CONSIDERATIONS TO ENHANCE THE FLORIDA DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN

by

Steven Donaway

March 2011

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The Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan 2009 to 2011 does not prioritize, assign or use metrics to define its goals, objectives or subobjectives thereby making it less effective. The research found prioritization to be a necessary element for achieving results that in turn lead to funding, which is the most significant determinant of progress. Priorities should be kept to a manageable number and remain flexible to adapt to changing threats. Assignment of responsibility was determined to be an important aspect especially in regards to the attainment of accountability. To be effective, assignment must also come with authority. Metrics were determined to be important to accountability. They should be clearly defined, measurable in a quantifiable way and define an end state. A tracking and reporting system was found to be necessary to enhance assignment and metrics accountability. The research suggests that a state homeland security strategy and a single statewide gap analysis should guide all federal grant funding sources with a nexus to domestic security issues and not just the distribution of DHS grant funding. Implementation steps are included for Florida to integrate the primary findings of this research into its future homeland security strategies.
CONSIDERATIONS TO ENHANCE THE FLORIDA DOMESTIC SECURITY STRATEGIC PLAN

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The Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan 2009 to 2011 does not prioritize, assign or use metrics to define its goals, objectives or subobjectives thereby making it less effective. The research found prioritization to be a necessary element for achieving results that often brings with it funding. Funding was identified as the most significant determinant for progress. Priorities should be kept to a manageable number and remain flexible to adapt to changing threats. Assignment was determined to be important with its most significant benefit coming in the form of accountability. To be effective, assignment must also come with authority. Metrics were determined to be important to accountability. They should be clearly defined, measurable in a quantifiable way and define an end state. A tracking and reporting system was found to be necessary to enhance assignment and metrics accountability. The research suggests that a state homeland security strategy and a single statewide gap analysis should guide all federal grant funding sources with a nexus to domestic security issues and not just the distribution of DHS grant funding. Implementation steps are included for Florida to integrate the primary findings of this research into its future homeland security strategies.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BZZP</td>
<td>Buffer Zone Protection Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2C</td>
<td>Cost 2 Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHDS</td>
<td>Center for Homeland Defense and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Computer Aided Dispatch</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Citizen Corps Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed Circuit Television</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Center for Disease Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLGSP</td>
<td>Driver’s License Security Grant Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSOC</td>
<td>Domestic Security Oversight Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSTF</td>
<td>Domestic Security Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPG</td>
<td>Emergency Management Performance Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDLE</td>
<td>Florida Department of Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>U.S. Government Accountability Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPRA</td>
<td>Government Performance Results Act of 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAZMAT</td>
<td>Hazardous Materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>Health Human Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSEC</td>
<td>Chief Administrative Officers Homeland Security Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSPD</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IECP</td>
<td>Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCAC</td>
<td>Maryland Coordination Analysis Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHz</td>
<td>Megahertz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMRS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Medical Response System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCR</td>
<td>National Capital Regions</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHS</td>
<td>Office of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSGP</td>
<td>Port Security Grant Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCPGP</td>
<td>Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDSTF</td>
<td>Regional Domestic Security Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIC</td>
<td>Regional Information Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHSGP</td>
<td>State Homeland Security Grant Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLED</td>
<td>South Carolina Division of Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMART</td>
<td>Specific, Measurable, Action Oriented, Realistic and Timely or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs</td>
<td>Subject Matter Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPG-CAO</td>
<td>Senior Policy Group and the Chief Administrative Officers Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWG</td>
<td>State Working Group on Domestic Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCL</td>
<td>Targeted Capabilities List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UASI</td>
<td>Urban Area Security Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Florida developed a plan to address the threat of terrorism. The state was divided into seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces overseen by the Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC). The DSOC was given authority under Florida Statute 943.0313 to provide executive leadership and fiscal guidance to state and local agencies in their terrorism prevention, preparation, protection, response and recovery efforts. In this leadership role, the DSOC issued their Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan for the three-year period covering 2009 to 2011 (Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council [DSOC], 2008). The Strategic Plan contains five goals, 37 supporting objectives and 296 implementation steps.

The Strategic Plan does not prioritize its goals, objectives or implementation steps resulting in over three hundred equally weighed tasks. The people who serve in Florida’s domestic security administrative and tactical missions do so in addition to their regular job. These dedicated individuals do not have time to accomplish over three hundred items within the short time frame of the Strategic Plan. Since prioritization is not used in Florida’s homeland security strategy, it comes instead from its Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant funding process. Florida has received over $1.7 billion in federal domestic security related grant funds since 2001 (DSOC, 2009, p. 15). Each year Florida forms funding committees that are staffed by subject matter experts (SMEs) from state and local agencies with domestic security responsibilities. The committees review projects for funding and then rate them. Projects with the highest votes are funded until the grant funds are exhausted. This process has left the prioritization of domestic security critical needs to the discretion of the SMEs and resulted in a high portion of the grant money being spent in concentrated areas, such as police and fire response equipment and preparedness needs, while other areas like schools, health and prevention received little funding. Additionally, significant portions of the DHS grant...
funds have been awarded to Florida’s five Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI) designated cities. Each UASI utilizes its own funding committees and processes that make independent decisions from the statewide funding committees.

The Strategic Plan does not assign responsibility for making progress in achieving its goals, objectives or implementation steps. Florida has identified its major response disciplines to be law enforcement, fire services, health and emergency management; other disciplines, such as education, serve roles as well. There are hundreds of state, county and city agencies represented by these disciplines. Yet, the Strategic Plan does not assign any discipline, agency or person responsibility to accomplish the specific goals, objectives or subobjectives of the Strategic Plan (DSOC, 2008). Without assigning responsibility, the DSOC cannot empower the assignee with ownership and authority to carry out its tasking and at the same time provide someone who is accountable to the DSOC for progress.

The Strategic Plan indicates its implementation steps were developed to be measurable, actionable and attainable (DSOC, 2008, p. 6). Few of the implementation steps are defined in a measureable way. For example, Goal 2 of the Strategic Plan is to Prevent, Preempt and Deter Acts of Terrorism. Objective 2.4 supporting that Goal is titled Law Enforcement Investigations and Operations. This objective is supported by an Implementation Step that calls for obtaining adequate inventory of specialized equipment to conduct domestic security investigations (DSOC, 2008, p. 15). This implementation step provides insufficient information on what equipment should be obtained, and if it is to be inventoried, what level of stock would be adequate. The step cannot be attained if a completed state is not defined. Not knowing what is needed and to what extent it is needed prevents the achievement of the action desired by the Strategic Plan.

The DSOC is uniquely empowered to identify the most critical domestic security issues facing Florida and direct its available resources and funding to deal with them. By using prioritization, assignment and metrics in their strategic plan, the DSOC could become more effective in executing its critical oversight responsibility. Without change, the DSOC loses the opportunity to direct and coordinate the resources of the state, assign and empower its staff and have a clearly defined end state to achieve.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION

The primary aim of this research is to examine whether state homeland security strategies can be more effective toward the accomplishment of their goals, objectives or subobjectives if those goals and objectives are prioritized, assigned or clearly defined by the use of metrics. To support this analysis, the following secondary questions will be explored:

1. What does the existing literature reveal about strategy goals, objectives or subobjectives being prioritized?
2. What does the existing literature reveal about strategy goals, objectives or subobjectives being assigned to an entity to be responsible for their completion?
3. What does the existing literature reveal about strategy goals, objectives or subobjectives being clearly defined by the use of metrics?
4. How do existing state homeland security strategies handle prioritization, assignment and the use of metrics related to their goals, objectives or subobjectives?
5. What do subject matter experts that develop and/or implement state homeland security strategies say about the effectiveness of their method of prioritization, assignment or the use of metrics related to a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives? Finally,
6. Can this research identify methodologies of prioritization, assignment or the use of metrics that if adopted, can enhance Florida’s homeland security strategy?

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

This thesis will contribute to the national discussion regarding strategic plans. Specifically, it will focus on a few key elements of a state homeland security strategic plan and seek ways to make that plan more effective. As the research progresses, additional research questions outside of the scope of this project will likely arise. They will be discussed in the conclusion section as suggestions for future research. The author is employed in a domestic security role for the state of Florida. Florida authorities are in the process of drafting an updated homeland security strategy to cover the years 2012 to 2014. This research should be published in time for it to be considered regarding that
effort. Similar to Florida, most states revise their homeland security strategic plans every few years. This research can contribute to the literature consulted by those seeking methodologies for enhancing their strategies.

D. RESEARCH METHOD

Policy analysis methodology was used to evaluate the existing Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan in its ability to achieve the over 300 goals, objectives and implementation steps contained within the document. The Strategy was created to guide Florida’s domestic security efforts during the years 2009 through 2011, and authorities are now planning to draft the succeeding strategy. This research explored three areas of concern within Florida’s existing strategic plan. It searched for ways to improve upon them and make recommendations for inclusion in the next version of The Strategy. Specifically, the three areas of concern were what method should be used to prioritize goals, objectives or subobjectives? Second, what method should be used to assign responsibility to an entity for accomplishment of goals, objectives or subobjectives? Last, what metrics should be used to clearly define a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives? Florida’s homeland security strategy is not completely broken. The hypothesis suggests that changing parts of the strategy would improve its effectiveness. The policy analysis methodology was chosen because it focuses on an existing policy, examines its ability to obtain its stated goals and then recommends changes that can benefit it. This method of research would help to fairly evaluate the benefits of suggested improvements in order to reach a conclusion as to which modification to policy is preferable. The intent was the improvement of the existing policy.

The research started with a review of literature. Literature that focused on government strategies, as well as business strategies were reviewed for best practices of prioritization, assignment and clear definition by use of metrics in relationship to strategy plan goals and objectives. Once the best practices were identified, a review of thirty-five existing state homeland security strategies was conducted. The best practices identified during the literature review were used to guide the selection of specific homeland security strategies for additional review. This review sought examples of state homeland
security strategies exhibiting the use of prioritization, assignment or metrics. Within each category, the method of use was examined to determine if any patterns existed. Examples of each methodology pattern were singled out for further research. The review of state homeland security strategies provided an understanding of the intention of the authors of the document, but it did not provide data on how the strategy is applied in real life. There were questions that arose from the review of the strategies that could not be answered by merely reading the strategies but were better answered by those tasked with implementing the strategies. Therefore, interviews of subject matter experts (SMEs) related to the strategies were added as a second method of data collection for this research. The SMEs chosen for interview all held middle to upper management positions in state or local agencies with a responsibility for domestic security. These agencies either had a role in creating state strategies or implementing them. The SMEs held positions in a number of disciplines such as governor’s staff, police, fire services, health departments and emergency management. They represented state, county and city entities and averaged 19.75 years of experience in professional domestic security related disciplines.

As stated above, the literature review pointed favorably toward the use of prioritization, assignment and the use of metrics related to a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. These best practices were used as a guide in the review of thirty-five existing state homeland security strategies. Strategies that were found to use prioritization, assignment or metrics were reviewed further for patterns or methods of use. The review identified two different methods each of using prioritization, assignment and metrics. The strategies using each identified method were reviewed, and one was chosen as representative of the others in that group. Once a state strategy was selected, then two subject matter experts from the strategy’s state were interviewed. One SME worked for an agency that had a role in creating the strategy. The second SME worked for an agency that had a role in implementing part of the strategy. The two type of SME were used to capture the viewpoint of the different roles related to the strategy. These SMEs were asked to discuss their experience and opinions on how effective their state’s methodology is toward accomplishing goals or objectives. Within each area of concern,
the alternative methods were compared against Florida’s looking for innovation and effectiveness. They were evaluated and discussed regarding their ability to achieve the most desired effect within Florida’s implementation environments that included Florida’s Regional Domestic Security Task Force structure; budget considerations; DHS influence, state, county and local interagency relationships and cross-discipline considerations. Florida’s existing homeland security strategy was reviewed in a four-step process. The first step was to identify the potential weaknesses in the strategy. In the second, alternatives to those weaknesses were suggested in the hypothesis. Using the evidence gathered during the research, the third step considered alternative methods and their impact and value on achieving progress toward the Florida’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. In the fourth and final step, the policy modifications were compared against the existing strategy and a determination of the best policy alternative was made. At the conclusion of the research, recommendations were made for changes to the Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan that should make the document more effective in helping to guide Florida’s domestic security efforts.

E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The chapter overview for this thesis is as follows. Chapter I provides an overview of the research project. Chapter II then discusses the relevant literature related to prioritization, assignment and the use of metrics related to strategy goals, objectives and subobjectives. Chapter III furthers the research by describing the review of state homeland strategies and interviews of subject matter experts related to prioritizing goals, objectives or subobjectives. Chapter IV similarly describes the review of state homeland strategies and interviews of subject matter experts related to assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives. Chapter V concludes the research portion of the thesis by describing the review of state homeland strategies and interviews of subject matter experts related to the use of metrics with goals, objectives or subobjectives. Finally, Chapter VI provides a summary of the research, steps to integrate the primary research findings into Florida’s future homeland security strategies and suggests paths of future research.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. OVERVIEW

This literature review has been organized into eight subcategories. The first three review literature sequentially related to prioritization, assignment and the use of metrics related to goals, objectives and subobjectives. The fourth subcategory reviews literature generally related to the use of goals, objectives or subobjectives in strategies while the fifth covers congressional testimony related to goals and objectives. The sixth and seventh subcategories examine federal and state strategies respectively and how they deal with prioritization, assignment or use of metrics related to goals, objectives or subobjectives. The eighth and final subcategory looks at Department of Homeland Security grant guidance and its relationship to strategic planning. A discussion of each subcategory of the literature follows.

B. LITERATURE RELATED TO PRIORITIZATION

As discussed in the problem statement of this thesis (Chapter I, Section A), Florida does not prioritize the goals, objectives or implementation steps of its homeland security strategy. A review of related literature suggests prioritization is useful. In its 2004 response to a request from the U.S. Congress, the then named U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) presented its report, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism* (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004), to establish the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. In the years after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the Bush Administration issued seven national strategies related to homeland security. The GAO was tasked by Congress to define the characteristics that comprise a good strategy and compare the seven national strategies to those standards. The characteristics GAO identified as important for inclusion in all national strategies were as follows (GAO, 2004, p. 1):
1. Purpose, scope, and methodology;
2. Problem definition and risk assessment;
3. Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures;
4. Resources, investments, and risk management;
5. Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and
6. Integration and implementation.

In its report, the GAO provided further clarification of its six desirable characteristics. When discussing goals, subordinate objectives, activities and performance measures the GAO said it addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, the steps to that achievement as well as the priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results (GAO, 2004, p. 11). In developing these standards, the GAO considered statutory requirements of some of the strategies reviewed; legislative and executive branch guidance for other strategies; the Government Performance Results Act (GPRA); general literature on strategic planning and performance; guidance from the Office of Management and Budget; previous GAO reports and testimonies related to the topic; recommendations by national commissions chartered by Congress and various research organizations comments on national strategies (GAO, 2004, pp. 9–10). The six desirable characteristics established by the GAO in 2004 are still cited as the standard today in such reports as DHS’ Strategy and Plans to Counter Small Vessel Threats Need Improvement (Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2009, p. 18); Emergency Management: Preliminary Observations on FEMA’s Community Preparedness Programs Related to the National Preparedness System (GAO, 2009, pp. 4, 5, 13) and BioSurveillance: Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability Need a National Strategy and a Designated Leader (GAO, 2010, pp. 32–33). When the GAO compared the seven national strategies to its six desirable characteristics, it found they all identified goals, objectives and activities, but generally they did not identify priorities, milestones or performance measures that the GAO considered necessary for achieving results, evaluating progress and ensuring oversight (GAO, 2004, p. 12). On the other end of the spectrum, the GAO criticized the federal money laundering strategy,
stating it identifies more priorities than can be achieved in a reasonable timeframe and
does not rank them in order of importance (GAO, 2004, p. 18).

Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the GAO was stressing
the importance of prioritizing goals and objectives. In his March 2001 testimony, titled
*Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy*
before a U.S. House Committee, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities
and Management for the GAO, stated that key aspects of a national strategy should
include roles and missions of federal, state, and local entities and establish objectives,
priorities, outcome-related goals with milestones, and performance measures to achieve
those goals (GAO, 2001, p. 2).

The GAO concentrates most of its research on governmental agencies; however,
businesses use goals and objectives too. Authors Christy Lusk and Maria I. Marshall
wrote their article *How to Use Goals to Achieve Business Success: First Steps for New
Entrepreneurs* (2005) as a guide for starting a new business. In it, they stressed the
importance of goals. They likened goals to a road map to help identify where you are
going and how to get there. Lusk and Marshall argue that setting goals forces one to set a
desired outcome and the steps to get there; helps prioritize what needs to be done; enables
tracking progress and make the whole process of starting a business less overwhelming.

In his book, *Implementing your Strategic Plan How to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change*, C. Davis Fogg suggests that companies that are
long-term, strategic winners faithfully practice 18 keys to strategy implementation
(1999). Fogg states to begin, a company must have a strategic plan that has three critical
components. These are a direction statement, strategic objectives and strategic priority
issues. The direction statement defines that company and where it needs to go. The
strategic objectives are used to measure how one is doing on the key dimensions of the
direction statement. The strategic priorities are the urgent marching orders, the must dos.
When fleshed out, resourced and turned into action this small group of strategic priority
issues will lead one toward an envisioned future (Fogg, 1999, p. 6). Fogg suggests that it
is important where you put your resources. Assigning personnel and budget to handle
strategic priorities empowers that team to achieve it. However, investment of resources outside of the strategy and its priorities, weakens it (Fogg, 1999, p. 257)

In the article, *Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of Overprescribing Goal Setting* (Ordo'nez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), the authors take a different look at goals. Most researchers in the field advocate goal setting and argue that goals need to be specific and challenging. But the authors of this article suggest that goals are overused and have lead to a number of serious problems in the business world. Problems such as narrowing employee’s focus to the neglect of non-goal areas, too many goals, too short a performance time frame, too challenging and the goal becoming the ceiling of performance. The problems are exacerbated when managers chose the wrong goal. They provide the example of Enron managers who were focused on revenue while ignoring profit percentages because they were receiving bonuses to increase revenue. The authors suggest that goals should be used more like a prescription drug instead of an over the counter medicine. Use of goals should be carefully dosed with consideration for the harmful side effects and closely supervised.

In the article, *Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector* (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008), the authors discuss the goal setting theory of Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke. The goal setting theory states that a specific high-level goal will lead to higher performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting. Given ability and commitment the higher the goal the higher the performance while variables like participation in developing goals, praise, competition and monetary incentives only affect behavior to the extent that they lead to the setting of and commitment to a specific high goal (Latham, et al., 2008, p. 386). Specific goals focus on what is to be accomplished and leads to persistence until the goal is attained.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on America, the U.S. Congress began to spend money to prevent, respond to and mitigate another terrorist attack. On the state level, these funds were made available by grants from the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In 2010 alone, Florida received $91 million dollars from the DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2009, pp. 13–28). These funds do not come without guidance on how to spend them
from DHS. Each year, DHS issues grant guidance that specifies how some of the funds are to be spent and how they are not to be spent. This documents most recent title was *FY 2010 Preparedness Grant Programs Overview*. For example, DHS does not allow its grant funds to be used to purchase firearms but in the last few years DHS has required that 25 percent of its Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants and State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) grants be spent on law enforcement prevention of terrorism type projects (DHS, 2009, pp. 3, 4, 13, 15). To Florida, in 2010, that meant $18.6 million dollars (DHS, 2009, pp. 3, 4, 13, 15). By controlling the use of $18.6 million, DHS is expressing its prioritization of these types of projects.

Additionally, in its National Preparedness Guidelines, DHS produced the *Target Capabilities List*, which contains 37 targeted capabilities, commonly referred to as TCLs (DHS, 2007, pp. 31–32). The TCLs are capabilities that DHS believes state and local governments should possess to effectively prevent, respond to and mitigate acts of terrorism. In order to receive DHS grant funds, states are required to measure their current capabilities against the TCLs and determine any gap between them. DHS then requires states to tie the request and spending of DHS grant funds to closing those identified gaps. DHS requires that states submit a state homeland security strategy to them each year as part of the grant application process. In order to qualify for grant funding, the states must show in their strategy document how they plan to target the same priorities determined to be important by DHS. Again, DHS is using its leverage to insure prioritization of what it has deemed important capabilities.

The GAO testimonies, business strategy authors and DHS grant guidance stress the importance of prioritizing goals, objectives or subobjectives in strategy documents and establish that as a best practice for strategic planning.

### C. LITERATURE RELATED TO ASSIGNMENT

In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, just 10 days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States presented his report, *Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts* (Walker, 2001), which discussed the need...
for a national strategy for homeland security. Walker commented that homeland security involves a large number of organizations that must have clearly articulated roles, responsibilities and accountability. He stated that clarifying those roles will be a critical function for the entity that is given oversight for homeland security efforts. Walker continued that once a national homeland security strategy is developed then all levels of the government and private sector will need to understand and prepare for its roles in it. The federal government would need to reach consensus with lower levels of government and the private sector on their roles since the federal government does not control them.

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) presented its report, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism* to the U.S. Congress in 2004. In the report, it established six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, which, as described above, are still used by GAO as its standard. One of the six desirable characteristics was to include organizational roles, responsibilities and coordination. The GAO report further defined this characteristic as addressing who will be implementing the strategy, what their roles will be compared to others and mechanisms for them to coordinate their efforts (GAO, 2004, p. 11). In addition, the GAO stated a strategy would ideally clarify implementing organizations’ relationships in terms of leading, supporting, and partnering and could describe the organizations that will provide the overall framework for accountability and oversight. Furthermore, a strategy might also identify specific processes for coordination and collaboration between sectors and organizations and address how any conflicts would be resolved (GAO, 2004, p. 22). In his pre 9/11 testimony titled *Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy* before a U.S. House Committee, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management for the GAO stated that key aspects of a national strategy should include roles and missions of federal, state, and local entities (GAO, 2001, p. 2).

There are other examples of the federal government placing importance of identifying the roles agencies are to play in a strategy. When the U.S. Congress passed the law titled the *National Money Laundering and Related Financial Crimes Strategy* (U.S. Congress, 2007), it included a coordinating role it wanted the Secretary of the
Treasury to play in the efforts of the many federal, state and local law enforcement agencies responsible for enforcing financial laws. This law also directs the coordination between the private sector and law enforcement agencies regarding prevention and detection of money laundering and other financial crimes (U.S. Congress, 2007, p. (b)(4)). In *Homeland Security Presidential Directive #1* (White House, 2001) then President Bush, recognizing the extensive coordination needed across a broad spectrum of federal, state and local agencies related to prevention of terrorist attacks, directed the Homeland Security Council to ensure coordination of all homeland security related activities amongst executive departments. He gave the responsibility and through the HSPD the authority to the Homeland Security Council.

