INTERNALIZING FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS DOCTRINE IN THE U.S. ARMY

by

Christopher A. Gonzales

March 2011

Thesis Advisor: Kenneth R. Dombroski
Second Reader: Kalev I. Sepp

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
For the U.S. Army, the fundamentally new concept of full spectrum operations requires that stability operations be internalized into its culture and operations. The main research question of this thesis is: How can the Army internalize full spectrum operations, including stability operations, into its culture and operations? Internalization specifies a cultural integration of stability operations represented by organizational attitudinal responses in the execution of full spectrum operations.

The findings of this thesis are that full spectrum operations will be internalized in the U.S. Army under the following three conditions: 1) The National Security Strategy formally and consistently embraces the use of the military forces to conduct stability operations in support of national objectives. As addressed in Chapter II, this is the best method for prompting the Army to accept full spectrum operations, and specifically stability operations, as a permanent mission-set with the accompanying imperative to internalize it. 2) The Army doctrinally evolves the full spectrum concept, and devises a training model that supports operationalizing full spectrum operations. As described in Chapter III, addressing these imperatives requires the Army to rectify core issues such as leader development and the optimal force structure for full spectrum operations. 3) The Army is able to close the conceptual gaps in the whole-of-government approach to stability operations and overcome internal biases as represented by the current assignment and career development practices in the personnel system.
ABSTRACT

For the U.S. Army, the fundamentally new concept of full spectrum operations requires that stability operations be internalized into its culture and operations. The main research question of this thesis is: How can the Army internalize full spectrum operations, including stability operations, into its culture and operations? Internalization specifies a cultural integration of stability operations represented by organizational attitudinal responses in the execution of full spectrum operations.

The findings of this thesis are that full spectrum operations will be internalized in the U.S. Army under the following three conditions: 1) The National Security Strategy formally and consistently embraces the use of the military forces to conduct stability operations in support of national objectives. As addressed in Chapter II, this is the best method for prompting the Army to accept full spectrum operations, and specifically stability operations, as a permanent mission-set with the accompanying imperative to internalize it. 2) The Army doctrinally evolves the full spectrum concept, and devises a training model that supports operationalizing full spectrum operations. As described in Chapter III, addressing these imperatives requires the Army to rectify core issues such as leader development and the optimal force structure for full spectrum operations. 3) The Army is able to close the conceptual gaps in the whole-of-government approach to stability operations and overcome internal biases as represented by the current assignment and career development practices in the personnel system.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................1
   A. PROBLEM .......................................................................................................2
   B. SUPPORTING RESEARCH QUESTIONS ..................................................3
   C. TERMS OF ART .............................................................................................4
      1. Full Spectrum Operations ...................................................................4
      2. Stability Operations .............................................................................5
      3. Internalize .............................................................................................5
      4. Operationalize ......................................................................................6
      5. Doctrine .................................................................................................6
      6. Capability ..............................................................................................6
   D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................6
      1. National Security Strategy and Army Doctrine ................................7
   E. THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................14

II. THE CORRELATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE INTERNALIZATION OF STABILITY OPERATIONS DOCTRINE .................................................................17
   A. POST-COLD WAR NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE RESULTING ARMY INTERNALIZATION .............................................17
      1. Inconsistent National Security Strategies—the 1990s ............17
      2. What the Army Internalized From Inconsistent Strategy in the 1990s ...............................................................................................19
         a. The Initial Set ..........................................................................22
         b. Iraq: The Game Changer .......................................................23
      4. The Army’s Lessons Learned From the 2000s............................24
   B. THE CORRELATION OF SMART POWER AND STABILITY OPERATIONS ...............................................................................................25
      1. Smart Power Defined .........................................................................25
      2. Smart Power Specified and Implied Tasks ......................................26
      3. Stability Operations ...........................................................................27
      4. Stability Operations Specified and Implied Tasks .......................28
      5. Strategy Doctrine Correlations .........................................................29
      6. Strategy and Doctrine Disconnects ...................................................30
   C. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................32

III. OPERATIONALIZING FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS .............................33
   A. THE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS ...............................................................................................33
      1. The Department of Defense—Policy Framework .........................33
      2. The Whole of Government—Policy Framework ............................35
      3. The Army Policy Framework ...........................................................36
### B. ARMY METHODOLOGIES FOR OPERATIONALIZING FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

1. Army Organizational Roles .............................................................. 37
2. The Army’s Training Strategy .......................................................... 39
3. The Army’s Training Strategy for Stability Operations .................. 42

### C. EVALUATION OF THE ARMY’S OPERATIONALIZING STRATEGY

1. Training .......................................................................................... 44
2. Organizational Focus ....................................................................... 45

### D. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................. 47

### IV. CONCEPTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO INTERNALIZATION

#### A. INSTITUTIONALIZING VS. INTERNALIZING .................................. 49
1. Institutionalizing ............................................................................ 50
2. Internalization .............................................................................. 52
3. The Army’s Raison D’être .............................................................. 53

#### B. RECONCILING STABILITY OPERATIONS AND THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT ............................................................. 54
1. Organization .................................................................................. 54
2. Innovative Doctrine ........................................................................ 55
3. Resourcing .................................................................................... 56
4. Addressing the Challenge .............................................................. 57
5. Contracting Support ....................................................................... 58
6. Growing the Capability ................................................................. 59

#### C. IMPLEMENTING A STABILITY ETHIC .......................................... 60
1. Stability Ethic and the Strategic Corporal ...................................... 60
2. Organizational Resistance ............................................................. 61
3. Decision Points ............................................................................. 63
   a. Leadership ................................................................................. 63
   b. Education ................................................................................ 65

#### D. CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................. 67

### LIST OF REFERENCES ........................................................................ 69

### INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................... 75
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Conceptual Intersection Points: National Security Strategy and Stability Doctrine .......................................................... 29
Figure 2. The Army’s Force Generation Model ARFORGEN ............................................... 40
Figure 3. The Army’s Aim Point Strategy ........................................................................ 42
Figure 4. The Army’s DOTMLPF Model ......................................................................... 52
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. The Intellectual Foundations of the Interagency Process ................................55
# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>The Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Force Generation Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUB</td>
<td>Bottom Up Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Foreign Area Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.I.</td>
<td>Typical American Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>Interagency Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRTC</td>
<td>Joint Readiness Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernment Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD 25</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td>Highest Readiness State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td>Second Highest Readiness State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

The Obama administration has embraced the national security strategy of “Smart Power” as a balance of hard power, emphasizing military centric approaches, and soft power, relying on a diplomatic multilateral tact.\(^1\) Accordingly, the Department of Defense has developed the principle of full spectrum operations, which envisions a spectrum of engagement from offensive and defensive combat operations to stability operations. Stability operations require the military, in coordination with other elements of national power, to provide security within, and build the institutional capacity of, troubled states. The key tenant of full spectrum operations is the concept that combat and stability operations are of co-equal importance. Full spectrum doctrine envisions operations where the U.S. military transitions between all points along the spectrum (offense/defense and stability operations) as needed, to fulfill the mission.

For the U.S. Army, this fundamentally new concept of full spectrum operations requires that stability operations be internalized into its culture and operations. The main research question of this thesis is: How can the Army internalize full spectrum operations, to the inclusion of stability operations, into its culture and operations? Internalization specifies a cultural integration of stability operations represented by organizational attitudinal responses in the execution of full spectrum operations. This thesis will assert that the Army faces the following three challenges to internalizing full spectrum operations:

1. Correlating the National Security Strategy to full spectrum operations doctrine, and by extension stability doctrine. This is an external political condition that enables internalization by emphasizing the validity of stability operations as an enduring mission-set.

2. Operationalizing full spectrum operations, specifically by the inclusion of stability operations.\(^2\) This challenge encompasses the internal friction inherent in incorporating new doctrinal practices of stability operations into the Army’s operational paradigm.


\(^2\) Operationalizing doctrine consists of translating the concept into plans for execution.
3. Overcoming the internal challenges to the internalization of full spectrum doctrine posed by conceptual and institutional barriers. This challenge incorporates the friction points innate to adding stability operations to the Army’s reason for existence.

The main focus of this thesis is the identification and analysis of decision points that will facilitate the Army’s internalization of full spectrum operations, and by extension stability operations, doctrine in support of national objectives. This research correlates to the defense decision making and planning curriculum as it links the Army’s internal organizational decisions to national strategic initiatives.

A. PROBLEM

Central to the policy of Smart Power strategy is an imperative for prevention, likely in the form of a stability operation in a troubled state, to prevent collapse and the resultant deterioration of the international system. U.S. Presidents have long relied on the expeditionary capabilities of the U.S. military to conduct stability operations, yet because they were not a formal mission, they remained on the Army’s intellectual and operational peripheries. In 2005, DoD Directive 3000.5 Military Support to Stability Security Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations corrected the operational paradigm by stating:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.3

This mandate, effectively creating the concept of full spectrum operations, necessitated the internalization of full spectrum operations into the culture and operations of the Army.

---

Organizational attitudinal responses include the cultural acceptance of stability operations precepts, within the hierarchy of full spectrum operations. This can be demonstrated by the institutional training methods that develop full spectrum capable leaders, bolstered by the training institutions that generate full spectrum capable units. A further indication of attitudinal responses is how the Army maintains that cultural acceptance absent active involvement in the two ongoing stability operations being carried out in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how the doctrine evolves to meet future contingencies. The ultimate output of internalization is a reduced “lag time” in transitioning between combat and stability operations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates addressed this lag in terms of the time necessary to switch from high intensity combat to stability operations, while incorporating a nuanced understanding the fundamental differences between the two missions.4

B. SUPPORTING RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This thesis will address the major research question of how can the Army internalize full spectrum operations, to the inclusion of stability operations, into its culture and operations, by concentrating on the following three supporting questions:

Question One: How important is a consistent correlation between the National Security Strategy and full spectrum operations doctrine to the Army’s internalization of stability operations as a permanent mission-set? Key to this argument is the consistency with which the national security strategy specifies and integrates the tenets of stability operations. This consistency can be measured over multiple strategies by successive administrations, and by examining supporting policies within the current strategy. A survey of post-Cold War strategies reveals that while most strategies made extensive use of stability operations, many were ambiguous as to the role of them in the greater hierarchy of initiatives. Further, the current strategy of Smart Power, although espousing

---

the tenets of full spectrum operations, lacks conceptual congruency within supporting policies that inhibit indications to the Army that stability operations are a permanent mission set.

Question Two: How can the Army operationalize full spectrum operations, specifically the inclusion of stability operations, to allow the doctrine to be internalized? Operationalizing full spectrum operations doctrine requires decision points involving fundamental organizational tenets. The first decision point is the creation and promulgation of full spectrum policy framework, as the basis for the doctrine itself, an effort that will be explored in depth by the literature review. The second decision point requires optimizing force structure and training models to integrate offense/defense and stability operations into a comprehensive operational paradigm. By evaluating the Army’s decision points for a full spectrum policy framework, along with an optimized force structure and training model this thesis can answer the question of how the Army can operationalize full spectrum operations.

Question Three: How will the Army overcome conceptual and institutional barriers to organizationally internalize full spectrum operations doctrine? The preconditions of a consistent national strategy and an operationalized doctrine, as analyzed in the previous questions, form the basis for exploring the conceptual and institutional barriers to internalizing new doctrine. Integral to this question is an understanding of the Army’s goals and institutional biases, as well as the conceptual shortcomings of the whole of government approach that must be negotiated for the Army to internalize full spectrum operations.

C. TERMS OF ART

1. Full Spectrum Operations

Full spectrum operations apply to the joint force as well as the Army. The foundations for Army operations conducted outside the United States and its territories are reflected in the elements of full spectrum operations: continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. These combinations are
manifested in operations designed to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative using the mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities of the Army. In full spectrum operations, the emphasis on the individual elements changes with echelon, time, and location. No single element is more important than another; simultaneous combinations of the elements, constantly adapted to the dynamic conditions of the operational environment, are key to successful operations.  

2. **Stability Operations**

Stability operations leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority. Through stability operations, military forces help to set the conditions that enable the actions of the other instruments of national power to succeed in achieving the broad goals of conflict resolution and stabilization. Stability operations are usually conducted to support a host-nation government; however, they may also support the efforts of a transitional civil or military authority when no legitimate government exists. Stability operations have been referred to as irregular warfare, small wars, peacekeeping, and military operations other than war.

