Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual

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Special Operations Forces
Interagency Counterterrorism
Reference Manual

Second Edition

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The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense leadership.

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and selected other national and international security decision makers, both military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint and interagency environment.

JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions:

**USSOCOM mission.** USSOCOM provides fully capable and enabled SOF to defend the nation’s interests in an environment characterized by irregular warfare.

**USSOF mission.** USSOF conducts special operations to prepare the operational environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, aggression, and lethality to achieve tactical through strategic effect.

The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, interagency, and United States military communities.

The JSOU public Web page is located at https://jsou.socom.mil.
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Foreword

This Second Edition of the SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual is designed to support the Joint Special Operations University’s mission and, in particular, its Interagency Education Program. This program includes six educational activities:

a. Combating Terrorism Executive Interagency Seminar
b. Special Operations Support Team Orientation Course
c. Combating Terrorist Networks Seminar
d. SOF-Interagency Collaboration Course
e. SOF Orientation for Interagency Partners
f. Interagency Education Outreach.

Mr. Charles Ricks, a JSOU Senior Fellow, compiled this manual to provide a valuable reference work for JSOU students, SOF staff officers, and partners in the interagency process. While not all-inclusive, it provides an outline of organizations, missions, and relationships that comprise the interagency process. The manual provides insight and information regarding various counterterrorism organizations in the U.S. Government national security apparatus. New information contained in this edition expands our understanding of the interagency counterterrorism roles of the Department of State, especially the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Intelligence Community and other intelligence resources, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and other agencies throughout the United States government structure. Additional definitions, organizations, and acronyms are included to provide the special operations warrior with an improved, practical, quick-reference guide to the interagency community.

The interagency process is a fluid interaction involving U.S. Government organizations and processes that changes the way the government is organized and adjusts its priorities to meet real-world challenges. Consequently, as before, JSOU expects to continue updating the document; treating it as an iterative product will keep it current and relevant. Updates are planned on a two-year cycle. If you have suggestions for improvements or changes to the manual, please contact the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil.

Kenneth Poole, Ed.D.
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department
Introduction

As the director of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Inter-agency Task Force (IATF), I am pleased to introduce the Second Edition of the *SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual*. I recently had the good fortune to attend a Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) Executive Combating Terrorism Seminar and obtained first-hand knowledge of their organization and personnel. This manual reflects the same level of effort that I witnessed in that seminar.

The First Edition of this manual established a community standard as it is used by the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), the National Center for Combating Terrorism (NCTC), and other members of the interagency community. This Second Edition enhances the earlier document by adding President Obama’s National Security Strategy, expanding information in other areas such as in the Country Team and discussing the concept of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) professional operating as the 3-D warrior (defense, diplomacy, and development). This concept recognizes the importance of SOF as part of the sinew that binds together critical elements of national power and animates them under the most demanding conditions.

USSOCOM conducts a robust engagement campaign by working with interagency components from throughout the U.S. Government. As part of that effort, it sustains a very active liaison program with the various agencies engaged in the current fight. This manual serves as an essential component of JSOU’s successful education curriculum that is focused on the interagency process. JSOU’s Interagency Education Program and this manual make an important contribution to the knowledge base and professional development of the SOF and interagency communities.

Frankie H. Shroyer Jr., SES
Director, Interagency Task Force
On the cover. The cover image includes a representative sample of U.S. Government department seals for those routinely involved in interagency counterterrorism activities with Special Operations Forces. USSOCOM is one organization within the Department of Defense and among other federal agencies who work through the interagency process to achieve synchronized results. The graphic suggests networked relationships among federal agencies to highlight the concept that any one agency may be working with multiple and different partners at any point in time.

The content of this manual represents an ongoing, dynamic project to capture existing interagency counterterrorism structures, organizations, responsibilities, and work flow. Changes driven by new presidential administrations, fresh policy and current events inevitably alter the interagency landscape. All information comes from open sources to include official fact sheets and background obtained from various official Web sites. The cutoff date for input to this Second Edition was 1 December 2010. Any omissions are completely unintentional.
Chapter 1. Interagency Counterterrorism Components

No single department, agency, or organization of the United States Government (USG) can, by itself, effectively locate and defeat terrorist networks, groups, and individuals. Similarly it has become increasingly evident that it is not possible for individual countries, coalitions, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to “go it alone” against the threats of terrorists and their networks.

The USG and these various international players must seek ways to work collectively to create environments that discourage the conditions that breed terrorism in the first place, defeat threats where and when they emerge, and prevent the recurrence of terrorism once defeated. This manual addresses the complex mix of players and structures within both the USG interagency and, to a lesser extent, the wider international community.

It is often the case that the special operations warrior first encounters the interagency and the rest of the players in a meeting within the area of operations (AO). Thus this manual seeks to answer three basic questions:

a. Who are these people?
b. For whom do they work?
c. Why are they here?

Chapter 1 focuses on the USG interagency structures and processes in four sections:

a. The first section — The 3-D warrior (defense, diplomacy, and development) — offers a brief overview of the international security environment, the USG interagency process, and the role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) within that process. While it is by no means exhaustive in its scope, the discussion provides basic information for the special operations warrior about both the interagency concept and its historical context.

b. The second section — Counterterrorism Roles, Missions, and Responsibilities — identifies the various department, organization, and agency components within the USG that address counterterrorism issues. It is important to know where specific counterterrorism expertise and resources reside, but also to understand that they frequently function separately from their parent leadership.

c. The third section — Functioning of the Interagency Counterterrorism Components — describes how these various components are linked together into functional work clusters centered around a lead agency responsible for carrying out specific counterterrorism activities. For instance, the Director of National Intelligence is the focal point for all USG intelligence activities and coordinates the activities of the 16 members of the Intelligence Community and other supporting bodies that originate from throughout the USG.

d. The fourth section — Interagency Organizations and Initiatives — presents specific examples of interagency cooperation within the USG with a particular emphasis on engagement initiatives in which USSOCOM plays significant roles.
The 3-D Warrior (Defense, Diplomacy, and Development)

The traditional role of SOF has been to transcend the narrow military component of the elements of national power. This reality is acknowledged within the evolving concept of the 3-D warrior, an individual with the skill sets and experiences to work with the interagency to produce diplomatic, defense, and development effects as required within any area of operations.

**DIME-FIL Model**

USSOCOM has conducted what it calls a *Global Synthesis* that seeks to capture the complexity of the international security environment. The Global Synthesis assists in driving SOF strategic thinking and bring together the mosaic of variables that contribute to international instability and generate threats to national sovereignty.

The general conclusion of this work is that traditional nation-state tensions are fading and strategic thinking must focus on a *new reality*. That new reality is that the international security environment is irregular in nature and will require SOF that are prepared, positioned, led, and able to lead others within the Department of Defense (DoD) and coordinate with the wider USG and, as appropriate, elements of the international community to meet these emerging threats.

The synthesis has identified *crime, migration, and extremism* as recurring general concerns around the globe. Various studies, to include those contained in the synthesis, have identified more specific threats. Among these are:

- Sovereignty issues
- Failing and failed steps
- Ethnic conflict
- Global economic crisis
- Energy dependence
- Cyber crime
- Pandemics
- Natural disasters
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- Trafficking of drugs, weapons, and human beings
- Piracy
- Regional instability
- Resource competition (energy, food, and water)
- Globalization
- Climate change.

Over the decades, the concept of the interagency approach — also called the *whole-of-government* — has emerged as the process that harnesses the traditional diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) elements of national power to address a broad spectrum of security threats and to ensure the safety of the United States and the American people. A strategic reassessment, based on the experiences and insights of the past decade, has expanded the notion of the elements of power to include *financial, intelligence* and *law enforcement* components, resulting in a more comprehensive spectrum of capabilities (DIME-FIL).

The primary focus of this updated manual remains on that slice of the larger USG interagency community that works through the coordinative process to address counterterrorism (CT) issues and activities overseas. However, it is essential for the SOF community to possess an awareness of the importance of all elements of national power in the CT effort because domestic and international interests overlap. Thus the discussion of the many different participants, capabilities, resources, and agendas leads to the occasional focus on broader CT and antiterrorism topics to include some homeland security concerns.

The three broad capacities of the 3-D warrior absorb, not replace, the components of the DIME-FIL model.

**Interagency and the 3-D Warrior**

As defined in Joint Publication 3-0 (September 2006, incorporating Change 1, February 2008), *interagency* “coordination occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged U.S. Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective.” Joint Publication 3-0 was updated in March 2010.

Dealing with CT issues, however, involves more than just the departments, agencies, and organizations of the USG. The successful application of U.S. foreign policy and military power to achieve CT objectives...
also requires the inclusion and, if possible, commitment of host nation (HN) participants, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Because of this complexity, the special operations warrior frequently requires innovative mental flexibility to achieve assigned national security objectives. Essentially, Special Operations Forces, in the role of the 3-D warrior, become a source of expertise, resources, and leadership for the CT effort.

It is important to realize that the USG interagency community is not a body with a fixed structure and a developed operational culture. Instead, it is a loose and often undefined process of multiple structures and cultures that is often personality and situational dependent for its success to an extent normally unfamiliar to the special operations warrior. Stepping outside the comfort zone of military operations introduces uncertainty about the ways and means to accomplish the mission.

The special operations warrior can take some solace in the recognition that working the complex interagency environment is not a new challenge. As far back as 1940, the Small Wars Manual of the United States Marine Corps identified the problem: “One of the principal obstacles with which naval forces are confronted… has to do with the absence of a clean-cut line of demarcation between State Department authority and military authority.” Further on, the manual asserts that a need exists “for the earnest cooperation between the State Department representatives and naval authorities.”

What has changed, however, is the complexity of the national security environment and the number of departments, agencies, and organizations that now play roles in ensuring the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of our nation. What was once written about relationships between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS) now applies similarly to DoD relationships throughout the USG and beyond.

The SOF Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual is intended to assist the special operations warrior, the 3-D warrior faced with the often bewildering array of USG interagency departments, agencies, and organizations as well as the HNs, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs who also act as players within any given AO. As noted earlier, this manual focuses on departments, agencies, organizations, and programs by identifying who they are, where they fit and how they contribute to CT efforts.

Recent experience teaches much about the rapidly changing environments of the global war on terror. However, there exists little to prepare one for the diverse mix of players and agendas encountered within the multiple venues of any battle space. Sometimes it might appear that there are lots of different people and organizations performing all sorts of unrelated and uncoordinated tasks directed toward unclear objectives.

If true, such a situation represents a recipe for failure. The reality is probably less severe. The ideal is to achieve synchronization of all the various skill sets and resources available within the various organizations of the USG and also externally with HNs, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

At its core, the interagency process synchronizes U.S. strategic national security efforts. Navigating the interagency environment requires special operations warriors to be guided by achievable expectations and to maintain high levels of situational awareness, display a willingness to listen and learn, and exercise the skill of knowing when to lead, support or, when appropriate, enable others outside of DoD to accomplish their objectives.

Though it may sometimes appear to be the most efficient course of action, expecting the military to perform every required task in the AO is typically self-defeating and risks alienating those most in need of assistance. It is likely that, somewhere in any AO, there exists a USG interagency component or external organization that has the skill sets and resources to accomplish a given task. The first step is to review existing policy and strategy to determine which agency has been designated the lead in a given situation.

The USG interagency process seeks to orchestrate the various means and mobilize the required resources to bring each initiative to a successful conclusion. The assignment of lead agencies establishes responsibility for task accomplishment and defines the paths for the required work flow.

Beyond the USG interagency process, the coordination of the agendas of HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs in support of CT objectives is essential to ultimate success. Once again, it is predictably
counterproductive to launch a multitude of well-intentioned activities that may only coincidentally focus on the true needs of the situation.

While the USG interagency process supports unity of effort by USG departments, agencies, and organizations, the successful inclusion of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO initiatives strengthens the shared effort. However, by its very nature, that inclusion carries with it the risk of jeopardizing the unity of effort.

The SOF 3-D warrior plays a variety of essential roles within the CT interagency process, chief among them as a unique source of expertise, experience, and leadership.

### Counterterrorism Roles, Missions, and Responsibilities

Awareness of the various departments, agencies, and organizations playing interagency CT roles is helpful for the special operations warrior. Though based in Washington, D.C., representatives of the USG interagency community are also present on the ground within the AO through the work of the U.S. Embassy Country Team and are likely to have an impact on military operations (see Chapter 2, Overseas Interagency Structures).

Beginning with the White House, this section identifies the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the USG interagency components engaged in meeting the challenges of overseas CT threats to U.S. security. As noted earlier, the interagency community is not a “place” or a formal organization with clear lines of coordination. Rather it is a process of information exchange and coordination among all the various USG departments, agencies, and organizations tasked with CT responsibilities. How these individual components work together is addressed later in this chapter.

#### The White House

**www.whitehouse.gov**

The President, supported by and working through the National Security Council (NSC) and other senior officials, directs the development and implementation of national CT strategies and policies, oversees necessary planning, and makes the required decisions to activate those plans. Continuous liaison between the White House and the various USG interagency components seeks to ensure the availability of the most timely and accurate information and the clearest strategic guidance to enable the achievement of national security goals against specific threats and within the targeted areas of operation.

#### Interagency Work Flow

Throughout the USG, the work flow of information exchange, analysis, assessments, draft strategy, policy options, courses of action, consequence analysis, and recommendations for the way ahead moves laterally among the relevant USG interagency components. Products from that work flow then rise vertically from the USG interagency community through the structure of the NSC to the President.

Once strategies, policies, and decisions are promulgated, the engaged
USG interagency components use them to guide the direction, management, oversight, and evaluation of national CT activities throughout the world. Figure 1 portrays the work-flow relationship between the USG interagency community and the NSC.

Overseas, the U.S. Embassy Country Team, led by the ambassador, becomes the “face” of the USG interagency process. Staffed with representatives of the relevant USG interagency components, the Country Team takes those steps necessary to achieve U.S. CT objectives. It works with the on-scene military commander to synchronize Country Team activities with military operations and with the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs to maximize the effects of the common effort.

The National Security Council (NSC)

The NSC came into existence under the National Security Act of 1947 and has been under the Executive Office of the President since 1949. It provides advice and counsel to the President on the synchronization of foreign, military, and domestic policies to ensure the national security of the United States. As the NSC is the President’s coordinating hub for national security power, its structure changes as administrations change, and each version of the NSC is crafted to meet the preferences and priorities of each chief executive. It is through the NSC that all the components of national power (DIME-FIL) are animated to address CT and other national security threats.

Traditionally, an early step for a new administration is to publish its vision of the ideal structure for the NSC and to define work-flow procedures and responsibilities. Predictably, some Presidents are more involved with the details of the NSC workings than others.

President Barack Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive-1 (PPD-1) on 13 February 2009 to begin the process of outlining his vision for the structure and functioning of the NSC. As per PPD-1, the NSC consists of the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Treasury, Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, Chief of Staff to the President, National Security Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Counsel to the President is invited
to attend every meeting; the Deputy National Security Advisor attends and serves as the Secretary.

PPD-1 specifies additional attendees from throughout the USG departments and agencies when discussing issues concerning international economic issues, homeland security or CT, and science and technology.

Figure 2 identifies the NSC participants. As noted earlier, the specific NSC structure varies from administration to administration as is seen in the provisions of PPD-1. However, the basic elements of the NSC will remain in place.

In addition to the decisions taken by the new administration, changes may also emerge as a result of the Project on National Security Reform (www.pnsr.org), which has been conducting extensive analysis of interagency operations in support of national security processes and objectives. Its final report (www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20new%20shield.pdf; Executive Summary www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging_exec%20summary_12-2-08.pdf) offers a glimpse into the efforts of the project, but no final decisions have yet been taken.

The NSC staff conducts issue and situation analyses, develops policy options and courses of action, projects consequences of policy development, formalizes recommendations for the President, publishes and circulates documentation of Presidential decisions, and oversees policy execution based on those decision documents.

As we have seen, President Obama’s national security decisions will be documented in Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs). In the recent past they have been called National Security Presidential Directives (G. W. Bush administration), Presidential Review Directives and Presidential Decision Directives (Clinton administration) and National Security Study Directives and National Security Decision Directives (Reagan administration). Regardless of title, the documentation of
Presidential decisions becomes the touchstone for the actions of the USG interagency components.

It should also be remembered that these directives constitute the President’s Executive Department decisions. They should be in compliance with existing law and, by themselves, constitute direction rather than law.

**The National Security Council Principals Committee (NSC/PC)**
The NSC/PC serves as the senior interagency body that is responsible for discussing policy issues and situations critical to the national security of the United States. It is chaired by the National Security Advisor, who sets the agenda and supervises the preparation and presentation of assessments, reports, and options that support the work of the committee.

Additional members include the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Homeland Security, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, Chief of Staff to the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Deputy National Security Advisor, Deputy Secretary of State, Counsel to the President, and Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs are invited to each NSC/PC meeting. The heads of other departments, agencies, and organizations are included as appropriate depending on the issues or situations under discussion, including international economic issues, homeland security or CT issues, and science and technology issues. Given the broad scope of its responsibilities, the NSC/PC serves as a strategic hub for interagency policy deliberations and recommendations and provides oversight for policy implementation.

**The National Security Council Deputies Committee (NSC/DC)**
The NSC/DC serves as the senior sub-cabinet venue for interagency process coordination. It assigns work to and reviews the output of NSC staff and policy groups. The NSC/DC acts to ensure that issues brought before the NSC/PC and the NSC itself have been properly analyzed, staffed, and structured for review and, as appropriate, decision.

Chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor, membership includes the Deputy Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Treasury, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Secretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Deputy to the United States Representative to the United Nations, Deputy Director of National Intelligence, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs. As with the NSC/PC, discussion of homeland security or CT, international economic, or science and technology issues will include representatives from other executive departments and agencies.

The NSC/DC serves to sharpen the focus of interagency coordination as information and recommendations flow from the Interagency Policy Committees and then through the NSC process to the President. Decisions are then documented and disseminated for execution.

**The National Security Council Interagency Policy Committees (NSC/IPCs)**
Oversight of national security policy development and execution is accomplished by a collection of regional and functional Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs). They are engaged in the daily management of the interagency process for specific national security issues and situations.

Once again, IPCs exist in every Presidential administration, though their specific number, areas of interest, and work flow are likely to vary. Likewise, individual IPC membership, meeting schedules, and work flow are likely to reflect the requirements of the individual IPC.

IPCs conduct analysis; prepare assessments, strategy drafts, policy options, and courses of action; and craft recommendations for the NSC/DC, NSC/PC, and NSC. Once issued, the IPCs monitor the implementation of Presidential decisions within their areas of responsibility.

The PPD of 13 February 2009 outlines the purposes of the IPCs and changes their previous name from Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs: a term that remains in pre-2009 documents). It also mandates
that “an early meeting of the NSC/DC will be devoted to setting up the NSC/IPCs and providing their mandates for reviewing policies and developing options in their respective areas for early consideration by the interagency committees established by this directive.”

To date, the Obama administration has not published a definitive list of IPCs. Various IPCs have been established, many of which are temporary in nature to address specific issues or situations and are then disbanded. Typically presidents will expand the scope and number of IPCs under whatever name they are known. Such a trend is not unusual as presidential visions and ways of doing business adapt over the course of the administration to new circumstances and changes in the threat environment.

By way of historical context, President George W. Bush’s NSPD-1, which first defined his views on the structure and functioning of the NSC, established six regional Policy Coordination Committees:

a. Europe and Eurasia
b. Western Hemisphere
c. East Asia
d. South Asia
e. Near East and North Africa
f. Africa.

NSPD-1 also established eleven functional PCCs:

a. Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations
b. International Development and Humanitarian Assistance
c. Global Environment
d. International Finance
e. Transnational Economic Issues
f. Counterterrorism and National Preparedness, otherwise known as the Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG)
g. Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning
h. Arms Control
i. Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense
j. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Predictably, the number of functional PCCs under President George W. Bush’s administration increased significantly as the threat environment changed dramatically during his time in office.

DoD representation exists on the NSC, NSC/PC, NSC/DC, and on most IPCs.

