THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE: AN OPERATIONAL TRANSFORMATION

BY

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The Army National Guard and Army Reserve: An Operational Transformation

The current level of foreign and domestic operational demands exceed the available supply of Active Component forces and these demands will not decrease in the foreseeable future. In order to sufficiently meet the current and future operational demands, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of the Army (DA) must transform the ARNG and USAR from a Strategic reserve to an Operational Reserve. This transformation requires fundamental reforms in Reserve Components (RC) homeland defense/homeland security roles and missions; personnel management systems, equipping and training policies, family and employer support policies, the organizations and structures used to manage the RC, and funding. The Department of the Army, the ARNG, and the USAR all fundamentally agree on the general definition of an Operational Reserve. However, there is not a consensus on the detailed objectives and metrics necessary to achieve the desired end state. This is one of several issues currently impeding progress in achieving this objective. The Department of the Army, the ARNG, and the USAR collectively must clearly define the specific attributes of an Operational Reserve to include the appropriate employment, support policies and resources. This paper will examine the work that DA has completed thus far. It will identify the strengths and weaknesses of the work as well as outline some detailed measurable attributes of an Operational Reserve. It will conclude with some specific changes DA must implement to the process and process oversight structure to achieve these objectives.
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by

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The Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) are an integral element of the total force and employed as an Operational force since Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), while resourced as a Strategic reserve. The current level of foreign and domestic operational demands exceed the available supply of Active Component forces and these demands will not decrease in the foreseeable future. In order to sufficiently meet the current and future operational demands, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of the Army (DA) must transform the ARNG and USAR from a Strategic reserve to an Operational Reserve. This transformation requires fundamental reforms in Reserve Components (RC) homeland defense/ homeland security roles and missions; personnel management systems, equipping and training policies, family and employer support policies, the organizations and structures used to manage the RC, and funding. The Department of the Army, the ARNG, and the USAR all fundamentally agree on the general definition of an Operational Reserve. However, there is not a consensus on the detailed objectives and metrics necessary to achieve the desired end state. This is one of several issues currently impeding progress in achieving this objective. The Department of the Army, the ARNG, and the USAR collectively must clearly define the specific attributes of an Operational Reserve to include the appropriate employment, support policies and resources. This paper will examine the work that DA has completed thus far. It will identify the strengths and weaknesses of the work as well as outline some detailed measureable attributes of an Operational Reserve. It will conclude with some specific changes DA must implement to the process and process oversight structure to achieve these objectives.
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Transformation is a holistic effort encompassing how the Army fights, trains, modernizes, develops leaders, bases forces and supports Soldiers, Families and Civilians. It includes growing and modernizing the Army, developing agile, adaptive leaders and especially adapting the Reserve Components, but in an operational roll for which they were neither designed nor resourced. They are no longer a strategic reserve mobilized only in national emergencies. They are now an operational reserve, deployed on a cyclical basis to allow us to sustain extended operations. Operationalizing the Reserve Components will require national and state consensus as well as continued commitment from employers, Soldiers and Families. It will require changes to the way we train, equip, resource and mobilize, and also administrative policies. We owe it to them to make this transition rapidly.¹

--Gen. George W. Casey, Jr.
Chief of Staff of the Army

Introduction

The Reserve Component (RC) is an integral element of the Total Force and employed as an operational force since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, utilizing the Strategic Reserve strategy of tiered resourcing. Today, the Army is less than 40 percent of its size 35 years ago, and the Nation’s operational demand for an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) is unprecedented. Many of the Army’s key capabilities are in the RC. The RC contains 42 percent of the AC’s combat forces, 66 percent of the AC’s combat support forces, and 71 percent of the AC’s combat service support forces.²

The Nation has engaged in a protracted conflict with a persistent threat since the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) resulting from 9/11 necessitated paradigm shifts in the way the Army conducts operations. It became crucial for the Department of the Army (DA) to adapt the longstanding relationships between the AC and the RC to restore balance and ensure total force utilization to meet the demands of this new strategic environment. The high level of foreign and domestic operational demands since 9/11 significantly exceeded the available supply of AC forces. According to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) in this era of persistent conflict these demands will not decrease in the foreseeable future.³ In order to sufficiently meet these current and future
operational requirements, Department of Defense (DoD) and DA increased the use of the RC. Now more than ever, the RC is an integral part of the Nation’s national defense.

The increase in operational demands brings new challenges for the RC. The Strategic reserve resourcing strategy of tiered readiness requires the RC to cross-level equipment to ensure deploying RC units are resourced to meet wartime readiness levels. Cross-leveling equipment decrements equipment readiness levels for the donor units. In 2006, equipment on hand (EOH) availability readiness levels declined to approximately 40 percent of equipment available and improved to 77 percent as of March 2009.

Since 9/11, the ARNG and USAR mobilized over 500,000 personnel. The requirement to cross level personnel to deploying RC units has increased with each subsequent mobilization since 9/11. The USAR has cross leveled 62 percent of their Soldiers from RC donor units to RC deploying units for the most recent rotations compared to 6 percent in fiscal year 2002, a 56 percent increase in seven years.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is a critical dual ARNG mission. Decremented equipment and personnel readiness levels influences the capability of the ARNG to successfully execute domestic missions without relying upon Interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreements. EMAC agreements offer state-to-state assistance during governor-declared states of emergency. However, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau pledged to Governors that 50 percent of Army and Air Guard forces will be available at all times to perform state missions.

The SECDEF directed 12 month mobilization policy implemented in January 2007 led to more frequent deployments and training periods. The revised policy actually increases stress and decreases predictability for citizen Soldiers, families and employers. Soldiers prefer to be away from home for a single longer period of time rather than many shorter periods of time.

The DoD Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 conducted in 1999 established RC full-time manning levels based on a Strategic reserve. The current manning levels established by the study are funded at 70 percent of the required level and are not sufficient to support an Operational Reserve. The RC full-time staff met the high foreign and domestic operational requirements through the use of Active Duty Operational Support – Reserve Components (ADOS-RC) soldiers and Temporary Civil
Service Technicians bridging the full-time manning shortfalls. Funding for this temporary manpower is dependent upon supplemental funding. This system assisted the RC with meeting the operational requirements, but the Army cannot continue to depend on temporary funding to achieve its mission during this era of persistent conflict.

This increased use of the RC demonstrated the “Cold War” Strategic reserve model is no longer feasible. By embracing the transformed paradigm, DoD and DA abandoned the Strategic reserve notion of only mobilizing the RC in times of national emergency and replaced it with a more sophisticated concept to produce new capacities to preserve those qualities essential for national security. The current challenges facing DoD and DA on the operational transformation are the institutional, policy, and systemic resource changes and procedures. These changes are necessary to ensure a sustainable and ready force capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict and to successfully transition the RC to an Operational Reserve.

