlefield.

First, everyone is a communicator. From the individual soldier, to the operational and strategic leader, all members of the team must understand their responsibility to participate in the overall strategic engagement effort. When they identify a target… engage! This could be as simple as relaying efforts to family and friends at home, communicating selected themes to local actors, interacting with the media or a deliberate planned engagement with a political or military entity. This proactive approach is critical to generating and sustaining the volume and message penetration necessary to achieve strategic effects.

When communicating messages to a foreign audience, each actor must understand the importance of cultural context. Although we cannot expect all military members to become cultural experts, there are several concepts that can ensure we don’t inadvertently undermine our message. Using trusted cultural advisors to vet and translate to ensure messages resonate as intended is key. When possible, use locals in a position of authority (formal or informal) to convey the messages and themes. This will greatly increase acceptance, penetration, and propagation of the message. Encourage the use of stories or narratives to convey your message. We tend to favor facts and logical argument in our messages, but most people are much more receptive to illustrative examples that highlight the intended communication. To relate these stories effectively, we must ensure subordinates do not over classify. Many of these narratives are based on reports of enemy or friendly actions. We often classify these reports as a matter of habit and unintentionally limit our ability to rapidly exploit and relay this information to a critical audience.

The final step in the process is to adapt to the changing information environment. In the kinetic fight, leaders use control measure to shift and focus lethal fires as the enemy reacts to our actions or attempts to seize the initiative from us. This requirement is just as important in the information fight. To shape the actions of subordinates without unnecessarily limiting initiative is essential. Leaders must adjust key messages and themes to help subordinates focus information fires on audiences and actions that will support the overall strategic engagement objectives. Subordinates must likewise provide timely and accurate feedback to allow for rapid and effective adaptation in the information realm.

The ability to empower and decentralize our strategic engagement actions is essential to enabling the agility and responsiveness necessary to seize and maintain the initiative from our adversaries. It requires informing and empowering service members at all levels to demand the exercise of individual initiative in the execution of strategic engagement. This requires a cultural shift in how our armed forces deal with information and communication. This shift requires us to cede some control in order to achieve effects. However, as discussed earlier, this cultural adjustment places communication actions in a context similar to kinetic activities. This change is not without risk, but the risk of inaction is far greater. Maintaining the status quo cedes the information fight to enemy and makes our success in the long war and future struggles problematic at best.

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Footnotes:
1. LTG William Caldwell, Commander, Combined Arms Center, to GEN Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, memorandum, 16 OCT 2009
2. For the full results of the poll, a PowerPoint presentation of the results and a methodology report please visit ORB’s website. http://www.opinion.co.uk/Newsroom_details.aspx?NewsId=165
3. Origin uncertain, quote often incorrectly attributed to Nathan Bedford Forrest concerning his strategy for employing military forces.
Editor’s Note: In this article Mr. Jeszenszky outlines a historical context to US Influence Operations and Strategic Communication. His outline and references show that the US has historically and legally created the organizations for international influence and successfully conducted influence and strategic communication for most of the past century. His views are his own and are relevant to the current discussions about strategic communication and influence operations.

This is the Information Age. The United States is in a war of ideas with those who oppose democratic ideals. The ability of the United States government to effectively explain its objectives and intent to a global audience is a vital element of foreign policy implementation. These are ideas commonly discussed in government. Why, then, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates quoted it in a 2007 speech at Kansas State University “… has one man in a cave managed to out-communicate the world’s greatest communication society?”

On the one hand government leaders talk about the need to reach foreign populations; on the other hand they deride and underfund government communication efforts because it smacks of propaganda. Has this always been the case? This paper will trace the history of influence operations both at home and abroad. In addition, it will provide recommendations on the future of the United States government’s information effort.

The use and manipulation of information has always been an element of warfare. It was not until George Creel and the Committee for Public Information during World War I that the importance of words was given organized, systematic thought in the United States. Creel began his career as a reporter taking various jobs in Kansas City and New York City. It was not until he began his own paper, The Kansas City Independent, in 1899 that Creel found his true calling. With The Independent Creel “became a down-in-the-dirt crusader against all manner of political corruption in Kansas City.” Creel used The Independent as a voice for whatever particular issue inspired him. In 1905, after hearing Woodrow Wilson speak, Creel began to use The Independent as a platform to support Wilson’s campaign for president. On Wilson’s election, Creel immediately offered his services to Wilson’s chief strategist Bob Wooley. President Wilson took up Creel’s offer and with executive order 2594 he established the Committee on Public Information (CPI) on 14 April 1917.

The CPI was primarily focused on securing domestic support for the war effort and overseeing the voluntary censorship of information that might be useful for the enemy. The growth of the CPI was explosive. From the executive order in April, the CPI expanded to 100,000 members by the end of 1917. Because the CPI grew so rapidly and exact organizational structure is difficult to determine; additional offices continued to spring up throughout the life of the organization. The CPI was divided into three main functions: the Office of Business Management which handled production and distribution of content; the Domestic Division which controlled all aspects of foreign information outlets and translated products from the Domestic Division.
Of the three aforementioned divisions, the Domestic Division was the largest and most influential. The division covered every aspect of communication possible and was comprised of four other divisions. The Division of Civic and Education Cooperation sought to develop and influence information that students received at all educational levels. The Film Division enlisted prominent directors to develop informational and entertainment films all designed to produce further support for the war. The Division of Industrial Relations received a substantial amount of criticism as they sought to reduce the level of valuable information that was released to the enemy. Creel claimed to be opposed to censorship and in fact opposed a censorship law early in the United States' involvement in the war. He was, however, a strong advocate for self-censorship. The pressure applied by the Division of Industrial Relations was perceived as heavy handed.7