3. **Internalize**

The demonstration of motor, verbal, and attitudinal responses, by members of an organization, which embody the fundamentals of a concept or idea (i.e., full spectrum operations doctrine). Within the Army, motor, verbal, and attitudinal responses to a doctrine are the collective result of conditioning, familiarity, and acceptance. Motor responses include testable skills that ascribe to a standard, such as rifle marksmanship or language proficiency. Verbal responses encompass a demonstrated understanding of

---


procedures or culture understanding. Attitudinal responses sit atop the hierarchy and include a demonstrated understanding of how a given concept fits within the larger scope of policy and strategy.7

4. Operationalize

The action of integrating a concept into the operational paradigm so that it may be organizationally executed. For the Army, operationalizing new doctrine requires identifying key tasks and devising methods by which those tasks may be trained and evaluated in concert with existing operational requirements. Operationalizing a concept, such as full spectrum operations, is an evolutionary process that requires constant re-evaluation of best practices and synchronization with the existing operational paradigm.

5. Doctrine

A set of guiding principles that influence how concepts are to be operationalized. Army doctrine is designed to be permissive rather than restrictive in nature.8

6. Capability

An amalgamation of unit force structure, modernization, unit readiness, and sustainability. Together these four components define a unit’s ability to achieve a specified objective.9

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

This review will address significant theories organized around the two research problems that serve as the foundation for exploring the internalization of full spectrum operations doctrine: 1) The correlation of the National Security Strategy to full spectrum and specifically stability operations doctrine, and 2) Operationalizing full spectrum

---


operations. These two areas also constitute the wider foundation for exploring the third question concerning the conceptual and institutional barriers internal resistance points.

1. National Security Strategy and Army Doctrine

Linking the National Security Strategy and the Army doctrine of full spectrum operations is one of the intellectual underpinnings of this thesis. Brian Linn’s *The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War*, draws a correlation between the Army’s traditional intellectual interpretations of national security strategy and the concept of stability operations. Linn makes the historical case for three non-mutually exclusive intellectual traditions within the Army: The Guardians, the Heroes, and the Managers.\(^{10}\) The Guardians see the Army’s function as protecting the homeland through a precise application of warfare, an application best entrusted to the professional officer corps. The Heroes tradition emphasizes the human aspect of warfare, deeming marshal esprit and adaptability as the most important factors in the art of warfare. The Managers tradition attempts to frame warfare through the summation of processes and the application of technology to a problem.\(^{11}\)

Linn uses two historical eras to provide evidence of how Army doctrine and culture are influenced by national security strategy: The pre World War One era, and the post-Vietnam era. Linn recounts the Army’s historical experiences with irregular warfare (stability operations) across the frontier and among the inherited territories of the former Spanish empire. Linn concludes that while repetition allowed for isolated proficiency, the entire enterprise suffered from a lack of institutional emphasis. Because it was never a specified mission irregular warfare remained subjugated to traditional war fighting, never gaining traction in the Army’s intellectual mainstream. Examples of this limited proficiency include the evolved understanding of dealing with civilians. When the Army occupied Mexico City in 1846-1849, it necessitated a new approach to civilian interaction characterized by distinctions between sanctioned combatants, innocent civilians, and


\(^{11}\) Ibid., 4–8.
guerillas. These distinctions were operationalized in the field and evolved to form the basis for the scant formal doctrine to emerge from irregular campaigns, Henry Halleck’s *International Law*, published in 1861. This document was meant to serve as a guideline for civil-military operations in the aftermath of the Civil War, and thus codified the principles necessary to gain the cooperation of the populace and stifle opposition to military occupation. Having been codified and practiced during such a concentrated large operation of Reconstruction, the basic tenets of *International Law* were internalized and used in subsequent irregular operations. Even with the basic and temporary internalization of *International Law*, the intellectual traditions within the Army still essentially viewed irregular warfare as second-rate fighting and generally detracting to the “real” Army mission of winning wars against other armies.\(^\text{12}\)

Linn’s second example occurs during the post-Vietnam period, when the Army was intellectually adrift, having been sapped of its will for engaging in counterinsurgencies in the Third World. Nixon’s Guam Doctrine (essentially freeing the U.S. from commitment in Vietnam, and directing attention to the Soviet Union) was more than enough of a suggestion for the Army to direct all resources towards preparing for high-intensity combat against the Warsaw Pact on the plains of Europe. According to Linn, the intellectual traditionalists would draw the wrong conclusions from the Vietnam War and forsake an honest critique of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy for a narrative blaming careerist general officers and politicians. Linn makes the case for an Army that, when left to its own intellectual devices, draws the wrong conclusions about its role in the national security strategy and will likely default to a comfort zone encapsulated by a focus on conducting conventional combat operations.\(^\text{13}\)

Ivo Daalder likewise argues that the Army, abetted by inconsistent national security strategies, has been opposed to the integration of stability operations in favor of focusing on traditional combat roles.\(^\text{14}\) He cites inconsistencies between the post-Cold

\(^\text{12}\) Linn, *The Echo of Battle*, 75.

\(^\text{13}\) Ibid., 195.

\(^\text{14}\) Ivo H. Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No, the Development of U.S. Policy for Peacekeeping,” in *UN Peacekeeping Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, edited by William J. Durch (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996), 44.
War National Security Strategy of multilateral peacekeeping initially embraced by the
Clinton administration, and the Presidential Decision Directive 25 that reversed direction.
PDD 25 entitled *U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, set course by
which the U.S. military would marshal its power to combat an enemy that would rise to
near-peer status, instead of diffusing military resources among peacekeeping initiatives.\(^\text{15}\)
The directive also constrained the U.S. financial contribution to the United Nations
peacekeeping regime to 25 percent of the peacekeeping budget.\(^\text{16}\) While this initiative
effectively put stability and peacekeeping operations on the back burner as far as military
priorities, it did nothing to stem the increasing frequency of U.S. involvement in stability
operations. This dichotomy was played out in major U.S. interventions from Haiti to
Bosnia, resulting in a situation where the U.S. foreign policy of intervening in failing
states was fundamentally disconnected from the military’s priority of training for combat
operations.

Daalder characterizes these inconsistencies as an evolutionary process rooted in
the U.S. strategic attempts to balance being the sole superpower with the need to
intervene in crises around the globe. He further contends that this lack of balance was
reflected in the inability to synchronize national security strategy with military doctrine.
The seminal example of this imbalance was General Colin Powell’s “doctrine” that the
U.S. military was to be employed as the nation’s safeguard against threats; implicit in this
statement is that stability operations do not warrant acceptance as a threat, and further
that employing the military in stability operations degrades their ability to counter
threats.\(^\text{17}\) The context of this doctrine was out of balance with the operational realities of
the period which saw a dramatic uptick in the use of the U.S. military to execute stability
operations.

Francis Fukuyama’s *State Building Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*,
summarizes the challenges that the post-9/11 world to lay the groundwork for

---


\(^\text{16}\) Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No,” 44.

\(^\text{17}\) Ibid., 44.
the eventual mandate of stability operations as a military mission. His premise that state building, either as it applies to creating new states or to strengthen existing ones, is the most significant issue facing the international system. The international system, defined by interconnectedness and the Westphalian traditions of sovereignty, forces states to assume functions in the interest of their citizens and the international community as a whole.\textsuperscript{18} Fukuyama argues that global challenges, especially economic instability, and military aggression can be traced back to the need to strengthen states, emphasizing methods to improve bureaucratic organizations as the basis for enhancing stability in a state. Fukuyama wraps up his argument by advocating intervention, essentially using the military for stability operations, in unstable states for the common good of the international system.\textsuperscript{19} Fukuyama’s concepts were accepted by the George W. Bush’s administration as they sought a new way forward in the post-9/11 world, and were subsequently used as the basis for the formulation of the stability operations doctrine.\textsuperscript{20}

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s \textit{Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations} directed the creation of full spectrum operations by elevating stability operations on par with offense/defense operations. This document signaled the beginning of the synchronization between the national security strategy embracing multilateral stabilization operations and Department of Defense policy embodied by full spectrum operations. DoD Directive 3000.5, in granting stability operations equal precedence with combat operations, exemplified the transitional nature of full spectrum operations.\textsuperscript{21} The DoD directive was echoed in the subsequent publication of the \textit{Army Field Manual 3-0 Operations}, which codified the Army’s doctrinal approach to integrating stability operations into the full spectrum of operations.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{fukuyama2004}
\bibitem{fukuyama2004a}
Ibid., 124.
\bibitem{harlow2008}
\bibitem{england2001}
\bibitem{army2003}
\end{thebibliography}
incorporated the precepts of stability doctrine in direct response to the challenges faced by the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and aptly segued for the Obama administration’s application of smart power. This circumstance allowed the military doctrine of full spectrum operations to get a head start in synchronizing and internalizing the new National Security Strategy of smart power. Smart power was articulated in the 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Both documents recognize the limits of offense/defense operations and highlight stability operations as the lead initiative for engaging current challenges.

Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations represents the latest articulation of stability operations doctrine based directly on the preceding litany of policy and doctrine. FM 3-07 describes how full spectrum operations link offense, defense, and stability operations together into a cohesive mission set to be prepared for and executed on a simultaneous and continuous basis. The manual outlines the key tasks involved in stability operations including:

Support a partner nation during peacetime military engagement, after a natural or man-made disaster, as part of a humanitarian-based limited intervention, during peace operations to enforce international peace agreements, to support a legitimate host-nation government during irregular warfare, during major combat operations to establish conditions that facilitate post-conflict activities, and in a post-conflict environment following the general cessation of organized hostilities. This manual emphasizes the need to establish a unity of effort between military, other government organizations, and non-governmental humanitarian organizations to successfully strengthen host nation governmental capacity.

Standing out amongst the tasks are those that involve building host-nation institutional capacity, especially in the judicial system and the police. Essential tasks, such as enacting interim legal codes and procedures permitted by international law, will entail new approaches to preparing Army forces to execute stability operations.

2. Operationalizing Stability and Offense/Defense Operations

The challenges of operationalizing stability operations are addressed via several methods from training approaches to unit configurations. The Army has chosen to address this issue within the context of leader focus. In the *Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, The Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, the Army distinguishes between the enemy-centric focus of offense/defense operations and the much broader environmental focus of stability operations. Recognizing the Army as a leader-focused organization, the pamphlet charges the unit commander with focusing resources on the correct aspect of the spectrum. This nuanced point of leader-driven focus to negotiate the operational differences between these approaches can be aptly summed up in a passage from *The Army Operating Concept*:

> Intelligence automatically defaults to focusing on the enemy if the commander is not involved in setting priorities and explaining why they are important. To succeed in complex environments [stability operations] commanders must collaborate throughout their organizations to build the narrative.²⁷

Robert M. Perito argues that the task of operationalizing stability operations is too large for the Army to adequately bridge with leadership alone. Perito instead argues that the skill set required for stability operations is so fundamentally distinct from those necessary in combat operations, that it is necessary to develop a separate stability force to assume those duties. The crux of his argument resides is that stability operations, because of their innate focus on civilian interaction yet expeditionary nature, are best executed by paramilitary constabulary forces.²⁸ Perito describes the rich U.S. history of fielding constabulary forces externally, as opposed to other developed countries that typically field a constabulary force to augment domestic law enforcement. This history has been modified in the post-Cold War era to include the use of contractors to support U.S. commitments to international missions requiring a constabulary capability. These


missions, under U.N. authority, have been met with the complications of spotty international support, logistical inadequacies, and mandates that are insufficiently resourced for the efficient employment of constabulary capabilities. Thus, international mission requirements often default to the U.S. military’s blunt force capabilities, when the situation becomes too volatile or politically important to fail. His proposal of creating a stability force augments the full spectrum principle of a reduction in lag time. First, it allows for a unified command effort, a necessity in the ambiguous post-conflict environment of a stability operation. Second, it provides the basis for “plugging-in” other like assets from other U.S. agencies and partner nations.29

The Army has decided forego the creation of a specialized stability force and instead use general purpose forces trained to specific mission parameters to conduct missions across the spectrum of operations. The 2008 version of Army Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force lays out a framework for training a general purpose force to execute the full spectrum of operations:

Units do not have the time or other resources required to train under the conditions of all operational environments along the spectrum of conflict. Therefore, Headquarters, Department of the Army, analyzes possible operational environments and determines the likely force package requirements for each operational theme at the points along the spectrum of conflict where Army forces are most likely to operate. Based on this analysis and Headquarters, Department of the Army, guidance, Army command, Army Service component command, and direct reporting unit commanders focus their subordinate units’ training on specific operational themes.30

Nathan Freier asserts that the configuration of stability forces should further correlate to the anticipated operating environment, in his concept known as “armed stabilization.” Freier makes the case that forces operating in the stability portion of the spectrum should be:

[O]ptimized for circumstances where: (1) vital interests are challenged by violent unconventional threats; (2) the degree of violence itself is quite

29 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 325.
high and the environment is non-permissive; (3) physical threats demonstrate some organization and relative sophistication at various levels; and finally, (4) foreign partners suffer from substantial loss or complete failure of sovereign control over political and security outcomes.31

Freier concludes that due to the complex nature of full spectrum operations, the Army’s concept of using general purpose forces to operate in an environment as described above is sub-optimal. In a later study, MIA in QDR: A Unifying Vision for Land Forces, he argues that the Army’s concept of organizing and training for stability operations is fundamentally impossible. He instead postulates that bridging the gap between combat and stability operations will come as a joint function of specialization among the services. In this case, the integration of stability operations will be more aligned with the land component forces, the Army and Marines, while offense/defense operations will be more aligned to the Navy and Air Force.32 Freier understands the inherent risks of focusing the land components on stability at the decrement of combat capabilities, however, he hypothesizes that this general trend will self-perpetuate as operational deployments drive the specialization.