**Strategic Policy Documents**

Acting through the NSC, the President has developed several different strategies that drive the development of additional strategies and the writing and execution of operational plans. Chief among these are:

a. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
b. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
c. The National Strategy for Homeland Security
d. The National Counterintelligence Strategy
e. The National Strategy for Information Strategy.

Given that strategic guidance, the Secretary of Defense has promulgated *The National Defense Strategy*, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has provided direction through *The National Military Strategy*.

In response to all of these, the commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has been tasked by the Secretary of Defense to prepare *The Global Campaign Plan for the War on Terror* from which each geographic combatant commander has developed a supporting theater campaign plan.

Within the DoD, these strategies and plans are further delineated under classified Contingency Plans and Execute Orders related to CT.

**Department of State (DoS)**

*www.state.gov*

The DoS serves as the designated USG lead in fighting terrorism overseas. Therefore, a major slice of USG CT components resides within the DoS, and these DoS components are presented below.

**Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)**

*www.state.gov/s/ct*

At the direction of the Secretary of State, the Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism stands at the center of the interagency CT hub. Figure 3 identifies the USG CT components that work with the Coordina-
tor for Counterterrorism. Note that Figure 3 does not depict a command structure.

It is important to recognize that the responsible Ambassador-at-Large serves as a coordinator. The mission of the S/CT is to “develop and lead a worldwide effort to combat terrorism using all the instruments of statecraft: diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law enforcement, and military” (source: DoS). Work is produced within the USG CT components to feed into the interagency process through the Interagency Policy Committee (NSC/IPC) for Counterterrorism, the NSC/DC, the NSC/PC, and the NSC to the President.

Liaison officers within S/CT also work the interagency process by interfacing with the National Counterterrorism Center, the broader IC, the FBI, and other components within the USG interagency community. The Operations Directorate and the Technical Programs Unit within S/CT also play important interagency roles.

The work of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism is guided by the goals outlined within the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism:

a. Defeat terrorists and their organizations.
b. Deny sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists.
c. Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.
d. Defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.

S/CT pursues the following multipath strategy to defeat terrorists and their organizations:

a. Apply all the Elements of National Power (DIME-FIL) in coordination with international partners, allies and various nonstate actors.
b. Attack the terrorist leadership (including those providing resources, inspiration, and guidance

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![Figure 3. USG CT Components. The DoS Web site refers to this cluster as the “U.S. Counterterrorism Team.”](image-url)
to extremist networks); safe havens (physical, cyber-safe, and ideological); and underlying conditions that terrorists exploit (e.g., grievances, communal conflicts, and adverse economic environments).

c. Build trusted networks that undermine, marginalize, and isolate the enemy and empower legitimate alternatives to extremism.

d. Respond with sustained engagement at the global, regional, national, and local levels to isolate the threat, defeat that threat, and prevent its reemergence.

To accomplish these goals, the DoS has identified specific tasks that must be accomplished through the work of the USG interagency process:

a. Building the political will and CT capacity of foreign governments
b. Developing public diplomacy strategies that delegitimize terrorism, encourage moderates to oppose extremism, and explain USG CT policy
c. Designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) to freeze their assets and isolate them internationally
d. Providing deterrence and rapid response to international terrorist incidents
e. Delivering creative and flexible antiterrorism and CT finance training
f. Enhancing border security and global terrorist watch listings
g. Providing expert CT assistance in support of embassies and partner nations
h. Integrating homeland security initiatives with foreign policy
i. Leading technology development to effectively combat terrorism
j. Developing the intellectual capital necessary for a decades-long struggle.

S/CT is organized into four directorates as portrayed in Figure 4.

The Directorate of Homeland Security and Multilateral Affairs seeks an integrated approach to link homeland security and international CT activities. The S/CT maintains a strong relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and the White House Homeland Security Council. The S/CT chairs the DoS Homeland Security Coordinating Committee (HSCC). The Office of Trans-Regional Affairs and Designations oversees the operations of the Terrorist Designations Unit and the International Organizations Unit.

The Operations Directorate (Ops) pursues two primary missions:

a. Assist the DoD to develop and implement overseas CT policies, plans and operations. Simultaneously, the directorate advises DoS officials at home and abroad on DoD CT concepts and proposals.

b. Sustain and lead the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST), which is the USG’s only on-call asset capable of responding to terrorist incidents worldwide (see page 1-33).

As part of its larger interagency role, Ops co-chairs both the Hostage Policy Subgroup, responsible for updating and executing USG policy during incidents involving the detention of Americans abroad, and the Interagency Athletic Events Security Coordination Group that coordinates U.S. assistance to security operations associated with the Olympic Games and other major international sporting events.
The Programs, Policy, and Budget Directorate, among other responsibilities, focuses its efforts to build partner nation capabilities to combat terrorism. These include assisting nations to develop the practical capacities in law enforcement, border control, and banking regulation as tools to identify, interdict, and defeat terrorists. The Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA), implemented by the DS and discussed later (page 1-12), is the primary program for developing law enforcement skills and providing equipment to partner nations. Along with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the directorate co-chairs the interagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) discussed later. The directorate also provides policy, planning, and programming guidance to the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) (www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16663.htm) that shares information with partner nations about suspected terrorists seeking to enter or pass through their territories.

The Regional Affairs Directorate is responsible for developing, coordinating, and executing national, regional, and multilateral U.S. CT policy. Central to its efforts is the ongoing challenge of building political will and capacity within partner nations. It works with members of the U.S. Counterterrorism Team and other USG interagency structures to ensure that all elements of national power are used most effectively to target terrorists by engaging partner nations, allies, and like-minded nonstate actors. Regional officers focus on the Western Hemisphere, Europe and Eurasia, the Near East, Africa, South and Central Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific. They operate extensive consultative and coordination networks within DoS, the USG interagency community, and their regions.

Counterterrorism (CT) Finance Unit
www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16662.htm

CT Finance teams up with the Public Designations Unit within the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism to identify financial support structures for terrorists and eliminating them. These efforts rely on relationship building with governments around the world to improve their abilities to investigate, identify, and interdict the flow of money to terrorists and terrorist groups. Within the DoS, CT Finance works with the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) — see page 1-15 — while coordinating with the other USG interagency components (shown on page 1-30) to sever terrorist financial support while building training and technological assistance in five operational areas:

a. Legal frameworks
b. Financial regulatory systems
c. Financial intelligence units
d. Law enforcement
e. Judicial/prosecutorial development.

Terrorist Designation List
www.state.gov/s/ct/list

Terrorist Designation Unit
www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16816.htm

The Secretary of State exercises the authority to publicly identify terrorists and terrorist organizations. Once defined, these identifications, or designations, trigger specific requirements about how U.S. individuals and businesses interact with anyone on the designation list. The Public Designations Unit evaluates candidates for inclusion, submits them to the Secretary of State for review and approval, and then monitors to ensure that sanctions placed against a specific individual or group are enforced appropriately. The Foreign Terrorist Organizations List (FTOs) focuses on travel related to terrorist organizations, criminalizes material support to terrorist organizations, and assists in freezing the financial resources of terrorist organizations located in U.S. financial institutions. The maintenance of the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) also assists in efforts to identify and take action against terrorists and terrorist organizations.

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)
www.state.gov/m/ds

The DS serves as the security and law enforcement arm of the DoS and has as its mission the responsibility to create a secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. It prepares and executes programs to protect U.S. embassies and personnel overseas (through the regional security officers) and to secure facilities and information systems. The criminal investigative branch of DS, the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), also conducts investigations of passport and visa fraud.
as a way of preventing access by suspected terrorists to the U.S. and partner nations. DS operates from offices in 25 U.S. cities and in 159 foreign countries worldwide and establishes close working relationships with local law enforcement organizations. Both the Antiterrorism Assistance Program and the Rewards for Justice Program are the responsibility of the DS. Among other interagency components, the DS works closely with the Department of Homeland Security’s Document and Benefit Fraud Task Force and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. DS also has responsibility to provide protection for the Secretary of State and for defined foreign government officials visiting the U.S. who do not receive protection from the U.S. Secret Service or the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA)
www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm
The ATA is managed by the Office of Antiterrorism Assistance. It is designed to encourage and nurture cooperative initiatives between U.S. law enforcement agencies and similar organizations within those partner countries cooperating in efforts to deal with terrorism. Programs focus on training for bomb detection, crime scene investigation, airport and building security, maritime protection measures, and VIP protection. More broadly, ATA seek to increase capacity to protect national borders, protect critical infrastructure, protect national leadership, and respond to and resolve terrorist incidents. While providing training and equipment resources, the ATA also helps to build and strengthen bilateral relations so important to the broader CT effort. These relationships serve to increase the security of Americans living and traveling overseas and play an important role in international CT efforts. Since the program was established in 1983, more than 48,000 security and law enforcement officials from 141 countries have participated in the ATA.

Rewards for Justice Program
www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8651.htm
Originally established by the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, the Rewards for Justice Program was expanded under the terms of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (commonly known as the Patriot Act). Currently this DoS-managed program (Bureau of Diplomatic Security) offers awards of as much as $5 million for information that solves or prevents terrorist acts or leads to the capture and conviction of those responsible. The Secretary of State has the authority to offer rewards in excess of $5 million for specific cases. More than $40 million has been paid to credible informants, with notable successes in arresting those involved with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and of certain high-value targets in Iraq. Information can be provided to any FBI office, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security or through the regional security officers in U.S. embassies overseas. Information gathered through the program is shared with partner nations who are also at risk.

Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC)
www.osac.gov
The OSAC is a Federal Advisory Committee operating under a USG charter that came into being in the wake of increased terrorist threats to U.S. businesses and organizations operating internationally. The program currently has more than 4,600 U.S. companies and other organizations with international interests participating. The OSAC seeks to orchestrate security cooperation between its members and the DoS. As part of its activities, the council operates committees on Security Awareness and Innovation, Country Councils and Outreach, and Threats and Information Sharing. A system of country councils scattered around the world provides interface between U.S. embassies and consulates and the local U.S. communities to exchange security information.

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)
www.state.gov/t/pm
The PM serves as the main coordination node for interface between DoS and DoD. It performs critical interagency functions by providing policy guidance on international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade. The Office of International Security Operations, contained within PM, forms the essential link between DoS and DoD on all operational matters. Also contained within PM is the Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis (PM/PPA), which supports the Security Assistance Team, the Political-Military Policy
and Planning Team, and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The PM Bureau strengthens the DoS-DoD relationship by providing the Secretary of State with a global perspective on political-military issues; supporting DoD by negotiating basing agreements, reviewing military exercises, facilitating overseas operations, and providing embedded Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) to military service branch chiefs and combatant commanders worldwide; promoting regional stability by building partnership capacity and strengthening friends and allies through security assistance programs; reducing threats from conventional weapons through humanitarian demining and small arms destruction programs, thus setting the stage for post-conflict recovery in more than 50 countries throughout the world; by contributing to Defense and Political-Military Policy and Planning; and regulating arms transfers and U.S. defense trade.

Nuclear Trafficking Response Group (NTRG). The NTRG was established in 1995 to coordinate USG responses to incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials overseas, including radiation alarms. The goals of the NTRG are to work with foreign governments to secure smuggled nuclear material — including facilities where diversions occurred, prosecute those involved and develop information on smuggling-related threats (e.g., potential links between smugglers and terrorists). The NTRG is chaired by the DoS and includes representatives from the nonproliferation, law enforcement, and intelligence communities.

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP). The PNSP was established in 2007 to help countries counter nuclear smuggling by increasing capabilities in prevention, detection, and response. PNSP supports projects developed by Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) where no other donor can be found or where there are opportunities to leverage foreign funding. To date, these projects have focused on securing radiological sources, monitoring open borders between fixed crossing points, and identifying legal gaps in national laws for prosecuting smugglers. PNSP also focuses on increasing foreign governments’ response capabilities by ensuring the entire spectrum of ministries follow a single set of well-exercised national operating procedures. PNSP is also dedicated to promoting nuclear forensics, which plays a critical role in promoting nuclear material security and investigating illicit uses of nuclear or radioactive material. PNSP is working to promote international nuclear forensics cooperation through National Nuclear Forensics Libraries and by promulgating nuclear forensic best practices for technical and law enforcement personnel.

Forensics Engagement Working Group (FEWG). The FEWG is an interagency working group that coordinates and facilitates USG outreach, engagement, and policy development on nuclear forensics. The group is chaired by the DoS and includes participants from the nonproliferation and law enforcement communities.

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (S/PD) — www.state.gov/r

The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs leads a comprehensive communications effort targeted at audiences both at home and internationally. The Under Secretary oversees the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, and the Bureau of International Information Programs. The Under Secretary also participates in the formulation of foreign policy. Responsibilities include active engagement in the ideological struggle with those who practice and support terrorism as a tactic.

Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). The CSCC was formed at the initiative of the President and the Secretary of State. It began its work on 27 September 2010. The Center’s current staff is made up of detailees from a number of agencies as well as State Department personnel from various bureaus. Effective communication is an essential part of the effort to support our national security, and the central responsibility of the CSCC is to take the lead in enhancing whole-of-government communication efforts and capabilities to counter the Al Qaida narrative and disrupt radicalization efforts in foreign societies. The CSCC coordinates, orients, and informs USG-wide communications with international audiences with the goal of using communication tools to reduce radicalization and extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security of the United States. The CSCC operates under the broad policy direction of the White House and interagency leadership.
The director reports to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (S/PD) and works closely with the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), as well as with the heads of other Department bureaus and other government agencies. CSCC coordinates closely within the State Department with S/CT’s Countering Violent Extremism unit as well as with the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) — see page 1-15 — and the geographic bureaus, primarily through the S/PD for Public Diplomacy.

**Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs (EEB)**

[www.state.gov/e/eeb](http://www.state.gov/e/eeb)

The EEB mission is to promote economic security, both domestically and internationally. It serves as a hub for USG interagency economic policy seeking to promote national security by ensuring successful achievement of U.S. foreign economic policy goals. To this end, it also works with the European Union (EU), G-8, G-20, World Trade Organization (WTO), and other IGOs to engage the international community on issues of common interest. The EEB coordinates within the USG interagency community with the Department of the Treasury and international partners such as the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, EU, and Persian Gulf States to deny terrorists access to the international financial system. EEB efforts are spread across seven sections: Energy, Sanctions and Commodities (EEB/ESC), International Communications and Information Policy (EEB/CIP), International Finance and Development (EEB/IFD), Trade Policy and Programs (EEB/TPP), Transportation Affairs (EEB/TRA), Commercial and Business Affairs (EEB/CBA), and Economic Policy Analysis and Public Diplomacy (EEB/EPPD).

**Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy**

[www.state.gov/e/eeb/esc/fts](http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/esc/fts)

Working with and through the interagency process, the Office of Counterterrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy is responsible for obtaining international agreement and support for initiatives targeting terrorist financing. As conditions dictate, it also develops, adjusts, and terminates as appropriate U.S. sanctions imposed on specific countries. As part of its interagency efforts, the office also coordinates with the Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security to develop and provide policy guidance on import-export arrangements and licensing issues.

**U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)**


The USAID plays critical roles both strategically and operationally in the USG interagency process. The agency’s history reaches back to the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Post-World War II Europe. USAID is an independent USG agency, operating under the policy direction of the Secretary of State. Its purposes are to advance U.S. foreign policy interests into expanding democratic and free market environments while simultaneously seeking to improve the lives of people living in the developing world. These goals are accomplished by supporting economic growth, agriculture, and trade; global health; and democracy, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance. USAID provides regional assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa; Asia; Latin America, and the Caribbean; Europe and Eurasia; and the Middle East. It also acts as the lead USG agency for international disaster assistance. Consequently, USAID serves as an active member of the U.S. Embassy Country Team and remains a highly visible presence throughout any AO.

As its part in an unprecedented interagency effort, USAID delivered 46,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to the port of Songrim, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) on 29 October and 15 November 2007. USAID Photo.
Chapter 1: Interagency Counterterrorism Components

**Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA)**
http://travel.state.gov/about/about_304.html

The Bureau of Consular Affairs is involved with processing and issuing passports for U.S. citizens and providing assistance and care to U.S. passport holders traveling overseas. It also manages the immigrant and nonimmigrant visa programs. The visa program requires screening for possible terrorists and other undesirables while preserving access to those welcome to travel to the U.S. Because of the nature of its responsibilities, the Bureau of Consular Affairs is a major interagency participant in any AO. It also contributes to public diplomacy campaigns through its interactions with local nationals. Because of its international reach, the CA supports efforts to protect the lives and interests of American citizens abroad and assists with securing our domestic borders through its visa and passport protocols.

**Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)**
www.state.gov/g/drl

The DRL has the responsibilities to promote democracy, ensure the respect and protection of human rights and international religious freedom, and advance labor rights around the globe. Such values are specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in various other regional and global agreements. As part of its international outreach, the U.S. employs a variety of tools to advance our freedom agenda to include bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, foreign assistance, reporting and public outreach, and economic sanctions. Among other activities, DRL works with U.S.-based NGOs who coordinate the activities of those working on the ground throughout the world. DRL is involved with developing the capacity of civil and governmental institutions to promote human rights and bring about stability. DRL also participates in technical assistance projects, coordinates with local business and labor leaders, and conducts evaluation of its funding assistance programs.

**Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)**
www.state.gov/p/inl

The INL provides advice to the President, Secretary of State, bureaus within the DoS and other departments, agencies, and organizations that make up the USG interagency process. Its two goals are to reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States and to minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens. To those ends, counter-narcotics and anticrime programs support CT efforts by promoting the modernization of foreign criminal justice systems and their evolving operational capacities. Thus INL policies and programs designed to address international narcotics trafficking and crime have an impact on the funding of terrorists and terrorist organizations through the development of working relationships among international law enforcement agencies both regionally and globally.

**Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)**
www.state.gov/s/inr

As a member of the USG’s Intelligence Community (IC), INR’s primary responsibility is to provide quality intelligence information and resources to support U.S. diplomacy and the achievement of national security objectives. INR analysts rely on all-source intelligence, diplomatic reporting, in-house public opinion polling, and interactions with domestic and foreign scholars. It seeks to provide global coverage of terrorist threats and other relevant concerns. INR produces reports on topics of interest to include political/military developments, terrorism, narcotics, and trade. It is...

What is clear to me is that there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development…civilian participation is both necessary to making military operations successful and to relieving stress on the men and women of our armed services who have endured so much these last few years, and done so with such unflagging bravery and devotion. Indeed, having robust civilian capabilities available could make it less likely that military force will have to be used in the first place, as local problems might be dealt with before they become crises.

— Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, reported quote, Manhattan, Kansas, 26 November 2007
also a regular contributor to the IC’s National Intelligence Estimates, the Presidential Daily Brief, and other senior level products. INR also conducts policy reviews of counterintelligence and law enforcement activities. Its Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) provides unclassified information to the USG interagency community and other partners to support responses to humanitarian crises worldwide. INR also maintains an unclassified database of independent states and sovereignty relationships to support global security initiatives. A relatively new responsibility within the IC is to serve as the “Executive Agent for Outreach” whereby INR establishes relationships between intelligence agencies and expertise residing in academia, think tanks, research councils, NGOs, and the private sector.

**Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO)**
www.state.gov/p/io

The IO serves as the USG’s primary tool for interaction with the United Nations (UN) and a variety of other international agencies and organizations. It serves as the activity hub for the extensive U.S. multilateral engagement program on global issues such as peace and security, nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, economic development, climate change, and global health. The IO maintains diplomatic missions in New York City, Geneva, Vienna, Rome, Paris, Montreal, and Nairobi. Besides pursuing issues of interest, IO seeks to increase the effectiveness of multilateral relationships by advocating for more transparent, accountable, and efficient international organizations.

**Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)**
www.state.gov/t/isn

The ISN leads the USG interagency efforts to block the spread of WMD. These include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. ISN also engages the international community through bilateral and multilateral relationship-building. To achieve its goals, ISN promotes international consensus on WMD proliferation through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy; leads the development of diplomatic responses to specific bilateral and regional WMD proliferation challenges; develops and supports strategic dialogues with key states or groups of states who are engaged in WMD issues and initiatives; addresses WMD proliferation threats posed by nonstate actors and terrorist groups by improving physical security, using interdiction and sanctions, and plays a central role in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); and works closely with the UN, G-8, NATO, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other international institutions and organizations to reduce and eliminate the threat posed by WMD.

**Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)**
www.state.gov/g/prm

PRM is focused on the very difficult mission of providing aid and sustainable solutions for refugees, victims of conflict, and stateless people around the world through repatriation, local integration, and resettlement within the United States. More specifically, the PRM mission is to “provide protection, ease suffering, and resolve the plight of persecuted and uprooted people around the world on behalf of the American people by providing life-sustaining assistance, working through multilateral systems to build global partnerships, promoting best practices in humanitarian response, and ensuring that humanitarian principles are thoroughly integrated into U.S. foreign and national security policy.” It provides assistance through a complex network of multinational organizations to include the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East (UNRWA). With a staff of some 130 civil servants and Foreign Service staff, PRM does not provide aid directly to refugees, but works through international organizations to manage contributions to the agencies and monitor the programs that are U.S. funded to ensure compliance with USG goals and policies.

**Foreign Service Institute (FSI)**
www.state.gov/m/fsi

The FSI is the primary training base for the USG’s Foreign Service officers and support personnel as they prepare themselves to advance U.S. foreign affairs interests
overseas and in Washington, D.C. The FSI program of instruction contains more than 450 courses (including training in some 70 foreign languages) available to the Foreign Service community, interagency departments, agencies and organizations, and the military services. The George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center supports an enrollment of some 50,000 enrollees annually from the DoS, more than 40 other USG agencies, and the military services. Courses range from a half-day to 2 years and focus on developing cultural, leadership, and management skills within the U.S. foreign affairs community and their families. The FSI serves as an important forum for gathering lessons learned and imparting them to its enrollees. It is organized into five schools like a university to include The School of Language Studies, The School of Applied Information Technology, The School of Leadership and Management, The School of Professional and Area Studies, and the Transition Center.

**U.S. Mission to the United Nations**
www.usun.state.gov/about

Established in 1947 under the provisions of the United Nations Participation Act, the U.S. Mission to the UN represents the U.S. at all meetings of the UN as part of a comprehensive effort to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives. It further engages the UN Secretariat and the member nations in consultations and negotiations to gain support for U.S. positions and initiatives. The mission staff consists of some 150 people who manage issues involving political, economic and social, legal, military, public diplomacy, and management issues at the UN. The U.S. delegation provides a continuous flow of information to DoS and U.S. embassies throughout the world and develops recommendations on how to proceed on issues before the UN.

**Additional Department of State Organizations and Initiatives**

**Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)**
www.state.gov/s/crs (See Chapter 2.)

**Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)**
www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance

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**Department of Defense (DoD)**
www.defense.gov

The DoD provides its full range of capabilities and resources to the CT effort. As a major participant in the NSC process, it plays an important role in the workings of the USG interagency community as it goes about its work to meet national security goals by defeating the terrorist threat to the U.S. DoD further participates in a variety of interagency clusters that perform specialized roles in the CT fight. The activities of all DoD components are under specified organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For example, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence oversees the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. The DoD components listed here obviously do not represent a comprehensive survey of DoD capabilities and resources. However, they do reflect major DoD components committed to USG interagency CT efforts.

**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD/SOLIC&IC)**

The ASD/SOLIC&IC is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to special operations and low-intensity conflict. The ASD/SOLIC&IC provides policy oversight for strategic capabilities, force transformation, and resources while supervising special operations and low-intensity conflict activities. USSOCOM’s 2007 Posture statement and Section 167 of Title 10 of the United States Code (USC) provide similar, though not identical, lists of SOF activities. These include CT, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, information operations, military information support operations (MISO), and WMD counter-proliferation.

**Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)**
www.darpa.mil

DARPA was established as part of DoD to conduct advanced research and manage development programs. DARPA’s mission is to prevent technological surprise to the U.S. and to create technological surprises for
our enemies. Through the years, DARPA has continuously refocused its work in direct response to, or in anticipation of, national security threats and revolutionary technology opportunities. Most recently, its strategic thrusts have included detection, precision ID, tracking, and destruction of elusive targets; urban area operations; advanced manned and unmanned systems; detection, characterization and assessment of underground structures; robust, secure, self-forming networks; space; increasing the tooth-to-tail ratio; biorevolution; and core technology. DARPA pushes technology transitions and seeks solutions to technological challenges.

**Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)**

[www.dia.mil](http://www.dia.mil)

The DIA is the chief provider of military intelligence to DoD and serves as a major participant in the USG IC. The Director of DIA acts as the principal advisor on intelligence matters to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. DIA provides intelligence products to policy makers, war fighters and force planners for their use in meeting their responsibilities within the national security arena. DIA applies varied expertise in a wide range of interests to include military, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking and defense-related political and economic issues.

DIA’s workforce of some 12,000 people represents expertise in foreign military and paramilitary forces, capabilities, and intentions; proliferation of WMD; international terrorism; international narcotics trafficking; information operations; and defense-related foreign political, economic, industrial, geographic, and medical and health issues. DIA has established the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) to consolidate terrorism-related intelligence gathering and reporting. October 2007 saw the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) to improve coordination of intelligence activities in support of the combatant commands (COCOMs).

The DIOCC also serves as the interface with the National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C), a DNI organization. The DIOCC operates and maintains a 24/7 global situational awareness center to address the intelligence requirements of the national leadership and COCOMs; serves as the lead organization for DoD intelligence planning; and provides direct, on-site support to all COCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) through various means including Joint Intelligence Support Teams. DIA personnel operate around the world. Major U.S. facilities include the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C.; the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center at Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland; and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center at Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama. As part of its responsibilities, DIA operates the Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Service and the Defense Attaché System.

The director of the DIA also commands the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR).

**Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)**

[www.dsca.mil](http://www.dsca.mil)

Working under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (ASD-GSA), the DSCA is responsible for directing and managing Security Cooperation (SC) programs and resources in support of national security objectives. SC activities are intended to build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests; build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access. An important subset of SC is Security Assistance (SA), which represents a collection of programs to deliver weapons systems and other defense items as well as various services to friendly governments to promote defense burden sharing and regional stability. Examples of SA initiatives include Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants or loans, and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Figure 10 (page 1-34) reflects the interagency relationships with the DSCA serving as the hub for interagency coordination.
The military departments (MILDEPs) field unique intelligence organizations with a full-spectrum of collection, analysis, production, and dissemination capabilities, appropriately linked to the service’s areas of expertise. For instance, U.S. Air Force intelligence, working through organizations like the Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency (AFIAA) and the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (AFISRA), relies on sophisticated technology such as manned and unmanned air- and space-based systems such as the U-2, Global Hawk, Predator, and Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS) to generate a wide variety of intelligence product.

Because of their mission orientations, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marines rely heavily on HUMINT techniques continuously enhanced by other technology-based resources. The Army relies on extensive Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate (F3EAD) capabilities to provide a continuous flow of credible intelligence into the decision cycle. The Marines integrate trained intelligence personnel into all echelons of command beginning with battalion/squadron and employ Intelligence Battalions for all-source intelligence; Radio Battalions for Signal Intelligence (SIGINT); Unmanned Aerial Systems squadrons for airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); and Reconnaissance Battalions for ground reconnaissance. With the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) serving as its production center, much of the Marines’ focus is placed on the complexities of expeditionary warfare.

With its sustained global reach, the U.S. Navy serves as the primary agency for maritime intelligence. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is co-located within the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC). The intelligence content supports the core Navy missions to include forward presence, maritime security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), power projection, sea control, and deterrence. ONI also provides intelligence on foreign naval capabilities, trends, operations and tactics, and global civil maritime activities.

Intelligence gathered from the MILDEPS flows through the IC and other interagency venues to support CT efforts overseas and other national security priorities. Each Military Department Intelligence Service serves as an individual member of the IC.

**National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)**

NGA is responsible for supplying timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of U.S. national security objectives. It provides imagery and geospatial information to assist decision makers and military commanders in understanding the intricacies of areas of the earth that are of interest. NGA provides tailored, customer-specific geospatial intelligence, analytic services, and solutions to assist in planning, decision making, and execution. Geospatial Intelligence refers to the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth. Among other activities, NGA provides information to support humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. It also manages the National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSG). NGA is a member of the U.S. IC and is designated as a DoD Combat Support Agency.

**National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)**

The NRO designs, builds, and operates the nation’s reconnaissance satellites and serves as the “nation’s eyes and ears in space.” Because of the unique placement of its resources, the NRO is able to provide global awareness of activities on the ground while focusing specifically on locations of particular national security interest. It is a major interagency player, working with the National Security Agency, NGA, CIA, U.S. Strategic Forces Command, the MILDEPs, and the rest of the Interagency Community. NRO also draws expertise from private sector aerospace companies and research centers. Its budget, the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), comes through the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP).
The core missions of the NSA/CSS are to protect U.S. national security systems and to produce foreign signals intelligence information. To those ends, NSA/CSS serves as the nation’s cryptologic organization that pursues the tasks of Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance. It “enables Network Warfare operations to defeat terrorists and their operations at home and abroad, consistent with U.S. laws and the protection of privacy and civil liberties.” NSA/CSS serves a wide variety of customers throughout the interagency process to include the military leadership, senior policy makers, and those involved with CT and counterintelligence activities. It also works with certain international allies in support of their efforts. Areas of interest include terrorism, narcotics trafficking, criminal gangs, and asymmetric threats. Among the NSA’s assets are the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center, National Security Operations Center, and the Research Directorate.

Additional DoD Organizations and Initiatives
Defense Security Service
www.dss.mil
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
www.dtra.mil
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P))
http://policy.defense.gov

Department of Justice (DoJ)
www.usdoj.gov

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI)
www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm

Operating from 21 field divisions within the U.S. and some 86 offices in 63 countries, DEA/ONSI maintains a major international law enforcement presence in support of national security objectives. DEA representatives serve on U.S. Embassy Country Teams (Chapter 2). The DEA/ONSI works with the IC and the wider interagency process to address threats from drug traffickers, immigration violators, and global terrorist networks. Among its responsibilities are the following:

a. Investigate and prepare for the prosecution of major violators of controlled substance laws involving interstate and international environments.
b. Manage a national drug intelligence program in cooperation with federal, state, local, and foreign officials.
c. Coordinate with various government agencies, to include foreign governments, to conduct programs to reduce illicit-drug availability within the U.S. through crop eradication, crop substitution, and training of foreign officials.
d. Oversee all programs involving law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries under the policy guidance of DoS and the local Country Teams.
e. Conduct liaison with the UN, Interpol, and other similar organizations with interests in international drug control efforts.

The DEA’s Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI) represents the agency in the IC and both contribute to the task of combating terrorism and leveraging IC support to the DEA’s law enforcement mission.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)–Counterterrorism
www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterterrorism/waronterrorhome.htm

The FBI, the lead federal agency for combating domestic terrorism, works both domestically and internationally to combat terrorism and other threats to national security. The FBI serves as the lead USG agency for a domestic terrorist incident. As an interagency player, the FBI works closely with the law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic communities to meet their domestic responsibilities to neutralize terrorist individuals and cells within the U.S. and to assist in dismantling terrorist networks worldwide.

The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) operates with the FBI’s Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) to co-locate interagency representatives from the law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, defense, public safety and homeland defense communities.
The setup allows for immediate access to FBI and participating agency databases and assures the rapid exchange of information and the working of issues and operational requirements. Information flows into the NJTTF from a variety of sources, including from some 100 JTTFs that are scattered throughout the U.S. The DoJ/FBI-led JTTFs retain their interagency identity and incorporate investigators, linguists, SWAT members, and other expertise from a cross-section of U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. JTTFs are domestically focused and combine federal, state, and local resources. Today more than 4,400 people from over 600 state and local agencies and 50 federal organizations work within the JTTF system.

Internationally, the FBI maintains some 70 offices and sub-offices that provide coverage to more than 200 countries, territories, and islands. They are identified on the U.S. Embassy Country Teams, discussed in Chapter 2, as legal attaches. Their responsibilities include sharing information, identifying threats to national security, disabling those threats if possible, investigating crimes and incidents, and identifying, tracking and apprehending terrorists and terrorist organizations. In addition to working with local authorities to meet its responsibilities, the FBI also conducts training for local law enforcement within their geographic areas of responsibility.

Federal Bureau of Investigation–Most Wanted Terrorists
www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterterrorism/waronterrorhome.htm

In coordination with the interagency Rewards for Justice Program, the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) (www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/tsc) maintains a Terrorist Watch List of those terrorists wanted worldwide. The list is the product of a comprehensive database of identifying information about those known or reasonably suspected of being engaged in terrorist activity. Photos on Web sites and other media communicate the identity of these individuals and seek additional input and tips about their location and habits to assist in their capture and prosecution. The list serves as a valuable asset in supporting screening agencies to positively identify known or suspected terrorists trying to obtain visas, enter the country, board aircraft, or engage in other activities. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) relies on the list as an important source of information to be shared with both domestic and international agencies.

Federal Bureau of Investigation–National Security Branch (NSB)
www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/nsb

Established on 12 September 2005, the NSB represents the consolidation of FBI national security programs into its Counterterrorism Division, Counterintelligence Division, and the Directorate of Intelligence. The NSB also operates the WMD Directorate and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) that provides actionable Intelligence to state and local law enforcement. Drawing on the information derived from the JTTFs located throughout the U.S. and the Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs), the NSB produces assessments of the structure, capabilities, motivation/ideology, and linkages among terrorist groups and networks. NSB is also responsible for the conduct and management of all foreign counterintelligence investigations.

National Security Division (NSD)
www.justice.gov/nsd

Under the terms of the USA PATRIOT Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2006, the President established the position of Assistant Attorney General for National Security with responsibilities for the National Security Division (NSD). This step brought together CT, counterespionage, FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act), and other expertise from throughout DoJ into a single organization.

The NSD combats terrorism and other threats to national security by enabling greater cooperation and ensuring greater unity of purpose among prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, intelligence attorneys, and the IC. Areas of interest include Intelligence Operations and Litigation, Counterterrorism to include the Antiterrorism Advisory Council (ATAC), Counterespionage, Oversight, Law and Policy, Foreign Investment, and Victims of Terrorism. The Division is organized into Counterterrorism and Counterespionage sections — the Office of Intelligence with three sections (Operations, Oversight, and Litigation), the Law and Policy Office, the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism, and an Executive Office.
Specific responsibilities of the NSD include the following:

a. Promote and oversee a coordinated national CT enforcement program that engages the USG interagency community to include the 93 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.

b. Oversee and support the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC).

c. Consult, advise, and collaborate with prosecutors nationwide on international and domestic terrorism investigations, prosecutions, and appeals.

d. Share information and advice to international prosecutors, agents, and investigating magistrates.

e. Develop training for prosecutors and investigators on relevant tactics, laws, policies, and procedures.

f. Provide guidance on interpretation and application of new terrorism statutes, regulations, and policies.

g. Serve as the DoJ representative on interagency boards, committees, and other groups focused on national security.

h. Establish and maintain the Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism.

i. Ensure the rights of victims and families are honored and respected.

Additional DoJ Organizations and Initiatives

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
www.atf.gov

Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

Counterterrorism Section (CTS)
www.usdoj.gov/nsd/counter_terrorism.htm

Field Intelligence Group (FIG)

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/foreign-terrorist-tracking-task-force-fttff

INTERPOL–United States National Central Bureau (INTERPOL-USNCB)
www.usdoj.gov/usncb

Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx)
www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/n-dex/n-dex

Office of Intelligence
www.justice.gov/nsd/intelligence.htm

Terrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS)
www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_financing

Terrorism and International Victim Assistance Services Division
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/factshts/tivas08/welcome.html

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
www.dhs.gov

As its title indicates, DHS has as its primary focus securing the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks as well as other man-made and natural threats. The department leads a variety of agencies whose purpose is relevant to both domestic and international CT efforts. DHS came into being under the terms of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. That legislation consolidated 22 existing federal agencies and many additional federal responsibilities that were then distributed throughout the DHS.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
www.cbp.gov

With its core mission as “guardians of our nation’s borders,” the CBP pursues its priority responsibility to prevent terrorists and their weapons from entering the U.S. Relying on the work of more than 53,000 people, CBP is responsible for apprehending individuals attempting to enter the U.S. illegally; stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband; protecting agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases; protecting U.S. businesses from theft of their intellectual property; and regulating and facilitating international trade, collecting import duties, and enforcing U.S. trade laws. CBP works through its National Targeting Center (NTC), which coordinates within the USG interagency process to identify threats in advance of an incident, and participates in targeting support of USG CT initiatives.
Chapter 1: Interagency Counterterrorism Components

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
www.ice.gov

As the largest investigative agency within DHS, ICE plays a major CT role by enforcing customs and immigration laws and other supportive activities. Its principal targets are illegal immigrants who could pose threats to the U.S. and the financial and material resources they rely on to facilitate terrorist or other criminal activity. The agency employs some 19,000 employees in more than 400 offices worldwide who work under authorities contained in 400 plus federal statutes. ICE conducts its activities through three integrated operational directorates: Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), and Management and Administration (MA). ICE is the second largest federal law enforcement presence within the DoJ/FBI’s interagency NJTTF. As such, it participates in information exchange, planning, and other work functions among the USG interagency components.

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0870.shtml

The DHS intelligence function includes I&A and other separate intelligence offices located within each of the departments’ operational components. I&A pursues five “analytic thrusts” to include threats related to border security, threat of radicalization and extremism, threats from particular groups entering the U.S., threats to the Homeland’s critical infrastructure and key resources, and WMD and health threats. Relationships with the CBP and ICE are particularly important for addressing border issues. I&A synchronizes internal intelligence activities through the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC). To ensure the strongest possible unity of effort, the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis directs the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (IE), which includes I&A and the intelligence elements of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). I&A serves as the executive agent for the Department of Homeland Security state and local Fusion Center Program and has officers working out of dozens of fusion centers located throughout the country. While I&A serves as the DHS representative within the IC, the separate intelligence offices in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, Secret Service, and Citizenship and Immigration Services all maintain strong relationships and interaction with various members of the IC because of the specialized nature of their responsibilities.

Office of Policy
www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0870.shtml

The DHS Office of Policy is made up of several components, which impact specific CT efforts. These include the Office of Policy Development, Office of Strategic Plans, and Office of International Affairs. The 13 units of the Office of Policy Development work within the USG interagency process to ensure synchronization of DHS policies with other USG departments, agencies, and organizations.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
www.tsa.gov

Though most familiar for its presence in some 450 U.S. airports, the TSA is further engaged through the USG interagency process to assist in the security of the nation’s entire transportation system of highways, railroads, buses, mass transportation systems, and ports to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
www.uscg.mil

The nearly 42,000 members of the USCG conduct a variety of missions designed to monitor shipping traffic near and approaching U.S. shores and to secure U.S. ports, harbors, and coastline. It performs within five functional roles including maritime security, maritime
safety, protection of natural resources, maritime mobility, and national defense. The USCG also participates as a full member of the IC. Internationally, the USCG works with other countries to improve maritime security and to support U.S. diplomatic activities. The U.S. Coast Guard’s presence in ports and along shorelines, both domestically and internationally, positions it as a source of intelligence not always available through other collection means. The Coast Guard’s Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program includes Its National Intelligence Element, the Criminal Investigations Service, the Counterintelligence Service, the Intelligence Coordination Center, and the Cryptologic Service.

**U.S. Secret Service (USSS)**  
[www.secretservice.gov](http://www.secretservice.gov)

The USSS has both protective and investigative responsibilities that cause it to engage the USG interagency process for information exchanges, planning coordination, and other critical activities within the CT effort. It plays a critical role in securing the nation’s financial infrastructure and money supply while protecting national leaders, visiting heads of state, and various security venues.

**Additional DHS Organizations and Initiatives**

**Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Counterterrorism Policy**  

**Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)**  
[www.fema.gov](http://www.fema.gov)

**Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (International Programs Division)**  
[www.fletc.gov](http://www.fletc.gov)

**Federal Protective Services**  

**National Fusion Center Network**  
[www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2008/05/national-fusion-center-network.html](http://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2008/05/national-fusion-center-network.html)

**National Protection and Programs Directorate**  

**Office of Strategic Plans**  

**United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)**  
[www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis](http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis)

**Department of the Treasury (Treasury)**  
[www.ustreasury.gov](http://www.ustreasury.gov)

The Department of the Treasury’s CT role focuses on ensuring the sound functioning of the U.S. and international financial systems in the face of security threats to their stability. Through participation in the USG interagency process and coordination with partner nations and international organizations, Treasury targets and manages sanctions against foreign threats to U.S. financial systems while also identifying and targeting financial support networks established to sustain terrorist and other threats to national security.

**Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)**  
[www.treasury.gov/ofac](http://www.treasury.gov/ofac)

OFAC is the Treasury agency responsible for managing and enforcing sanctions against targeted countries, terrorists, drug traffickers, and those suspected in the proliferation of WMD. OFAC is linked throughout the USG interagency process and with the international community through the UN and other IGOs, international mandates, and direct cooperation with partner nations. OFAC also deploys attaches to postings in various countries in support of the Country Team. Further details are presented in Chapter 2.

**Office of International Affairs**  
[www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-International-Affairs.aspx](http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-International-Affairs.aspx)

The Office of International Affairs is responsible for the development of U.S. international financial and trade policy. It is led by the Under Secretary of International Affairs and oversees 12 separate deputates: Africa, Development Policy and Debt, East Asia, Environment and Energy, Europe and Eurasia, International Monetary and Financial Policy, Investment Security, Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Technical Assistance, Trade and Investment Policy, and the Western Hemisphere.
The office encourages international financial stability and sound economic policies that address various issues to include monitoring possible threats to the U.S. It also tracks economic and financial conditions around the world and then coordinates with financial markets, other governments, and international financial organizations to develop and promote constructive policies.

The Office of International Affairs is concerned with worldwide monetary conditions, trade and investment policy, and international debt issues while working on G-8 initiatives and the annual economic summits.

**Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI)**
[www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Terrorism-and-Financial-Intelligence.aspx](http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Terrorism-and-Financial-Intelligence.aspx)

TFI synchronizes the Treasury intelligence and enforcement capabilities to protect the U.S. financial system by targeting rogue nations, those supporting terrorists, those involved with the proliferation of WMDs, drug traffickers, and various other national security threats. It interfaces with the USG interagency process at several nodes to produce maximum effects.

**Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA)** ([www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Intelligence-Analysis.aspx](http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Intelligence-Analysis.aspx)). The OIA came into existence as a result of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2004. The office operates as a subordinate agency of the Office of Terrorism and Financial Analysis (TFI). OIA gathers, analyzes, and produces intelligence on financial support networks for terrorist networks and other threats to national security. Its strategic priorities are terrorist financing, insurgency financing, and rogue regimes/proliferation financing. More specifically, OIA combats terrorist facilitators, WMD proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats. OIA has developed expertise in understanding how terrorist financial networks operate and in developing intelligence to help cut off necessary funding mechanisms. OIA is also active in tracking resources flowing to rogue states involved with the production and proliferation of WMDs.

**Office of the Director for National Intelligence (DNI)**
[www.dni.gov](http://www.dni.gov)

The DNI serves as the head of the USG IC. The DNI began functioning in April 2005, but the concept of a coordinator of national intelligence has been under discussion since the mid-1950s. The DNI manages and oversees the execution of the National Intelligence Program (NIP). The director serves as the principal intelligence advisor to the President, NSC, and Homeland Security Council. The DNI responsibilities include leading the IC; overseeing the coordination of foreign relationships between the IC and the intelligence services of foreign governments; establishing requirements and priorities for national intelligence; and transforming the IC into a unified, collaborative, and coordinated organization. The DNI executes its responsibilities through four deputy directors for National Intelligence: Office of the Deputy Director for Policy, Plans, and Requirements (DDNI/PPR); Office of the Deputy Director for Collection (DDNI/C); Office of the Deputy Director for Analysis (DDNI/A); and the Office of Deputy Director for Future Capabilities (DDNI/FC). Figure 5 identifies the USG interagency components that populate the IC.

**Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)**
[https://www.cia.gov](https://www.cia.gov)

First established in 1947 by the National Security Act, the CIA’s role was modified under the terms of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, which created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. It remains the largest producer of all-source national security intelligence to senior U.S. policy and decision makers. The director of the CIA works with all agencies contained within the interagency IC and reports to the director of National Intelligence. The CIA employs human and other resources to collect, evaluate, organize, assess, and disseminate intelligence products throughout the USG interagency process to policy makers, decision takers, and other users. The CIA functions through the National Clandestine Service (NCS), Directorate of Intelligence (DI), Directorate of Science & Technology (DS&T), and the Directorate of Support (DS).
Established by the IRTPA of 2004 and defined by Executive Order 13354 on 27 August 2004, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has as its mission to “lead our nation’s effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.”

The NCTC hosts analysts and others from more than 16 departments, agencies, and organizations and provides information sharing through more than 30 networks in an effort to identify those who pose threats to the U.S. The NCTC draws on the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) and the NCTC Online (NOL), which is a data library of CT information with a worldwide reach.

As depicted in Figure 5, the NCTC, along with the DNI, serves as the principal hub for IC coordination. In that role, the NCTC serves as the lead organization for CT intelligence and strategic operational planning for CT activities while conducting business from a continuously functioning operations center that is staffed with representatives from throughout the IC and other organizations such as the Capitol Police.

The NCTC produces a range of analytic and threat information products for the President, cabinet officials, military leaders, and the remainder of the USG interagency community. The NCTC is co-located with the FBI-NJTTF in Northern Virginia.

While the individual members of the IC carry on their traditional functions in support of their parent department, agency, or organizations, intelligence of mutual interest concerning both national and homeland security terrorism issues and events is exchanged and acted on through the IC interagency process.
Department of Agriculture (USDA)  
Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)  
www.fas.usda.gov

Most broadly, the FAS conducts activities to improve foreign market access for U.S. products, build new markets, improve the competitive position of U.S. agriculture in the global marketplace, and provide food aid and technical assistance to foreign countries. It seeks to introduce resources and guidance on the ground to encourage agricultural growth as a component of economic development. FAS representatives are present in more than 90 countries and are participants on U.S. Embassy Country Teams (see Chapter 2). The organization participates within the USG interagency process in a variety of ways, including working closely with USAID to administer various U.S. food aid programs. FAS also serves as a link to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on a variety of issues.

Department of Commerce (DoC)  
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)  
www.bis.doc.gov

The BIS assists in support of national defense and economic security objectives through export controls, treaty compliance, and the assurance of U.S. technology leadership. It manages and enforces dual-use export controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, and to block the transfer of weapons to terrorists, those countries supporting them and rogue states.

Department of Energy (DoE)  
Office of Intelligence (IN)  
www.energy.gov/nationalsecurity

The DoE’s intelligence programs reach back as far as the World War II Manhattan Project. IN conducts assessments of the global threats from nuclear terrorism and works to stall the proliferation of nuclear technology, resources, and expertise. The IN focuses on nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; energy security; science and technology; and nuclear energy, safety, and waste. Working through the interagency IC, the Office of Intelligence enables the exchange of intelligence throughout the USG interagency process on energy matters and conducts evaluations of emerging threats to U.S. economic and security interests. More specifically, IN serves as the IC’s technical intelligence resource in the core areas of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation; energy security; science and technology; and nuclear energy, safety, and waste. Separate from the Office of Intelligence, DoE also provides Nuclear Emergency Support Team assistance to deal with technical aspects of radiological or nuclear terrorism.

Functioning of the Interagency Counterterrorism Components

The previous section identified the various components of the interagency process that deal with CT. They are identified by their parent department, agency, or organization. However, like the military, these various components generally do not act without coordination with other USG components or structured task organization.

The functioning of the USG interagency process is organized around a collection of coordinating “hubs” that are clustered to accommodate USG departments, agencies, and organizations in pursuit (within the purview of this manual) of specific overseas CT goals. Many of these interagency hubs have evolved over time and have taken on a sense of permanency with specific departments, agencies, and organizations assigned “lead” responsibilities.

Other interagency bodies are put together on an ad-hoc basis to address specific events, situations, or issues. These are also led by designated leads to ensure specific national security goals are met. Once those goals have been achieved, the ad-hoc body disbands. As noted earlier, the Interagency Policy Committees (IPC) within the National Security Council structure frequently share this ad-hoc nature.

Chapter 2 discusses how the U.S. Embassy Country Team overseas, operating with support from the interagency process in Washington, D.C., is responsible for integrating the various interagency components on the ground to gain maximum effects. The Country Team...
also interfaces with HN, partner nations, IGO, and NGO initiatives committed to the CT effort in the AO. It is a dynamic and potentially confusing environment within which participants often expend their skills and resources in multiple directions simultaneously.

This section identifies the functional clusters that address specific issues such as CT, intelligence, finance, disaster response, and technology.

The USG Counterterrorism Components/“Team”
www.state.gov/s/ct/team/index.htm

The first of these clusters is the DoS “U.S. Counterterrorism Team.” As noted earlier in this chapter, the DoS serves as the designated lead agency for coordinating and managing USG CT initiatives overseas. Some may find that fact confusing. Those who are not informed of the structure and functioning of the interagency process are frequently surprised at the complexity associated with the numbers of players and the apparent looseness of the working relationships among the members of the U.S. Counterterrorism Team.

As depicted in Figure 3 (page 1-12), the U.S. Counterterrorism Components extend throughout the USG to bring together a wide variety of resources to address CT threats. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, shown in yellow, acts as the central hub for that part of the interagency process dealing with CT. There is no command relationship defined.

However, the interagency work flow discussed earlier typically passes through the Coordinator for Counterterrorism into the NSC Process and then back through for action and management. Specific roles, missions, and responsibilities for the members of the U.S. Counterterrorism Components are contained in the previous section.

The USG Intelligence Community (IC)
www.intelligence.gov

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 restructured the coordinative relationships among the members of the USG IC. The legislation established the Office of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with the responsibility to act as the lead agency for the IC, execute the National Intelligence Program, and serve as the principal advisor to the President and NSC on intelligence issues involving national security.

Figure 5 (page 1-25) portrays the IC. With the DNI serving as its interagency intelligence “hub,” the members of the IC represent an extensive cross-section of the USG. As noted earlier in discussions about the agencies contained within the DHS, the 17 core members of the IC also maintain close working relationships with other agencies uniquely positioned to develop useful intelligence information. This fact adds to the inherent complexity of the extensive USG IC and requires a high level of situation awareness on the part of SOF warriors and others who rely on the IC membership.

The IC produces a wide variety of intelligence products. At the most senior level, these include the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) and the World Intelligence Review (WIRE). However, there are numerous other reports available to IC members and associates from throughout the USG.

Oversight of the IC is exercised by a variety of Executive and Legislative Branch organizations. Executive Branch supervision is carried out by the NSC and by the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB), the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

The DNI and IC are responsible for providing timely and objective intelligence to the President, other department and agency heads, and the Congress as required to successfully prosecute CT activities. They are also tasked to develop, resource, execute, and evaluate intelligence strategies and programs on all matters involving national security and homeland security.

To facilitate its leadership of the IC, the DNI organization consists of ten functional mission support activities:

a. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
b. National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX)
c. National Counter-Proliferation Center (NCPC)
d. Special Security Center (SSC)
e. National Intelligence University (NIU)
f. Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA)
g. Center for Security Evaluation (CSE)
h. National Intelligence Council (NIC)
i. National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C)
Chapter 1: Interagency Counterterrorism Components

j. Mission Support Center.

With the large number of intelligence agencies scattered throughout the USG, the DNI and IC face the challenge of synchronizing USG activities in support of national intelligence requirements. In addition to the IC, there are other interagency bodies that are concerned with information exchange and intelligence operations, as described below.

Information Sharing Environment (ISE)
www.ise.gov

Experience teaches that success in preventing future terrorist attacks and successfully targeting terrorists and their networks rests on the effective sharing of information among all relevant parties. This engagement involves the efficient gathering, analysis, and sharing of intelligence among the organs of the USG, state, local and tribal governments, the private sector, and partner nations. The goal is to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its interests around the world.

It has become clear that greater institutional flexibility and resilience are required of all participants. To support a wide-ranging agenda of initiatives, the ISE was created through Section 1016 of the IRTPA of 2004 and supports the intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland security, and foreign affairs communities of the USG. Structurally, the ISE is led by a program manager and supported by the Information Sharing Council.

The ISE pursues the following goals: 1) create a culture of sharing, 2) reduce barriers to sharing, 3) improve sharing practices with federal, state, local, tribal, and foreign partners, and 4) institutionalize sharing. To achieve these goals, the ISE employs various specific approaches to include these:

a. Facilitate the establishment of a trusted partnership among all levels of government, the private sector, and foreign partners.

b. Promote an information-sharing culture among ISE partners by facilitating the improved sharing of timely, validated, protected, and actionable terrorism information supported by extensive education, training, and awareness programs for ISE participants.

c. To the maximum extent possible, function in a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated manner.

d. Develop and deploy incrementally, leveraging existing information-sharing capabilities while also creating new core functions and services.

e. Enable the federal government to speak with one voice on terrorism-related matters and to promote more rapid and effective interchange and coordination among Federal departments and agencies and state, local and tribal governments, the private sector, and foreign partners, thus ensuring effective multidirectional sharing of information.

f. Ensure sharing procedures and policies protect information privacy and civil liberties.

Information Sharing & Fusion Centers
www.ise.gov/2010-baseline-capabilities-assessment

Various states and municipalities have established fusion centers to ensure the efficient sharing of information of importance to the law enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and CT communities. Most of the scores of functional fusion centers now operating follow guidelines developed through the DoJ-sponsored Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the DHS-sponsored Homeland Security Advisory Council. The National Strategy for Information Sharing (www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing/NSIS_book.pdf) guides the interagency effort.

Federal support includes:

a. DHS and DoJ’s Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services
b. DHS’s Fusion Center Initiative, including providing DHS personnel to the fusion centers to assist
c. DoJ’s Information Sharing Resources for the Justice and Public Safety Communities
d. DoJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative
e. National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC)
f. Criminal Intelligence Training Master Calendar.
Established by the President and Congress, the ITACG seeks to improve the quality of “federally coordinated” terrorism-related information in support of the interagency efforts of the NCTC. As appropriate, its activities reach beyond the USG to supply relevant information to state, local and tribal officials, and the private sector.

Among its priorities, the ITACG prepares federally coordinated views on terrorist threats and issues of interest to USG interagency members. Additionally it seeks to establish a shared sense of situation awareness among its various partners and customers.

ITACG products include alerts and warnings of terrorism threats within the US; situational awareness reports that support international, national, state or local level events and activities; and strategic assessments of risks and threats to the U.S.

The office of the NCIX is a component of the DNI and is made up of representatives from USG intelligence and security departments, agencies, and organizations. It is led by the National Counterintelligence Executive who is appointed by the DNI in consultation with the Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The NCIX is responsible for conducting an annual National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment and other counterintelligence reports, developing and executing the National Counterintelligence Strategy, and preparing assessments of strategy implementation with an eye toward improving the effectiveness of counterintelligence operations.

The NCIX also chairs the Counterintelligence Policy Board (Figure 6), which reports through the NSC to the President. In addition to the NCIX, membership includes senior representatives from the DoJ, FBI, DoD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoS, DoE, and the CIA. As with all such bodies, representation from other departments, agencies, and organizations may be mandated by the President.

Counterintelligence Policy Board

Counterterrorism Finance Efforts

With the DoS Counterterrorism Finance Unit serving as the functional hub, USG CT efforts to locate, track, disrupt, and eliminate financial support of terrorists and their networks are coordinated within the USG as shown in Figure 7. Additionally, interagency finance activities are enhanced through interaction with other countries and IGOs who are concerned with ensuring the stability of the international financial systems and the prevention of their abuse by criminal elements, especially terrorists. Chapter 3 identifies the major international players in this process. One of those IGOs, the Financial Action Task Force, is included in this discussion.

The FATF is an IGO that, since its founding in 1989 by the G-7 countries, has grown to more than 30 members with several more organizations holding associate or observer status. Its primary focus is on combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Because of its broad linkage through financial organizations around the world, the FATF plays a critical role in information exchange, policy development, and the
building of consensus to act. It pursues its mandate by setting international standards to combat money laundering and terrorist financing; assessing and monitoring compliance with FATF standards; conducting studies of money laundering and terrorist financing methods, trends, and techniques; and responding to new and emerging threats. The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Finance and Financial Crimes (TFFC), a subordinate element of the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI), leads the USG’s participation in the FATF.

**Counterterrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement**

www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/mission

Working through the interagency process, DoJ has consolidated a listing of CT training available through the USG, the private sector, and nonprofit organizations. The Counterterrorism Training Coordination Working Group, operating under a mandate from the DoJ’s Office of Justice Programs, is responsible for this effort.

Reflecting the interagency makeup of the working group and training availabilities, membership includes the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the Office of Justice Programs, the Office of the Police Corps and Law Enforcement Education, the Office for Domestic Preparedness, the U.S. Army Military Police School, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S. Department of Labor.

Figure 8 depicts the Counterterrorism Training Working Group, with the hub indicated in yellow.
Interagency Organizations and Initiatives

As we have seen, the dynamic interaction of the USG interagency process requires the participation of many departments, agencies, and organizations from throughout the USG. Though placed within a specific department such as the DoS or DoD, USG interagency components rely on expertise and resources far beyond the boundaries of any specific organizational chart.

Given the numbers and wide variety of participants, programs, and relationships, many volumes could be written about the challenges of navigating the USG interagency process. However, for the purposes of this manual, it is most useful to identify as many participants and programs as possible and to chart their relationships to arrive at an awareness of the existing complexities. Such basic understandings empower the special operations warrior at strategic, operational, and tactical levels to function credibly and effectively.

The influence of these various participants is felt in their collection and assessment of information and in their development of various options as the USG interagency process flows upward through the NSC/DC and NSC/PC to the President. Once a decision is taken, the various USG organizations, both standing and ad-hoc, then play important roles in overseeing the execution of policy and the evaluation of its effectiveness.

The functioning of CT efforts requires regular liaison, sometimes in the form of embedded interagency liaison teams, to ensure the closest possible coordination of efforts.

To improve the efficiency of its liaison mission, USSOCOM has placed Special Operations Support Teams (SOST) within departments, agencies, and organizations of the USG. Their purpose is to provide an embedded liaison team at critical nodes of the interagency process to facilitate the exchange of information, the development of courses of action, the preparation of recommendations, and the efficient execution of executive orders.

Because the interagency environment is continuously evolving and changing, no exhaustive list of interagency organizations and programs is possible. However, the following are the kinds of organizations that have an impact on the effectiveness of SOF.

**United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM)**
(www.africom.mil)

To reduce the frequently ad-hoc nature of the USG interagency process, DoD has partnered with other USG components to form USAFRICOM. USAFRICOM is the first organization of its kind to institutionalize the interagency structure necessary for the achievement of U.S. national security objectives in a very complex region of the world.

Prior to the establishment of USAFRICOM, no fewer than three U.S. military headquarters were responsible for building relationships with countries that make up the African continent. The USG interagency process was made more complex as other USG departments, agencies, and organizations pursuing diplomatic, economic, and informational national security objectives simultaneously functioned throughout the continent.

USAFRICOM is traveling the unique path of incorporating DoS, USAID, and other USG components into the staff and leadership structure of the command, resulting in far greater inclusion than the current USG interagency process could ever achieve.

For instance, USAFRICOM features two deputy commanders. One represents the traditional Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO). That officer is complemented by a senior U.S. diplomat who serves as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA).

The DCMA directs planning and programming for health, humanitarian assistance and demining actions, disaster response, security sector reform, strategic communications, and others related functions. Based on background and experience, the DCMA is also well suited to ensure that USAFRICOM activities are in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives, a check traditionally made through the USG interagency process. Staffing throughout USAFRICOM will support the efforts of the DCMA and provide immediate interface and coordination with the more traditional military staff structure.

