THESIS

THE IMPACT OF CIVILIAN CONTROL ON CONTEMPORARY DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEMS: CHALLENGES FOR SOUTH EAST EUROPE

by

Diana Molodilo

March 2011

Thesis Advisor: Thomas C. Bruneau
Second Reader: Thomas D. Young

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THE IMPACT OF CIVILIAN CONTROL ON CONTEMPORARY DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEMS: CHALLENGES FOR SOUTH EAST EUROPE

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M.A., Moldova State University, Republic of Moldova, 2003

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from the

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March 2011

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ABSTRACT

Defense planning has always been one of the most sensitive issues in promoting civilian control of the armed forces. Ensuring democratic control of defense policy is a challenging task, and Southeastern Europe’s (SEE) experience to date has inevitably been mixed. At this phase of the reform process, some countries from the region do not possess the necessary civilian knowledge to replace the dominance of the armed forces in the defense planning process.

This thesis provides a comparative analysis of efforts to establish civilian democratic control over defense planning in three SEE countries. Its purpose is to contribute to a better understanding of the importance and the role of civilians, especially elected leaders in defense planning, and to search for models of defense planning systems that are most appropriate for countries that have very limited defense capabilities.

This thesis argues that the use of a defense planning system with the necessary civilian control may result in the establishment of a modern, effective military. This thesis focuses mainly on the experience of three countries: Romania, Bulgaria and Republic of Moldova. It looks at the achievements and major challenges that these countries still face to establish greater professional civil-military cooperation and effective civilian control over defense planning.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1
   A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.................................................................1
   B. IMPORTANCE..............................................................................................1
   C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES ...............................................................2
   D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4
   E. METHODS AND SOURCES..........................................................................7
   F. THESIS OVERVIEW .....................................................................................8

II. A FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS AND THE
    RELEVANCE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL, OVERSIGHT AND
    EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MILITARY .................................................................11
   A. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ...............11
      1. Civil-Military Relations Paradigms .................................................11
      2. Defining Civil-Military Relations: Elements Necessary for
         Defense Planning.................................................................13
         a. Democratic Civilian Control and Oversight ....................13
         b. Military Effectiveness .........................................................17
      3. Defense Planning Conceptual Overview..........................................17
         a. Defense Planning vs. Operational Planning .....................17
         b. Defense Planning Methodologies: Classic vs. Modern
            Methods ...................................................................................20
   B. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................24

III. DEFENSE PLANNING REFORM IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AND
    CIVILIAN CONTROL AS A KEY REQUIREMENT FOR EFFECTIVE
    DEFENSE PLANNING.............................................................................................27
   A. DEFENSE PLANNING REFORM IN SEE................................................27
      1. Background Leading to Defense Planning Reform and the
         Dynamics of CMR.............................................................................28
         a. The Legacies of Communism in SEE ..............................28
         b. Defense Planning Trends after the Cold War in SEE........29
      2. Defense Planning Reforms and CMR Progress in SEE .................32
         a. Bulgaria: Example of Relatively Successful Defense
            Planning Reform.............................................................................33
         b. Romania: Achievements and Problems .................................36
         c. The Challenges of Defense Planning Reform in the PfP
            Countries: The Republic of Moldova Case.............................39
   B. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................45

IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: THE GENERAL STATE OF DEFENSE
    PLANNING IN BULGARIA, ROMANIA AND REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
    AND THE ROLE OF ELECTED LEADERS IN DEFENSE PLANNING
    PROCESS...................................................................................................................47
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................47
B. OUTLINE OF THE BULGARIAN, ROMANIAN, AND
MOLDOVIAN DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEMS ..............................48
1. Bulgaria......................................................................................................48
2. Romania....................................................................................................49
3. Moldova ....................................................................................................51
Planning System.........................................................................................53
C. DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS: CONTENT AND OUTPUT ........55
1. Defense Planning Process Stages ......................................................55
   a. Development of Strategic Concepts........................................56
   c. Assessment of Defense Organization Effectiveness and
      Efficiency.................................................................................61
2. Overall Assessment of the Defense Planning Process in SEE
   Countries.............................................................................................62
D. DEFENSE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY
   EFFECTIVENESS.........................................................................................63
1. Analysis of Existing Political Guidance for Defense Planning......64
2. Institutional Responsibilities and Functions Clarification.............68
3. Adequate Resources...........................................................................70
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ..............................................................75
LIST OF REFERENCES..........................................................................................83
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...............................................................................95
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Generic Process Chart of Capability Based Planning.................................24
Figure 2. Defense Planning Process...........................................................................55
Figure 3. Mapping Capabilities to Tasks.................................................................57
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. High Level Policy Documents .................................................................67
**LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>BAF</td>
<td>Bulgarian Armed Forces</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>CBP</td>
<td>Capabilities-Based Planning</td>
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<td>CCMR</td>
<td>Center for Civil-Military Relations</td>
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<td>CMR</td>
<td>Civil-Military Relations</td>
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<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>FSR</td>
<td>Force Structure Review</td>
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<td>GOP</td>
<td>Guidance on Operational Planning</td>
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<td>IPAP</td>
<td>Individual Partnership Action Plan</td>
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<td>IPP</td>
<td>Individual Partnership Program</td>
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<td>MAF</td>
<td>Moldovan Armed Forces</td>
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<td>MAP</td>
<td>Membership Action Plan</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Concept</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>OPP</td>
<td>Operational Planning Process</td>
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<td>PARP</td>
<td>Planning and Review Process</td>
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<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
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<td>PPBS</td>
<td>Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System</td>
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<td>SDR</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Review</td>
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<td>SEE</td>
<td>Southeast Europe</td>
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<td>SSDAT</td>
<td>Security Sector and Defense Assistance Team</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>TBP</td>
<td>Threat Based Planning</td>
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<td>TTCP</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation Program</td>
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This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Veronica and Vasile, and to the person who believed in me all the way through!
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Defense planning has always been one of the most sensitive issues in promoting civilian control of the armed forces. Ensuring democratic control of defense planning is a challenging task and Southeastern Europe’s (SEE) experience to date has inevitably been mixed. At this phase of the reform process, some countries from this region do not possess the necessary civilian expertise and experience to replace the dominance of the armed forces in the defense planning process. The questions addressed by this research are: How do these countries address this challenge, and how can they improve civil-military cooperation in this field? How effective are the implications of civilians and especially elected leaders in defense planning? This thesis tries to answer these questions by presenting major successes and failures of some SEE countries in establishing a modern defense planning system adequate to the democratic political system.

The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the importance and the role of civilians, especially elected leaders in defense planning, focusing on the difference in and complementary roles civilians and militaries play in defense planning. This thesis mainly focuses on the experience of three countries: Romania, Bulgaria and Republic of Moldova. It looks at the achievements and the major challenges that these countries still face to establish constructive professional civil-military cooperation and effective civilian control over defense planning.

B. IMPORTANCE

The transition to democracy and good governance cannot avoid dealing with the central problem of building defense planning systems under strong civilian democratic control. After the end of the Cold War, the defense planning system in almost every Southeastern European country was challenged by these major political changes. The new security environment stressed the necessity to significantly modify the defense planning process in transitional countries. Demands for building armed forces, which are
under democratic control, have caused radical changes in the nature of civil-military relations. This particularly affected the SEE countries where existing legacy almost non-existent defense planning systems need to be replaced with transparent, effective, efficient and compatible ones.¹

The importance of the research question derives from the theoretical and practical approach to the problem. From the theoretical approach this thesis will identify the indicators that measure the success or failure that distinguishes successful civilian control over defense planning. The research attempts to explain why some of the countries have been more successful in this process than others, and have succeeded in building defense planning systems with required characteristics, while in some SEE countries there is still significant room for consolidation and improvement in this area.

From the practical approach, this thesis attempts to suggest some models of defense planning systems for countries that try to improve effectiveness and efficiency in the defense planning process.

C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

Within this research the author will argue that the use of a modern defense planning system with the necessary civilian control may result in the establishment of a modern, effective military. The problems identified, and the common challenges, in the area of civilian control of defense planning that are shared by countries in Southeast Europe include a lack of expertise and experience on the part of civilian defense officials, and a lack of civilian and military partnership in defense planning.

Lack of expertise and experience on the part of civilian defense officials in defense planning issues sometimes leads to inappropriate policy choices and politicization of the military. Due to the lack of experienced and well-prepared civilians that can undertake reforms, programs in defense planning are not being realized. There are also certain forms of politicization in the security sector, unclear statements of

national interests and goals, promotion of inadequate or unrealistic decisions and an inability to form a consistent defense policy. These have all been evident in the SEE governments’ attempts to adopt major security and national documents and laws. Moreover, in most countries in the region, there is an absence of a knowledgeable political elite that shows an ability to establish effective and efficient governmental structures and effective planning norms.2

A lack of civilian and military partnership in the defense planning agenda can also lead to inappropriate military interference over elements of defense planning that may have detrimental consequences. As George Cristian and Mihaela Matei noticed:

Now it is common sense that planning for a certain type of command-and-control system or asserting certain operational rules of engagement has inner political implications and must therefore be analyzed and endorsed by the civilian leadership despite the fact that previously defense planning was perceived as being entirely the province of the military. Both military and civilian leadership had to face the task of redefining the role and shape of the armed forces in a new environment, one where the absence of clearly defined external threats has complicated the heretofore classical approaches to plans and scenarios in force building.3

This thesis also intends to find examples of successful planning systems that should be studied and followed for a specific country, identify models that should apply to countries in transition, and how they can improve their planning. How can countries with modest capabilities work in a modern system and what are the steps to take? The aim is to identify the trends in the defense planning area, to analyze the impact of civilian control on these trends in transitional countries, and to propose a generic model of the defense planning system suitable for the transitional countries.

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D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The research is based on literature from several fields: civil-military relations, defense planning, comparative politics, security sector reform, defense economics, and international relations.

Until the end of the Cold War the specific situation of the defense and security sector in Southeast Europe did not allow for the development of independent and professional research on the topic of democratic control of armed forces and defense structures. Consequently, by the early 1990s, no theoretical establishment of civil-military relations existed that applied specifically to the SEE region. Initially, the civil-military relations debate was dominated by the contributions of scholars whose analytical focus concentrated on West European and North American traditions and experiences, and who have analyzed the evolution of the democratic control in those countries. Concerning defense planning as a subject, there is little attention in the literature on this matter and, consequently, there is a significant gap in the professional and academic literature. Defense planning in this view is a contested process in which civilians and military officers often work at cross-purposes. With regards to the literature dealing with both civil-military relations and defense planning, it is very vague; these two fields of research are considered to be separate areas of investigation. This thesis tries to combine these two areas and present civil-military relations as a factor that influences considerable defense planning.

Much of the literature on the subject of civil-military relations argues that tensions between civilian and military leaders are unavoidable due to different backgrounds, interests and outlooks of the two groups.4 Until now, most debates on civil-military relations were articulated on the basis of the assumptions of Huntington and Janowitz’s classical theories on the civil-military gap, which was reinterpreted after the end of the Cold War by introducing other factors into the analysis, such as the consequences of

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shrinking and professionalizing the military establishment, the emergence of new risks and threats, and the redefinition of armed forces’ missions. The substance of this cultural gap between the military and civilian leadership also constitutes a point of dispute between academics and policy makers.

After the Cold War ended, the military’s traditional role in many Western and non-Western countries was questioned in this regard. A recent study argues that, “after the end of the Cold War, democratization and globalization have had a big role in determining the timing and sequence of defense reform and the consequent impact on civil-military relations.”

After analyzing the existing literature the author has concluded that an adequate defense planning system does not exist in SEE countries. Consequently, in order to implement the new defense planning system based on planning, programming, budgeting and execution methodology, it is necessary to develop a new defense planning concept considering trends such as capability-based planning, output-oriented budgeting, as well as “best practice” in their own experience and in the experience of other transitional countries. Some studies dedicated to defense planning were very insightful in regards to identifying the problems and lessons learned in this field. Of great help were Center of Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) Reports that offer a detailed evaluation on status of defense policy, planning and execution in the countries examined in this thesis.

Some studies dedicated to “capabilities-based planning (CBP) and assessment”

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issues by Sharon Caudle\textsuperscript{7} and Paul Davis\textsuperscript{8} were also helpful in order to understand the new planning methodology and the importance of institutions in order to implement defense planning. The former argues that CBP implementation offers unique challenges because of differences between homeland security and the defense community.

The available literature dealing with civil-military relations and defense planning in SEE is very vague. Only a few of the studies refer to Southeastern Europe. There were some studies, by Constantine P. Demopoulos and Daniel Ziker;\textsuperscript{9} Jean Callaghan and Jürgen Kuhlmann;\textsuperscript{10} Philipp H. Fluri, Gustave E. Gustenau and Plamen I. Pantev;\textsuperscript{11} Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan;\textsuperscript{12}and Rachel A. Epstein,\textsuperscript{13} but each had a narrow focus. They dealt with either some specific issues of civil-military relations or focused on a particular country, and none of them dealt with both areas of research: civil-military relations and defense planning.

To better understand the research problem, this thesis proposes to examine the question by doing a comparative case study. In this order, a more detailed field-related analysis is provided. It analyzes and details the major successes and failures of three SEE countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Republic of Moldova) in establishing a modern defense planning system, supportive of a democratic political system. Scientific articles and


official publications from these countries provided resourceful insights in accomplishing this task.\textsuperscript{14} Although the Southeastern European countries are discussed by civil-military relations theories, the case of the Republic of Moldova is neglected. The Moldova case is analyzed in this research through the eyes of some contributions of scholarly articles published by Moldovan policy makers, strategy papers issued by expert’s structures from Moldova,\textsuperscript{15} research of the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of armed Forces (DCAF), and on the contribution of scholars from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California.