One issue currently impeding progress in achieving this objective is clearly defining an Operational Reserve in terms of detailed objectives and the metrics necessary to successfully transition the RC to an Operational Reserve. The DA, the ARNG, and the USAR all fundamentally agree on the general definition of an Operational Reserve. However, there is not a consensus on the detailed objectives and metrics necessary to achieve the desired end state. DoD, DA, the ARNG, the USAR and the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC) have all scripted versions of the general definition of an Operational Reserve. However, there is no consensus on the methods to achieve the end state. There are additional versions of the definition but they are currently internal documents and not available for publication. It is unrealistic to employ the RC as an Operational Reserve, and hold their parent Services responsible for ensuring this, without DoD clearly defining an Operational Reserve and how it will be utilized. It is imperative the DA, the ARNG, and the USAR collectively identify specific objectives and metrics necessary to transition the RC to an Operational Reserve. When the specific objectives and metrics are clearly defined then resource requirements can be accurately identified, a transformation plan can be implemented and a funding strategy developed.

This paper will examine the work that DA has completed thus far. It will identify the strengths and weaknesses of the work as well as outline some detailed measureable
attributes of an Operational Reserve. It will also outline some specific changes DA must implement to the process and process oversight structure to achieve these objectives.

**Definitions**

DoD struggled to develop a definition of an Operational Reserve. The current DoD definition does not provide answers to the following questions: What missions will the RC perform in their operational and strategic roles? What resources and equipment will the RC receive to ensure a ready force capable of executing foreign and domestic operational demands? What can combatant commanders, RC services, citizen soldiers, families, and civilian employers anticipate in terms of deployment predictability? The current definition does not answer these questions; nor does it provide the way ahead for fundamental reforms in RC homeland defense/homeland security (HLD/HLS) roles and missions; personnel management systems, equipping and training policies, family and employer support policies, the organizations and structures used to manage the reserve components, or funding.

**Strategic Reserve**

A Strategic reserve was a force mobilized for “total war” against a Cold War adversary for the duration plus six months without a rotation. The Strategic reserve required the AC to begin the fight without them which allowed ample time to alert, train, and deploy the ARNG and USAR forces. Throughout the Cold War, the role of the citizen-soldier was twofold. First, the citizen Soldier would transition to active duty in the event that a major war proved to be longer or more difficult than originally envisioned by the nation’s leaders. Short of a major war, citizen Soldiers were “weekend warriors” and were rarely called upon to serve alongside their AC counterparts. It was further understood a call-up was an infrequent occurrence and a period of time would allow the reserves into the fight. The assumption underlying this model was the Army would not need the force until months after the initial hostilities occurred. This assumption held until after the Vietnam War. The Strategic reserve was tied to contingency plans developed by the Army. Reserve component units included in the war plans received the most resources under the “first to fight” funding rule, but many RC units did not even appear in the plans. Virtually all RC units were funded and equipped at lower levels than their AC counterparts. This employment framework construct provided minimal
equipment to train the RC forces in order save additional equipping costs. It accepted the risk of not fully equipping the force, with the understanding the equipment would come during the units’ train-up prior to deployment.23

**Operational Reserve**

The DoD Directive 1200.17 dated October 29, 2008 defines Operational Reserve as providing:

Operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, the RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans.24 Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, the service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy.25 As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.26

The ARNG defines Operational Reserve as a:

Reserve of operational capabilities organized and resourced in a recurrent predictable cycle to support Army requirements, in peace and war; an Operational Reserve Force is fully manned, equipped and trained to provide ready units across the full spectrum of operations.27

The USAR defines Operational Reserve as:

A reserve of operational capabilities organized and resourced to support the Army’s full spectrum requirements. An operational force manned, equipped and trained to provide ready units to meet combatant command requirements in a recurrent, predictable cycle.”28 The difference between the two RC definitions is the ARNG clearly defines fully manned, equipped and trained as 100 percent in each readiness category.29

The Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC) defines Operational Reserve as:

A military organization composed of RC units and Soldiers resourced to provide capabilities to the Army, and when required to Civil Authorities. Man, equip, and train units to support a recurrent and predictable cycle. Units are resourced to attain and maintain at least 95 percent available trained personnel; 90 percent of mission essential equipment at the Available Phase (in accordance with ARFORGEN and the Army Equipping Strategy); collective training at company level, or higher, prior to mobilization. Operational reserve units should be available for mobilization and deployment in a Title 10 United States Code status
once every six years (1:5), but not more than once every four years (1:3) to provide ready units across the full spectrum of operations. Defense operations in support to Civil Authorities are an enduring mission.  

The Reserve Components Prior to and after 9/11

During the Cold War the RC principally operated as a force in reserve. Members generally served 39 days a year—one weekend a month and an additional two weeks, typically during the summer. If a major war broke out, it was expected that the Reserves would be called upon to augment the active forces in an operational role, principally in combat support or combat service support, and the mobilization lead time would likely be months, not weeks or days. The RC was not utilized on a large scale for much of the period after the Vietnam War until the summer of 1990, when President George H.W. Bush called-up the RC as the US military prepared to execute Operation Desert Storm. Large numbers of RC forces were engaged. They deployed quickly, early in the conflict, alongside the AC forces, performing the entire spectrum of operations. The RC proved effective in their operational role during this conflict. However, the Strategic reserve role of the RC continued to prevail due principally to the relative short duration of the war.

The use of RC personnel in substantial numbers in the first Gulf War initially appeared to be the exception and not the rule in deploying RC forces in significant numbers to support foreign operational requirements. The fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War eliminated one of the principal motivations for both a Strategic Reserve and a large AC force. The US entered into an era of virtual strategic calm and policymakers prematurely began to focus on reductions in defense spending and decreasing the size of the military in order to address and resource the nation’s domestic agenda. These actions became known as “Peace Dividends” which was a political slogan popularized by US President George H.W. Bush to describe the economic and domestic benefits of a decrease in defense spending.

Conflict and instability soon erupted in Kuwait, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. As a result, the RC was mobilized and deployed to serve in operational roles in these areas throughout the 1990s. The events of September 11, 2001 produced a dramatic paradigm shift in how DoD and DA employs the RC. Since 9/11 the Nation has been engaged in a protracted conflict with a persistent threat. Effects of the “Peace Dividends” of the 1990s on the military were not fully realized until after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
The reductions in defense spending, the drawdown in military forces and tiered readiness had an immediate and significant impact on how the US responded to this persistent threat. The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) brought significant changes in the way the Army fights. The surge of operational requirements immediately following 9/11 far exceeded the capacity of AC forces to react without utilizing the RC as part of the operational force. These terrorist attacks were the first significant events that demonstrated the Strategic reserve strategy was neither feasible nor suitable to meet the operational demands of an unpredictable environment. It became imperative for DoD and DA to reexamine the long standing relationships between the AC and the RC to ascertain how to meet the demands of this new strategic environment. Since 9/11, the ARNG and USAR had mobilized 506,277 personnel in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM as shown in Figure 1 below.

