

PARADIGM SHIFT AND STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PARADIGM SHIFT AND STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

by

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ABSTRACT

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Joint doctrine identifies a theater strategic level of war between the national strategic and operational levels, but beyond that identification there is a decided lack of elucidation on the subject. At the theater strategic level GCCs must interact with foreign nations, coordinate efforts between different operational-level commands, synchronize efforts among the services and other GCCs and functional combatant commands (FCCs), harmonize with the interagency, and provide theater strategic information and assessments to the national authorities. This occurs both in peacetime and during contingency execution. For all these reasons the theater strategic level has taken on perhaps greater and even critical importance.

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Joint doctrine identifies a theater strategic level of war between the national strategic and operational levels, but beyond that identification there is a decided lack of elucidation on the subject. At the theater strategic level GCCs must interact with foreign nations, coordinate efforts between different operational-level commands, synchronize efforts among the services, other GCCs, and FCCs, harmonize with the interagency, and provide theater strategic information and assessments to the national authorities. GCCs also interact with the national strategic level by informing and implementing national policy. They certainly do not make policy, but their influence on it is substantial. This all occurs both in peacetime and during contingency execution. It is purposeful that this paper uses the term theater strategic level and not the theater strategic level of war. This is to make clear that this level exists both during war and during peacetime to avoid the confusion that it only exists during times of conflict

The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) requires combatant commanders to develop Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) to “operationalize” their strategies. The implied task of course is to develop theater strategies. Wartime experience with Central Command in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown that the GCC

should operate at the theater strategic level with subordinate commanders carrying out operational and tactical missions. USPACOM has also recognized this fact and is beginning to develop GCC Operation Plans (OPLANs) at the theater strategic level with sub-unified commands and subordinate joint task forces developing operational level OPLANs.

Reviewing the Strategy Formulation Model from the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) it is readily apparent that there is a void in strategy formulation. The model posits that a strategy formulation process is fed by an analysis of national purpose, national interests, and national policy. After this analysis there occurs a strategy formulation process which leads directly to the publishing of a strategy.¹ There is currently a serious deficit in terms of strategic documents, focused at the theater strategic level, that were developed using such a rigorous process. Combatant commands are recognizing this void and filling it through the development of theater strategies as well as other theater strategic level documents and planning activities.

For all these reasons the theater strategic level has taken on perhaps greater and even critical importance. This paper examines whether a paradigm shift has occurred and if it has does it demand the development of additional joint doctrine. This paper concludes with specific proposals.

Strategic Guidance and the Theater Strategic Level

Following the end of WW II, the United States began to reorganize its military forces to meet the strategic imperatives of the post war world. The document developed to codify this arrangement of forces was first known as the Outline Command Plan, and later evolved into the modern Unified Command Plan (UCP).² The UCP is based upon guidance contained in the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National

Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS), none of which mentions the theater strategic level. The National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10 of the United States Code (USC) provide the basis for the establishment of combatant commands. The UCP delineates the missions, responsibilities, geographic areas, and functions of combatant commands. This opening statement in the UCP clearly posits that the combatant command is at a level that differs from all others based on legal requirements and imperatives.³ The initial focus of the original unified commands was on the operational control of forces, and later expanded to include logistics, administration and planning. This seemed to clearly position the unified commands at the operational level with the JCS prescribing missions and exercising strategic direction over the armed forces.⁴ The 2006 Unified Command Plan (UCP) follows suit with a focus on operational level activities with no outright mention of the theater strategic level.⁵ Thus none of the strategic documents clearly articulate a theater strategic level. If the theater strategic level is not elucidated in the national strategic documents, and the UCP, which defines combatant commands, makes no mention of it, then it is fair to question where this level comes from. Another strategic level document will provide somewhat more insight.

The GEF was first developed in 2006 to consolidate all major planning guidance into a single document. The current 2008 GEF states that, “Global and theater campaign plans “operationalize” combatant command theater or functional strategies.”⁶ The implied task is therefore to have combatant commands develop theater or functional strategies depending on whether they are a GCC or a FCC. This begins to define the theater strategic level, for if there is a theater strategy there must be a theater

strategic level. However, the use of the term “operationalize” is unfortunate here as it seems to allude to the operational level. The author submits that implementing a strategy on a theater wide basis that leverages all elements of national power is in actuality a theater strategic activity.⁷ Thus it can be inferred that there is a recognition of the theater strategic level and it is the level at which the combatant commands operate. As of the writing of this paper there is no formal tasking for the combatant commands to submit their strategies for Secretary of Defense approval as is required for select contingency plans. However, it is clear they must be written and perhaps in the future they will require formal approval. Although strategic guidance only alludes to the theater strategic level there are additional indications as to what this level is within joint doctrine.

Joint doctrine does not explicitly define the theater strategic level as it does the strategic, operational and tactical, but it does identify a theater strategy.⁸ A theater strategy is defined as, “Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power.”⁹ According to the GEF the TCP encompasses all the Phase 0 shaping activities and contingency plans are branches to it.¹⁰ The synchronizing and integrating of the elements of national power that takes place for the TCP must also occur during conflict. If the combatant commands develop theater strategies that synchronize and integrate the instruments of national power in peacetime and conflict, then the theater strategic level is now better defined and begins to take on more importance. The theater strategic level is thus differentiated from the operational level and takes on a

transcendent quality that then connects the national strategic level to the operational.¹¹ This nexus between the operational and national strategic levels is also found in other joint publications.

The theater strategic level is mentioned in both Joint Publications (JP) 5-0 and 3-0. JP 5-0 states that joint strategic planning takes place at the national and theater strategic levels¹², and that the combatant commands contribute to this process through participation in the development of the NMS and theater strategies.¹³ JP 3-0 mentions theater strategic concepts as *statements of intent* for operations¹⁴ and defines the levels of war as the strategic, operational, and tactical¹⁵ with no further meaningful mention of the theater strategic level. Thus in joint doctrine there are some hints as to what the theater strategic level is, but no firm definition. Certainly it is inferred that it exists as a separate level, and resides between the national strategic and operational levels. Other than this understanding there is very little doctrine to describe this level.