In the current security environment the civilian sector must better understand and address the needs of the armed forces. In turn, the armed forces must further accept that there is a leading role for civilians in the formulation of defense policy. As Clausewitz wrote, “Policy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details,” but it can be felt “in the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even on the battle.” The bottom line is that any major military development considered by the commander should be reviewed by the statesman to determine potential policy implications.\textsuperscript{16} As a result, military and civilians must interact to continuously contour the course of events.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

The aim of this thesis is to fill the gap of our understanding of the difference and complementary roles civilians and militaries play in defense planning by providing a comparative study on how Bulgaria, Romania, and Republic of Moldova succeeded or failed in establishing professional civil-military cooperation and effective civilian control over defense planning. Thus, a detailed, field-related analysis is provided.


For the purpose of cross-national comparison an analytical framework was employed to assess the progress made and problems faced by the SEE countries in establishing a viable defense planning system (regarded as an independent variable) adequate to the new realities. The suggested analytical framework argues that the use of a defense planning system with the necessary civilian control may result in the establishment of a modern, effective military (considered in this framework as a dependent variable). The framework suggests that a range of factors influence the defense planning system in any given country: clear government policy, adequate organizational structures (coordination between the civilian and military defense planning organizations), and adequate financial resources (to acquire long-term capabilities).

Also, the research studies the modern defense planning systems and their force development methodologies, concluding with an analysis of the lessons from other countries that can be useful or applied to countries in transition.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

Four major chapters comprise this thesis. Following the Introductory chapter, Chapter II is devoted to an overview of basic concepts such as democratic control, oversight and military effectiveness in defense planning process. The thesis provides the reader with some conceptual clarifications and draws a framework of analysis. It provides a basis for understanding the concepts of democratic control, military effectiveness, defense planning, etc. It also introduces a relatively new planning methodology that is gaining increasing currency in Europe—Capability Based Programming (CBP).

Chapter III examines the defense planning reform and the dimension of civilian control over that process in three SEE countries: Bulgaria, Romania, and Republic of Moldova. It examines the changes in defense planning after the end of the Cold War in these countries. In order to better understand the progress registered throughout the last sixteen years of defense planning reform and the challenges regarding civil-military relations in SEE countries, a brief return to the legacies of communism is essential.

The research also focuses on those aspects that are significant for Southeastern Europe. It arranges them in three main areas: first, the factors that influenced new trends
in defense planning; second, the current relevance of the civil-military contradiction in defense planning; and finally, the gap between civil and military culture within Southeastern Europe and the opportunities to overcome it. All of these aspects will be discussed further in this research using Romania and Bulgarian models of defense planning.
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS AND THE RELEVANCE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL, OVERSIGHT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MILITARY

A. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

One can pose the question: What is political and what is military? It should be stated from the very beginning that all major issues in military, in one way or another, have a fundamental political value. On the issue of civilian control, Clausewitz wrote that “[p]olicy, of course, will not extend its influence to operational details,” but it can be felt “[i]n the planning of war, of the campaign, and often even on the battle,” stating that any major military development considered by the commander should be reviewed by the politician to determine potential policy implication.\(^\text{17}\) In order to facilitate an understanding of civilian implication in defense planning, this chapter starts with some basic clarifications of civil-military relations and moves towards defense planning definitions.

1. Civil-Military Relations Paradigms

The current paradigm of the civil-military relations study is still dominated by some works that date from the early Cold War period, that are associated with the books of Samuel Huntington\(^\text{18}\) and Morris Janowitz,\(^\text{19}\) which have been more than sufficiently reviewed and criticized over the years\(^\text{20}\) and are not useful under the present

\(^{17}\) Von Clausevitz, On War, p. 606–608

\(^{18}\) Huntington, The Soldier and the State.

\(^{19}\) Janowitz, The Professional Soldier.

circumstances, nor are they useful for the purpose of this thesis. A new generation of scholars expressed frustration with the old Huntington and Janowitz theoretical frameworks and came forward with some new alternatives. These authors made important contributions to our understanding of the dynamics of civil-military relations, but the problem is that they focused only on democratic civilian control over the security forces; in this regard an additional focus is needed on their effectiveness and efficiency. In an attempt to conceptualize civil-military relations in the contemporary world, this thesis will look at a new conceptualization of civil-military relations, proposed by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristina Matei, which deals with three dimensions: the civil-military relations trinity of democratic control, effectiveness, and efficiency (the last dimension is not examined by the authors).

These two dimensions are mainly used by democratically elected leaders to exercise control over defense planning process.

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21For example: Huntington’s formulation is problematic, first of all because it is “closely linked to the US democratic experience, of questionable relevance elsewhere in the world.” Huntington advanced his notions of “objective” and “subjective” control explicitly around the assumption of a clear separation of responsibilities between the civil and military sectors with the military having a clearly defined, autonomous and professionalized area of responsibility, exclusively concerned with the management and application of force. So he argues that the military mind is static. The author totally disagrees with this assumption and considers that military mind is very dynamic, and Huntington is wrong. The author thinks that Huntington provided a good theory study but not an empirical one.

22For example: Deborah Avant came with the interpretation of “effect of divided versus unified principal on military compliance with doctrinal change”, and the role of private contracting and its effect on civil military relation; for more see: Avant, Deborah D. 1996/1997. “Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? Why the U.S. Military is Averse to Responding to post-ColdWar Low-Level Threats.” Security Studies. 6(2): pp. 51–90. Peter Feaver came with the paradigm that laid out an agency theory of civil-military relations, which he argued should replace Huntington's institutional theory. He proposes an ambitious new theory that treats civil-military relations as a principal-agent relationship, with the civilian executive monitoring the actions of military agents, the “armed servants” of the nation-state. Taking a rationalist approach, he used a principal-agent framework, to explore how actors in a superior position influence those in a subordinate role. He used the concepts of “working” and “shirking” to explain the actions of the subordinate. For more see: Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington., p.231). Other authors like Weiner (1995), Zegart (1996), and Brooks (1999) also used the principal agent approach to explore variations in how political military institutions are formed and reformed. Another contribution to literature on civil-military relations is made by Michael Desch, who talks about the importance of external threats in influencing military intervention in politics and the impact of this factor on civil-military relations. Desch suggests that there is a variable relationship between the strength of civilian control of the armed forces and levels of internal and external threats. For more see: Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001.

These authors claim that a new re-conceptualization of civil-military relations is needed, in the sense that such conceptualization is helpful to the “understanding of the large and more complex relationships concerning democracy and security, particularly considering the wider spectrum of roles and missions.”\(^\text{24}\) T. Bruneau also emphasized the utility of new institutionalism\(^\text{25}\) as the tool for the conceptualization in the study of civil-military relations. In his assessment of new institutionalism, T. Bruneau highlights the fundamental role that institutions play in shaping national security policy and civilian control on defense planning process.


For the purpose of this thesis, the author looks at the following civil-military relations elements: democratic civilian control oversight and military effectiveness.

   a. **Democratic Civilian Control and Oversight**

   The first dimension of the civil-military relations trinity to be analyzed is democratic civilian control and oversight.\(^\text{26}\) Strong civilian democratic control is the main element for a sound defense planning system, especially for the countries in transition to democracy and good governance. Oversight focuses on resource and organizational management, professional expertise, and the establishment of a security community within civil society. Oversight as the civilians actually keeps track of what the armed forces or other security forces do; if they are in fact following the direction and guidance they receive.

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\(^{24}\)Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization.” p.910.

\(^{25}\)New institutionalism is a theory that seeks to elucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes. For more details see: Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism,” *Political Studies*, 1996: 936.

\(^{26}\)We conceptualize “democratic civilian control “in Bruneau’s framework, as: “[a]uthority over the institutional control mechanisms, oversight and professional norms”. An institutional control mechanism refers to “the institutions in place to control the three instruments of security. These include a wide spectrum beginning with a clear legal basis, ministries of defense, committees in parliaments with authority over policy and budgets, national security councils, and officer promotion processes.” Thomas C. Bruneau, and Matei Florina, Cristiana (Cris). “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations.” *Democratization* 15, no. 5 (December 2008): 916.
The process of civilian control over defense planning in SEE region went through three interrelated stages of development. Initially, these countries followed a top-down approach by establishing the legal framework for implementing civilian control and reorganizing military institutions to comply with the democratic requirements of the Constitution. A second stage ensured the appropriate creation and implementation of legal provisions, specifically regarding defense-planning processes. Finally, in the third stage, policy-makers have started to address the broader issue of military-transformation integration within the overall security sector’s reform efforts.

Until 1989, countries such as Bulgaria, Romania and Republic of Moldova were entirely part of the Communist bloc and used typical “Communist models of civilian control.” “Communist (or authoritarian) models are characterized by the following traits:

- A relatively confusing legal framework, meant to consolidate not only the formal, but also the informal power of the Communist Party’s leadership;
- A focus on coercion rather than consent in implementing and legitimizing policies, ensuring the Communist Party’s control over the armed forces;
- A (mostly conscription-based) military establishment whose leaders held significant political influence;
- An authoritarian political system, concentrating the power in the publicly unaccountable leadership of the Communist Party;
- A virtually non-existent civil society.”

Starting in the 1990s, these countries started to adopt a “Western model of civilian control over the armed forces.” Western (or liberal) models of civilian control over the military are based on the view that “[t]he armed forces are by nature

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hierarchical structures and thus inherently undemocratic and, for that reason, have to be brought under democratic control.” These models are also characterized by several key features:

- A relatively clear legal and/or institutional framework regulating the relationship between civilian authorities and the military; A democratic political system, providing the mechanisms to ensure the free expression of people’s will in a majority of situations and to facilitate public scrutiny of military actions;

- A (mostly professional) military recognizing the legitimacy of the political system and the rule of law, and acknowledging the need for its own political neutrality as an institution (i.e., politically nonpartisan);

- The subordination of the armed forces (i.e., the General/Defense Staff) to the Government, through a civilian-led Ministry/Department of (National) Defense, and to the civilian Head of State (i.e., a clear chain of command, with civilian leaders at its top), and a significant role for the Parliament in making decisions on military (especially budgetary) issues;

- The existence of a civil society, involved in a public debate on military issues.” 28

They agreed to abandon the previous Communist models of oversight, due to the transformation of the international strategic environment and the new nature of their domestic political systems. They have promoted the idea of a profound transformation of their civil-military relations, yet that has not happened as smoothly as initially predicted, and this aspect will be covered better in Chapter III. Nevertheless, in most Southeastern European countries, the formal changes have fundamentally altered the way military leaders and civilians interact when dealing with security and defense issues.

As the following chapter will demonstrate, throughout generations of defense planning reform, SEE countries examined in this thesis made consistent progress in establishing a legal and institutional framework,\(^{29}\) enforcing healthy civil-military relations and implementing the principles of democratic oversight, transparency and accountability, and also creating the institutional framework. However, the existence of constitutional and legal arrangements or the creation of institutional frameworks does not necessarily guarantee the appropriate implementation of the existing legislation and the actual exercise of civilian control through the means available to democratic societies: the elected representatives, parliamentary defense commissions, media and citizens. However, the adoption of these principles, procedures and structures in no way implies that, when combined, they will produce military efficiency, let alone effectiveness.

In this context, we can conclude that setting up civilian control over defense planning is relatively easy and all countries investigated have done so. Military effectiveness is, however, not assured. The case of Bulgaria appears to be one of the most successful cases. The Romania and Moldavian cases suggest lower rates of success. The main problems being:

- An executive which has first to learn about transparent planning cycles and gain self-confidence in the implementation;
- A legislative power which needs to learn about guidance and oversight mechanisms; a national media and institutions of civil society which need to change their expectations from commenting on the successes of authoritarian leadership to the assumption of the responsibility for public oversight.\(^{30}\)

\(^{29}\)Within the civil-military relations framework, the principal organizations involved in this process are: the Office of the President, Parliament, Government, the Minister of Defense, the MoD components, National Security Councils. These institutions would interact as follows: The President-Parliament-Government- NSC- civil society.

b. Military Effectiveness

This refers to whether the military can actually fulfill the roles and missions assigned to it by the civilian leadership, and the means by which a democracy exercises civilian control over its armed forces. The question of measuring effectiveness to see how successful the defense and security reforms are in the new democracies of Southeastern Europe, or to improve them, is nevertheless an extremely difficult task. The question of effectiveness is very acute today. In the current environment many countries are embracing peacekeeping and peacemaking as justifications for preserving their armed forces.

3. Defense Planning Conceptual Overview

Defense planning has always been one of the most sensitive issues in promoting civilian oversight of the armed forces. One of the main problems in civil-military relations has been introducing any fundamentally new concepts for defense planning, particularly ones that extend the limits of civilian expertise in order to address areas that had been considered exclusively within the realm of the military. The problem with better understanding this concept and the defense planning methodologies is that there is a significant gap in the professional and academic literature on this matter.31 As Talbot effectively pointed out, “the defense planning is and will remain an uncertain enterprise.”32

a. Defense Planning vs. Operational Planning

Some analysts associate defense planning with:

the creation and maintenance of military capabilities. It supports preparations for war, the conduct of operations in situations less than, and involves the planning necessary to recruit, organize, train, equip and provide military forces. It comprises the processes of strategic and

31 Young, “Capabilities-Based Defense Planning.”
programmatic planning and represents the main tools for the transformation of national defense objectives and available resources into the comprehensive set of military capabilities needed for the future security environment.\textsuperscript{33}

George Cristian and Mihaela Matei describe defense planning “as the process of establishing a state’s defense policy and pursuing its objectives through the involvement of the military on the international and/or internal arena, the distribution of defense resources, and the development of domestic institutional systems of cooperation;”\textsuperscript{34} or in other words, it is a complex area that seeks to ensure that a defense system has the necessary forces, assets, facilities, and capabilities to fulfill its tasks throughout the full spectrum of possible missions. For a better understanding of the defense planning process it is intended to place the definitions, used in this research, in a broader context, by also embracing operational planning and the relationship between defense and operational planning.

For example, Zrnić Bojan distinguishes three areas of the defense planning realm:

- the development of national strategies and policies or strategic planning,
- the development of defense programs or programmatic planning and operations or military planning. Strategic planning usually provides broad strategic goals, describes risks and threats, declares policies and defines available resources and constraints. Operational planning develops the courses of action, which determines how to use different military capabilities in order to achieve a government’s declared objectives. Programmatic planning is a bridge between strategic and operations planning and it is a process for balancing and integrating resources among the various defense programs in order to build the desired capabilities.\textsuperscript{35}

It is important to point out that there are strong interdependency and soft borders between the particular planning levels.