In addition to these operations, the ARNG and USAR supported both contingency and domestic operations in Kosovo, Africa, Sinai, Central America, and the US. This information confirms the nation’s dependence on the RC as an Operational Reserve in this era of persistent conflict.

Figure 1. ARNG and USAR personnel activated since 9/11/2001
Analysis: Progress of the RC Operational Transformation

The use of the ARNG and USAR since 9/11 and the subsequent transition to an Operational Reserve raised concerns from Congress, senior DoD and DA leadership, senior ARNG and USAR leadership, and state Governors. In order to answer these concerns, Congress and DoD directed the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), the RAND Corporation, think tanks and independent commissions to conduct studies to address the concerns associated with transforming the RC from a Strategic to an Operational Reserve. In 2005, Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 established an independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR). Congress charged the Commission with recommending any needed changes in law and policy to ensure the National Guard and Reserves were organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the national security requirements of the United States. The CNGR released two interim reports before submitting a final report to Congress and the SECDEF in 2008. The report contained six major conclusions and 95 recommendations, supported by 163 findings. The SECDEF accepted 57 of 95 CNGR recommendations.

The CNGR concluded there was no reasonable alternative to the nation’s continued increased reliance on the RC as part of its operational force to meet current and future foreign and domestic requirements. First, Congress and DoD should unequivocally acknowledge the need for, and should create, an Operational Reserve. Second, Congress and DoD must modify, change existing laws, policies, and regulations as well as introducing new legislation in order to place the RC on a sustainable path as part of the operational force. Third, this new legislation should address homeland defense/homeland security roles and missions, personnel management systems, equipping and training policies, family and employer support policies, the organizations and structures used to manage the reserve components, and funding. These significant changes to law and policy are necessary in order to realize the full potential of the RC to serve this nation and reverse the existing adverse trends in readiness and capabilities.

The CSA, GEN George Casey, established seven Army Initiatives and working groups to tackle the problems associated with these initiatives. The seven initiatives are:

(1) Grow the Army.
(2) Enhance support to Soldiers and families.
(3) Modernize the force.
(4) Transition the RC to an Operational Reserve.
(5) Develop leaders.
(6) Adapt institutional policies, programs, and procedures.
(7) Build strategic communications capability.\(^{41}\)

**Army Initiative #4 (AI4)**

The fourth initiative of transitioning the RC to an Operational Reserve became AI4 which focused on transforming the RC from a Strategic to an Operational Reserve. The purpose of AI4 was to outline changes to statutes, policies and resourcing required to increase readiness and facilitate the transition of the RC to an operational force ready to meet evolving global requirements. The CSA tasked Headquarters, United States Forces Command (FORSCOM) as the lead agent in developing a concept plan for the operational transformation. The concept plan focused on the essential tasks and paradigm changes required to effectively operationalize the RC while preserving a Citizen-Soldier Ethos for the 21\(^{st}\) Century and closely paralleled the final findings and recommendations of the CNGR.\(^{42}\) The Concept Plan served as the formal instrument to facilitate a battle handover of AI4 to DA for the development an action plan, implementation and execution.\(^{43}\)

DA formed a task force known as AI4 Task Force (AI4TF) to review the concept plan. The mission of AI4TF was planning, organizing, recommending policies, priorities, resourcing requirements, and synchronizing the Army’s efforts to transition the RC to an Operational Reserve.\(^{44}\) Their key task was developing a comprehensive, coordinated Army implementation plan to execute the transformation of the RC from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve. The AI4TF worked collaboratively with the DA directorates, the ARNG and the USAR to develop the strategic plan. The scope, breadth and depth of the AI4TF mission expanded significantly.\(^{45}\) Despite the many challenges, the AI4TF produced six essential tasks or recommendations to successfully transform the RC to an Operational Reserve as shown in Figure 2 below.\(^{46}\)
DA dissolved the AI4TF after they accomplished the mission they were charged to complete. The AI4 implementation responsibility and oversight transferred to the Office of the Director of the Army Staff (DAS). The DAS assigned the six essential tasks to the appropriate Army Staff (ARSTAFF) Directorates for developing recommendations, implementation plans and identifying resources. The DAS conducts an AI4 Operational Reserve Update Brief to the CSA or Vice Chief of the Army (VCSA) quarterly but the process in which the DAS tracks the ARSTAFF’s progress on these tasks is unclear.\textsuperscript{47}

There are arguments on both sides as to whether or not dissolving the AI4TF was premature. Some leaders in DA say the AI4TF accomplished their mission.\textsuperscript{48} There are others who argue the AI4TF still had a significant amount of work remaining in transforming the RC to an Operational Reserve and should not stand down until the RC was operational as defined by the CNGR.\textsuperscript{49} The subject matter expertise, synergy and focus lost when the AI4TF dissolved negatively impacted the momentum of the operational transformation. The DA Directorates now charged with executing the transformation are not specifically focused on the transformation, lack the subject matter expertise and must retrace paths the AI4TF has already taken.

\textbf{Figure 2. AI4 Six Essential Tasks.}
Adapt Pre and Post-mobilization Training Cycles (PPMT)

The Army lacks a sustainable mobilization process that enhances the employment of a fully operational RC as part of the total force. DA needs to reevaluate how to mobilize, train and deploy sizeable numbers of RC personnel on a continuous basis during protracted operations. The current modified policies, practices and resourcing supporting RC mobilization accomplished the mission for the past eight years but are not sustainable. Supplemental funding provided the resources with no fiscal accountability. Voluntary personnel from operational units provided the ad-hoc generation force resulting in possible degraded readiness in the donor units. Failure to transform mobilization operations degrades the Army’s ability to maximize RC employment in theater Boots-On-The-Ground (BOG) increases stress on the force by reducing dwell times, threatens our AVF and severely challenges restoration of balance.\(^\text{50}\)

The GAO stated in a recent report:

The Army is changing the organization and missions of some of its reserve units to provide more operational forces, and is increasing their personnel and equipment, but faces challenges in achieving the predictable and sustainable mobilization cycle envisioned for an operational force, primarily due to the high pace of operation. In the past, RC forces often required significant time after mobilization to prepare individuals and units for deployment. However, the Army is continuing to need to improve readiness after mobilization by addressing medical and dental issues, or transferring personnel and equipment from non-deployed units to fill shortfalls. Until demand eases, it seems unlikely the Army will be able to achieve the mobilization cycle it initially envisioned or the reserves.\(^\text{51}\)