In summary, there are significantly varying schools of thought regarding how the Army should operationalize stability operations. The most common differences lie between the Army’s general purpose do-everything force, and the argument in favor of specialized forces.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis will be divided into four chapters. Chapter I will introduce the framework of the general research question, define relevant terminology, review pertinent scholarly work addressing the research question, and set the course for the rest of the thesis.


Chapter II will argue that a consistent correlation between National Security Strategy tenets and stability operations doctrine, both over successive administrations and through conceptual uniformity, will prompt the Army to recognize stability operations as a permanent mission-set and create the imperative to internalize full spectrum operations doctrine. First, this chapter will conduct a comparative analysis of post-Cold War national security strategies and the resultant ideals internalized by the Army, to make the case for inconsistent national strategies as the catalyst for the Army not previously accepting stability operations as a permanent mission-set. Furthermore, this chapter will compare components of the current National Security Strategy of Smart Power and it’s supporting conceptual foundations, to tenets of stability operations doctrine, this will provide evidence of the adequacy of smart power as a strategy that prompts the Army to recognize the stability mission-set as permanent, and creates the imperative to internalize full spectrum operations doctrine.

Chapter III will address how the Army operationalizes (integrates a concept into the operational paradigm so that it may be organizationally executed) full spectrum operations to enable stability operations doctrine to be internalized. Full spectrum operations compel Army commanders to simultaneously engage in offensive, defensive, and stability operations specifically to maintain or gain the initiative in support of strategic goals.33 Full spectrum operations doctrine specifically requires the Army to operationalize the new tasks associated with stability operations, while maintaining operational proficiency in combat operations. The main point of this chapter is to investigate how can the Army operationalize full spectrum operations, specifically the inclusion of stability operations, to allow the doctrine to be internalized.

Chapter IV will expand on findings of the previous chapters to identify and analyze the Army’s internal challenges to internalizing full spectrum doctrine, posed by conceptual and institutional barriers, and frame them as decision points that must be overcome. Framing this analysis are the following two challenges: 1) How can the Army execute stability operations when the other concerned government agencies lack

33 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations, Foreword.
the necessary capability to execute a whole of government approach? 2) Which internal biases must be overcome to implement a full spectrum capable force, as a requirement for internalizing stability operations? Integral to both of these challenges is an understanding of Army’s desired end-state for institutionalizing stability operations capabilities, and the conceptual shortcomings of the whole of government approach, both of which will be explored in this chapter. This chapter will identify the two challenges with the Army’s internal decision points, and offer analysis of those decisions that will enable the internalization of full spectrum operations in the Army.
II. THE CORRELATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE INTERNALIZATION OF STABILITY OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

This chapter will argue that a consistent correlation between National Security Strategy tenets and stability operations doctrine, both over successive administrations and through conceptual uniformity, will prompt the Army to recognize stability operations as a permanent mission-set and create the imperative to internalize full spectrum operations doctrine. First, this chapter will conduct a comparative analysis of post-Cold War national security strategies and the resultant ideals internalized by the Army, to make the case for inconsistent national strategies as the catalyst for the Army not previously internalizing stability operations as a core mission. Further, this chapter will compare components of the current National Security Strategy of Smart Power, and it’s supporting conceptual foundations, to tenets of stability operations doctrine to draw conclusions as to the adequacy of smart power as a strategy that prompts the Army to recognize the stability mission-set as permanent, and create the imperative to internalize stability operations doctrine.

A. POST-COLD WAR NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE RESULTING ARMY INTERNALIZATION

This section will focus on analyzing the post-Cold War period because it adequately lends itself to an evaluation of the wider concepts in this thesis. Post-Cold War national security strategies can be categorized into two historical eras: 1) The 1990s, defined by the U.S. attempts to define its role as the world’s sole superpower. 2) Post-9/11, defined by the U.S. led interventions into unstable regions to disrupt terror networks.

1. Inconsistent National Security Strategies—the 1990s

President George H.W. Bush, when faced with the demise of the Soviet Union, chose to chart his National Security Strategy through the United Nations by enhancing
support of the international peacekeeping regime.\textsuperscript{34} His plan included an increase in funding and troop contributions to the U.N. to counter the uncertainties created in the wake of the new world order. Even though his administration achieved a high level of credibility with victory in the Gulf War, his vision ran into opposition when he proposed a U.S. standby force be made available to the U.N. for crisis contingencies.\textsuperscript{35} When President Bush was voted out of office in 1992, this inchoate policy initiative was passed on to the Clinton Administration for articulation.

President Clinton’s first national security strategy was preceded by a Department of Defense Bottom Up Review, published by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in 1993. This document was an internal review, meant to garner consensus on a subsequent national security strategy. The review analyzed the turbulent state of the post-Cold War international system and specifically identified military intervention as a tool for multilateral engagement: \textsuperscript{36}

Through overseas presence and power projection, our armed forces can help deter or contain violence in volatile regions where our interests are threatened. In some circumstances, U.S. forces can serve a peacekeeping role, monitoring and facilitating the implementation of cease-fire and peace agreements with the consent of the belligerent parties as part of a U.N. or other coalition presence. In more hostile situations, the United States might be called upon, along with other nations, to provide forces to compel compliance with international resolutions or to restore order in peace enforcement operations.\textsuperscript{37}

Coincidently, the review was released nearly simultaneously with the infamous Battle of Mogadishu, where 18 U.S. Rangers were killed. The mission to Somalia had started off as a humanitarian assistance effort under U.N. authority, and drifted into conflict with warlords, with disastrous results.\textsuperscript{38} The implications of the Mogadishu battle on Clinton’s National Security Strategy were far-ranging. Foremost, he was forced

\begin{footnotesize}  
\textsuperscript{34} Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No,” 37.  
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 37.  
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., Section 2.  
\end{footnotesize}
to reorient his strategic goals onto more traditional national interests such as support to key allies and energy security. This was a deliberate shift away from initiatives such as the U.N. peacekeeping regime where casualties, such as those experienced in Somalia, were difficult to justify. The reorientation away from stability operations was formally codified the following year with the release of Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25). This document affirmed the U.S. commitment to this new course by retooling the method for contributing financially to the peacekeeping regime, and iterated the primacy of vital national interest in justifying the commitment of U.S. troops. The directive prioritized the use of the military for fighting the nation’s wars over commitments to peacekeeping. PDD-25 could not stem the events that now followed the end of the cold war, with an escalation of global strife and instability prompting the military to execute an unprecedented number of interventions as the U.S. asserted a world leadership role. The official strategies adopted in the 1990s charted a course away from multilateralism and cast peacekeeping as a temporary mission set, a view at odds with the realities of constant military interventions.

2. What the Army Internalized From Inconsistent Strategy in the 1990s

As a result of this dichotomy between strategy and reality, the Army internalized the following three ideals: 1) Army readiness for high intensity combat equals readiness for peacekeeping. 2) Force protection, or safety of U.S. soldiers, is the primary consideration for peacekeeping. 3) Rules of engagement ensure the moral high ground. The combined internalization of these ideals served to marginalize the importance of peacekeeping operations.

Equating readiness for combat and peacekeeping was born out of the doctrine of Air-Land Battle. The Army created Air-Land Battle to defeat the Soviets on the plains of Europe and received the opportunity to validate its doctrine in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq in the winter of 1991. The Army’s quick and decisive defeat of the Iraqis in the Gulf War helped internalize Air-Land Battle as a doctrinal concept. It produced an

---

exaggerated sense of how post-Cold War military expeditions would and should be approached: Through the use of overwhelming and coordinated force to destroy enemy formations and infrastructure. This emphasis on high intensity combat combined with the official notion that peacekeeping was a distracting trend, led the Army to internalize the ideal: If the Army is ready to fight the big wars (high intensity combat) then less important missions, such as peacekeeping, can easily be accomplished.\textsuperscript{41} This sentiment was best summed up by General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he stated: “to this day the doctrine remains that the best peacekeepers are the soldiers best trained for combat.”\textsuperscript{42}

The military’s culture of force protection was born of the failed Somalia operation. The leadership in charge of the Somalia operation, notably Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Major General William F. Garrison, were summarily dismissed for their failings. This dismissal was a signal from the civilian management to Army leadership that they must internalize the concept of risk aversion at the peril of their commands and careers. Field commanders thus ascribed to the following logic: Casualties are politically unacceptable, and I must take steps to alleviate casualties in the execution of my mission, or else I may be fired. By the time of the U.S. intervention into Bosnia, this ideal was fully internalized within the U.S. Army.

A force protection staff section was created, with tentacles at all levels of staff and command, troops wore complete body armor at all times, were cantoned, and were closely regulated in their movements beyond the wire. Contact was limited by orders that required GIs to remain armed, helmeted and clothed in their camouflaged combat gear. A guide had become the law, doctrine had become dogma.\textsuperscript{43}


In a risk-adverse political environment, force protection became the operative concept that would decrease the chance of a soldier being unnecessarily killed or wounded.

Emphasis on the rules of engagement was internalized in response to the marked uptick in the use of the U.S. military to conduct operations amongst civilians. The concept was based in the precept that perception matters, in convincing local populations to comply with military efforts and in the court of international opinion. An example of this can be found in Haiti, where U.S. soldiers deployed under a U.N. mandate to restore order, but stood idle as the Haitian National Police mercilessly beat a crowd of civilians in view of the worldwide media. The message conveyed by the media images was that the U.S. soldiers condoned the actions of the police.44 Rigid rules of engagement and inexperience in dealing with civilians resulted in the costly indecision. This episode gave the perception that the U.S. military could not sufficiently handle the moral complexities of dealing with civilians and prompted a knee jerk reaction that set rules for every conceivable situation. The rules of engagement became an internalized concept as evidenced by a Marine pilot utilizing four separate rules of engagement cards en route to a mission over Kosovo.45 The internalization of the rules of engagement did not promote adaptive leaders guided by principle, a trait especially useful in peacekeeping operations, but instead fostered a culture that refers each situation to a rule book for adjudication.

The pressures inherent in internalizing a preference for high intensity combat, force protection, and the rules of engagement, led the Army to view peacekeeping operations as an enterprise that distracted from the real work of soldiering.


This era was marked by the national security strategy of preemption in response to the attacks of 9/11 and underpinned by two concepts. First, the ideal espoused by President George W. Bush, that the American military had been overused for

peacekeeping in the 1990s and that a return to the core competency of war fighting was in order. Second, the theory embodied by the “revolution in military affairs” that touted technology as a force multiplier and a logical extension of Air-Land Battle doctrine. The amalgamation of these ideals and the strategy of preemption led the Army to near defeat in the sands of Iraq that triggered a shift to an official recognition, in the form of DoD Directive 3000.05, of stability operations precepts.