Of all the elements in the Domestic Division, the most famous and most visible to the general public was the Speaking Division, more commonly known as the four minute men. The four-minute men made up the bulk of the CPI with over 75,000 active members. The concept behind the four-minute men was to give an informative, persuasive speech during the intermission at movie theaters in no more than four minutes. The reason for the time limitation was it took a theater attendant an average of four minutes to change film reels of a feature length presentation. It is also interesting to note how the four-minute men were managed. The speeches they gave were not written by the CPI. Instead the CPI produced a weekly bulletin which provided tips and guidelines on what to discuss. The four-minute men crafted their own speeches and tailored them to their communities. In fact, this was the first element to touch on foreign influence. Speeches were often given in many languages in order to accommodate various immigrant populations. The ideas from these speeches then found their way to all types of foreign populations. It is important to recall regular radio broadcast did not begin until November of 1920, therefore the four-minute men served as a key voice between the central government and local communities.8

The organized element of foreign influence tended to be more formal. It was seen as the “fight for the mind of mankind.”9 The success of the Foreign Division is evident in the universally positive reception that Wilson received on his travels to Europe during the Versailles Treaty process. This division served as the forerunner to public diplomacy as it is known today. The Foreign Division served several key functions. On the outbreak of the war, the Navy Department took control of all the wireless outlets. Control of the wireless outlets meant that the government could control all information reaching to foreign audiences. One element that is still used today was the preparation of psychological estimates. The estimates covered the historical background, controlling factors and vulnerabilities of different countries. This information was then used to tailor information to specific audiences. The Foreign Division also had a robust translation department, which was responsible for translating a wide variety of CPI material for foreign consumption.10 The final task of the Foreign Division was to collect and translate information coming from other countries. Today this is known as open source intelligence. It is still a vital element of understanding the enemy and allies alike.

Immediately after the war was over, Creel put an end to the domestic role of the CPI. The organization remained in existence for about a year. Creel traveled to Paris with the President in order to provide support in winning the peace. Creel and the CPI had successfully prepared the European public for President Wilson’s arrival. The President was met with wide public acclaim at every stop on his visit. However, no amount of influence operations were successful in realizing Wilson’s ultimate goals at Versailles. The final treaty was not what the President had envisioned. On Creel’s return to the United State the organization was officially disbanded by Executive Order 3154 in August of 1919.11 Just as quickly as it had come into existence, the
The propaganda machine of George Creel ceased to exist. The need for some sort of organization to control information became evident in the opening stages of World War II. The administration quickly saw the need to provide information about the massive new spending efforts even before the United States entered the war. Of course, the memory of the Creel apparatus was still fresh on the public’s mind so the effort was spread over several innocuous sounding organizations in order to eliminate the association with propaganda. As early as 1938 there was the Interdepartmental Committee for Scientific and Cultural Cooperation. This was followed by the Office of Governments Reports in 1939; the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Affairs between American Republics in 1940; and finally the Office of Facts and Figures, the Coordinator of Information and the Foreign Information Service in 1941.12

The problem which arose from the numerous organizations was “It all seemed to boil down to three bitter complaints: first there was too much information; second, that there wasn’t enough of it; and third, that in any event it was confusing and contradicting.”13 Some organizations withheld information on security grounds; others disseminated redundant or confusing information. By 1942 Roosevelt was convinced that one organization was needed to control information targeting both domestic and foreign audiences. In June of 1942 and a new executive order was signed creating the Office of War Information (OWI). Elmer Davis, a journalist and well known radio personality, was named as the OWI’s chief.14, 15

Almost immediately, the OWI ran afoul of Congress and other competing organizations such as the Office of Strategic Services. The issue of the actions of the Committee on Public Information was still a concern. In addition, the impact of Hitler and his chief propagandist Goebbels was keenly felt. Congress did not want to see the same level of propaganda used on American citizens. The radio was a major tool of the OWI during World War II used to great effect especially during the bond drives to raise funds for the war effort. However, the resistance to propaganda in general meant the information element of the World War II did not reach the same level as the effort during World War I on the domestic front. Against foreign audiences, the OWI met with more success. Themes in American propaganda from this period focused on three major areas: American might, productivity and commitment to the fight. This was also the first time the term psychological warfare was introduced within the military. Propaganda was seen to have value when coupled with military action. The idea that propaganda in itself could have a decisive effect was dispelled. Because of this recognition, President Truman dismantled the OWI by executive order, after the conclusion of the war in 1945,16 but not to the same extent as the end of the CPI in 1919.

Portions of the OWI survived the postwar years under the auspices of the State Department, first as the Interim International Information Service, and then as the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs. One of the most important elements of the OWI to survive in the new organization was the Voice of America (VOA). The VOA was a radio broadcast service responsible for broadcasting American news and cultural information first to the German population.
during the war, and later to Eastern Bloc citizens as the Cold War began to heat up. At the same time the United States began
to dismantle its wartime propaganda, the Soviet Union began
to ratchet up their efforts.

In direct response to the mounting Soviet threat, President
Truman unveiled the Truman Doctrine in 1947 that sought to
contain the Soviets. As a result, the Smith-Mundt act was passed
the next year in Congress in order to provide “information
about the United States, it peoples and it policies” to foreign
audiences.17 The concerns of government propaganda targeting
the American people was still a major concern to Congress and
specific language was inserted in the Smith-Mundt act which stipulated propaganda and information products could not be
produced for domestic audiences. President Truman certainly
saw the need to counter Soviet propaganda but the record of
his response remains mixed.

It was not until President Eisenhower came into office that the
United State Information Agency (USIA) was created. Even
under the President the birth of the organization was not without
controversy. Eisenhower appointed Charles Douglas Jackson
to review United States information activities and recommend
a way to move forward. At the same time, the VOA was
undergoing scrutiny by Senator McCarthy over mismanagement
that somehow, he believed, “served Stalin’s grand design.”
Attacks by McCarthy expanded when the American libraries
run by the State Department were found to contain works by
communist writers. As McCarthy did his damage to the VOA and the American library program, C.D. Jackson presented his
findings to President Eisenhower that a separate agency should
be formed to handle United States information activities. In
August of 1953, The United States Information Agency became
a separate entity.18 After the inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961 USIA continued to grow. It was actually President Kennedy, in a

memo to the best known director of the USIA Edward R. Murrow, who captured the mission best:

To help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements.19

After Kennedy’s guidance the USIA centered on five core
tasks. One of the most vital tasks was known as listening. The
USIA utilized its presence around the globe to provide the
President and the rest of government feedback on “evidence and assessments of the international mood”20 The Office
of Research and Intelligence conducted extensive polling and analysis of foreign media outlets in order to provide the
President a better understanding of the impact of United States foreign policy. Hand in hand with providing a better
understanding the next key element of the USIA was to provide
the President a voice for his policies abroad. This effort ranged
from establishing American libraries and information centers
in various foreign capitals to presenting films and exhibitions,
which demonstrated everyday life in the United States. The
third task was the use of cultural diplomacy; exposing foreign
audiences to American art, music and culture. Exchange
diplomacy made up the fourth task. Sending groups of students,
scientists, and leaders to various countries and bringing the
same types of groups to the United States served to provide
hands on interplay between individual citizens in order to build
trust. Finally, the most important task in the Cold War was the
use of radio broadcasting. The Voice of America played a key
role in reaching audiences behind the Iron Curtain.

The USIA executed all of these tasks until the fall of the
Soviet Union in 1989. Congress, eager to cash in on the “peace
dividend” sought to make cuts in what it saw as a relic of
the Cold War. Many did not see the need for an organization
designed to counter the Soviet menace. On 30 September 1999,
the USIA was disbanded.21 The Voice of America became an
independent organization and many of the other functions
returned to the State Department under the Undersecretary of
State for Public Diplomacy.

With the demise of the USIA, the United States lost its voice in
the world. The end of the Cold War was viewed as a triumph
for the United States and her allies. We won the war of ideas
with our archival; therefore, there was no need for an entire
organization dedicated to projecting American ideas and values
abroad. Since the creation of the Undersecretary position, it has
gone unfilled over thirty percent of the time. The undersecretary
is responsible for coordinating the message coming from both
State and Defense targeting foreign audiences. In addition, the
undersecretary ensures foreign policy goals and objectives can
be clearly articulated. Now, every agency is responsible for its
own communications. This leads to a redundant, sometimes
conflicting communications effort. The first step towards the
creation of a coherent national communications strategy is to
fill the position of the Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy.

The next step, in the medium term, is the funding, training, and
culture of the State Department must be updated. Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates has recently advocated the reduction of
big-ticket defense spending and redirecting the money towards
more immediate needs of the troops. Equally, some of the

JOINT INFORMATION OPERATIONS
WARFARE CENTER
INFORMATION OPERATIONS
PRIMER COURSE
FOCUS
• IO CORE CAPABILITIES AND PLANNING SUPPORT
• IO EXECUTION SUPPORT AND SYNCHRONIZATION
• JOINT PLANNING AND IO KNOWLEDGE BASELINE
• IO DOCTRINE AND OVERVIEW OF IO TOOLS

INFORMATION
• OPEN TO IO PROFESSIONALS BASED ON PRIORITY
• COURSE IS 4 DAYS IN DURATION

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reduction in big-ticket defense items should go towards funding the expansion of the diplomatic corps in order to better integrate “smart power” into the National Security strategy. Training opportunities for diplomats must also be expanded. Training for the new diplomatic corps should include not just regional training, but also learning new public diplomacy techniques and technologies; crisis diplomacy and nation building. In addition, the State Department should mirror the Defense Department in senior level continuing education. Opportunities should be available both internally and in conjunction with top universities across the country and abroad. Finally, the culture of the State Department must change. One of the major criticisms of the State Department during both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom is once the military operations are complete; the State Department should take over the rebuilding effort. Members of the State Department who went to Iraq and Afghanistan was often unprepared for the tasks they were asked to complete. Junior officers looking to establish themselves deployed instead of the true regional experts. Tours were also too short for diplomats to achieve any meaningful results, sometimes as short as 90 days. The State Department must develop a deployable element that works in conjunction with the military and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This deployable element should have the primary responsibility for nation building tasks.

Every new diplomat should be well versed in the art of public diplomacy as part of his or her training, yet individually, trained diplomats and military officers are not enough. If we live in the information age, and if the current and future conflict is a war of ideas, then there should be an agency whose sole focus is information. The first two measures will suffice in the interim, but in the long term, a new version of the USIA must be reconstituted. The focus of the new agency should be the development of a national communications strategy; to integrate information from across the various agencies to ensure the United States is speaking with one voice; to incorporate civilian communications expertise; to harness existing communication technologies; crisis diplomacy and nation building. In addition, the expansion of the diplomatic corps in order to better integrate the communications effort and harness the technological capabilities of the sole superpower.

The recent nomination of Judith McHale, the former CEO of the Discovery Channel, for undersecretary for public diplomacy and public affairs within the structure as it already exists, is an important first step to establish a coherent national communications strategy. The next step is to revitalize the State Department with funding and training in order to put today’s diplomats on an equal footing with the already proven military forces of the United States. Finally, the USIA or a similar organization under a different name should be reestablished to integrate the communications effort and harness the technological capabilities of the sole superpower.

Footnotes:
3. Ibid. 34.
5. Axelrod. 77.
6. Mock. 66.
7. Axelrod. 94.
8. Axelrod. 115.
10. Mock. 68.
11. Mock. 74
14/15. Ibid. 31.
16. Ibid. 149.
3. Ibid. 34.
4. Ibid. 3.
5. Ibid. 77.
6. Ibid. 66.
7. Ibid. 94.
8. Ibid. 115.
9. Ibid. 189.
10. Mock. 68.
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14/15. Ibid. 31.
16. Ibid. 149.
3. Ibid. 34.
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14/15. Ibid. 31.
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4. Ibid. 3.
5. Ibid. 77.
6. Ibid. 66.
7. Ibid. 94.
8. Ibid. 115.
9. Ibid. 189.
10. Mock. 68.
11. Mock. 74.
14/15. Ibid. 31.
16. Ibid. 149.
3. Ibid. 34.
4. Ibid. 3.
5. Ibid. 77.
Enhancing the Australian Army’s Operations in the Information Dominance and Influence Battlespace

by

Major Jason Logue, Australian Defence Force

Editor’s Note: Major Jason Logue brings an international view of influence and strategic communications. The editor of IO Sphere has served and worked with Major Logue in the past and he is one of the finest officers in the service of any nation. His views about ADF public affairs policy are his own. However, they are relevant to any discussion on these issues in many national defense organizations. Major Logue is Australian and his use of the English language is slightly different from the North American version. This is an excellent submission to IO Sphere Journal.