FORSCOM formally requested DA establish a Mobilization Tiger Team (MT2) to conduct a deliberate mission analysis, planning effort, and holistic assessment of mobilization infrastructure, organizations and command relationships.\(^\text{52}\) The MT2 plan establishes eight primary Force Generation Installations (FGI), six secondary FGIs, 12 contingency FGIs and a blended generation force of AC, ARNG and USAR personnel to support RC post-mobilization training. In accordance with current statutes and regulations the ARNG and USAR senior leadership will continue to validate unit pre-mobilization training and readiness levels. FORSCOM will continue to utilize First U.S. Army as the executive agent to validate ARNG units post-mobilization while those units are in a Title 10 status. The VCSA approved this Army initiative and specified that MT2
efforts would complement ongoing AI4 initiatives to operationalize the RC in order to maximize BOG time in theater and increasing dwell time for the operational forces.\textsuperscript{53} The MT2 plan requires changes in organizations, operations, permanent manning, infrastructure, command relationships/authorities and funding necessary to sustain enduring mobilization in an era of persistent conflict.\textsuperscript{54} The MT2 plan requires First Army as the executive agent to validate RC post-mobilization training to undergo a major transformation and re-balancing of its infrastructure and personnel requirements within the Army Campaign Plan and the ARFORGEN process. The First Army transformation is necessary to effectively support the primary and secondary FGIIs in order enhance efficiency and effectiveness of mobilization operations. However, the MT2 plan and First Army transformation requires significant additional resources from DA during a time of constrained federal government funding and are contingent upon receiving the additional resources from DA.\textsuperscript{55} What is the FORSCOM and First Army contingency plan if the required resources to execute the transformation and the MT2 plan are not available?

**AI4 Operational Force Model**

The AI4 Operational Force Model shown in Figure 3 below is a resourcing model that allows RC units four years of Reset, Train/Ready followed by one year of availability for mobilization.\textsuperscript{56}

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### Operational Force Model (AI4)

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<th>Reset</th>
<th>Train/Ready 1</th>
<th>Train/Ready 2</th>
<th>Train/Ready 3</th>
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<td>Unit Training Assemblies: (Days)</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>ARNG: 27.5 / USAR: 24</td>
<td>ARNG: 27.5 / USAR: 24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Additional Active Duty Training Days:</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>ARNG: 19 / USAR: 17</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Annual Training Days:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Legend for the Pie Charts:
- Red: Training (T)
- Green: Personnel (P)
- Blue: Equipment on Hand (S)

### Revised Operational Force Model

<table>
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<th>Reset</th>
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<th>Train/Ready 2</th>
<th>Train/Ready 3</th>
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<td>RC ARFORGEN Rotational Readiness Model</td>
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<td>Annual Training Days:</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend for the Pie Charts:
- Red: Training (T)
- Green: Personnel (P)
- Blue: Equipment on Hand (S)

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Figure 3. AI4 Operational Force Model.
This model organizes units in various stages of readiness. Reserve component units in the Reset and Train/Ready cycles provide the strategic capability and flexibility to respond to Homeland Defense/ Homeland Security (HLD/HLS), Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) and State mission requirements. However, the level of capability and flexibility is degraded due to the availability of equipment in these cycles. This model conflicts with the current Army Equipping Strategy which states that initially, units in the Train/Ready cycle can expect to enter into this phase filled to 80 percent based on Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) authorizations.\textsuperscript{57}

The model does not show the 80 percent equipment fill until year two of the Train/Ready cycle. The ARNG has a dual mission to support HLS/HLD, DSCA and State missions regardless of the cycle the unit is in. The ARNG identified the list of Critical Dual Use (CDU) equipment to support these missions and according to National Guard Bureau requires a 100 percent fill rate.\textsuperscript{58} The 2009 Army Equipping Strategy acknowledges RC units must be properly equipped to meet their obligations in support of HLD/HLS, DSCA and State missions but will be equipped at less than 100 percent.\textsuperscript{59} This represents risks in the ability to adequately respond to HLS/HLD, DSCA and State requirements. The strategy indicates that the DA’s goal is to equip the ARNG with at least 80 percent of its CDU requirements.\textsuperscript{60}

Reserve component units in year 2 and 3 of the Train/Ready cycle provides the operational depth to support Major Contingency Operations and has the ability to support HLD/HLS, DSCA and State mission requirements. Reserve component units in the Available Pool are part of the operational force and have the ability to support the full spectrum of operations. This Operational Force Model guarantees full access to cohesive RC units and achieves full integration of the RC into both current and contingency operations.

Another aspect of the Operational Force Model is converting the 48 Unit Training Assemblies (UTA) to 24 active duty days. The CNGR Final Report recommended DoD reduce the number of RC duty statuses from the current 29 to 2.\textsuperscript{61} A soldier is either on active duty or off active duty. Reserve component personnel would no longer be in an inactive duty for training (IDT) status but in an active duty status during a drill weekend. The current RC drill IDT compensation system pays soldiers two days of pay for one day.
of drill which equates to four days of pay for two days of drill. The proposed changes well intend to support the best interest of the Citizen Soldier in the RC duty statuses but means a Soldier would only receive one day of pay and allowances for one day of duty – not two days of pay for one day of duty under the current IDT compensation system. This new approach potentially alleviates pay issues associated with transitioning from a reserve to active duty status but also reduces a soldier’s monthly drill pay. The financial problems associated with the proposed changes in duty statuses and reduced monthly drill pay outweighs the potential benefits. Reserve component soldiers historically depend on the IDT check to meet monthly financial obligations and the current economic situation only reinforces the requirement to reevaluate this proposal.

Adapt the RC Generating Force – Full-time Manning

Sufficient full-time manning is essential to RC readiness, training, administration, logistics, family support and maintenance. The efficient execution of these functional areas has a direct correlation to deployment readiness. As stated earlier, the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 conducted in 1999 established the current full-time manning levels using the Strategic Reserve strategy and tiered readiness. The manning levels established by the study resulted in the RC being currently funded at 70 percent of the required level.62

The RC met the high foreign and domestic operational requirements through the use of Active Duty Operational Support – Reserve Components (ADOS-RC) soldiers, Temporary Civil Service Technicians and Temporary Military Technicians to bridge the full-time manning shortfalls. Funding for this temporary manpower depends upon supplemental funding. The supplemental funding system allows the RC to meet the high operational demands but DA and the RC cannot continue to depend on temporary funding to sustain the RC full-time manning at acceptable levels to accomplish the mission. The practice of implementing short-term fixes does not provide solutions to long-term problems that currently exist and Congress, DoD and DA must address these problems. The CNCR Final Report recommended and the senior military leadership acknowledged the current RC full-time manning is not sufficient to support the Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) of an Operational Reserve. The requirements for additional full-time manning cannot be ignored simply because the associated funding
and resources are cost prohibitive or the fiscal constraints are too complex to address. The DoD recently asked the RAND Corporation to conduct a study on RC full-time manning but the final report did not provide DoD and DA with the data they expected.63

The Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 12-17 recommends maintaining the current FTS ramp of 72 percent of the FTS requirement and recognized as the minimum but acceptable FTS level.64 DA recommends adding ADOS-RC funds into the base budget for the continued use of ADOS-RC personnel to support deploying RC units.65 This recommendation is a short-term solution and suggests an Operational Reserve is not a permanent requirement.