Another document that alludes to the theater strategic level without clearly defining it is the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). This document serves as a menu of tasks providing a task name, description, and listing of sub-tasks. There are numerous references to the theater strategic and strategic levels, but no concrete definitions or clearly crafted concepts. Some tasks provide hints, such as ST 5.3.2, Develop Theater Strategic Concepts. This task directs the combatant command to, "...develop strategies that translate national and multinational direction into strategic concepts to meet strategic and joint operational planning requirements directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policy."¹⁶ However, there is virtually no way to re-engineer this document and from it divine doctrinal terms and concepts. Indeed the

UJTL itself references Joint Publications, which themselves have been shown to lack a lucid articulation of the theater strategic level.

National strategic documents make no mention of the theater strategic level and joint doctrine only briefly touches on it. According to illustrations in JP 5-0 it lies at the nexus of the strategic and operational levels.¹⁷ A further exploration of United States Central Command's (USCENTCOM) wartime experience and United States Pacific Command's (USPACOM) recent reorganization will assist in not only further defining the theater strategic level, but in highlighting its emerging importance.

USCENTCOM

USCENTCOM went to war in 1991 against Iraq as a forward deployed, operational level headquarters. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf decided that the command was best utilized directly controlling coalition operations from Saudi Arabia. This decision had the benefit of positioning a very experienced commander forward to control the operational war fight, but was deleterious from the perspective of having that same commander somewhat disconnected from the national strategic level decision-making apparatus.¹⁸ Additionally, if a crisis had occurred elsewhere in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) it would have been problematic to have the commander and his headquarters forward and deeply involved in an operational level war fight. This decision in effect put the combatant commander squarely at the operational level and was apparently fully supported by leaders at the national strategic level.

In contrast to the forward deployment of the USCENTCOM headquarters in 1991, GEN Tommy Franks sent a deployable Command Post forward in 2003 to help oversee the operational war fight from Qatar.¹⁹ This arrangement had the effect of

removing him somewhat from the operational level, but still allowed him to be close enough to the action to influence it. However, even though partially removed he was still, at least for the conduct of the invasion, deeply enmeshed at that level but certainly less so than was General Schwarzkopf.

The necessity of conducting operations in two operational level AORs was the impetus for the movement towards the theater strategic level.²⁰ This was due to the realization that the USCENTCOM commander would be unable to control two operational level actions simultaneously and effectively. USCENTCOM further refined this concept and continued the movement towards the theater strategic level during its operations in the Horn of Africa. There they leveraged subordinate joint task forces (JTFs) to conduct operations while the USCENTCOM commander and staff focused on the region as a whole.²¹

Furthermore, there is a realization, based on empirical data from Afghanistan and Iraq, that a comprehensive approach is needed to conduct modern warfare. A whole of government (WOG) approach appears to be the most effective method for prosecuting these large-scale campaigns. A fact substantiated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. "The wars we are fighting today and assessments of the future security environment together demand that the United States retain and enhance a whole-of-government capability to succeed in large-scale counterinsurgency (COIN), stability, and counterterrorism (CT) operations in environments ranging from densely populated urban areas and mega-cities, to remote mountains, deserts, jungles, and littoral regions."²² All the elements and instruments of national power are resident in current campaigns and, as previously stated, the combatant commands contribute to their

synchronization and integration. How effectively they are being integrated and synchronized can be open to debate, but the combatant command is responsible for these activities.

These actions and activities establish the realization that combatant commanders must give their attention to an entire theater rather than one particular operational level action. This is not to say the commander cannot move forward to influence an operation, but perhaps the theater as a whole is better served when the combatant commander maintains theater strategic perspective. Certainly it is less complicated to interact with the other elements of national power and to focus and meter their efforts in support of an operational subordinate from the theater strategic level. The focus on the operational will tend to narrow perspective, perhaps to the detriment of the wider theater. This narrow focus also detracts from the combatant command's ability to garner national and international support for a particular operational level effort. The experience of USPACOM has furthered an understanding of this concept and the resultant movement by combatant commands toward the theater strategic level.

USPACOM

The United States Pacific Command became a unified command on January 1, 1947, making it the oldest unified command in the U.S. military. Originally fashioned from the areas assigned to the former Far East Command and Alaskan Command, it is responsible for the largest area of any unified command.²³ The establishment of USPACOM as a unified command provided the impetus for the formation of additional unified commands to eventually include all US military forces worldwide.²⁴

USPACOM began moving away from the operational level towards becoming more strategically focused with the release of its Strategy in April 2009.²⁵ This strategy

was developed in accordance with the previously mentioned implied GEF tasking. This was not the first strategy ever developed by USPACOM, but it was certainly the most detailed and the first that focused so clearly at the theater strategic level. “This strategy underwrites the National Defense Strategy by linking USPACOM activities and operations to U.S. Government policy and strategic guidance.”²⁶ This clear linkage between the National Defense Strategy and the USPACOM Strategy helps to define the theater strategic level.

The USPACOM J5 reorganized and formed the Strategy Branch²⁷ in order to write the initial command strategy and the TCP. This reorganization facilitated the development of these theater strategic documents and continued this initial USPACOM movement away from the operational level and towards the theater strategic level.

On October 19, 2009, Admiral Robert F. Willard assumed command of USPACOM and continued this move towards the theater strategic level. In his newly published USPACOM Strategic Guidance he has made it one of his guiding principles to focus the command at the theater strategic level.²⁸ This shift towards the theater strategic level goes beyond the new strategy document and required a reorganization of the USPACOM staff, the creation of entirely new staff organizations, and a wholesale change in planning methodology. Each of these specifics will be addressed in turn.