This era was defined by two policies: 1) The National Security Strategy of preemption. 2) The drafting of DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations. The latter is the source document representing the correction of the flawed ideals internalized by the Army over the previous decade.

\textit{a. The Initial Set}

The era commenced with President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy that articulated the policy of preemption:

The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if the uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.

This policy iterated the prerogative of the U.S. to use force absent international approval. This policy represented a fundamental shift away from


international consensus building by adopting a “go-it-alone” attitude.\textsuperscript{48} By marginalizing the need for international legitimacy the policy of preemption marginalized the U.S. role in peacekeeping operations.

Underpinning the preemption strategy was the core belief that the military should not be dulled by peacekeeping duty. The terms peacekeeping and nation building were discarded from the civil-military lexicon, supplanted by the notion that military forces would be used solely for war. This notion was complimented by the concepts inherent in the revolution in military affairs (RMA). This theory existed as a logical extension of Air-Land Battle and fit neatly into the paradigm that readiness for high intensity combat equals readiness for lesser contingencies such as stability operations. The RMA concept evolved throughout the 1990s and was embraced by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in the early 2000s. The RMA foresaw engagements that required fewer boots on the ground, less reliance on conventional forces, and a more emphasis on special operations forces buoyed by technological superiority.\textsuperscript{49}

\textit{b. Iraq: The Game Changer}

Charged with the post-invasion occupation of Iraq, the U.S. Army uncovered flaws in the ideals that had been internalized, namely that combat readiness equaled readiness for stability operations, and that technology could supplant boots on the ground. These flaws contributed to the Army’s general unpreparedness in the face of a mounting insurgency that gripped post-invasion Iraq, and endangered the entire enterprise. The Army determined that an unfettered supply of drones and bombs could not make up for soldiers on the ground, and worse that a propensity towards high intensity combat was counterproductive to a counterinsurgency campaign. The factors that turned the tide in Iraq, a skillfully implemented counterinsurgency campaign and a whole of government approach, were essentially bottom up initiatives forged on the


battlefields, and adopted by a national security establishment desperate to salvage the Iraq war.\textsuperscript{50} DoD Directive 3000.05 drafted in 2005, was an attempt at correcting the flawed ideals that the Army had unsuccessfully operationalized in Iraq.

4. The Army’s Lessons Learned From the 2000s

Resultant from the tumultuous events of the 2000s, the Army learned two lessons: 1) Reliance on the internalized precepts of combat operations, especially the propensity for kinetic operations almost caused the loss of the Iraq War. 2) Operations such as counterinsurgency and stability operations must be executed in concert with other elements of national power. These two lessons were the foundation for the creation of full spectrum, and by extension stability operations, doctrine.

Reliance on Air-Land Battle doctrine represented a comfort zone for the Army, around which the flawed notion that readiness for combat equated to readiness for occupation duty in the civilian intensive environment of post-invasion Iraq. When stressed, the Army as an organization, reverted to its comfort zone and came to rely on heavy handed kinetic operations to counter the insurgency. This institutionally reflexive action prolonged the war, and cost thousands of additional lives in the process. As an institution, the Army internalized the fact that it cannot kill its way out of an insurgency, because every fighter will be replaced in turn; and that the population represents the decisive terrain that must be secured and co-opted by every effort. These new lessons ran counter to the previously internalized notions that emphasized fighting and killing the enemy, and implementing force protection measures that alienated the population. The Army learned that adaptation was the key to success, and created the doctrine of full spectrum operations with the integral concept that a competent unit must be able to execute operations at any point in the spectrum with minimal lag time between tasks.

\textsuperscript{50} Janine Davidson, \textit{Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight Modern Wars} (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2010), 98.
Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans wrote: “Today, the question from soldiers is not what is USAID, but where is USAID?” This quote reflects the realization that mastery over the complex operating environments faced in the post-9/11 world requires all the elements of national power in a concept known as the whole of government approach. A major step toward the realization of the comprehensive approach was the drafting of the stability operations doctrine, Field Manual 3-07. This doctrine is unprecedented in that it represents a collaborative process involving input from academia, non-governmental organizations and other agencies of the federal government. Field Manual 3-07 delineates stability operations as a pillar of full spectrum operations and describes the unique tenets that comprise the whole of government approach.

B. THE CORRELATION OF SMART POWER AND STABILITY OPERATIONS

This section will draw a correlation between Smart Power strategy and stability operations doctrine in support of the greater argument that an alignment of national strategy with stability operations tenets will encourage the internalization of full spectrum operations doctrine. This section will describe the current strategy of Smart Power and stability operations doctrine separately, and further compare and contrast them to determine commonalities and disconnects.

1. Smart Power Defined

Smart Power is the current national security strategy that strives to balance elements of hard power, that emphasizes military centric approaches, and soft power that articulates a diplomatic tact. The goal of Smart Power is to maintain U.S. predominance in the international system by influencing solutions to common

---


problems. The basis of Smart Power is U.S. led multilateral engagement as articulated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy:

Remaining engaged is absolutely essential. Neo-isolationism is not an option. Engagement means shoring up the fundamentals of the international system that I mentioned before: open commerce based on free and fair access to air, sea, space and cyberspace; strong alliance structures based on respect and willingness to share burdens; commitment to international norms that shore up and contribute to the advancement of our national interests; and securing those global goods that are the backbone of a renewed effort to restore and revitalize American global leadership.55

Achieving these goals requires a balanced approach among the major purveyors of foreign and national security policy, the Departments of State and Defense.

2. Smart Power Specified and Implied Tasks

Smart Power strategy specifies five initiatives as a common framework for U.S. foreign and national security policy agencies: Alliances, partnerships, and institutions; Global development; Public diplomacy; Economic integration; and Technology and innovation.56 These initiatives are complimented by the two implied concepts of: Preventative engagement; and the whole of government approach.

These five specified initiatives aim to strike a balanced approach to codify Smart Power strategy by elevating their priority for effort and resources. An example is the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a State Department program, which aims to strengthen alliances, partnerships, and institutions. Through GPOI, the U.S. trains militaries of select nations to perform United Nations peacekeeping duties, emphasizing ethical treatment of civilians, working with non-governmental organizations, and the

---


importance of civil military relations. Through the increase of 75,000 peacekeepers, GPOI is strengthening partnerships, and increasing the international community’s capacity to meet future challenges.

Smart Power strategy recognizes that state and regional instability can have an unacceptably disruptive effect on the international system. The implication is that the prevention of state instability is preferred to a later and more costly intervention. The second implication of Smart Power is that stabilization efforts be comprehensively executed by all components of national power in a concept termed the whole of government approach. Operationalizing this concept requires a unified effort where concerned government departments work in concert to accomplish the overall stability mission. An example of the whole of government approach is the integrated political and military strategy for stabilizing the Afghanistan/Pakistan region, and specifically the Defense and State Department coordinated plans for increasing capacity within Afghan National Security Forces. The implied concepts of preventative intervention and the whole of government approach are fundamental to linking Smart Power strategy and stability operations doctrine.

3. Stability Operations

Stability operations doctrine is the guideline for providing security within, and building institutional capacity of, troubled states. It is subordinate to the capstone concept of Full Spectrum Operations. Stability operations are predicated on two precepts: The Army will prepare and conduct them in equal precedence with offense and defense operations; they must be executed with the assistance and coordination of the whole of the U.S. government. Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations formalizes Army roles in stability operations, and reinforces the baseline precepts:


As the Nation continues into this era of uncertainty and persistent conflict, the lines separating war and peace, enemy and friend, have blurred and no longer conform to the clear delineations we once knew. At the same time, emerging drivers of conflict and instability are combining with rapid cultural, social, and technological change to further complicate our understanding of the global security environment. Military success alone will not be sufficient to prevail in this environment. To confront the challenges before us, we must strengthen the capacity of the other elements of national power, leveraging the full potential of our interagency partners.59

Stability operations doctrine thus attempts to balance being one of three co-equal Army operations, while incorporating the other elements of national power into the operational fold.

4. Stability Operations Specified and Implied Tasks

*Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations* specifies five sectors of civil/military focus, plus one area, information engagement, that unites these efforts: Security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian and social well-being, governance and participation, economic stabilization and infrastructure. Implied in the doctrine are the implicit notions that, the Army may be initially responsible for these tasks because it is the first responder, and relevant U.S. government civilian agencies will have the capability to lead or co-execute these tasks alongside Army units in the field.

These specified tasks represent a broad framework for guiding the military in establishing stability in a troubled state; however each is bolstered by the implication that the Army will not be acting alone. For example, the task of economic stabilization and infrastructure has sub-tasks that the Army can reasonably be expected to execute alone, such as: Secure and protect the natural resources, energy production, and distribution infrastructure of the host nation. 60 Other tasks such as, economic stabilization and infrastructure however, have sub-tasks that require a level of expertise not typically found in Army formations, for example: Implement programs that encourage trade and

---

60 Ibid., 2–8.
investment with initial emphasis on host-nation and regional investors. Inherent to these specified tasks is the implicit notion that the Army cannot accomplish these tasks without a whole of government approach among several elements of the federal government.61

5. **Strategy Doctrine Correlations**

Figure 1 draws a conceptual connection between the basic tenets of Smart Power strategy, as defined by the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, and stability operations doctrine in *Field Manual 3-07*. These connections are shown between the respective subtasks of Smart Power strategy and stability operations doctrine, as depicted in the dashed box, and anchored by the basic tenets of each across the top and sides.

![Figure 1. Conceptual Intersection Points: National Security Strategy and Stability Doctrine](image)

---

In comparing operational imperatives to strategic goals, the objective is to show conceptual congruencies resultant from a general alignment of specified tasks. For example, the association between the Smart Power precept of Global Development and the Stability Operations tenet of Restore Essential Services, share similar conceptual underpinnings as exhibited through respective sub-tasks of Strengthen the Leadership of the World Health Organization, and Support Public Health Programs. This conceptual correlation demonstrates a case for stability operations as a suitable supporting concept for Smart Power strategy.

6. Strategy and Doctrine Disconnects

The strategy and doctrine disconnect along implied assignments within the whole of government approach, specifically through the unbalanced nature of civilian vs. military expeditionary capabilities. The whole of government approach to stability operations directs that civilian agencies should have the lead prior to and after combat operations, with the military in charge during combat operations.62 These disconnects will be explored through the issues of: Civilian agency design, and lead agency imperative.

Executing the whole of government approach for a stability operation implies that the civilians are sharing the operating environment, including inherent risks, with the soldiers. Civilian agencies are not only under resourced for this task (this issue will be explored in Chapter IV); they are also not fundamentally designed to be expeditionary. Outside the military, government agencies employ nearly all of their personnel in the jobs they were hired to do with little excess capacity in the system for training. On the other hand, the military has built in excess capacity designed to enable training and an operational tempo similar to that of a fire department, waiting for the fire to break out. Training for complex potential missions is a core task of the military, bolstered by an

---

excess capacity of personnel. Civilian agencies are not designed to be expeditionary by training or personnel sourcing. For example, civilian employees of the Department of Agriculture have no institutional training to work in a potentially violent environment, as they are instead trained to work in among farms and factories. Further, someone looking to work in a potentially dangerous environment would likely not join the Agriculture Department in the first place, opting instead to join the military. These points illustrate the fact that a whole of government approach is impossible without significant restructuring of government civilian agencies to make them expeditionary and increase their capacity to include training for a complex mission set. It also exposes the fundamental flaw in stability operations doctrine: Who should be in charge of an operation?

If the military is the only agency designed and resourced to operate in the austere environment of a stability operation, then how, as stability doctrine assumes, can it be expected to be in a supporting role? Operational support implies that some other agency is the lead element responsible for the overall mission. Doctrinally, the military has assumed a supporting role often depicted as interim support or initial tasks designed to hold the line until the civilian experts can arrive and take the lead. This approach is dangerously flawed because the civilian agencies cannot adequately deploy to a stability operation, much less assume a leading role. Military support to a stability operation, within the whole of government concept, is flawed because it assumes civilian agencies will fulfill an expeditionary role, a task they are not up to.