Businesses also use goals and objectives. Maria I. Marshall suggests that goals can be broad and general in nature in her article, *Defining Your Business Through Goals and Objectives First Steps for New Entrepreneurs* (2004); however, she argues that objectives must be clear and concise. She suggests the SMART method of objective writing that requires them to be specific, measurable, action oriented, realistic and timely (SMART) (Marshall, 2004). Objectives should be clear targets of performance that can be evaluated. They should state what needs to happen, who should do it and when (Marshall, 2004, p. 2). In his book, *Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change*, C. Davis Fogg suggests that companies that are long term strategic winners faithfully practice eighteen keys to strategy implementation (1999). Fogg’s first key to strategic implementation is to develop an accountability system. He argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them. Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57). Having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success. Fogg’s eleventh key suggests that it is important where an organization puts its resources. Assigning personnel and budget to handle strategic priorities empowers that team to achieve it; however, investment of resources outside of the strategy and its priorities weakens it (Fogg, 1999, p. 257).
The GAO testimonies and the literature suggest that homeland security involves a large number of players and their roles and responsibilities must be clarified. Someone has to be given the responsibility and authority to accomplish goals and objectives. Assignment of accountability and responsibility for strategic plan objectives empowers the team and results in a high probability the objective will be accomplished.

D. LITERATURE RELATED TO THE USE OF METRICS

The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) presented its report, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism* (GAO, 2004), to the U.S. Congress in 2004. In its report, it establishes six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, which as described above are still used by the GAO as its standard. One of the six desirable characteristics included goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures in the strategy. The GAO provided further clarification of this characteristic by stating it addresses steps to achieve results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results (GAO, 2004, p. 11). The GAO felt that measuring performance was important enough that if there were limitations on the ability to collect performance data then one of the goals of the strategy could be to obtain better data (GAO, 2004, p. 16). The GAO developed its six desirable characteristics as a standard to review seven national domestic security strategies that were issued by the Bush Administration soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (GAO, 2004, p. 10). In its review of the seven national strategies, the GAO found they all identified goals, objectives and activities, but generally it did not identify priorities, milestones or performance measures. These are elements the GAO considered necessary for evaluating progress, achieving results and ensuring oversight (GAO, 2004, p. 12). The GAO stated a better identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures would aid implementing parties in achieving results in specific timeframes—and would enable more effective oversight and accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 19).

In his April 2002 testimony before a U.S. House committee, Randall A. Yim, the then Managing Director of National Preparedness for the U.S. General Accounting
Office, stressed the importance of metrics for goals and objectives. In his report titled *National Preparedness, Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security* (GAO, 2002), Yim describes measuring results of federal programs as a longstanding objective of the Congress. To further that effort, the Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which was designed to have agencies focus on the performance and results of their programs rather than on program resources and activities. The GPRA requires agencies to set strategic quantifiable, measurable performance goals, measure performance and report on the degree to which goals are met. Agencies should also ensure goals within their lower organization levels support the agency-wide goals. Yim argued that a preparedness program that lacks broad, but measurable, objectives is unsustainable because it deprives policy makers of information they need to make rational resource decisions (GAO, 2002).

In his March 2001 testimony titled *Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy* before a U.S. House Committee, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management for the GAO, stated that key aspects of a national strategy should include roles and missions of federal, state, and local entities and establish objectives, priorities, outcome-related goals with milestones, and performance measures to achieve those goals (GAO, 2001, p. 2). In March 2003, Decker presented a report again before a U.S. House Subcommittee titled *Combating Terrorism Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism* (GAO, 2003). The report discussed the coordination of efforts across the vast number of federal and other governmental agencies with homeland security responsibilities. Decker stated that performance measures are important for monitoring the successes of strategies and their related programs (GAO, 2003, p. 16). One key to assessing overall performance is that they define an end-state of what the strategy is trying to achieve. Decker suggests that lacking specific performance measures in federal homeland security strategies makes it more important that federal agencies have their own explicit performance measures such as required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). Decker goes on to say that national performance goals and measurements should extend
beyond just federal agencies and include state and local governments, the private sector and the international community (GAO, 2003, p. 18). He recognizes this is difficult with the principles of federalism, international sovereignty and private sector independence, but he stresses that national strategies to combat terrorism require national and international performance expectations if they are to be successfully implemented (GAO, 2003, p. 18).

Focusing on the business community, Maria I. Marshall suggests that goals can be broad and general in nature in her article, *Defining Your Business Through Goals and Objectives First Steps for New Entrepreneurs* (2004); however, she argues that objectives must be clear and concise. She suggests the SMART method of objective writing that requires them to be specific, measurable, action oriented, realistic and timely. To be measurable, an objective should be expressed in terms of dollars or quantities. Objectives should be clear targets of performance that can be evaluated. They should state what needs to happen, who should do it and when (Marshall, 2004, p. 2).

In his book, *Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” into Effective Action for Sustainable Change* C., Davis Fogg suggests that companies that are long-term strategic winners faithfully practice eighteen keys to strategy implementation (1999). Fogg argues a company must have a strategic plan that has a direction statement, strategic objectives and strategic priority issues. The direction statement defines that company and where it needs to go. The strategic objectives are used to measure how one is doing on the key dimensions of the direction statement. The strategic priorities are urgent marching orders (Fogg, 1999, p. 6). Fogg’s first key to strategic implementation is to develop an accountability system. He argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them. Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57). Having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success. Fogg’s definition of measurable includes a completion date and results that can be measured by numbers such as dollars or percentages.

In the article, *Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector* (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008), the authors discuss the goal setting theory of Gary
P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke. The goal setting theory states a specific high-level goal will lead to higher performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting. Given ability and commitment the higher the goal the higher the performance while variables like participation in developing goals, praise, competition and monetary incentives only affect behavior to the extent that they lead to the setting of and commitment to a specific high goal (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008, p. 386). Specific goals focus on what is to be accomplished and leads to persistence until the goal is attained. The goal setting theory works in the public sector, as it does in the private sector. On the federal level, goal specificity, a core aspect of the goal setting theory, is not as often present. Federal legislatures have diverse stakeholders and are reluctant to set specific goals that communicate a goal not specified is of secondary importance. While local level governments are more operational than the national level and setting specific goals is more similar to that in the private sector (Latham et al., 2008, p. 398)

The governmental reports and literature suggest that the objectives or subobjectives of a strategic plan should be results driven. They should establish milestones, be measurable in a quantifiable way and be an action item. They should describe a specific action that can be recognized when completed and done so in a timely manner. If done correctly, goals, objectives and subobjectives can be used to evaluate progress, provide oversight, enhance management decisions and above all, achieve results.

E. GENERAL LITERATURE

In their article, Enhancing the Benefits and Overcoming the Pitfalls of Goal Setting (2006), Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke explain that more than 1,000 studies with over 40,000 participants from five different continents show that specific goals are effective in significantly increasing a person’s performance. It does not matter whether the goal was set by a manager, self set or a combined effort so long as it includes a logic or rationale from the manager (Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 332). People who realize their performance is below a goal will likely increase their effort or change to attain it (Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 332). Studies across a wide variety of professions show the more
difficult the goal, the greater will be the effort, focus and persistence by the employee. Studies even show that praise, public recognition and money have no effect on a person’s performance unless they lead to a specific high goal; however, goals can have potential drawbacks. If people lack the knowledge and skill to obtain a goal, then giving them a difficult goal can lead to poorer performance (Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 334). Problems can also occur if people see their assigned goals as competitive with others. Then they could set off on their own withholding information and ideas from one another instead of sharing for the good of the organization (Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 334). Goals can sometimes cause nongoal performance to be ignored, or stress can increase if a person is challenged with thirty goals instead of a manageable three to seven. Finally, the authors caution that progressively increasing the challenge eventually lead to unattainable goals (Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 337).

In the article, *Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of Overprescribing Goal Setting* (Ordo'nez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), the authors take a different look at goals. Most researchers in the field advocate goal setting and argue that goals need to be specific and challenging. But the authors of this article suggest that goals are overused and have lead to a number of serious problems in the business world. Problems exist, such as narrowing employee’s focus to the neglect of nongoal areas, too many goals, too short a performance time frame, too challenging and the goal becoming the ceiling of performance. The problems are exacerbated when managers chose the wrong goal. They provide the example of Enron managers who were focused on revenue while ignoring profit percentages because they were receiving bonuses to increase revenue. The authors suggest that goals should be used more like a prescription drug instead of an over the counter medicine. Use of goals should be carefully dosed with consideration for the harmful side effects and closely supervised.

A number of references were found that combined the topics of strategies and the public sector. For example, in their article *A Strategic Planning Approach Defining Alternative Counterterrorism Strategies as an Illustration* (2009), authors Lynn Davis and Melanie Sisson suggest adding a new step into traditional strategic planning that will lead to means or methods of accomplishing goals being prioritized. The article was
written for U.S. policy makers, specifically the military; however, the authors kept their article generic so the theory easily translates to other forms of strategic planning and is very relevant to this research project (Davis & Sisson, 2009). In another example in the article Changing Homeland Security: What Should Homeland Security Leaders Be Talking About? (2006), Christopher Bellavita suggests that because of a lack of terrorist attacks on American soil only homeland security professionals are thinking about the future of homeland security. In addition, Bellavita suggests that homeland security officials plan today with wisdom for sweeping changes that will be demanded if another terrorist attack happens. This article is thought provoking about strategic thinking needs of the day but does not specifically discuss strategy methodology.

A review of Darren Chen’s master’s thesis, State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategy v3.0 Evolving Strategic Planning (2006), provided a historical review of how state domestic security strategies developed from 1999 until 2006. The author promotes comprehensive, multi-discipline, nonfunding based strategies that have defined and measurable goals and objectives. Chen’s thesis is outdated for the purpose of this research, as the strategy requirements from DHS have continued to change since 2006. In his thesis, What Type of State Homeland Security Strategy Should the State of New Jersey Develop? (2007), Richard Rosell discussed the need for the state of New Jersey to create a homeland security strategy. Rosell first justifies the need for a strategy and then offers suggestions for building one. While Rosell’s research is interesting, it does not delve into the detail of goals, objectives, prioritization, accountability and measuring accomplishments desired for the current research project.

A number of literature sources reviewed were found to be written for the business community but their arguments translate well into the public sector. In his article The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning, Henry Mintzberg tells his readers that strategic plans are used so that everyone pulls in the same direction (1994, p. 113), but strategic planning should not take the place of strategic thinking. Thinking comes from managers and workers who are working in the production units of the entity. They are exposed to the subtle trends and currents of their industry. They understand the data from statistics and how they apply to their work. Mintzberg states most successful strategies are visions, not
plans (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 107). Strategic planners should not be developing vision. They should supply data for consideration by managers and once a vision is chosen, then they should specify the series of steps needed to carry out the vision (Mintzberg, 1994, p. 108). The articles in this subcategory are scholarly and offer insight into theories of strategic planning. Some were found to be more directly related to the present research than others, but all add value.

F. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY

In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, just 10 days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States, presented his report *Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts* (Walker, 2001) discussing the need for a national strategy for homeland security. Walker commented on the need for clearly articulated roles, responsibilities and accountability for homeland security efforts for all levels of the government and private sector. In his April 2002 testimony before a U.S. House committee, Randall A. Yim, the then Managing Director of National Preparedness for the U.S. General Accounting Office, stressed the importance of metrics for goals and objectives. In his report titled *National Preparedness, Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security* (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002) Yim describes measuring results of federal programs as a longstanding objective of the U.S. Congress. He discusses the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which was designed to have agencies focus on the performance and results of their programs rather than on program resources and activities.

In March 2003, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the US Government Accountability Office presented a report titled *Combating Terrorism Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism* (GAO, 2003) before a House Subcommittee. The report discussed the coordination of efforts across the vast number of federal and other governmental agencies with homeland security responsibilities. The report promotes defining a desired end state and
establishing performance measures to track the progress there. In a March 2001 appearance before a U.S. House Committee, Decker stated that key aspects of a national strategy should include roles and missions of federal, state, and local entities and establish objectives, priorities, outcome-related goals with milestones, and performance measures to achieve those goals (GAO, 2001, p. 2).

In its report, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism* (GAO, 2004), the U.S. Government Accountability Office discusses six characteristics that a national strategy should contain. Three of these are directly related to the hypothesis of this research. The report examined seven national strategies that deal directly with homeland security and national security issues. This report provides quality supporting documentation for its conclusions that also help to guide further research. The report was created in 2004, but it remains pertinent as it is often cited as a standard in recent GAO reports.

A review of the record of testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response dated October 27, 2009 was made. The testimony was titled *Preparedness: What has $29 Billion in Homeland Security Grants Bought and How do We Know* (US House of Representatives, Homeland Security Committee, 2009)? One of the topics of the testimony was relevant to this research—specifically, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s use of the Cost 2 Capability (C2C) method of measuring progress. The C2C was discussed as a tool for measuring the effectiveness of federal grants for homeland security enhancements. The prepared statements given by two testifying witnesses were similar in that they made unsupported claims about the C2C tool. One witness provided bullet statements of the virtues of the system without any providing any supporting evidence. All of the testimony was general in nature and none of the witnesses provided any details about how the C2C tool works. One witness did offer credible testimony on the tools deficiencies (US House of Representatives, Homeland Security Committee, 2009, p 18–22).
This subcategory shows a pattern of congressional testimony supporting the prioritization, assignment and use of metrics related to goals and objectives of strategies. Most of the testimony before the congress is supported by evidence in reports submitted with the testimony.

G. FEDERAL STRATEGIES

A review of One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008–2013 (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008) was made regarding this research. The Strategy was found to be broad with five strategic goals. The document points to an innovative document titled Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Report Fiscal Years 2008–2010 (DHS, 2009). This second document lists individual program goals within the many divisions of the Department of Homeland Security and ties those program goals back to the department-wide objectives of the first document. The program is innovative and will be useful to examine for the current research.

Along similar lines, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s document titled FEMA Strategic Plan Fiscal Years 2008–2013 (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008) showed a typical strategy comprised of goals and objectives. The document did not prioritize, assign tasks or suggest metrics to measure success. An interesting addition to this strategy was a list of nine core competencies for the agency and an effort made to relate them into their strategic goals and objectives. In 2005 the U.S. Homeland Security Council issued the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2005). This strategy listed three overarching goals and promised a future document to provide more details. In 2006, the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2006) was published that provided roles and responsibilities of government, private and international entities in dealing with a pandemic outbreak. This second document listed by name federal agencies and assigned them responsibilities, including measurements of progress and timelines for implementation for parts of the strategy implementation plan. The documents in this subsection are useful to the current research by providing
examples of whether federal strategies prioritize goals, assign responsibility for achievement or establish metrics to measure progress. While not considered scholarly, they are the official strategies of the United States that should be considered when researching protocols for statewide strategies. Since they are government strategies, they do not provide explanations or rationale for their contents and directions.

H. STATE HOMELAND SECURITY STRATEGIES

State homeland security strategies were the most useful forms of literature in this research project. Thirty-five state strategies were reviewed and found to be very different in the manner they handled prioritization, assignment and metrics related to goals, objectives or subobjectives. The state homeland security strategies were found to fit into five separate categories. Those that prioritize, those that assign, those that use metrics, those that use a combination and those that do not prioritize, assign or use metrics. Each category will be discussed below.

Two state homeland security strategies were found that prioritize their goals or objectives. In his opening address in *Maryland's Strategic Goals and Objectives for Homeland Security* (State of Maryland, 2009), Governor Martin O'Malley expresses his belief that Maryland should focus its goals and objectives on 12 basic, core capabilities that should be available in every region of the state. The governor had developed these priorities in the previous year and the pursuit of those goals would continue in this updated strategy document. These core goals are then supported by objectives and implementation steps. The goals, objectives and steps are not assigned nor measured within the document. In its *State of Colorado Homeland Security Strategy 2008–2013* (2008), the Governor's Office of Homeland Security added three state priorities to round out its guidance priorities. The guidance priorities do not appear as goals or objectives. Colorado has five goals in its strategy. Each goal is assigned a “goal champion” who then establishes objectives and assigns a goal leader for each. The goal champion and leader are state agencies.

One state homeland security strategy was found that assigned its goals and objectives. California has a 100-page strategy titled *State of California Homeland Security Strategy 2008* (California Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008). The
strategy provides goals and objectives that are not prioritized nor measured. The strategy does identify divisions of the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and the goal or objective it is to serve in a supporting role (California Governor’s Office of Homeland Security, 2008, pp. 18, 26, 34, 44, 52, 57, 62, 67, 70, 72, 76).

Five state homeland security strategies were found that use metrics on their goals or objectives. The New Hampshire Homeland Security Strategy (New Hampshire Department of Safety, 2004) sets completion dates for each of its objectives. The completion dates are general as they only specify the year the objective is to be completed by. Otherwise, this strategy does not prioritize, assign or measure its goals and objectives. South Carolina’s 2003 State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy (South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, 2003) was developed by the South Carolina Division of Law Enforcement (SLED) to cover a three-year period. In its strategy, it uses three goals that are further supported by action goals, objectives and implementation steps. SLED sets completion milestones by listing completion dates for 60 percent of its objectives and 41 percent of its implementation steps (South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, 2003, p. 8–24). Examination of South Carolina’s methods will be useful in this research. In the state of Georgia’s 2004 State Strategic Plan for Terrorism and All-Hazards Preparedness, Georgia Office of Homeland Security based its strategy’s priorities on national guidelines, such as the eight national priorities (DHS, 2007, p. 11) and the 37 TCLs (DHS, 2007, p. 31–32). In addition, it added three Georgia specific priorities that were to strengthen agro terrorism defense, strengthen search and rescue and establish an urban evacuation plan (Georgia Office of Homeland Security, 2006, p. 6). The priorities do not appear in their goals or objectives, except for search and rescue training and equipment. Interestingly, they also prioritize all future funding decisions based upon the population of the submitting jurisdiction with larger populations receiving a higher priority. The Strategy lists objectives and supporting implementation steps for each of their goals. The objectives are assigned a completion date; however, no agency is made responsible for them. Virginia’s Secure Commonwealth Strategic Plan (Virginia Office of Commonwealth Preparedness, 2009) uses a blend of goals, objectives and implementation steps. The objectives are organized into planning, organizing, equipping,
training and exercise groups. The Strategy discusses how each state agency is rated annually on its emergency preparedness, with 20 percent of the reviews conducted by an onsite independent team. The goals and objectives are not prioritized nor are the implementation steps assigned to a specific agency. The Alaska State Homeland Security Strategy 2008 (Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2008, p. 27) does not incorporate metrics toward completion of its goals and objectives within the document; however, the Strategy describes how its goals and objectives are incorporated into the grant award of subgrantees who are then responsible for quarter reports on their progress toward achieving them.

Ten homeland security strategies were found to use a combination of prioritization, assignment or metrics with their goals or objectives. In its State of Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy (Wisconsin Homeland Security Council, 2009), the council identifies nine specified priorities as the core of its strategy. Each of the nine priorities is assigned a lead state agency called a champion. The priorities are then broken down into goals and subgoals. Each goal is assigned a state agency to serve as the goal champion to ensure progress toward them. Some of the subgoals include completion dates. The Kansas State Homeland Security Strategy Goals and Objectives (Kansas Division of Emergency Management, 2009) is a 22-page document that lists six goals that are supported by objectives and implementation strategies. All of the implementation strategies related to the first two goals list the agency responsible for completion of it and lists a completion date for that task. In the third goal, ownership of the task continues to be identified but completion dates are not provided. As the strategy gets into the remaining three goals, it does not provide ownership or completion dates very often. The implementation steps are often succinct and clearly obtainable. Missouri's Homeland Security Strategy (Missouri Department of Public Safety, 2008) provides a great deal of relevant data regarding this research. The strategy priorities objectives, assigns ownership of objectives and includes measurement toward completion. This document is thorough and well organized. The authors of the Idaho Homeland Security / Emergency Management Strategy (Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security, 2010) used the eight national priorities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
2007, p. 11) as the priorities of its state strategy. The bureau also added two of its own state priorities (Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 3). Each priority was supported by goals, objectives and implementation steps. Each objective in the strategy is assigned a completion date. Based upon input from project managers, a project tracking software is used to monitor the progress of goals and objectives. Results are discussed with the Bureau of Homeland Security Director who is the State Administrative Agency, each quarter. The *Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2006–2011* (Washington Emergency Management Division, 2006) lists goals, objectives and implementation steps. The objectives are assigned a government agency or formal committee to guide in the completion of its implementation steps. Each subobjective is given a targeted completion date. The objectives are neither prioritized nor assigned further metrics for progress. The *National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Overview 2007–2009* (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2006) is part of a three part strategy document presentation. The first is an overview document. The second, titled *National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume I: Core Plan* (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2006), provides details of the goals, objectives and the initiatives toward achieving the objectives. The third part, titled *National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume II: Appendices* (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2009), contains detailed descriptions and metrics for initiatives developed to support the goals and objectives of the strategy. The *Strategic Plan* provides a detailed time frame for the implementation of the initiatives and prioritizes some of them. Since the *Strategic Plan* covers a multi state region, it goes on to discuss working within the various budget periods of the states and coordinating with the various levels of government within the region. This document is detailed and well-organized and should be beneficial to this current research. In the *Delaware Strategy for Homeland Security*, the authors established 12 high-level state goals for the state. Each goal is assigned a team manager which is assigned to lead the efforts of stakeholders along a timeline provided with its objectives. Objectives each are given a completion date and are assigned to a discipline instead of a specific agency (Department of Safety and Homeland Security, 2004, p. 23). The *Iowa Strategy for
Homeland Security and Emergency Management has five goals supported by objectives and implementation steps (Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, 2009). Each step has a completion date in the form of a year with most indicating they are ongoing efforts. In Annex B of the Strategy, each objective is assigned performance measures as well as a state agency to be responsible for it. The performance measures do not link directly to the implementation steps assigned to each objective earlier in the Strategy. The Indiana Strategy for Homeland Security (Indiana Department of Homeland Security, 2008) limits its goals to just eight that are supported by objectives and implementation steps. Indiana effectively handles progress toward its goals and objectives by including a completion date and a clearly defined measure that describes what must be done to complete each step. It uses the SMART criteria to draft its measurements so that they are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time sensitive. This document will be very useful to comparison in this research. In the Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy (Nevada Division of Emergency Management, 2010), it states that Nevada will focus its efforts over the next three years on 13 specific priorities. They use those priorities as the goals of the strategy. The goals are supported by objectives and implementation steps. The implementation steps are given completion dates but most of those are already past.