Within the USPACOM Strategic Guidance there are some key elements to address, in addition to the aforementioned guiding principle, that focus the command at the theater strategic level. Furthermore, contained in the commander’s intent is additional language that provides guidance for operating at the theater strategic level.

USPACOM will, “Synchronize USPACOM actions across the U.S. Government, associated Combatant Commands, regional Allies, and partners.”²⁹ This is a powerful statement that clarifies actions at the theater strategic level and indeed helps to better define that level. An operational level commander cannot easily conduct this echelon of synchronization, and there is no command above USPACOM that does so. USPACOM is therefore at the nexus of the national strategic and operational levels, and is the first level which brings together all the instruments of national power in order to accomplish national objectives.³⁰ There are additional statements that help provide further clarity on the theater strategic level.

The USPACOM Strategic Guidance goes on to say that USPACOM will, “Provide conventional and strategic military capabilities for extended deterrence of aggression against the United States, its territories, Allies, and interests.”³¹ Nowhere in the guidance are words stating that USPACOM conducts war fighting. If USPACOM was to conduct war fighting then that is obviously an operational task and would require USPACOM to operate at both the strategic and operational levels. However, this statement declares that USPACOM will provide capabilities to subordinate JTFs so that they in turn can conduct the operational level war fight. This is another key aspect of the theater strategic level. The guidance document also states in the guiding principles that USPACOM will enable the operational level war fighter.³² USCENTOM learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom that unless there are subordinate JTFs conducting operations the combatant command will be drawn into the operational level and there will be no headquarters operating at the theater strategic level.³³ USPACOM is aware of this lesson.

The USPACOM Strategic Guidance also describes focus areas and strategic priorities for the command, “In particular, concentrate on five Focus Areas: Allies and Partners, China, India, North Korea, and Transnational Threats.”³⁴ The complexities inherent in each of the focus areas require a theater strategic headquarters to provide a wider theater perspective. Subordinate headquarters could concentrate operationally on one of the areas, but more than that requires a span of control and capabilities beyond the operational level. This then is another aspect defining the theater strategic level - span of control. When the span of control is extended to more than one significant operational area or aspect it requires a theater strategic level command. The USPACOM Strategic Guidance not only provides guidance to the command, but as we will soon elucidate it also assists in providing a definition of the *theater strategic level*. The next significant step that ADM Willard took in this movement towards the theater strategic level was to reorganize the staff.

To ensure that the USPACOM staff was able to concentrate on the theater strategic level ADM Willard internally reorganized his staff. He took officers and civilians from throughout the staff and created strategic focus groups (SFG). Each of these SFGs concentrates on one of the focus areas specified within the USPACOM Strategic Guidance. The SFGs are separate staff organizations that answer directly to the commander.³⁵ Additionally, he created the USPACOM Pacific Outreach Directorate (J9). This new staff directorate includes Legislative Affairs, Public Private Partnership, the Washington Liaison Office, and the Joint Interagency Working Group.

The creation of the Strategy and Assessment Division, SFGs and the J9 ensures that the command has the wherewithal to focus on the theater strategic level. Their

creation also guarantees that subsequent commanders will have to sustain theater strategic focus, or else they must reorganize the staff.

The final aspect that ensures a focus on the theater strategic level is the shift in planning efforts away from developing operational plans to the development of *strategic capstone* documents. Every operational plan assigned to USPACOM has a *strategic capstone* that is focused on the theater strategic level and a supporting operational level plan given to a subordinate headquarters. A *strategic capstone* is defined as “an integrated planning framework that defines the strategic level elements of a military campaign essential to the development of complete OPLANs by subordinate commanders.”³⁶

The shift in focus for these plans was not based solely on the fact that the staff was being reorganized, but was done out of a recognition that any conflict requires a whole of government (WOG) approach. The combatant command facilitates this WOG approach by leveraging all instruments and elements of national power to support the operational commander. There is no other echelon that can do this. It cannot be done from the national strategic level and the operational level commander is too close to the action to effectively manage the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power. There needs to be an intermediary who is near the action, yet far enough away to provide wider focus. One who is likewise closer to the national level and can manage national level resources. It becomes readily apparent that the theater strategic level is the only level that can truly facilitate the operational level war fight by metering and injecting the other elements of national power. Additionally, there is no organization

above the combatant command capable of developing a WOG contingency or crisis plan. This is a key concern.

There is a decided lack of strategic level planning resources at the national level and there is no entity developing strategies to support operational level plans. Thus, there is a tasking in the GEF to develop operational plans, but no strategy developed above them. If there are no plans developed at the theater strategic level there appears the very real possibility that the operational war fight could become disconnected from the overarching national strategy. Operational plans developed devoid of a strategic framework will inherently be disconnected at execution or worse the operational plan could drive strategy. Therefore, the theater strategic level is the appropriate one to develop WOG war fighting plans. They have the assets and the connections with the national strategic level, to develop theater strategies which support national level objectives. This final aspect further enables the movement towards the theater strategic level, and like the formation of the SFGs, the Strategy Branch, and the J9, helps to ensure that the combatant command focus is on the theater strategic level and away from the operational.

This shift in focus based on the USPACOM and the USCENTCOM experience makes clear that a paradigm shift is occurring that necessitates the more conscious and deliberate development of a theater strategic level in both peacetime and war. At the theater strategic level GCCs must interact with foreign nations, coordinate efforts between different operational-level commands, synchronize efforts among the services and other combatant commands, harmonize with the interagency, and provide theater strategic information and assessments to the national authorities. They must write

theater strategies, implement theater strategies through TCPs, and develop theater strategic plans that drive and support operational level contingency planning efforts. For these reasons the theater strategic level has taken on greater and perhaps even critical importance. Therefore, a working definition of the theater strategic level becomes, “the level at which a command attains national objectives through the employment of all the elements and instruments of national power while linking the national strategic level to the operational level.”³⁷ The theater strategic environment is characterized by the fact that the span of control and focus exceeds any single operational level command. The theater strategic command plans and synchronizes actions across the U.S. Government, associated combatant commands, theater Allies, and partners. The theater strategic command ensures the accomplishment of operational level tasks and missions through the formation of subordinate JTFs and other operational level commands. A discussion of combatant command strategies is now warranted to further analysis of the theater strategic level.