It is my contention that these disconnects represent an inchoate policy foundation, a situation that will be tougher to solve in the coming years due to fiscal resource challenges. Yet, the disconnects between national security strategy and stability operations doctrine will lessen as the respective organizations fall in line with national directives, and address the problems identified in this section. This assertion is based on the presumption that successive national security strategies remain consistent with the tenets of Smart Power, and do not regress to deemphasizing stability operations.

C. CONCLUSIONS

This chapter argued that a consistent correlation between National Security Strategy tenets and stability operations doctrine will prompt the Army to recognize stability operations as a permanent mission-set and create the imperative to internalize full spectrum operations doctrine. This assertion is based on the historical analysis of Post-Cold War national security strategies and the resultant ideals internalized. This chapter further asserted that Smart Power maintains a sufficient conceptual structure, even with unresolved supporting structures, to impresses upon the Army the requirement to internalize stability operations doctrine. This assertion is based on the strong demonstrated linkages between the two concepts that should allow the supporting policy foundations to mature.
III. OPERATIONALIZING FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

This chapter will first examine the resolutions that created and promulgated the full spectrum policy framework, as the basis for the doctrine. Next, this chapter will explore the decision points that comprised the force structure and training methodologies for operationalizing full spectrum doctrine. Finally this chapter will critique the methodology the Army has chosen to achieve proficiency in, and balance among, the distinct tasks inherent to full spectrum operations. This will be accomplished by evaluating the amalgamation of policy framework and training methodology as it applies to two broad areas: training and organizational focus.

A. THE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

This thesis has previously argued that a National Security Strategy advocating the principles of stability operations increases the likelihood of the doctrine being internalized. This section will examine subordinate policies that shape full spectrum operations, to the inclusion of stability operations, into a comprehensive concept. This common policy framework must exist in order to trigger the requirement for the Army to operationalize full spectrum operations. It has evolved through a series of decision points expressed through documents of various functions that enable different components of the Department of Defense to proceed with the operationalizing process. This section will show how DoD Directive 3000.05, The Quadrennial Defense Review, and The National Military Strategy, have been articulated to create the policy framework and by extension the imperative to operationalize full spectrum operations. This section will also show how the whole of government approach has conceptual flaws in the policy framework that will inhibit the operationalizing of the doctrine.

1. The Department of Defense—Policy Framework

DoD Directive 3000.5 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations was born out of a need to fundamentally change the way the military interacted with the other elements of national power as evidenced by the
shortcomings in Iraq. DoD Directive 3000.05 set the organizational heading by making stability operations a core mission of the Defense Department and equal in precedence with combat operations. This equality was directed to be extended in terms of doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is seen as the seminal document in the DoD because it directs priorities in force structure, modernization plans, and the budget. The 2010 QDR emphasizes stability operations in particular, and stability precepts such as: a commitment to the whole of government, building partner nation capacity, and developing leaders for the complexities of full spectrum operations among its signature initiatives. These initiatives set the conditions for the services to begin to integrate these precepts into the future visions for their organizations.

The National Military Strategy (NMS) is the military’s plan for directing the defense of the U.S., by operationalizing the National Security Strategy. The 2011 NMS calls for the military “to serve in an enabling capacity to help other nations achieve security goals that can advance common interests,” goals derived directly from Smart Power Strategy. The NMS further directs the military’s land components, the Army and Marine Corps, to be full spectrum capable, with the implicit task of being able to conduct stability operations.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has further articulated these DoD policies by emphasizing the role of stability operations though informal guidance. In addressing the Association of the United States Army in 2007, Secretary Gates recognized the challenges associated with bringing the Army back up to standard in high intensity combat skills that had atrophied during the prolonged counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also went on to expand on the need to maintain the hard-won

---

skills of interacting with the civilian population and enabling the host nation government, skills he contends will be the most important aspect of future military interventions. Secretary Gates articulated his intent of how he views success stating that it “will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.”\(^{68}\) Thus through formal policy and informal guidance, the DoD has set the requirement for the Army to operationalize stability operations while maintaining the combat skills necessary to win conventional wars.

2. The Whole of Government—Policy Framework

National Security Presidential Directive-44 has directed the Department of state to be the lead element in stability and reconstruction efforts, and this task is fulfilled by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).\(^{69}\) NSPD-44 is a policy from the George W. Bush presidency that has been informally extended, as the Obama administration works on a new policy paradigm. Doctrinal processes for a whole of government approach to stability and reconstruction are in place to guide the planning and execution of an operation, however key policy issues remain untouched. The whole of government approach set the stage for a myriad of decisions that must be adjudicated at a policy level. From this standpoint the most important decisions yet to be made involve exactly how the Department of Defense will support Department of State led stability and reconstruction operations. These points arise from the requirement to resource and build capacity in both the military and civilian sectors of government that satisfy the new requirements of stability operations without causing a duplication of effort. Military experts insist that in order for the military services to properly resource stability operations they must first understand what their civilian counterparts are bringing to the stability operation table, conversely the civilian agencies involved insist


that they require an understanding of what the military is planning on providing. Interagency resource planning is thus a fundamental source of policy disconnect hindering the operationalizing of full spectrum doctrine.

3. The Army Policy Framework

The Army has implemented full spectrum operations as the conceptual basis for operationalizing the DoD requirement to place stability operations on par with combat operations. Operationalizing full spectrum operations means achieving proficiency and readiness in, and balance among, the distinctly different skill sets for conducting offense, defense and stability operations. In addition to the formal doctrine embodied by Field Manual 3-0 Full Spectrum Operations, and Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations, Army leaders have articulated their policy framework by casting full spectrum operations in the greater context of how the Army will operate. Complementing Secretary Gates’ vision, Army Chief of Staff General George Casey has articulated four roles for land forces in the twenty-first century that will inform how the Army operationalizes full spectrum operations.

*prevail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns; engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure friends and allies; support civil authorities at home and abroad; deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors.*

In order to operationalize full spectrum operations, the Army has decided to formalize two broad areas of operational responsibilities: combined arms maneuver, and wide area security. General Dempsey, commander of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) further articulated these areas of responsibility as the conceptual basis of full spectrum operations:

1. Army forces conduct combined arms maneuver to gain physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over enemy organizations. Applying an expanded understanding of combined arms, Army forces integrate the

---

combat power resident in the Army’s six warfighting functions with a wide array of related civil and military capabilities to defeat enemies and seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

2. Army forces conduct wide area security to consolidate gains, stabilize environments, and ensure freedom of movement and action. Wide area security operations protect forces, populations, infrastructures, and activities, predominantly in protracted counterinsurgency, relief, and reconstruction efforts, and sustained engagement focused on the development of partner capabilities.73

These areas of responsibility outline full spectrum operations doctrine within the context of the supporting policies. These two areas, as the conceptual bridge between the supporting policies and the doctrinal foundations of full spectrum operations, represent the basis for operationalizing the doctrine of full spectrum operations.

B. ARMY METHODOLOGIES FOR OPERATIONALIZING FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

The decision points embodied by the policy framework have set the stage for the Army to operationalize full spectrum operations by integrating it into the operational paradigm. This section will evaluate the methodology the Army has selected to achieve proficiency in, and balance among the distinct tasks inherent to the broad mission set of full spectrum operations. First, this section will articulate the roles of the organizations responsible for operationalizing Army doctrine. Next this section will examine how full spectrum operations doctrine is promulgated through the various Army training centers, including the proposed methodology for achieving readiness at any point in the spectrum. This section will discuss the Army’s progress in operationalizing full spectrum operations and evaluate if this effort has enabled stability operations doctrine to be internalized.

1. Army Organizational Roles

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has the responsibility of drafting doctrine, conceiving training methodologies and, through an extensive network of schools and training centers, implementing a standardized training regime. Forces Command (FORSCOM) by virtue of being responsible for the maneuver training centers
is responsible for fostering the operationalizing of doctrine. FORSCOM operates three major maneuver training centers, the National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin, the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) at Hohenfels, Germany. Active duty and select Army Reserve and National Guard units from throughout the Army rotate into these training centers for a multi-week training event that is designed to focus units on specific mission requirements. Each training center is staffed by an opposing force simulating a thinking enemy and a staff of observer controllers who mentor leaders at all levels on doctrinal approaches to their assigned mission. The units in training are immersed into a simulated operational environment that is designed to closely parallel real world deployments, where they must complete missions that involve defeating the opposing force and working closely with the civilian population.73 This constructive training environment forms the basis for operationalizing doctrine. It is the ultimate responsibility of the individual unit commander to operationalize doctrine within the conditions of the mission environment. Unit commanders are specifically responsible for operationalizing the simultaneous execution of the three elements of full spectrum operations.74 Operationalization of doctrine is inherent to the two main responsibilities of a unit commander: Mission command, and readiness.

Mission command obligates the unit commander to articulate guidance from which operational plans and subordinate initiative flows.75 Mission command requires the commander to grasp standardized doctrinal precepts and operationalize them to the mission environment using formal orders and informal guidance.

Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander and the commander's staff to integrate the warfighting functions using the operations process and mission orders to accomplish successful full-spectrum operations. Mission command enables agile and

---


75 Ibid., Chapter 3.
adaptive leaders and organizations to execute disciplined initiative within commander’s intent as part of unified action in a complex and ambiguous environment. Mission command is critical to Army forces’ ability to develop the situation through action and seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.\textsuperscript{76}

Readiness embodies the commander’s responsibilities of training and mission preparedness. Readiness, or the units’ ability to perform a given mission set, is another primary responsibility of the commander that requires operationalization of doctrine. Commanders direct training through a standardized methodology, that sets the tasks to be trained, the conditions under which those tasks will be trained, and the required standards.\textsuperscript{77} The commander, as the enforcer of training standards, has the responsibility for ensuring that the unit has sufficiently operationalized doctrine and is ready to accomplish a given mission.

2. The Army’s Training Strategy

The training strategy for full spectrum operations is framed by the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN) and informed by the concept of “Aim Point” to meet the overall Army training goals. The goal of the Army training strategy is to train all units to a T2 standard on full spectrum tasks, prior to their maneuver training center rotation, and then to a T1 standard before deployment.\textsuperscript{78}

ARFORGEN is a model that is designed to provide trained and ready forces for employment on a cyclical schedule through three phases: Reset, Train/Ready, and Available. Reset units have recently returned or otherwise cycled off of available status, and are receiving personnel and equipment and focusing on training individual and collective tasks. Train/ready stage units are those undergoing intensive collective training in anticipation of deployment. Available units are ready to deploy or deployed in support of ongoing worldwide operations. This process frames the training strategy for

\textsuperscript{76} TRADOC Pam 525-3-3, Paragraph 2–1.
\textsuperscript{77} U.S. Army, Field Manual 7-0, 2–5.
\textsuperscript{78} T1 and T2 refer to unit readiness standards, specifically as the commander’s evaluation of proficiency in their assigned tasks. A T1 rating denotes 85 percent proficiency in assigned tasks, while a T2 rating denotes a 70–84 percent proficiency rating.
full spectrum operations because it forces units in the train/ready phase to focus on a specific mission set. The ARFORGEN process calls for most of the Army’s brigade combat teams, the Army’s tactical unit of employment, to conduct two maneuver center rotations during the train/ready phase of each cycle. The first rotation seeks to develop training proficiency across the entire spectrum of operations by training for offense, defense, and stability operations. Brigade commanders are directed to narrow their focus onto specific core competency tasks, including those necessary for full spectrum operations, nine months prior to deployment or prior to the second training center rotation.79 The second rotation occurs prior to the available phase and focuses on an assigned mission, in theory the anticipated portion of the spectrum the unit will be operating in. The Army training strategy, by progressively narrowing the focus of training among BCTs over the train/ready phase of ARFORGEN, aims to build a force trained and available for a variety of missions sets across the spectrum of operations.80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Readiness pool</th>
<th>Tasks being conducted</th>
<th>Available for</th>
<th>Move to next pool when</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Reset/train    | 1. Receiving personnel and equipment  
2. Individual and collective training on core tasks | 1. Homeland security  
2. Humanitarian and disaster relief | Unit successfully completes combat training center-level collective training event |
| Ready          | Collective training on theater-specific tasks | Mobilization for full-spectrum operations | Unit successfully completes theater-focused combat training center-level collective training event |
| Available      | 1. Deployed in operational mission  
2. Standby for immediate deployment as required | 1. Conducting active operations  
2. Mobilization for full-spectrum operations | Unit returns to home station |

Figure 2. The Army’s Force Generation Model ARFORGEN


Underlying the training strategy is the precept that, due to the complexity of the tasks involved, a unit cannot expect to achieve a high degree of readiness across the entire spectrum of operations simultaneously. Therefore, units must seek to achieve a higher degree of readiness in a few mission sets (i.e., high intensity combat, or counterinsurgency) and assume risk in not achieving as high of a degree of readiness in other mission sets. To inform this concept of risk, the Army has established an aim point, or a reference for focusing effort in the train/ready phase. The concept of aim point, as depicted in Figure 3, can be summarized as the training priority that the Army intends on giving each sector of the spectrum of conflict in order to generate maximum operational readiness across the force.\(^{81}\) The aim point reflects the current unbalanced realities of a force that has been defined by an operating environment of counterinsurgency and stability operations as experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. By placing the aim point further to the right, the Army is making the case for rebalancing the force by focusing more on conventional major combat operations (traditional offense/defense operations) in a broader effort to operationalize full spectrum operations. This rebalancing could be problematic for the internalization of stability operations.