Seventeen of the homeland security strategies reviewed did not prioritize, assign or use metrics with their goals or objectives. These state strategies include:

- Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan (Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council, 2008)
- Kentucky’s Strategic Plan (Kentucky Office of Homeland Security, 2006)
- Vermont Homeland Security Strategy (Vermont Department of Public Safety, 2010)

New Mexico Strategic Plan (New Mexico Department of Homeland Security & Emergency Management, 2009)


Ohio Homeland Security Strategic Plan Version 3 (Ohio Department of Public Safety, 2007)


West Virginia Homeland Security Strategy (West Virginia Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety, 2010)


This subcategory of literature is comprised entirely of governmental documents. These documents, while all fairly recent, are not considered scholarly; however, they are the executive level strategy documents that the states use to guide important funding and resource decisions. They are an important resource offering insight into how Florida’s peer states are handling their domestic security strategies. Since they are government strategies, they do not provide explanations or rationale for their contents or findings.

I. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT DOCUMENTS

The Fiscal Year 2010 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit (DHS, 2009) is perhaps one of the most significant documents in this literature review. The review of many state homeland security strategies shows close
adherence to federal grant funding guidance. This document and its preceding annual iterations are the guiding force for those funds. This document sets the rules for obtaining U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant funds. Few would argue that state and local governments have extra funding to invest in domestic security preparation, response and mitigation. Most such progress since 2002 has been made using DHS grant funding. This document makes it clear that grant funds will be allocated based on legislative mandates, DHS’ risk methodology and effectiveness (DHS, 2009, p. 48). Any research regarding state strategic plans must consider the most significant source of funding for that plan and the requirements to obtain it. The document is a government document that is detailed, but does not provide any logic or reasoning for its directions.

J. CONCLUSION

The literature reviewed can be divided into two main categories. The first are government documents and the second scholarly articles. Much of the literature herein was written by government agencies. Most are recent, but neither scholarly nor peer reviewed. Often statements of fact in these documents are generic or not supported by evidence; however, they are the official documents used by governments to allocate resources and funding. Like most government documents, they do not provide explanation, evidence or rationale for their contents and directions. Some of the literature found is right on point for this research project while others were generally informative but not relevant. Some literature was found to be outdated, while some did not specifically focus on goals and objectives and how they should be used in a strategic plan. Overall, the literature resources reviewed will help guide this research and provide a wide range of data to be considered for enhancing Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan.
III. PRIORITIZATION OF GOALS, OBJECTIVES OR SUBOBJECTIVES IN STRATEGIC PLANS

*I learned that we can do anything,*
*but we can’t do everything…*
*at least not at the same time.*
*So think of your priorities not in terms of what activities you do,*
*but when you do them.*
*Timing is everything.*

Dan Millman

The hypothesis of this research project theorizes that prioritization of Florida’s state homeland security strategy’s goals, objectives or implementation steps will help make the strategy more effective in accomplishing them. A summary of the literature suggests that prioritization is an important and effective tool in a strategy. The U.S. General Accounting Office used prioritization as a component in the definition of one of its six desirable characteristics of a strategy (GAO, 2004, p. 11). It states that priorities are considered necessary for achieving results. This same GAO report continues to be cited in recent years as a government standard (Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2009, p. 18); (GAO, 2009, pp. 4, 5, 13; 2010, pp. 32–33). DHS grant funding guidelines also take advantage of the power of prioritization to insure grant funding is spent on items that DHS believes are the most important. Once the findings from the literature were identified, they were used as a guide to review thirty-five state homeland security strategies to find those that appear to utilize those best practices. The identified state strategies were then reviewed to determine the way prioritization was use in their goals, objectives or subobjectives.

In an effort to establish additional data for evaluation, two subject matter experts (SME) were interviewed: one from the agency that helped to create the selected strategies and one from an agency responsible for implementing part of them. The SMEs were asked their opinion on how effective their state’s method of prioritization of goals, objectives or subobjectives has been toward accomplishing them. SMEs interviewed for other chapters in this research at times made statements related to prioritization. These comments will be included in this chapter as supporting evidence. To encourage answers
that reflect reality without the fear of repercussion each SME was assured complete confidentiality in this research. Therefore, the statements made by SMEs will be written to prevent attribution. The data from these two phases of the research will be analyzed and the findings will be considered for suggested use by Florida in its future homeland security strategies.

A. REVIEW OF STATE STRATEGIES

The first data collection in this phase of the research involved a review of existing state homeland security strategies for evidence of prioritization of their goals, objectives or subobjectives. Thirty-five state homeland security strategies were reviewed for this research project; they appear in Table 1. Most strategies were found to mentioned priorities in some manner, but that often did not seem to have a direct influence on the goals or objectives that appeared in the strategy. Commonly, the priorities referred to in the strategies were federal priorities, such as the eight federal priorities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 11), the 37 TCLs (DHS, 2007, p. 31–32), as well as priorities from various national strategic plans and presidential directives. Since the focus of this phase of the research is on prioritization of actual goals, objectives or subobjectives the review of the state strategies was focused there.

It was determined that six or 17 percent of the thirty-five reviewed strategies employed some form of prioritization of their goals, objectives or subobjectives. Based upon this criterion, the six state homeland security strategies were selected for review. Upon review, the strategies seem to fit into two categories. First, those that used their priorities as their goals or objectives, and, second, those that had multiple goals and objectives but prioritized only some of them. A discussion of each category follows.

1. Strategies That Used Their Priorities as Their Goals or Objectives

In his opening address in Maryland’s Strategic Goals and Objectives for Homeland Security (O’Malley, 2009), Governor Martin O’Malley expresses his belief that Maryland should focus its goals and objectives on 12 basic, core capabilities that should be available in every region of the state. The governor’s office had developed
these priorities in 2007, and the pursuit of those goals would continue in this updated strategy document. These core goals are then supported and fleshed out by objectives and implementation steps. In the *State of Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy* (Wisconsin Homeland Security Council, 2009), the authors identify nine specific priorities as the core of their strategy. The priorities appear in the goals section and are broken down further into goals and subgoals. The authors of the *Idaho Homeland Security / Emergency Management Strategy* used the eight national priorities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 11) as the goal sections of their state strategy. They also added two of their own state priorities, which were to implement a statewide training and exercise program and to implement and synchronize emergency management, administration, finance and logistics process (Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 3). Each priority was supported by goals, objectives and implementation steps. In the *Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy* (Nevada Division of Emergency Management, 2010), the authors advise that Nevada will focus its efforts over the next three years on 13 specific priorities. They use those priorities as the goals of the strategy. The goals were then supported by objectives and implementation steps.

Table 1. Review of State Homeland Security Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Year of the strategy</th>
<th>Prioritize Goals / Objectives</th>
<th>Assign Goals / Objectives</th>
<th>Presence of metrics for Goals / Objectives</th>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>Assign Goals / Objectives</td>
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2. Strategies That Have Multiple Goals and Objectives but Prioritized Only Some of Them

In Missouri's Homeland Security Strategy, it describes the use of a multi-discipline approach to build a consensus on 17 state initiatives that were felt to be important to protect Missourians (Department of Homeland Security, 2007). Missouri uses DHS’s 37 TCLs (DHS, 2007, p. 31–32) as the objectives for its strategy. Missouri recognized that while it has needs within each of the 37 target capabilities, it is prudent to prioritize their spending on its 17 specific state initiatives. In the strategy, it states that capabilities and associated implementation steps not specifically referenced in Missouri’s 17 state initiatives will be addressed in future funding cycles. (Missouri Department of Public Safety, 2008, p. 3).

The National Capital Regions (NCR) strategic plan is a regional and not a state plan; however, like the other states reviewed for this research, the NCR territory is comprised of state, county and city level governments working together. Based upon 2009 U.S. Census Bureau estimates, the NCR has a combined population of nearly 4.5 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, p. 1). NCR’s population level is larger than the Census Bureau’s estimate for 25 other states in the nation (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, p. 1). These facts suggest that the NCR is similar enough to other states for the purpose of comparison in this research. The National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume 1 Core Plan (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2006) has four goals. Each goal has an average of three objectives that serve as milestones toward the accomplishment of each goal. The Strategy then breaks down each objective into more tangible and measurable components called initiatives that serve to achieve the objective it supports. The NCR stakeholders prioritized their initiatives. The initiatives were prioritized based on their alignment with and support of three criteria: the eight national priorities (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007, p. 11); 37 TCLs (DHS, 2007, p. 31–32); and regional gaps identified by the NCR partners. As a result, 14 of the 30 initiatives are considered “priority initiatives.” These are placed first in line for implementation and funding (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2009, p. A–3). The NCR stakeholders set their initiatives on a time line chart to determine when
they should begin and end the initiative. Their order on the time line was based on factors such as their current status, priority and dependencies on prerequisite initiatives.

3. Analysis

The two different methods of prioritization produced similar results. The states that used their priorities as their actual goals averaged 10.5 goals. Those that had many goals and objectives, but prioritized only some of them, averaged 15.5 prioritized goals or objectives. In their article Enhancing the Benefits and Overcoming the Pitfalls of Goal Setting (2006), Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke warn that stress can increase, if a person is challenged with 30 goals instead of a manageable three to seven (Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 337). In the article, Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of Overprescribing Goal Setting (Ordoñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009), the authors suggest that goals should be used more like a prescription drug instead of an over the counter medicine. While surpassing Latham and Locke’s target of seven goals, the six strategies reviewed here were definitely closer to the idea number of prioritized goals than Florida’s 338 goals, objectives or subobjectives that were not prioritized.

The review of thirty-five state homeland security strategies revealed the majority of states (83 percent) do not prioritize the goals, objectives or subobjectives in their homeland security strategy. That is a significant percentage of states that fail to take advantage of the power of prioritization. In 2004, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) identified prioritization as a necessary element for achieving results. This standard continues to be cited into 2010 in many federal homeland security related strategies (Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 2009, p. 18; GAO, 2009, pp. 4, 5, 13; GAO, 2010, pp. 32–33). On the other end of the spectrum, the GAO criticized the federal money laundering strategy stating it identifies more priorities than can be achieved in a reasonable timeframe and does not rank them in order of importance (GAO, 2004, p. 18). In his book Implementing your Strategic Plan How to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change (1999), C. Davis Fogg calls strategic
priorities a critical component of a strategic plan. He continued that once fleshed out, resourced and turned into action, strategic priority issues will lead to toward the envisioned future (Fogg, 1999, p. 6).

There are several examples of the federal government using prioritization methodologies to insure desired actions. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on America, the U.S. Congress began to spend money to prevent, respond to and mitigate another terrorist attack. On the state level, these funds were made available by grants from the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In 2010 alone, Florida will receive $91 million dollars from the DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (Department of Homeland Security, 2009, pp. 13–28). These funds do not come without guidance from DHS on how to spend them. Each year, DHS issues grant guidance that specifies how some of the funds are to be spent, and how they are not to be spent. The 2010 grant guidance document is titled *FY 2010 Preparedness Grant Programs Overview* (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). In the last few years, DHS has required that 25 percent of their Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants and State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) grants be spent on law enforcement prevention of terrorism type projects (Department of Homeland Security, 2009, pp. 3, 4, 13, 15). In 2010, for Florida that meant $18.6 million dollars (Department of Homeland Security, 2009, pp. 13–28). By controlling the use of $18.6 million, DHS is expressing and enforcing its prioritization of these types of goals. Additionally, in their National Preparedness Guidelines DHS produced the *Target Capabilities List* which contains thirty seven targeted capabilities commonly referred to as the TCLs (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007). The TCLs are capabilities that DHS believes state and local governments should possess to effectively prevent, respond to and mitigate acts of terrorism. In order to receive DHS grant funds, states are required to measure their current capabilities against the TCLs and determine any gap between them. DHS then requires states to tie their request and spending of DHS grant funds to closing those identified gaps. Again, DHS is using their leverage of funding to insure prioritization of what they have deemed important goals.
Federal strategies, GAO testimonies, literature and DHS grant guidance all demonstrate the importance and power of prioritization of goals, objectives or subobjectives. As determined here, 83 percent of the reviewed state homeland security strategies did not prioritize their goals, objectives or subobjectives. State homeland security strategies are still in their first decade of development. In time, they should begin to align with federal guidance related to prioritization. In a 2004 report to the U.S. Congress, the U.S. General Accounting Office established the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. In the report, the GAO stated that priorities are an important part of goals and subordinate objectives (GAO, 2004, p. 11). Current budget constraints are limiting the amount of grant funding available to states from DHS and other sources. As grant funds decline, the competition for them will increase and as will the importance for states to use them more effectively. Prioritizing goals, objectives or subobjectives will play an important role in that effort.

Just because a strategy exists and prioritizes goals, objectives or subobjectives does not necessarily mean that it is practiced in reality. Questions arise, such as does prioritization produce results? Is prioritization used to focus other resources available beyond DHS funding? Upon what standard should prioritization be based? These questions cannot be answered by merely reading the strategies but are better answered by those tasked with implementing the strategies.

B. SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS

The second data collection in this phase of the research was to speak to subject matter experts (SMEs) related to two of the state homeland security strategies reviewed above. There were a total of 12 SMEs interviewed for this entire research project. The SMEs held positions in a number of disciplines such as governor’s staff, police, fire services, health departments and emergency management. They represented state, county and city entities and averaged 19.75 years of experience in professional domestic security related disciplines. The SME’s opinions will serve as evidence toward the findings of this research.
The state homeland security strategies above were divided into two categories. One from each was selected for further research with SMEs related to it. The first category was comprised of strategies that used their priorities as their goals or objectives. The choice from this category was *Maryland's Strategic Goals and Objectives for Homeland Security*. This strategy was chosen because its authors developed their entire strategy around 12 core capabilities they believed they needed. Most of the other strategies used federal priorities to justify their own. Maryland came into its strategy with its own priorities and pursued them. The second category contained strategies that had multiple goals and objectives but prioritized only some of them. The *National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume 1 Core Plan* was chosen from this category because it goes into greater detail than the others on its prioritized initiatives. Two SMEs related to each chosen strategy were interviewed. The SMEs were assigned the confidential names of Subject Matter Expert 1, 2, 3 and 4. Two were from an agency that had a part in the creation of one of the state homeland security strategies while two were from an agency that has responsibility to implement part of the strategies. Choosing SMEs with these different points of view related to their strategy should provide more balance data.

1. **Strategies That Used Their Priorities as Their Goals or Objectives**

   a. *Maryland's Strategic Goals and Objectives for Homeland Security*

   SMEs 1 and 2 provided an overview of how their state determined its 13 priorities used in Maryland’s state homeland security strategy. The strategy priorities were built upon the assumption that there are certain basic building blocks to sustaining a community. If the electrical power is lost with no generator back up, it does not matter if a hospital is fully equipped for mass surge—that capability is worthless without electrical power. Maryland felt its 12 core capabilities represent the primary building blocks upon which all other capabilities were built. They were (O’Malley, 2009, pp. 4–5):

   - Interoperable Communications
   - Intelligence/Information Sharing
Uniquely, Maryland does not intend to change its priorities. It does not plan to move on to other priorities once the original 12 have been accomplished; it intends only to sustain them. Maryland’s strategy was built with state and local input. The intent of the strategy is to guide both state and local jurisdictions in their preparedness efforts.

Most domestic security professionals in Maryland did not take part in the selection process for Maryland’s strategy priorities. This came from the Governor’s Office with input from subject matter experts. Maryland has formed Joint Executive Committees that are given oversight over different priorities. The Joint Executive Committees meet monthly to discuss the strategy and its application. Domestic security professionals have an opportunity for input into the strategy, and how it is implemented, through these committees.

The review of state strategies above raised the question whether prioritization produces results. The SMEs provided three examples as evidence that prioritizing Maryland’s goals was effective. First, the development of a statewide radio system, second, the development of a statewide Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system, and third, the statewide coordination of bomb squads. In 2007, Maryland had a number of statewide radio systems in use or in the planning stages. The state police used a number of different systems throughout the state; the transportation department was in the process of planning a 450 MHz system while another agency was planning a 700
MHz system. At the same time, most of the large municipal agencies were using 800 MHz systems while smaller agencies could not afford a new radio system. Interoperability was one of the core priorities of the new strategy. Leaders recognized that it made better sense to build a single statewide system for all state agencies. It should be 800 MHz, since most of the big local agencies already used that frequency range and that would enhance interoperability. Another benefit was that small agencies could piggy back on the infrastructure of the state system with a substantial cost savings. It is expected that Maryland will commit to a statewide radio system build out by the end of 2010.

In 2007, the state had five major law enforcement agencies. Three had different CAD systems while the other two had none. Following the same core priority of interoperability Maryland is expected to built a statewide CAD and make it available for all to use. As before, smaller agencies would be able to piggy back on state’s infrastructure at a substantial savings while they work to make larger city existing CAD systems compatible. It is expected that Maryland will commit to a statewide CAD system build out by the end of 2010.

Another core priority was explosive device response. To accomplish this goal, the state wanted the bomb squads around the state to work together in regional support. It got the team leaders together and found each was very different. Some were run by a sergeant, while others were run by a higher ranking person. Some were run by a fire department; others by the police; they had different equipment and different response protocols. Leaders wanted a standard system for the state. Collectively the teams set out protocols and goals for themselves. The bomb squads were able to use this statewide guidance to go back to their agencies to make the changes. They agreed to exercise and train together and developed a comprehensive agreement so all areas of the state had coverage and back up.

The SMEs believe Maryland is serious about its priority goals. Additional evidence to prove that is represented by how Maryland spends its resource allocations in the prioritized area of intelligence/information sharing. Maryland invests in this priority in a number of different ways. First, it dedicated approximately one million dollars of
DHS funding annually to support the Maryland Coordination Analysis Center (MCAC), which is Maryland’s fusion center. Second, Maryland receives funding from National Capital Region’s DHS grants that is used to fund four full-time positions in the MCAC. Third, the MCAC has over 80 full-time members assigned there from many different agencies. Fifty to 60 percent of those members are Maryland state employees from various state agencies. Maryland also has three Regional Information Centers (RIC) that work in concert with the MCAC. Maryland state employees also partially staff the RICs. Overall, Maryland has approximately 100 state employees dedicated to the intelligence/information sharing mission. These state employee’s salary and benefits costs are paid from Maryland general revenue funds. This represents a serious commitment of Maryland’s general budget to this strategic priority. Finally, in 2009, Maryland received federal funding from the American Recovery and Investment Act. Maryland chose to use part of those funds to add seven full-time employees to the MCAC. Essentially, Maryland is proving its commitment to its strategic priority by the amount of funding it is willing to devote to it.

The review of state strategies above raised another question. Is prioritization used to focus other resources available to the state beyond DHS funding? Both SMEs agree Maryland uses its homeland security strategy to guide the use of not just DHS grants funds but all the resources of the state. The strategy directs how Maryland spends its manpower, goodwill, time, Center for Disease Control (CDC) grants, transportation grants, seaport grants and more. DHS grants are just part of the resources guided by the strategy. As already described, Maryland commits general revenue salary dollars, NCR funds and American Recovery and Investment Act toward the priority of information sharing. Another example pointed out by an SME was a grant proposal to purchase vehicle license plate readers for local police agencies. The grant request was for two million dollars to purchase the systems. Maryland added a condition to the grant that local agencies would be required to provide collected data from the systems to the MCAC. It made information sharing a condition of the grant. Similarly, Maryland is requiring another of its priorities, Close Circuit Television (CCTV) systems, to direct feed their signals into the MCAC, and state emergency management offices
thereby combining the priorities of CCTV and information sharing. One SME stated he/she often tells DHS that their state’s strategy is not a DHS strategy; it is Maryland’s homeland security strategy.

The SMEs agreed that prioritized goals should be developed from baseline capabilities with threat as part of the equation. The goal of public safety should be the primary goal. An example of this threat consideration is the pattern of terrorists attacking mass transit targets around the world. Using that factor lead Maryland to include transportation security as a prioritize goal. Threat is the most critical consideration when developing strategic priorities. One SME suggests that jurisdictions should consider their assets and which are the most likely to be a target and then spend their effort there. Once spread out amongst different projects/disciplines, limited resources become spread too thin and ineffective. One SME suggested if a local agency does not want to follow the state strategy, then it should be free to go on its own but without any funding support.

One SME posited traditional strategy planning takes into consideration what resources are available to accomplish goals. It is not a matter of just having $24 dollars and 12 goals, therefore, one should spend two dollars per goal. Maryland prioritized the goals it thought it needed. In Maryland’s case, the statewide radio system costs hundreds of millions of dollars. The organizing of the bomb teams did not really cost dollars, but rather leadership and time. Maryland did not build its strategy off DHS funding. Instead, it build it off the core capabilities it felt necessary.

The SMEs differed on one point. One believed that even though Maryland’s strategy did not specifically cover common homeland security issues, such as campus safety, such issues can be addressed through the core building blocks of the strategy. Campus safety needs interoperable communications, emergency power and they need law enforcement intelligence to keep away threats. So, the many needs can be supported upon the foundation goals of their strategy. The other SME felt that Maryland’s strategy is too broad. It does not cover enough detail, which leads to certain threats not being addressed. If the strategy covered more objectives, it would help to facilitate them.
One SME closed by saying that a state strategy actually matters to the people who have to implement it; it gives them direction. It represents a clear statement from the governor where to place state and local efforts. If it is not articulated in the strategy, it can be overlooked amongst the many responsibilities of homeland security professionals.

SME 2 believed that a state homeland security strategy can not be very effective if it does not prioritize its goals, objectives or subobjectives. SME 1 believed moderate progress was being made on goals, objectives or subobjectives that had been prioritized in the strategy. Both SMEs agreed that progress made toward goals, objectives or subobjectives was in large part due to the fact that it had been prioritized. Both SMEs felt that state homeland security strategies should use prioritization methodologies.

b. Analysis

The SMEs both agreed that prioritizing goals, objectives or subobjectives within a strategy is important. They gave examples, such as the statewide radio system and information sharing that showed prioritizing the goals of the strategy lead directly to progress being made toward their accomplishment. The literature supports this concept. In his article *The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning*, Henry Mintzberg tells his readers that strategic plans are used so that everyone pulls in the same direction (Mintzberg, 1994). Prioritization gives the direction for everyone to pull. In their article *Enhancing the Benefits and Overcoming the Pitfalls of Goal Setting* (2006) Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke explain that more than 1,000 studies with over 40,000 participants from five different continents show that specific goals are effective in significantly increasing a person’s performance. People who realize their performance is below a goal will likely change their effort to attain it. Studies across a wide variety of professions show the more difficult the goal, the greater will be the effort, focus and persistence by the employee. In a 2004 report to the U.S. Congress, the then named U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) presented its report, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism*, to establish the
desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. When examining existing federal homeland security strategies, the GAO found the reviewed strategies all identified goals, objectives and activities, but generally did not identify priorities among other desirable elements that the GAO considered necessary for achieving results (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004, p. 12).