Adapt the RC Generating Force - TTHS

The DoD Instruction 1120.11 dated April 1981 authorizes all active component forces to set up Trainee, Transient, Holdee, Student (TTHS) accounts to manage Soldiers not available for deployment.66 The TTHS account is the tool to efficiently manage all Soldiers not fully qualified for deployment and ensure units maintain high levels of personnel readiness across the Total Force. Soldiers not available for deployment are moved into the TTHS account from Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) units to prevent a negative impact on unit personnel readiness. The TTHS account is the difference between the Congressionally mandated end strength (ES) and the Force Structure Allowance (FSA). Increasing the size of a TTHS account results from either an increase in the Congressional mandated ES or a decrease in MTOE and/or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) FSA. The Army and USAR are authorized TTHS accounts. Recently, Congress and DA authorized an ARNG TTHS account. The Army TTHS account is authorized 71,000 personnel and represents 13 percent of their ES; the ARNG TTHS account is authorized 8,000 personnel and represents 2.5 percent of their ES; and the USAR TTHS account is authorized 4,000 and represents 2 percent of their ES.

Each component executes their TTHS account differently due to unique requirements, historical manning authorizations, funding limitations, and the direction of current leadership. The Army utilizes all four categories of the TTHS account to accurately account for all Soldiers not available for deployment regardless the reason. The ARNG currently utilizes only the “Trainee” portion of the account for the 8,000
TTHS allocations. The ARNG use of “Trainee” portion of the TTHS addresses a portion the training pipeline. It does not address the issues of medical and dental readiness, non-duty MOS qualification, Officer Candidate School cadets, recently commissioned officers waiting to attend the basic officer course, or pending separation actions. The USAR utilizes only the “Holdee” portion of the account for the 4,000 TTHS allocations. Soldiers in this category include personnel with a P3 or P4 in their PULHES that requires a Medical Evaluation Board (MEB), a Physical Evaluation Board (PEB), or a non-duty related PEB. The USAR elects not to utilize the “Trainee” or “Student” portions of the TTHS account in order to maintain force structure. Unlike the ARNG, the USAR utilizes the Reset portion of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model to send Soldiers to Initial Entry Training (IET) and schools.

This method of getting Soldiers DMOSQ depends entirely on TRADOC providing sufficient training seats.

Currently, the ARNG has over 29,000 Soldiers or 8 percent of ES in the Training Pipeline (14,000 Soldiers currently attending training and 15,000 Soldiers waiting to attend training). In 2008, DA and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) verbally agreed to provide additional training seats to the ARNG and USAR to reduce the training pipeline population and the duty MOS backlog. However, since September 2001 the TRADOC manpower authorizations have decreased by 7,300 military authorizations and 4,500 DA civilian authorizations while the workload requirements continue to increase. The backlog has improved from 44,000 Soldiers in the Training Pipeline two years ago to the current 29,000 Soldiers as of 31 January 2010 but is still an ongoing problem and requires DA to continue increasing the number of training seats the ARNG and USAR receive annually to reduce the backlog. The ARNG medical readiness is 48 percent of the ARNG assigned strength and the USAR medical readiness is 41 percent of the USAR assigned strength. Medical readiness in the ARNG and USAR has improved since 2007 when medical readiness was 24 percent overall. The Medical Protection System (MEDPROS) reflects a total of 51,000 personnel in both the ARNG and USAR are coded either medically non-deployable (MND) or on a Limited Duty Profile (LDP). Soldiers coded MND in MEDPROS have either a P3 or P4 in their PULHES and requires a Medical Evaluation Board (MEB), a Physical Evaluation Board (PEB), or a non-duty related PEB to determine continued service in the ARNG or USAR.
LDP are medically non-deployable and requires either a MOS/Medical Review Board (MMRB), a Medical Evaluation Board (MEB), or a Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) to determine physical limitations and continued service in the ARNG or USAR. Until recently, DA placed the responsibility of improving medical readiness within the ARNG and USAR on the respective components and the individual Soldiers through their civilian medical provider until mobilization. The active component Soldiers receive government provided medical care at no cost to the Soldier. The ARNG and USAR have enhanced five of the eight categories of medical readiness (DNA, Dental, HIV, Immunizations and Periodic Health Assessment) through the use of existing Medical Evaluation Programs and the newly established Army Selected Reserve Dental Readiness System but are short of the DoD minimum medical standard of 75 percent. Unfortunately, these programs are only funded at 77.6 percent of the FY 10-15 Critical Requirement. In order for the ARNG and USAR to achieve the DoD minimum medical standard, DoD and DA must allocate the appropriate required resources to at least meet the minimum standard of 75 percent with a goal of achieving 100 percent medical readiness. Consequently, there is not a medical treatment program that addresses the 51,000 RC MND and LDP Soldiers.

Adapt RC Pre-mobilization Equipping Strategies

Equipment shortages exist in both the AC and RC due to the current OPTEMPO. However, the Strategic reserve strategy of tiered readiness created an Equipment on Hand (EOH) deficit in the RC and precluded the equipment EOH level from being at the appropriate level of readiness when the RC role as an Operational Reserve began. The short term solution to address the shortages was a directed mission essential equipment list (MEEL) and in most cases remains the solution for addressing equipment shortages in deploying AC and RC forces.

The number of equipment shortages is improving but not to the level to maximize opportunities to train on and with the equipment earlier in the ARFORGEN Cycle. In this era of persistent conflict, it is crucial units have 100 percent of the authorized MTOE equipment earlier in the ARFORGEN cycle to ensure personnel receive the maximum amount of training time on equipment to successfully execute the mission. The process of cross-leveling equipment to deploying units by donor units is still a necessary significant
event for both the ARNG and USAR. In February 2009, the Army Audit Agency reported the ARNG and USAR were unable to complete pre-mobilization training tasks because they could not obtain the equipment for training. The 2008 USAR Posture Statement noted the USAR was forced to expend significant resources to move equipment between units and training locations to address equipment shortages.

The overall ARNG EOH level as of March 2009 was 77 percent. The ARNG CDU EOH level is currently at 83 percent but approximately 15 percent of the equipment is in Title 10 status at any given time and therefore not available to Governors. Congress directed DoD to pay attention to CDU equipment for the ARNG to ensure sufficient support to HLD/HLS, DSCA and State mission requirements. The current overall USAR EOH level was 73 percent as of March 2009. These EOH percentages include “in lieu of” equipment as well as authorized substitutes which in most cases are not deployable because of incompatibility or the lack of interoperability with equipment in theater. Equipment considered “in lieu of” and an authorized substitute is reported on the Unit Status Report (USR) for determining readiness levels and does not give an accurate deployment readiness level.