\(^{81}\) U.S. Army, *Field Manual 7-0*, paragraph 1–6.
3. The Army’s Training Strategy for Stability Operations

Training for stability operations is unique in that it requires specialized individual and unit training that exceeds a simple task list and instead emphasizes cultural awareness and multilateral cooperative efforts. Developing the skill set necessary for stability operations requires some key leaders to attend years of language and cultural training to advise plans and operations. Even lower ranking soldiers tasked with executing stability operations must similarly master a set of skills that incorporates cultural nuances, minimal use of force, and a level of civilian engagement. The stability operations skill set is fundamentally different from those necessary to conduct high intensity combat operations. In describing the broad capabilities the Army will likely require, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept Operational Adaptability has identified two broad categories of stability tasks: Provide wide area security, and
develop the host nation’s capacity for governance. These areas represent a metric for thinking about future operations however, the Army’s ample experience with stability operations in the recent past offers guide posts for operationalizing stability operations.

The Army has an institutional basis for holistically training stability operations extending back to the 1990s when brigade combat teams cycled through the maneuver training centers en route to executing stability centric operations in the Balkans and Haiti. The training model for one 1994 JRTC rotation of 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, involved training leaders and unit skills systematically within the exercise construct. Leader “stability” skills were honed by attending meetings with simulated NGOs and local government officials (played by role players) where they had to coordinate operations with the overall political priorities of the mission, such as providing security for a humanitarian relief convoy. Line units were tasked with executing vehicle checkpoints and searching houses for weapons, honing techniques that would not alienate the simulated local civilian population. Essential to this effort was the establishment of measures of effectiveness, designed to give the commander a metric to determine if his efforts were succeeding in stabilizing the area. The 2nd Brigade staff focused in on items such as cease fire violations, hostile contact with U.S. or friendly forces, and refugee flow to construct their measures of effectiveness. The training constructs of JRTC represent the final step in a multi-month training cycle that focused on training the nuances of stability operations to a conventional infantry brigade. The concepts developed during these training evolutions, when merged with the implied requirements of provide wide area security, and develop the host nation’s capacity for governance, serve as a guideline for operationalizing stability operations doctrine.

Training for stability operations further requires a comprehensive approach, or a holistic application of national power and influence, to increase the legitimacy of the host

---


nation government in the eyes of its citizens.\textsuperscript{84} For the Army, this implies integrating other U.S. government executive agencies and select non-government organizations into training and preparation for stability operations. The Army partially addresses this issue by emphasizing the need to develop more adaptive leaders capable of operating in ambiguous circumstances and in support of non-military organizations.\textsuperscript{85} Training scenarios further use civilians to interact with training units to staff working groups and simulate working with civilian experts to prepare for specific tasks and ease the civilian-military cultural barriers.\textsuperscript{86} This civilian participation is represented by role-players that leverage their personal experience to augment the training scenarios, they are however not the actual civilians that the soldiers will be working with while deployed in support of stability operations. This lack of true representation in training environments is a product of limited expeditionary capacity in civilian partner agencies. Lack of expeditionary capacity in civilian agencies results in operations being staffed by ad hoc teams that introduce themselves to each other on the first day.

C. EVALUATION OF THE ARMY’S OPERATIONALIZING STRATEGY

In evaluating Army efforts at operationalizing full spectrum, this section will critique the amalgamation of policy framework and training methodology as it applies to two broad areas: training and organizational focus.

1. Training

Training is the gateway to operationalizing full spectrum operations, and this section will critique the ARFORGEN methodology for producing trained Army formations to determine if they promote or inhibit the operationalizing of full spectrum doctrine. The Army has developed a sound full spectrum training strategy, implemented through a rigorous training program at the various combat training centers. This strategy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{86} Swannack, Jr. and Gray, “Peace Enforcement Operations US Army.”
\end{itemize}
is grounded in using the maneuver training centers to enhance best practices and assist the unit commanders in certifying units before they deploy. The methodology of refocusing the BCT training regime nine months prior to deployment however, discounts the suddenness with which the need to conduct stability operations can arise (i.e., the recent Haiti earthquake response in 2010.) The rigid timelines associated with the ARFORGEN process, to enable the operational requirements of Iraq and Afghanistan, optimize the production of counterinsurgency and stability capable units but inhibit the production of full spectrum capable units. Until the Army can figure out a way to train the entire spectrum during one training rotation, it will be forced to train units on only one part of the spectrum.

Furthermore, operationalizing the comprehensive approach poses difficulties more difficult to overcome because, they involve resourcing organizations outside the Department of Defense. Building capacity in civilian and nongovernmental partner agencies sufficient to operationalize the comprehensive approach remains outside the control of the Department of Defense, yet it undercuts the necessary axiom of training as you fight/ stabilize. This subject will be explored in depth in Chapter IV.

2. Organizational Focus

The Army’s organizational focus, or what it chooses to doctrinally emphasize and stress in training, is a critical factor in how full spectrum operations are operationalized. This focus can be evaluated through the quandary inherent in the Army’s aim point concept. Currently the Army is organizationally focused on the counterinsurgency and stability portions of the spectrum, as required by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As evidenced by the aim point model in Figure 3, the Army is attempting to refocus the organization on the higher intensity portion of the spectrum to mitigate the risk of being unprepared conduct conventional operations. Setting an organizational focus that operationalizes all areas of the spectrum of conflict, while rebalancing the force as called for by the aim point concept is a challenge for Army leadership. This challenge is being met through an organizational focus on leader development.
The Army has a crop of leaders that is well versed in counterinsurgency and stability operations, and wants to create leaders that are proficient in all areas of the spectrum. To this end, in 2004 Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker, coined the phrase “pentathlete leader,” connoting that the Army would need well rounded leaders to operationalize the concept that would come to be full spectrum operations doctrine. The pentathlete leader concept aims to build leaders that are: skilled in maneuver warfare, familiar with regional and cultural nuances, diplomacy attuned, and capable of leading large organizations. The Army has taken strides to internalize this concept, producing results such as enlarging the Foreign Area Officer program, and creating a retention program that offers a graduate school option that requires officers to study international relations.

The imperative to build the pentathlete leader, by creating well rounded soldier-statesmen, and the requirement to balance the aim point, by creating specialists in maneuver warfare, are coming into conflict. Incoming Chief of Staff General Martin Dempsey summed up this quandary and charted a way ahead:

What do you do with this magnificent Army of ours when Iraq and Afghanistan are in the rear view? The Army needs to decide which five things—not 55 things—its soldiers are going to master. If we make leaders skilled in a few areas, they’ll have the confidence to adapt when we inevitably get the future wrong, but if you’re not a master of anything, you have no confidence in anything.

Dempsey made these comments during Unified Quest 2011, an exercise charged with operationalizing full spectrum operations. They are based on the premise that full spectrum operations are too complex for any one person to master. The Army’s circumspect approach to bridging the conceptual gap between leaders who can satisfactorily operationalize the entire spectrum, and leaders capable of expertly operationalizing part of the spectrum, seems to question the basis of a general purpose force lead by pentathletes. Thus, my assertion is that the Army is suffering from a lack of

---

87 Matthew T. Margotta, *Creating the Pentathlete: Are We Willing to Pay the Price?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007), Figure 1.

organizational focus and will continue to do so until the conflict between the aim point imperative and the pentathlete leader, and the root causes therein are resolved. Until resolved, this lack of organizational focus will encumber efforts to operationalize full spectrum doctrine.

As demonstrated by the highlighted deficiencies in the ARFORGEN process, and the conceptual foundation issues with the full spectrum formations, the process of operationalizing full spectrum operations faces numerous challenges that must be addressed at the highest levels.

D. CONCLUSIONS

Operationalizing full spectrum operations is integral to the success of internalizing stability operations. This chapter explored and evaluated Army efforts at operationalizing full spectrum operations as an enabler for internalizing the doctrine. Despite significant challenges, the Army has made strides towards operationalizing full spectrum doctrine. The process of operationalizing the doctrine has exposed significant issues in the concept of full spectrum operations, namely the intellectual deficiencies in the whole of government approach, the Army’s institutional preference for high intensity combat operations, and the unsettled conceptual basis for force structure. By evaluating the Army’s pursuit of operationalizing full spectrum operations, this chapter forms the basis for Chapter IV’s examination of the cultural and institutional barriers to the internalization of stability operations doctrine.
IV. CONCEPTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO INTERNALIZATION

In addition to correlating the national security strategy and operationalizing the concept, the Army must overcome several other challenges before full spectrum operations doctrine can be internalized. This chapter will expand on findings of the previous chapters to identify and analyze the Army’s internal challenges to internalizing full spectrum doctrine, posed by conceptual and institutional barriers, and structure them as decision points that must be overcome. Framing this analysis are the following two challenges: 1) How can the Army execute stability operations when the other concerned government agencies lack the necessary capability to execute a whole of government approach? 2) Which internal biases must be overcome to implement a full spectrum capable force, as a requirement for internalizing stability operations? Integral to both of these challenges is an understanding of the Army’s desired end-state for institutionalizing stability operations capabilities, and the conceptual shortcomings of the whole of government approach, both of which will be explored in this chapter. This chapter will link the two challenges with the Army’s internal decision points and offer analysis of those decisions that will enable the successful internalization of full spectrum operations in the Army.

A. INSTITUTIONALIZING VS. INTERNALIZING

These two distinct terms, institutionalizing and internalizing, represent organizational goals with direct bearing on this thesis. Institutionalizing a concept denotes the creation of institutional processes and structures that, when amalgamated create a force capability, in this case the ability to conduct stability operations. Internalization of a concept specifies a cultural integration of stability operations represented by organizational attitudinal responses in the execution of full spectrum operations. This distinction between building an environment to cultivate stability
operations capabilities, as represented by institutionalizing, and internalizing a cultural acceptance of stability operations precepts, within the hierarchy of full spectrum operations, is significant.

1. Institutionalizing

The Army has set a goal of “focusing, integrating, and institutionalizing stability operations capabilities” to achieve a full-spectrum-capable force.89 According to the Army’s action plan for stability operations, achieving this capability specifically means:

Focus, integrate, and institutionalize Army activities to improve the Army’s capability and capacity to conduct Stability Operations in a joint, interagency and multinational environment. Direct the development of DOTMLPF solutions that positively impact the Army’s ability to effectively conduct stability operations.90

Implicit in the institutionalizing process is the enhancement of the Army’s capability and capacity to conduct stability operations. Generating capability and capacity are concepts significant to the process of institutionalizing full spectrum operations. Capacity connotes a basic ability, typically correlating to unit force structure, including size, and composition. Capability expands on capacity, adding modernization, unit readiness, and sustainability to the conceptual construct.91 According to Joint Publication 1-02, military capability unites these four components to define a unit’s ability to achieve a specified wartime objective, the term predating the advent of full spectrum doctrine.