Combatant Command Strategies

A review of the theater strategies developed by several different combatant commands will assist in further exploration and analysis of the theater strategic level and will yield insights as to whether additional joint doctrine is required to assist in their development.

As previously stated the April 2009 USPACOM strategy was a leap forward for the command in terms of strategic development. It represented over a year’s worth of work by several different staff agencies within the command.³⁸ It is an unclassified document and was purposefully meant to be seen by friends, allies, partners, and adversaries. As such it was carefully crafted in such a way as to convey overarching

strategic concepts without great depth of detail. There is emphasis on security cooperation and capacity building and for obvious reasons a lack of emphasis on war fighting. As a point of fact the GEF specifically instructs that contingency plans are branches to the TCP.³⁹ The construct of the USPACOM strategy is revealing in that it highlights a particular command's priorities as encompassed within three *pillars*.

The USPACOM Strategy's *pillars* are partnership, readiness, and presence. The document begins with a brief introduction followed by the commander's vision, the command's mission statement, and a summation of the USPACOM's strategic environment. The document then lists trends found in the region, delineates four sub-regions and provides a listing of nine assumptions. From this point the strategy focuses on what are called *imperatives*, theater strategic objectives, and a section titled Means & Resources. A brief description of the last section containing the *imperatives*, objectives, and means and resources follows.

The "USPACOM *imperatives* denote the unconditional requirements for the successful implementation of this strategy."⁴⁰ The strategy goes on to list and define the individual *imperatives* as military superiority, multilateral approach to security, freedom of movement and secure access, and a whole-of-government approach. The document then lists seven objectives and provides a brief description of each. Finally, the USPACOM Strategy identifies the means and the resources to accomplish the theater strategic objectives. Overall, the document provides a unique mix of doctrinal and non-doctrinal terms. Whenever non-doctrinal terms are used in the USPACOM Strategy there follows a brief definition of each to provide the reader with a conceptual baseline understanding.

The United States European Command (USEUCOM) Strategy is titled Strategy of Active Security. Like the USPACOM Strategy the USEUCOM Strategy is unclassified and focuses on security cooperation and capacity building. This document begins with an introduction and an elucidation of its two overarching objectives, which are derived from an analysis of national strategic guidance. The two objectives are to defend the homeland forward and support U.S. strategic interests by promoting security and stability.⁴¹ The USEUCOM Strategy also includes a short vision statement, a mission statement, a commander's intent, theater objectives, as well as *theater priorities*, and a method for achieving them.

Contained in the section titled Regional and Subordinate Plans, the USEUCOM strategy also describes the environment through a threat overview and an explanation of transnational threats. There is also a section describing sub-regions, theater posture, and training and resources. In the final section there occurs a discussion of planning requirements and strategy management. This final section provides the bridge to the USEUCOM TCP and offers guidance for the development of that document and also a description of what is contained in that document. The similarities of this document and the USPACOM Strategy are striking, and the point on which they diverge could easily be incorporated from one document into the other to provide a more comprehensive whole. An examination of the USCENTCOM Strategy will continue to highlight the similarities in the combatant commands' approaches to theater strategy development.

The USCENTCOM Theater Strategy contains classified and unclassified sections. The USCENTCOM Theater Strategy incorporates a mission statement, vision, a section on *strategic imperatives*, a description of the strategic environment,

challenges and opportunities, assumptions, *strategic principles*, and objectives and effects. Like the other two theater strategies this one describes its derivation from national strategic guidance and provides a bridge to TCP development through a focus on security cooperation and capacity building. Additionally, much like the USPACOM Strategy there is a short description of non-doctrinal terms when they are used.⁴²

When compared side by side the overall approaches and the use of both doctrinal and non-doctrinal aspects in all three documents is remarkable.⁴³ The similarities are profound and where there are differences they can certainly be shared. A synthesis could yield more comprehensive documents for each command. At the very least the commonalities could be captured and articulated in joint doctrine as best practices. There would then at least be commonality in terms and framework for each combatant command's theater strategy.

The combatant command strategies articulated here were derived from national strategic guidance and provide a bridge to the respective command's TCPs. Nowhere in joint doctrine is there a methodology for developing theater strategies, no description of what should be contained in them, and no definitional foundation for strategic terminology. Before describing a potential methodology for developing a theater strategy, in essence a more formal process that could be contained in joint doctrine, an examination of theater strategic planning methodology is warranted to allow for more holistic recommendations.

USPACOM Strategic Planning Methodology

Like strategy development, there is no strategic planning process. As stated previously USPACOM is developing *strategic capstones* for each operational plan. This concept of *strategic capstones* was recently approved by the Secretary of Defense

during an In Progress Review (IPR) briefed by ADM Willard.⁴⁴ The strategic planning methodology described below was first used to develop the USPACOM TCP, and based on that experience was heavily modified to develop the USPACOM strategic capstones. The methodology will be described in detail and it must be noted that although informed by joint doctrine it is unique and not in the least intuitive.

In his initial guidance to his plans team ADM Willard made four specific points. First, he wanted to enhance the command's strategic focus while integrating interagency support and enabling strategic maneuver.⁴⁵ Secondly, he wanted to refine command relationships to ensure that the subordinate operational commanders could operate effectively. Incumbent in this step is the refinement of national level and combatant command interaction, a synchronization of theater and subordinate JTF roles and responsibilities, and a mitigation of any seams between supporting commands and agencies. Third, he wanted to revise the plan design. The GEF provided planning guidance to consolidate all Phase 0 shaping activities into the TCP.