The current DA plans and budgets for equipment do not restore readiness and attain the goal of fully equipping RC units until FY 2019 with intermediate goals in FY 2013. According to the ARNG, funds currently allocated for equipment are distributed into three categories:

1. MTOE Equipment shortages
2. Equipment modernization
3. New equipment

Forty cents of every dollar allocated for equipment purchases MTOE equipment shortages; the remaining sixty cents is for equipment modernization and new equipment purchases. The current strategies of equipping just prior to deployment and cross-leveling equipment will likely continue for some time. The FY 2019 target date prolongs the improvement of equipment readiness for too long and increases the possibility the DA plan will not come to fruition. The 2009 Army Equipping Strategy includes an affordable strategy with the goal to ensure Soldiers operating within ARFORGEN have the appropriate amount and types of equipment to meet their mission requirements across the
full spectrum of operations. The equipping strategy proposes to equip to mission, rather than to MTOE, and to align equipping priorities with ARFORGEN. Funds for training and equipping must be fully synchronized with budgetary regulations and ARFORGEN to effectively program and execute resources to support a “train-mobilize-deploy” construct.

**Adapt Statutes, Policies and Processes**

An Operational Reserve requires a higher standard of readiness for longer durations, with less time to achieve readiness goals between deployments. For the RC to sustain this standard of readiness, DoD and DA must change policies, budgets, and planning. Many of the current legacy statutes, policies and processes do not support utilizing the RC as an Operational Reserve. An effective transformation of the RC to an Operational Reserve requires adapting statutes, policies and processes that support this transition. The critical process of identifying which statutes, policies and procedures require change has lagged behind considerably because some leaders were not convinced there was a long term requirement for an Operational Reserve. Senior leader support is critical to the successful Operational Reserve transformation because they are the RC conduit to Congress. Historically, DA has not successfully conveyed the needs of the RC to the Congressional leadership. Without a complete and accurate plan, Congress and other decision makers do not have the information they need to determine the amount of funding that should be appropriated to fully transform the RC to an Operational Reserve. Congress must clearly understand the strategic importance of an Operational Reserve and should be updated on the transformation on a consistent basis.

Recently, DoD and DA established a RC Omnibus made up of a Council of Colonels Committee and a General Officer Steering Committee. The charter of the committees was developing and recommending Secretary of the Army level policies and Uniform Legislative Budget (ULB) proposals to institutionalize the Operational Reserve. The two committees developed the following 13 proposed policy actions for the Secretary of the Army to review:

1. TTHS
2. Medical/Dental Readiness
3. Benefit and Service Obligation Linkage
The proposed Army policy actions impact all six Title 10 functions and provide the mechanism to ensure Army compliance with DODD 1200.17 Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational. 87

**Strategic Communication**

The purpose of strategic communication is gaining support from the stakeholders. Congress, senior ARNG and USAR leaders, state Governors, Adjutant Generals, American public, soldiers, families and civilian employers are the stakeholders. To meet the demands and strategic objectives of the National Military Strategy (NMS), it is imperative the RC is trained and resourced to operate across the full-spectrum of conflict as an Operational Reserve. To gauge whether the message is clearly communicated to the stakeholders, senior civilian and military leaders must address the following questions:

1. Does the elected leadership fully understand the mission?
2. Does the American public understand the mission?
3. Will there be political and public will to support an era of persistent conflict for the next ten to fifteen years?

Clearly articulating the message to the stakeholders is critical to gaining support to adapt statutes, policies, processes and resources to transition the RC to an Operational Reserve. This nation’s citizen Soldiers are de facto centers of influence in their respective communities and are proponents or opponents of the transformation depending on the effectiveness of strategic communication. Unfortunately, strategic communication to the stakeholders pale in comparison to the high OPTEMPO level of the RC forces. As stated
earlier, one shortfall in communicating to the stakeholders is some leaders were not
convinced there was a long term requirement for an Operational Reserve.

**Recommendations: Progress of the RC Operational Transformation**

There are leaders who believe the ARNG and USAR has fully transitioned to an
Operational Reserve. The RC will not be a fully Operational Reserve until changes are
made in statutes and policies; and the personnel and equipment readiness levels are
sufficient to support an Operational Reserve. General Casey, CSA, wants to balance the
forces no later than the first quarter of 2012. He states that by bringing the forces into
balance adds operational depth and flexibility. Improving operational depth and
flexibility of the operational forces requires two critical assets – personnel and
equipment. The readiness levels of these two assets are critically low in the AC, ARNG
and USAR. Operational depth and flexibility will not improve until the personnel and
equipment readiness levels improve or the operational demands decrease.

Building and sustaining an Operational RC requires a significant amount of
funding and resources. FORSCOM estimated the initial costs for transforming the RC to
an Operational Reserve. A 2008 estimate identified costs of between $24.4 billion and
$28.1 billion over a 6-year period from 2010 to 2015. These estimated costs include
increasing full-time support personnel, training days, recruiting and retention incentives,
and installation support, among others.\textsuperscript{88} The sustainment cost was estimated between $3 billion and $5 billion annually.\textsuperscript{89} The primary cost driver was increasing full-time
support, estimated at $12.8 billion over the period.\textsuperscript{90} Despite current budgetary
constraints these resources must be found if the US intends to transform the RC to an
Operational Reserve. The AC and RC leadership should collaboratively develop a
funding strategy that prioritizes the six essential tasks not based solely on estimated costs
but rather on the task that has the most significant impact on the operational
transformation. Partnership, not competition, should guide the AC/RC policy and budget
development process. DA, ARNG and USAR must inculcate the spirit and intent of the
Total Force Policy in order to approach budget and policy challenges as teammates rather
than competitors. Senior DoD civilian and military leaders should consistently include
ARNG and USAR leaders early on during critical policy and budgetary debates and
decisions. Exclusionary internal DoD processes will only lead to divisive external battles
during the Congressional budget process.

**Adapt Pre and Post-mobilization Training Cycles (PPMT)**

The high OPTEMPO of the AC and RC forces prevents the full implementation of the ARFORGEN Model in terms of dwell time and predictability. Current mobilization regulations are inadequate for mobilizing, training and deploying the RC expeditiously and on a continuous basis. The amount of time RC units spend at the mobilization station conducting post mobilization training and soldier readiness processes reduces the BOG time for the RC and reduces the dwell time for AC and RC forces. The existing DA mobilization strategy is contingent on one time mobilization and demobilization operations that maximize use of AC installation structure for the duration plus six months. Although the Army adapted these mobilization processes, when evaluated together, they place FORSCOM’s ability to execute its executive agent responsibility for mobilization at risk. FORSCOM recommended implementing the MT2 Concept Plan to provide a permanent and sustainable strategy that supports continuous mobilization requirements and maximize BOG time and subsequently increasing dwell time. This MT2 Concept Plan requires First US Army as the executive agent for FORSCOM to re-station Training Support Battalions (TSB) to provide mission tailored support and training to the RC as they progress through ARFORGEN and post mobilization validation for deployment.