Future plans call for seeking inclusion of partner nations and NGOs.
Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST)
The DEST is one of a collection of response and recovery assets available to the consequence management efforts of the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). These could include nuclear, biological, and chemical events. The response to any specific domestic incident, whether natural or man-made, is structured to meet the challenges encountered. The goal is to provide specialized skills and capabilities, establish emergency-response facilities, and assist in incident management efforts. The DoD is frequently called upon to provide specific assets and expertise along with other federal, state, local, and tribal agencies. For instance, the DoD provides transportation for DEST deployments. Among the organizations that are available for consequence management include Emergency Response Teams (ERTs), Federal Incident Response Support Teams (FIRSTs), Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs), Nuclear Incident Response Teams (NIRTs), and Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs).

Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)
www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16664.htm

Of particular importance to the special operations warrior is the role played by the Operations Directorate of the S/CT. One of the S/CT missions involves working with DoD to develop and execute overseas CT policies, plans, and operations. The Operations Directorate also acts as a communication hub for communicating DoD CT initiatives throughout the DoS infrastructure, both at home and abroad. Additionally, the directorate is responsible for training and leading the quick-response, interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) that is designed to react to events around the world on short notice.

The FEST provides crisis management expertise, time-sensitive information and intelligence, planning for contingency operations, hostage negotiating expertise, and reach-back capabilities to agencies in Washington, D.C. The FEST relies on expertise from DoS, DoD, FBI, DoE, and the IC (see Figure 9). FESTs have deployed to more than 20 countries since the development of the organization in 1986. For instance, two FESTs deployed to Africa in 1998 in the wake of the terrorist bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya and in Tanzania. Consistent with their mission, the teams provided assistance to the ambassadors and helped manage the consequences of the attacks.

A FEST also went to Yemen in 2000 in response to the attack on the USS Cole as it anchored in the Port of Aden. Other FESTs are routinely involved with events and situations around the world such as the abductions of Americans in Ecuador and the Philippines. “Contingency” FESTs were also deployed to the Summer Olympic Games in Athens, Greece in 2004, the Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy in 2006, and to Lagos, Nigeria during a hostage crisis.

Figure 9. FEST

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
www.dsca.mil

Though a DoD component as identified earlier, the DSCA accomplishes its various security assistance missions by engaging a wide variety of members of the USG interagency process. Figure 10 identifies the various USG interagency components that play a role in
the process, with the DSCA serving as the coordination hub. The interagency security assistance process asserts itself both in Washington, D.C. and overseas, meaning that special operations warriors will inevitably encounter DSCA resources while pursing their missions.

**USSOCOM Interagency Task Force (IATF)**

To ensure the most efficient environment for the exchange of information, coordination of activities, and synchronization of planning, USSOCOM has established a IATF that includes DoD, USG interagency components, and partner nations. The intent is to move beyond ad-hoc liaison relationships to the creation of a forum where interaction is continuous and sustained. Participants in the IATF will change based on circumstances, but the nature of the IATF structure and process allows for the accommodation of such changes.

Figure 11 describes the makeup of the USSOCOM IATF with the understanding that specific members can and will vary. The IATF also “provides a direct access to agencies and departments through the Special Operations Support Teams (SOST) program that can leverage the right decision maker to ensure a more timely response/decision.” The effectiveness of the SOSTs lies in the embedded nature of their members within other agencies and their on-scene responsiveness to their interagency partners. The success of the SOST initiative has resulted in an expansion of the number and dispersion of the teams to multiple components of the interagency community. SOST partners include those in the IATF and others not represented within that organization. Though the number of SOSTs will change, recent partners have included the following:

- Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
- National Capital Region (NCR)
- USAID
- Department of the Treasury
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
- Department of State (DoS)
- Department of Energy (DoE)
- Department of Justice (DoJ)
Chapter 1: Interagency Counterterrorism Components

The DoD reliance on JIACG structures began in October 2001. CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, and other commands also rely on a JIACG to support their operations. Thus efficiencies gained elsewhere are likely to assist the USSOCOM IATF even as the latter exchanges lessons learned through its SOSTs and other information-sharing venues.

Experience teaches that SOF operations do not occur in a vacuum and, in fact, rely on coordination and support provided by other DoD, non-DoD USG departments and agencies, various host and partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. The IATF helps to facilitate those relationships as reflected in its mission statement to “coordinate Special Operations activities with interagency partners and other stakeholders to counter irregular or transnational violent extremist threats worldwide.” The IATF vision is that the team formed by its network of relationships “identifies and defines discrete problems and facilitates USSOCOM efforts to build, integrate, and inform partnerships and communities to effect solutions.”

The structure and purpose of the USSOCOM IATF is not entirely consistent with those traditionally associated with such organizations. Therefore there is ongoing discussion about changing the name to more accurately capture its roles in support of the USSOCOM. Possible alternatives include “Interagency Coordination Center” or “Interagency Coordination Group (IACG).” The IACG concept has been evolving over the past decade.

![Diagram of the Interagency Task Force](image-url)
The IATF serves as a major hub within USSOCOM for orchestrating interagency efforts against terrorism overseas and other missions. It conducts its activities through four separate components that seek to counter irregular or transnational violent extremist threats around the world:

a. **Synchronization Division.** Coordinating actions with host organizations and synchronizing operations, Intelligence, and the wider USG interagency community.

b. **Outreach Division.** Creating a synergistic, stable, full-time network of USSOCOM personnel located within the National Capital Region (NCR).

c. **Forecasting Division.** Identifying, understanding, and anticipating emerging irregular warfare threats.

d. **Fusion Division.** Coordinating SOF perspectives and capabilities with broader, whole-of-nation actions.

The key tasks performed by the IATF include the following:

a. Integrate Interagency (IA) knowledge, capabilities, authorities, and enablers to counter irregular or transnational violent extremist threats worldwide.

b. Provide a single point of entry for all IA issues for USSOCOM; maintain open lines of communication with the IA through SOSTs and senior interagency representatives.

c. Identify gaps/seams to seek functional, geographic, and organizational opportunities.

d. Enable Communities of Interest (COI) to achieve shared understanding and collective Operations, Activities, and Actions (OAA) to maximize effects on complex, multiagency, and transnational threats and opportunities.

e. Provide a range of IA coordination, processes, and expertise to facilitate vertical and horizontal integration between USSOCOM, the NCR, and deployed elements.

f. Hand off mature OAA to appropriate partners and then pursue new opportunities to develop solutions for strategic problems that can be allowed to local situations.

The IATF makes available the following products and services to USSOCOM, to include deployed SOF, and to its IA partners:

a. Synchronize desired IA effects and OAA with those of the deployed SOF.

b. Provide continuous (24/7) access to the IA for all deployed SOF to address discrete problems impacting SOF; assist deployed SOF with raising those issues to senior leadership to ensure awareness and attention.

c. Develop and maintain COI focused on transnational extremism and global forecasting to assist SOF by “looking” outside the Combined/Joint Operational Area.

d. Provide fused Intelligence/Operations/IA products on topics of relevance to deployed SOF and maintain influence on COIs developed to facilitate action.

e. Provide IA collaboration lessons learned and vignettes on a quarterly basis through newsletters, point papers, and briefings.

f. Provide a deep understanding of complex threat networks and their environment so appropriate authoritative agencies and departments can take the lead on specific issues.

**Additional USSOCOM Organizations and Programs**

- Civil-Military Support Element (CMSE)
- Joint Combined Exercise for Training (JCET)
- Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC)
- Military Information Support Team (MIST)
- Special Operations Support Teams (SOST)
- Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (USSOCOM/JICC)

**Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)**

The CTFP was established under the 2002 DoD Appropriations Act as a security cooperation tool in support of the global war on terrorism. It provides education and training opportunities for foreign military officers,
ministry of defense officials, and foreign security officials to build individual proficiency while enabling regional cooperation. It complements other programs such as IMET, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs), Counter Narco Terrorist (CNT) training, Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)-related training, and Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) programs. CTFP goals include the following:

a. Build the CT capabilities and capacities of partner nations.
b. Build and strengthen a global network of combating terrorism experts and practitioners committed to participation in support of U.S. efforts against terrorists and terrorist organizations.
c. Counter ideological support for terrorism.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC&IC) serves as the senior policy official for CTFP initiatives while the director of the DSCA is responsible for the management and execution of all CTFP programs.

**Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)**

www.tswg.gov

The Technical Programs Unit of the S/CT is responsible for providing policy oversight for TSWG, an interagency organization that draws its management direction and technical oversight from DoD through the ASD SOLIC&IC. Figure 12 (obtained from the DoD Web site) lays out the structure of the TSWG and identifies the various interagency linkages that are involved.
Additional Interagency Programs

Several interagency programs, in addition to those already discussed, have relevance to CT operations overseas. Figure 13 presents an overview of these additional interagency programs. Each relies on the inclusion and participation of multiple partners from throughout the USG interagency process for its operational effectiveness.

Business Executives for National Security (BENS)
www.bens.org/home.html

While not a USG agency, BENS is concerned with providing the U.S. with a strong and efficient security sector. It is a nonpartisan public interest organization whose membership includes business executives from a wide variety of professional and political backgrounds. BENS was established in 1982 by Stanley A. Weiss and has been active ever since in providing quality business solutions to U.S. national security challenges. Over the years it has established working relationships with the White House, federal and state government agencies, and the Congress. At the same time, BENS has been active in the public arena in voicing its independent positions on the issues of the day. It has had an influence on the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (Nunn-Lugar), the creation of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, procedures for the closing of obsolete military bases, and the introduction of business-management practices into the DoD. Among its current efforts are enhancing intelligence analysis; tracking terrorist finances; strengthening Cyber Security; and improving crisis management processes, techniques, and procedures.

Operations and Capacity Building

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR)
Demining Test and Evaluation Program
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
DoD Counterdrug Programs
Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
Global Peace Operations Initiative
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)
International Foreign Intelligence Program
International Information Programs (IIP)
International Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
National Foreign Intelligence Program
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR)
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA)
Pakistan Frontier Corps
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation Programs (RDT&E)

Training and Education

Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP)
Global Train and Equip Program
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)
International Military Education and Training (IMET)
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)
Regional Centers for Security Strategies
Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF)

Financial and Resource Support

Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF)
Coalition Support Funds (CSSF)
Combatant Commanders Initiative Funds (CCIF)
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)

www.opic.gov

OPIC is a self-sustaining (no taxpayer funding) USG agency established in 1971. Its purpose is to support the execution of U.S. foreign policy by assisting U.S. businesses to invest overseas while encouraging economic and market development within more than 150 countries worldwide. OPIC initiatives are focused on establishing the reform of free markets and other institutions to support good governance and political stability. Its programs ensure that reform encourages incorporation of best business practices that promote international environmental, labor, and human rights standards. For several years, OPIC has operated its Anti-Corruption and Transparency Initiative to build credibility into the functioning of markets and the creation of wealth and social responsibility. By its very nature, OPIC works with many USG interagency components to affect conditions overseas in a way to support CT activities and other USG foreign policy goals.
Chapter 2. Overseas Interagency Structures

It is understandable for the special operations warrior overseas to feel somewhat isolated and detached from USG activities back in Washington, D.C. However, it is prudent to recall that the departments, agencies, organizations, programs and agendas that are active in the USG interagency process back home are likely represented somewhere in the AO and must be accommodated.

Consequently, the distance between the U.S. and the AO is not as great as it first appears. It is also necessary to remember that the DoS serves as the lead USG department for combating terrorism overseas, which brings the interagency process immediately into play. It is not a DoD “show” alone. Responsibility for the USG role in Afghanistan and elsewhere centers principally on the Ambassador and the Country Team.

The Country Team

Led by the U.S. Ambassador—also referred to as the Chief of Mission (COM), the Country Team serves as the multifaceted “face” of the USG interagency process. The Country Team is made up of USG representatives who are placed on the ground to ensure the successful functioning of the programs administered by their parent departments, agencies, and organizations. Under each COM’s discretionary authority, the organization of country teams varies to suit the COM’s approach, the various U.S. programs in the country, and the particular senior officers of the represented agencies.

The various members of the Country Team bring to the mission their own respective organizational cultures, procedures, expectations, situation awareness, and levels of experience. Thus there exists a strong tendency toward “stove piping” of the effort, with individual Country Team members frequently remaining within their comfort zones by exchanging information with and responding to direction from their leadership back in the U.S.

Ideally, the COM will be successful in integrating the stovepipes and in flattening the interagency work flow to bring about greater lateral coordination among participating departments, agencies, and organizations. After all, those representatives operate within the same U.S. embassy, sit around the same Country Team table, and are theoretically focused on the same desired end states.

As the work flow shifts to the conditions within the AO, it is also important to recall that interagency is a process and not a collection of fixed organizational charts with specific responsibilities that are managed by a structured chain of command. As policy guidance, strategy, planning, and operational decisions move from the senior levels of the NSC through the layers of the USG interagency process to the Country Team, there is a real danger of losing track of the goals, intentions, resources, measures of effectiveness, and sensitivity to adjustments that may become necessary to improve the effectiveness of the effort.

The COM must translate the interagency policies, strategies, and plans into productive action on the ground. From a narrow perspective, the Country Team can serve as a partner for the special operations warrior, assisting with access to those within the interagency process who can provide assistance and support for SOF missions that fulfill Country Team objectives.
U.S. Ambassador/Chief of Mission (COM)

Contrary to some misperceptions, the COM is not simply the senior spokesperson for DoS interests as they “compete” with other Country Team agendas. In fact, the COM is the leader of the Country Team, which essentially serves as the “cabinet” for the COM. The COM’s authority is defined by the President; the COM serves as the President’s personal representative.

Continuing a tradition begun by President John F. Kennedy in May 1961, each incoming COM receives a letter from the President defining the nature and parameters of his responsibilities. These include orchestrating the efforts of more than 30 government agencies toward achieving a wide range of diplomatic, economic, security, and intelligence objectives.

The status of the COM was codified in Section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (PL 96-465):

“Under the direction of the President, the chief of mission to a foreign country—

(1) shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander); and

(2) shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country, and shall insure that all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply fully with all applicable directives of the chief of mission.”

The primacy of the COM’s authority does not mean that other members of the Country Team are prevented from maintaining relationships with their parent organizations. In fact, such contacts are useful for maintaining situation awareness as long as the COM, his deputy, and Country Team are kept updated.

As the President’s personal representative, the COM is responsible for providing clarity of purpose and for ensuring the implementation, management, and evaluation of foreign and security policies within the AO.

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM)

The DCM is responsible for the management of embassy operations and works with the COM to guide the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals through the functioning of the Country Team. As with all deputy positions, the DCM acts in the absence of the principal and thus exercises the authority and responsibilities of the COM at those times. The DCM is also known as the Charge d’Affaires and serves as COM when there is no Ambassador.

Figure 14 portrays the operational interagency environment. The Country Team block summarizes the complexity of the USG interagency process. The participation of the others shown, many of whom could be inadvertently operating at cross purposes, renders the challenge even more difficult.

It is always a wise course of action for the special operations warrior entering an AO for the first time or returning after a period of absence to come to an early understanding about how things work and how they got to be that way. The answer may not always be satisfactory, but it is important to be aware so as not to seek changes that are unworkable, unwanted, or not needed in the first place.

The Interagency Components within the Country Team

Executing the work output of the USG interagency process takes place within the AO, closest to the immediate challenges and threats, and farthest away from the policy and decision makers who set the USG interagency process into motion. Any shortcomings in the USG interagency process are present and often magnified. The special operations warrior should understand the makeup of the Country Team and recognize the critical areas of expertise that reside within each functional area. All are important, but some have a greater impact than others on the SOF mission.

Agricultural Attaché

The Agricultural attaché is a Foreign Service officer from the DoA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS). Attaches operate from more than 100 offices in 82 countries; they also monitor and report on agricultural trade matters in more than 70 additional countries. Agricultural attachés provide direct management of
FAS programs within the country to distribute needed food supplies and provide technical assistance. They coordinate with USAID and other agencies in support of broader USG assistance programs designed to improve living conditions for the local population. In Afghanistan and Iraq, much of this coordination takes place within the structure of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

**Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT)**

The SDO/DATT is designated by the Secretary of Defense as the principal DoD official in the U.S. embassies. The DoD designated the position in 2007 to ensure unified DoD representation in U.S. embassies. The SDO/DATT is also the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer (defense attaché) assigned to a U.S. diplomatic mission, and the point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. All DoD elements assigned, attached to, or operating from U.S. embassies are aligned under the coordinating authority of the SDO/DATT except for the Marine Security Detachment, which is under control of the regional security officer (RSO). In most embassies the defense attaché and Security Cooperation Offices remain as separate units with distinct duties and statutory authorities, but both report to the SDO/DATT.

**Defense Attaché Office (DAO)**

The in-country representation of each of the DoD service chiefs is carried out through the DAO by each of the service attachés. The DAO reports to the SDO/DATT, in some embassies through a deputy for Defense Attaché Affairs when appropriate. In some cases the
DAO also manages Security Assistance (SA) programs where no designated Security Cooperation Office is in the embassy. The DAO is manned through the Defense Attache System (DAS) and under management of DIA. As the development of military capacity is a central CT task, this office provides a crucial link to the HN security sectors whose effectiveness will ultimately bring about successful outcomes.

Drug Enforcement Attaché
The Drug Enforcement attaché performs a variety of functions both to enable USG counterdrug operations and to build HN capacity through relationship building, training, and mentoring. The attaché serves as an interagency point of contact for those assisting in counterdrug operations within the AO.

ICE Attaché
The DHS Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Office of International Affairs, stations ICE attachés in offices co-located with U.S. embassies and senior ICE representatives co-located at U.S. consulates. The attachés work closely with the ICE Office of Investigations and with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to conduct complex inquiries into a variety of customs threats and other criminal behavior. ICE attachés also conduct liaison with HN officials to provide training, assist with infrastructure building, and support regulatory and compliance functions within the AO. They also establish relationships with the HN Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their local law enforcement counterparts.

Legal Attaché
Legal attachés are assigned by the FBI to oversee its CT programs around the world. The specifics of the effort are contained in Chapter 1, in the section on the USG Counterterrorism Components under Federal Bureau of Investigation–Counterterrorism.

Narcotics Control Officer (NCO)
The NCO is an asset of the DoS Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs who is assigned to the U.S. embassy to serve as liaison to the HN and to carry out a number of tasks in support of counterdrug programs. Responsibilities include collecting information, strategic and operational planning, and training. The NCO assists in the development of the U.S. embassy counterdrug strategies and contingency plans targeting drug producers and traffickers. The NCO also seeks to harmonize USG and HN counterdrug priorities while assessing risks and evaluating progress.

NCOIC, U.S. Marine Corps Security Guard Detachment (MSG)
Working under the supervision of the RSO and in coordination with the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), the MSG is responsible for providing for the security of embassy facilities and the protection of classified information. The Marines also support the protection of visiting dignitaries and assist the RSO in developing security plans for the external defense of embassy property. That external mission is often carried out by HN assets, reinforced by the MSG.

Public Affairs Officer (PAO)
The Country Team’s PAO performs traditional responsibilities as spokesperson, coordinator of international education and visitor programs, and facilitator of information exchanges. The office is also responsible for coordinating public diplomacy initiatives so essential to presenting an accurate narrative of U.S. efforts within the country. The public diplomacy role causes the PAO to perform front-line duties in the effort to challenge and defeat the ideological foundations of terrorists and their networks.

Regional Security Officer
This officer is a representative of the DSS and responsible for creating a secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and the protection of diplomatic personnel and facilities. Of special interest to the special operations warrior is the role of the regional security officer as the liaison between the Country Team and the host government law enforcement community. As an effective local, regional, and national police force is central to effective governance, the development of a credible HN law enforcement capacity is a critical mission for the regional security officer and the Country Team.
**Resident Legal Advisor (RLA)**

RLAs are assigned through the DoJ’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT). They focus primarily on providing assistance to Rule of Law programs within HN justice institutions and law enforcement agencies. RLAs seek to build justice sector capacity to increase effectiveness in dealing with terrorism, organized crime, corruption, and other criminal activity. In addition to building relationships with the USG, RLAs also assist HNs to develop regional crime-fighting relationships and justice reform.