\textsuperscript{34} Cristian and Matei, “Bridging the Gap in Civil Military Relations,” p.60.

Holger Pfeiffer, former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning of NATO, defines defense planning as “the planning activity that deals with establishing and maintaining armed forces over time, so that they are available when needed,” and operational planning is “about employing and deploying them.”

He also broke them down into more specific disciplines: operational planning, for example, into contingency planning or crisis response planning, and defense planning into force planning, armaments planning, logistics planning and a number of others.

At the same time, the NATO Glossary of Standardization Terms and Definitions proposes the following definition for defense planning: “The political and military process used by nations to provide the capabilities needed to meet their defense commitments.”

As for operational planning, there are no NATO agreed definitions, only some explanations of the terms in agreed documents, which could serve as informal definitions. In this context, operational planning is a compartment of a strategic work plan, defined by Kask, Murumets, and Youngas a process that:

- is carried out within a strategic framework and seeks to translate strategic guidance and direction into a scheduled series of integrated military actions that are to be carried out by forces to achieve strategic objectives efficiently and with acceptable risks. At the strategic level, operational planning involves the development of strategic military objectives and tasks in support of the National Security Concept (and National Military Strategy) and the development of the force and materiel requirements necessary to accomplish those tasks.

It describes short-term ways of achieving milestones and explains how a strategic plan will be put into operation during a given operational period.

Taking into account the vague and broad spectrum of definitions proposed, in order to assess what defense planning and operational meaning means, we

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Ibid., 105.

38 NATO, NATO Glossary of Standardization Terms and Definitions (2007).


should go beyond the classical approach. Defense institutions should be less threat-oriented and more security capability-oriented to reflect a policy shift from “defense against others” to “security with others” in Daniel Nelson’s terms.41 Both militaries and civilians have to face the task of redefining the role and shape of the armed forces in a new environment. They have to answer to the following questions in assessing a new paradigm in defense planning: Against whom is defense planning aimed? What are the needs of the country? Who are potential enemies? And what are the capabilities required?

b. Defense Planning Methodologies: Classic vs. Modern Methods

There are different approaches to defense planning. Among those there are two that are well recognized: threat-based planning and capability based planning.

(1) The Classic (Cold War) Defense Planning Approach. Defense planning during the Cold War was dominated by threat-based planning (TPB). Its main characteristics are:

- The system responds to an identifiable threat, meaning that the enemy was not uncertain. In the case of the Cold War, it was the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union;
- Resources were relatively stable, they were not subject to radical changes;
- The area of operation was clear: it was Central Europe;
- Threats were quantifiable;
- Defense planning implies policy approval and guidance.42

The idea of threat-based planning was that using threats as requirements would lead to the appropriate capabilities. Davis argues that there were as well other considerations, but the bounding threat was a core concept taught to and used


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by generations of planners. Until recently most of the countries examined in this research (Bulgaria and Romania) largely employed variations on TBP.

(2) Modern Defense Planning. As previously mentioned, the Cold War planning era dealt largely with symmetric threats, but with the end of the Cold War this all changed. What was once predictable became very unpredictable. In place of a one dominant threat that can be used as a benchmark for measuring everything else, a number of possible threats arose. The “symmetric threats” were now “asymmetric threats,” if even threats at all.

The change from a predictable, symmetrical threat to the unpredictable, asymmetrical threat environment considerably affected the defense planning process. It impelled a shift from TBP to CBP.

Previously, individual threats played the central role in defense planning. Currently CBP has become a central theme of defense planning. The characteristics of CBP are:

- This system responds to an unclear threat, the enemy in this context is no longer certain;
- Threats are not quantifiable;
- Resources are uncertain;
- The area of operation is no longer clear;
- The method requires continuous policy guidance that shifts priorities.

CBP puts integrated capability packages and not individual systems at the center of a more adaptive defense planning. From an earlier predominant focus on systems, now it is the common idea of capabilities as combinations of elements that have to be brought together to get things done. In this context, capability is defined

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44 Ibid., 16–39.
45 Builder, “A Time for Planning?” p 6
as a “quantitatively measurable capacity of each defense forces structural element to perform a given task under specified conditions up to established standards.” Thus, the main trend in this definition is away from purely material, towards more conceptual capabilities.

In this context, CBP has become the “gold standard” of defense planning. The main idea behind CBP is probably still best formulated by Paul Davis of RAND: “[C]apabilities-based planning is planning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that necessitates choice.” This definition and CBP’s key elements are still widely accepted but opinions differ about it details and how to implement it. CBP’s key elements include:

- A conceptual framework for planning under uncertainty by emphasizing flexibility, robustness, and adaptiveness of capability;
- An analytical framework with three components: understanding capability needs, assessing capability options at the level of mission or operation, choosing capability levels and choosing among capability options in an integrative portfolio framework that considers other factors, different types of risk, and economic limitations;
- A solution framework that emphasizes: “building blocks.”

According to the “Guide to Capability Based Planning,” this system has several major building blocks:

- “CBP is output oriented, it must have high-level capability objectives derived from government guidance;

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• CBP needs to consider the way in which the force will fight. This generally takes the form of top-level doctrine or some overarching operational concept;

• CBP uses standard groupings - capability clusters or capability partitions to make the process more manageable;

• The resulting capabilities are realized within available resources.

• It starts with the overarching guidance, identifies capability gaps, explores options and ends with an affordable investment plan. In the CBP process, there are two groups that are involved: decision-makers and defense planners.

• Decision-makers are usually senior government officials and defense leadership. This is the group responsible for making decisions about trade-offs in defense capability development. Decision-makers will generally be interested in information such as how they can achieve their strategic objectives, what risk is there for defense due to various decisions or constraints and the impact of choosing a portfolio of options on capability.

• Defense planners include the groups of planners who are required to implement the chosen initiatives and projects. They want to provide the best options to achieve capability goals and need to understand the synergies between their options and the rest of defense capability.”49 (see Figure 1 below)

Figure 1 below depicts a process chart of CBP.

B. CONCLUSION

As this section demonstrated, understanding of basic concepts and relationships concerning the issue of civilians’ responsibilities for, and influences on, the defense planning process is fundamental, especially for the SEE region—a region where many defense establishments still struggle with fully implementing the concepts of defense policy, defense planning, the concept of “capability” (vs. “systems”), and understanding of the proper and essential role played by civilians in defense planning. Highlighting the conceptual clarifications is important for the goal of the research, namely measuring success or failure of civilian control over defense planning in SEE countries.

Although defense planning and civil-military relations are usually considered separate, specialized fields of research, this chapter presented civil-military relations as a general factor that perforce influences defense planning. It started by providing a basis

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for understanding the concepts of democratic control, oversight and military effectiveness in defense planning process. In order to better understand the CMR in a modern world, the chapter looked at a new conceptualization of CMR, proposed by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristina Matei, which deals with three dimensions: democratic control, effectiveness and efficiency. This study focuses primarily on the two dimensions of democratic civil military relations: issue of civilian control over defense planning process and military effectiveness over defense planning process, and not on the broader topic of civil-military relations.51

This chapter also introduced a planning methodology that is frequently discussed, but is little understood. The planning methodology under consideration is capability based planning. The chapter provided a definition of capabilities based planning and then in Chapter IV it will relate capabilities based planning to the objective of transforming SEE forces to deal effectively with the changes taking place in military affairs.

Given the above, the chapter looked at the capability based planning approach adopted in many EU and NATO countries. In the countries covered by this research, only Bulgaria has recently adopted this methodology. This approach was promoted in the 2010 Force Structure Review (FSR) with the intention to replace an integration of the single service vision of necessary capabilities. Small countries, like those examined in this research, have a hard time mustering this type of defense planning. However, at the same time they are encouraged by some successful examples (see the Australian example)52 that demonstrate that even a smaller, or medium, and quite active defense institution can still manage to facilitate effective defense planning. The attractiveness of the CBP system is that the system will make civilian defense leadership aware of the clear costs/benefits implications of their decisions that must balance effectiveness and efficiency.

51 The first dimension, civil democratic control, should be validated by defense policy and planning, which includes defining the military’s role, shaping resource allocation, and evaluating the results. Effectiveness is determined by whether or not a state is prepared to fulfill the security forces major roles and missions. For more details see: Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana (Cris) Florina Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations,” Democratization 15, no. 5 (December 2008): 17.

52 Young, Capabilities-Based Defense Planning.”
III. DEFENSE PLANNING REFORM IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AND CIVILIAN CONTROL AS A KEY REQUIREMENT FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENSE PLANNING

A. DEFENSE PLANNING REFORM IN SEE

After the end of the Cold War, defense systems in Southeastern European countries were challenged by the significant changes that occurred. The nature of the contemporary security environment, as well as permanent pressure on the limited resources, demands the reform of the defense systems both in developed and transitional countries. Demands for building armed forces which are under democratic control and prepared for Euro-Atlantic integration have caused radical changes in the nature of civil-military relations in these countries. This is particularly significant in the area of defense planning where systems should have been replaced with transparent, effective, efficient, and compatible ones. Some of the transitional countries were more successful in this process than others and succeeded in building the defense planning system with the practically required characteristics. However, for different reasons, in the greater number of transitional countries there is significant room for consolidation and improvement in this area.

This chapter examines the defense planning reform and the dimension of the civilian control over that process in three SEE countries: Bulgaria, Romania and Republic of Moldova. Two of these states, Bulgaria and Romania, joined NATO in March 2004 and EU in 2007. The other one, Republic of Moldova, is aspiring for EU membership. The Bulgarian and Romanian defense planning reform process is presented as an example of a relatively successful defense planning reform among NATO and EU countries. The achievements and problems in civil-military relations in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries and the role of defense planning in this process are shown in the Republic of Moldova case. This chapter deals with the period of time from the revolutionary changes of 1989 to the present.
1. Background Leading to Defense Planning Reform and the Dynamics of CMR

With the end of the Cold War, the main reason behind huge investments in armed forces disappeared. Today, most militaries are struggling to justify their budgets and size. Due to these changes, militaries are finding it difficult to define their current and future role and missions. At the beginning of the 1990s, new realities such as: changes in the strategic security environment (different challenges and different missions), new definitions of risks and threats, and the ineffective management of national defense imposed a defense planning reform in SEE countries. In this context, most of these countries found themselves needing to adapt their heavily oversized defense establishments to the post-Cold War realities, without having adequate national procedures, tools, and expertise. In regards to the civil-military relations aspect, most Southeastern European countries have superficially adopted, since 1989, Western models of civilian oversight of the military, formally abandoning their previous Communist models. The combination of Western paradigms, Communist legacies, and pre-Communist patterns of civil-military relations since 1989 have led to new, hybrid forms of civilian control over the armed forces.

In most cases, the problem that appeared was not the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces or the separation of the military from politics, but rather that of the effective execution of democratic governance of defense in relation to the defense planning process, and the effective engagement of civil-society in a framework of democratic legitimacy and accountability.

a. The Legacies of Communism in SEE

In order to understand the dynamics of defense planning reform and the impact of civilians in this process, it is necessary to briefly introduce the legacy factor. Historical legacies matter heavily in most countries, but none more so than in the SEE

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region. The past decade has witnessed the constant ambiguous and non-uniform transition from authoritarian governments and centrally planned economies to pluralist democracies and free-market economies. These countries were almost equally disadvantaged with inefficient governing and planning legacies. The inefficiency of the Soviet planning system and its centralized control and execution of plans is well known and still affects countries that grew up in the Soviet generation. Soviet military systems, as Ronald S. Mangum and William J. Craven well pointed out in their paper:

> [w]ere long on directives and short on detailed planning, long on establishing accountability and short on giving authority, long on checks and balances and short on encouraging ingenuity – in short, a system that strangles itself and kills the enthusiasm of its inhabitants.55

Others problems that these countries faced were:

> [b]ureaucratic resistance against change, especially from the General Staff; the lack of experience among the military in planning, programming and budgeting; the shortage of expertise among civilians within the defense establishment and security agencies; little interest on security and defense matters; and the lack of an appropriate legislative framework for carrying out reform etc.56

Democratic consolidation of some of these countries (in particular in Moldova), including civil-military relations and defense reform is still plagued by these Soviet/Communist legacies.

**b. Defense Planning Trends after the Cold War in SEE**

At the beginning of the 1990s the defense planning system in the countries investigated in this thesis were characterized by following trends:

- Defense planning was fully centralized by Moscow. Warsaw Pact countries had either no or very limited knowledge and experience


in defense policy and planning. The exception was Romania, who was not fully integrated into the Warsaw Pact C2 structure and was outside of their centralized planning system;

- SEE countries largely employed variations on threat-based planning. The military culture of defense planning was very much related to Cold War thinking concerning the dominant role played by threat assessments, strategic theaters of deployment, and the use of mass conscript militaries;

- Even under the impact of declining economies and the lack of an obvious enemy, senior political and military leaders felt safer adhering to inherited force structures and force development models. One result is that, at the time of their accession to NATO, very few of the new alliance members had any sizeable contribution to make to the Alliance’s capabilities.  

- Weak civilian control on defense planning process. The notion of the democratic civilian control over the armed forces was slowly introduced, but General Staffs remained the primary organizations, if not the only ones, thinking how to adapt military establishments to the 1990s security environment. According to Philipp Fluri and Eden Cole, defense planning in transitional states had struggled with the same problems:

[a]n executive which has first to learn about transparent planning cycles and gain self-confidence in the implementation thereof; a legislative power which needs to learn about guidance and oversight mechanisms; and national media and institutions of civil society which need to change their expectations from commenting on the successes of authoritarian leadership to the assumption of the responsibility for public oversight.