Through painstaking analysis the USPACOM planners came to an understanding that there is a Phase 0 shape and a Phase 0 contingency. Phase 0 shaping activities are resident in the TCP and Phase 0 contingency activities are those specific to any particular situation, and are contained in OPLANs and Concept Plans (CONPLANS). Phase 0 contingency is therefore focused on developing the forces and structure to enable deterrence. The plans team was also told to improve the transition from Phase 0 contingency to Phase 1 deterrence.

Unfortunately, as with other strategic planning doctrine, there is a lack of guidance on the development of a TCP. To be fair the TCP only came into being with

the development of the first GEF in 2006 and doctrine has had limited time to catch up with such a substantial addition. However, the planning guidance in the GEF could well form the basis of future doctrine.

Fourth, the plans team was told to ensure effective military integration with the other elements of national power to meet strategic objectives. From this guidance was born a planning methodology.

The USPACOM strategic planning methodology is a modification of the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP) adapted to focus at the theater strategic level through an incorporation of the planning guidance contained in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI), 3141.01D, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans. This instruction contains guidance to conduct three different IPRs to the SECDEF for campaign and contingency plan approval. The first of these is IPR A which is focused on *strategic guidance* and generally equates to a theater strategic or operational level mission analysis. The next is IPR B which is focused on *concept development* and highlights theater strategic or operational courses of action (COAs). The next is IPR F *plan development*, during which the finalized campaign plan or contingency plan is briefed for approval.

USPACOM has taken each of these broad concepts, *strategic guidance*, *concept development*, and *plan development* and matched them with their appropriate JOPP steps. *Strategic guidance* encompasses JOPP initiation and mission analysis. *Concept development* includes COA development, analysis and war gaming, comparison, and approval. *Plan development* includes the finalization of the plan and either guidance for the development of sub-regional and country plans, in the case of a campaign plan, or

subordinate headquarters plans if it is a contingency plan. What makes this process unique are the inputs to each of the categories, as well as the outputs. The inputs are always based on strategic level guidance, and the outputs are focused on the theater strategic level.

During the conduct of the strategic guidance phase of *strategic capstone* development the USPACOM planners analyzed national strategic guidance and direction⁴⁶ documents, such as the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, GEF, JSCP, UCP, etc., and from these documents formulated a strategic estimate⁴⁷. During this process the adversaries' national and military strategies were taken into account and analyzed. This estimate was further evaluated and a strategic mission analysis was completed after the introduction of facts, assumptions, deterrent options, initial risks, history, geography, constraints, etc. During this process it was discovered that there was a lack of not only doctrine, but also of definitions. As a consequence USPACOM planners developed definitions for terms of reference to help describe the process and the situation. After exhaustive staffing these definitions were briefed to and approved by the commander. These terms included, but are not limited to *strategic capstone*, *strategic situation*, *strategic lines of operation*, *strategic concept of the operation*, *strategic redlines*, and *strategic levers*. Each of these definitions assisted not only in the development of the strategic estimate and mission analysis, but also in the development of strategic courses of action (COAs).

To develop strategic COAs the planners now had to devise a developmental methodology for and definition of exactly what a strategic COA was. The definition settled upon was a, "plan that integrates and synchronizes the employment of military

forces across the levels of war, and the other instruments of national power to achieve strategic end states and objectives.”⁴⁸ As originally envisioned the development of strategic COAs was an options based construct. The intent was to provide the strategic leaders as many strategic options as possible. Therefore there might in actuality be several different COAs developed and written into the final plan. This differs from traditional OPLAN developmental processes in that most select and develop a single COA. It was thought that the better tact at the strategic level was to provide options.

The strategic leader is now provided with flexibility in responding to any potential crisis, and can react more appropriately to the unique circumstance surrounding any particular situation or crisis. This aspect in itself is an extreme departure from “normal” or standard operational level OPLAN development. As of this writing the developmental methodology is still under refinement, but includes such strategic factors as the strategic environment, the nature of the adversary, the nature of the conflict, the adversary’s strategy, positive ends, negative ends, historical context, and risk.⁴⁹ Although the Secretary of Defense has approved the overarching rationale and concept for strategic capstones, the strategic planning methodology is still in its infancy and the process remains relatively fluid.

Like the development of theater strategies, the development of *strategic capstones* is hampered by a lack of doctrine to assist in the developmental process. USPACOM has recognized the need to develop strategic plans to synchronize and integrate all elements and instruments of national power, and develop what in essence are whole of government plans. This need is borne out by U.S. wartime experience over the last decade. The conduct of two large-scale counterinsurgencies necessitates

the utilization of all instruments of national power. To prosecute a large-scale conventional war fight at the theater strategic level would most assuredly require a similar level of effort. Thus, the necessity to develop theater strategies and the current movement in plan development by USPACOM not only highlight the need for additional doctrine concerning the theater strategic level, but assists in defining that level and underscores the fact that a paradigm shift has occurred and this level is increasing in importance.

Recommendations/Conclusion

Joint doctrine focused at the theater strategic level will be extremely helpful in the crafting, assessing, programming, and execution of combatant command strategies, TCPs, and other regional planning efforts, such as the USPACOM strategic capstones. Analysis has shown that a lack of strategic and theater strategic doctrine hampers the development of planning documents as well as higher levels of strategic thinking and campaigning at the combatant commands. This has led to combatant commands taking doctrine designed specifically for the operational and tactical levels, and attempting to extrapolate terms and concepts to then apply at the theater strategic level. This method has met with varying degrees of success and is by no means optimal. Indeed, in many cases it leads to an inappropriate application of inappropriate doctrine. This section makes recommendations on how to best fill the void currently present in doctrine at the theater strategic level.