The literature, the review of state strategies in the first part of this chapter and the SMEs touched on the appropriate number of priorities a strategy should have. The review of state strategies showed states that used their priorities as their actual goals set an average of 10.5 goals. Those that had many goals and objectives but prioritized only some of them averaged 15.5 prioritized goals or objectives. SME 1 stated when developing the strategy the authors wanted to use a manageable number of goals. Not too few, not too many yet have enough to keep busy. If they prioritized just one or two items, it might keep one discipline very busy, but others would have nothing to do. They wanted to engage all disciplines. SME 2 cautioned that too many priorities spread limited resources amongst different projects and disciplines to the point where they become ineffective. The SMEs suggested picking priorities and fully funding them. In addition, the SMEs are supported by the literature. When the GAO compared existing national security strategies to its six desirable characteristics, it criticized the federal money laundering strategy stating it identifies more priorities than can be achieved in a reasonable timeframe (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004, p. 18).

In the article *Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of Overprescribing Goal Setting* (Ordoñez et al., 2009), the authors suggest that goals are overused and have lead to a number of serious problems in the business world. Problems such as narrowing employee’s focus to the neglect of non-goal areas, too many goals, too short a performance time frame, too challenging and the goal becoming the ceiling of performance. The authors suggest that goals should be used more like a prescription drug instead of an over the counter medicine. Use of goals should be carefully dosed with consideration for the harmful side effects and closely supervised. In their article *Enhancing the Benefits and Overcoming the Pitfalls of Goal Setting* (2006), Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke explain goals can have potential drawbacks. Goals can
sometimes cause non goal performance to be ignored or stress can increase if a person is challenged with 30 goals instead of a manageable three to seven. In the second category of strategies reviewed above there existed more objectives and subobjectives than those that had been prioritized. This allows for all disciplines to have some goals, objectives or subobjectives to make progress toward, but allows the focusing or concentrating on just a few. Literature suggests a manageable level of priorities is three to seven. The strategies reviewed for this research averaged 10 to 15 priorities. It is suggested that a state strategy could reasonably handle seven to 10 priorities.

One SME pointed out that Maryland does not intend to change its priorities. Their priorities, which are also their goals, are written broadly to cover all issues. One SME gave the example that a potential need in campus safety can fit within the broad goal priorities. Campus safety officials need interoperable communications and emergency power, and the officials need law enforcement intelligence to keep away threats. Therefore, many needs can be supported within the prioritized goals of the strategy. The other SME disagrees with this one size fits all method and believes it takes away the advantage of a clearly defined priority. By having all the strategy’s goals as a priority, literally everything that is placed within the supporting objectives and subobjectives becomes a priority. The net effect is there are no real priorities to the exclusion of other projects. The generalized one size fits all goals seemingly do not make logical priorities.

SME 1 and 2 gave solid examples of Maryland’s commitment to fund identified prioritizes. Prioritization brings with it funding. SME 5, from Colorado, believes prioritization is more important than assignment, since it brings with it funding. SME 6, also from Colorado, posited progress depends mostly upon whether the locals receive DHS grant funding for a project. For optimum progress, SME 5 and 6 agreed that a combination of prioritization, funding and assignment is best. The fact that prioritization brings funding is supported by the literature. As described above in the summary section related to the review of state strategies, DHS will give Florida $91 million dollars in 2010 alone. These funds do not come without guidance on how to spend them from DHS. For example, in the last few years DHS has required that 25
percent of their Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants and State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) grants be spent on law enforcement prevention of terrorism type projects (Department of Homeland Security, 2009, pp. 3, 4, 13, 15). To Florida, in 2010, that meant $18.6 million dollars (Department of Homeland Security, 2009, pp. 13–28). By controlling the use of $18.6 million, DHS is expressing their prioritization of these types of projects. Also, as described above, DHS requires states to measure their current capabilities against the DHS 37 TCLs and determine any gap between them. DHS then requires states to tie the request and spending of DHS grant funds to closing those identified gaps. DHS is using its leverage to insure prioritization of what it has deemed important capabilities. In these examples, local agencies that followed the prioritization mandates of Maryland’s strategy and DHS’ grant guidance were in position to receive significant funding to accomplish those priorities.

An important issue related to prioritization is whether a state homeland security strategy guides more than just the distribution of DHS grant funding. Both Maryland SMEs strongly agreed Maryland uses its homeland security strategy to guide the use of not just DHS grants funds but all the resources of the state. One SME stated the strategy directs how they spend their manpower, goodwill, time, CDC grants, transportation grants, seaport grants and more. As demonstrated above, Maryland committed general revenue salary dollars, NCR UASI funds and American Recovery and Investment Act toward its priority of intelligence and information sharing. One SME stated they often tell DHS that their strategy is not a DHS strategy, instead it is Maryland’s homeland security strategy.

The final area discussed by the SMEs was the basis on which priorities should be built. The SMEs agreed that prioritized goals should be developed from base line capabilities with threat as part of the equation. One SME suggested that public safety should be the primary goal. An example of this threat consideration is the pattern of terrorists attacking mass transit targets around the world. Using that factor led Maryland to include transportation security as a prioritized goal. Threat is the most critical consideration when developing strategic priorities. One SME stated that Maryland set its priorities without consideration as to whether or not it had funding to
meet that need. The SME provided the examples of the statewide radio system and the coordination of the bomb squads around the state. The statewide radio system cost hundreds of millions of dollars, while the coordination of the bomb squad cost very little money, but required leadership and time to accomplish.

2. Strategies That Have Multiple Goals and Objectives but Prioritized Only Some of Them

a. National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan
   Volume 1 Core Plan

SMEs 3 and 4 provided an overview of organizations within the National Capital Region (NCR) with oversight and input into the regional homeland security strategy. The NCR has a pseudo government known as the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) that coordinates a variety of mutual interest issues for the surrounding state, county and city governments. For example, the council coordinates transportation grants, economic development as well as DHS Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants to name a few. The Senior Policy Group and the Chief Administrative Officers Committee (SPG-CAO) combines to serve as the lead oversight group for matters related to domestic security. This group worked together to set the priorities that are found in the NCR regional homeland security strategy. Supporting this group are two additional layers of committees. The first level is a department or agency head group such as the Police or Fire Chiefs Committees. The second layer of committees is known as operations groups, such as the Fire, Hazmat or Emergency Medical Operations Sub Committees. SME 3 and 4 agree that these lower level committees provided suggestions for inclusion in the NCR strategy up through the levels of committees to the SPG-CAO; however, there was a disconnect between what was provided by the lower level committees and what ended up in the strategy. The committees continue to have input via monthly meetings where they work on current issues, training and exercising. They also work with other discipline committees to develop joint response protocols.
The review of state strategies above raised the question whether prioritization produces results. The SMEs both agree that prioritization of a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives is important and can lead toward their accomplishment. Prioritization focuses attention and, therefore, funding on the issue. One SME stated prioritization gets the organization closer to a goal. Prioritization is an important principle but in practice there are potential gaps. One SME gave an example of a priority gone wrong. The NCR had a priority of situational awareness. In order to support that priority, they have built a multimillion dollar information exchange system. The system uses the latest technology and equipment and was built to be bomb proof. The problem is that no one has agreed to exchange information. Local agencies cannot agree on what information to share. The system was built to serve a purpose that is not in place yet. The SME suggests that operations level people would have recognized the potential problem with this system prior to it being built.

One SME stressed the importance of being able to be flexible regarding priorities. The SME suggests that COG committees need to be able to adapt to new and changing threats and have the ability to change strategy priorities. The example given occurred within one of the NCR operations group. Three years ago members of the group tried to raise a new priority to build protocols, train and exercise joint response for police and fire to active shooter incidents. At that time, the committee could not raise the issue to a priority level to obtain funding. Since it was not a priority, the initiative went nowhere; however, on September 1, 2010 the Discovery Communications building in Silver Springs, Maryland had an armed take over incident. As a result, the committee’s previous requests were then gaining attention.

The review of state strategies above raised another question. Is prioritization used to focus other resources available to the state beyond DHS funding? One SME pointed out that the NCR strategy only directs UASI grant funding from DHS which in 2010 will total approximately $60 million (DHS, 2009, p. 15). The NCR strategy does not direct the use of SHSGP, Health Human Services (HHS), Center for Disease Control (CDC) or any other type of funding. One SME pointed out that UASI funds are often used to perform gap analysis on capabilities. The gap analysis research
sometimes includes a look at other resources and funding that can be utilized to close identified gaps. This serves as a potential coordination point for using other resources beside UASI funding to address an issue, but these other grants and resources are controlled by state and local agencies. The SME pointed out that most of the SMEs who sit on the CAO-SPG committee and its subcommittees are the same people who handle SHSGP, CDS, HHS and other grants for their states or jurisdictions. These people are in a position to deconflict against duplicitous spending, but they do not coordinate the use of the separate grants together. The SME believes the states and local agencies wait to see what resources they can get from UASI funding and then use the other grants available to them to fund their remaining gaps. The SME believes that the NCR strategy should prioritize the 37 TCL gaps and have the power to direct the many resources available in the region to accomplish these priorities; however, this does not take place in reality.

The SMEs agreed that threat and gap analysis were the preferred method to establish priorities. One benefit to this method is that UASI funds are commonly used to assess current capabilities and provide accurate gap analysis for what needs to be accomplished. One SME cautioned that attention needs to remain focused on capabilities already built out. An example would be radiation detection equipment purchased but not maintained in a ready usable state.

The NCR SMEs agreed that a state homeland security strategy can not be very effective if it does not prioritize its goals, objectives or subobjectives. SME 4 believed moderate progress was being made on goals, objectives or subobjectives that had been prioritized in the strategy while neither believed much progress was made on goals, objectives or subobjectives that had not been prioritized. Only one SME agreed that progress made toward goals, objectives or subobjectives was in large part due to the fact that it had been prioritized. Both SMEs felt that state homeland security strategies should use prioritize its goals, objectives or subobjectives.

b. Analysis

SME 3 and 4 both agree that prioritization of a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives is an important step toward accomplishing them. They believe
prioritization focuses the attention of those in a position to make the needed progress. This is supported by the literature. In 2004, the then named U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) presented a report to Congress in which they identified six desirable characteristics a federal homeland security strategy should possess. When defining one of those characteristics the GAO pointed out that priorities were necessary for achieving results (GAO, 2004, p. 12). In the article, *Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector* (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008), the authors suggest that specific goals focus on what is to be accomplished and leads to persistence until the goal is attained. One SME suggested that prioritization also leads to funding. SME 5 from Colorado also suggested that prioritization is important, since it brings with it funding. The federal government does tie funding to prioritized objectives, which is demonstrated in two examples. First, in the last few years, DHS has required that 25 percent of its Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants and State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) grants be spent on law enforcement prevention of terrorism type projects (DHS, 2009, pp. 3, 4, 13, 15). Second, DHS requires states to compare their current capabilities against the DHS 37 TCL’s and determine any gap between them. DHS then requires states to tie their request and spending of DHS grant funds to closing those identified gaps. Many of the SMEs interviewed for this research project identified funding as the most important determinant whether there will be progress made on goals, objectives or subobjectives. SME 5, from Colorado, believed one can look at where the state directed its funding and expect to see progress. SME 6, also from Colorado, stated progress depended mostly upon whether the locals receive DHS grant funding for a project. SME 8, also from the NCR, saw progress being made but only on the items being funded. SME 9, from Indiana, said funding and prioritization were a greater influence toward progress then the use of metrics. SME 11, from Washington State, also suggested that progress in a strategy was more a factor of prioritization and supporting funding than the use of a metric.

SME 10, from Indiana, spoke of many independent steps toward progress that had been made toward the goals, objectives or subobjectives of Indiana’s homeland security strategy. SME 10 went on to say that unfortunately no one had taken charge to
put these steps into a logical order to accomplish prerequisites and focus on priorities. When building a house, the foundation must precede the walls that must be in place to support the roof. SME 10 felt it was important to determine what needed to be done first and apply resources to get those things done first. SME 10 lamented nothing was going in the right direction. In his article *The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning*, Henry Mintzberg tells his readers that strategic plans are used so that everyone pulls in the same direction. Law enforcement agencies often take advantage of the force multiplying effect of task forces to focus on priority issues like serial rapists and gang violence. The expertise and unique resources of the various agencies work efficiently and effectively together to solve problems. But the benefits of working together and prioritizing are lost when groups work independent of each other. The NCR SMEs reveal that the NCR strategy only applies to UASI funding allotted to the NCR which for fiscal year 2010 was $59,392,477 (DHS, 2009, p. 15). The NCR strategy does not provide guidance for additional DHS Homeland Security Preparedness Grant Program funds provided to these three states, which total $30,382,135 for Maryland, $19,399,981 for the District of Colombia and $37,126,020 for Virginia (DHS, 2009, pp. 13–28). Details for the additional grants awarded to these three states are provided in Table 2.

Table 2. Additional DHS Grant Awards for Tri State Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DHS Fiscal Year 2010</th>
<th>Maryland</th>
<th>District of Columbia</th>
<th>Virginia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)</td>
<td>$3,214,934</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$4,253,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)</td>
<td>$15,819,538</td>
<td>$10,073,987</td>
<td>$18,680,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)</td>
<td>$317,419</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$1,904,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Corps Program (CCP)</td>
<td>$2,363,786</td>
<td>$107,969</td>
<td>$282,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG)</td>
<td>$6,086,158</td>
<td>$2,853,025</td>
<td>$7,455,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program (IECGP)</td>
<td>$1,031,500</td>
<td>$595,000</td>
<td>$1,223,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver’s License Security Grant Program (DLSGP)</td>
<td>$748,800</td>
<td>$600,000</td>
<td>$1,046,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer Zone Protection Program</td>
<td>$800,000</td>
<td>$1,600,000</td>
<td>$600,000</td>
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The lack of coordination results in independent groups setting their own priorities and directing separate resources to address the same problems, literally. SME 3 stated that state and local agencies wait to see what resources they can get from the NCR UASI and then use their other resources to build out remaining gaps. SME 8, also from the NCR, explained that local agencies are trying to meet their response and preparedness needs and that becomes the focus of their UASI grant submissions. The NCR strategy cannot compete with the political landscape of the region. Tax revenue is down and citizen expectations for services are up. So, the local agencies are using DHS funds to support their needs, which tend to be in the area of response and preparedness. Most of the NCR strategy priorities do not deal with the things that police and fire do on a day-to-day basis, but that has been where the investment of dollars has been.

This problem is exacerbated by the disparate control over complementary grant sources like Center for Disease Control and Health and Human Services grants that are lead and controlled by additional groups of people. Three of the SMEs interviewed for this chapter agreed that a single strategy should be used to set the priorities and direct all the resources available to address the issues of domestic security. The taxpayers of the United States have been living through a depression for the last several years. At the same time, the federal government has ballooned its deficit spending into tens of trillions of dollars per year. The DHS grant funds spent by state and local governments is the taxpayer’s money. Taxpayers deserve to have the money used as efficiently and effectively as possible.

It is not uncommon to hear that we are fighting a war on terror. The U.S. military maintains its command and control in a central location. It does not divide up its resources to field commanders who then engage the enemy in isolated uncoordinated attacks. Similarly, it does not make sense to divide prioritization and direction of funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DHS Fiscal Year 2010</th>
<th>Maryland</th>
<th>District of Columbia</th>
<th>Virginia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(BZZP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$3,570,000</td>
<td>$1,680,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL FUNDING PER STATE</td>
<td>$30,382,135</td>
<td>$19,399,981</td>
<td>$37,126,020</td>
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resources that have been identified as the most important determinant whether there is progress made on a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. As described above, DHS does play a centralizing role to prioritize the use of their grant funding. However the literature suggests that might not be enough. In the article, *Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector* (Latham et al., 2008), the authors discuss the goal setting theory that states a specific high-level goal will lead to higher performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting. The goal setting theory works in the public sector as it does in the private sector. On the federal level, goal specificity, a core aspect of the goal setting theory, is not often present. The authors argue federal legislatures have diverse stakeholders and are reluctant to set specific goals that communicate a goal not specified is of secondary importance. While local level governments are more operational than the national level and their ability to set specific goals is more similar to that found in the private sector (Latham et al., 2008, p. 398). State strategies are uniquely positioned to be detailed about the priorities need to accomplish their goals, objectives or subobjectives. However, as described above there is room for improvement.

One SME discussed the need for flexibility in a strategy’s priorities. Most state homeland security strategies cover periods of three or more years. Terrorist tactics and threats to communities can change more quickly than that. Examples of such rapid changes are the 2004 Besian school siege, which brought attention to campus safety, and the 2009 H1N1 flu virus, which brought attention to mass prophylaxis measures. One SME above provided the example of an operations group committee desire to change priorities to active shooter incidents, but the committee could not influence the needed change. This suggests that states should consider developing a capacity to change the direction on its state homeland security strategy and with it the prioritization and funding influence it carries. As described above, the NCR has levels of committees that provide input to the SPG-CAO committee that has ultimate authority to direct the use of UASI funding. Operational personnel will likely be the first to recognize the need to change and adapt to new threats. These individuals hold important roles in the operations group committees of the NCR; however, as both SME 4 and 5 described, there was a
disconnection between the input of operational level personnel and the final strategy produced by the SPG-CAO. SME 8 also described a disconnection between the leadership of the NCR strategy and the operational entities that benefit from the UASI funding. This problem is also discussed in the article *Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of Overprescribing Goal Setting* (Ordoñez et al., 2009) where the authors suggest that goals are overused and have lead to a number of serious problems in the business world. The problems are exacerbated when managers chose the wrong goal. They provide the example of Enron managers who were focused on revenue while ignoring profit percentages because they were receiving bonuses to increase revenue.

**C. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND APPLICATION TO FLORIDA**

The review of thirty-five state homeland security strategies revealed the majority of states (83 percent) do not prioritize the goals, objectives or subobjectives in their homeland security strategy. That is a significant percentage of states that fail to take advantage of the power of prioritization. The literature supports the idea that prioritization is a necessary element for achieving results and that priorities will lead to a desired end state. The federal government ties DHS grant funding to compliance with prioritization to insure progress on goals, objectives or subobjectives it deems most important. The Maryland and NCR SMEs all agreed that prioritizing goals, objectives or subobjectives within a strategy is important and effective.

The research above found two methods to apply priorities in a strategy. The first was Maryland’s approach to make all goals a priority. The second was NCR’s prioritization of just a few of many objectives and subobjectives. The NCR method appears more useful. By having all goals as a priority, literally everything that is placed within the supporting objectives and subobjectives becomes a priority. The net effect is there are no real priorities to the exclusion of other projects. The two different methods of prioritization did produce similar results in the number of priorities. The states that used their priorities as their actual goals set an average of 10.5 goals. Those that had many goals and objectives but prioritized only some of them set an average of 15.5 prioritized goals or objectives. Latham and Locke suggest that a person is challenged
with 30 goals instead of a manageable three to seven (Latham & Locke, 2006, p. 337). Ordo’nez, et al. suggest goals should be more like a prescription drug instead of an over the counter medicine (Ordo’nez, et al., 2009, p. 14). SME 1 stated when developing Maryland’s strategy the authors wanted to use a manageable number of goals. Not too few, not too many yet have enough to keep busy. SME 2 cautioned that too many priorities spread limited resources amongst different projects and disciplines to where they become ineffective. In the NCR method of assigning priorities, there are more objectives and subobjectives than those that had been prioritized. This is a more favorable method, since it allows for all disciplines to have some goals, objectives or subobjectives to make progress toward, but it also allows additional focus on a few through prioritization. The SMEs from both Maryland and the NCR agreed that prioritized goals should be developed from base line capabilities gap analysis with threat as a critical part of the equation.

One SME discussed the need for flexibility in a strategy’s priorities. Most state homeland security strategies cover periods of three or more years. Terrorist tactics and threats to communities can change more quickly than that. The SMEs suggested that states consider developing a capacity to change the direction of its state homeland security strategy and with it the prioritization and funding influence it carries. Operational personnel will likely be the first to recognize the need to change and adapt to new threats. Leadership committees like the SPG-CAO have the authority to alter the priorities of a strategy. The two must work together. However, SME 4, 5 and 8 described a disconnection between the input of operational level personnel and the final strategy produced by the SPG-CAO. Such issues must be recognized and prevented to insure the appropriate flexibility is available to meet changing demand.

The SMEs suggested that prioritization brings with it funding. SME 1 and 2 provided examples of Maryland’s commitment to fund identified prioritizes. SME 5, from Colorado, believes prioritization is more important than assignment, since it brings with it funding. SME 6, also from Colorado, posited progress depends mostly upon whether the locals receive DHS grant funding for a project. For optimum progress, SME 5 and 6 agreed that a combination of prioritization, funding and assignment is best. The
that prioritization brings funding is supported by DHS grant guidance that ties funding to compliance to DHS’ priorities. DHS is using its funding leverage to insure what it has decided are important capabilities. Agencies that follow DHS grant guidance are in position to receive significant funding to accomplish those priorities. Many of the SMEs interviewed for this research project identified funding as the most important determinant whether or not there will be progress made on goals, objectives or subobjectives. SME 5 believed one can look at where the state directed its funding and expect to see progress. SME 6 stated progress depended mostly upon whether the locals receive DHS grant funding for a project. SME 8, from the NCR, saw progress being made but only on the items being funded. SME 9, from Indiana, said funding and prioritization were a greater influence toward progress then the use of metrics. SME 11, from Washington state, also suggested that progress in a strategy was more a factor of prioritization and supporting funding than the use of a metric.

An important issue related to prioritization is whether a state homeland security strategy should guide more than just the distribution of DHS grant funding. Resources, such as CDC, HHS, transportation, sea port, general revenue and other resources can be useful in making progress toward priorities of a homeland security strategy. In his article *The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning*, Henry Mintzberg tells his readers that strategic plans are used so that everyone pulls in the same direction. As pointed out above, the NCR strategy only guides $59 million in UASI funding while nearly $87 million in other forms of DHS grants funding is prioritized separately by other entities within the same geographical area (DHS, 2009, p. 13–28). This lack of coordination fails to take advantage of the force multiplier on expertise and resources. It results in independent groups setting their own priorities and directing separate resources to address literally the same problems. While this describes disconnection on the strategic level, there is another disconnection between the operational and strategic levels. SME 3 and 8 described local agencies focusing on the use of grant funds to meet their local response and preparedness needs in competition with the boarder statewide strategic viewpoint.