58 Fluri and Cole, DCAF's Activities in Support of Effective., p.5.
In this realm, one SEE country (the Republic of Moldova) had to start from scratch in defense planning; whilst others (Bulgaria and Romania) had to overcome the burden of mass armies and faced the problem of downsizing before reform could start. Also, they understood that the best option to redefine their position and to transform would be to become full members of Western structures. However, in order to be accepted into organizations such as NATO or the EU, candidate countries have to, at the very least, initiate extensive programs of reform in most fields based on Western guidelines.59 The need for their association to NATO was expressed by the two countries (Romania and Bulgaria) in the mid-1990s, when they considered much more seriously the idea of formally applying for NATO membership. Consequently, European and Euro-Atlantic politico-military organizations have become directly involved in the process of transformation of the relationship between the military establishment and political forces in Southeastern European countries.

In this process, all countries examined in this chapter benefited, in some way, from foreign guidance and assistance, in particular from NATO’s PfP and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) programs. NATO programs assisted these countries to undertake necessary defense management reforms, such as: transparent national defense planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate legislation and parliamentary and public accountability. The PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and PfP exercises introduced them to collective defense planning and pave the way for more detailed operational planning.60 Romania and Bulgaria have experienced PfP and MAP assistance in full while Republic of Moldova benefits from PfP assistance.

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2. Defense Planning Reforms and CMR Progress in SEE

The need for defense planning reform in the SEE countries is explained by the following factors: the changing geopolitical situation that generates new realities and risks, new opportunities for international cooperation in the field of defense and security, imperfections in the state’s existing defense planning systems, or its non-existence (Republic of Moldova), the need to adjust the countries defense and foreign policies to this basic principle and the intention to correlate defense and security systems with the real financial and material resources and possibilities of the states, and the need to re-size, rationalize, and re-invest in the force.

Since the early 1990s, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Republic of Moldova have been engaged in reforming their legal frameworks dealing with security and defense issues. In all cases, the principle of democratic civilian control over the armed forces was incorporated into their Constitutions, adopted in 1991 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 1994 (Republic of Moldova). More specific legal provisions were provided several years later. Except for the laws on defense (1994 and 1995 in Romania and Bulgaria, respectively; for Republic of Moldova much more recently in 2003), more significant changes have been made only in the late 1990s. The pace of change during the post-Communist period has been slow and the content of the legal frameworks resulting from this process, although democratic in essence, has been relatively vague. All three Constitutions also lack a clear division of power amongst the various actors involved in the system exercising civilian control over the armed forces. This leaves enough room for the military to impose their viewpoints on defense issues. Moreover, this situation creates confusion about the precise responsibilities of civilian institutions in the fields of security and defense.

In almost all SEE countries, waves of reform have followed each other since 1991. Three different waves can be readily distinguished:

- The NATO oriented phase of 1996-2001. It was characterized by a conceptual and strategic transformation of the military in order to face an expanded spectrum of tasks. PfP extended the notion of “security through participation” to the entire continent.
- The third wave of reform, currently taking place since 2001, aims at structural modularization combined with a comprehensive professionalization.”

The existing defense institutions of the countries examined in this paper were either inherited or imported from the former Soviet Union arrangements and procedures governing the defense sector, and adapted to the requirements of independent states in transition to democracy and free market economies.

a. Bulgaria: Example of Relatively Successful Defense Planning Reform

During the Soviet era, the Bulgarian military structure was involved in domestic politics, and officers were often affiliated with political parties. Bulgaria lacked a substantial pool of civilian defense experts, and professional military personnel did not recognize the legitimate viewpoints of civilian officials. The lack of understanding between civilian and military components led to conflict between the two, thus impeding constructive cooperation on reforming the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF). Other obstacles to reform were the internal resistance of key people in General Staff and the armed services because they felt threatened by down-sizing and restructuring, the lack of competent people to implement changes systematically, the constraint of limited resources, and a huge infrastructure that was difficult to maintain.

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The defense planning reform in Bulgaria has known four phases. The Adaptation Phase (1989-1998) marked an initial legislative and institutional approximation of the requirements of the democratic principle. The system existing at that time had several major deficiencies:

- no holistic but rather a 'mosaic' approach to defense planning, no long-term assessment and the traditional understanding of planning among the Bulgarian military, who perceived ‘operational planning’ – as a highly classified activity carried out by few, highly expert military officers of the General Staff of the country’s armed forces.

The Bulgarian thinking on defense reform started in approximately 1991. In 1995 the Cabinet approved a draft Concept for National Security, followed by a Concept for Reforming the Bulgarian Army until the Year 2010. But, until 1995, the attention of Bulgarian politicians towards defense was insignificant; in 1996—the year of the economic crisis—defense was not even on their agenda. In 1998, the Cabinet approved a top-secret plan for reforming the military establishment, known as Plan 2010. In sum, although defense policy was subject to civilian control, in principle civilians in parliament and government lacked sufficient expertise to establish a defense planning process, or to assess principal defense planning decisions.

The real change in Bulgaria started in 1997 when the government decided to apply to join NATO. The model of defense planning implemented in Bulgaria in 1998 was a product of both internal and external factors, domestic willingness and NATO

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63 The new Constitution of 1991 was adopted, followed by the new laws on defense, armed forces, were defined the functions and responsibilities of the Parliament, President, Government and General Staff according to the requirements of the democratic civilian control.


65 Plan 2010 called for downsizing the peacetime personnel of the Bulgarian Army to 75 000 people. The Reform Plan 2010 has been unrealistic in its objectives and was approved by the Bulgarian government without discussions. See: Jeffrey Simon, “Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe,” Strategic Forum (Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University), June 2000: 2–3.
persistence. Since autumn of 1998, the establishment and the effective functioning of a vigorous system for defense planning was one of the emphases in Ministry of Defense (MoD) activity.66

The Second Phase (1999-2003) was characterized by the establishment of a rudimentary defense planning system and the initiation of the first Strategic Defense Review (SDR) in 2001 that resulted in the Adapted Plan 2004. The failure of this plan was due, in large part, to the fact that the former version was not publicly debated and in the end, lacked full government oversight.67 After the first SDR, a first White Paper was published in 2002, along with the first Defence Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria. It is worth mentioning that the principal objective set in the first White Paper was not achieved. The Bulgarian Army’s organization-building and modernization plans were not developed with optimal consideration to the state’s ability to guarantee the resources necessary for their practical implementation. Many decisions were taken without deep analysis and secured resources.68

The Third Phase (2003-present) is known as Transformation Planning. In 2004 a formal SDR was conducted. Bulgaria’s 2004 SDR set a timeframe for the reduction of the BAF from 45,000 to 39,800 by 2015. As of 2010, the current active total stands at 44,100 (of which 78.7% are military and 21.3% are civilians).69 The weaknesses of this SDR were manifested by the fact that the modernization plan that it proposed—Plan 2015—was officially acknowledged in 2008 as being unsupportable. Reasons for planning implementation failure are: the lack of clear policy directives and priorities, inaccurate cost analysis/the lack of proper cost data, the inability of the current MoD to create effective and precise policy to guidance planning, the challenge of having a legacy force structure that was not necessarily supportive of new missions and

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69 Ibid., 12.
supporting tasks, and the possible misunderstanding that national defense planning is not similar either in content, or its development process, to operational planning. In 2010 a new, disciplined and thorough Force Structure Review was conducted. The main results of this review and the resulting guidelines for political and practical action were presented in the White Paper on Defense and Armed Forces.\(^{70}\) At the time of this writing, an “Armed Forces Development Plan” is under development. The defense planning methodology currently introduced and in use now is capabilities based planning.

In conclusion we can state that in the case of Bulgaria defense reform can be characterized as being painful, relatively slow, but not yet unsuccessful. Lost years were followed by radical and deep reforms, though their ultimate success at reform remains to be proven.

\[b. \quad \text{Romania: Achievements and Problems}\]

When speaking about Romania’s planning reform process and the dynamics of civil-military relations, it is worth mentioning that Romania has been undergoing a major review and reform of the armed forces, seeking to achieve both dimensions of T. Bruneau’s framework of democratic civil-military relations.\(^{71}\) As Cris Matei well pointed out:

> Democratizing and professionalizing Romania’s armed forces has therefore been an onerous process, which involved an overhauling of the legal framework on defense and security, coupled with systematic changes in structure, organization, recruitment, personnel, promotion, management, accountability and transparency, all in all to make the armed forces better prepared for post-Cold War security risks.\(^{72}\)

In Romania, as well in the other case studies examined in this thesis, the legacy of the Communist past at the end of the Cold War was enormous and omnipresent. During the Communist regime Romania’s armed forces lost their power and influence.


\(^{71}\) Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization.”

The Ceausescu policies led to a de-professionalization of the military.\textsuperscript{73} Since the 1989 Revolution, the defense sector has been one of the most challenged sectors in Romania. However, in comparison with other armed forces examined in this thesis, the Romanian defense forces seemed better prepared to cooperate with Western partners after 1989.

The defense planning reform in Romania has known four phases, which are outlined in the following paragraphs.

The First Phase (1990–1999) saw the adaptation of laws and governmental decisions that regulate the foundation, organization and functioning of various military bodies, as well as Romanian’s international military relations and participation in PfP and peacekeeping missions. Also in 1997, the missions of the armed forces abandoned the concept of “mass armies” and territorial defense of 1989, and adopted policies that sought to develop a more flexible and affordable army, which was cut to about half of its initial military strength, reaching a peacetime active force of 163,523 soldiers, of which 76,345 were conscripts.\textsuperscript{74} The National Security Strategy (NSS) was finally adopted in 1999 by Parliament, creating a coherent framework for security sector reform and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Regarding civilian control over defense planning at that stage, Romania followed a top-down approach by establishing the legal framework for implementing civilian control and re-organizing the military institution to comply with the democratic requirements of the Constitution. This period was dominated by establishing institutions and improving legal bases for defense,\textsuperscript{75} as well as the appointment of the two first civilians in command positions within the military system: a Deputy Director of the National Defense College, and respectively, a deputy Minister of Defense.\textsuperscript{76} During this period, an important catalyst was the 1999-adopted NATO Membership Action Plans


(MAP). In 1998, Romania issued a Government Ordinance on Romania’s National Defense Planning, which set up the legal framework for defense planning.

During the Second Phase (2000–2003), according to the requirements of the NSS (1999), a “Romanian Armed Forces Restructuring and Modernization Concept” and an “Action Plan for the Concept Implementation” were issued. The purpose was to design a new military capability and adequate structure. During this period the force structure was made operational at the minimum required level (an objective cited by the PfP Planning and Review Process). Also, Romania adopted a defense budgetary system based on DoD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) methodology.

The first National Military Strategy was adopted in 2000 and this document established new missions for the Armed Forces in accordance with the NATO New Strategic Concept. The activity regarding defense planning was developed according to Law Nr.63/2000 for the approval of the government ordinance Nr.52/1998 regarding Romania’s national defense planning.

Also in 2001, the Defense Integrated Planning Directorate was established and placed under civilian defense leadership (the State Secretary for Defense Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department). Until then, the planning and allocation of resources was the responsibility of J5/General Staff.

The goals of the Third Phase (2004–2007) were to modernize the armed forces procurement planning and execution processes, fulfill the operational capability of the established structures at the planned level, and complete the major procurement programs.

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77 The NMS is currently under revision with the intention to readjust the force structure following participation in full spectrum of NATO operations.

Heavily influenced by the U.S. defense planning studies, Romania's Army Reform 2004 envisions reducing the armed forces. The Supreme Council of National Defense approved the maximum number of the Armed Forces to 140,000, of whom 112,000 military personnel and 28,000 civilians.79

At that stage, policy-makers started to address the broader issue of military transformation integration within the overall security sector’s reform efforts.80 In this context, an SDR was conducted. In 2008, the MoD has launched another attempt to conduct an SDR, which has met opposition from the General Staff.81

The Fourth Phase (2007-present) shows relative progress in the development of defense planning system. A threat-based planning methodology is still being used, but there is a tendency to introduce the capability-based planning system. As a first step towards capability-based planning, a new National Defense Strategy has just been drafted and is currently heavily debated in the media. Since the executive and legislative branches are more preoccupied with the current economic crisis and budgetary cuts, it may take some time until these projects will become reality.

c. The Challenges of Defense Planning Reform in the PfP Countries: The Republic of Moldova Case

Democratic defense planning is in its infancy for the Republic of Moldova. Currently, there are very weak structural defense planning methods in place. The legal framework for the Republic of Moldova’s defense organization is provided by the Law on National Defense, adopted in 2003.82 The National Defense Law of Moldova does not integrate a unique legislative concept and provides only some aspects related to

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82 Law No. 345-XV of 25.07.2003 on National Defense. According to this Law, in war and during peacetime, the leadership of the armed forces is ensured by the Supreme Commandment and led by the President of the Republic of Moldova as Commander-in-Chief. The Supreme Commandment also includes the Minister of Defense, the Joint Chief of Staff, the Commanders of the Border Guards and Carabineer Troops.
the tasks and competencies of the central public authorities in the organization of defense planning. In this context, it is worth mentioning that existing legislation on security and defense is ill-defined with respect to arrangements which have been established for the purpose of justifying a preference for a certain size or type of military force, for its missions and the capabilities the military should develop.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and, respectively, the proclamation of independence, the Moldovan Armed Forces (MAF) have been formed from what was inherited from the former Soviet Army: corruption, consolidated political power, the lack of a political culture, Soviet military mentality, weak professional skills, and an attitude to the service which were incompatible to the new realities.

The need to reform the national army became clear during the conflict over the region of “Transnistria”83 in 1991 and 1992. Transnistrian separatists fought a brief war with Moldovan forces in 1992, and a contingent of approximately 1,500 Russian soldiers continues to serve in Transnistria, ostensibly as peacekeepers and guardians of an estimated 20,000 tons of Soviet era weapons and ammunition. In 1999, Russia pledged to remove this equipment, but withdrawals ceased in 2004. Although tensions remain, little political violence has ensued since the conflict, and residents of Transnistria and Moldova proper experience relative ethnic homogeneity and regularized contact compared to other Eurasian frozen conflicts. Nonetheless, Transnistria overtly seeks integration with Russia, and formal status negotiations (the “Five plus Two” talks) held under the auspices of the OSCE have been stalled since 2006.”