The first area in which any future development of joint doctrine should focus is the development of a common strategic lexicon. This paper has shown that although there are some strategic definitions available in joint doctrine, they are lacking in depth and richness. The development of a common strategic lexicon provides the definitional

framework upon which an entire body of joint doctrine could evolve. The next area to concentrate on is a model for strategic level planning. This applies to both theater strategies and other theater strategic plans.

The U.S. Army War College teaches a developmental model for crafting strategies and policies. This model could easily be incorporated into joint doctrine to assist in theater strategy development. This model is based on the JOPP and just as the JOPP can be modified to conduct crisis action and contingency planning; it can be adopted for the strategic and theater strategic levels. This model is known as the Strategy Formulation Process and is composed of eight steps.⁵⁰

- 1) Identify and determine U.S. interests.
- 2) Determine level of intensity for each interest.
- 3) Evaluate the issues, trends, and challenges (threats and opportunities in regard to interests).
- 4) Identify policy objectives (ends).
- 5) Consider alternative concepts (ways) that use resources (means) to achieve the objectives.
- 6) Determine the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of the strategic options.
- 7) Conduct a risk assessment.
- 8) Present strategy recommendations.
- 9) Continuous assessment (monitor for success, failure, or modification).

The Strategic Formulation Process could easily form the backbone of future joint doctrine as regards theater strategy and regional planning efforts. In addition to adopting this process there is a need to develop a general format in outline form for

writing theater strategies. This would be similar to the format currently used for developing OPLANs and CONPLANs, and like those formats it would have to be flexible to allow for differences in each combatant command. However, the point being there is currently no standardization in the format of theater strategies, and there needs to be in order to create a known metric for comparison and facilitate repeatability.

Taking the best practices from the current suite of combatant command strategies some common themes have been shown to emerge. Vision, mission, commander's intent, assumptions, objectives, a description of the strategic environment (challenges and opportunities), and strategic imperatives and or principles (or a similar construct) are all common themes within each of the previously analyzed combatant command theater strategies. It only makes sense to formalize through incorporation in joint doctrine these common themes that have emerged through the crucible of necessity. It is remarkable, but understandable, that common themes evolved separately in each combatant command. It is now incumbent on the joint community to capture these practices that were won through so much intellectual effort, and not allow them to go to waste from the doctrinal perspective.

Additionally, there must be recognition that planning at the theater strategic level is different than planning at the operational level. A whole of government (WOG) approach to strategy is recognized by the NSS and the NDS. If the theater strategic level is that level where all instruments and elements of national power are synchronized and integrated, this then requires a WOG approach. This is not to say that the military commander has the authority to direct and control the other elements of national power, but that they must be brought to the planning table to intelligently

ensure that their particular element or agency is appropriately represented. This is a gathering of interagency planners who can speak with authority for their agency. For contingency planning it might not go so far as to constitute a specific commitment of guaranteed involvement at the time of execution, but they would at the least provide the combatant command planning community with possibilities.⁵¹ Additional doctrinal terms will of necessity be developed for this planning effort and potentially a new planning methodology. This methodology could be based on the Strategic Formulation Process, or best practices as developed by USPACOM and other commands. Either way planning at the theater strategic level must achieve recognition as a unique effort with joint doctrine enabling and facilitating it.

Finally, there is an opportunity to leverage the work resident in the GEF on TCP development. The planning guidance in the GEF could easily translate into comprehensive planning doctrine at the theater strategic level. The USPACOM planning methodology previously described was first used to develop that command's TCP and was later further refined and employed in the development of the *strategic capstones*. This only tends to highlight the fact that the lack of doctrine hampers the development of theater strategic planning documents and that combatant commands are forced to devise systems and procedures to overcome this lack.

TCP development and execution at the combatant commands is of utmost importance. The TCP is in actuality a plan that is always in execution and forms the basis for all actions and activities within the combatant command. The planning guidance in the GEF could also act as the foundation for a richer and deeper body of

doctrine that should encompass all the actions and activities surrounding theater security cooperation.

The development of joint doctrine to encompass definitions, a strategic planning framework, and a template for theater strategy development is easily facilitated leveraging the USAWC Strategic Formulation Process, the JOPP, the GEF, and best practices from current combatant command efforts. These adaptations should not be viewed as a long step down the short path to inflexibility and dogma, but a step in the right direction for developing a disciplined and repeatable series of mutually supporting processes. This new joint doctrine would guide and assist military planning, as well as execution, while providing an invaluable suite of tools for the joint organizations that function at the theater strategic level. An example of a table of contents for a future joint theater strategic publication is provided in Figure 1 to illustrate potential subjects for inclusion in such a document. This is by means not an all inclusive listing and could easily be expanded to cover additional topics pertinent to the subject. A presently deficient yet critical education and training regime could then inculcate and inform military and partner agency theater strategic appreciation and capacity. A paradigm shift has occurred and the joint community should pursue the challenge to deliberately develop the theater strategic level.