Three of the SMEs interviewed specifically regarding prioritization agreed that a single strategy should be used to set the priorities and direct all the resources available to
address the issues of domestic security. SME 12, from Washington State, believes a strategy should be written to direct all statewide resources including local agencies. SME 6 pointed out that meetings tend to focused the specific grant deliverables of the person calling the meeting instead of focusing across funding sources/grants or other resources of the state. SME 5 suggests one way to bridge the gap between disparate funding sources is to require everyone to use a singular statewide capability assessment and gap analysis. Currently, the different funding sources utilize their own assessments of needs and set their own priorities. Having a single needs analysis could enable and encourage each grant source to focus its unique resources on the parts of the single gap analysis where it has jurisdiction and expertise. It does not make sense to spread out the authority to prioritize and direct domestic security grant funding resources, which have been identified herein, as the most important determinant whether there is progress made on a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. As described above, DHS does play a centralizing role to prioritize the use of their grant funding; however, the literature suggests the federal government often will not commit to priorities for political reasons and that role is better handled by state and local governments, which are more operationally focused (Latham, Borgogni, & Petitta, 2008, p. 398). SME 12 warned not to let political sensitivities interfere with prioritizing goals, objectives or subobjectives. Prioritization is very important but can be politically sensitive when telling one discipline that their need is less important than another’s. Therefore, state homeland security strategies are uniquely positioned to be detailed about the priorities needed to accomplish statewide goals, objectives or subobjectives.

The research in this chapter shows the literature and many SMEs support the idea that prioritization is a necessary element for achieving results and that priorities can lead to a desired end state. The SMEs from both Maryland and the NCR agreed that prioritized goals should be developed from base line capabilities gap analysis with threat as a critical part of the equation. Most state homeland security strategies cover periods of three or more years. Terrorist tactics and threats to communities can change quicker than that. The research suggested that states should develop a capacity to change the direction of their state homeland security strategy along with it the prioritization and funding
influence they carry. The research suggested that prioritization brings with it funding. Over half of the SMEs interviewed made statements confirming this. Many of the SMEs identified funding as the most important determinant whether there will be progress made on a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. An important issue discussed by the SMEs was whether a state homeland security strategy should guide more than just the distribution of DHS grant funding. Three of the SMEs interviewed for this chapter agreed. One method to accomplish this would be to require all domestic security related funding sources to use a singular statewide capability assessment and gap analysis. Currently, the different funding sources utilize their own assessments of needs and set their own priorities. Having a single needs analysis could enable and encourage each grant source to focus its unique resources on the parts of the single gap analysis where it has jurisdiction and expertise.

Florida is included in the 83 percent of the reviewed states that do not take advantage of the power of prioritization. It is recommended that Florida develop and implement a prioritization method in their future state homeland security strategies. In order to understand the proposed implementation plans listed below, the reader will need to understand the way Florida is structured for guidance over its domestic security efforts and funding. Florida’s Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC) is statutorily empowered to oversee all matters related to domestic security in the state. The DSOC is an executive policy advisory group, which is comprised of heads of state agencies that have a critical role in Florida’s domestic security. Representatives from Florida’s Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) and key members of federal, private sectors and professional associations make up the balance of the executive committee. The DSOC is served by seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) and a State Working Group on Domestic Preparedness (SWG). The SWG has an Executive Board that is served by two different groups of subcommittees. The first is known as primary committees. The second group is known as funding committees. Collectively, all the entities listed above are known as Florida’s Domestic Security Task Force (DSTF).
The SWG primary committees are staffed by subject matter experts from all disciplines and from all regions of the state. These committees research and recommend policies and response protocols for all the specialty teams and programs funded by DHS grant funding through the DSTF. Florida’s primary subcommittees are:

- Operations and Planning
- Critical Infrastructure
- Training and Exercise
- Logistics and Equipment
- Campus Safety
- Interoperability

The second group of SWG subcommittees are known as funding committees. These subcommittees are also staffed by subject matter experts from all regions of the state but tend to be discipline specific. These committees are active during DHS grant funding cycles. These subcommittees are responsible for reviewing DHS funding proposals within their area of expertise from state and local agencies. As expected, there are more funding requests than DHS grant funds available. These subcommittees vote to determine which projects are to be selected for funding and to what level of funding. Once these subcommittees make their selections, they are brought to the SWG Executive Board for review and approval. The approved projects are then brought to the DSOC for final review and approval. In 2010, Florida had the following funding subcommittees:

- Agriculture and Environment
- Community Health
- Campus Security
- Medical Surge
- Emergency Management
- Fire Rescue
- Interoperable Communications
- Law Enforcement Prevention
- Law Enforcement Response
- Public Information
It is recommended that the SWG primary subcommittees be charged with developing initial ideas for priorities for the domestic security efforts of the state. They are operational level SMEs who are already responsible to develop the interdisciplinary response protocols for Florida’s domestic security assets. Each primary subcommittee should recommend its own priorities. Based upon the results of the research, it is recommended that Florida prioritize only some of their strategy’s goals, objectives and subobjectives. A total of 10 to 15 priorities should be the maximum. This would intensify the resources available to accomplish the priorities while remaining within a manageable amount. The priorities would best be based upon capability assessment gap analysis related to the federal 37 TCL list. Once draft priorities are prepared, the primary subcommittees should have a joint session with the SWG Executive Committee to select the statewide priorities. The selected priorities could then be reviewed and approved by the DSOC. Another issue raised in the research is the flexibility for priorities to be changed in response to changing terrorist threats. The SMEs serving on the SWG primary subcommittees will likely be the first to recognize the need to change and adapt to new threats. Florida will need to insure that the changing needs and challenges identified by operational SMEs are clearly shared with the DSOC. The DSOC should remain sensitive to the unique position of operational SMEs and heed their call for rapid change.

To implement the priorities, Florida could use a similar system that has been effective for DHS. Florida could determine a percentage of its DHS funding must be spent toward prioritized goals, objectives and subobjectives of their homeland security strategy. All DHS grant proposals must be approved by the SWG funding committees. The funding committees could be required to spend a designated percentage of their allotted funding toward Florida’s prioritized items.

The research determined that it would be more effective if Florida’s state homeland security strategy priorities guided more than just the distribution of DHS grant funding. Resources, such as CDC, HHS, education, transportation, sea port, general revenue and other resources can be useful in making progress toward the priorities of Florida’s homeland security strategy. In his article, *The Fall and Rise of Strategic*
Planning, Henry Mintzberg tells his readers that strategic plans are used so that everyone pulls in the same direction. There is a serious flaw in the SWG funding committees used in Florida. They have no oversight over Florida’s five UASI funding entities. While Florida received $33,011,575 in 2010 State Homeland Security Program funding, the five UASIs in Florida will received a total of $35,367,406 in funding (DHS, 2009, pp. 13, 15) and each UASI city applies funding based on its own priorities. Therefore, the SWG funding committees have oversight over less than half the DHS funding coming to Florida. In addition, the funding committees have no oversight over hundreds of millions of dollars in domestic security related federal grants available to the state such as Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control, Department of Education, Emergency Management Performance Grants, Metropolitan Medical Response System, Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program, Driver’s License Security Grant Program and the Port Security Grant Program to name a few. Florida could leverage the coordination and prioritization power of this funding by requiring state agencies that receive such grants to also gain approval for grant proposals through the funding committees. These agencies would logically need to have representative voting powers on the funding committees. To support this methodology, it is also recommended that Florida develop a singular statewide capability assessment and gap analysis. Currently, the different funding sources utilize their own assessments of needs and set their own priorities. Having a single needs analysis could enable and encourage each grant source to focus its unique resources on the parts of the single gap analysis where it has jurisdiction and expertise. The issues raised here could be corrected if the DSOC would bring the matter before the Florida legislature and ask for amendments to the Florida State Statute that gives authority to the DSOC.

This chapter has concentrated on prioritizing goals, objectives and subobjectives. Once priorities have been identified, they will need to be implemented. The following chapter will discuss the assignment of goals, objectives and subobjectives.
IV. ASSIGNMENT OF GOALS, OBJECTIVES OR SUBOBJECTIVES IN STRATEGIC PLANS

“\textit{I must do something}”
\textit{always solves more problems than “Something must be done.”}

Author Unknown

The hypothesis of this research project theorizes that assignment of Florida’s state homeland security strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives to a person or entity would be more effective in accomplishing them. A summary of the literature suggests that the homeland security discipline involves a large number of players and their roles and responsibilities must be clarified. Someone has to be given the responsibility and authority to accomplish goals and objectives. Assignment of accountability and responsibility for strategic plan objectives empowers the team and results in a high probability the objective will be accomplished. Once the findings from the literature were identified, they were used as a guide to review thirty-five state homeland security strategies to find the ones that appear to utilize those best practices. The identified state strategies were reviewed to determine the methodology used in the assignment of their goals, objectives or subobjectives.

In an effort to establish additional data for evaluation, interviews were conducted with a subject matter expert (SME) from the agency that helped to create the selected strategies and one from an agency responsible for implementing part of them. The SMEs were asked their opinion on how effective their state’s methodology of assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives has been toward accomplishing them. SMEs interviewed for other chapters in this research at times made statements related to assignment. These comments will be included in this chapter as supporting evidence. To encourage answers that reflect reality without the fear of repercussion each SME was assured complete confidentiality in this research. Therefore, the statements made by SMEs will be written to prevent attribution. The data
from these two phases of the research will be analyzed and the findings will be considered for suggested use by Florida in its future homeland security strategies.

A. REVIEW OF STATE STRATEGIES

The first data collection in this phase of the research involved a review of existing state homeland security strategies for evidence of assignment of responsibility for completion of their goal, objectives or subobjectives. Thirty five state homeland security strategies were reviewed for this research project (see Table 1). It was determined that eight or nearly 23 percent of the strategies reviewed assigned responsibility for some portion of their goals, objectives or subobjectives. Based upon this criterion, these eight state homeland security strategies were selected for review. Upon review, the strategies seem to fit into two categories: those that assigned responsibility for goals and objectives to entities of the state government and those strategies that assigned responsibility for goals and objectives in part to multiagency committees. A discussion of each category follows.

1. Strategies That Assign Goals, Objectives or Subobjectives to State Entities

California has a 100-page strategy, *State of California Homeland Security Strategy 2008*. The strategy uses goals and objectives and links them to divisions of the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security, which are to serve in a supporting role toward completing the goals and objectives (California Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008, pp. 18, 26, 34, 44, 52, 57, 62, 67, 70, 72, 76 ). The *Iowa Strategy for Homeland Security and Emergency Management* has five goals supported by objectives and implementation steps (Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division, 2009). In Annex B of the Iowa Strategy, each objective is assigned a state agency to be responsible for it. The *State of Colorado Homeland Security Strategy 2008–2013* ((Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008) established five goals, and each goal is assigned a goal champion. The goal champion is a public agency of the state. The goal champion then establishes objectives and assigns a goal leader for each. Like the champion, the goal leader is from a state agency. The *Kansas State Homeland Security*
Strategy Goals and Objectives (Kansas Division of Emergency Management, 2009) is a 22-page document that lists six goals that are supported by objectives and implementation strategies. All of the implementation strategies related to the first three goals list the agency responsible for completing it. These agencies are almost entirely state agencies. As the strategy gets into the remaining three goals, the implementation strategies do not identify a responsible agency very often. In their State of Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy (Wisconsin Homeland Security Council, 2009), the authoring council identifies nine specified priorities as the core of the strategy. Each of the nine priorities is assigned a lead state agency called a champion. The priorities appear in the goals and objectives section of the strategy and are broken down further into goals and subgoals. Each goal is assigned a state agency to serve as the goal champion to ensure progress toward them.

2. Strategies That Assign Goals, Objectives or Subobjectives in Part to Multiagency Committees

The NCR strategic plan is a regional plan; however, as described in more detail in Chapter II, the NCR is similar enough to states for the purpose of this research based on governmental structure and the population of the region. The National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume II: Appendices (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2009) explains how its strategy is comprised of four goals and 12 associated objectives. Thirty initiatives were developed as action steps toward completion of the objectives. The Strategy provides a great amount of detail for each initiative. One of the details provided is the identification of the initiative lead. The strategy states the initiative leads are responsible for the definition, development and enhancement of the initiatives. The leads will be held accountable to the National Capital Region leadership for the successful and timely completion of the initiative (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2009, p. A15). The initiative lead consists of a variety of entities that are part of the NCR structure. These include the NCR Homeland Security Grants and Program Management Office, regional emergency support function committees, regional program working groups and the Emergency Preparedness Council. Most of these entities are comprised of city, county and state subject matter experts serving on these regional groups. In the Delaware Strategy for Homeland
Security, the authors list their goals and objectives (Department of Safety and Homeland Security, 2004). Each goal is assigned a team manager who is assigned to lead the efforts of stakeholders along a timeline provided with its objectives. The team managers are state agencies or organizations. The objectives are handled slightly different as they are assigned to a response discipline instead of a specific agency (Department of Safety and Homeland Security, 2004, p. 23). The Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2006–2011 (Washington Emergency Management Division, 2006) lists goals, objectives and implementation steps. The objectives are assigned a state level government agency or formal committee to guide in the completion of its implementation steps.

3. Analysis

This review of thirty-five state homeland security strategies revealed the majority of states (77 percent) do not assign goals, objectives or subobjectives to someone. Those that did, assigned the responsibility to a state government entity, a multiagency group or some combination of the two. This low use of assignment contrasts with the suggested benefits found in the literature. David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States in his report Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts (2001) commented that homeland security involves a large number of organizations that must have clearly articulated roles, responsibilities and accountability. He stated that clarifying those roles will be a critical function. An interesting point made by Walker was that the federal government would need to reach consensus with lower levels of government and the private sector on their roles since the federal government does not control them.

Similarly, in its report Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism the U.S. General Accounting Office pointed out the importance of identifying specific processes for coordination and collaboration between sectors and organizations and address how any conflicts would be resolved (2004). These two issues are also found in state homeland security strategies since the state often does not have the authority to control local response agencies,
especially in home rule states. The technique of assigning goals, objectives or subobjectives to multiagency committees found in this review provides a workable method to facilitate coordination across agencies and levels of government, as well as encouraging local agency buy in on accomplishing assigned goals, objectives or subobjectives. The majority of the thirty-five reviewed homeland security strategies fail to take advantage of the power of assignment.

In his book, *Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change*, C. Davis Fogg argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them. Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57). Fogg added that having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success. The assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives to state agencies was the most prevalent methodology found since five of the strategies solely use this technique and two others use it partially. State agencies have authority or influence that can be used to direct the implementation of a statewide strategy.

Just because a strategy exists and assigns responsibility for an objective does not necessarily mean that it is practiced in reality. Questions arise, such as is the strategy actually used? Does assignment produce results? Does assignment come with authority? Does assignment create an environment for interdisciplinary and inter agency cooperation? These questions can not be answered by merely reading the strategies but are better answered by those tasked with implementing the strategies.

B. SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS

The second data collection in this phase of the research was to speak to subject matter experts (SMEs) related to two of the state homeland security strategies reviewed above. There were a total of 12 SMEs interviewed for this entire research project. The SMEs held positions in a number of disciplines such as governor’s staff, police, fire services, health departments and emergency management. They represented state, county
and city entities and averaged 19.75 years of experience in professional domestic security related disciplines. The SMEs opinions serve as evidence toward the findings of this research.

The state homeland security strategies above were divided into two categories. One from each will be selected for further research with SMEs related to it. The first category was comprised of strategies that assign goals, objective and subobjectives to state entities. The choice for further review from this category was the State of Colorado Homeland Security Strategy 2008–2013 (Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 2008). This strategy was chosen because it assigns responsibility for both its goals and its objectives to state agencies called goal champions and goal leaders, respectively. The second category contained strategies that assigned goals, objectives or subobjectives at least in part to multi agency committees. The National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume II: Appendices was chosen from this category because it assigns responsibility for the initiatives almost entirely to regional committees or work groups. Two SMEs related to each chosen strategy were interviewed. They were assigned the confidential names of Subject Matter Expert 5, 6, 7 and 8. Two were from an agency that had a part in the creation of one of the state homeland security strategies while two were from an agency that has responsibility to implement part of the strategies. Choosing SMEs with these different points of view related to their strategy should provide more balance data.

1. Strategies That Assign Goals, Objectives or Subobjectives to State Entities


SME 5 and 6 provided a general overview of how the State of Colorado Homeland Security Strategy 2008–2013 assigned responsibility for goals and objectives. The Governor’s Office of Homeland Security (OHS) was responsible for creating the strategy. The OHS assigned state executive or Governor’s cabinet members to serve as goal champions for the strategy’s five goals. The goal champions then developed objectives and chose department head level staff to serve as goal leaders. The goal
leaders were expected to lead the progress toward accomplishment of their assigned objectives. One SME suggested that local agencies do not want the state directing their actions and state agencies felt a dominant state role caused relationship issues for them with local agencies. These concerns were defused by the use of capability working groups. A capability working group was formed for each of the federal 37 TCL capabilities with one of the state goal leaders assigned to lead it. Colorado is divided into nine regions and each send representatives to serve on the various capability working groups. They bring their regional needs and point of view to the statewide discussions. The goal leaders use the capability working groups to gain consensus amongst the various jurisdiction and disciplines that have an interest in the TCL covered by the group. The goal leader remains accountable to the goal champion for the progress of the objectives assigned to him.

The review of state strategies above raised the question whether the assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives actually produced results. The SMEs both agreed that assignment brings with it accountability. It focuses attention on the important issues. People with responsibilities in homeland security often have other job responsibilities. Assigning a task to people keeps it in the forefront of their efforts and prevents it becoming lost amongst other responsibilities. Twice a year the Governor’s OHS asks for an update from the goal champions. The report has two parts. First, a report on the local regions’ progress and second the state agencies report on their progress. SME 5 believed one can look at where the state directed its resources of funding and personnel and expect to see progress in those TCL categories. While these reports will show progress toward the 37 TCL identified gaps, the SMEs caution that progress reports do not identify what caused results to be accomplished. They believe results are a factor of many variables and not just assignment. There also exists a Senior Advisory Committee that approves all funding projects related to DHS funding. This group holds the goal champions accountable for their assigned goals and objectives. The review of each goal champion team’s efforts is conducted by the governor in the presence of the other goal champions. A goal champion does not want to be embarrassed that his goal leaders failed to make the progress expected. To date, the governor has not needed
to intercede and encourage a goal champion to get something moving. The peer pressure has been successful in producing progress. But, funding is a key issue taken into consideration. If an objective is not funded or staffed, then the goal champion or leader is not expected to get it done.

SME 5 believed that assigning a goal or objective brings accountability that will help to move toward accomplishment. The act of assigning assures the task will remain on someone’s list of things to do. But, accountability alone is not enough. SME 5 believes prioritization is more important, since it brings with it funding. SME 6 posited progress depends mostly upon whether the locals receive DHS grant funding for a project. While assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives is useful in combination with funding, it alone will not produce results. For optimum progress, the SMEs agreed that a combination of prioritization, funding and accountability is best.

Another consideration raised during the review of the state strategies was if authority came with assignment. Both SME raised the issue of Colorado being a home rule state. The goal champions and leaders have no direct authority over the local agencies in implementing the strategy. The SMEs agree that local agencies do not want to be recognized as not getting the work done. The SMEs believed the local agencies strived to implement the strategy but only to the point it was funded. Also, both SMEs believe interdisciplinary and interagency relationships are strengthened by assigning responsibilities for goals, objectives or subobjectives. The capability working groups, lead by the goal leaders, bring subject matter experts from many agencies and disciplines together to work on a wide variety of issues. In the course of daily work, people are too busy to go out and interact with other disciplines and agencies. The assignment function forces the assignee to get involved with others and that results in relationships that transcend into daily work.

SME 5 believed that a state homeland security strategy can not be very effective if it does not assign its goals, objectives or subobjectives. SME 6 felt that other factors, such as prioritization, funding, and federal guidelines play important roles too. Both SMEs believed progress was being made on goals, objectives or subobjectives that had been assigned in their strategy. When asked if progress made toward goals,
objectives or subobjectives was in large part due to the fact that it had been assigned the SME rating differed, but their reasoning was similar. SME 5 rated this high but qualified the answer by stating that funding was important too. SME 6’s answer was neutral but qualified by stating prioritizing a goal is what makes things happen stating it is more important than assignment. Both SMEs strongly felt that state homeland security strategies should use assignment methodologies.

b. Analysis

The SMEs agreed that assigning Colorado’s state strategy goals to goal champions and its objectives to goal leaders was effective in moving them toward completion. One SME suggests assigning tasks to people keeps it in the forefront of their efforts and prevents it becoming lost amongst other their responsibilities. The SMEs point out the most important benefit of assignment came in the form of accountability. This is supported by the literature. In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, David M. Walker, then Comptroller General of the United States presented his report Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts (Walker, 2001). In it, Walker commented that homeland security organizations that must have accountability. In a March 2001 appearance before a U.S. House Committee, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the U.S. Government Accountability Office, stated that key aspects of a national strategy should include roles and missions of federal, state, and local entities (GAO, 2001, p. 2). In his book Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change, C. Davis Fogg’s first key to strategic implementation is to develop an accountability system. He argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them. Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57). Fogg adds having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success.

Another issue of importance discussed by the SMEs was the amount of authority that comes with the assignment of a goals, objectives or subobjectives. In
Homeland Security Presidential Directive #1 Directive on Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council (White House, 2001) then President Bush, recognizing the extensive coordination needed across a broad spectrum of federal, state and local agencies related to prevention of terrorist attacks, directed the Homeland Security Council to ensure coordination of all homeland security related activities amongst executive departments. He gave the responsibility and through the Homeland Security Presidential Directive the authority to one agency. Colorado, like Florida, is a home rule state. Colorado’s state goal champion and goal leaders do not have any authority to tell local jurisdictions what to do. One SME suggests this short coming is mitigated by two factors. First, for the purpose of obtaining DHS grants funding state homeland security strategies tend to mirror DHS grant guidance requirements. The local agencies will insure they follow DHS grant guidance rules such as assessing capabilities and addressing gaps related to the federal 37 TCLs. The locals will comply because they want to remain eligible for grant funding. Second, local agencies do not want to be seen as not accomplishing goals. In the article Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector (Latham et al., 2008), the authors suggest most people given ability and commitment, regardless of praise, competition and monetary incentives, react to a higher goal with higher performance. Specific goals keep focus on what is to be accomplished and leads to persistence until the goal is attained.

The progress reports made by the goal leaders and goal champions showed evidence of progress toward the goals, objectives or subobjectives of Colorado’s strategy. Both SMEs agree that this evidence could be misleading when assessing the reason for the success. The reports do not tell what lead to those results. Many factors, such as funding, prioritization, staffing, DHS grant guidance, committee direction and assignment contributed to the success. Each SME believed that assignment is a factor in the equation leading to results especially in its ability to place accountability. As Fogg argued above, organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives. Both SMEs strongly felt that state homeland security strategies should assign their goals, objectives or subobjectives to someone. The SMEs stressed the importance that assignment must include accountability. Goal leaders and
goal champions should report their progress on a regular basis. Without accountability assignment has no value. For optimum progress, the SMEs agreed that a combination of prioritization, funding and accountability is best.