**Security Cooperation Organization (SCO)**

The SCO is responsible for conducting the in-country management of SA programs to the HN. The SCO reports to the SDO/DATT, in some embassies through the Deputy for Security Cooperation when appropriate. To accomplish this mission, the SCO maintains relationships with HN counterparts while coordinating with other members of the Country Team, the regional military commander, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DSCA, and the MILDEPs. Programs include equipment transfers, a wide variety of in-country and U.S. training opportunities, and other defense-related resources and services under the terms of Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs). The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) manages the financial resources to support approved LOAs. The SCOs are tailored and named differently through the world. Many are referred to as Military Groups (MILGPs) and are tailored in structure and mission to meet the requirements of the HN. Within U.S. policy constraints, the MILGP can conduct training, support the introduction of new equipment, mentor the reform of HN security sector institutions, and provide advisory support to HN security forces.

**Treasury Attaché**

Depending on the country, the Treasury Department can field more than one attaché team. The first of these is the Treasury attaché, sometimes referred to as the financial attaché. These representatives are responsible for representing the department on issues within the traditional purview of Treasury. Country Teams in Afghanistan and Pakistan are among those hosting a Treasury attaché. In some embassies, including Colombia and Mexico, attaché offices are present from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC attachés are focused primarily on counter-narcotics issues and are responsible for managing OFAC sanctions within their areas of responsibility (AOR). OFAC also has deployed investigators who are attached to the Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC).

**USAID Representative**

Chapter 1 discusses the broad range of responsibilities and programs that reside within USAID. The USAID Representative — often called the Mission Director — and staff on the ground are responsible for direct management and resourcing of a wide variety of activities in the areas of agricultural, health, education, economic, and institutional reform. USAID also assists in reinforcing the unity of effort by coordinating with and frequently overseeing the activities of some, but by no means all, NGOs in the AO. USAID maintains an active presence that assists in the functioning of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq.
U.S. Military Operations

SOF pursuing CT responsibilities frequently require access to the interagency representatives who serve on the Country Team. Predictably, such interactions will not be restricted to military personnel such as the defense attaché. They are likely to also involve interagency relationship building with USAID, DEA, RLAs, and law enforcement representatives such as the FBI and regional security officer.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) can enter an AO under a variety of conditions and assistance needs. The most obvious, of course, is through the SDO/DATT assigned to the embassy to provide assistance. However, SOF may also be engaged in a specific HN through the need for law enforcement capacity building that comes through the various law enforcement representatives. Additionally, disasters or humanitarian assistance missions may cause the USAID representative to advocate for a SOF presence.

Interagency Organizations and Initiatives

While the Country Team plays the central role in meeting U.S. CT objectives, operating within the AO frequently brings the special operations warrior into contact with other coordination venues. The following organizations and initiatives serve as synchronization nodes for a wide variety of activities.

DoS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

S/CRS works to reduce instability and other conditions in failing and post-conflict states that could contribute to the development and sustainment of terrorists and their networks, violent crime, trafficking, and various human catastrophes. It is tasked to develop initiatives that develop, sustain and synchronize an expeditionary, innovative, and interagency civilian capability for the USG to provide the skill sets and resources for post-conflict situations and to stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition.

While the COM is personally responsible to the President for the successful functioning of the Country Team, he or she exercises no control over U.S. military personnel operating under the command of a geographic combatant commander (GCC). To improve coordination, agreements have been negotiated, formalized, and put in place to define the relationship between the COM and the GCC and how both can work together to accomplish U.S. national security objectives.

Typically, the DoS, working through the COM, assists with the entry of U.S. military forces into the HN by negotiating the specific goals of the effort, terms of the military’s presence, tasks to be accomplished, length of stay and/or measures of success leading to a withdrawal.

Beyond that, it should be clear that unique SOF capabilities frequently result in greater direct coordination and interaction with the Country Team than by conventional military organizations.

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton emphasizes what she calls the employment of “Smart Power,” leveraging the various diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural expertise and resources that reside throughout the USG to meet the foreign policy and national security goals of the United States.

Because of its roles and responsibilities in delivering Smart Power, it is almost inevitable that SOF will encounter and perhaps assist the S/CRS and its efforts within a variety of AOs. For instance, the withdrawal of military forces from Iraq is being matched by an expansion of USG civilian capacity within the country.

The recently released QDDR suggests structural changes regarding the DoS role as CRS. Figure 15 depicts the organizational structure as of 1 December 2010—that is, changes are ongoing. In the spirit of the interagency process at the strategic level, S/CRS is staffed by representatives from a variety of USG departments, agencies, and organizations:

a. DoS
b. USAID
c. DoD
d. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
e. DoJ

Other members of the S/CRS Team include:

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
b. Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (SO/LIC&IC)
c. U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stabilization Operations Institute
d. DoJ — International Criminal Investigative Training Program-ICITAP
e. DoS — International Narcotics and Law Enforcement’s Civilian Police Programs
f. DoS — Office of the Director General, Diplomatic Readiness Initiative
g. DoS — Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration
h. DoS — Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
i. DoS (Foreign Services Institute)
j. CIA
k. USAID — Office of Democracy and Governance
l. USAID — Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
m. USAID — Office of Transition Initiatives
n. Department of the Treasury

The S/CRS is concerned with four tasks:

a. Assessment of conditions on the ground that breed conflict and lend themselves to the commitment of funds and other resources to Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) efforts.
b. Results-oriented planning that engages the whole-of-government approach and develops doctrine and concepts that represent the best practices, organization structures, systems, and processes to ensure a sustained response to crisis and conflict.
c. Extensive coordination throughout the USG interagency community and with international partners in Washington, D.C. Additionally,
Interagency cooperation among the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the DoS Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and the DoS Policy Planning Staff (S/P) has resulted in a “Watchlist” of countries who are particularly vulnerable to failure or have begun to demonstrate troubling weakness and inability to function.

Central to the S/CRS efforts is the application of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) to address conditions within various Watchlist countries. ICAF acts as a tool for enabling the diplomatic, defense and development (3-D) capabilities and resources of the USG in support of individuals and institutions who seek peaceful resolution to conflict.

The ICAF brings together appropriate members of the USG interagency community to “assess conflict situations systematically and collaboratively and prepare for interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization.” Additionally, the ICAF process seeks to “establish a strategic baseline against which USG engagement can be evaluated.” This understanding of the need for measures of effectiveness (MOEs) is an important component of the ICAF.

ICAF includes two basic components:

a. Task 1 is conflict diagnosis. It evaluates the context of the conflict, understands core grievances and social/institutional resilience, identifies the drivers of conflict and the mitigating factors, and describes opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict.

b. Task 2 is segue into planning. It is where the findings of the conflict diagnosis are fed into the situation analysis and policy formulation systems that form the planning process within the USG planning framework.

As part of its effort, S/CRS orchestrates the output of six working groups from throughout the USG that resulted in the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks highlighted in Figure 16. The entire product is quite detailed and many pages long; it can be accessed at www.state.gov/documents/organization/53464.pdf.


Civilian Response Corps

S/CRS is also fielding another interagency initiative with operational implications for SOF. The Civilian Response Corps of the United States of America serves as an innovative, whole-of-government expeditionary organization designed to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance to weakened countries or to those emerging from conflict. It works with interagency partners from various DoS agencies, USAID, and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury.

The Civilian Response Corps is made up of civilian federal employees and, eventually, volunteers from the private sector, state, and local governments who possess the essential skill sets and are able to deploy rapidly to countries requiring assistance in stabilization and reconstruction. These skill sets include the following:

   a. Planning/operations/management
   b. Rule of law
   c. Diplomacy/governance
   d. Essential services
   e. Economic recovery
   f. Diplomatic security.

The Corps deploys with a logistics capability that includes armored vehicles, personal protective equipment, personal gear, specialized communications equipment, and necessary operational funding support. Necessary training is provided by an interagency collection of institutions to include the Foreign Services Institute (FSI), United States Institute of Peace, National Defense University, and the U.S. Army War College.
The Civilian Response Corps relies on three levels of participation:

a. A core of 264 full-time positions for the active component (who represent the participating USG interagency components), deployable within 48 hours of notification.

b. A standby force of 2,000 trained members from the same interagency partners who are federal employees, trained for the mission, and deployable within 30 days for up to 180 days.

c. A reserve force — volunteers recruited from the private sector, state, and local governments — who are trained in the deployment skills they need to complement the skill sets they bring to the effort; possess backgrounds that are generally not available in the USG such as civilian police officers, city administrators, and port operators; and deployable within 45 to 60 days.

Collectively the Civilian Response Corps supplies critical skills that are not available within the USG structure, but are important to achieving national CT objectives. These skills include diplomats, development specialists, public health officials, law enforcement and corrections officers, engineers, economists, lawyers, agronomists, and others.

As always, special operations warriors interacting with Civilian Response Corps members should be prepared to interact with different cultures, expectations, and levels of experience.

The S/CRS is also heavily involved with the International Stabilization & Peacebuilding Initiative (ISPI), which began its work in February 2010. In addition to members of the USG interagency community, the ISPI includes 14 nations (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and...
the U.S.) and five international organizations—African Union (AU), European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), UN, and the World Bank. ISPI’s mission is to “improve the effectiveness of stabilization and peacebuilding operations by enhancing civilian capability globally and strengthening interoperability among international actors.”

Coordination of Humanitarian Efforts Within the AO

Because so many HN, IGO, NGO, and military organizations, and resources can be operating in any given AO, coordination and establishment of objectives and unity of effort are always challenging. USAID has the mission lead, to the extent possible in a sovereign nation, for coordinating humanitarian assistance efforts on behalf of the USG.

NGOs have traditionally seen independent action as their best path to survival and success. The perception of neutrality therefore is essential to the NGOs. Consequently, it is predictably counterproductive to enlist NGO assistance in providing military forces with their assessments of local needs and the security situation on the ground. Information exchange is not a task NGOs typically assign themselves.

Working through a coordination mechanism such as that USAID provides is the most workable plan. If nothing else, the consequences of alienating the NGO community are unacceptably high. Tension and distrust also distract from essential mission tasks.

Part of this reluctance to cooperate is for security reasons. Once NGOs are compromised and linked to unpopular governments or unwanted international assistance, they can become targets. Their effectiveness is also diminished as the local population could become less likely to approach them for assistance for fear of reprisals.

For a variety of reasons, recent years have seen a shift in the attitude of many NGOs, resulting in a greater synchronization of efforts. Increasingly the flexible, situationally aware, highly skilled NGO staffs on the ground are doing much of the actual work of humanitarian response in coordination with HN authorities, IGOs, other NGOs, and international military forces.

Various mechanisms for coordinating collective humanitarian responses to wars and natural disasters have evolved. Given the diversity of the participants and the complexity of the operational environments, they predictably operate under different names, but frequently perform very similar functions.

Thus the careful establishment and management of interagency coordination hubs are essential to minimizing the duplication of effort and limiting the risks of excluding those wishing to participate.

Humanitarian Information Centers (HICs) have emerged as nodes for information exchange and the development of information management procedures and technology. With an eye toward developing common practices and standards, HICs serve as venues for data collection, data distribution, and coordination of plans and projects.

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACCs) are established by military organizations participating in humanitarian operations. They are designed to support all forms of interagency information exchange, coordination, planning, and execution of programs. They ensure an open link to NGOs and IGOs operating within the AO. HACCs provide a means by which the diverse agendas, skill sets, and resource bases of all humanitarian response agencies can be synchronized.

A Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) may be established by the HN, the UN (UNHOC), or a lead USG agency. The HOC is designed to provide a venue for interagency policy makers to coordinate the humanitarian response. Representatives include HN organizations, international embassies involved in the effort, UN officials, IGOs, NGOs, and military forces.

A Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) is typically located within a secured, military-controlled facility. Access is limited to the key HN leadership and that of partner nations, major IGOs, and NGOs. Collectively they develop the plans and manage the execution of humanitarian operations within the AO.

A Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) is both a place and a process for coordinating the efforts of U.S. military forces, relevant USG interagency components, HN representatives, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. It is not a command and control center and exercises
no directive authority over the participants. It does, however, provide an opportunity to conduct information exchanges, build relationships, and synchronize efforts within the AO.

Management of the CMOC may fall to a multinational force commander, shared by U.S. and multinational force commanders, or shared between a U.S. military commander and a USG civilian agency head. As always, the specific structure depends on the situation. Civil Affairs officers typically serve as directors and deputy directors.

Other military skills present can include legal, operations, logistics, engineering, medical, and force protection. Additional expertise and resources are provided by the USG interagency community (usually through the Country Team), HN organizations, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

A Civil-Military Information Center (CIMIC), similarly to a CMOC, is located outside of a secured military facility and functions similarly to a HACC. As with the other coordinating mechanisms, a CIMIC acts as a source of information and a venue for coordinating plans and projects. It also serves as an external information source for parties to the humanitarian effort and to local populations.

Though institutional suspicion, confusion, and duplication of effort remain, they are less than before. As with any interagency national or international functional area, designation of lead organizations and coordination hubs is a necessary first step. Protocols for accommodating diverse organizations and agendas lead to the establishment of procedures for information exchanges, planning approaches, and shared oversight of activities designed to bring about successfully executed humanitarian operations.

**Interagency Task Force (IATF)**

A IATF is made up of USG interagency representatives, including the DoD, partner nations, and others who are tasked with taking on specific issues or missions. Their primary focus is on geographic or functional responsibilities.

Unlike the FBI’s JTTF or the USSOCOM IATF discussed in Chapter 1, IATFs are typically intended to be short-term organizations with specific tasks to perform and with the authority under a single commander to act on those tasks. They then disband once their purposes are fulfilled.

The ad-hoc purpose and structure of IATFs, however, provides flexibility that allows them to adapt to changing situations and thus occasionally breed longer-than-anticipated life cycles as missions expand or threats become more immediate. IATF-South represents such an example.

**Interagency Task Force-South (IATFS)**

Increased DoD involvement with counterdrug operations took shape beginning in 1989 with various commanders in chief (CINCs) establishing individual task forces and other organizations focused on the mission. With reorganization in 1994 and a consolidation in 1999, the life cycle of IATF-South now spans nearly two decades in one form or another.

IATF-South fields joint, interagency, and international capabilities (Figure 17) that monitor a wide geographic area for suspected drug-related activity, train and advise counter-drug forces, and plan and execute counter-drug operations.

Although developed in the counter-drug environment, IATF-South has become a model for the organization, staffing, coordination, information sharing, intelligence fusion, planning, and execution for other IATFs faced with different complex missions. This model includes many of the interagency features of the developing USAFRICOM structure discussed in Chapter 1.

Within the DoD, IATF-South synchronizes activities with the DIA, NGA, NSA, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and the National Guard. USG interagency partners include:

a. U.S. Coast Guard
b. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (DHS)
c. CIA
d. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DoJ)
e. FBI
f. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DHS).
To extend its reach, several Hemispheric and European countries have sent liaison teams and, in some cases, maritime assets to support the IATF-South mission.

**Interagency Task Force-CT (Afghanistan)**

As U.S. military forces began their fight against the Taliban and other insurgent forces in the fall of 2001, USCENTCOM established IATF-CT (Figure 18) that deployed to Afghanistan in support of the effort. Its primary responsibilities were to act as an intelligence-gathering fusion center and to operate the interrogation facility at Bagram Air Base.

From its beginning, IATF-CT maintained a strong interagency structure. Among others, membership included:

a. FBI  
b. CIA  
c. Diplomatic Security Service  
d. Customs Service  
e. NSA  
f. DIA  
g. New York’s Joint Terrorism Task Force  
h. DoJ  
i. Department of the Treasury  
j. DoS.

A few allied nations also provided representatives who worked side by side with the others to exchange information and collectively apply their skill sets, experiences, and resources to the effort.

As conditions on the ground in Afghanistan evolved, the IATF-CT returned to the U.S. in the spring of 2002 and began a transformation from the temporary, ad-hoc structure and focus of a IATF to more sustained operations as USCENTCOM’s JIACG that continues to function.
Both IATF-South and IATF-CT came into existence to address a specific threat to U.S. national security. Because of their effectiveness and adaptability, both continue to function well beyond the time limits one would expect for such an organization.

Though its title remains essentially the same, IATF-South’s responsibilities have broadened significantly while remaining engaged in its original mission as a central player within U.S. counter-drug operations. By contrast, IATF-CT has undergone a name change that reflects the expansion of its responsibilities within a mix of related missions.

What remains the same is that both organizations have survived and grown because of their abilities to accommodate the vastly different cultures, skill sets, and procedures that make up their diverse memberships. Harmonizing these differences has allowed both to make continuing contributions to the accomplishment of national security objectives and to act as models for newer IATF organizations created to address CT and other security threats.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/iz/c21830.htm

PRTs were first established in Afghanistan, where the Gardez City PRT opened in early 2002. PRTs are designed to assist in extending the influence of the central government from Kabul and other major cities into those isolated areas so that they are less likely to fall under the influence of destabilizing forces that breed and harbor terrorists and their networks. The goal is to assist the central government to build its credibility and support across a country roughly the size of Texas.

The PRTs vary in size depending on local needs and the prevailing security situation. In addition to military personnel, the PRT includes USG interagency representation (working through the Country Team), partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

PRT leadership consists of both military and Foreign Service officers who strive to synchronize the agendas, policies, strategies, procedures, and activities of all participants to gain the greatest impact of the shared effort. PRTs work closely with local village, district and provincial officials, and military operational units to strengthen local governance, reform the security sector beginning with the police, and execute reconstruction and development projects.

Among others, PRT tasks involve establishing security, developing and executing plans for reconstruction and development, improving governance through the mentoring of local and district leaders and other measures, and judicial reform.

DoS, USAID, USDA, and other members of the USG interagency community play prominent roles in building government capacity, combating corruption, discouraging poppy growth, encouraging the growth of alternative crops, and local and regional planning.

PRTs also function in Iraq with structures, management, and objectives tailored to local needs. For instance, PRTs in Iraq are typically embedded within U.S. Brigade Combat Teams, which is consistent with the operational environment within that country.

As noted earlier, the S/CRS, operating through the Civilian Response Corps and other resources, is assuming a larger role in recovery efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other venues.

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, successor to the very effective Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), is a DoS-led interagency program involving DoS, DoD, USAID, and others in a broad initiative to confront the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in the Maghreb and Sahel in Africa.

The five-year initiative brings together CT, democratic governance, military assistance, and public diplomacy activities. In addition to USG interagency components, regional IGOs such as the African Union (Center for the Study and Research of Terrorism) are involved with the efforts. Interagency participants have identified four specific strategic goals to be accomplished within the operational environment:

a. Build local capacity.

b. Counter radicalization.

c. Foster regional cooperation.

d. Enhance public diplomacy and strategic communication.

The partnership focuses on nine countries, including the Maghreb nations of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia.
and the Sahel nations of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Nigeria and Senegal are also participants.

Military support for the TSCTP is present in the form of U.S. AFRICOM’s Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), which is the USG’s regional war on terrorism. However, OEF-TS engages TSCTP primarily as a security and cooperation initiative. OEF-TS partners with Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.

Funding for the TSCTP comes from a variety of USG sources. Among them are DoD Title 10 funding, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR), Development Assistance, and Economic Support financing. NGOs engaged in the region have also contributed.

Capacity-building programs focus on nurturing tactical intelligence capabilities that encourage the development of “eyes and ears” to identify and target potential terrorists and their networks. Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) efforts are also involved.

A variety of train-and-equip programs support CT efforts to provide weapons, equipment, training, and tactical mentoring to stop the flow of uncontrolled weapons, goods, and people and to neutralize safe havens where terrorists thrive.

Efforts in counter radicalization, public diplomacy, and strategic communication have contributed with a variety of initiatives. Programs to reduce the pool of potential terrorist recruits have focused on encouraging youth employment and civic education, improving educational access and quality, and reintegrating former combatants.

Additionally, programs to increase government credibility and reduce ungoverned areas have sought to improve good governance practices at the local level, the capacity of rule-of-law systems, and the ability of the government to be seen as providing necessary goods and services to their populations.

Upgrading communication capacity within the partner countries allows the government to counter extremist claims and behavior by keeping their populations informed about what is being done to protect them and improve their quality of life. Ideally, favorable views of the USG and its support of the HN government breed popular respect for a government that is able to partner with such a helpful ally.
Chapter 3. Beyond the USG Interagency Community

Beyond the complexities of the USG interagency process experienced both in Washington, D.C. and within the Country Team, SOF must also account for and interact with representatives of the HN government and a mosaic of partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Predictably, each is operating on a separate agenda-driven path.