Introduction

In June 2006, Charles Sturt University academics Hibbert and Simmons published the results of their Defence-sponsored research into the relationship between Australian journalists who specialise in reporting Defence matters and the Military Public Affairs Branch of the Australian Defence Force. The study focused on the relationship between the two groups during the 2003 Iraq invasion and sought to “clearly identify gaps and problems in the relationship between the two parties.” While laudable in its approach, the study failed to recognise that Military Public Affairs, for the most part, does not engage directly with the media. Military Public Affairs Officers have neither the freedom of action, nor the command authority, within the current military or political environment to act on most recommendations of the study. In fact, the result of the study, reported as “helping the military public relations department to change strategy, structure and policy,” did little more than redesign the wider Defence Public Relations area, within the existing constraints of manpower, to be almost singularly focused on media responsiveness. Anything beyond the internal restructure and focus was, and remains, simply beyond the authority of the organisation to change. In reality, the study which sought to establish the relationships between Military Public Affairs, those uniformed officers of the ADF who operate within the Global Information Environment in support of military operations, was more reflective of relationships between the media and the larger, mostly civilian, Defence Public Affairs area. In the current Defence construct, it is civilian public affairs staff that primarily interfaces with the media in this regard. This interface is constrained to the provision of cleared responses provided for release by the relevant service or branch of the department. Most importantly however is that this approach is universally applied across Defence issues which range from Kangaroo culling within training areas through to the latest operational incident in Afghanistan. The current approach makes little distinction between a domestic public relations function and supporting an operational commander in achieving effects within the Information Dominance and Influence Battlespace. Despite its shortcomings, the Hibbert and Simmons study

US and Australian Soldiers Prepare for an Operation in Afghanistan

Source: defenseimagery.mil
clearly identified there are relationship issues between Defence and the media. More importantly, it clearly identified that there are significant issues within Defence in understanding exactly what ‘operations’ within the Global Information Environment entail. That the Hibbert and Simmons study and its scope was commissioned by Defence is as telling in this regard, as the predictability of the outcome. Across Defence, the focus is on media relationships as the panacea to the information conundrum, yet for the most part, the capability to specifically address the operational aspect of this issue has been left to its own devices.

Army continues to employ a small group of specialist communicators within the Australian Army Public Relations Service to address ‘media issues’ but unlike their U.S. and U.K. equivalents, has completely disempowered them from proactively engaging with the media. This leaves an obvious question. Is Army and the ADF actually demanding and receiving the service it now requires from its uniformed specialists, particularly in light of the release of Adaptive Campaigning – Army’s Future Land Operations Concept?6

Aim
This article seeks to further the debate started in the 2008 Chief of Army’s Military History Conference titled “The Military, the Media & Information Warfare.” The conference, through its range of speakers and topics, focused almost solely on the media element of the triumvirate and in doing so, furthered the misperception that the military’s relationship with media was the critical element of operations in the Global Information Environment. The author contends that it is the third element, the mislabelled ‘Information Warfare’8, which should be the focus of Army and the ADF today. The fact that convenors chose to use a term that fell out of favour almost a decade ago also highlights the single greatest issue facing any practitioner of effects in the Global Information Environment today; everyone has an opinion on what it is, who should do it, how they should go about it and, quite regularly, how it is failing. For a capability that Army requires to generate and sustain the dominant narrative in Adaptive Campaigning9 very little has been done to actually direct its development beyond stovepiped enhancement within information task elements. Like the resultant changes from the Hibbert & Simmons research, development of capability in creating information effects has essentially been self-generated, limited in scope and generally, unsupported externally. The real issue therefore is not as Hibbert & Simmons or many of the Chief of Army’s History Conference presenters would contend, the relationship between the military, particularly Military Public Affairs, and the media, but one of the Army actually moving beyond a capability requirement that was developed in the ‘80s, and actively supporting its own doctrine and policy through the directed development of capabilities to support the Adaptive Campaigning’s ‘Information Actions’ Line of Operation.10 Rethinking the uniformed Military Public Affairs capability is a possible first step in doing so.

Background
The preponderance to focus on relationships with the media as the panacea to improve and maintain support for operations is not new. Following the U.S Civil War, Union Army General William Sherman made his disdain for journalists well known but also identified the requirement to seek ways to better manage their impact. Given the widespread use of General Sherman’s contention, it remains surprising that most authors focus on his negative opinion of journalists, not his insight into the requirements of operational commanders. He quite clearly identified that the issues concerning

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“Newspaper correspondents with an army, as a rule, are mischievous. They are the world’s gossips, pick up and retail the camp scandal, and gradually drift to the headquarters of some general, who finds it easier to make reputation at home than with his own corps or division. They are also tempted to prophesy events and state facts which, to an enemy, reveal a purpose in time to guard against it. Moreover, they are always bound to see facts colored by the partisan or political character of their own patrons, and thus bring army officers into the political controversies of the day, which are always mischievous and wrong. Yet, so greedy are the people at large for war news, that it is doubtful whether any army commander can exclude all reporters, without bringing down on himself a clamor that may imperil his own safety. Time and moderation must bring a just solution to this modern difficulty.”

General William Tecumseh Sherman, US Army

media in his area of operations were part of a commander’s responsibility based upon guidance from higher headquarters. He also acknowledged that the outcome was unlikely to be tactically or operationally suitable but such was the strategic imperative, a commander must make certain allowances to support the requirement. In Europe, the requirement to create an informational line of operation was also evident. In 1832, General Carl von Clausewitz in his seminal work, On War, posited that war was “not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce.” It was, as he bluntly stated, “a mere continuation of policy by other means.”