Overall, the defense planning reform in Moldova, which started in 1991, has had three phases.

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83 Transnistria is the Moldovan name for the breakaway territory on the left bank river Nistru, also known as Trans-Dniester or Transdniestria. The official name of self-proclaimed republic is “Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika.”

(1) First Phase (1991–1997). As aforementioned, the MAF were formed out of the ruins of the former Soviet Army: a highly political power, a Soviet military mentality and views, which has timely proved to be incompatible with new international and national security realities. As a result, the MAF remained a mirror reflection in many key ways of the former Soviet Army. A series of reforms were initiated to change the military, but without a previous methodological and detailed assessment of the existing state of the military security system or security needs, and without sufficient civilian expertise. Military reform was rather an internal MoD initiative.

In 1992, when the MoD was established and the first Moldovan Minister of Defense was appointed, new defense legislation was passed (Law on Defense, Law on the Armed Forces and the Law on Military Obligation and Military Service by the Citizens of the Republic of Moldova). These laws established new roles and missions for the MAF, the organization and activity of the Moldovan defense sector, and the rights of the bodies of state power and state administration.

The Constitution adopted in 1994 set forth the basic principles governing civilian and democratic control and oversight of the armed forces. This led to the development and adoption by the Moldovan Parliament of the key normative acts that regulated the system (system presumes institutions, responsibilities, and chain of command) of national security. In this framework, the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine were adopted in 1995. Also, cooperation with the military political structures of NATO through PfP program was launched while in 1995, an Individual

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85 At that stage of the reform process, Moldova did not possess the necessary civilian expertise to replace the dominance of the armed forces in the defense process.


89 On March 16, 1994, Moldova became the 12th state to enroll in NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.
Partnership Plan (IPP) was signed between Moldova and NATO. In this framework, in summer of 1996, Moldovan military contingents participated for the first time in PfP exercises in Ukraine and in Bulgaria.

Civil-military relations, in particular civilian control was emerging, yet it was far from being effective. For example, although at that time President Mircea Snegur in his capacity as a Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, issued a decree of removing Division General Pavel Creanga from his position on the grounds of incompetence and corruption, the Constitutional Court ruled against the presidential decree. That political case revealed the fragility of political command and control system of the armed forces as well as weakness of democratic control and oversight over the defense sector.

(2) Second Phase (1997–2004). During this stage, the appointment, in 1997 of the first civilian Minister of Defense was a positive breakthrough in the democratic civil-military relations in Moldova. In addition, the concepts of civilian control of the armed forces and democratic military reform were introduced to Moldovan society by the elected leaders. In this context, in 1997 the National Army joined the PfP PARP. After having joined this process, Moldova agreed to a series of interoperability goals with NATO, related to identified forces and means in order to be made available within multinational peacekeeping operations. This period also saw the approval by the Parliament in 2002 of a reform plan, “Military Reform Concept,” that recognized that the Armed Forces were in poor condition due to the lack of practical

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91 Valariu Pasat was the first civilian appointed to act as the Minister of Defense.


93 The *Military Reform Concept* states that it is intended to respond to the current geopolitical situation and the need to adapt to the new realities, risks, threats and missions of military character. However, it fails to stipulate explicitly the new role and functions of the civilian and military components of Moldova’s security arrangements. It also states that the reform will be carried out over a 12-year period (2002–2014) and will consist of three stages (stage I: 2002–2004, stage II: 2005–2008, stage III: 2009–2014). The Concept also emphasizes modifications in defense budgetary allocations, taking the GDP as the basis and providing an increase in the defense budget from 0.7% to 2.5% of the GDP during the above-mentioned period.
experience in the area of military construction and management, lack of general expertise, an insufficiency of funds; all of which had a profound effect on the structure of defense planning, funding, administration and organization. This concept stated also that “democratic command and control of the armed forces” would be a key area of cooperation with other armed forces.\textsuperscript{94}

Also, during this period (May 2004) the Supreme Security Council of Moldova approved “The Concept of Restructuring and the Modernization of the National Army to 2014,” which was developed in the framework of a Defense Reform Concept. The 2004 Document established a conceptual basis for the development and implementation of state defense programs and plans. However, it should mention that, during this period, both concepts have been very difficult to fully implement due to a structural lack of funds, low priority of the defense sector, and the lack of strategic expertise among many politicians to understand the complexity of defense reform in a democratic and free market economy country.

(3) Third Phase (2005-present). This period is characterized by the creation of a civilian and military command structure of the armed forces with a detailed delimitation of its attributes in the political, administrative and military command spheres.

During this stage, Moldova has taken more security sector reform initiatives; yet, success continues to elude it. These initiatives include the ratification of an Action Plan with EU (2005) and an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO (2006). The adoption of these tools led Moldova in a serious dialog with Euro-Atlantic institutions regarding co-operation and defense sector reform with the West. In fact, a comprehensive plan for security sector reform was developed in the framework of in the IPAP. This set out a plan for the renewal and reform of national security institutions. Regretfully, Moldova’s political elite didn’t realize at that time the seriousness of these undertakings; i.e., the complexity and the difficulty of implementing

these plans. As a result, in the opinion of many national security experts, these reforms were led in the wrong direction, adopting only “cosmetic democratic elements.” Furthermore, the reforms were not completed in accordance with declared commitments.\(^\text{95}\)

Luckily, during this period the Republic of Moldova also benefited and continues to profit from external technical assistance. Experts from the NPS in Monterey, CA, United States (CCMR), as well as civilian and military advisors from NATO and its partner states have been assisting Moldova in its reform efforts. With the assistance of UK experts (Security Sector and Defense Assistance Team, SSDAT) and representatives of the CCMR, the first Strategic Defense Review (SDR) was launched. The State Commission for Strategic Defense Analysis was created for this purpose by the Moldovan Government. For the first time, representatives from the civil society were invited to participate at the meetings of this Commission.\(^\text{96}\) The SDR objective has been to conduct a detailed inventory of the entire defense system, which will assist Moldova’s political leadership realistically to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the system in regard to facing threats and challenges by national security. The final results of the SDR should produce conceptual and organizational changes in the development of defense institutional framework and capabilities; ideally, these should be adopted by political leadership in order to meet the security needs of the state. At the current stage, based on the SDR methodologies, the Commission with assistance of international experts has developed two interim reports: one on the current capabilities of the Armed Forces, and the other on the legal and regulatory defense.\(^\text{97}\) The final document is in the process of being reviewed and agreed by government.


Beyond assisting Moldova in its reform process, another key objective of partners’ support has been to develop the ability and capability of the 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion to operate together with forces from NATO and partners’ countries, especially in international crisis-management and peacekeeping operations as well as to assist in developing a new training program for the armed forces.\footnote{NATO, “NATO’s Relations with the Republic of Moldova,” \textit{NATO Topics}, February 24, 2009, \url{http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-moldova/index.html} (accessed February 20, 2011).} According to the Moldovan Chief of the Land Forces Command, the 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion is going to be reorganized in the next two years and “the National Army will get a force always ready to interfere, trained in compliance with Western requirements contributing to different peacekeeping missions.”\footnote{Moldova azi- Tara pe Internet, “The 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion to be Reorganized in the Following Two Years,” \textit{Politics}, DECCA Press, May 20, 2010, \url{http://www.azi.md/en/print-story/11378} (accessed February 20, 2011).}

In conclusion, it is obvious that the defense planning reform in Moldova, despite scattered initiatives of interested leaders and foreign involvement and support (including PfP), has to date proven to be very difficult to implement due to several factors: a lack of funds,\footnote{Currently a great percentage of the defense budget goes to salary and entitlements, leaving very little discretionary resources for maintenance and modernization effort.} poor governance, and the inertia of old approaches, lack of political will, and conservative tendencies that still remain very visible.

\textbf{B. CONCLUSION}

The transition from Communist to Western frameworks has not been an easy process in SEE countries. The results of this transformation are sometimes obscure, and the effectiveness of the new provisions in terms of ensuring civilian control over the military is not always clear. In this context, at the end of 1989 the combination of communist legacy with issues such as ineffective political leadership of the countries transformation processes towards functional democracies and market economy, the legal and institutional inconsistencies on the execution of the national chain of command of the Armed Forces; combined with the lack of professionalism and expertise of both civilian
authorities and military leadership caused the delay of the implementation of effective civilian direction and democratic oversight of the defense planning system.

However, the decision by SEE countries to join European and Euro-Atlantic structures has led to the creation of specific dynamics involving systemic changes in defense planning processes. Nevertheless, the processes of transformation have not led every time to the expected outcomes designed by Western and even SEE political architects. Often, the programs of reform have been set up and implemented because the West has required them (e.g., the Romania case). Regarding the issue of oversight of the military, one has to mention that the governments in the countries examined in this thesis have promoted it as a priority specifically because European and Euro-Atlantic organizations have defined it as such.

In conclusion, it can be stated that the desire for integration with NATO or EU has been a powerful factor influencing SEE civil-military relations and defense planning reform. But membership in NATO (in Romania and Bulgaria case) does not solve the problem of creating democratically accountable armed forces. Democratic control and effectiveness are living processes not discrete events. The domestic economic context has, however, made defense reforms difficult. Despite this, institutional mechanisms for effective democratic control of the military have been put in place. More work is needed in order to develop democratic civil-military relations in the areas of defense policy, defense budget planning, and in professionalizing civilian knowledge of the military. The main areas of further improvement are:

- developing capabilities for better cost estimation,
- the refinement of different data bases for support of the programming phase,
- an introduction of the business management tools in order to improve the execution and evaluation phase and development of an adequate selection and training process for personnel involved in the defense planning process on different levels.\footnote{Bojan, “The New Trends in Defense Planning,” 38–39.}
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: THE GENERAL STATE OF DEFENSE PLANNING IN BULGARIA, ROMANIA AND REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND THE ROLE OF ELECTED LEADERS IN DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

As previously discussed, under the pressure of uncertainties of the new strategic environment, combined with radically changed financial priorities, currently defense planning has become an interest of elected leaders, and they have started to think and act in new ways. They have understood the need of being better prepared to balance national agendas with collective security arrangements, find the right proportion between civil domestic concerns, and adequate military budget. Participation in peace operations and international initiatives has also generated new types of civil-military communications and co-operation between elected leaders and their military counterparts, which created new thinking and perception both within the military and within the civil society. The involvement of elected leaders in defense planning is important especially in the new security environment, where what is built today may not be appropriate tomorrow. In this context an increased civilian oversight and responsibility within the defense planning process are more necessary than ever.

The purpose of this chapter is to present the major achievements and challenges of SEE countries in establishing a modern defense planning system adequate to the democratic political system. This chapter focuses mainly on the contemporary defense planning systems which are capability-based planning in the sense of establishing objectives, output-oriented in the budget sense, and are program based in the sense of attempting to link available resources to desired capabilities.

This section takes a more detailed look at the Bulgarian, Romania, and Moldavian experiences in establishing effective civilian control over defense planning. The focus is on both the difference and the complementary roles civilians and militaries play in
defense planning. Further, the thesis documents where the referents examined for this study currently stand in this difficult and slow transition to valid capabilities-based planning.

B. OUTLINE OF THE BULGARIAN, ROMANIAN, AND MOLDOVIAN DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEMS

After the political changes in Europe (1990), the process of establishing a new defense planning system in SEE countries was slow-going and uncertain, due in part to the lack of experience and expertise from both civilians and militaries, and also due to the general lack of the new concepts of defense planning. In a contemporary setting, politicians and military planners started to think about the possible consequences of the change on military postures. This lead to an attempt in almost all of the countries examined in this research to review their defense planning system and to develop new defense planning methods, which include political guidance, military tasks derived from the former, as well as adequate financial resources.

1. Bulgaria

The Bulgarian defense planning system is in the process of adopting capabilities-based planning system. In this research, the Bulgaria case is presented as an example of a relatively successful defense planning system among the new NATO countries. According to the CCMR survey of the defense policy, planning, programming, and budgeting system of the Bulgarian MoD and Armed Forces “Bulgaria has the basic elements of a Western defense policy, planning, and programming system; but critical tools and procedures remain to be adopted.”102 Currently, the redesign of the defense planning process in Bulgaria is still a priority task for both civilians and military officials.

The Bulgarian defense planning process relies upon two main guidance documents: the Government four-year programs and MoD Annual guidance

document,”103 (overtaken by the White Book and White Paper). Based on these documents, defense planners produce plans. A central emphasis of these plans is the transformation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces—the building up of a modern, flexible and up-to-date army. The latest one, Armed Forces Development Plan, is being developed as an output from the guidance contained in the 2010 FSR. It focuses on “building a single set of forces with balanced capabilities across all components, to address the entire spectrum of tasks arising from the expected scenarios and analyses of the military-strategic security environment and its progression.”104

Missing from the Bulgarian defense planning system is the under-development of institutional linkage between operational planning and national defense planning. It lacks institutionalized operational planning and analysis inputs, as well as reliable models to determine system or platform life-cycle costs.105 In general, the Bulgarian Defense Planning System is considered to be in the process of development amongst the new NATO countries.

2. Romania

The Romanian defence planning system is presented as a relatively successful system. In the Romanian case, a threat-based planning methodology is being used, but there are initiatives to introduce the capability-based planning system and some progress was made in the development of this system. According to CCMR experts:

Romania has more than merely the basic elements of a Western defense policy, planning, and execution system; but some critical tools and procedures are lacking and remain to be adopted. Also, key defense policy documents are dated and lack suitable context in order to enable effective planning.106

105 Ibid., 1.
The Romanian defense planning system is developing into a system that is more compatible to NATO nations’ and is now taking steps to prepare for the rigors of NATO force planning. This involves improving decision making explicitly to link Romania’s responsibilities with the country’s limited resources.

The Romanian defense planning process is supported by the Defense Planning Law adopted in 2000.\textsuperscript{107} The main national documents on defense planning are the National Defense Strategy and Government program.\textsuperscript{108} At the MoD level, established planning documents are the White Paper of Security and National Defense, Military Strategy, Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), main plans, and operation plans of force employment, the problem being that these documents are still out of date.\textsuperscript{109} The DPG is the main internal planning document, elaborated by civilian structures and revised annually.