<p>CHAPTER I</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">THEATER STRATEGIC CONTEXT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduction • Policy • National Strategy • Instruments of National Power <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Processes and Systems • Resources/Mean • Authorities • Unified Action • Relationships • The Theater Strategic Environment • The Levels of War • The Nature of Warfare at the Theater Strategic level <p>CHAPTER II</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">FUNDAMENTALS OF THEATER STRATEGIC OPERATIONS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Principles • Organizing and Setting the Theater • Strategic Maneuver • Organizing Joint Forces to support the Theater • Understanding the Theater Strategic Environment • Joint Mission Essential Task List <p>CHAPTER III</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic (DIME) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interagency Coordination and Integration • Geographic Combatant Commands <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Subordinate Unified Commands • Joint Force Headquarters • Standing Joint Force Headquarters • Service Components • Multinational Considerations • Security Partners <p>CHAPTER IV</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">STRATEGIC ART AND DESIGN</p> <p>SECTION A. INTRODUCTION</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic Art • Strategic Design • The Campaign <p>SECTION B. STRATEGIC DESIGN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic Guidance • Strategic Design Elements • Strategic Design and Planning Integration 	<p>CHAPTER V</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">STRATEGIC PLANNING</p> <p>SECTION A. THEATER STRATEGY</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater Strategy Formulation Process • Identify and determine U.S. interests • Determine level of intensity for each interest • Evaluate the issues, trends, and challenges (threats and opportunities in regard to interests) • Identify policy objectives (ends) • Consider alternative concepts (ways) that use resources (means) to achieve the objectives • Determine the feasibility, acceptability and suitability of the strategic options • Conduct a risk assessment • Present strategy recommendations <p>SECTION B. THEATER CAMPAIGN PLANNING</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater Campaign Plan <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater Security Cooperation • Theater Strategic Capstones • Theater Campaign Planning Process • Strategic Guidance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Theater Strategic Estimates • Facts • Tasks • Assumptions • Strategic Levers (Friendly, Adversary, Neutral) • Theater Strategic Mission Statement • Combatant Commander's Intent • Concept Development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic Options • Analysis • War gaming • Comparison • Approval • Plan Development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Finalization • Guidance for Subordinate Plan Development <p>CHAPTER VI</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">THEATER STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General • Levels of War and Assessment • Assessment Processes and Measures • Synchronization and Assessment Boards (SAB) • Defense Readiness Reporting System
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Figure 1: Example Table of Contents for a Joint Theater Strategic Publication

Endnotes

¹ United States Army War College Department of National Security and Strategy, *National Security Policy and Strategy Course Directive AY 11*, 109.

² “Faced with the need to establish a unified command of US military forces in peacetime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946 created an organizational directive, the “Outline Command Plan,” which was the first in a series of documents known as Unified Command Plans.” Ronald H. Cole et al, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999* (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, 2003), Foreword.

³ Office of the President of the United States, *Unified Command Plan*, 5 May 2006, 3.

⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the history of USPACOM and other unified commands, as well as their responsibilities, see Cole et al, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999*.

⁵ For further information on the duties and responsibilities of the geographic combatant commands and functional combatant commands see the Office of the President of the United States, *Unified Command Plan*, 5 May 2006.

⁶ Department of Defense, *Guidance for Employment of the Force 2008-2010* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2008), 31.

⁷ This would then match the JP-02 definition of theater strategy.

⁸ Joint Publication 1-02 defines the levels of war as strategic, operational and tactical. It does not differentiate between their peacetime and wartime construct, but the definitions are still useful. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2000, as amended through April 2010).

⁹ *Ibid.*, 474.

¹⁰ Department of Defense, *Guidance for Employment of the Force 2008-2010* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2008), 2.

¹¹ “This document transitions the Department’s planning from a contingency-centric approach to a “strategy-centric” approach. Rather than initiating planning from the context of particular contingencies, the strategy-centric approach requires commanders to begin planning from the perspective of achieving broad regional or functional objectives.” *Ibid.*

¹² “Joint strategic planning occurs primarily at the national- and theater-strategic levels to help the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and other members of the National Security Council formulate political-military assessments, define political and military objectives and end states, develop strategic concepts and options, and allocate resources.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 December 2006), I-1.

¹³ “CCDRs plan at the national and theater strategic levels of war through participation in the development of NMS, and the development of theater estimates, strategies, and plans. The supported CCDR normally participates in strategic discussions with the President, SecDef, and CJCS, and with multinational partners. The supported CCDR’s strategy links US national strategy to operational-level activities. The CCDR’s planning efforts guide joint operation planning at the operational level, which links the operational and tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art — the employment of military forces to attain strategic objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.” *Ibid.*, I-9.

¹⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 September 2006, incorporating change 2, 22 March 2010), I-4, I-5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, II-1, II-2.

¹⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *PDF Version of Approved Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Database with Conditions*, 12 October 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/ujtltasks/ujtl_tasks.pdf (accessed November 27, 2010).

¹⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 December 2006), III-13, III-60.

¹⁸ “Finally the communications networks in Saudi Arabia were installed, and on August 23, I notified Colin Powell that I was ready to move my headquarters to Riyadh. I told him that Buck Rogers, my deputy commander in chief, had agreed to stay in Tampa and hold the fort; I knew I could count on him to keep the forces flowing smoothly from stateside. Powell recognized that I had to go, but admitted he liked having me within easy reach of Washington, and was concerned that I’d become inaccessible once I left the States.” General H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, *It Doesn’t Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam, 1992), 377.

¹⁹ “The Joint Operations Center at CENTCOM’s Deployable Command Post in Qatar was in a doublewide trailer, about as long as the permanent facility back at Tampa, but a lot narrower.” General Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004), 413.

²⁰ “CENTCOM’s most important innovation has been the use of two JTFs for major campaigns: A senior JTF to focus on theater-strategic issues, including the integration of all elements of national power, combined with a junior, operational level JTF. This has allowed CENTCOM to concentrate on the AOR and national strategic level, and to focus on interagency and coalition coordination.” Colonel David A. Dawson, “Evolution of the U.S. Central Command from Operational to Strategic Headquarters,” *Program Research Project* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 10, 2010), 23.

²¹ “For major operations, JTFs have proved effective. In the Horn of Africa, with about 1,500 troops CJTF-HOA effectively managed strategic issues for the entire sub-region in an effort Abizaid regarded as a model for the future.” *Ibid.*

²² Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2026jan10%200700.pdf> (accessed November 3, 2010).

²³ HISTORY OF U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, linked from the USPACOM Homepage at “USPACOM History”, http://www.pacom.mil/web/site_pages/uspacom/history.shtml (accessed September 25, 2010).