His early 1800’s treatise has become a fundamental basis for understanding the complexities of the military art the world over. On War defines military strategy and is directly targeted at those who plan and practice warfare. Yet, even back in the early 1800’s, military leaders recognised the need to not only inform their political masters of the peculiarities of warfare, but to also shape, them towards the most appropriate use of force. In this regard, it is interesting to compare On War with von Clausewitz’s earlier work, his Principles of War. Von Clausewitz’s principles, targeted at his political leadership, are simple and to the point.

Warfare has three main objectives:

a. To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy;
b. To take possession of his material and other sources of strength, and
c. To gain public opinion.”

He further posits that public opinion can be gained “through great victories and the occupation of the enemy’s capital.”

Von Clausewitz’s advice to his political masters remains relatively accurate to the present day, save his opinions on how to win and gain public opinion through military campaigns. Admittedly, in 1812 General von Clausewitz did not need to concern himself with an information environment that was global, instantaneous and highly participative, but his view that feat of arms victory was all that was required to win over public opinion highlights a short sightedness among armed forces that may continue to this day. Current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce every day that tactical or even operational successes do not readily or automatically equate to strategic triumph. Military victories on their own rarely gain and maintain strong domestic or operational-area public support for the activities of a military force. Moreover, the success of Australia’s commitment to these ongoing conflicts matters little if perception of the wider campaign is increasingly negative.
As we have seen over the past years, the great work of Australians in Afghanistan does little to sway the public towards supporting the conflict if they believe, based on information presented into the Global Information Environment, that the conduct of wider Coalition campaign is flawed.

The information element of operations, in which media in the battlefield are but a part, was identified as a command issue more than a century ago. The relationship between the media and the army is clearly one between the journalist and the commander. If it was this clear in 1875, why have armies the world over invested in capabilities and processes to place a firewall between the commander and the media? Moving forward a century may provide an insight.

Populist opinion that media coverage lost the war in Vietnam for the United States and its allies has been the predominant thought in military environs through the decades that followed the war. The result of this thought has been the deliberate attempts to ‘manage’ media in the operational area as part of campaign planning and the employment of uniformed Public Affairs Officers to ‘deal’ with the media on behalf of commanders. A study of the approaches utilised during Grenada, Panama and the Gulf War of ’91 highlight the various attempts of the U.S military to gain ascendancy and control over journalists in the operational area.¹⁶ These approaches, essentially the implementation of access limitations and the use of authorised proxies to engage with the media, also served the Australian Army well during its early inception.

The Australian Army took an almost unique approach of forming a specialist Corps to perform this role. Army expected its Public Affairs Officers to ‘deal’ with the media and granted them freedom of action to do so long as it didn’t interfere with the real job of soldiering. Together with highly proficient NCOs, Army’s PR Corps (originally an adjunct of Royal Australian Army Education Corps, that has since 31 March, 1994 been known as the Australian Army Public Relations Service¹⁷) undertook a range of generally self-directed tasks to gather and provide product to their major customer, the Australian media. Public Affairs Officers were specifically recruited from among civilian media agencies as journalism qualifications were deemed essential if they were to build and maintain relationships with journalists. A civilian qualification was enough to see generations of uniformed Army Public Affairs Officers progress through the ranks as ‘specialists,’ many who had never completed any formal military training beyond an abbreviated induction (and some did not even do this). Even a cursory review of the revised AAPRS competency requirements published in 1999 highlights a significant shortfall in requiring officers to be anything more than a civilian Public Affairs specialist wearing a uniform. While the requirement to contribute to planning is acknowledged, competencies are heavily weighted towards executing public affairs activities. The result of the specialisation and focus on civilian equivalency led to the creation of a uniformed Army Public Affairs Officer who was neither 100 per cent military nor a member of the media. Surprisingly this approach was for the most part successful during the ‘80s and early ‘90s. That this just happened to coincide with that period in time when the ADF’s major activities were domestic exercises, not operations, is perhaps the single greatest factor in its success. The period is also characterised by communication technology that was only just starting to exponentially increase. The mainstream media’s wire and courier services up until the late ‘80s were not that different to those employed during Vietnam. The immediacy of communication encountered today was but a mere dream until the 1991 Gulf War/1993 Somalia intervention and their resultant ‘CNN Effect.’¹⁹ What the Army, and wider ADF, required of its uniformed Public Affairs Officers then and now have significantly changed yet for the most part Army is still recruiting and organisationally managing these personnel as it did in the ‘80s.
AAPRS – Mislabeled and Misused

The 2000 review of Defence’s Public Affairs capability sought to apply civilian best practice, centralised, strategically driven communications with key stakeholders, across Defence. The result, the Public Affairs and Corporate Communications Branch of the Department, encompassed all civilian and uniformed personnel working within the Public Affairs role. It took personnel from the Services, including the AAPRS Army personnel, and centralised them under a SES Band-1 Public Service officer in a Canberra-centric entity that was alternatively described as ‘making the leap from ‘managing public affairs’ to ‘shaping organisational communication’ by the authors of the strategy through to a “nightmare or worse” by the media that dealt with it day-to-day. Services lost the independence to operate in the information domain and despite assurances that the new organisation would seek to move beyond it, the transition to PACC increased organisational focus on media relations at the same time increasing complexity of the task by requiring a centralised approach. It is from these beginnings, the role of Army’s Public Affairs Officers has morphed. Policy implemented by PACC removed their ability to engage with the media and lessons from operations highlighted an increasing need to support operational commanders with specialist ‘information effects’ advice rather than just ‘media’ advice during planning and conduct of operations. AAPRS Officers moved from doing Public Relations to keep the Australian public informed about military activities and ‘dealing’ with the media, towards planning and conducting activities to create information effects in support of operations. They had, through natural evolution and operational demand, become staff officers on headquarters working to a commander’s intent rather than independent beings filling their days meeting media requirements.