DOTMLPF is the Army’s structure for institutionalizing capabilities through an acronym representing: Doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (Figure 4.) This framework incorporates all of the major categories that must be addressed in order to realize a new capability within the Army. In reference to the emerging capability of stability operations, this thesis has previously addressed the

90 Ibid., 4.
categories of doctrine, organization, and training. Doctrinal evolution has been an ongoing process that fulfilled its DOTMLPF integration with the publications of *Field Manual 3-0 Full Spectrum Operations*, and *Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations*. As explored in Chapter II, the discrepancy between the whole of government approach and the inadequate resourcing of other government agencies, has left stability operations doctrine intellectually undeveloped. This discrepancy has further consequences for other aspects of internalizing stability operations into the Army that will be addressed in forthcoming sections. Organizationally, the Army has elected to generate a stability operations capability through maintaining the current general purpose force structure, as opposed to creating a specialized stability force. The training regime for stability operations has matured with the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, creating a foundation from which to generate stability operations capability. Material and facilities will undergo minimal change in this process because force structure will remain constant. Institutionalizing stability operations capability will fall into the categories of leadership and education, the very areas where organizational biases and cultural norms are formed and maintained.
2. Internalization

Organizationally internalizing full spectrum operations requires the modification of organizational biases and cultural norms to produce attitudinal responses towards stability operations within the full spectrum hierarchy. Generating full spectrum capability within the DOTMLPF domain means a fundamental shift in the methodology of developing leaders and subordinate personnel. This process of internalization goes above and beyond the creation of processes and structures as outlined in DOTMLPF, and into the realm of organizational cognitive adjustment. Internalizing full spectrum operations will require an organizational evolution to a “stability ethic,” a concept articulated by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Calvert, a Civil Affairs officer with broad operational experience in stability operations:

---

Even more fundamental and important than teaching specific stability skills is to find a way to make stability part of the basic thought processes of every soldier. This “stability ethic” must go beyond just teaching soldiers the Law of War and the current Rules of Engagement. It is about the tone and nature of every interaction they have with civilian elements in the area of operations, and it is about maintaining a basic attitude of respect for the indigenous population and institutions (IPI) in the face of the ambiguities that are always present in full spectrum operations. And the most difficult part—it must do this without subverting the soldiers’ skills, instincts and readiness to use deadly force as needed to accomplish the mission.93

This “stability ethic” embodies the internalization of full spectrum operations because it addresses the basic soldier thought process, and the place of stability operations in the operational hierarchy.

3. The Army’s Raison D’être

As stated in the introduction, in internalizing full spectrum operations, the Army faces two challenges: Overcoming capabilities shortfalls created by inchoate whole of government approach, and modifying organizational biases and norms to develop a stability ethic. Of these two challenges, the latter poses the most significant test. This is because the Army has rarely had to foster a fundamental cultural shift in consideration of its existential identity, or primary reason for being. Organizationally the Army has undergone noteworthy readjustments, a prime example being the post-Vietnam War period. This timeframe was underscored by a significant refocusing on the Soviet threat, buoyed by the new doctrine of AirLand Battle, including revolutionary training methods in the National Training Center, and the inclusion of the After Action Review.94 These adjustments began the process of modifying organizational biases and norms, yet the Army’s focus remained fighting and winning the nation’s wars.95 Because DoD


94 After Action Review is a professional discussion of an event, focused on performance standards, that enables soldiers to discover for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve on weaknesses. It is a tool leaders and units can use to get maximum benefit from every mission or task.

95 Davidson, *Lifting the Fog of Peace*, 98.
Directive 3000.5 modified the Army’s *raison d’être* to include the execution of stability operations, it requires a concerted effort that exceeds the combination of processes and structure, institutionalization effort, and extends into the uncharted territory of developing a stability ethic. The forthcoming challenges should thus be contextualized within the imperative not only to effect changes to the institutional structure and processes, but to internalize a new attitudinal response to operating in a full spectrum environment.

**B. RECONCILING STABILITY OPERATIONS AND THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT**

The whole of government approach to stability operations operates directs that civilian agencies should have the lead prior to and after combat operations, with the military in charge during combat operations.\(^{96}\) Operationalizing this collaborative effort requires two components: innovative doctrine, and properly resourced agencies. In the case of stability operations, under resourced civilian agencies have disrupted the formation of comprehensive doctrine, causing the entire enterprise to defer to military direction. This reality leads to a question: How can the Army execute stability operations, when the other concerned government agencies lack the capacity to execute a true whole of government approach?

1. **Organization**

According to the National Security Presidential Directive-44, the State Department has the responsibility to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”\(^{97}\) The State Department has further delegated these responsibilities to the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS.) To this end, the S/CRS is comprised of an interagency staff responsible for coordinating across the whole of government, and a deployable Civilian Response Corps (CRC) designed to integrate

---


civilian and military components on the scene of a stability operation. These civilian entities are designed to interface with the military, and specifically the Army structure, at the Combatant Command staff levels.

2. Innovative Doctrine

The first step in operationalizing the whole of government approach to stability operations is developing new doctrine. Relevant doctrine is encapsulated by three key documents, and one process, collectively referred to in a RAND corporation study as the four pillars of rethinking the interagency process, outlined in Table 1.

Table 1. The Intellectual Foundations of the Interagency Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interagency</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
<td>System of Advisory board, Planning cell, &amp; deployable teams to enable civilian agency coordination of SO</td>
<td>Ground Combatant Commander, Task Force Staff represented at IMS for operational purposes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Post-Conflict Essential Tasks Matrix</td>
<td>S/CRS developed tool for interagency planning of SO</td>
<td>Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept</td>
<td>Joint Forces Command J-7 doctrine describing how the future Joint Force Commander (JFC) will provide military support to SO</td>
<td>Army Field Manual 3-0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

99 Szayna, Eaton, and Richardson, Preparing the Army for Stability Operations, 27.
100 Ibid., 11.
These documents represent a collaborative foundation for implementing the whole of government approach to stability operations. The Interagency Management System allows the S/CRS to operationalize this doctrine through the incorporation of a decision making body, a planning cell, and a deployable Civilian Response Corps (CRC). Working in tangent with each other, these elements of the IMS have the potential to harness the doctrine and synchronize civilian-military approaches to stability operations. However, this capstone organization has fallen short of its potential due to inadequate funding.

3. Resourcing

Sufficient funding for the IMS, although miniscule in terms of the discretionary budget, has proven a difficult objective to secure. Central to the IMS concept, and most costly, is the deployable Civilian Response Corps (CRC). The CRC is a necessary component of any integrated civilian agency coordination effort because they represent the civilian boots on the ground of a stability operation. Thus far CRC funding requests have fallen short of enabling the creation of a 250 person deployable pool of qualified civilians. In 2008, Ambassador John E. Herbst, head of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, estimated it would cost $248 million to create, and $131 million to sustain this capability. Three years later, the fiscal year 2011 budget has only specified $184 million to generate and operate a deployable civilian capability. Intermediate budget cycles have seen the overall IMS concept augmented by a transfer of funds from Defense Department accounts to those of the Department of State. Eluding to the notion that current priorities preclude the proper funding for the whole of government approach, Congress has stated that “this provision as a temporary authority to provide additional resources, if needed, to the Department of State until S/CRS is fully stood up and

---

101 Clifton D. Reed, The Battle Within: DOD and Interagency Coordination for Regional Conflicts: AFRICOM and the Interagency Management System as Models (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2008), 10.


adequately resourced.”\textsuperscript{104} These stopgap measures fall short of addressing the problem by adequately funding a deployable civilian capability in the State Department. Conversely, in 2010 the Department of Defense was funded with $550 million dollars to augment foreign internal defense, conduct counter-terror operations, and stability operations.\textsuperscript{105} It is important to note that these funds, unlike those earmarked for the civilian agencies, are solely for operations with personnel and support funding being drawn from a separate budget line. This major budgetary inequity between civilian agencies and the military underlines the problem that the whole of government approach exists in theory and doctrine, but not in capability.

4. Addressing the Challenge

The gap in capabilities between civilian government agencies and the military will not relieve responsibility from either for executing stability operations. However, as the most conspicuous of U.S. efforts, the military will by default be responsible for a successful outcome. This leads to the first challenge: How can the Army execute stability operations when the other concerned government agencies lack the capability to execute a true whole of government approach? It is my assertion that the Army, as the largest purveyor of stability operations within the DoD, has employed a hedging strategy. This strategy, while continuing to value government civilian input and coordination, accounts for the capability gap by developing the resources to accomplish the mission. This assertion is substantiated by the 2005 DoD report on institutionalizing stability operations within the military:

Unfortunately, during the last year the progress of other organs of Government has been less fulsome, and we cannot have confidence in the speed with which changes in other departments and agencies outside DoD will take place. Thus we urge that the Department act with dispatch to


accelerate the transformation of its own capabilities, while concurrently continuing to give full support to the evolution of capabilities elsewhere within the Government.\textsuperscript{106}

Even at this early stage, the DoD predicted the resource shortfalls that would define civilian support to stability operations, and that it would be necessary to augment stability operations capability by developing them in-house. Examples of these positions include experts in infrastructure management needed to restart or maintain critical utilities such as power, water, or sewage; and professionals qualified to train judges and police officers, to enable the rule of law. The Army has two options for attaining these skill sets to conduct stability operations: Harness private civilian expertise via contracting, and recruit and retain civilian specialists into the reserve components to compliment active component capabilities.

5. Contracting Support

Specialized private sector support to a stability operation can be drawn from a variety of sources, including foreign and domestic commercial companies, academia, government backed research and development centers, private consultants, and Non Governmental Organizations.\textsuperscript{107} Contracting the needed expertise is advantageous because it allows for a tailored fit, for example an engineer to fix and maintain an aging power grid. Another advantage is monetary savings accrued by temporarily contracting a specific skill set vs. permanently hiring, reducing the myriad of logistical support required of a tenured professional. Further, hiring local professionals disaffected by the unstable situation often performing their former jobs, can offer a two-fold benefit by infusing the local economy and assisting in the restoration of a critical service.

Foremost amongst the detractors of hiring civilians is an inability to attract qualified personnel to fill the need in a timely fashion. A recent historical example is the post-combat occupation of Iraq, when failed recruiting efforts left critical political and


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 14.}
economic advisory posts filled by inexperienced adventure seekers scarcely out of college. Another downside is the inability to fully integrate contractors, whose loyalties lie outside the U.S. government, into the whole of government team. Accordingly, it must be asked how much loyalty should contractors be expected to give a mission when they are not vested as direct representatives of the U.S. government. This lack of integration can diminish U.S. readiness to conduct a stability operation, because it hinders proficiency born of familiarity and repetition as envisioned by the whole of government approach.

6. Growing the Capability

In line with maintaining a general purpose force capable of conducting operations across the spectrum of conflict, the active Army has incrementally increased a number of specialty job fields that have a direct correlation to stability operations. Among the specialties that have experienced an increase in numbers over the past twenty years are the Civil Affairs branch, and Judge Advocate General Corps. Both branches represent a marked increase in the Army’s capability to autonomously execute stability operations. Increasing capabilities in-house can also be achieved by staffing the reserve components with skilled professionals to compliment the skill sets in the active force. The Defense Science Board recommended that the Civil Affairs branch focus on recruiting individuals with professional “domain” experience, ages 35–45, and enticing these qualified individuals with warrant officer status. A model for this can be found in the WWII Army program to co-opt qualified individuals into the military, affording them requisite rank to execute post-combat occupation duties. These Military Governors were trained at one of 13 Army-run Schools of Military Government to administer occupied territories. Because these individuals were drafted on an as needed basis, the challenges associated

---


with recruiting and retaining them was minimized.\textsuperscript{111} Finally, forecasting the correct mix of needed skills in anticipation of what might be needed in a stability operation is a thorny proposition, especially in coming times of economic austerity.

\section*{C. IMPLEMENTING A STABILITY ETHIC}

Generating full spectrum capabilities, and specifically stability operations capabilities, among the Army’s general purpose force requires the development and application of a stability ethic. Implementing this ethic, to enable a full spectrum capable force, faces inherent organizational resistance. This section will expand on the idea of the stability ethic within the context of full spectrum operations, study the sources of resistance to a stability ethic as rooted in organizational culture, and examine methods for easing it.