A USAR and ARNG Cooperative Initiative would be the preferred concept versus the MT2. This initiative would be a cooperative agreement between the USAR and ARNG to man and operate five RC mobilization training sites (Fort Dix, Fort McCoy and Fort Hunter Liggett, Camp Shelby and Camp Atterbury). The agreement would designate these five sites as primary FGIs and the USAR, ARNG and DA civilian personnel would exclusively man and operate these sites. The ARNG and USAR FGIs would provide mission tailored support and training to units as they progress through ARFORGEN and post mobilization validation for deployment instead of First US Army. Today’s RC is experienced combat veterans, trained and capable of validating post mobilization training for deployment. The first Major General (USAR or ARNG) in the chain of command would approve the post mobilization training for deployment validation. This change in policy/statute would parallel the AC process of commanders
validating the unit’s readiness directly to the Division Commander.

The First US Army TSBs that currently support post mobilization training and validation to RC units are currently manned by a number of USAR and ARNG personnel. The existing support construct at the five ARNG and USAR FGIs would remain in place with minimal or no increase in structure. If the Cooperative Initiative required additional positions, the Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) positions currently supporting the TSB would be the bill payer to support the additional manning requirements. The Cooperative Initiative is supportive because it standardizes and expedites the mobilization and demobilization process but with no additional structure growth or costs.

**AI4 Operational Model**

The DoD and DA should mobilize Reserve component units in the Contingency Expeditionary Forces (CEF) pool during their Available cycle to maintain predictability and sustain a high level of readiness as an Operational Reserve. Reserve component units in the Available pool of land forces are part of the operational force and can employ across the full spectrum of conflict. Reserve component CEF units can mobilize to participate in validated requirements such as foreign or domestic security operations, Combat Training Center rotation support or unnamed operations. The new paradigm assures DoD and DA access to trained and cohesive RC units and achieves full integration of the RC into both current and contingency operations.

Reducing the number of RC duty statuses to either on active duty or off active duty is a beneficial proposal. The proposal significantly reduces the pay issues Soldiers currently experience while transitioning from a reserve status to an active duty status. If the proposal is a cost savings initiative, it is not beneficial and would be a detriment to RC Soldiers and their families. Converting the 48 UTAs to 24 active duty days without additional monetary compensation will have an adverse effect on the financial status of many Soldiers and families. Reserve component Soldiers will receive active duty base pay plus allowances for 2 days of duty which does not equal the four days of base pay under the current RC compensation system. Department of Defense and DA proposes a long term incentive of providing 2 retirement points for every duty day versus the current one point for every duty day. This incentive is beneficial only to the Soldiers who intend to complete 20 years of service for retirement. DoD and DA needs to develop short and
near term solutions to compensate the difference in pay for citizen Soldiers before implementing this proposal. Possible solutions are:

1. One additional day of base pay and allowances;
2. Incentive pay for completing the appropriate level of military education and professional development;
3. Performance pay for drill attendance; and
4. Longevity pay for reenlistments.

As stated in the analysis, historically RC Soldiers and their families depend on the IDT check to meet monthly financial obligations. The current economic situation reinforces the requirement to reevaluate this proposal. DoD and DA needs to thoroughly reexamine this proposal because it could potentially have a negative impact on stabilization, unit cohesion and personnel readiness through decreased retention levels.

**Adapt the RC Generating Force – Fulltime Manning**

What is the optimal level of RC full-time manning that sufficiently supports an Operational Reserve? The current DA process of addressing RC full-time manning shortfalls through supplemental funding is a short term fix but does not provide a long term solution. There are educated estimates but no one knows the answer. The DoD Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 conducted in 1999 recommended a 70 percent RC full-time manning ramp based on the Strategic reserve strategy. It is reasonable to conclude the full-time manning ramp for an Operational Reserve should be significantly higher than 70 percent based the current operational demands of the ARNG and USAR. In 2009, DA commissioned the RAND Corporation to conduct a study to assist with identifying the existing requirements for RC full-time support, determining how the ARNG and USAR met operational requirements in the past, and developing analytical links between full-time support and unit readiness. RAND completed the report but either the report failed to provide the data DA requested or provided data supporting a significant increase in fulltime manning. The DoD and DA should move forward quickly and decisively to secure funding and resources to increase RC full-time manning to at least 80 percent. In the interim, DoD and DA should continue to provide ADOS-RC funds to support an Operational Reserve and the war fight.
Adapt the RC Generating Force – TTHS

The size of the ARNG and USAR TTHS accounts are not adequate to sufficiently account for Soldiers in the training pipeline and the medical non-deployable population. The ARNG and USAR require an increase in their TTHS accounts based on the current training pipeline backlog and medical non-deployable population in order to improve personnel readiness. The ARNG and USAR favor an increase in the Congressional mandated ES rather than a reduction in FSA. There is a reluctance of the ARNG and USAR to request an increase in the size of their respective TTHS accounts at the cost of reducing FSA and resources. How can DoD and DA penalize the ARNG and USAR by reducing FSA to pay for increasing the size of their respective TTHS accounts? The DoD and DA are principally responsible for the sizeable non-deployable population. Insufficient resources for RC medical care and lack of training seats are the primary cause for the current situation. The DoD and DA needs to accept ownership for the large number of medical and training pipeline non-deployable Soldiers and provide the resources to improve the medical readiness and decrease the training pipeline backlog in the ARNG and USAR. Increasing ARNG and USAR ES to accommodate larger TTHS accounts is not a favorable option for DoD and DA because it requires additional resources during a time when the federal government is experiencing fiscal constraints. Improving medical readiness and decreasing the training pipeline backlog also requires additional resources but is required if DoD and DA expects to improve the overall personnel readiness in the ARNG and USAR.

Increasing ARNG and USAR ES and transferring Soldiers not available for deployment to the TTHS accounts creates vacant positions and “hollow” units until qualified Soldiers occupy the positions. Recruiting non-prior service personnel will not resolve the problem in the short term but rather exacerbates it. Recruiting non-prior personnel continues to increase the size of the training pipeline population backlog until DA and TRADOC provides additional training seats to reduce ARNG and USAR backlog. However, increasing the training pipeline population puts a greater demand on Army training system. The increase in the training pipeline population will theoretically generate the additional resources TRADOC requires to meet the increased demand. Recruiting FMR and MOS qualified prior service soldiers and transferring fully qualified
Soldiers from over-strength units to fill the vacancies created by the TTHS accounts will assist in preventing prevent “hollow” ARNG and USAR units and improve personnel readiness.

Decreasing the ARNG and USAR MTOE and/or TDA FSA will resolve the issue with vacant positions created by the TTHS accounts. A decrease in ARNG and USAR MTOE and/or TDA FSA also necessitates the loss of unit equipment and supporting Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) funds. A decrease in ARNG MTOE unit FSA could impact units required for homeland security/homeland defense and state missions. Larger TTHS accounts based on the current training pipeline and medical non-deployable population will have a significant negative impact on the components capability to perform federal and state missions if DoD and DA require the ARNG and USAR to reduce MTOE and/or TDA FSA. Decreasing FSA in the ARNG and USAR is not a favorable choice based on the negative impact it would have on their capability to perform foreign and domestic missions.