This change in focus highlighted the significant shortfall in the management of the capability by Army. Military Public Affairs Officers were increasingly required to turn out complex staff documents and work within dynamic planning teams yet most had received little to no training in this role. Up until the introduction of the Army All-Corps Officer Training Continuum there was no requirement to attend the suite of Officer training Army requires of its General Service Officers and for a period, it was the author’s experience that Directorate of Officer Career Management actively discouraged attendance on courses, as it was not required for promotion. This led to a core of mid- to senior-level AAPRS officers with severely atrophied civilian skills and limited military ones. The job that they had been employed for had changed significantly and they were ill equipped to undertake it. The shortfall was evident in the perceived performance of many AAPRS officers employed in any role beyond media escort or liaison during the 2003 Op BASTILLE/FALCONER. Through no fault of their own, most simply did not have the skills required to operate in a high-stress, operationally focused, staff environment.

The Rise of IO

An associated factor in the lack of development within AAPRS is the rise of Information Operations in the ADF and its Allies during the late ‘90s. Australia, keen to embrace the concept,
relied almost solely on U.S. doctrine for the formalisation of the function. In doing so, it failed to recognise the impact of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which essentially forbids U.S. Government information activities that may influence the U.S. population. Correspondingly, the restrictions this act infers, coupled with self-imposed limitations following the organisation’s Vietnam experience has left the U.S. Military with a uniformed public affairs capability which actively seeks to distance itself from activities designed to generate effects in the information domain. These self-generated separations were famously highlighted in the 2004 Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Memo Policy on PA Relationship to IO, a direct result of the decision to consolidate the Information Operations, Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy functions in MNF-I under one commander and the more recent opposition to General McKiernan’s attempts to similarly merge the Public Affairs Office, and IO functions within ISAF headquarters. The result of the ADF’s reliance on U.S. doctrine has been threefold. Firstly, the role and function of a uniformed Military Public Affairs Officer in supporting information effects has become distorted. Years of educational exchange at U.S. Army colleges and institutions has created a cadre of senior Australian officers who naturally apply the same limitations on their return to the ADF, limiting the versatility of the developing AAPRS capability. Secondly, because our doctrine has been sourced from the U.S. it relies on an IO functional specialist to implement it. IO is not an Australian Army speciality, despite its recognition as a separate Battlefield Operating System, only recently renamed as Information Dominance and Influence. Finally, the lack of clarity in the doctrine and the sweeping changes across the field in recent years have left the capability open to exploitation by organisations and elements seeking to generate justification for activities. The term Information Operations is variously and incorrectly used across the ADF as a euphemism for Psychological Operations, Computer Network Operations and even Information Warfare. The 2009 Defence White Paper furthers the misconception by placing reference to developing Army’s IO capability within the very same sentence as enhancing intelligence capabilities. The Chief of Army added to this confusion by releasing a supporting Order of the Day that described “information operations specialists” as a “tactical intelligence capability.”

Information Operations 101” or “Busting the IO Myths

Despite the regularly reported mysticism incorrectly associated with it, IO, in the ADF context, is extremely straightforward. As the ADF definition clearly states, IO is simply a coordinating function. To take it further, IO coordinates and synchronises lethal and non-lethal effects during both planning and execution in support of a main effort. IO, in the Australian context, doesn’t actually do anything beyond tying together a range of disparate
activity to generate targeted effects in either the physical, information or cognitive domains – preferably all three. It is impossible to ‘IO a target’ in the same way that it is impossible to ‘Mobility and Survivability’ one. IO, or in Australian Army lexicon, Information Dominance and Influence, is simply one of the eight Battlefield Operating Systems that Army commanders should consider in operations. It is in essence an operational-level planning function that requires a strong understanding of the complex environments that the ADF routinely operates in and the wide variety of capabilities on offer to commanders.

Importantly, however IO is not conducted at the operational level in isolation. In the ADF, IO planning is supported by two key documents; a Whole-of-Government Strategic Communications Guidance and targeting guidance. The Strategic Communications Guidance, an output of an interdepartmental committee, provides IO planners with agreed limits, a strategic narrative and broad themes and messages for activities within the information domain and the targeting guidance provides formal authority to implement and restrictions on the conduct of information actions. Actually carrying out the information effect tasking is, generally, a tactical activity, which is well covered within Army’s new doctrine Information Actions.

It is also important to recognise that IO does not do anything by itself. IO planning supports the main effort as defined by a commander and is managed and executed by the operations branch of a headquarters. IO-trained personnel supporting the execution of a plan are working to the principal Operations Officer and ultimately, the Commander. To not integrate the IO capability into the operations function is tantamount to ignoring doctrine that seeks coordination across the Battlespace Operating Systems. The Operations cell, through its IO specialists, coordinates the activities of all Information Actions task elements in accordance with the plan or the Commander’s direction. This is no different to the Operations cell mobility and survivability or combat service support specialist coordinating the activities of the tactical elements within their relevant Battlefield Operating System.

If IO only coordinates activities and is working to the principle Plans Officer or Operations Officer, why would the Army actually need specialists in this field? The answer is summed up well in Adaptive Campaigning 2009:

“Influencing public perceptions of battlefield events will become both more important and more difficult. Commanders even at lower levels may find themselves as concerned with shaping the narrative of those events as with planning and conducting the operations that produce them.”

A commander would not think to go to war without officers in logistics, communications or offensive support to advise him, yet when it comes to the Information Dominance and Influence Battlefield Operating System we are stuck in paradigm that provides a range of insular information task elements all operating within the Global Information Environment but no trained, qualified and practised officer to coordinate them. The author’s experience has been that a trained and dedicated IO planner on any operational headquarters is an extremely valuable commodity to the commander. It is also the author’s experience that an untrained officer purporting to be an IO planner is disruptive and ultimately dangerous to both the mission and the force.