So, in the Romanian and Bulgarian cases it was noticed that security-planning documents have been developed within the interagency and inter-ministerial settings and this process contributed to balancing and adapting each institutions agenda.\textsuperscript{110} Its carried out on the basis of the decisions by the President, Parliament, the country’s Supreme Defense Council and Government, as well as on the measures and actions performed by other public institutions responsible for defense.\textsuperscript{111}

According to the law on defense planning, a resource management (PPBES) is under implementation within the MoD. This system is co-ordinated by the State Secretary and the Head of the Department of Euro-Atlantic Integration and Defense Policy. The

\textsuperscript{107} Law No. 63/2000 for the approval of the Government; Ordinance No.52/1998 regarding Romania’s national defense planning.

\textsuperscript{108} Article 7, Law 45/1994 regarding national defense.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., Article 4, § (2).

\textsuperscript{110} Cristian and Matei, “Bridging the Gap in Civil Military Relations,” 72.

\textsuperscript{111} Article 3, Law No. 63/2000.
system establishes priorities regarding procurement planning and resource allocation through the Defense Planning Council, led by the Minister of National Defense.\textsuperscript{112}

According to the 2008 CCMR report:

[a]n important aspect of national defense planning, force employment, i.e., operational planning is underdeveloped and is addressed insufficiently. In 1998-1999 the NATO’s Guidance on Operational Planning (GOP) has been translated into Romanian language to serve as the basis for a Romanian national operational planning procedures manual. Once fully implemented, it should look toward the development of those military capabilities necessary to meet a range of operational requirements and tasks, specified through political tasks. Nowadays, reviewing the existing Romanian version of OPP we can conclude that it needs to be revised in order to be compatible with current version of GOP. A critical deficiency is the lack of contingency planning guidance, which should be provided to the General Staff by the Minister of National Defense.\textsuperscript{113}(Provides the armed forces with guidance on how the armed forces are to prepare themselves, and for which operations).

In conclusion, it can be stated that the Romanian defense planning system currently shows clear signs of maturity, but there are many areas for improvement. These areas include: developing capabilities for better cost estimation, the refinement of different data bases for the support of the programming phase, and the development of an adequate selection and training process for personnel involved (especially civilians) in the defense planning process on different levels.

3. Moldova

The challenges in defense planning in the PfP countries are shown in the Republic of Moldova case. According to CCMR experts report, “there are a number of critically important areas of defense management and planning that require development in Republic of Moldova. Missing is a number of basic procedural building blocks that can

\textsuperscript{112} Article 3, Law No. 63/2000, 39.

and should be introduced in the near term.” At present there is no structural defense planning methodology in place. The legal framework for Republic of Moldova defense is provided by Law on National Defense, adopted in 2003. The National Defense Law of Moldova does not integrate a unique legislative concept, and provides only some aspects related to the tasks and competences of the central public authorities in the organization of defense planning. In this context, we should mention that the existing legislation on security and defense is ill-defined with respect to the arrangements which have been established for the purpose of justifying preference for a certain size or type of military force, for its missions and the capabilities the military should develop.

The essence of the current defense planning exercise is to complete the SDR. As a result, it is expected that Moldavian defense budget to increase in real terms. Further, this level of defense expenditure should be sufficient to support reform and restructuring plans.

As noticeable from the Defense planning systems outlines presented above, the democratic defense planning process remains a new practice for most of the countries in SEE region. In some of them (see Republic of Moldova case) an appropriate defense planning system still does not exist practically, it is reduced to the annual budgeting only where the allocation of resources process is not, to a large extent, connected with strategic goals. Consequently, in order to implement the new defense planning system based on planning, budgeting, and execution methodology, it is necessary to develop a new defense planning concept considering trends such as capability-based planning, output-oriented budgeting, as well as “best practice” of other transitional countries. Also, the planning system has to be tailored according to specific conditions in these countries.

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115 Law No. 345-XV of 25.07.2003 on National Defense. According to this Law, in war and during peacetime, the leadership of the armed forces is ensured by the Supreme Commandment and led by the President of the Republic of Moldova as Commander-in-Chief. The Supreme Commandment also includes the Minister of Defense, the Joint Chief of Staff, the Commanders of the Border Guards and Carabineer Troops.

The defense planning system that these countries started to look at is capability-based planning. All of them (apart from Bulgaria, who is switching to a capability-based planning system) are slowly moving to this type of planning. But the uncertainties of the new strategic environment combined with radically changed financial priorities in many countries led to a situation where these ideas were not so easily converted into new useable tools. CBP may require the development of new tools such as operational planning analysis tools and costing methodologies. According to CCMR reports in Bulgaria case, “The existing program structure lacks institutionalized operational planning and analysis inputs, as well as reliable models to determine system or platform life-cycle costs.”116 In the Romanian case:

The existing program structure lacks institutionalized inputs that should be provided by the armed forces in the form of a formal operational planning and analysis process. And existing costing methodologies and models are not providing the MoD with reliable and actionable data on life-cycle costs of systems and platforms, thereby precluding informed decision-making.117

As to the Republic of Moldova, in order to facilitate the budget planning process, in 2008 a new methodology of costing in defense planning was elaborated, and in 2010 a new data base with the most used costs was adopted. However, as in the previous cases, the existing methodology is not providing the MoD with reliable and actionable data on life-cycle costs of systems and platforms.

In this context, the countries examined in this thesis have made impressive efforts in adopting different defense planning tools, but they still have problems in implementing them and integrating all of their outputs to be able to inform decision-making authorities. A basic resource management tool that all of these countries have a problem with is the

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implementation of the PPBS, a tool that helps to ensure the effective utilization of available resources with proper authority, responsibility, and accountability at all levels of the defense establishment. The PPBS is not a simple thing and cannot be assimilated easily. The recipients should recognize that they do not have the expertise to introduce PPBS on their own and should seek outside assistance. A close analysis of the experiences of Defense Ministries in countries examined in this research on the implementation of the PPBS shows that Defense Ministries in these countries have had great difficulties with implementing this system. After many decades of a command economy, the former Communist countries do not have all of the needed functioning methods for defense management. Even as the defense planners are reorienting themselves to working in a new political environment, they have to assimilate new methods of resource management.

There are also several missing links in the development of the military forces in some of these countries, such as defense reviews, white papers, procurement strategies and defense planning guidance and/or directives.

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118 “The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) is a management tool. It was introduced into the US Government by Robert McNamara (US Secretary of Defence) in 1961. It was intended to provide a better analytical basis for decision making and for putting such decisions into operation. A PPBS has five elements: (1) a programme structure – a classification of the courses of action open to an organization for attaining its objectives; (2) an approved programme document that includes precise, quantitative data on needs, resource inputs, and programme outputs extending a number of years into the future; (3) a decision making process that establishes the functions, rules, and timetables for the actions required by the PPBS; (4) an analysis process for measuring effectiveness and for weighing alternatives; and (5) an information system that supplies the data required to implement the system.”; in: Senior Seminar for Defense Planning Programming Officials, “Planning, Programming, and Budgeting: The Canadian Experience,” International Review of Administrative Sciences (SAGE Publications) 38, no. 4 (May 2009): 3.

119 Defense Reviews provides government and ministers with the opportunity to examine closely all key defence planning assumptions with the objective of examining if and how current activities should be continued using different organizations, force mixes, public-private contractual arrangements. It is able to provide to government and ministers data-informed options to meet governmental policy objectives and financial limits. A key component of the SDR is that future plans should be affordable.

120 The White Paper gives a detailed presentation of the Ministry’s activities in defense reform: priorities and planning methods, force structure and force development plans, defense budget forecasts, international and regional co-operation, assessment by foreign experts, and the relationship between the Armed Forces and society.
C. DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS: CONTENT AND OUTPUT

1. Defense Planning Process Stages

The defense planning process comprises three discrete stages: development of strategic concepts, elaboration of defense force capability options paper, and assessment of defense organization effectiveness and efficiency. Figure 2 below depicts the cycle of the defense planning process.

Figure 2. Defense Planning Process

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121 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) is the essential MOD planning document. This document provides a programming framework on 4–6 year time horizon through establishing defense policy priorities, determination of main programs and their objectives, an estimation of defense budget and allocation of financial resources to main programs for the planning period and identification of additional analyses needed to support the future planning process. The DPG should be issued at the beginning of the annual planning cycle by the main MOD planning body (in this model called the Defense Management Board-DMB) and approved by the Defense Minister.

a. Development of Strategic Concepts

The “highest political authorities define the high-level policy objectives” for the defense organization. These objectives represent the “high level guidance”\textsuperscript{123} that is provided to defense planners in order to create a defense position that can accomplish the tasks set within the given resource constraints.\textsuperscript{124} The Strategic Concept will consist of a list of derived tasks to support the identified mission of the Defense Forces.\textsuperscript{125} The task lists are of great value for defense planners, providing a common lexicon, clarifying roles and missions, etc. In this context, the task lists:

- Define the types of capabilities needed to accomplish the tasks (or to achieve the desired effects). Then, planners define the capability levels needed to accomplish the tasks (or “capability goals”). Thus, for each scenario, planners design a force package that would provide the capabilities to apply the operational concept and to achieve the mission objectives.\textsuperscript{126}

Figure 3 depicts a mapping of capabilities to tasks.

\textsuperscript{123} High level guidance should at least consist of a description of the security environment, a definition of the goal level to which the organization should aspire, and the resources should be made available for achieving that goal.

\textsuperscript{124} Stephan De Spiegeleire, Paul van Hooft, Charles Culpepper and René Willems, “Closing the Loop - Towards Strategic Defence Management,” (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies) April 2009: 220–221. Also see Figure 2.

\textsuperscript{125} In all the countries addressed in this research, missions are derived from political guidance (usually in NSC and NMS). These are:

- Protection of the independence and territorial integrity of the state and possible implementation of collective defense commitments;
- Promotion of international order and stability;
- Support of civil authorities when needed, for maintaining law and order, civil emergencies and humanitarian assistance, both nationally and internationally;

\textsuperscript{126} Todor Tagarev, “The Art of Shaping Defense Policy: Scope, Components, Relationships (But No Algorithms),” \textit{Connections- The Quarterly Journal V}, no. 1 (2006): 15–34; see also Figure 3.
In the Moldova case, for example, in order to improve institutional cooperation, national-level task lists for the strategic and operational levels have been developed, but have yet to be fully adopted. These national task lists have been informed by the NATO Task List (Bi-SC Directive 80-90). These documents cover the entire Moldovan defense structure, as well as all four levels of escalation.\textsuperscript{128}

In the Romania case, there is a need to develop and adopt an entire family of task lists (strategic, operational, and tactical). The lack of an endorsed family of task lists contributes to an unclear division of responsibilities among organizations executing strategic, operational, and tactical responsibilities. The problems that defense planners


confront in this process are that the tasks specified in the Strategic Concepts are just conceptual and do not specify how missions are to be accomplished.

After a close examination of referents Strategic Concepts it was concluded that many armed forces in SEE exist without a fully developed role or specification of tasks from which they might be employed to undertake. “Without clarity concerning such tasks, serious issues are raised concerning the type of force requirements that needed to be developed and how competing demands may be prioritized.”

b. Elaboration of Defense Force Capability Options Paper

Defense planners derive real capabilities from the defense guidance they were given and assemble them into a coherent defense force that can realize the high-level policy choices within the set budgetary constraints. Guided by the top level Government decisions the defense organizations components have the task and responsibility of organizing, equipping, training, upgrading and supporting the military forces under their command to provide operational capabilities that will support the selected national military strategies.

This stage comprises the following steps:

- “Establish the existing capabilities and assess whether they are relevant to the task in question;
- Make initial judgment about the acceptable level of performance of capabilities and assess the consequences of not being able to execute tasks to that level;
- Explain how the defense force could reduce or limit the deficiency without major financial expenditure, i.e., cost-effective;
- If the defense force cannot fulfill a task identified in a Strategic Concept, the analysis must explain how it could acquire a higher

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130 Ibid., p. 7–8
level of proficiency by improving its various components, e.g., increases in manpower, new equipment, expanded individual / unit training, etc;

- Estimate the expected level of improvement needed whilst assessing the resource implications of such changes in terms of the costs of any such enhancement options, as well as the possible consequences of not being able to perform the tasks to the level already judged acceptable;

- Finally, establish force development options and priorities, based upon the preceding analyses that present the best return for expended resources.”

The question that arises at this stage is: What kind of capabilities do countries need and are they in conformity with the policy?

As previously mentioned, the capability-based planning system has put capability packages at the center of more adaptive defense planning. In this context capabilities are at the heart of any defense effort and getting them “right” has been, and will remain, a difficult task for the countries under research. It is necessary to mention that all these countries under examination are developing their defense capabilities in accordance with national interests and levels of affordability. Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova are developing their military capabilities according to various requirements, including those resulting from the international commitments each country has made in recent years. Bulgaria, for example, structured its national defence capabilities in accordance with the core areas set forthby NATO:

timely forces availability; effective intelligence services; effective reaction and engagement; deployability and mobility; consultation, command, control and communications; sustainability and logistics; survivability and protecting forces. They determine their national defence capabilities within the framework of NATO’s collective capabilities and their

131 Young, “Capabilities-Based Defense Planning.” 44–45.
predefined and definite participation, by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, in NATO’s collective defence planning system.\textsuperscript{132}

But Bulgaria still needs to implement a NATO-compatible operational planning process and supporting operational planning analysis system to contribute to the identification of capability requirements and capability gaps. During the 2010 Force Structure Review, the Bulgarian national defense capabilities were structured in a “Catalogue of capabilities for the development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria,” according to allied specifications. They were prioritized through the “Method of Prioritisation of Deficient Capabilities” into three groups according to the criteria of “probability of occurrence” and “anticipated risk.” These groups served as the foundation for the development of operational concepts, including lines of action and force requirements.