One of the SMEs commented that Colorado is geographically and culturally diverse. Florida is the same. Florida has densely populated areas south and mid-state with very rural areas surrounding them. Most Floridians are not native but are foreign immigrants or transplanted from another state. State agency person are exposed to the variations of capabilities and needs throughout the state while a local agency SME view can be myopic. Assigning goals and objectives to state agency personnel appears effective and logical, so long as accountability comes with the assignment. State agency personnel have jurisdiction and an understanding of the diversity found throughout their state. They can encourage local agency and multidiscipline contribution and buy in for projects that result in accomplishment of assigned objectives. As the SMEs suggest, the capability of a state agency goal leader can be enhanced by joining together with a capability working group that brings the innovation, experience and buy in from local agencies throughout the state.

2. Strategies That Assign Goals, Objectives or Subobjectives in Part to Multiagency Committees

a. National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume II: Appendices

SME 7 and 8 provided a general overview of how the National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume II: Appendices assigned responsibility for its initiatives. The NCR strategy was formed under the guidance of the Chief Administrative Officers Homeland Security Executive Committee (HSEC) that serves chief executives from Maryland, Virginia and D.C. and the Senior Policy Group that is made up of leaders that represent agencies from within the NCR. Supporting these leadership groups are Council of Governments (COG) working groups that represent police, fire and other disciplines. The process to develop the strategy involved a region wide risk assessment and a gap analysis. This process developed insight into what was
needed to make NCR resilient against a terrorist attack. Once the needs were identified, the COG working groups came up with initiatives to fill those needs. When determining who would be the lead for an initiative, they logically went back to the working group that developed it, since they were the experts in that field.

The review of the state strategies described above raised the question whether the assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives produced results. One SME sees the NCR strategy as essentially a document that was not used. The strategy was written by the HSEC and the Senior Policy Group, intending it lean toward prevention. That viewpoint was from top down. The funding projects are submitted by local agencies that view the world from the bottom up. They are trying to meet their response and preparedness needs during difficult budget years and that is the focus of their grant submissions. Both SMEs agreed that most of the strategy does not cover the things that police and fire do on a day-to-day basis, but that has been where the investment of DHS grant dollars has been. By approving the DHS grant submissions of the local agencies, one SME suggested the NCR leadership were deploying funds outside of the guidance of its own strategy. There has been progress, but only on the items being funded, not necessarily in the initiatives of the strategy. There has not been a great amount of buy in to the strategy from the lower level leaders. In this case, the assignment of the initiatives did not produce results.

The review of the state strategies also raised the issue of authority and if it came with assignment. One SME felt that the regional work groups hold no power. They can not force agencies across state, county and city boundaries to comply with the work group’s guidance. The assignment of initiative leads in the NCR strategy document failed to produce results because the power base remains in the local agencies who utilize grant funding to fill their local needs first. The strategy can not compete with the political landscape of the region. Tax revenue is down and citizen expectations for services are up. So the local agencies are using DHS funds to support their needs, which tend to be in the area of response and preparedness. Prevention initiatives, like those in the strategy, suffer because of that concentration.
The SMEs disagreed whether or not interdisciplinary and interagency relationships are strengthened by assigning responsibilities for goals, objectives or subobjectives. One believed the NCR still wrestles with stove pipes across the disciplines reflected by health, police and fire—all having their own needs and interests. The other SME pointed out that the COG working groups that developed the initiatives were already staffed by cross discipline and multi agency personnel. The assignment of the initiatives to these work groups results in good coordination across the disciplines and agencies; however, this same SME agreed that this cooperation cannot compete with the interests at the local level agencies.

Both SMEs believed that a state homeland security strategy cannot be very effective if it does not assign its goals, objectives or subobjectives. One SME believed progress was not really being made on initiatives that had been assigned in their strategy while the other believed that their success was due in part due to the fact that they had been assigned. One SME stressed the importance of regular progress reports and accountability to make assignment effective. Both SMEs strongly felt that state homeland security strategies should use assignment methodologies.

b. Analysis

The idea of assigning responsibility for the completion of the NCR initiatives to multiagency and multidiscipline COG working groups makes sense except for the disconnect in authority to oversee the initiatives. The SMEs point out that COG working groups are made up of subject matter experts that have expertise in their discipline and firsthand knowledge of the needs of their local communities throughout the region. They bring those assets to the working groups that develop initiatives to the benefit of the entire region. The working group members have the opportunity to have their ideas considered by the rest of the region which encourages buy in on the initiatives that finally get recommended by the committee. In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, David M. Walker, then Comptroller General of the United States presented his report *Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts* (Walker, 2001) in which he commented that homeland security involves
a large number of organizations. He went on to suggest that since the federal government does not have direct authority over state, local and private entities, then the use of consensus would be helpful in coordinating the actions of those various levels of entities. In its report titled *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism* (GAO, 2004), the U.S. General Accounting Office discussed coordination as one of their six desirable characteristics for a strategy document. This GAO report is still used as the government standard for the desirable components of a government strategy. In this report, the GAO suggested that strategies should identify specific processes for coordination and collaboration between sectors and organizations and address how any conflicts would be resolved (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2004, p. 22). The NCR faces similar coordination issues as the federal government. The use of the COG working groups provide an excellent platform to coordinate across jurisdictions, agencies and disciplines as suggested by the SMEs and in the literature.

The SMEs felt that authority needs to come with assignment. In *Homeland Security Presidential Directive #1 Directive on Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council* (White House, 2001) then President Bush, recognizing the extensive coordination needed across a broad spectrum of federal, state and local agencies related to prevention of terrorist attacks, directed the Homeland Security Council to ensure coordination of all homeland security related activities amongst executive departments. He gave the responsibility and through the HSPD, the authority to one agency. The COG working groups would be idea to serve in such a lead coordinating role. The assignment of responsibility for the initiatives in this case failed, because as pointed out by the SMEs, the working groups have no direct authority over the local agencies of the region. However, if the working groups were given actual authority over the local agencies ability to submit grant applications to DHS then they would be in a position to leverage consensus. This concept is partially in use in Florida and will be further explored in the chapter summary.
Both SMEs felt strongly that a state homeland security strategy should assign its goals, objectives or subobjectives and believed it could not be very effective if it did not; however, they each stressed the importance that assignment must include accountability. SME 7 stated a strategy should be specific about who should be accountable and that person should be required to make regular progress reports. This is supported by the literature. In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, David M. Walker, then Comptroller General of the United States, presented his report *Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts* (Walker, 2001). In it Walker commented that homeland security organizations must have accountability. In a March 2001 appearance before a U.S. House Committee, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the U.S. Government Accountability Office stated that key aspects of a national strategy should include roles and missions of federal, state, and local entities (GAO, 2001, p. 2). In his book *Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change*, C. Davis Fogg’s first key to strategic implementation is to develop an accountability system (1999). He argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them. Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57). Fogg adds having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success.

The literature and SMEs agree that assignment of a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives is a best practice. It failed in this case because of the lack of authority given to the COG working groups. The SMEs stated that assignment is only one of many factors that produce results in the pursuit of goals, objectives or subobjectives. Additional factors of authority, funding and priority are important too. Assignment brings with it accountability, which according to Fogg, produces results.

**C. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND APPLICATION TO FLORIDA**

The data found in this phase of the research supports the hypothesis that assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives will contribute to the effectiveness of the
state strategy to accomplish them. The literature and SMEs strongly support assignment and the accountability it brings. The review of state strategies showed that only 23 percent of thirty-five reviewed strategies used some form of assignment of their goals, objectives or subobjectives. State homeland strategies are still in a developmental phase and will likely follow national guidance such as the U.S. General Accounting Office report *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism* (2004) that promotes assignment as one of the six desirable characteristics of a strategy and strategies like the *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan* (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2006) that lists by name federal agencies and assigned them responsibility for parts of the strategy implementation plan. The SMEs all agreed that assignment is a factor in the equation leading to results. While the weight assignment should have in the equation can be debated, it remains a factor that needs to be present.

The most important benefit of assignment comes in the form of accountability. This is supported by the literature and the SMEs. In his testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States, commented that homeland security organizations that must have accountability (Walker, 2001). The U.S. General Accounting Office in its report *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism* stated a strategy would ideally clarify the relationship between implementing organizations in terms of leading, supporting, and partnering and could describe the organizations that will provide the overall framework for accountability and oversight (2004, p. 24). In his book, C. Davis Fogg’s first key to strategic implementation is to develop an accountability system (1999). He argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them. Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57). Fogg adds that having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success. SME 5 and 6 each believe that assignment is a factor in the equation leading to results related to goals, objectives or subobjectives, especially in its ability to
place accountability. SME 7 and 8 each stressed that assignment must include accountability. SME 7 offered that accountability must include reporting progress on a regular basis, at least biannually, for it to be effective. SME 12, from Washington and who was interviewed regarding the use of metrics, also spoke of the importance of accountability. SME 12 felt that progress made should be compared quarterly to the metrics in place and the results reported to someone in charge of making progress on the strategy’s goals, objectives and subobjectives. If the metric is not being met, then that is a good time to reevaluate the objective. Someone needs to be placed in charge of each objective and subobjective.

Another requirement for assignment to be effective is that it be accompanied by authority. All the SMEs felt that authority needs to come with assignment. In Homeland Security Presidential Directive #1 then President Bush, recognizing the extensive coordination needed across a broad spectrum of federal, state and local agencies related to prevention of terrorist attacks, directed that a single agency ensure coordination of all homeland security related activities amongst executive departments. He gave the responsibility and through the HSPD the authority to one agency. Similarly Florida, Colorado and the NCR all face the same issue. They have no direct authority over the local agencies who are the main DHS grant recipients. Government committees and task forces have long dealt with the lack of authority over their member agencies. Consensus plays a role in every successful multi agency endeavor. David M. Walker, former Comptroller General of the United States, presented a report to the U.S. Senate in which he commented that since the federal government does not have direct authority over state, local and private entities, then the use of consensus would be helpful in coordinating their actions (Walker, 2001, p. 6). The U.S. General Accounting Office suggested that strategies should identify specific processes for coordination and collaboration between sectors and organizations and address how any conflicts would be resolved. The literature suggests that strategies need to encourage cooperation across jurisdictions and disciplines. Progress will depend upon consensus.

Interestingly, Colorado and the NCR both used multiagency work groups in their formula for assigning goals, objectives or subobjectives. While Colorado’s strategy did
not directly mention their capability working groups, in reality the goal leaders were embedded in those working groups to further their assigned missions. SME 11 and SME12 (both from Washington State and interviewed regarding the use of metrics in a strategy), stated that Washington has also begun to rely on the strength of multiagency work groups. They have established a work group for each of the 37 TCLs. These groups are conducting assessment and gap analysis for their assigned TCL. They are building a better understanding of the capabilities in their state and beginning to provide guidance toward what they need to do to close gaps. Those assigned to make progress for goals, objectives or subobjectives in Colorado and the NCR both faced problems with having the authority to so. This short coming was mitigated by two factors. First, for the purpose of obtaining DHS grants funding state homeland security strategies tend to mirror DHS grant guidance requirements. The local agencies will insure they follow DHS grant guidance. The locals will comply because they want to remain eligible for grant funding. Second, local agencies do not want to be seen as not accomplishing goals. In the article *Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector* (Latham et al., 2008), the authors suggest most people given ability and commitment, regardless of praise, competition and monetary incentives, react to a higher goal with higher performance. Specific goals keep focus on what is to be accomplished and leads to persistence until the goal is attained (Latham et al., 2008, p. 386).

A review of thirty-five state strategies showed that only 23 percent used some form of assignment of their goals, objectives or subobjectives. Florida would benefit by adopting the use of assignment as recommended in the research. The research showed assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives will contribute to the effectiveness of the state strategy to accomplish them. In order to understand the proposed implementation plans listed below, the reader will need to understand the way Florida is structured for guidance over its domestic security efforts and funding. This process is described in detail in the chapter summary section of Chapter III and will only be summarized here.

Florida’s Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC) is statutorily empowered to oversee all matters related to domestic security in the state. The DSOC is served by a State Working Group on Domestic Preparedness (SWG). The SWG has an Executive
Board that is served by two different groups of subcommittees. The first is known as primary committees the second as funding committees. The SWG primary committees research and recommend policies and response protocols for all the specialty teams and programs funded by DHS grant funding. The SWG funding committees are responsible to review DHS funding proposals within their area of expertise submitted by state and local agencies. They determine which projects are to be selected for funding and to what level of funding.

It is recommended that Florida adopt a hybrid of the two methods of assignment studied in this research. The first was assigning a strategy’s goals, objectives and subobjectives to a state agency. The second assigned them to a multiagency committee. The two methods could work well together by taking advantage of each one’s strengths. State agency personnel have jurisdiction, an understanding of the diversity throughout their state and can encourage local contribution and buy in. Multiagency committees give a voice to local communities, bring the expertise of local SMEs, and can build consensus. As described above, all DHS grant funding requests must be approved by the SWG funding committee that oversees the discipline or specialty in which it falls. These funding committees are uniquely situated to exert control over the entire DHS grant process.

As discussed in Chapter III, that control can be used to ensure DHS funds are being applied toward priorities established in Florida’s homeland security strategy. The control can also be used to insure accountability that DHS grant recipients are making progress toward the goals, objectives and subobjectives of Florida’s strategy. The research has shown that the use of assignment brings accountability and that brings results. It is recommended that Florida assign responsibility for each goal, objective or subobjective of its strategy to one of the SWG funding committees. Since individual agency proposals must be approved by the funding committees, they have the authority to approve, deny or modify a proposal and its subsequent funding requests. This enables the funding committee to enforce compliance with expectations. As suggested by the research, a Florida state goal leader should be identified and placed as the lead chairperson on each funding committee. This would place the goal leader in a position of
authority over local agency grant submission with the tempering of a multi agency working group to insure statewide consensus prevails. As discussed in detail in the chapter summary of Chapter III, this recommendation is not without issue. As also described in Chapter III, most of the DHS and other federal funding available to Florida for domestic security related issues do not pass through the SWG funding committee for approval but this could be changed by the DSOC bringing the matter before the Florida Legislature.

The research suggested that a progress reporting system be established to help the SWG funding committees with accountability. The accurate tracking of projects can insure the funding committees have the data, they need to make accurate decisions to promote effective progress toward the accomplishment of Florida’s homeland security strategy goals, objectives or subobjectives. This topic and the use of metrics in a strategy will be discussed further in the following chapter.
V. USE OF METRICS IN STRATEGIC PLANS

One accurate measurement is worth a thousand expert opinions.

Grace Murray Hopper

The hypothesis of this research project theorizes that using metrics to clearly define what is needed to achieve the goals, objectives or implementation steps of Florida’s state homeland security strategy will make the strategy more effective in accomplishing them. A summary of the literature suggests that the objectives or subobjectives of a strategic plan should be results driven. They should establish milestones, be measurable in a quantifiable way, and be an action item. They should describe a specific action that can be recognized when completed and done so in a timely manner. If done correctly, goals, objectives and subobjectives can be used to evaluate progress, provide oversight, enhance management decisions and above all, achieve results. Once the best practices from the literature were identified, they were used as a guide to review thirty-five state homeland security strategies. State strategies found to use metrics were reviewed to determine how they applied metrics to their goals, objectives or subobjectives. In an effort to establish additional data for evaluation, a subject matter expert (SME) from the agency that helped to create the selected strategies, and one from an agency responsible for implementing part of them, were interviewed. The SMEs were asked their opinion on how effective their state’s use of metrics in relation to their goals, objectives or subobjectives has been toward accomplishing them. SMEs interviewed for other chapters in this research at times made statements related to the use of metrics. These comments will be included in this chapter as supporting evidence. To encourage answers that reflect reality without the fear of repercussion, each SME was assured complete confidentiality in this research. Therefore, the statements made by SMEs will be written to prevent attribution. The data from these two phases of the research will be analyzed and the findings will be considered for suggested use by Florida in their future homeland security strategies.
A. REVIEW OF STATE STRATEGIES

The first data collection in this phase of the research involved a review of existing state homeland security strategies for evidence of the use of metrics that clearly define their goals, objectives or subobjectives. The literature review in Chapter I lead to the identification of four desirable characteristics of performance measures to be used in a strategy. These four desirable characteristic were sought during the review of the thirty-five state homeland security strategies. The four desirable characteristics of performance measures are to:

- Establish milestones
- Be measurable in a quantifiable way
- Be an action item
- Have an identifiable completed state

Thirty-five state homeland security strategies were reviewed for this research project. They appear in Table 1 for review. Thirteen state homeland security strategies were found to use at least one of the desirable performance measure criteria. These 13 strategies were selected for further review. Since the review sought evidence of four different types of desirable performance measures, a summary table was built to organize the findings. The results are located in Table 3. In the table, the ratings reflect the type of metric commonly found to be used on the goals, objectives or subobjectives. For example, if a strategy had 50 objectives and only a few of them were quantifiable objectives, then the rating would reflect that the strategy does not commonly use quantifiable objectives.

Table 3. Metrics Commonly Found in Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Commonly Establish Milestones</th>
<th>Commonly Measurable in Quantifiable Way</th>
<th>Commonly an Action Item</th>
<th>Commonly have an Identifiable Completed State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Commonly Establish Milestones</td>
<td>Commonly Measurable in Quantifiable Way</td>
<td>Commonly an Action Item</td>
<td>Commonly have an Identifiable Completed State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>Partial</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
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<td>Partial</td>
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<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Capital Region</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Upon review, the strategies seemed to fit into two categories. First, strategies whose performance measures were quantifiable or had an identifiable completed state, and second, those that did not. A discussion of each category follows.

1. **Strategies Whose Performance Measures Were Quantifiable or Had Identifiable Completed State**

In the *State of Wisconsin Homeland Security Strategy* (Wisconsin Homeland Security Council, 2009), some objectives are assigned completion dates. A number of subobjectives were found to be quantifiable. The subobjectives were actionable but a completed state was not readily evident. In the *Indiana Strategy for Homeland Security* (Indiana Department of Homeland Security, 2008), it establishes a target completion date for each objective. Each objective has an identifiable measure toward completion. Many of these measures were quantifiable, such as ten courses will be offered, 10 percent of facilities designated as critical infrastructure shall have Buffer Zone Protection Plan (BZPP) grant consideration or 50 percent of fusion centers will have private sector participation. The objectives were actionable and a completed state could be identified for most. The *Iowa Strategy for Homeland Security and Emergency Management* has five goals supported by objectives and implementation steps (Iowa Homeland Security
and Emergency Management Division, 2009). Most of the implementation steps have a completion date in the form of a year. In Annex B of the Iowa Strategy, each objective is associated with performance measures. These performance measures are quantifiable, such as the number of attendees to train, number of exercises held, and percentage of impact plans that cover pets.

In the National Capital Region Homeland Security Strategic Plan Volume II: Appendices (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2009), each goal and objective is given a performance measurement many of which are quantifiable. The supporting initiatives are documented in great detail (National Capital Region Homeland Security Partners, 2009, p. A15). Each NCR initiative provides a desired result, which is a description of the planned outcome of the initiative. They provide quantifiable measures, such as the number of citizens that have signed up for a county alert system. Missouri’s Homeland Security Strategy uses goals, objectives and implementation steps. Each implementation step is assigned a completion date and given a score indicating its progress toward completion. Missouri was conducting a pilot capability assessment in 2009 where their capabilities would be rated toward completion (Missouri Department of Public Safety, 2008, p. 10). The grading was based on a scale of 1 to 10 with ten representing objective being achieved. Missouri included these ratings within their strategy, so they can quantify their current capacity and allow for measurement of future improvements.

2. Strategies with Performance Measures That Are Not Quantifiable Nor Have an Identifiable Completed State

A number of state strategies provided completion dates for objectives or subobjectives and they were written as actionable items. These strategies include: the Delaware Strategy for Homeland Security (Department of Safety and Homeland Security, 2004); the State of Georgia’s 2004 State Strategic Plan for Terrorism and All-Hazards Preparedness (Georgia Office of Homeland Security, 2006); the Idaho Homeland Security / Emergency Management Strategy (Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security, 2010) and the Washington Statewide Homeland Security Strategic Plan 2006–
Two state strategies provided completion dates for only some of their objectives or subobjectives, and they were written as actionable items. These include the Kansas State Homeland Security Strategy Goals and Objectives (Kansas Division of Emergency Management, 2009) and South Carolina’s 2003 State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy (South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, 2003). The New Hampshire Homeland Security Strategy (New Hampshire Department of Safety, 2004) was found to set completion dates for each of its objectives, but they were generally not actionable items. In the Nevada State Homeland Security Strategy (Nevada Division of Emergency Management, 2010), many of the objectives and implementation steps are given completion dates but most of those dates were already past.

3. Analysis

The review above revealed the majority of states (62.8 percent) did not use metrics to further define their goals, objectives or subobjectives. This is in contrast to the benefit of doing so suggested in the literature. In the article Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector (Latham et al., 2008), the authors discuss the goal setting theory of Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke. The goal setting theory states a specific high-level goal will lead to higher performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting. Given ability and commitment, the higher the goal the higher the performance (Latham et al., 2008, p. 386). Specific goals focus on what is to be accomplished and leads to persistence until the goal is attained. The U.S. General Accounting Office presented its report Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism to the U.S. Congress in 2004 in which establish six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, which as described in Chapter II, are still used by the GAO as its standard in the year 2010. One of the six desirable characteristics was to include performance measures in the strategy. The GAO felt that measuring performance was important enough that if there were limitations on the ability to collect performance data then one of the goals of the strategy should be to obtain better data (GAO, 2004, p. 16). The GAO developed their six
desirable characteristics as a standard to review seven national domestic security strategies that were issued by the Bush Administration soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In its review of the seven national strategies, the GAO found all did not identify priorities, milestones or performance measures (GAO, 2004, p. 12). These are elements the GAO considered necessary for evaluating progress, achieving results and ensuring oversight (GAO, 2004, p. 12). The GAO stated a better identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures would aid implementing parties in achieving results in specific timeframes—and would enable more effective oversight and accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 19).

In his April 2002 testimony before a U.S. House committee, Randall A. Yim, the then Managing Director of National Preparedness for the U.S. General Accounting Office, stressed the importance of metrics for goals and objectives. In his report titled National Preparedness, Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002), Yim describes measuring results of federal programs as a longstanding objective of the Congress. To further that effort, the Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which was designed to have agencies focus on the performance and results of their programs. The GPRA requires agencies to set strategic quantifiable, measurable performance goals. Yim argued that a preparedness programs that lacks broad, but measurable objectives are unsustainable because they deprive policy makers of information they need to make rational resource decisions (GAO, 2002, P. 15).