The Current Reality

Plans developed within the Information Dominance and Influence Battlefield Operating System, are severely constrained...
by policy, procedures and command decisions developed by operational commanders, policy advisors and the Australian Government. Neither the Information Actions task elements nor the IO planner have the freedom of action to implement tactics, techniques and procedures to engage in the Global Information Environment to generate and sustain the “Dominant Narrative” under the current manifestation of policy. The Army and ADF ethos of “Mission Command” remains almost impossible to invoke for operations within the Global Information Environment because of the constraints and limitations placed on the ADF as a whole. These constraints and limitations are in part, a direct response to the impact the “Strategic Corporal” can play on today’s battlefields and the immediacy of modern media capabilities. This issue, and associated concerns such as the centralisation of product approval, are well documented in the U.S. military because of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is the author’s opinion that instead of adjusting to the new environment in order to exploit all that it offers, the ADF and Government has instead sought to tightly control and restrict activities that occur within it. Mission Command, or in the very least a strong intent to apply Mission Command, is alive and well in every Battlefield Operating System with the exception of Information Dominance and Influence. The ideals presented within Adaptive Campaigning 2009 will be difficult to achieve unless an understanding of coordinating the total information capability is improved and a better understanding of the Global Information Environment is developed throughout the ADF. A key element of this must be professionalising the Army’s IO capability.

Building a professional Army IO Capability

The Australian Army, unlike its US ally, does not currently have a professional career stream for IO officers. It does have a range of IO task elements within various Corps and organisations that allow junior officer specialisation such as Psychological Operations within Intelligence and Computer Network Operations and Electronic Warfare within Signals. In addition, Civil Military Cooperation draws personnel from across the Army as has Military Public Affairs in recent years. Army currently has a core group of individual specialists but only very few that have broadened their skills across a range of IO task elements. The author’s experience on operations is that an IO generalist, someone with training across several disciplines and exposure too many more, supported by specific IO and operational planning training, is always better than a task specialist that is simply thrust into the role. During the existence of MNF-I Strat-Com in 2004, the planning cell included both individual specialists and IO generalists. Their background was readily reflected in the breadth of the planning that was performed by the individuals. Excellence in the Information Dominance and Influence Battlefield Operating System requires coordination of all available assets with a scheme of manoeuvre. It also requires the ability to synchronise tactical actions to generate effects both inside an area of operations. Incorporation of strategic requirements into an operational-level IO plan is critical for success.

This requirement brings today’s evolved Military Public Affairs Officer to the fore. Recognising the increasing need to support Army’s requirements into the future, today’s AAPRS Officers have moved to militarily professionalise their capability. The All Corps Officer Training Continuum formalised a process that was for the most part occurring since 2003 among some AAPRS officers with all Army Military Public Affairs Officers now required to attend Grade 3, the complete Grade 2 and compete for Grade 1 Command and Staff Course selection. In addition, a training continuum has sought to maximise the focus on support to operational planning by completing a range of Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre Planning Courses, including mandatory attendance on Introduction to Joint Warfare and Joint Operations Plans Course as well as the Information Operations Staff Officers Course. Selected Officers complete the Psychological Operations Staff Officers Course, the Civil Military Co-Operation Planners Course, the Joint Targeting Course and the Special Operations Plans Course. Several also complete training in US or other allied institutions in relevant IO and targeting fields. In addition, they usually hold post-graduate organisational communication qualifications by the time they are promoted to Major (O4). Interestingly it is only Army that has formalised this structure. RAAF and Navy Military Public Affairs Officers do not complete the range of military specific training now required of their Army counterparts unless they are selected for operational service in a specific role. For the most part, RAAF and Navy require only a media operations function and achieve this by attracting working journalists for reserve service. By the time, Army’s AAPRS officers reach Major (O4) they have usually worked at Division headquarters or higher, and have joint staff experience at HQ JOC. Their exposure to levels of planning, and the requirements for operations in the Global Information Environment from strategic influences through to tactical actions is unparalleled. An AAPRS Officer, shaped by their formative experiences, brings information planning reality to the Information Dominance and Influence domain. They, more than most, are aware of the impact of perceptions and approach all planning with a view towards the second and third order effects of proposed actions across the complete information environment, not just in the tactical area. They’re also highly cognisant of the highly topical line in the sand when it comes to generating communication that Public Affairs will lose credibility if it works with IO because it is associated with deception planning or psychological operations directed at the adversary loses relevance because one of the people developing the plan is inherently aware of the constraints and limitations in employing the capability. It is in effect no different to an offensive support planner utilising different ammunition natures for different targets. More relevant is the fact that the Public Affairs approach, under current policy is actually executed by the commander or their designate and not the Military Public Affairs Officer. Their actual interaction with the media is now almost solely limited to escort tasks so the credibility argument becomes invalid. Most importantly, recent history proves that this level of integration and coordination is highly successful. The information successes in the 2004 Op AL FAJR to secure Fallujah are directly attributable to the level of coordination that was achieved in MNF-I Strat-Com, working with its subordinate and superior headquarters, and the execution of that plan under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff Strategic Operations. For the first time in the campaign, an adversary spokesperson admitted to losing the “media battle.” The dominant narrative had been generated and sustained by the Coalition and the Iraqi Government.

This shift in focus from media relations towards holistic and coordinated communications campaigns is not unique to the ADF. Australian and International Universities are predominantly offering post-graduate communications courses to expand a civilian Public Relations’ practitioner’s scope beyond media relations and crisis communications.
The Charles Sturt University course focuses on “a world-class learning experience for communication professionals to develop their communication management and strategic skills,” and includes topics on strategy planning, research and communication audits, stakeholder engagement, crisis and issues management, culture and integrated communication. Similarly, the School of Communication at the University of Leeds in the United Kingdom recognises the importance of coordination in its Masters-level program in international communication that seeks to integrate theory and applied knowledge across a range of aspects for a communication effect. No longer are civilian Public Relations personnel simply focused on one area of communication. They seek to utilise all available elements to support their parent organisation’s raison d’être. The development path of Army’s AAPRS officers has taken a similar approach. They are now, more than ever, organisational communicators with a range of skills well beyond media management.

Problems associated with sustaining a small IO capability have often been cited as reasons why the Army has not sought to create a career field in this area. Generally, other specialists in IO disciplines have a career path that is managed through to the Army’s senior ranks, if they so choose, by drawing on their parent Corps. An Army Psychological Operations specialist for example continues with a career in intelligence long after their time at 2nd Intelligence Company is finished. Career Management of AAPRS officers is not that simple. Once they have completed their junior postings as a Lieutenant and junior Captain they are locked into a career progression that for the most part removes them from Army. Presently there are only six Major and three Lieutenant Colonel positions for the Regular Army members of the Corps. The opportunity to stream into and out of the IO field, competing against other qualified Army and ADF personnel enhances the sustainably of AAPRS in addition to providing a valuable commodity to Army and the wider ADF.