Romania as well has focused on increasing the interoperability, deployability and sustainability of its forces earmarked for peace support operations and Article 5 missions. All forces assigned for collective defense operations are also available, as required, for operations in or outside the Romanian territory, on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, Romania is willing and able to participate in all NATO’s new force structures, including the NATO Response Force, NATO’s elite rapid reaction force. From the force package made available for peace support operations, Romania already has the capacity to deploy and sustain 1,500 troops in operations abroad.\textsuperscript{133} Therefore, existing methods and procedures to identify capability requirements require close examination and review to ensure that adequate and validated data are produced to support decision-making, not only in acquisition, but also, and more importantly, in the force planning process.


Moldova intends to undertake a reform of all its security and defense structures in order to build a viable capability for the security of the nation and to have the capacity to contribute to international operations on an appropriate scale.  

The capabilities required for these countries to maintain their international commitments, including those based on co-operation with NATO, have been developed within an institutional framework. Each nation has established varying degrees of interest in fostering international co-operation and involvement, negotiating with international partners and initiating various programs. However, the current level of institutionalization is less straightforward, whereby a significant level of uncertainty in strategic matters, such as on perspectives of force development and on the effectiveness and efficiency of the options, remains.

c. Assessment of Defense Organization Effectiveness and Efficiency

During the third stage the defense organization has to develop ways of assessing its own effectiveness and efficiency based on the results it achieves. To this end, performance measures are developed, monitored and reported first within the (defense) organization itself, and then subsequently to the highest-level political authorities that initially formulated the high-level policy parameters. This strategic performance assessment should lead to a strategic reflection on the course set out.

In conclusion, it is worth mentioning that the most important finding of this study is that none of the countries studied in this research have fully followed a defense planning process, or closed the defense management cycle. Some of them are moving in that direction, as with the Bulgarian case.

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134 Paragraph 2.1 of the IPAP.

135 Stephan De Spiegeleire, Paul van Hooft, Charles Culpepper, René Willems, Closing The Loop, Towards Strategic Defense Management, April, 2009; p.218.
2. Overall Assessment of the Defense Planning Process in SEE Countries

Based on CCMR reports, and after close examination of the referents defense planning systems, the following observations were made:

- In the defense planning process, there is still inadequate communications between the MoD and Joint Staff and within these organizations; there is also a lack of agreement on the roles and missions of the MoD and the Joint Staff;
- The existing legislation on defense is ill-defined with respect to the arrangements established for the purpose of justifying preference for a certain size or type of military force, for its missions, and the capabilities this military should develop;
- Steps for identifying new force requirements, deciding on preferred solutions and planning for force and capability development are also lacking. While these countries have elaborated a number of strategic documents defining the perceived risks to their national security, correspondence between the assessed risks and national defense requirements, in institutional terms, is less visible;
- Long-term force development is inadequately linked to the planning process;
- Financial programs were not responsive to planning guidance;
- Defense planning tools are adopted, but in some cases the countries lack knowledge in implementing them, nor are their outputs fully integrated.

In short, the thesis found that Bulgaria’s defense planning system at present time is in the process of being reformed; the implications of which is that it can serve as a model for other transitional states. Romania has to take some additional important steps to improve its defense planning system, and some critical tools and procedures remain to be adopted. The Republic of Moldova defense planning system is relatively underdeveloped, and largely in a state of stasis. However, despite the existing difficulties
and problems in adopting a defense planning system, there were indications that the system and procedures was improving and even had a modest record of some successes.

The experience of new NATO members has shown that the introduction of the new defense planning system had a vital importance for the holistic approach to reform and preparation of a defense system to join the Euro-Atlantic security integration processes.

D. DEFENSE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

The last decade of the twentieth century was a period of fundamental changes in Southeastern European security. Today the world faces different challenges and different missions; regional or civil wars, humanitarian emergencies, peacekeeping operations, the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction, etc. To meet these challenges the SEE countries are undergoing fundamental defense and military reform. This reform is the essential foundation for building the modern forces and defense capabilities that are needed. However, the restructuring process of the military involves not only a new organization and a new dimension for the Armed Forces, but also an increased need for democratic control over the military and effectiveness of armed forces in implementing new missions and task.

A defense planning process needs strong and continuous political management based on a unanimous understanding amongst politicians, society, and professionals on the major issues of the national security vision, strategy, and policy. The political-military consensus on defense planning is crucial for its success. Both civilians and military leadership must cooperate in assessing their own new priorities. Both categories should acquire a specific planning culture, starting with a specialized language, a deep understanding of the requirements of medium and long-term planning, and ending with the familiarity of the planning process. They should also be able to operate with specialized planning tools. Procedures should be carefully selected and initially limited to the simplest level.
In order for defense organizations to be effective and efficient in carrying out their duties, they should do so on the basis of a well-considered national security and defense policies, be under democratic control, and act on the basis of realistic, credible and affordable plans. According to Bruneau’s framework,¹³⁶ three elements are necessary for armed forces to be effective in fulfilling their new roles and missions:

- A plan/policy;
- Structures and processes to formulate and implement it (like, MoD, National Security Councils or other means of inter-agency coordination); and
- Commitment of resources, in the form of political capital, money and personnel.

1. Analysis of Existing Political Guidance for Defense Planning

One of the first requirements for the successful implementation of CBP is elected leaders’ involvement. This must be achieved early in the process as the politicians generally control the information, resources and authority required to support CBP. This ranges from strategic policy through to operations. It is important to identify these areas as early as possible to ensure that the elected leaders are involved and their requirements are considered from the onset. Politicians must be included in CBP to ensure that their requirements and concerns are considered. Key stakeholders will eventually control the CBP process, and it is therefore important that they feel they have ownership of it. It is also important to ensure that stakeholders have an understanding of each other’s perspective and an appreciation of the different, if not competing, requirements. The overall defense priorities promulgated by government and senior defense leadership should help to provide a unifying vision. On the other side, defense decision-makers may need to be convinced that CBP is useful for their work. Facilitated workshops involving key stakeholders in developing the process and understanding the product are useful in

addressing this issue. The use of workshops provides a forum for the stakeholders to discuss their concerns and come to a common understanding of the process and other stakeholder requirements.\textsuperscript{137}

The whole defence planning system should be based on several guiding documents, all of which perforce need to be tied to supporting decision-points. The capability-based planning system, in particular, requires fundamental and continuous policy guidance. In this context, the establishment of a sound and clearly formulated defense policy ensures that all national efforts are directed towards achieving its objectives. The formulation of defense policy requires two main prerequisites: effective political control and the involvement of adequate specialist with institutional ability to affect consensus building. Both those prerequisites remain the exclusive responsibility of civilians. The military plays an important role in the process of policy formulation, not as decision-making authority, but in the capacity of expert advisor on military strategy, on the generation and employment of forces, and on the development of military capabilities.

The national policy documents are very important in defense planning and force development system, but as Young adequately stated, defense planners should not rely only on them and wait for them in formal documents (this is a very common situation in the countries examined in this research). By his words, “[i]mportant guidance for defense planning can be found from different sources, such as speeches made by elected government officials or even press interviews.”\textsuperscript{138}

An examination of national level strategy documents reveals that the countries assessed in this research have all the necessary policy guidance documents essential for defense planning; see Table 1. Since the early 1990s, Bulgaria, Romania and Republic of Moldova have been engaged in elaboration of the main strategic documents dealing with security and defense issues. There is a National Security Concept (NSC)/National Security Strategy (NSC of Bulgaria, 2002; NSS of Romania, 2004; NSC of Republic of Moldova).\textsuperscript{139}


\textsuperscript{138} Young, “Capabilities-Based Defense Planning,” p. 38.
Moldova, 2008) a Military Doctrine (Bulgaria, 2002; Moldova, 1995), a National Military/Defense Strategy (Bulgaria, 2002; Romania, 2008), a Strategic Defense Review (Bulgaria, 2010; Romania, 2008; Moldova, 2011), a White Paper (Bulgaria, 2010; Romania, 2004), etc. However, the existence of all these documents does not necessarily mean that defense planning will end in military effectiveness. A close examination reveals that some of these documents are dated and have no use under present circumstances (e.g., Military Doctrine of Republic of Moldova, 1995, National Security Strategy of Romania dated from 2004, etc.) or they are very broad focused, and they also do not provide defense planners with clear priorities and little guidance that can be executed.\footnote{See: “Status of Defense Policy, Planning and Programming in the Republic of Bulgaria,” CCMR Report (July 28–29, 2008), 6; “Status of Defense Policy, Planning, and Execution in Romania,” CCMR Report (September 24–25, 2008), 4; “Status of Defense Institution Building in the Republic of Moldova,” CCMR Report (April 3, 2007), 4.} As a CCMR report concludes, even if the policy documents are properly structured in technical terms, they are outdated and the existing policy needs to be reformulated in a prompt manner.\footnote{“Status of Defense Policy, Planning, and Execution in Romania,” CCMR Report (September 24–25, 2008), 4.} In this context, we can conclude that setting up the necessary policy guidance documents is important, but not a sufficient factor in the defense planning process. Establishing a defense policy is relatively easily and all countries under research have done so. Effectiveness is, however, not assured.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>BULGARIA</th>
<th>ROMANIA</th>
<th>REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA</th>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Law on Defense and the Armed Forces</td>
<td>National Security Concept; Military Doctrine</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>National Security Concept; Plan 2010</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>Military Doctrine</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td>National Military Strategy; Defense Planning Law</td>
<td>Law Nr.1156-XIV on the participation of Moldova in International peacekeeping Missions</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Review; Plan 2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>National security Concept; Military Doctrine; Military strategy; White Paper on Defense</td>
<td>Concept of Military Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
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<td>Law Nr. 345-XV on National Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>SDR; Plan 2015</td>
<td>National Security Strategy; White Paper; Law on Defense Planning, No.473; Law on the participation of Romania in International peacekeeping Missions</td>
<td>The Concept of Restructuring and the Modernization of the National Army - 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Government program 2005-2008</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>Strategic Defense Review-present</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>SDR; National Defense Strategy</td>
<td>National Security Concept</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Government Program 2009-2012</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>Force Structure Review; White Paper on Defense; Armed Forces Development Plan</td>
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Table 1. High Level Policy Documents
After the elaboration of defense policy guidance, the defense planners have to translate the political guidance they receive from the political leadership into parameters that can guide concrete choices. This means:

To translate the high-level policy guidance into a set of more concrete planning assumptions that defense planners can actually work with. These planning assumptions identify things like: the type of missions, the area within the violence spectrum they may operate, concurrency requirements, the long-term limits within budget, etc. On the basis of these defense planning assumptions, defense planners use a number of different analytical building blocks to ‘engineer’ capability packages.141

2. Institutional Responsibilities and Functions Clarification

The next step in implementing CBP is to establish an appropriate management structure and division of responsibility. Achieving this requires commitment at senior levels and without it the benefits of CBP will be limited. This is sometimes referred to as “institutionalizing” CBP.”142

Thus, the second important factor to be analyzed is the adequate organizational structure (co-ordination between the civilian and military defense planning organizations).

An appropriate institutional structure is necessary in order to implement a viable defense planning system. The referents experience demonstrates that without these structures, the planning process between the individual services and the development office can be very combative and, as a result, ineffectual. Thus, the creation of a joint headquarters with adequate staffing, headed by a senior military officer, to work with the civilian defense force development officials, will also encourage success.143


143 Young, “Capabilities-Based Defense Planning,” 53.
In order to translate the high-level policy guidance into a set of more concrete planning assumptions, a closer collaboration between ‘political-military’ parts of the defense organizations and their more ‘military-technical’ and operational counterparts is needed.

In the Bulgaria case, the MoD has yet to assume all responsibilities to create effective national level policies/planning, human resources management, logistics/acquisition and finances, while the Defense Staff (formerly called General Staff, is now part of the integrated MoD) is not fully capable of implementing policy and still concerns itself with operational and tactical missions and tasks.\textsuperscript{144}

In the Romania case for example, of concern is that the specific planning responsibilities of different MoD and General Staff structures are not de-conflicted; nor has a matrix been developed to address institutional responsibilities and transfer of authority issues, through escalation from peacetime to tension, to crisis, to war. Another persisting problem is over-regulation of specific functions as opposed to establishing general authorities. The integration of the MoD and General Staff is likely to present unparalleled challenges to discern proper civilian and military responsibilities and functions.\textsuperscript{145}

In the Moldova case, although the development of institutional responsibilities and functions matrices at the national-level for peace, international tension, crisis, and war have been developed with external assistance, these documents have not been approved nor are they being used and implemented.\textsuperscript{146}

What, then, should be done? Organize a MoD and General Staff working group to develop a comprehensive list of responsibilities and functions for all defense organizations. This list should be limited initially to those responsibilities and functions during peacetime, but should be expanded to include: international tension, crisis, and


wartime, i.e., in accordance with NATO’s concept of escalation. Upon the completion of each list, the results should be placed in a matrix that cross-examines functions and organizations to determine where there are organizational gaps and overlaps.

Another aspect in order to achieve military effectiveness is a consolidated defense planning system covering both the government and the defense organizations. In each country, as presented in Chapter II, such a system should involve the President assisted by the Security Council, the Parliament, the Cabinet, and/or the Council of Ministers in co-operation with the key ministries involved in defense issues. The strategic dimension of the management of defense in Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova is situated at the level of the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The President is entrusted with the overall leadership of the national defense system and coordination of all public administration authorities on defense matters, as well as the general leadership in ensuring the required resources for national defense needs. Executive governments are key players in managing defense, especially in implementing defense policy objectives, with the ministries of defense playing a leading role.

In terms of legislation, assigning defense planning responsibilities to the key state authorities is an incredibly demanding task. Careful consideration should be made as to how many decision-making responsibilities are to be assigned to each level, and whether each authority has the required capacity to process proposals, options and alternatives, as well as requests for resources. It should also be recognized that concentrating too much authority without providing for a proper capacity to control and co-ordinate decision implementation might impede on the organizational performance of the defense sector.