The review of state strategies found 13 states (37.2 percent) use some form of metric to further define their goals, objectives or subobjectives. Eight (62 percent) of those use a milestone such as a date for completion. This method is supported by author C. Davis Fogg in his book Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change (1999). Fogg argues having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success (1999, p. 57). Fogg’s definition of measurable includes providing a completion date. Five (38 percent) of the 13 strategies used a more complex metric that was measurable in a quantifiable
way or that defined an end state to the desired goals, objectives or subobjectives. This method is also supported by the literature. In his March 2001 testimony titled *Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy* before a U.S. House Committee, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management for the GAO, stated that a national strategy should establish outcome-related goals with milestones, and performance measures to achieve those goals (GAO, 2001, p. 2). In March 2003, Decker presented a report again before a U.S. House Subcommittee titled *Combating Terrorism Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism* (GAO, 2003). The report discussed the coordination of efforts across the vast number of federal and other governmental agencies with homeland security responsibilities (GAO, 2003). Decker stated that performance measures are important for monitoring the successes of strategies and their related programs. One key to assessing overall performance is that they define an end-state of what the strategy is trying to achieve. As mentioned above, author C. Davis Fogg, in his book *Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change* (1999), argues having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success (Fogg, 1999, p. 57). Fogg’s definition of measurable includes a completion date, and in addition results that can be measured by numbers such as dollars or percentages.

Just because a strategy exists and states it uses metrics does not necessarily mean that it is practiced in reality. Questions arise, such as: does the use of metrics in a strategy actually contribute to progress toward its goals, objectives or subobjectives? How detailed should the metric be? These questions can not be answered by merely reading the strategies, but are better answered by those tasked with implementing the strategies.

B. SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS

The second data collection in this phase of the research was to speak to subject matter experts (SMEs) related to two of the state homeland security strategies reviewed above. There were a total of 12 SMEs interviewed for this entire research project. The SMEs held positions in a number of disciplines, such as governor’s staff, police, fire
services, health departments and emergency management. They represented state, county
and city entities and averaged 19.75 years of experience in professional domestic security
related disciplines. The SME’s opinion will serve as evidence toward the findings of this
research.

The state homeland security strategies above were divided into two categories. One from each was selected for further research with SMEs related to it. The first
category was comprised of strategies whose performance measures were quantifiable or
had an identifiable completed state. The choice for further review from this category was
the Indiana Strategy for Homeland Security (Indiana Department of Homeland Security,
2008). This strategy was chosen because it had the most detailed and highest usage of
metrics of all the strategies reviewed. Many of the metrics were quantifiable, such as ten
courses will be offered, 10 percent of facilities designated as critical infrastructure should
have BZPP plans or 50 percent of fusion centers will have private sector participation.
The objectives were actionable and a completed state could be identified for most. The
second category contained strategies with performance measures that were not
quantifiable nor did they have an identifiable completed state. The Washington Statewide
Division, 2006) was chosen from this category because it was representative of the others
in that it provided completion dates (month and year) for its objectives and subobjectives.
Two SMEs related to each chosen strategy were interviewed. They were assigned the
confidential names of Subject Matter Expert 9, 10, 11 and 12. Two were from an agency
that had a part in the creation of one of the state homeland security strategies while two
were from an agency that has responsibility to implement part of the strategies. Choosing
SMEs with these different points of view related to their strategy should provide more
balance data.
1. Strategies Whose Performance Measures Were Quantifiable or Had Identifiable Completed State

a. Indiana Strategy for Homeland Security

SME 9 and 10 provided a summary of how the metrics used in Indiana’s strategy were developed. The Governor’s Office of Homeland Security (OHS) met with SMEs around the state. They asked three questions. What is it that you want to accomplish? How do you define the completed state? How long will it take you to arrive at the completed state? The OHS built the metrics for the strategy objectives from those answers. One SME recalls that many of the completion dates were set because of grant requirements. The strategy went into effect in 2008, but a performance review on progress was delayed until early 2010. The assessment showed 55 to 60 percent of the objectives had been achieved.

Both SMEs believe the use of metrics help toward the completion of a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. One SME suggested metrics provide a target to achieve and helps to develop a plan. Metrics establish milestones useful to measure progress and announce when arriving at the finished goal. The other SME believes metrics are vital, and they absolutely help. The SME posits that things that get measured get done. This SME has seen many strategies with vague and lofty goals but believes metrics need to be concrete and achievable. When objectives are broken out into tasks things get done. By tasking specific measures, people get focused, which leads to results. One SME believed that metrics are an important part of accountability and implementing agencies should include their metrics into the work plans of their employees. Metrics should be set to close gaps in desired state capabilities. Both SMEs believed that the feedback from any system of checking progress should be used when building the next set of priorities and metrics.

One SME provided an example of a metric that was not thought out completely. There existed an objective for volunteers. The goal was met, since they managed to meet the required number of volunteers. But, they found they could not sort the list of volunteers to identify the required skills that they might need in a given
situation. They had to take the metric another step to add the capability to sort the volunteer lists. This shows the importance of understanding the practical use of the objective to insure it does what is intended. One SME suggests a routine reevaluation of a strategy’s metrics. The review should include all metrics and do so with all discipline’s input. The SME believed it had been some time since the Indiana metrics were drafted. It was time to refresh them and to insure they are the right metrics for what Indiana wants and needs done now.

The review of state strategies above raised the question whether the use of metrics with goals, objectives or subobjectives actually produced results. One SME suggested that items like funding or prioritization had a greater influence on progress then the use of metrics whereas the other SME suggested that metrics are a critical part of accountability and that can drive results. If employees know that they will be asked to account for their progress in achieving assigned objectives, they will strive for success. Both SMEs agreed the important part of accountability is having the metrics to measure progress and the system that checks and reports regularly that progress or lack thereof.

One SME believed the use of metrics should be realistic. Success is not necessarily a completed goal but more realistically progress made toward the goal. Those tasked with implementation of objectives or subobjectives should be comfortable that their task is not completed so long as reasonable progress is being made. Objectives will go through logical periods of red and yellow before getting to green. The SME also suggests that metrics should include elements outside of the normal span of control of those responsible to implement them. This high goal should not be ignored because it seems impossible at first.

Both SMEs believed a state homeland security strategy cannot be effective, if it does not measure progress of its goals, objectives or subobjectives. They also attribute some of the success of their state’s progress toward its goals, objectives or subobjectives is based upon the fact that metrics are applied to them. The SMEs agree strongly that a state should attach metrics to their goals, objectives or subobjectives.
b. Analysis

SME 9 and 10 both believed that metrics are important to a homeland security strategy. They provide a target to achieve and help to develop a plan to arrive at a desired end state. One SME strongly believed things that get measured get done. SME 3 from the National Capital Region (NCR) discussed how most DHS grant project are proposed and funded even though they do not clearly define their metrics. SME 3 provided an example of a project to build a house. The lumber arrives to start the building but the plans have no measurements. The builder does not know whether to build a ranch, split level or bungalow; there is no vision of a finished state. The importance of metrics is supported in the literature. In 2004, the U.S. General Accounting Office presented its report *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism* to the U.S. Congress. In the report, it describes performance measures as a desirable characteristic of an effective strategy. They clarify this statement by stating performance measures address steps to achieve results and are useful to gauge results (GAO, 2004, p. 11). In this same report, the GAO reviewed seven national security strategies. They criticized all seven for not identifying milestones or performance measures that the GAO considered necessary for evaluating progress, achieving results and ensuring oversight (GAO, 2004, p. 12). In his book, *Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change* (Fogg, 1999), C. Davis Fogg argues having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success.

The SMEs agreed that performance measures should be detailed and understandable. One SME stated metrics need to be concrete and achievable. SME 3 from the NCR believed objectives should be defined in a measurable way and failure to do so results in throwing money down a hole. The GAO reported to Congress that better identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures would aid implementing parties in achieving results in specific timeframes and would enable more effective oversight and accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 19). The U.S. Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which was designed to have agencies focus on the performance and results of their programs. The GPRA requires
agencies to set strategic quantifiable, measurable performance goals, measure performance and report on the degree to which goals are met. Maria I. Marshall in her article *Defining Your Business through Goals and Objectives First Steps for New Entrepreneurs* states that objectives must be clear and concise (2004). She suggests the SMART method of objective writing that requires them to be specific, measurable, action oriented, realistic and timely. To best be measurable, an objective should be expressed in terms of dollars or quantities. Objectives should be clear targets of performance that can be evaluated (Marshall, 2004, p. 2).

SME 9 believed that performance measures should reach beyond the comfort zone and control of those responsible to achieve them. This is supported by the authors of the article *Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector* (Latham et al., 2008). The authors discuss the goal setting theory of Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke. The goal setting theory states a specific high-level goal will lead to higher performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting. Given ability and commitment, the higher the goal the higher the performance (Latham et al., 2008, p. 386). SME 9 also expressed the importance of looking at metrics wisely. Success is not necessarily a completed goal but more realistically progress made toward the goal. Those tasked with implementation of objectives or subobjectives should be comfortable that their task is not completed so long as reasonable progress is being made.

The research showed that accountability is important and that metrics play an important role in it. SME 5 and SME 6, both from Colorado, agreed that a combination of prioritization, funding and accountability is the best path to accomplishing a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. SME 7 and SME 8, both from the National Capital Region, stressed that assignment of responsibility for an objective must include accountability. SME 7 stated a strategy should be specific about who should be accountable. From Washington State, SME 12 spoke of the importance of metrics in supporting accountability by stating metrics are milestones that provide feedback. SME 9 and 10 agree that metrics are a critical part of accountability. They also believe that accountability can drive results. If employees know they will be asked to account for their progress in achieving assigned objectives, they will strive for success.
SME 9 stated milestones are useful to measure progress and announce when arriving at the finished goal. SME 10 stated without measurement then the accountability is worthless.

The literature supports the connection between clearly defined metrics and accountability. In its review of national strategies, the GAO found they all identified goals, objectives and activities, but generally they did not identify priorities, milestones or performance measures. These are elements the GAO considered necessary for evaluating progress, achieving results and ensuring oversight (White House, 2001, p. 12). In his book *Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change* (1999), C. Davis Fogg argues that to be successful companies must develop an accountability system. He argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them. Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57). Having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success. Fogg’s definition of measurable includes a completion date and results that can be measured by numbers such as dollars or percentages.

A number of SMEs discussed the importance of a tracking and reporting system for metrics. Both SME 9 and 10 agreed an important part of accountability is having the metrics to measure progress and the system that checks and reports regularly that progress or lack thereof. SME 7, from the NCR, stated a strategy should be specific about who should be accountable and that person should be required to make regular progress reports. SME 3 from the NCR believed that accountability does come from the use of metrics but only to the point that the data is collected necessary to determine progress and that information is used to hold people accountable. SME 12 from Washington State believed that at least quarterly, any progress made should be compared to the metrics in place and the results reported to someone in charge of making progress. If the metric is not being met, then that would a good time to reevaluate it and readjust the objective or metric.
2. Strategies with Performance Measures That Are Not Quantifiable Nor with an Identifiable Completed State


   SME 11 and 12 provided a summary of how Washington State used metrics in relation to the goals, objectives or subobjectives of its state homeland security strategic plan. One SME recalled that in December 2001, prior to the existence of DHS, Washington State submitted a homeland security strategy to the Department of Justice (DOJ). DOJ required submitters to include implementation steps, including completion dates. The use of completion dates continued with each year’s submission and it carried over to DHS. Most of the time lines came from the time lines built into existing grants. Washington continued to apply a completion date for each of the objectives and implementation steps in its strategy, including its updated strategy issued in 2009. In this latest version completion dates remain the only metric used.

   One SME expressed concern that Washington does not include any measurement of success or progress in its strategy. As an objective or subobjective becomes complete or no longer relevant, it is simply dropped from the strategy. The SME pointed to an objective to support the winter Olympics that were held in Washington. Next year, there will be no reporting on the results of this objective, and it will just drop off the strategy. The SME laments that strategies have no place to report what has been completed in the past. This marker of what has been accomplished is part of the metrics that should be used in a strategy. It reflects the baseline and the progress made to date.

   One SME spoke of the importance of metrics in supporting accountability. Metrics are milestones that provide feedback. At least quarterly, the progress made should be compared to the metrics in place, and the results reported to someone in charge. If the metric is not being met, then that is a good time to reevaluate it and set a new date for completion. Someone needs to be placed in charge of each objective and
subobjective. The SME suggests agency heads should be responsible for collecting the data and reporting out on the status of the metrics. This process would bring accountability.

Washington is planning a move to use capabilities based gap analysis in the future as its metric standard and to stop using the date of completion method. An SME stated that while not in place yet, the new metrics will be based on gap analysis of the federal 37 TCLs. The baseline and identified gaps from the analysis will serve as the standards for setting objectives and subobjectives and measuring their success. The gap can become the metric for the objective to close the identified gap. Both SMEs agreed that capability gap analysis would be a better metric standard for the strategy to use than the use of completion dates. Since 2006, Washington has increased the importance of work groups set up for each of the 37 TCLs. These groups are conducting the assessment and gap analysis that is expected to support the move of Washington’s strategy objectives toward the 37 TCLs gaps.

Neither SME could provide any data on the completion rates for and of the strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives that had a completion date applied to it. One SME recalled in mid-2007, an assessment was conducted. At that time, just under 50 percent of the objectives were completed or on track to be completed. Since that time, the number that number has risen to over 60 percent. This same SME made it clear that the success that was made was more a factor of prioritization and supporting funding than the completion date assigned in the state strategy. The goals, objectives or subobjectives that were not making any progress were also one that had not been funded.

In addition, both SMEs felt that the use of metrics was helpful toward accomplishing goals, objectives or subobjectives so long as they were used as part of an accountability system. At one point, Washington was conducting regular review of progress toward its goals through the use of balanced scorecards. This motivated people to strive to meet the completion dates because they were being evaluated on that achievement. The use of metrics can be effective, if agencies take ownership and oversight for projects and are required to report results quarterly based on the metrics.
Both SMEs also agreed that a strategy that does not use metrics to measure progress will be less effective. They both felt that the use of completion date metrics in the strategy did not contribute to the progress made toward goals, objectives or subobjectives. One reiterated that the use of metrics in a strategy will not result in the same progress that prioritization and funding would. Both SMEs felt that the use of metrics was important. One suggested that they are useful in measuring success. The other felt that measuring must be accompanied by reporting and accountability to be effective.

\textit{b. Analysis}

The SMEs agreed that the use of metrics as a tool of accountability is effective in bringing progress toward the accomplishment of a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. One SME believed Washington state’s use of completion date metrics did drive progress early in the strategy period when regular progress reviews were made. The SME recalled that people would strive to make the completion dates because they knew they were being held accountable. This behavior is supported by the literature. In the article, \textit{Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector} (Latham et al., 2008), the authors discuss the goal setting theory. The goal setting theory states a specific high-level goal will lead to higher performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting. Given ability and commitment the higher the goal the higher the performance (Latham et al., 2008, p. 386). In his book, \textit{Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change}, C. Davis Fogg argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them. Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57). The other SME agrees that metrics are effective if someone will take oversight and ownership of the process and require regular reporting. SME 11 pointed out that DHS grant proposals often require milestones of completion dates. This method of metric is very effective in achieving progress because grant recipients want to maintain their eligibility for grant funding, so they will insure the necessary progress.
Each SME agreed that Washington’s future plan to build metrics from the state’s 37 TCL gap analysis would be a better metric than using just completion dates. Gap analysis is an annual requirement for DHS funding, so it is already being done. The analysis determines a state’s current level of capability for each targeted capability. It then measures the gap between the present state and the idea completed state. The identified gap could become an actual objective in a strategy. Clearly defined measurable subobjectives could be established toward completing the objective. If done correctly, this could provide a quantifiable standard for measuring progress. This would include a more detail metric than just a completion date. Support for this idea can be found in the literature. In its report, *Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism* to the U.S. Congress in 2004, the GAO stated a better identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures would aid implementing parties in achieving results in specific timeframes and would enable more effective oversight and accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 19).

In March 2003, Raymond J. Decker, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management for the GAO presented a report before a U.S. House Subcommittee titled *Combating Terrorism Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism* (GAO, 2003). Decker spoke of the importance of performance measures and stressed that they should define an end-state of what the strategy is trying to achieve. Decker suggests the lack of specific performance measures in federal homeland security strategies makes it more important that federal agencies have their own explicit performance measures required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). The GPRA requires agencies to set strategic, quantifiable, measurable performance goals; measure performance and report on the degree to which goals are met. Decker goes on to suggest that a strategy should extend beyond its immediate jurisdiction and include performance measures for sublevels of government like states, counties, cities and private sector entities too (GAO, 2003, p. 18). In her article *Defining Your Business Through Goals and Objectives First Steps for New Entrepreneurs*, Maria I. Marshall argues that objectives must be clear and concise. To be measurable an objective should be expressed in terms of dollars or quantities (Marshall, 2004). In his book, *Implementing your
Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change. C. Davis Fogg’s definition of measurable includes a completion date and results that can be measured by numbers such as dollars or percentages.

Both of the SMEs felt that use of metrics contributed directly to accountability. If no identifiable measurable work expectation exists, then it is difficult to hold someone accountable for work not accomplished. Those assigned responsibility also appreciate clarity in their expectations. As mentioned above, Maria I. Marshall argues that objectives must be clear and concise. In the article Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector (Latham et al., 2008), the authors state specific goals will focus on what is to be accomplished. Accountability has been raised in other parts of this research document as a critical element toward effectively accomplishing a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. SME 5 and SME 6 both from Colorado agreed that a combination of prioritization, funding and accountability is the best path to accomplishing a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. SME 7 and SME 8 both from the National Capital Region stressed that assignment of responsibility for an objective must include accountability. SME 7 stated a strategy should be specific about who should be accountable and that person should be required to make regular progress reports.

SME 12 from Washington state spoke of the importance of metrics in supporting accountability by stating metrics are milestones that provide feedback. At least quarterly, any progress made should be compared to the metrics in place and the results reported to someone in charge of making progress on the goals, objectives or subobjectives. If the metric is not being met, then that is a good time to reevaluate it and readjust the objective or metric. The SME’s opinions are supported by the literature. David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States in his report Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts (Walker, 2001) commented that homeland security involves a large number of organizations that must have clearly articulated roles, responsibilities and accountability. In his book, Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change, C. Davis Fogg argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned
to employees that are held accountable for achieving them. Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57). Fogg added that having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success.

C. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND APPLICATION TO FLORIDA

The research in this chapter determined that clearly defined metrics are a useful tool in the process of accomplishing a state homeland security strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. The review of thirty-five state strategies above revealed the majority of states (62.8 percent) did not use metrics to further define their goals, objectives or subobjectives. This is in contrast to the benefit of doing so suggested in the literature. The goal setting theory states a specific high-level goal will lead to higher performance and given ability and commitment the higher the goal the higher the performance (Latham et al., 2008, p. 386). The GAO states that milestones or performance measures are necessary for evaluating progress, achieving results and ensuring oversight (GAO, 2004, p. 12). The GAO stated a better identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures would aid implementing parties in achieving results in specific timeframes and would enable more effective oversight and accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 19). SME 9, 10, 11 and 12 all believed that metrics are important to a homeland security strategy. Metrics provide a target to achieve and help to develop a plan to arrive at a desired end state. One SME strongly believed things that get measured get done.

The review of thirty-five state strategies found thirteen states (37.2 percent) use some form of metric to further define their goals, objectives or subobjectives. Eight (62 percent) of the 13 use a milestone such as a date for completion. Five (38 percent) of the 13 used a more complex metric that was measurable in a quantifiable way or that defined an end state to the desired goals, objectives or subobjectives. The SMEs agreed that performance measures should be detailed and understandable. One SME stated metrics need to be concrete and achievable. SME 3 from the NCR believed objectives should be defined in a measurable way and failure to do so results in throwing money down a hole. The GAO reported to Congress that better identification of priorities, milestones and
performance measures would aid implementing parties in achieving results in specific timeframes and would enable more effective oversight and accountability (GAO, 2004, p. 19). Maria I. Marshall, in her article *Defining Your Business Through Goals and Objectives First Steps for New Entrepreneurs*, states that objectives must be clear and concise and should be clear targets of performance that can be evaluated (2004, p. 2). SME 9 believed that performance measures should reach beyond the comfort zone and control of those responsible to achieve them. This is supported by the authors of the article *Goal Setting and Performance Management in the Public Sector* (Latham et al., 2008). The authors discuss the goal setting theory of Gary P. Latham and Edwin A. Locke. The goal setting theory states a specific high-level goal will lead to higher performance than an easier goal, a general goal or no goal setting. Given ability and commitment, the higher the goal the higher the performance (Latham et al., 2008, p. 386).

The research was clear that accountability is a strong determinant for progress toward the goals, objectives or subobjectives of a strategy and that metrics play an important role in it. SME 5 and SME 6 both from Colorado agreed that a combination of prioritization, funding and accountability is the best path to accomplishing a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. SME 7 and SME 8 both stressed that assignment of responsibility for an objective must include accountability. SME 7 stated a strategy should be specific about who should be accountable. SME 12 spoke of the importance of metrics in supporting accountability by stating metrics are milestones that provide feedback. SMEs 9, 10, 11 and 12 agree that metrics are a critical part of accountability. They also believe that accountability can drive results. SME 9 stated milestones are useful to measure progress and announce when arriving at the finished goal. SME 10 stated without measurement then accountability is worthless.

The literature supports the connection between clearly defined metrics and accountability. In a review of national strategies, the GAO found they all identified goals, objectives and activities, but generally they did not identify priorities, milestones or performance measures. These are elements the GAO considered necessary for evaluating progress, achieving results and ensuring oversight (White House, 2001, p. 12). In his book, *Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action*
for Sustainable Change (1999), C. Davis Fogg argues that to be successful companies must develop an accountability system. He argues that strategic plan objectives are usually met when they are assigned to employees that are held accountable for achieving them. Organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (Fogg, 1999, p. 57). Having measurable objectives and accountability are the best predictors of a plan’s success. Fogg’s definition of measurable includes a completion date and results that can be measured by numbers such as dollars or percentages.

SMEs discussed the importance of a tracking and reporting system for metrics. Both SME 9 and 10 agreed an important part of accountability is having the metrics to measure progress and the system that checks and reports regularly that progress or lack thereof. SME 11 recalled Washington state’s use of completion date metrics did drive progress early in the strategy period when regular progress reviews were made. The SME recalled that people would strive to make the completion dates because they knew they were being held accountable. SME 7, from the NCR, stated a strategy should be specific about who should be accountable and that person should be required to make regular progress reports. SME 3, also from the NCR, believed that accountability does come from the use of metrics but only to the point that the data is collected necessary to determine progress and that information is used to hold people accountable. SME 12 from Washington state believed that at least quarterly, any progress made should be compared to the metrics in place and the results reported to someone in charge of making progress. If the metric is not being met then that would a good time to reevaluate it and readjust the objective or metric. The GAO felt that measuring performance was important enough that if there were limitations on the ability to collect performance data then one of the goals of the strategy should be to obtain better data (GAO, 2004, p. 16).