²⁴ “The impetus for the establishment of a postwar system of unified command over US military forces worldwide stemmed from the Navy’s dissatisfaction with this divided command in the Pacific. On 1 February 1946, the CNO characterized the existing arrangement, with Army and Navy forces under separate command, as “ambiguous” and “unsatisfactory.” He favored establishing a single command over the entire Pacific Theater (excluding Japan, Korea, and China), whose commander would have a joint staff and would exercise “unity of command” over all US forces in theater.” Ronald H. Cole et al, *The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1999* (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint History Office, 2003), 11.

²⁵ United States Pacific Command Strategy: Partnership, Readiness, Presence, April 2009.

²⁶ United States Pacific Command Strategy: Partnership, Readiness, Presence, April 2009, 1.

²⁷ The Strategy Branch is part of the J56 Strategy & Assessments Division.

²⁸ "Focus Strategically. USPACOM will focus on the strategic level of leadership, engagement, planning, and war fighting. Our strategic behavior will be shaped and informed by an analysis and assessment effort that seeks to understand fully the complex and dynamic Asia-Pacific security environment by concentrating on the five Focus Areas." United States Pacific Command Strategic Guidance, <http://www.pacom.mil/> (accessed September 25, 2010).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ "instruments of national power — All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military." U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 200, as amended through April 2010), 233.

³¹ United States Pacific Command Strategic Guidance, <http://www.pacom.mil/> (accessed September 25, 2010).

³² "Enable the war fighter. USPACOM will ensure the war fighter is enabled to lead, plan, and execute successfully at the operational level; and will support the war fighter by providing capstone guidance, facilitating decision-making processes, and enabling effective command and control." Ibid.

³³ I disagree with this author that the combatant command is not at the nexus of the operational and national strategic levels and should be more appropriately be at the newly defined theater strategic level. However, there is a clear understanding that the combatant command should operate at a higher than operational level and that subordinate operational commanders are needed to facilitate this. "To avoid the problems experienced by CENTCOM during OEF/OIF, joint doctrine requires two minor revisions. First, instead of placing combatant commands at the nexus of the operational and strategic levels of war, joint doctrine needs to clearly state that combatant commands operate at the strategic level, and should use components or establish subordinate JTFs for operational requirements. This will not preclude combatant commands from acting at the operational level when necessary. But, given the powerful tendency to concentrate on the lower levels of war and neglect the higher levels, a firm doctrinal statement will help commands keep themselves and their staff focused at the strategic level." Colonel David A. Dawson, "Evolution of the U.S. Central Command from Operational to Strategic Headquarters," *Program Research Project* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, May 10, 2010), 24-25.

³⁴ United States Pacific Command Strategic Guidance, <http://www.pacom.mil/> (accessed September 25, 2010).

³⁵ "The commander of the U.S. Pacific Command has formed a special group of experts at the Hawaii-based headquarters to examine China - its military buildup, cyber activities and other military and security threats. The China Strategic Focus Group is one of five new groups formed by Adm. Robert Willard, head of the command. Navy Capt. Lydia Robertson, a spokeswoman for the admiral, said the groups were formed shortly after Adm. Willard took over in October and will operate as "mini-think tanks" to address the commander's "challenges and opportunities." "The small groups are made up of PACOM staff assigned to research and recommend opinion

to better inform the commander on ways to develop strategy and follow on engagement in the region using a whole of government approach," she said. In addition to China, the special focus groups include panels on allies and partners, India, North Korea and transnational threat." Insides the Ring, "Notes from the Pentagon," February 11, 2010, <http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring021110.html> (accessed September 29 2010).

³⁶ This definition was developed by the author and his planning staff during his tenure as the Chief, J54, Strategic Plans Division.

³⁷ This would bring the definition of a theater strategy into line with the definition of the theater strategic level.

³⁸ The author was present during this development and assisted the primary authors who were from the USPACOM J56, Strategy and Assessments Division. The author at the time was Chief, Northeast Asia Plans Branch within the J54.

³⁹ "Under this concept, contingency plans become "branches" to the campaign plan." Department of Defense, *Guidance for Employment of the Force 2008-2010* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2008), 2.

⁴⁰ Headquarters United States Pacific Command, *United States Pacific Command Strategy: Partnership, Readiness, Presence*, April 2009, 7.

⁴¹ Headquarters United States Pacific Command, *The United States European Command Strategy of Active Security*, June 4, 2010, 1.

⁴² Headquarters United States Central Command, *United States Central Command Theater Strategy*,

⁴³ To the best of the author's knowledge no other combatant command's strategies were used in the development of the USPACOM Strategy and there were never any formal planning meeting for the planners from each combatant command to meet and cross-level best practices.

⁴⁴ As related to the author by Lt Col Stanley Springer, Plans Officer from USPACOM J541, Southeast Asia Plans Branch.

⁴⁵ Strategic maneuver, as defined within USPACOM, is composed of both fires and movement. Strategic fires refers to the ability to strike the opponent's strategic and operational depth with strategic U.S. assets. The second component is the movement of large forces and sustainment from around the globe to a specific concentration point, or points, where they can be re-assembled and flow onto the operational battlefield. Combined together this is essentially the concept of strategic maneuver.

⁴⁶ "Strategic direction – the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the joint staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance in the form of various strategic products." U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 200, as amended through April 2010), 448.

⁴⁷ “Strategic estimate- The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the President, Secretary of Defense, or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition.” Ibid.

⁴⁸ Definition briefed to and approved by the USPACOM commander in February 2010.

⁴⁹ Positive ends – end states, objectives or goals which are achievable only by applying military force or coordinated DIME-FIL actions Negative ends - end states, objectives or goals which are achievable only by limiting military force or coordinated DIME-FIL actions.

⁵⁰ United States Army War College Department of National Security and Strategy, *National Security Policy and Strategy Course Directive AY 11*, 111 - 115.

⁵¹ However, for TCP development they must commit their respective agencies. This practice was used successfully by USPACOM in the development of its TCP during the regional joint planning group (JPG) and the subsequent country JPGs. Although the interagency participation was limited primarily to the Department of State and USAID, it was certainly a step in the right direction.