It is imperative the ARNG and USAR fully utilize the Trainee, Holdee and Student categories of the TTHS account to accurately account for all non-deployable Soldiers. The “Trainee” portion of the account would include personnel waiting to attend basic training and IET, personnel not DMOSQ and waiting to attend MOS school, Officer Candidate School Cadets and recently commissioned officers waiting to attend the basic officer course. The “Holdee” portion of the account would include personnel declared medically non-deployable and awaiting medical clearance or separation by a MEB or PEB, personnel awaiting disciplinary action or separation, personnel coded as unsatisfactory participants in the pay management system who have not been paid for at least three consecutive months, personnel in the Inactive National Guard and personnel awaiting separation for other administrative reasons. The “Student” portion of the account would include personnel enrolled in the Reserve Officer Training Corps Simultaneous Membership Program in the third and fourth year of college. Department of Defense Instruction 1120.11 identifies requirements that do not particularly account for the unique circumstances of the ARNG and USAR. The Department of Department should revise DoD Instruction 1120.11 to incorporate the proposed changes to account for the unique force management requirements and to develop a concise process and
definition to sufficiently account for all Soldiers not available for deployment. The revised DoD Instruction 1120.11 will create a universal TTHS policy for the Army, ARNG and USAR. The universal TTHS policy will allow the TTHS accounts to be more functional in addressing the true operational readiness issues of the ARNG and USAR.

Increasing the ES to create larger TTHS accounts for the ARNG and USAR but does not resolve the short term requirement to cross-level personnel to fill positions left vacant by the TTHS accounts. Decreasing the FSA to increase the size the TTHS accounts to accommodate the current training pipeline and medical non-deployable population in the ARNG and USAR will provide immediate improvements in personnel readiness. The results of reductions in ARNG and USAR MTOE and/or TDA FSA are fewer units to meet the increased operational demands in an era of persistent conflict.

**Adapt RC Pre-mobilization Equipping Strategies**

Army National Guard units in the Reset cycle must consistently maintain at least an MTOE EOH readiness level of 80 percent. The proposed EOH level of 80 percent includes CDU EOH readiness level of 100 percent to adequately support HLS/HLD, DSCA and state mission requirements. The AI4 Operational Model and the 2009 Army Equipping Strategy developed by DA allows a unit in the Reset cycle to have decremented EOH levels. The dual mission of the ARNG to support HLS/HLD, DSCA and state missions requires the ARNG to respond regardless of the where the units are at in the ARFORGEN Model. An ARNG unit with decremented EOH levels prohibits the unit from contributing significantly to the mission. Equipping the RC at 80 percent EOH in the Reset cycle provides an early equipping strategy. Implementing this strategy:

1. Ensures ARNG and USAR units are adequately equipped to support HLS/HLD, DSCA and State missions.
2. Fulfills DoD and DA requirements to provide RC units with the necessary equipment early in the ARFORGEN Model to successfully conduct pre-mobilization and post-mobilization training.
3. Reduces RC post-mobilization training time and increases BOG time.

**Adapt Statutes, Policies and Processes**

The RC continues to function as an Operational Reserve but has not fully transitioned to an Operational Reserve. Many of the legacy statutes, policies and
processes governing the RC existing prior to 9/11 still exist today with minimal or no changes being made. The DoD and DA recently established an RC Omnibus. The Omnibus developed 13 proposed actions which are positive steps but seriously overdue. DoD and DA must act quickly to aggressively pursue a strategy that clearly conveys the importance of these actions with the purpose of garnering Congressional support and approval. If the AC and RC forces continue to operate under this bridging strategy there will be negative impacts on the Soldiers, their families, civilian employers and the nation as a whole.

**Strategic Communication**

Strategic communication with the stakeholders has not been successful to date. An example of this error in judgment is the minimal progress made in adapting the legacy statutes, policies and processes that support the operational transformation. The challenge of successfully transforming the RC to an Operational Reserve is gaining national support from the stakeholders. There are various documents, information papers and briefings published that address different aspects of the RC operational transformation. There is not a single document published that addresses all aspects of an Operational Reserve that is accessible to all stakeholders. DoD and DA needs to develop a comprehensive Strategic Communication Strategy that addresses the following:

1. Identifies the stakeholders – Congress, senior ARNG and USAR leaders, state Governors, Adjutant Generals, American public, soldiers, families and civilian employers.
2. Clearly articulates to each stakeholder in understandable terms the purpose, the vision and operational concept of an Operational Reserve.
3. Identifies the communication tools to convey the message such as social media, email, information cards, websites, town hall meetings, briefings, etc.
4. Clearly communicates the end state and the roadmap to achieve it.

**Conclusion**

This era of persistent conflict and the hybrid threat that exists dictates the necessity for an Operational Reserve. In the past nine years the RC has contributed significantly to GWOT despite being constrained by Cold War era rules, regulations, funding processes and laws. Some civilian and military leaders argue for increasing the size of the AC
forces to alleviate the need for an Operational Reserve. The initial and sustainment cost of increasing the size of the AC forces far exceeds the costs of operationalizing and sustaining an Operational Reserve. There are some leaders who argue the costs of sustaining an Operational Reserve equals the costs of sustaining a larger AC force which studies prove are not true.

Optimally, an Operational Reserve provides:

1. The NMS with strategic depth and operational flexibility.
2. Expands the Army’s capacity to meet foreign and domestic operational requirements.
3. Fully integrates a Total Force that is trained, manned and equipped.
4. Enhances response capabilities across the full spectrum of operations by providing an RC that is manned and equipped to its authorizations and receives the training necessary for mission execution.
5. Provides deployment predictability and maximum dwell time for RC soldiers, their families and civilian employers.
6. Preserves the unique skill sets RC soldiers bring to the fight that AC soldiers do not possess.
7. Preserves the AVF.

The CNGR identified the requirement for an Operational Reserve. The AI4TF identified six essential tasks necessary to fully transform a Strategic reserve to an Operational Reserve. These actions and initiatives are consistent and will contribute significantly in providing the road map for the operational transformation. However, the current bridging strategy resulting from “just-in-time” readiness will continue until the senior civilian and military leadership of DoD and DA clearly defines the roadmap and produces solutions to the current problems with reduced dwell time, personnel and equipment shortfalls. There must be a clear and defined Strategic plan before identifying resource requirements, implementing a transformation plan, or developing a funding strategy. Reserve component forces will continue to face challenges building cohesion because of “just-in-time” readiness of cross-leveling personnel and equipment. The ultimate degree of RC transformation depends on the scope of the global requirements,
the support of strategic leaders, elected officials and the American public.


Army Initiative #4 Update to the ARFPC. Washington, May 19, 2009.


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