\subsection*{1. Stability Ethic and the Strategic Corporal}

Full spectrum operations require the execution of operations across the spectrum of conflict, from high intensity combat to stability operations, necessitating the capability to transition among the points within a compressed timeframe. Stability operations are grounded in the credibility among potential enemies that if the situation warrants hostile action, the U.S. Army would defeat them.\textsuperscript{112} These seemingly dichotomous characteristics are at the heart of a stability ethic as embodied in the concepts of the three block war and the strategic corporal.

The three block war and the strategic corporal were coined by the former Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, to contextualize the ambiguous operating environments, and the appropriate actions therein that would come to characterize full spectrum operations. The three block war outlines a simple construct that envisions fighting on one block, distributing humanitarian relief on the second, and separating warring factions on the third. Enter into this scenario the strategic corporal,

who cannot afford to be lacking in any of the necessary skills to successfully master each block. The Marine Corps is meeting this challenge by integrating cultural awareness into the formal education chain for upcoming Marines, requiring them to focus their efforts on mastering a culture (including a language) that is predicted to be operationally relevant.\textsuperscript{113}

The Army is developing its own three block war and strategic corporal models via the complex paradigm of operational adaptability.\textsuperscript{114} For the Army, building a strategic corporal is akin to implementing a stability ethic, except the Army is a fundamentally different organization than the Marine Corps, posing unique challenges to organizational change.

2. \textbf{Organizational Resistance}

The Army culture is fragmented amongst specialized branches, united by common values and an overarching mission. Individual identities in the Army are dictated first by branch affiliation, for example, the Signal Corps or the Infantry, next by unit of assignment, and finally by the common bond of soldiering. Each distinct branch, and affiliated soldiers, has an identity derived from a mission set, in précis what soldiers are assigned to do determines who they are. Residing at the apex of the branch hierarchy is the traditional combat arms, only from which the Chief of Staff and other senior generals are selected. From this culture springs, what Civil Affairs advocate Stephen Henthorne calls, a “Warfighter Insurgency” as articulated in his open letter to former National Security Advisor, James L. Jones:

This lack of training is due to a “War Fighter Insurgency” within the U.S. Army, which still espouses, although in seemingly subtle ways, kinetic operations as their preferred method of operation; ways that, combined


with the fact that truly no one in DOD is paying any attention to a very transparent problem, have re-enforced a U.S. Army kinetics first, last, and always, approach to operations.¹¹⁵

This framework of branch identity and hierarchy is united by common values and mission integration.

Army values are nominally represented by the seven Army values: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage. I assert that one additional value, professionalism, encompasses the Army in its entirety. Professionalism serves two primary functions for the Army, providing a mandate to operate on behalf of the nation directly leading to the responsibility to effect necessary changes in the operational paradigm. The Army has a professional mandate afforded by the nation to provide for the common defense.¹¹⁶ Inherent in this mandate, rooted in the Constitution, dictates that as professional organization the Army will be granted a great deal of autonomy and latitude to provide for the common defense. In exchange for that autonomy, the Army will nurture professional ethics and standards in line with the overall national values.¹¹⁷ This mandate is the source of the professionalism embraced as a common value throughout the branches that comprise the organizational culture of the Army. As a professional organization the Army must change to adapt to new operational realities, i.e., the requirement to execute full spectrum operations, or risk failing the mandate of the nation.¹¹⁸ Maintaining institutional expertise in the operational art of national security is the definition of professionalism for the Army. Adding the new paradigm of stability operations to the required tasks for the Army will pose a challenge that a professional force will need to meet head on.


The requirement to perform full spectrum operations, and in particular stability operations, will not be hindered by a lack of professional zeal to adapt and overcome; it will instead be sapped by lack of organizational identity. Because the Army is culturally segregated by branch and specialty, and by design the Army is going to approach full spectrum operations with the same general propose forces needed to conduct traditional combat missions, stability operations are at a cultural disadvantage of being internalized into the Army.

3. Decision Points

Creating a stability ethic will require adapting the roots of organizational biases and cultural norms in leadership and education. Changing leadership involves a two-fold process: first, selecting general officers who have proven full spectrum operation proficiency, and second growing strategic corporals capable of succeeding in the three block war. Both efforts require an emphasis within the Army’s educational system to foster a stability ethic.

a. Leadership

Incoming Army Chief of Staff, General Martin E. Dempsey, stated that “soldiers and leaders emulate the behavior of those senior to them.”119 As the institutional decision makers, general officers shape the direction of the Army and shoulder an inordinate amount of responsibility for operational successes. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, a noted Army soldier-scholar, described the role of general officers this way:

The general is responsible for estimating the likelihood of success in applying force to achieve the aims of policy. The general describes both the means necessary for the successful prosecution of war and the ways in which the nation will employ those means. If the policymaker desires ends

for which the means he provides are insufficient, the general is responsible for advising the statesman of this incongruence.\textsuperscript{120}

Full spectrum operations require general officers to be grounded in the ways and means of prosecuting a three block war, implying an innate understanding of stability operations doctrine. Selection of brigadier generals with demonstrated full spectrum credentials offers an “interim” opportunity to institutionalize stability operations because these leaders will shape Army for the coming decade. The 2008 brigadier general promotion board symbolized an institutional crossroads because it involved the selection of H. R. McMaster, a colonel who had come to identify with full spectrum operations, and felt that the Army was moving away from institutionalizing it. His selection, overseen by General David Petraeus, himself an officer who was termed as successfully demonstrating full spectrum abilities, was seen as a bellwether in the institutional acceptance of full spectrum operations and by extension stability doctrine.\textsuperscript{121}

Interim solutions, such as promoting the right generals, must be bolstered by growing an officer corps of full spectrum operationally capable strategic corporals. Among the DOTMLPF domains, changing the personnel system is the most critical for internalizing stability operations in the officer corps. The personnel bureaucracy has been accused of nurturing a zero-defect mentality that stifles innovation and by default rewards conformists who come to represent the “warfighter insurgency.”\textsuperscript{122} In a critiquing the Army personnel system of the Vietnam era, scholars Paul Savage and Richard Gabriel, focused on the overall disintegration of the system, resulting in a lower quality officer.\textsuperscript{123} This disintegration was exemplified by the practices of, “ticket punching” and “time in rank requirements.” Unfortunately these two practices have persisted in the Army and are likely to stifle the internalization of a stability ethic. Ticket


punching dictates holding specific qualifying jobs at designated ranks as a requirement of promotion; while time in rank requirements ensures that all personnel are promoted at generally the same time throughout their careers, with no one eligible for promotion to general officer prior to 22 years of service. Ticket punching encourages officers to pursue a narrow range of jobs as designated by their career fields for advancement reducing emphasis on a depth of experiences as demanded by the three block war. Time in rank requirements discriminate against the brightest officers, specifically those who demonstrate the mental dexterity for full spectrum operations. This leaves them unable to excel past the bureaucracy to exert influence at higher levels of responsibility, and more likely to exit military service short of their potential. Modifying these two practices of the personnel system to encourage depth of experiences and ensure a faster rise to the top for the most talented officers are two steps in the direction of growing the strategic corporal officer corps.

b. Education

Co-equal with selecting and retaining the right leaders is equipping them with the tools to instill attitudinal responses to full spectrum operations within their organizations. Of the three responses, motor, verbal, and attitudinal, that signal an internalization of spectrum operations, and in turn stability operations doctrine, the attitudinal response is the hardest to achieve. In review, motor responses include testable skills that ascribe to a standard, such as rifle marksmanship or language proficiency. Verbal responses encompass a demonstrated understanding of procedures or culture understanding. Attitudinal responses, sit atop the hierarchy, and include a demonstrated understanding of how a given concept fits within the larger scope of policy and strategy. Leader education is the practical path to instilling attitudinal responses to stability operations doctrine within organizations and culture as a whole.

\[124\] Savage and Gabriel, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army; an Alternative Perspective,” 3.

\[125\] Arbuckle, Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations, 140.
Education stands apart from training, in that it prompts individuals to attain a foundation from which to articulate solutions to ambiguous problems, a signature of the three block war. Training offers a common baseline from which to execute specific tasks and functions in pursuit of a predetermined solution. Education is also predicated on experience, gained within a forum that forces individuals to analyze and challenge what they believe to be true in light of seemingly contradictory facts, another hallmark of full spectrum operations.

The resultant question is: What is the right education to foster attitudinal responses to full spectrum operations? The answer is creating a formal forum where leaders are constantly forced to analyze emerging ideas, coupled with a program that allows them to compare and contrast different methodologies. A model for achieving this can be found in the training requirement for Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs,) where after receiving region specific language training and graduate school education, they are “immersed” into designated regions for periods up to a year. During this immersion, and armed with command of the language, FAOs are expected to observe and analyze the cultural, economic, political and especially military trends that can later provide a contextual basis for strategic assignments as military attaches and regional experts. This educational experience is not unlike what the Marine Corps dictated to its officers and non commissioned officers at the tactical level. Their program requires Marines to develop language proficiency and cultural specialization (sans full immersion) of nations along the “arc of instability” in the event they may have to conduct a future three block war there.

Achieving this level of educational integration can be accomplished by integrating it with the changes to the personnel system, by what can be considered an investment in the Army’s human capital. Investment in human capital should be at the core of modifying the personnel and education systems, because it is leaders who in the long run will be responsible for attitudinal acceptance of full spectrum operations. Breaking the Army’s internal biases towards building a stability ethic, fostering a

---

personnel system that selects the correct generals and retains innovative junior officer, and educating the officer corps to allow them to successfully prosecute a three block war are challenges that must be met in order for the Army to evolve as a professional organization.

D. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis sought to answer the research question: How can the Army internalize full spectrum operations, to the inclusion of stability operations, into its culture and operations? In answering this question, this thesis examined three supporting quandaries:

1. How important is a consistent correlation between the national security strategy and full spectrum operations doctrine to the Army’s internalization of stability operations as a permanent mission-set?
2. How can the Army operationalize full spectrum operations, specifically the inclusion of stability operations, to allow the doctrine to be internalized?
3. How will the Army overcome conceptual and institutional barriers organizationally internalize full spectrum operations doctrine?

The answer to the original research question lies in the exploration and analysis of each of these supporting questions.

It is the findings of this thesis that full spectrum operations will be internalized in the U.S. Army under the following three conditions:

1. The National Security Strategy formally and consistently embraces the use of military to conduct stability operations in support of national objectives. As discussed in Chapter II, this is the best method for prompting the Army to accept full spectrum operations, and specifically stability operations, as a permanent mission-set with the accompanying imperative to internalize it.
2. The Army is able to doctrinally evolve the full spectrum concept, and devise a training model that supports the operationalizing of full spectrum operations. As described in Chapter III, addressing these imperatives requires the Army to rectify core foundational issues such as leader professional development and the optimized force structure for full spectrum operations.
3. The Army is able to hedge the gaps in the whole of government approach, and overcome internal biases as represented by the personnel system.
The future of the Army is directly tied to its ability to internalize the precepts of full spectrum operations. This assertion is derived from the notion that the United States, as a nation values the capabilities that a full spectrum military brings to the international arena. In the upcoming times of fiscal austerity the perceived value of a full spectrum capable force will be tested, both politically and within the ranks, with each interested party attempting to safeguard their bureaucratic fiefdoms. The Army has no stability branch, begging the question: who will see the value in internalizing full spectrum operations into the Army’s organization and culture.

Incoming Chief of Staff, General Dempsey has signaled that he values the precepts of full spectrum operations, yet it remains to be seen if he can midwife the concept through the conditions laid out in this thesis. General Dempsey framed the overarching challenge of internalizing full spectrum operations, reforming the personnel system, when he spoke of placing “value” on that which makes the Army a profession, and on “further reflecting that value in promotions, advancements, and selection for command.” 128 I argue that as a professional organization, the Army has an obligation to the nation to change in the face of new realities as represented by the challenge of internalizing full spectrum operations, and to “value” the internalization of stability operations doctrine.

---

LIST OF REFERENCES


smallwarsjournal.com/documents/bankuskievit.doc.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California