3. Adequate Resources

Due to the scarcity of resources in times of economic transition, one of the most important tools in developing civilian control in the defense-planning process is budgetary planning and its execution. In-depth civilian oversight was started in this field by assigning to the civilian leadership the exclusive tasks of controlling and evaluating fund allocations. But what is often seen is the struggle between military leaders who justified demands for greater spending (usually the allocated budget is less than what
defense planners would prefer), and civilian officials who sought to restrain military-ambitious budgets. In this context, defense should compete with other government ministries so that the final overall budget is a monetary expression of the priorities of the nation, its choice between "guns and butter" and "more guns mean less money for education."\textsuperscript{147}

In examining the role of civilians in defense budget planning we should look at the following budget process stages: "(1) the formulation of the budget by the executive, (2) its enactment into law by the legislature, (3) the disbursement and spending of the funds, and (4) an evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness with which the money was spent."\textsuperscript{148} In the countries examined in this research, civilian elites have been successful in exercising control over the level of the defense budget, often greatly reducing spending. Although civilians have had success in setting the levels of defense spending, on the whole there has been little civilian control over the allocation of resources within the defense sector. For example, in the Romanian case they have two parliamentary chamber committees for defense: Public Order Committee and National Security Committee. These two discuss the proposals advanced by the government. Then a Joint Report is sent to the Parliamentary Budget and Finance Joint Committee. Although this process is meant to be the most important parliamentary instrument for ensuring democratic control over the military, in practice due to the lack of financial resources, Committee responsibility is limited to the approval of government proposals with very minor changes. Thus this theoretically very powerful instrument of civilian control is in practice very weak "Capabilities-Based Defense Planning,". This is the case for many others SEE countries as well. Thus, in spite of the success of the SEE countries in reducing the amount of money spent on defense, elected civilians have been less capable of controlling how the money is spent or ensuring that the allocated funds meet the nation's security needs.


In speaking about defense budget planning and programming, it should be mentioned that in the countries under research, the planning for the next year begins soon after the current year's budget is approved, assuring civilian control over the military and effective policy making. Programming is based on a program budgeting system (adopted by Romania and Bulgaria-2000, Molodva-2009).

Hence, the defense budget in these countries is founded on “incremental principle”\(^{149}\)—the basis for the budget proposal is last years’ budget rather than the defense reform objectives which should be reached. For example, in Bulgaria the budgeting process operates within one- plus two-year timeframe; i.e., detailed allocations for the next fiscal year and budget projections for the subsequent two years, using the methodology of last year’s spending as a baseline.\(^{150}\) In the Moldova case, the process is based upon the principle of using resource-constraints to limit procurement options, versus determining requirements based upon policy priorities and supported by the objective results produced by operational planning analyses.\(^{151}\)

What happens in some countries examined in this research is that annual planning is concentrating on assuring the balance of expenses and central sources, so it is based on expense-related judgments and not on costs. But, an important contribution to defense planning, as was well estimated by CCMR experts in “Cost Accounting in Defense Planning and Budgeting: Definition, description and a generic methodology” Information paper:

Is the ability to understand and implement some aspects of cost accounting to enable senior military leaders to develop an appreciation of resource allocation and budget monitoring in the planning and execution of military activities. At its most basic, cost accounting provides information on the consumption of resources and insight on the organizational priorities to support effective resource allocation.\(^{152}\)


\(^{150}\) CCMR Report on Bulgaria, 11.

\(^{151}\) CCMR Report on Molodva, 5.

In the military sphere, cost accounting is used to assist senior government and military officials in evaluating different possible investments and to make informed decisions on the benefits relative to the costs of different possible scenarios. In talking about the development of the costing methodologies in these countries, it should be noted that in the Romanian case progress has been made in developing costing to support decision-making. As CCMR report evaluated:

Two basic costing models are used: one model for costing force structures, that includes operations and maintenance costs for standard systems and personnel costs; and one model for foreign deployments. No specialized models exist for costing life-cycle costs of different systems.153

In the Bulgaria case there is no model to accurately estimate life-cycle costs of a system or platform to support acquisition decision-making.154 In the Republic of Moldova case, currently the Ministry of Defense developed the guidance to develop a life-cycle costing model to support acquisition (2009); now this model should be adopted.

In studying the defense planning process in SEE countries, this author concluded that what is needed is a total reform of the system to bring it more in line with the market economy. The examination of past and current problems urges the establishment of such a military-economic planning system, which more precisely reflects the security political goals and economic capabilities.

The SEE defense institutions urgently need “high level support for the military to have oversight of, and some flexibility in, the management of the financial affairs of the armed forces,”155 defense financial professionals, a proper defense financial system, and a budgetary and planning process that understands real costs.

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154 Ibid., 11.
155 CCMR Information paper on “Cost Accounting,” 1.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The contemporary international security environment stresses the necessity to significantly modify existing defense planning processes in SEE countries. However, given the ongoing challenges facing both the young democracies of SEE and the more mature and modern military bureaucracies, the process of civilian control over defense planning and the achievement of military effectiveness is still far from being accomplished.

This thesis sought to provide a comparative analysis of efforts to establish civilian democratic control over defense planning in SEE countries (focusing mainly on the experience of Romania, Bulgaria, and the Republic of Moldova) and to make an assessment of the degree of progress toward this purpose.

The first section of the thesis proposed conceptual clarifications regarding theoretical approaches to defense planning and civil-military relations. An understanding of basic concepts and the critical relationship played by civilian authorities in the defense planning process was provided. It argued that such understanding is especially important for the countries in transition to democracy and good governance; countries where, until now, there was a lack in understanding of the imperative role played by civilians in the defense planning process.

Chapter I began by analyzing civil-military relations paradigms, with special attention being paid to a re-conceptualization of civil-military relations proposed by Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristina Matei. According to this framework, the analytical framework reviews the main elements of civil-military relations necessary for defense planning: democratic civilian control, oversight and military effectiveness, stressing that these elements are central for a sound defense planning system. Also, this section provided an analysis for an increasingly popular planning methodology: Capability-Based Planning, a planning methodology adopted in many NATO and EU countries, and under consideration in many SEE countries.
The chapter concluded that a necessary civilian control over defense planning was established in some of the countries examined; however, this alone is not sufficient in order to achieve military effectiveness. In relative terms, these countries have passed the most difficult part of their development to democratic civilian control of the armed forces, reaching a level close to the requirements for NATO membership. The problems that arise concern most of all the dimension of effectiveness. There is still an unrealistic belief in many of the countries examined in this paper, that once the formal requirements of the civilian democratic control are met, control itself will be guaranteed. The reason of this misperception is the lack of understanding that effective civilian control is possible only if there is clarity about the relation among resources, forces and goals of the defense policy.

Chapter III demonstrated that during generations of defense reform, SEE countries made some progress in building armed forces which are under democratic control and established within a clear legal and institutional framework to ensure healthy civil-military relations. This is particularly significant in the area of defense planning where systems should be developed with transparent, effective, efficient, and compatibles ones. As noted, the pace of defense planning reforms has varied in different countries and remains an ongoing process in all three. Bulgaria and Romania have made the most progress, while Moldova remains significantly behind. The author found that defense reform in the Republic of Moldova has been slow and less effective, partly because of a lack of understanding of the complexity of attaining the goals and objectives of such reforms by senior political leadership. However, despite the existing difficulties and problems in the national security sector, the Republic of Moldova has made significant progress in establishing democratic control of armed forces and national security sector.

Chapter III reviewed the Soviet and Communist legacies regarding defense planning in the SEE countries, with particular attention to Bulgaria and Republic of Moldova. It argued that Soviet and Communist legacy influences left the region, with inefficient governing and ineffectual planning practices. Afterwards, the analysis continued with an assessment of the trends in the ongoing transition process. Since the early 1990s, the countries of SEE Europe have taken a series of steps designed to adopt
Western models of civilian oversight of the armed forces and abandoning their previous Communist models. This transition, as shown, has not been an easy process. The results of this transformation are vague and not always clear; however, the decision by these SEE countries to join European and Euro-Atlantic structures led to some positive dynamics in defense planning processes. As the assessment demonstrated, on its difficult transition towards good governance, healthy civil-military relations, and the professionalization of the armed forces, SEE countries took full advantage of various forms of Western assistance and expertise. The process of reform has not consistently produced the expected outcomes designed by Western, and even SEE’s, political architects.

The author argued that the desire for integration within NATO or EU has been, and continues to be, for some countries (i.e., Moldova) a powerful factor influencing civil-military relations and defense planning reform, but not a sufficient one. NATO or EU membership does not solve the problem of creating democratically accountable armed forces. The chapter concluded that more work is needed in order to develop democratic civilian-military relations in the area of defense planning.

All of the above mentioned chapters prepared for the comparative analysis of the Romanian, Bulgarian and Moldavian defense planning processes and systems. Chapter IV presented the major achievements and challenges of SEE countries in establishing a modern defense planning system that are in conformance with democratic political norms. The section began by describing, assessing, and critiquing the current state of the defense planning systems in the countries under review.

The chapter was mainly based on the assessments undertaken by the Center for Civil Military Relations (Monterey, California). These surveys included analyses of the defense policy, planning, programming, and budgeting system of the Bulgarian, Romania, and Moldovan MoDs and Armed Forces.156 Also, the author argued that the

countries analyzed in this research have begun the process of transitioning to capability-based planning. In this context, the chapter presented Bulgaria’s defense planning system as a system that is in the process of adopting this planning methodology; Romania as a case where a threat-based planning methodology is being used, but there are initiatives to introduce the capability-based planning; and Moldova as a case where there is no structural defense planning methodology in place. In these realities, the reform of the defense planning systems for some of SEE countries is unavoidable; for example, the Republic of Moldova needs a totally new system, which according to the standardized and program tasks prepares short-, mid- and long-term plans, plus, during the feedback, controls the realization and efficiency of these plans.

Chapter IV concluded that the process of establishing new defense planning systems in SEE countries is a slow and uncertain process, due to the lack of experience and expertise on the part of both civilians and militaries and their inability to adapt these new concepts of defense planning.

A significant part of the chapter was devoted to the analysis of the defense planning process. After a deep analysis, the author concluded that the defense planning processes in these countries remains under-developed and not fully realized. Another aspect addressed is the analysis of essential defense planning tools necessary for the modern defense planning system. In this context, the author noticed that rarely will any defense planners or decision-makers possess all the kinds of knowledge and experience needed to face uncertainty and still make good choices. The necessity for good decisions thus drives planners and decision-makers to find tools that can help them cope with the many conditions of uncertainty. In this context, the countries examined in this research have made some efforts to adopt different defense planning tools (e.g., operational planning analysis methods and costing methodologies.), but they still have problems in implementing them and integrating all of their outputs to be able to inform decision-making authorities.

The author explored the factors affecting the current defense planning system in SEE countries (clear government policy, adequate organizational structures, and adequate
financial resources), and concluded that all of these three elements are necessary for the armed forces to be effective in fulfilling their new roles and missions.

In analyzing the first factor, it was concluded that defense planning documents that articulate policy are very important in defense planning system, but not sufficient. An examination of national level strategy documents revealed that the countries assessed in this research have all the necessary policy guidance documents essential for defense planning. However, the existence of all these documents does not necessarily mean that defense planning will end in military effectiveness. A close examination reveals that some of these documents are outdated and have no utility under present circumstances.

The second factor examined and stated as an important step in implementing CBP is establishing an appropriate management structure and division of responsibility. In almost all the countries examined in this research, the specific planning responsibilities of different MoD and General Staff structures are not de-conflicted. In some countries (such as Romania) institutional responsibilities and functions matrixes haven’t been developed in order to clarify institutional “roles and missions, “while in others (e.g., Moldova) they have been elaborated but have not been approved or implemented.

The third factor examined here was the question of resources. The author argued that these countries desperately need a proper defense financial management system, and a budgetary and planning process that understands real costs, provides predictive budgeting, sets priorities, and establishes a relationship amongst needs, costs, and effect. Such a system must bridge the gap between plans and budgets by better identifying resource considerations into the planning process at all levels. There is still a lack of realism and coherence between budgets and defense plans. To be more precise, once plans are endorsed they are regularly found to be unaffordable within allocated budgets. The result is that MoD has to adopt a significantly different force posture from the one agreed upon by Parliament in order to meet affordability constraints, i.e., there is a clear need for significant reductions, particularly in personnel costs.

In short, this chapter in particular and the thesis in general, found that SEE’s defense planning systems, at present, are in the process of being reformed. Despite the
existing difficulties and problems in adopting a modern defense planning system, there are indicators that some systems and procedures are improving and even show some modest successes (i.e., Bulgaria).

In conclusion, drawing on the analysis provided by the research and on the lessons learned during defense planning reform, some of the issues to be considered by defense planners and policy-makers, in order to achieve a certain level of success in defense planning, may be synthesized as follows:

• There are no algorithms for successful defense planning. We should keep in mind that what has worked in one nation may not work everywhere else. Thus, the more countries in transition can identify and document best planning practices, the better nations will understand how best to achieve the elusive and perennially challenging task of undertaking defense planning reform.

• The planning methodology should be kept simple also to make it transparent and unclassified.

• Ensure that planning is a civil-military exercise with each side bringing its own expertise. As some authors have noticed “this is a problem that requires urgent attention.”157 Defense expertise among the uniformed military is still superior to that posed by the relatively small pool of trained civilians.

As this thesis has demonstrated, ensuring democratic civilian control over defense planning is a challenging task for SEE countries, but some sparkles of optimism can be found. For example, in the Bulgarian and Romanian cases — which are NATO and EU members — substantial progress has been made in establishing democratic control over defense planning and they are moving to a phase of consolidation in this area. In the former Soviet states (Republic of Moldova), in contrast, the picture is much more mixed. Therefore, conclusions are inevitably varied. On the one hand, SEE countries do not possess the competitive civilian expertise necessary to replace that of the military. On

157 Andrew Cottee, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Foster, Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards. (N.Y: PALGRAVE, 2002), 129.
another hand, a holistic evaluation of progress in establishing democratic civilian control over defense planning suggests that some level of success was attained. Of course this does not mean that the current situation is satisfactory. There are still many aspects that need to be addressed, corrections that need to be made, and mechanisms that must be improved.
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