Florida is amongst the 62 percent of the reviewed states that did not take advantage of the benefits of using metrics to clearly define their state strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. Based upon a GAO report, this limits Florida’s effectiveness
in oversight and accountability over them (GAO, 2004, p. 19). Florida should adopt the use of metrics in their homeland security strategy to take advantage of the benefits described above.

In order to understand the proposed implementation plans listed below, the reader will need to understand the way Florida is structured for guidance over its domestic security efforts and funding. This process is described in detail in the chapter summary section of Chapter III and will only be summarized here. Florida’s Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC) is statutorily empowered to oversee all matters related to domestic security in the state. The DSOC is served by a State Working Group on Domestic Preparedness (SWG). The SWG has an Executive Board that is served by two different groups of subcommittees. The first is known as primary committees, the second as funding committees. The SWG primary committees research and recommend policies and response protocols for all the specialty teams and programs funded by DHS grant funding. The SWG funding committees are responsible to review DHS funding proposals within their area of expertise from state and local agencies. The funding committees determine which projects are to be selected for funding and to what level of funding.

Florida can implement metrics in three steps. First, it should develop metrics utilizing its existing primary committees; second, tie all grant funding to those metrics and third, create a reporting system that provides timely data to the primary and funding committees. The SMEs from Washington state spoke of their state’s future plan to build metrics from the federal 37 TCL gap analysis. It is recommended that Florida adopt this method of establishing its metrics. Florida should look annually at its current capability for each of the 37 TCLs. The analysis would determine the state’s current level of capability for each targeted capability. It would then determine the gap between the present state and the idea completed state. The identified gap then becomes an actual objective in the strategy. Clearly defined measurable subobjectives could be established toward completing the objective and the identified end state would be establishing the desired capability listed in the TCL list. If done correctly, this could provide a quantifiable standard for measuring progress. One benefit to adopting this system is that
this type of gap analysis is an annual requirement for DHS funding so it is already being done. Another benefit is that establishing metrics to fill TCL gaps will keep Florida within the desired prioritizes of DHS and ensure continued funding opportunities.

At the conclusion of each annual TCL review, the SWG primary committees will need to look at the gap analysis results and translate them into more specific metrics that need to be met to accomplish the TCL measured gap. Based on evidence provided by this research’s SMEs and the literature, the metrics will need to be measurable in a quantifiable way. The metrics for each TCL category when combined together will need to define an end state. These metrics should be documented into a list for each of the 37 TCLs. Since this list potentially could change annually, the state homeland security strategy should be amended to refer specifically to this list to be the guiding metrics for each year. The current list should be attached to the strategy in its first year as an addendum. The strategy could clearly state that the addendum will change to the most recent copy of the list, as it is produced each year.

As mentioned above, DHS funding proposals are required to be approved by the SWG funding committee that oversees them. All future DHS grant proposals seeking approval from the funding committees should be required to identify what metric(s) they will be addressing and estimate the progress expected to be made toward that metric goal. Since the members of these subcommittees are SMEs, they would be in a good position to judge each project and its proposed progress on the metric(s) it claims to impact. The use of metrics should be used wisely. Success is not necessarily a completed goal, but more realistically progress made toward the goal.

As suggested by the research, an effective reporting system will need to be established to insure data is collected and reviewed on a timely basis. Each grant recipient would be required to report biannually on the progress of its project and, specifically, its progress on the metric(s) it intended to affect. The reporting should be done in a quantifiable way that matches the nature of the metric to allow for logical comparison. The report will be provided to the SWG funding committee that oversees the grant for review. The SWG funding committee should insure the grant projects are accomplishing their intended results. If a metric is not being met, then that would a good
time to look closely at the issue and readjust either the objective or metric. The SWG funding committee will evaluate future funding requests for projects based on progress revealed by the reporting system. As discussed in detail in the chapter summary of Chapter III, this recommendation is not without issue. As described in Chapter III, most of the DHS and other federal funding available to Florida for domestic security related issues do not pass through the SWG funding committee for approval but this could be changed by the DSOC bring the matter before the Florida Legislature.

Chapters III, IV and V have detailed the research related to the thesis topic. In the final chapter, the primary research findings will be summarized and suggested implementation steps will be offered.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

Alice came to a fork in the road. “Which road do I take?” she asked.
“Where do you want to go?” responded the Cheshire cat.
“I don’t know,” Alice answered.
“Then,” said the cat, “It doesn’t matter.”

Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland (1865)

The Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC) was given authority through Florida Statute 943.0313 to provide executive leadership and fiscal guidance to state and local agencies in their terrorism prevention, preparation, protection, response and recovery efforts. In this leadership role, the DSOC issued its Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan for the three year period, covering 2009 to 2011 (Florida Domestic Security Oversight Council, 2008). The Strategic Plan contained five goals with 37 supporting objectives. There are 296 implementation steps offered in the Strategic Plan toward accomplishing the objectives. The Strategic Plan does not prioritize its goals, objectives or implementation steps resulting in over 300 equally weighed tasks with no clear direction from the DSOC. The Strategic Plan also does not assign responsibility for making progress in achieving its goals, objectives or implementation steps. Without assigning responsibility, the DSOC cannot empower the assignee with ownership and authority to carry out the DSOC’s tasking and at the same time provide someone who is accountable to the DSOC for progress, or lack thereof.
Lastly the Strategic Plan does not define its goals, objectives or implementation steps in a measurable way. A step is not attainable if a completed state is not defined. Knowing what is needed and to what extent it is needed enables the achievement of the action desired by the Strategic Plan.

Compounding the problem is the fact that significant portions of domestic security related federal grant funds available to Florida are not coordinated directly by the DSOC. While Florida received $33,011,575 in 2010 State Homeland Security Program funding, there were five UASI cities in Florida that received a total of $35,367,406 in funding (DHS, 2009, pp. 13, 15). Each UASI city applies funding based on its own
priorities. Therefore, the DSOC, through its state working group funding committees, has oversight over less than half the DHS funding awarded to Florida. In addition, the DSOC funding committees have no oversight over hundreds of millions of dollars in domestic security related federal grants available to the state such as Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control, Department of Education, Emergency Management Performance Grants, Metropolitan Medical Response System, Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program, Driver’s License Security Grant Program and the Port Security Grant Program to name a few.

The weaknesses of the Florida Domestic Security Strategic Plan have made the DSOC less effective. The DSOC should be empowered to identify the most critical domestic security issues facing Florida and direct the resources and funding of the state to deal with them. Without change, Florida will continue to spread its resources over a vast number of implementation steps while not completing any one of them. If the DSOC does not assign ownership and authority to strategic tasks along with a clear definition of what needs to be done to achieve success, then the state’s strategic plan will not achieve tangible policy objectives.

This research project began with an examination of literature related to goals, objectives and strategic plans. The review concentrated on the supporting and opposing arguments for the use of prioritization, assignment and metrics related to goals, objectives or subobjectives. Best practices were identified from the literature. The best practices were then used as a guide in the review of thirty-five existing state homeland security strategies. Each strategy was examined for use of prioritization, assignment or metrics and if found, chosen for further examination, which was detailed in Chapters III, IV and V, respectively. As the strategies were examined, similarities or patterns were identified. Representative strategies from these patterns were selected for further review. The further review came in the form of subject matter expert (SME) interviews. SMEs related to selected strategies were interviewed and asked to provide data and opinion related to their experience with their state’s use of prioritization, assignment or metrics. The data collected during these phases of the research were analyzed and best practices
were identified. These best practices were then discussed as options for Florida to consider adopting for its future homeland security strategies.

Primary research findings were identified for each category of prioritization, assignment and the use of metrics. A discussion of the findings from each category follows.

A PRIMARY RESEARCH FINDINGS

1. Prioritization Primary Research Findings

The literature supports the idea that prioritization is a necessary element for achieving results and that priorities will lead to a desired end state. The federal government ties DHS grant funding to compliance with prioritization to insure progress on goals, objectives or subobjectives they deem most important. Maryland and NCR SMEs all agreed that prioritizing goals, objectives or subobjectives within a strategy is important and effective.

The research found two methods to apply priorities in a strategy. The first was Maryland’s approach to make all goals a priority. The second was NCR’s prioritization of just a few of many objectives and subobjectives. The NCR method is a more favorable method, since it allows for all disciplines to have some goals, objectives or subobjectives to make progress toward, but also allows additional focus or concentration on a few through prioritization. The SMEs from both Maryland and the NCR agreed that prioritized goals should be developed from base line capabilities gap analysis with threat as a critical part of the equation.

Most state homeland security strategies cover periods of three or more years. Terrorist tactics and threats to communities can change more quickly. The research suggested that states consider developing a capacity to change the direction of its state homeland security strategy and with it the prioritization and funding influence it carries. Operational personnel will likely be the first to recognize the need to change and adapt to
new threats while leadership committees have the authority to alter the priorities of a strategy. The two must work together to insure the appropriate flexibility is available to meet changing demand.

The research suggested that prioritization brings with it funding. Over half of the SMEs interviewed for this research project made statements confirming this. This is also supported by DHS grant guidance, which ties funding to compliance to DHS’ priorities. Many of the SMEs interviewed for this research project identified funding as the most important determinant whether there will be progress made on a strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives.

An important issue discussed by the SMEs was whether a state homeland security strategy should guide more than just the distribution of DHS grant funding. Funding sources, such as Center for Disease Control, Health and Human Services, transportation, sea port grants and other resources can be useful in making progress toward priorities of a homeland security strategy. The research showed the NCR strategy only guides $59 million in UASI funding while nearly $87 million in other forms of DHS grants funding is prioritized separately by other entities within the same geographical area (DHS, 2009, pp. 13–28). This results in independent groups setting their own priorities and directing separate resources to address literally the same problems. Additionally, SMEs 3 and 8 described local agencies use of grant funds to meet their local response and preparedness needs in competition with the boarder statewide strategic viewpoint. Three of the SMEs interviewed for this thesis agreed that a single strategy should be used to set the priorities and direct all the resources available to address the issues of domestic security. SME 5 suggests one way to bridge the gap between disparate funding sources is to require everyone to use a singular statewide capability assessment and gap analysis. Currently, the different funding sources utilize their own assessments of needs and set their own priorities. Having a single needs analysis could enable and encourage each grant source to focus their unique resources on the parts of the single gap analysis where they have jurisdiction and expertise.
2. Assignment Primary Research Findings

The literature and SMEs strongly support the use of assignment and recognize it as a factor in the equation leading to results. The most important benefit of assignment comes in the form of accountability. Two methods of assigning responsibility for goals, objectives or subobjectives were identified in the research. The first was assigning them to state entities while the second was to assign them to multi agency committees. The research found that each had unique strengths and a shared weakness. State agency personnel have jurisdiction and an understanding of the diversity found throughout their state. They can encourage local agency and multidiscipline contribution and buy in for projects that result in accomplishment of assigned objectives. Multiagency committees give a voice to the diverse needs of local communities and brings the expertise of SMEs statewide. The research identified the shared weakness: they lacked true authority. The SMEs felt for assignment to be effective, it must be accompanied by authority. It was pointed out in the literature and by the SMEs that government committees and task forces have long dealt with the lack of authority over their member agencies with consensus playing a role in every successful multiagency endeavor. Colorado and the NCR were both found to use multiagency work groups in their formula for assigning goals, objectives or subobjectives. The two methods of assigning responsibility could work well together by taking advantage of each one’s strengths.

3. Metrics Primary Research Findings

The research determined that clearly defined metrics are a useful tool in the process of accomplishing a state homeland security strategy’s goals, objectives or subobjectives. The literature, SME 9, SME 10, SME 11 and SME 12 all concurred that metrics are important to a homeland security strategy. Metrics provide a target to achieve and help to develop a plan to arrive at a desired end state. One SME strongly believed things that get measured get done. Most of the strategies reviewed in this category used a milestone, such as a date for completion, while the others used a more complex metric that was measurable in a quantifiable way or that defined an end state. The SMEs agreed that performance measures should be more like the later. Nine SMEs and the literature
were clear that accountability is a strong determinant for progress toward the goals, objectives or subobjectives of a strategy and that metrics play an important role in it. In his book *Implementing your Strategic Plan how to Turn “Intent” Into Effective Action for Sustainable Change*, C. Davis Fogg argues that organizations that hold their people accountable achieve approximately 85 percent of their strategic objectives (1999, p. 57).

SMEs discussed the importance of a tracking and reporting system for metrics. SMEs agreed an important part of accountability is having the metrics to measure progress and the system that checks and reports regularly that progress or lack thereof. The SMEs suggested that if a metric is not being met, then the review process provides a good time to reevaluate it and readjust the objective or metric. The GAO felt that measuring performance was important enough that if there were limitations on the ability to collect performance data then one of the goals of the strategy should be to obtain better data (GAO, 2004, p. 16).

**B. RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTATION STEPS FOR FLORIDA**

The shortcomings identified in Florida’s homeland security strategy where examined in the light of the primary research findings. The following recommendations and their implementation steps are offered as solutions. In order to understand the proposed implementation steps listed below, the reader will need to understand the way Florida is structured for guidance over its domestic security efforts and funding. Florida’s Domestic Security Oversight Council is statutorily empowered to oversee all matters related to domestic security in the state. The DSOC is an executive policy advisory group. The DSOC is comprised of heads of state agencies that have a critical role in Florida’s domestic security. Representatives from Florida’s Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) and key members of federal, private sector and professional associations make up the balance of the executive committee. The DSOC is served by seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) and a State Working Group on Domestic Preparedness (SWG). The SWG has an Executive Board that is served by two different groups of subcommittees. The first is known as primary committees. The second group is known as funding committees.
The SWG primary committees are staffed by subject matter experts from all disciplines and from all regions of the state. These committees research and recommend policies and response protocols for some of the specialty teams and programs funded by DHS grant funding in Florida. Florida’s primary subcommittees are:

- Operations and Planning
- Critical Infrastructure
- Training and Exercise
- Logistics and Equipment
- Campus Safety
- Interoperability

The second group of SWG subcommittees are known as funding committees. These subcommittees are also staffed by subject matter experts from all regions of the state but tend to be discipline specific. These committees are active during DHS grant funding cycles. These subcommittees are responsible to review DHS funding proposals within their area of expertise submitted by state and local agencies. As expected, there are more funding requests then DHS grant funds available. These subcommittees vote to determine which projects are to be selected for funding and to what level of funding. Once these subcommittees make their selections, they are brought to the SWG Executive Board for review and approval. The approved projects are then brought to the DSOC for final review and approval. In 2010, Florida had the following funding subcommittees:

- Agriculture and Environment
- Community Health
- Campus Security
- Medical Surge
- Emergency Management
- Fire Rescue
- Interoperable Communications
- Law Enforcement Prevention
- Law Enforcement Response
- Public Information
1. Prioritization Implementation Steps

Florida was included in the 83 percent of the reviewed states that did not take advantage of the power of prioritization. It is recommended that Florida develop and implement a prioritization method in its future state homeland security strategies. It is recommended that the SWG primary subcommittees be charged annually with developing initial ideas for priorities for the domestic security efforts of the state. They are operational level SMEs who are already responsible to develop the interdisciplinary response protocols for Florida’s domestic security assets. Each primary subcommittee should develop its own priorities.

Based upon the results of the research, it is recommended that Florida prioritize only some of its strategy’s goals, objectives and subobjectives. A total of 10 to 15 priorities should be the maximum. This would intensify the resources available to accomplish the priorities while remaining within a manageable amount. The priorities would best be based upon capability assessment gap analysis related to the federal 37 TCL list. Once draft priorities are prepared, the primary subcommittees should have a joint session with the SWG Executive Committee to select the statewide priorities. The selected priorities should then be reviewed and approved by the DSOC. Another issue raised in the research is the flexibility for priorities to be changed in response to changing terrorist threats. The SMEs serving on the SWG primary subcommittees will likely be the first to recognize the need to change and adapt to new threats. Florida will need to insure that the changing needs and challenges identified by operational SMEs are clearly shared with the DSOC. The DSOC should remain sensitive to the unique position of operational SMEs and heed their call for rapid change.

To implement the strategy’s priorities, Florida could use a similar system proven to be very effective for DHS. Florida should require that a percentage of its DHS funding be spent toward prioritized goals, objectives and subobjectives of its homeland security strategy. All DHS grant proposals must be approved by the SWG funding committees. The funding committees could be required to spend the designated percentage of their allotted funding toward Florida’s prioritized items.
The research determined that it would be more effective if Florida’s state homeland security strategy priorities guided more than just the distribution of DHS grant funding. Resources, such as Center for Disease Control (CDC), Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Education, transportation and sea port grants can be useful in making progress toward the priorities in Florida’s homeland security strategy. In his article, *The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning*, Henry Mintzberg tells his readers that strategic plans are used so that everyone pulls in the same direction (1994, p. 113). There is a serious flaw in the SWG funding committees system used in Florida. They have no oversight over Florida’s five UASI funding entities. While Florida will receive $33,011,575 in 2010 State Homeland Security Program funding, the five UASIs in Florida will received a total of $35,367,406 in funding (DHS, 2009, pp. 13, 15), and each will apply its funding based on its own priorities. Therefore, the SWG funding committees have oversight over less than half the DHS funding awarded to Florida. In addition, the funding committees have no oversight over hundreds of millions of dollars in domestic security related federal grants available to the state, such as Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control, Department of Education, Emergency Management Performance Grants, Metropolitan Medical Response System, Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program, Driver’s License Security Grant Program and the Port Security Grant Program to name a few.

Florida could leverage the coordination and prioritization power of this funding by requiring state agencies that receive such grants to also gain approval for grant proposals through the funding committees. These agencies would logically need to have representative voting powers on the funding committees. The system problems raised here could be corrected if the DSOC would bring the matter before the Florida legislature and ask for amendments to the Florida State Statute that gives authority to the DSOC. To support this methodology, it is also recommended that Florida develop a singular statewide capability assessment and gap analysis. Currently, the different funding sources utilize their own assessment of needs and set their own priorities. Having a single needs analysis could enable and encourage each grant source to focus its unique resources on the parts of the single gap analysis where it has jurisdiction and expertise.
2. Assignment Implementation Steps

A review of thirty-five state strategies showed that only 23 percent used some form of assignment of their goals, objectives or subobjectives. Florida would benefit by adopting the use of assignment as recommended in the research. The research showed assignment of goals, objectives or subobjectives will contribute to the effectiveness of a state strategy to accomplish them. It is recommended that Florida adopt a hybrid of the two methods of assignment studied in this research. The first was assigning a strategy’s goals, objectives and subobjectives to a state agency. The second assigned them to a multiagency committee. The two methods could work well together by taking advantage of each one’s strengths. State agency personnel have jurisdiction, an understanding of the diversity throughout their state and can encourage local contribution and buy in. Multiagency committees give a voice to local communities, bring the expertise of local SMEs and can build consensus. As described above, all DHS grant funding requests must be approved by the SWG funding committee that oversees the discipline or specialty in which it falls. These funding committees are uniquely situated to exert control over the entire DHS grant process. As discussed in Chapter III, that control can be used to ensure DHS funds are being applied toward priorities established in Florida’s homeland security strategy. The control can also be used to insure accountability that DHS grant recipients are making progress toward the goals, objectives and subobjectives of Florida’s strategy. The research has shown that the use of assignment brings accountability and that brings results.

It is recommended that Florida assign responsibility for each goal, objective or subobjective of its strategy to one of the SWG funding committees. Since individual agency proposals must be approved by the funding committees, they have the authority to approve, deny or modify a proposal and its subsequent funding requests. This enables the funding committee to enforce compliance with Florida’s strategy expectations. As suggested by the research, a Florida state goal leader should be identified and placed as the lead chairperson on each funding committee. This would place the goal leader in a position of authority over local agency grant submission with the tempering of a multiagency working group to insure statewide consensus prevails. As discussed above,
this recommendation is not without issue since most of the DHS and other federal
dfunding available to Florida for domestic security related issues do not pass through the
SWG funding committee for approval. This could be changed if the DSOC brought the
matter before the Florida Legislature, which could require such oversight.

The research suggested that a progress reporting system be established to help the
SWG funding committees with accountability. The accurate tracking of projects can
insure funding committees have the data that they need to make accurate decisions to
promote progress toward the accomplishment of Florida’s homeland security strategy
goals, objectives or subobjectives. This topic will be discussed further below.

3. Metrics Implementation Steps

Florida is amongst the 62 percent of the reviewed states that did not take
advantage of the benefits of using metrics to clearly define their state strategy’s goals,
objectives or subobjectives. Florida should adopt the use of metrics in its homeland
security strategy to take advantage of the benefits described above. Florida can
implement metrics in three steps. First, it should develop metrics utilizing its existing
primary committees; second, tie all grant funding to those metrics and third, create a
reporting system that provides timely data to the primary and funding committees. The
SMEs from Washington state spoke of their state’s future plan to build metrics from the
federal 37 TCL gap analysis. It is recommended that Florida adopt this method of
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gap analysis is an annual requirement for DHS funding, so it is already being done.
Another benefit comes from establishing metrics to fill TCL gaps that will keep Florida within the desired prioritizes of DHS and ensure continued funding opportunities.

At the conclusion of each annual TCL review, the SWG primary committees will need to look at the gap analysis results and translate them into more specific metrics that need to be met to accomplish the TCL measured gap. Based on evidence provided by this research’s SMEs and the literature, the metrics will need to be measurable in a quantifiable way. The metrics for each TCL category, when combined together, will need to define an end state. These metrics should be documented into a list for each of the 37 TCLs. Since this list potentially could change annually, the state homeland security strategy should be amended to refer specifically to this list to be the guiding metrics for each year. The current list should be attached to the strategy in its first year as an addendum. The strategy could clearly state that the addendum will change to the most recent copy of the list as it is produced each year.

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funding committee should evaluate future funding requests for projects based on progress revealed by the reporting system. As discussed above, this recommendation is not without issue, since most of the DHS and other federal funding available to Florida for domestic security related issues do not pass through the SWG funding committee for approval. This could be changed, if the DSOC brought the matter before the Florida Legislature, which could require such oversight.

C. FUTURE RESEARCH

The scope of this research project was made broad by the inclusion of prioritization, assignment and metrics. The researcher was not able to examine the ideas and suggestions of the literature and SMEs to their fullest. One item that should be examined further is the idea of Florida adopting a singular capabilities assessment and gap analysis to be used by all funding sources related to domestic security issues. The research would have to explore the needs of each unique funding source to identify what would need to be included in the one size fits all assessment. Further research could be done to explore how the different funding source oversight groups would share in selecting the identified gaps that they would apply their resources to close. Another area untouched by this research is the potential contributions that could be made to this topic by examining domestic security strategies from other countries. Countries that are experienced in dealing with acts of terror, such as Israel and Great Britain, could add protocols not previously considered by states for use in their homeland security strategies. Finally, researchers should look at the enviable reduction or elimination of DHS grant funding and how states could provide oversight to maintain their existing capabilities through the use of their homeland security strategies.
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