The Chief of Army’s recently released directive on an Officer Career Pathway Strategy may provide a vehicle to achieve the growth and maintenance of a small group of IO generalists to support Army’s Information Dominance and Influence requirements and the ADF’s ongoing planning capability. By offering an IO generalist streaming option at senior Captain (03) or Major (04), Army’s requirement to fill IO plans and operations functions on Brigade, Divisional, and Command staffs and to provide suitably qualified and experienced personnel for Joint and Combined operations is dramatically improved. With a clear streaming option, comes a training burden but for the most part the personnel seeking to stream into this area would already have completed several of the required courses and should possess strong tactical experience with at least one IO task element. To be successful, Army should be seeking to create an IO generalist, an officer with a strong planning background with training in and exposure to the widest variety of IO task elements. At present Army, officers that fit this requirement are extremely limited and despite strong operational experiences while attached to coalition partners are all but forgotten in terms of this capability on their return to Australia. It is recognised that not every AAPRS officer will want to stream down the IO path and the author argues that simply embracing the opportunity the evolved AAPRS career model offers is not the best solution. Many took on the role as Military Public Affairs Officers because they enjoy the media aspects of the role and are comfortable fulfilling that role. It is envisioned however that with a generation of AAPRS officers who are meeting the requirements of the All-Corps Officer Training Continuum and the AAPRS internal qualification requirements, the desire to be seen as more than just a Public Affairs Officer is increasing. In addition, AustInt, RASigs and other Corps’ contain experienced officers that would willingly form the cadre of the new-streamed capability. Moreover, if the Army is to be truly adaptive, they should form this cadre to develop and enhance what is a poorly managed and
misunderstood capability. The key to providing the capability required of the Adaptive Army is to clearly focus on individual talent and experience and maximise its use for the betterment of the organisation as whole. The IO stream can’t be seen as an opportunity for those not progressing in their parent corps. It has to offer a growth from those involved in the development and delivery of tactical information effects towards generalisation as a competent IO planning officer.

Conclusion

In his paper on “Rethinking IO”38 the U.S. Army’s retired Brigadier General Wass de Czege states “lessons from commercial advertising are not necessarily as directly applicable as some practitioners in the field believe. Soldiers and Marines are not selling soap.”39 His assessment rings true when considering how the AAPRS capability has developed over the past decade. It has sought to become more military and less civilian and for the most part has achieved that. The AAPRS, in spite of its size, organisational perspectives and tempo has developed well beyond what the Army originally envisioned for the specialist capability. Restructures and reviews have consistently adjusted internal structures and requirements but for the most part, Army is still managing its Global Information Environment specialists as it did in the ‘80s. The Army Public Relations Officer of a decade ago bears little resemblance to the capability that exists in a Military Public Affairs Officer of today.

The recent adoption of the All Corps Officer Training Continuum, the release of Adaptive Campaigning and the 2009 Defence White Paper all provide the impetus for the Army to holistically review its individual information capabilities and identify a way to provide the subject matter expertise in the Information Dominance and Influence Battlespace. Expanding the role of a ready pool of trained specialists in this area is a relatively easy solution to getting the task underway.

Footnotes:

2. Op Cit, p 1.
3. Ibid.
4. The single reportable metric from Defence Public Affairs provides information concerning responsiveness to media enquiries using the journalist-defined timeframe as the critical success criteria.
5. The Global Information Environment was defined by ABCA in 2001 as “processes and systems that are often beyond the direct influence of the military, but which may directly impact on the success or failure of military operations.” The term has been removed from the latest edition of the Coalition Operations Handbook but remains useful to describe the environment.
Australia.

7. "Information Warfare: like its counterpart ‘Command & Control Warfare’ is a term that has been usurped in Allied military doctrine by ‘Information Operations’ since early in this decade.

8. The Dominant Narrative is defined in Adaptive Campaigning – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept 2009 as “the fundamental story or perception that has been established as valid in the minds of members of one or more target audiences.”

9. The Information Actions Line of Operations is described in Adaptive Campaigning – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept 2009 as “actions that inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour, and understanding of target population groups; assure the quality of our own information; while attempting to disrupt or dislocate enemy command capabilities.”


13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.


17. PACC, 2000, “Annex B Competencies Required of Specialist PAs” Enhancing the Military Public Affairs Capability in the ADF, Canberra ACT 2600.

18. The CNN Effect is described in Livingston, S, 1997. Clarifying The CNN Effect: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention retrieved 06 June, 2009 from http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/publications/papers/research_papers/18 Livingston pdf (as “1) a policy agenda-setting agent, 2) an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals, and 3) an accelerant to policy decision making” that is direct result of two significant changes in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s “One is the end of the Cold War. With its passing the United States lacks an evident rationale to protect and enhance our decision making and actions in support of national interests.”


30. Mission Command is defined in LWD 0.0 Command, Leadership and Management as “a philosophy of command and a system for conducting operations in which subordinates are given a clear indication by a superior of his/her intentions. The result required, the task, the resources and any constraints are clearly enunciated; however, subordinates are allowed the freedom to decide how to achieve the required result.” Adaptive Campaigning – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept takes the Mission Command philosophy one step further stating “Subordinate commanders are also expected to exert themselves in command, seeking opportunities to proactively further the commander’s intent without waiting for formal orders.”

31. This term is described in ADDP 00.6 Leadership in the Australian Defence Force as “... the ‘strategic corporal’ operating in an environment of immediate and long-range media coverage. It is not so much that every corporal has the desire to lead strategically and shape the ADF’s capability, but rather every corporal can have a strategic effect with modern communication tools and the global presence of the media mean that the effects of tactical leadership decisions can have strategic consequences.”

32. A brief overview of how the information campaign was coordinated during Op AL FAJR can be found in Molan, J, 2008. Running the War in Iraq, Harper Collins, Sydney NSW. pp 164-222.


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