The USG interagency process exists to coordinate the CT activities of disparate departments, agencies, and organizations with the goal of achieving assigned U.S. national security objectives. By contrast, there is no pretense that any similar mechanism exists on the ground overseas to bring about such effects once the SOF community steps outside the USG interagency environment and the Country Team.

Representatives of the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs are not part of the USG interagency process. However, their mere presence and activities within the AO inevitably have a major impact on the establishment and sustainment of the unity of effort required to meet both U.S. and international security objectives. More than ever, knowing and understanding those working alongside you become at least as important as an awareness of active or potential adversaries.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO environment to help the special operations warrior gain a general awareness of the other players present on the ground. It is not an exhaustive survey of the environment. In fact, the specific IGOs and NGOs introduced reflect only a small slice of the total participants. However, they do represent many of the more familiar players and offer a glimpse into characteristics that are often shared.

SOF personnel soon learn that introductions around the table at the beginning of a meeting represent more than polite hospitality. They are essential to identify the various players and their organizations and to begin to understand their agendas. Each of these other players possesses skills and resources relevant to the tasks at hand.

Again, however, it is necessary to remember that each applies its talents guided by what are often to us unfamiliar and seemingly inconsistent policies, strategies, plans, procedures, and organizational cultures. As with the USG interagency components serving the USG Country Team, HN officials, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs likewise bring with them their own unique “stovepipe” relationships.

It is frequently the case that some decisions can be made by local representatives operating at the tactical level, but more complex issues must be addressed in national capitals or in whatever country houses the headquarters of each IGO and NGO. Quite simply, many organizations operate either tactically or strategically and do not field an operational level decision maker to provide immediate guidance to their personnel or to help deconflict disputes.

These dissimilarities are not disqualifiers; in fact, such differences are inevitable and, one could argue, helpful if properly exploited. The immediate tasks become to identify who is on the ground, establish contact, identify goals and resources, and attempt to synchronize efforts to achieve a strong measure of unity of effort.

Success in relationship building is largely personality dependent, based on the ability of those on the ground to reach consensus on desired end states and to synchronize multilateral activities to achieve those end states.

Experience teaches that shared goals and objectives are not necessarily the same as a commonly accepted vision of a desired end state. Success will likely have many different definitions and metrics. In fact, sometimes the best one can hope for is a shared objective and an agreement to exchange information.
As with non-DoD USG departments, agencies, and organizations, no command relationships exist with the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs. Negotiation skills and the ability to listen emerge as premium assets. Once established, the relationships will be inevitably softer and less direct than is familiar to the special operations warrior.

Respectful coordination and, when possible, accommodation of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO agendas are most useful in achieving success. Alienation is never helpful.

As a practical matter, the combining of the USG interagency process with the effective inclusion of international partners and other outside organizations introduces efficiencies into the operational environment. The base reality remains that no one can do it all alone. Ideally those best suited to specific tasks are given the responsibility to manage those tasks.

Consistent with this principle, FM3-24 notes that “In COIN, it is always preferred for civilians to perform civilian tasks.” Though not always possible, this is a solid principle for guiding USG interagency coordination, especially in an operational setting. The guidance becomes even more relevant when dealing with the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

Efficiencies are also gained by applying the right mix of skill sets and resources to a specific challenge. It is not always true that the introduction of more personnel and resources inevitably results in a better outcome. Ensuring quality work is often more helpful than merely having more people performing the same tasks as before.

Ideally, cooperation among all the parties will result in a unity of effort through which USG, HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO efforts emerge as more than a collage of random, uncoordinated acts. The inclusion of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO resources assists the common effort in working smarter in a specific direction (or several paths heading in the same general direction) toward the achievement of a desired end state.

As a reminder of the size of the IGO and NGO community, the Union of International Associations identifies on its Web site 5,900 IGOs and IGO networks; 38,000 international associations-NGOs; and 4,100 regional organizations and regional networks. Individually and collectively, they represent a stern challenge for the special operations warrior trying to make sense of it all.

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

**ABCA Armies**

Initiated in 1947 with a general plan and formalized in 1954 with the Basic Standardization Concept, the ABCA Armies has a long history of seeking standardization among its member armies. Initial membership included the armies of the United States United Kingdom, and Canada who sought to sustain the partnerships in place during World War II. Australia joined in 1963, with New Zealand moving from observer status to full membership in 2006 without any change to the organization’s title.

Recognizing the coalition nature of current and future wars, the ABCA Armies are concerned primarily with ensuring the standardization and interoperability necessary "to train, exercise, and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks."

Strategic guidance is provided by the ABCA Executive Council, made up of national representatives at the level of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. That guidance is translated into interoperability objectives and the annual Program Plan of Tasks by the National Directors or ABCA Board, made up of officers at the one-star level. They typically meet four times annually, including one session with the Executive Council.

The work of the organization is conducted by the Program Office, based in Washington, D.C., through Capability Groups (CGs), Support Groups (SGs), Project Teams (PTs), and Information Teams (ITs).
The AU was established on 9 July 2002, by bringing together the separate countries of the continent. Current membership stands at 53 countries. It has developed several governing institutions to include the Pan African Parliament and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

The AU goals are to bring about political, social, and economic integration; develop common African positions on issues; achieve peace and security; and promote good governance through reform of governmental institutions and the respect for human rights. To date, AU troops have deployed to Burundi, Sudan’s Darfur Region, and Somalia to address security and humanitarian needs.

ASEAN was established, on 8 August 1967, in Bangkok with five founding members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia joined later. The ASEAN region is home to more than 560 million people. ASEAN represents a collective effort to promote economic growth, social progress, and cultural development.

In 2003, ASEAN identified three “pillars” to assist in achieving its goals: The ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. 1994 saw the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that includes the ASEAN countries plus others with an interest in the region. These include the U.S. and the Russian Federation. ARF’s goals are to promote confidence building, establish preventive diplomacy protocols, and develop conflict resolution strategies.

The EU consists of 27 European countries forming a political and economic partnership. Nearly 500 million people live within the borders of the EU. Its three major bodies are the European Parliament (representing the people of Europe), the Council of European Union (representing the governments of Europe), and the European Commission (representing the shared interests of the EU). Among other issues, the EU is involved with free trade, borderless internal travel, a common currency, and joint action on crime and terrorism.

A major emphasis focuses on securing the external borders of the EU while allowing free trade and open travel. The EU makes use of an extensive shared database that enables police forces and judicial officials to exchange information and track suspected criminals and terrorists. The European Police (EUROPOL) is housed in The Hague, Netherlands, and maintains extensive intelligence information on criminals and terrorists. EUROPOL is staffed by representatives from national law enforcement agencies (e.g., police, customs, and immigration services). They monitor issues such as terrorism, drug trafficking, financial crimes, and radioactive/nuclear trafficking.

INTERPOL supports four official languages: Arabic, English, French, and Spanish. Each member country maintains a National Central Bureau, which serves as the point of contact for international police issues and the exchange of information. The U.S. National Central Bureau is located within the Department of Justice and is staffed jointly by representatives of numerous U.S. law enforcement agencies.

In 2005, INTERPOL and the UN issued the first INTERPOL–UN Security Council Special Notice regarding individuals and organizations suspected of maintaining associations with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups.

The IMF is based in Washington, D.C. and is the host to 186 member countries. It encourages cooperation among its members to ensure the secure functioning
of the complex international banking systems. The IMF promotes stability of international currencies and exchange protocols. It also works to stimulate international job growth through economic development and, when necessary, assistance to countries with severe debt and other financial threats. The IMF maintains surveillance of financial and economic trends throughout the world and within individual countries. It also makes loans to countries in need and provides technical assistance to encourage self sufficiency in the operation of the world’s interconnected financial systems.

Organization of American States (OAS)
www.oas.org

The OAS has 35 member countries, 34 of which are active after the 1962 suspension of Cuba. It features four official languages: English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish. The OAS is the principal regional forum for discussing the major issues and concerns facing the member countries. These include terrorism, poverty, illegal drugs, and corruption.

Major policies and goals are outlined during the meeting of the General Assembly, which gathers annually at the foreign minister level. Regular activities are overseen by the Permanent Council that functions through the ambassadors appointed by the individual member countries. The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security is tasked with coordinating OAS actions against terrorism, illegal drugs, arms trafficking, anti-personnel mines, organized crime, gangs involved with criminal activity, WMD proliferation, and other security threats. The Secretariat is also responsible for developing confidence-building measures and other initiatives to ensure hemispheric stability and security.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
www.osce.org

The OSCE consists of 56 countries from Europe, Central Asia, and North America. It came into existence as a result of the 1 August 1975 Helsinki Final Act to serve as a forum for east–west dialogue during the era of Détente. OSCE operates 19 missions or field operations in Southeastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus Region, and Central Asia. These include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Zagreb, Minsk, Moldova, Ukraine, Baku, Georgia, Yerevan, Ashgabat, Astana, Bishkek, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The OSCE seeks to address the politico-military, economic-environmental, and human dimensions of conflict. Efforts include activities in arms control, confidence and security-building measures, human rights, minority group integration, democratization, policing strategies, economic-environmental initiatives, and CT.

United Nations (UN)
www.un.org/en

Founded in 1945 at the end of World War II, the New York-based UN now consists of 191 countries. There are 30 organizations that make up the UN system and work to address the peacekeeping, humanitarian, and other goals of the organization. In 2006, the UN adopted the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, which “sent a clear message that terrorism in all its forms is unacceptable.” (UN) The strategy consists of four pillars. “These address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, preventing and combating terrorism, building States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism, and ensuring the respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.” (UN)

The UN is also involved with developing CT capacity within its member countries through the training of national criminal justice officials and the development of technology to assist in the effort. These approaches rely heavily on the effective application of the rule of law. In July 2005, the UN Secretary General established a Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force to coordinate CT efforts throughout the UN System. Chief among the initiatives is an online system for the exchange of CT information. The UN also plays a role in blocking terrorist funding networks through its coordination with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO)

The first UN peacekeepers were deployed in 1948 to monitor agreements between the new state of Israel and the surrounding Arab states. Over the years, the UN has undertaken 63 peacekeeping missions. During the early years, especially during the Cold War, UNPKO
were limited in their scope, usually involving themselves with the enforcement of ceasefires and ensuring stability on the ground. Military observers and lightly armed troops employing confidence-building measures typically were the norm. The recent trend has been toward involving UNPKO in operations of greater complexity.

Tasks include government institutional reform; security sector reform; human rights monitoring; and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs (DDR) involving former combatants. There has also been a greater emphasis on addressing internal strife and civil wars. The required skill sets have also become more diverse. There exists a persistent need for individuals with nonmilitary skills such as administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, de-miners, election observers, civil affairs and governance specialists, humanitarian workers, and strategic communicators.

**UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT)**

In coordination with the HN, the UNDMT operates through a resident coordinator who is tasked with establishing such a team in each country that has a history of disasters or national emergencies. The UNDMT facilitates information exchange and discussion of initiatives designed to mitigate the impact of catastrophic events. Plans enable the team to respond quickly to needs at national, regional, and district levels; install long-term recovery programs and future preparedness; and provide the necessary advice, technical resources, and supplies to manage the crisis. As an example, the UNDMT in India (Figure 19) is made up of representatives from the following UN agencies: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO); International Labor Organization (ILO); Development Program (UNDP); Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); Children’s Fund (UNICEF); World Food Program (WFP); and World Health Organization (WHO).

**UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)**

Established on 28 March 2002, by the UN Security Council, UNAMA serves as the hub for international efforts to assist the recovery of Afghanistan. UNAMA operates under an annual renewal requirement; the Security Council has renewed the UNAMA mandate until 23 March 2009.

According to that mandate, UNAMA is responsible to “promote peace and stability in Afghanistan by leading efforts of the international community in conjunction with the Government of Afghanistan in...”

![Figure 19. UNDMT–India](image-url)
rebuilding the country and strengthening the foundations of peace and constitutional democracy.”

Afghanistan joined the UN on 19 November 1946. Because of its internal conditions, a long-term relationship has grown up between the country and the UN System and its NGO partners. UNAMA functions under the direction and with the support of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

It is guided by The Afghanistan Compact, a five-year plan to rebuild the country developed during the London Conference on Afghanistan from 31 January–1 February 2006. UNAMA offers political advice and assists in institutional reform (government ministries, rule of law, security, economic and social development), the employment of Afghans in UN positions, building capacity across the elements of national governance, human rights initiatives, and reconstruction programs.

UN Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP)
www.undpanbp.org

The ANBP is a UNICEF-funded organization dedicated to disarming child militias in world trouble spots. Among its efforts in Afghanistan, one of the most visible have been those involved with the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) who operated under the direction of hundreds of war lords throughout the country.

The DDR Program was a product of coordination with the nation of Japan that provided funding and guidance in conjunction with the ANBP. While the true numbers in the AMF remain unknown, an early estimate set a broad range between 100,000 and 200,000 fighters. In early 2003, the ANBP set a goal of disarming 100,000. A ceremony in Kabul in July 2005 marked the conclusion of that phase of the DDR process.

During roughly the same period, the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) teamed with the Afghan Ministry of Defense to conduct a Cantonment of Heavy Weapons also held by various war lords. The process began in December of 2003 and was successful in gathering and securing large numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, surface-to-surface rockets, and multiple-launch rocket systems. Since confirmed baseline numbers for fighters and weapons never existed, it is not possible to assess the ultimate success of either program. However, the coordinative efforts of the ANBP, Japan, and other participants did result in short-term efficiencies and established models for future cooperation.

UN Development Program (UNDP)
www.undp.org

UNDP is on the ground in 166 countries and has been in Afghanistan for more than 50 years. During the time of the Taliban, the organization operated out of offices in Islamabad, Pakistan. In general, UNDP focuses on education and training, leadership skill development, institutional reform, accountability, and encouraging the inclusion of all stakeholders into the processes of governance.

Goals are clustered under the general areas of democratic governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention and recovery, environment and energy, and HIV/AIDS. Since the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, UNDP has provided Afghanistan some $1.1 billion in aid. These funds have been spent on the elections for president and national assembly, disarmament, reconstruction, institutional reform, security sector reform (police), and rural development.

UN Mine Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA)

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) was established in October 1997. It serves as the UN System organization responsible for addressing all components of mine action. In the field, it provides mine-action support to areas affected by war, peacekeeping operations, and other humanitarian emergencies.

UNMAS operates in Afghanistan through UNMACA, which maintains coordination with and receives policy guidance from the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The MOFA serves as the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) coordination hub for demining issues. UNMACA has established seven Area Mine Action Centers that support 21 Mine Action Organizations.

The Mine Action Program for Afghanistan began in 1989 with considerable assistance from partner NGOs. UNMACA seeks to reduce human suffering
and remove obstacles to development and reconstruction through mine risk education; victim assistance; survey, clearing and marking of mines; stockpile destruction; technical training; and capacity building for the Afghans themselves.

**UN World Food Program (WFP)**

[www.wfp.org](http://www.wfp.org)

Characterized as the “world’s largest humanitarian agency,” the UN’s WFP affects some 90 million hungry people in 80 countries every year. Much of the effort is focused on the world’s refugees and displaced persons. Over the years, the WFP has developed the capacity to react quickly to crises and is able to move into unstable situations to provide relief. It relies on a system of aircraft, ships, helicopters, trucks, and pack animals to assist in delivering supplies to those in need.

**UN World Health Organization (WHO)**

[www.who.int/en](http://www.who.int/en)

The WHO is the lead agency for coordination and management of health issues within the UN system. It focuses on specific health issues, research agendas, public health standards, technical assistance to countries in need, and health policy development. Its involvement on the ground in countries around the world has as its priorities: promoting general social, economic, and governmental development; fostering health security; strengthening health systems; harnessing research and information flow; enhancing partnerships with HN authorities and other IGOs and NGOs; and improving the performance of international and national healthcare systems. The WHO maintains an extensive agenda of health topics and assistance programs that result in a strong local presence, particularly within struggling countries and territories.

**World Bank**


Though not a bank in the traditional sense, the organization is made up of 185 members who provide technical and financial assistance to developing countries. Its collective mission is to reduce the impact of global poverty while seeking to improve living standards around the world. The World Bank works through two component development institutions, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association. Collectively, the World Bank structure provides low-interest loans and no-interest credit and grants to encourage reform and development of education institutions, health systems, infrastructure, communications initiatives, and other pressing challenges to improve the quality of life and stability of developing nations.

**World Bank International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)**


As one of the two components of the World Bank, the IBRD is concerned with middle income and credit-worthy poor countries who are struggling to improve their situations. It was established in 1944 as the first World Bank Group institution and is structured as a cooperative that is owned and operated for the benefit of its membership. IBRD issued its first bonds in 1947 and has since established itself as a major presence within the world’s financial markets where it raises most of its funding. Its purpose is to encourage sustainable growth through loans, financial guarantees, risk management services, and advisory assistance.

**World Bank International Development Association (IDA)**


The IDA focuses on the very poorest countries in the world. It was established in 1960 and seeks to address world poverty through interest-free credits and grants to stimulate economic growth within the most challenging environments. Assistance programs are designed to improve equality and upgrade living conditions. IDA works in 78 countries, 39 of which are in Africa. It serves as the major source of donor funds for those countries. Since its establishment, IDA has issued credits and grants in excess of $182 billion, half of which have been targeted on Africa.

**World Trade Organization (WTO)**

[www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org)

Established in 1995, the WTO serves as the only IGO that focuses on the rules of trade between nations. Though a relatively young organization, it traces its
roots to the 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the 1986–1994 Uruguay Rounds of international Trade Negotiations. A new negotiation effort, known as the “Doha Development Agenda,” began in 2001. The broad purpose of the WTO is to assist trade to flow as freely as possible while mitigating any negative consequences of that trade. Special attention is paid to social and environmental concerns. To accomplish its goals, the WTO performs three basic roles: a forum for negotiations, the keeper of the sets of rules that emerge from negotiations, and a venue for the settlement of trade disputes.

Additional Selected IGOs
Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
www.apec.org
Association of Southeast Nations Regional Forum (ARF)
www.state.gov/s/ct/intl/io/arf/
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (G-7)
www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

NGOs are independent, mostly privately funded and managed organizations whose purposes are to improve the human condition by applying their collective skills while gathering and distributing needed resources.

Typically they are on the ground when U.S. and partner nation military forces arrive and are likely to remain after the outside military assistance has departed. Once again, each brings its own set of goals, expectations, cultures, procedures, and experiences to the effort. Some pursue very aggressive public agendas and conduct sophisticated public relations programs to promote their organization, raise funds, and shape public opinion. Those who do so introduce an important variable for those involved with public affairs and information operations.

The following NGOs are a frequent presence in countries around the world. This list is by no means exhaustive. However, it does provide a slice of the variety of NGOs and the focus of NGO interests toiling within an AO. Some may not seem relevant to military operations, but they do share space with military forces as both pursue their objectives within the AO. If possible, the harmonization of those objectives is an essential early step in any operation. Frequently, awareness of specific NGOs and their purpose only emerges from direct contact.

Africare
www.africare.org
Established in 1970, the U.S.-based Africare organization has provided more than $700 million in aid through 2,000 projects. It focuses its work within 25 Sub-Saharan African countries from Senegal to South Africa and Chad to Mozambique. Its three priority areas of concern include health (with particular focus on HIV/AIDS), food security and agriculture, and emergency response. Complementary activities include water resources development, environmental management, microenterprise development, and civil-society development and governance.
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
www.crs.org
The CRS was founded in 1943 by the Catholic Bishops of the United States in anticipation of the end of World War II and the relief care that would be required by its survivors. Over time the CRS effort expanded and has now reached some 80 million people in more than 100 countries on five continents. Its operations and policies of inclusiveness are typical of religious-based NGOs. Areas of focus include disaster response, disease eradication, antipoverty programs, and society infrastructure building.

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE)
www.care.org
As with many NGOs, CARE was founded in 1945 to provide help to the survivors of World War II. Its efforts have expanded over the years, and the organization now has international member organizations based in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Its worldwide reach enables it to respond quickly to the needs of the survivors of war and natural disaster. On a sustained basis, CARE focuses on developing self-help skills particularly by working through poor women. It is concerned with improving educational opportunities, providing access to clean water and sanitation, encouraging economic development, and protecting natural resources.

Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
www.doctorswithoutborders.org
Originally established in 1971 by French doctors and journalists, MSF today provides aid in some 60 countries to those affected by war, epidemics, natural disasters, malnutrition, and lack of healthcare. MSF is vocal in its public statements and reports about situations it encounters, communicating through what it calls “bearing witness and speaking out.” Most of its funding comes from private sources (U.S. funding is 100 percent private). MSF received the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize for its work.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
www.icrc.org
Henry Dunant founded the Red Cross in 1863. The pioneer organization became the origin of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movements that are committed to assisting the victims of war and internal violence. The history of the ICRC parallels the development of modern humanitarian law and the development of the rules of warfare. During World War I, national societies of the Red Cross provided ambulances to assist the wounded. At that time, the Red Cross also opened the International POW Agency, expanding its influence in the development of the rules of war. In the wake of World War II, the ICRC assisted in the drafting of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two additional protocols in 1977. Today the ICRC is a major presence in providing healthcare, economic security, and water and habitat assistance all over the world. It remains a leader in promoting International Humanitarian Law (IHL), Humanitarian Diplomacy, and Mine Action.

Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM)
www.oxfam.org
OXFAM represents an alliance of 13 “like-minded organizations” operating in concert with some 3,000 local partners in more than 100 countries. Their collective purpose is to improve the human condition by alleviating poverty and providing relief to victims of war and natural disasters. Of particular note is the OXFAM commitment to serve as a voice for the disadvantaged. It is very open about its goal to “raise public awareness” through international “campaigns” for fair trade, universal healthcare and education, agricultural reform, climate change, and arms control. It maintains offices in many of the world’s major capitals and specifically targets world leaders and organizations such as the G-7, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations, European Union, and the World Trade Organization. The purpose of these lobbying programs is to encourage decisions OXFAM feels are necessary to improve the world’s quality of life. It is also involved with policy research and policy initiatives.
Refugees International (RI)
www.refugeesinternational.org
Based in Washington, D.C., RI is dedicated to providing humanitarian assistance and protection for displaced persons around the world. The organization estimates that there are more than 34 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world who are fleeing from the conditions of war and internal oppression. RI also reports the existence of some 11 million stateless persons. In addition to the human cost, those conditions also contribute to international instability.

Working with local governments, IGOs, and other NGOs, RI conducts 20–25 field missions every year in an effort to provide solutions to the plight of those displaced. RI’s basic services include providing food, water, shelter, and protection from harm.

Save the Children (SC/USA)
www.savethechildren.org
Working through the International Save the Children Alliance, SC/USA defines its area of influence as encompassing more than 50 countries with some 37 million children and 24 million local parents, community members, local organizations, and government agencies. It divides its focus among Africa, Asia, Latin America-Caribbean, and the Middle East and Eurasia. SC/USA responds to war and natural disasters as well as addressing the consequences of political, economic, and social upheaval.

World Vision United States (WVUS)
www.worldvision.org
The WVUS is a Christian-inspired NGO operating within nearly 100 countries organized by region (Europe and the Middle East, Asia and Pacific, Africa, Central, and South America). Its efforts focus on children and the development of strong families by addressing the broad conditions of poverty and providing assistance in response to disasters. Its earliest involvement in Afghanistan came in 1956 as it worked through the Kabul Christian Church. After the fall of the Taliban government, WVUS established a comprehensive program that began operating in 2002. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, WVUS works to provide clean water, irrigation, health clinics, and pre- and post-natal care.

World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (WANGO)
www.wango.org
Based in the U.S., the WANGO is interesting as it represents an effort to organize the complex NGO community to increase its collective effectiveness. There are other such organizations pursuing similar agendas. It began with 16 international NGOs in August 2001 and now counts members from more than 140 countries. Its first stated purpose is to “unite NGOs worldwide in the cause of advancing world peace, as well as well-being at all levels—individual, family, tribal, national, and world.” WANGO also promotes itself as attempting to “give greater voice to smaller NGOs beyond their national borders, including NGOs from developing countries and countries with economies in transition.” WANGO supports its membership with NGO listings for networking, training seminars and conferences, and various publications that address issues of interest to their NGO membership.

Additional Selected NGOs
Academy for Educational Development (AED)
www.aed.org
American Council for Voluntary Action (Interaction)
www.interaction.org
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)
www.afsc.org
American Refugee Committee (ARC)
www.arcrelief.org/site/PageServer
Church World Service (CWS)
www.churchworldservice.org
International Alliance Against Hunger (IAAH)
www.iaahp.net
International Medical Corps (IMC)
www.imcworldwide.org
International Rescue Committee (IRC)
www.theirc.org
Mercy Corps
www.mercycorps.org
Partners for the Americas (POA)
www.partners.net/partners/Default_EN.asp
If nothing else, the commitment of the international community to the challenge of rebuilding Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. presents a useful example of the complexities in place to challenge the special operations warrior. Figure 20 captures a flavor of the international presence.

As the Taliban regime crumbled throughout the country, members of the international community, sponsored by the UN, gathered in Bonn, Germany to discuss the way ahead.

The product of their work is called the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institution,” better known as the “Bonn Agreement” or “Bonn 1.” It established a timeline for the establishment of an elected government and an overview of the tasks necessary to accomplish that very specific objective.

The Afghan Presidential Election of October 2004, the inauguration of President Hamid Karzai in December 2004, the National Assembly Election of September 2005, and the seating of the National Assembly in December 2005 accomplished many of the goals of the agreement.

As part of the Bonn Agreement Process, the UN and many in the international community committed themselves to various specific tasks to assist in bringing stability to Afghanistan. The interagency door opened wide as many in the world saw an opportunity to display their capabilities to help out. In addition to the U.S. and other traditional international players, new partner countries made commitments.

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**International Support for Afghanistan: A Case Study**

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Figure 20. International Support for Afghanistan
The commitments included Mongolia, which undertook the mission of training Afghan artillerymen because of their experience with the Soviet-era equipment used by the Afghan National Army (ANA). The NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) (www.nato.int/ISAF/index.html), established by the Bonn Agreement to secure Kabul and its surroundings, swelled to some 40 countries as nonmember countries signed on to assist.

Traditionally NATO has restricted its activities to the geographic boundaries of its member countries. The alliance is guided by the provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Interestingly, the only invocation of Article 5 came in response to the 2001 attacks on the U.S.

Over the decades, NATO has largely stayed away from direct military involvement in security missions considered to be outside of its geographical boundaries or “out of area.” Thus Afghanistan is an entirely new experience for the collective alliance and the other military forces, although certainly not for the U.S. and other countries acting alone or in concert outside NATO.

Although exercised for generations and put to the test in limited initiatives since the end of the Cold War, NATO procedures are being used in an extended operation for the first time in Afghanistan. The challenges increased as NATO forces expanded the ISAF mandate to other parts of the country, as envisioned in the Bonn Agreement, and assumed new missions such as combat operations in the southern regions of the country.

In addition to ISAF, the original Coalition Force remained operational and continued the fight against Taliban remnants, Al Qaeda, and other terrorist organizations.

Reform of the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and ANA became the responsibility of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A), a U.S.-led multinational organization operating from a tiny corner of a small compound in Kabul. OMC-A became the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSC-A) in July 2005 when it assumed responsibility for the reform of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the Afghan National Police (ANP), and other law enforcement organizations.

With the addition of new missions and more partners working on both MOD and MOI reform, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) emerged, taking over the entire compound. The expansion of USG, partner nation, and IGO involvement was having a very visible impact. The lead IGO for the entire Afghan effort is the UN and its various UN system agencies identified earlier.

Currently, Afghan security-sector reform is under the direction of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A).

In addition to the activities of the UN, NATO, IGOs, U.S., and other partner nations, many hundreds of NGOs are deployed throughout Afghanistan and have been for decades. All of these players actively coordinate with each other to gain the greatest effects from their activities.

Over the years, separate bilateral relationships have developed between various countries and the Afghan government. This was to be expected given the strong emphasis on hospitality within the Afghan culture. Many, if not most, of these arrangements exist outside the established organizations and protocols governing the reform of the Afghan Security Forces (ANA and ANP) and other government ministries.

Thus mentors from CSTC-A, various IGOs and NGOs, and individual countries might be working alongside each other to reform the same functional area. Sometimes Afghan officials suddenly depart for training in another country without the knowledge of those with the responsibility for the reform mission.
While none of these activities is ill-intentioned, they do represent a significant disruption of the unity of effort described within the Bonn Agreement and other protocols developed over the years. It is not likely to remain an unusual case as the number of countries, IGOs, and NGOs willing to invest human and material resources into an Afghan-like situation grows.

The coordination requirements for the special operations warrior working with the USG interagency and other players will only become more complicated in such environments.
Chapter 4. Navigating the Interagency Environment

As we have seen, navigating the USG interagency process represents a demanding exercise in relationship building, cooperation, and coordination. It involves a mosaic of different capabilities, resources, organizational cultures, agendas, and ways of doing business. Experience with these complexities teaches that working the USG interagency process can be confusing and frustrating. That becomes even truer when interacting with the representatives and agendas of the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs.

But experience also proves that the successful achievement of national security objectives is not possible without the skillful navigation of the USG interagency process. No department, agency, or organization can do it all without assistance. The evolution of the “3-D” special operations warrior—in possession of a toolkit of diplomatic, defense, and development skills—has become a priority in developing a force capable of applying all the elements of national power where required.

For that special operations warrior on the ground overseas, the functioning of the USG interagency community is more than a theoretical background study. What the USG interagency process produces in Washington, D.C. has a direct practical impact on what takes place overseas. The major outputs generated by the USG interagency processes are strategic direction, policies, Presidential decisions, and national security objectives translated into plans that are then provided to the operators on the ground.

As noted in Chapter 1, the specifics of interagency structure, policy, and procedures will inevitably change from time to time for a variety of reasons including the preferences of different presidents, the emergence of new issues, and the nature of the security threats facing the nation.

In general, however, the principles of the USG interagency process remain the same. For instance, the structure and functioning of the NSC remains familiar, even as administrations and political parties exchange power. However, there will be differences in other areas such as participants, numbers of IPCs, procedures, and work flow. Terminology will often change as each president’s administration adds its own particular flavor to the vernacular.

Additionally, individual USG departments, agencies, and organizations are continuously seeking new ways to approach the interagency challenge, resulting in fresh bureaus and offices, working groups, and programs that must be accounted for. Thus the reality of inevitable change within the interagency process demands flexibility and a strong sense of situation awareness by all participants.

Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the added complexity that comes from extending the reach of the USG interagency process overseas and then interacting with many players from outside the USG interagency community. Even under the best conditions, the introduction of HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs demands that the special operations warrior remains focused on the CT objective while accommodating an array of differing and sometimes competing agendas.

What is encouraging is that in recent years, many traditional and potential partner nations have begun to employ their own versions of whole-of-government approaches, particularly when creating infrastructure and in responding to terrorist threats. There is an emerging consensus internationally that all the elements of national power have roles to play in CT scenarios.

With so much evolving HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO expertise present in any given AO, it is possible to face situations in which solutions seem to be in
search of problems to solve. Random problem solving may provide immediate returns, but is rarely helpful in the intermediate or long term.

At such times, an individual’s interagency skills can assist in defining shared long-term goals and orchestrating the resources to address them. The objective becomes to establish shared goals and then to chart a path that ensures unity of effort to achieve them as efficiently as possible.

In such an environment, it becomes tempting to make promises about resources and funding, especially to HN officials. It is generally not wise to do so unless there is confidence that you can keep the promises you have made.

An IGO official was once speaking to a group of senior Afghan military and police officials in Kabul about what assistance his organization can provide. A member of the audience aggressively challenged the official on what he charged was a failure of the IGO to make good on an earlier promise.

According to the Afghan, the IGO promised—or appeared to promise—that each family in several villages would be provided a laptop computer. The questioner wondered why the IGO never delivered any computers, providing instead a goat and sheep to each family.

One could argue that in a country of 80 percent illiteracy and no or unreliable electrical supplies, a goat and a sheep would provide a very helpful contribution to improving each family’s quality of life—more so, it would seem, than a laptop computer.

Regardless, the perceived promise of laptops was not fulfilled. This outcome challenged the credibility of the specific IGO and the effectiveness of others working to improve living conditions in that district.

The critical skills—both within and outside the USG interagency process—are to learn the various cultures, identify the problems, understand the needs to be met, and encourage as many players as possible to invest in the effort to assure success. Adaptability is essential, as few situations allow for templated solutions.

Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Credibility, and News Media

While the special operations warrior is interacting within the USG interagency process and with officials from the HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs, there are “evaluators” present in the form of the local, national, and international news media.

Regardless of the measurements of success defined by the USG interagency process or agreed to by other participants, modern journalists tend to define their own standards and to judge performance through their own filters.

Thus it should not be surprising to discover that a persistent gap exists between what the USG interagency community and its international partners know to be happening and what the various domestic and international publics believe is going on. News media scrutiny introduces an important variable into the interagency navigation process that cannot be ignored.

The achievement and sustainment of credibility in the CT effort are essential. Since it is clearly not possible for the special operations warrior to speak personally with each citizen of the HN, U.S., or other countries, communicating credibly through the news media and other stakeholders is a task essential to establishing the legitimacy of any initiative.

The strategic communication challenge is to keep as narrow as possible that gap between what is being reported by the news media or discussed by various influential opinion leaders and what is happening within the AO. The need for accuracy and candor by both the strategic communicator and the news media is an essential requirement. This is because public support is essential to the successful accomplishment of CT operations. If the narrative developed by the news media persists in inaccuracies or negativity, either because of the flow of events or the tone of the reporting, public support will surely wane.

It has long been understood that the explanation and communication support of foreign policy and military activities is best achieved by consistency of message or, as it is better known, speaking with one voice. To achieve this goal, the Country Team is supported by the work of the Public Affairs officer who is
then backed up by the DoS Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the wider USG strategic communication community.

All USG Public Affairs programs are part of a collective interagency effort that seeks to provide accurate information to the news media while providing context and meaning through carefully crafted and coordinated strategic messaging.

The National Framework for Strategic Communication, signed by President Obama and submitted to the U.S. Congress under the provisions of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, acknowledged that there is a “need to clarify what strategic communication means and how we guide and coordinate our communication efforts.”

Given the uncertainty over the precise meaning of strategic communication, the report describes the process as the “synchronization of our words and deeds as well as deliberate efforts to communicate and engage with intended audiences.” This attempt at a definition is particularly useful for the special operations warrior as it reminds all players that the “word-deed gap” must also be kept as narrow as possible to prevent the loss of credibility in the eyes of the HN population, government, regional audiences, partner nations, IGOs, NGOs and other stakeholders.

More precisely, the negative consequences of even the best-intentioned efforts cannot be explained away by denials of responsibility, clever marketing slogans, or other persuasive techniques. Above all, it is necessary to be aware of what is being said about the efforts of the USG, HN, partner nations, IGOs, and NGOs within an AO. Awareness of what is being said does not imply acceptance of the content; but it does allow for the development and implementation of appropriate strategic communication initiatives that affirm, challenge, or ignore that content depending on the circumstances.

Unity of effort for the USG strategic communications effort originates within the White House with the Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication (DNSA/SC) and the principal deputy DNSA/SC, the Senior Director of Global Engagement (SDGE). Deliberate communication and engagement efforts are worked through the National Security Staff Directorate for Global Engagement (NSS/GE) and through the Interagency Policy Committee for Strategic Communication (IPC/SC). The DNSA/SC and SDGE chair the IPC/SC. The Interagency Policy Committee for Global Engagement (IPC/GE) also plays a critical role within the NSS on matters of strategic communication. Thus at least two IPCs within the National Security Council Structure have an impact on USG interagency strategic communication activities.

Within the wider USG interagency community (see discussions in Chapter 1), the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs serves as the central coordination hub. That individual works with functional and regional bureaus within the DoS to coordinate and create integration among policy, communication, and engagement objectives.

A variety of organizations and programs within DoS, DoD, and other USG agencies play critical roles within the interagency process to ensure the most influential strategic communication effects. Some of these include the following:

a. The DoS Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R/PPR), which provides long-term strategic planning and performance measurements
b. Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP)
c. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)
d. Bureau of Public Affairs (PA)
e. Public Affairs Officers on Country Teams
f. The Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC)
g. The Public Diplomacy Office Director (PDOD)
h. DoD’s Global Strategic Engagement Team (GSET)
i. Various Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DSPD) initiatives
j. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD)
k. DoD’s Global Engagement Strategy Coordination Committee (GESCC)
l. Broadcasting Board of Governors, who are responsible for USG nonmilitary, international broadcasting to include, among others, the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), Radio and TV Marti, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television.

These and other efforts are coordinated, as appropriate, with the USAID, IC, NCTC, and other interagency members.

The distribution of common strategic messages and public affairs guidance assists all USG departments, agencies, and organizations to breed consistency into their unilateral and collective information programs. The ultimate goal is to sustain a single-voiced relationship with the news media and other relevant national and international audiences.

It is a difficult challenge, one made even more so by the introduction of scores — perhaps hundreds — of HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO voices and agendas that are competing for exposure. It is important to remember that each serves a variety of stakeholders who provide both active and passive support. The interest of each stakeholder must be accounted for within the many disparate media relations programs that are in play.

The strategic communication environment is made even more complex by the presence of sophisticated terrorist propaganda initiatives that skew the truth while frequently attracting sympathetic news media coverage. Thus the difficult challenge of synchronizing all the Public Affairs agendas within the USG interagency process is just a first step toward establishing and sustaining a credible agenda internationally where both friendly voices and enemy propaganda compete for finite air time and column inches.

Experience teaches that pursuing complete strategic message control in such an environment is a waste of time. Some participants such as the HN, partner nations, and some IGOs may be willing to coordinate some messages to improve their effectiveness. However, those other players must also serve constituencies that are not relevant to the USG agenda and who must be addressed separately.

IGOs and NGOs frequently present special challenges as many operate sophisticated Web sites and frequently issue their own reports on their own progress and that of others within the AO. Those in the USG who are used to the comfort of speaking with one voice are often shaken by what those assessments assert and the degree of instant credibility they are often afforded by the national and international news media, especially if they appear to contradict official USG positions.

When such reports are not supportive of counterterrorist operations within the AO or are inconsistent with ongoing USG strategic messaging, they are frequently cited by the news media as evidence of policy failure by the USG and its various partners.

During the summer of 2004, a dispute between Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières–MSF) and the Coalition operating within Afghanistan caused the NGO to withdraw its representatives from the country. The squabble focused on what the NGO felt was an unacceptable threat to its personnel because of the appearance similarity between vehicles they used and those driven by the Coalition. MSF believed that the vehicles used by their representatives had become indistinguishable from the military’s and thus placed them in increased danger.

A similar episode took place in the summer of 2008 when aid workers from Refugees International were murdered by Taliban forces near Kabul, causing the NGO to leave the country.

In both cases, the announcement of NGO withdrawals led to flurries of reports in which the news media, many reporting from far outside the country, amplified the circumstances and drew conclusions about the poor state of security in the country that may or may not have been accurate.

Considering these and other cases, those USG personnel involved with Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, and Information Operations should be attentive to the chorus of potentially conflicting voices present in the AO and prepare contingencies for addressing their impact on public perceptions. Once again, explanation and context—not message control—offer the most promising path to success.
Chapter 4: Navigating the Interagency Environment

The USG Interagency Community Way Ahead

Considerable effort has gone into formalizing the structure, work flow, and cohesion of the USG interagency process. Even so, that process frequently remains uncertain in its purpose and direction while remaining confusing in its complexity.

By its very nature, the USG interagency process remains a coordinative system that largely depends on the relationship-building skills of individuals for its success. What is required for that success is for leadership to take the initiative within the midst of uncertainty and imprecise direction. Experience teaches that such steps do not always happen.

Institutional and personal credibility are essential to functioning successfully within the interagency process. Those who are the most responsive, provide the best databases, listen closely, craft the most perceptive assessments, and present the most promising options are most likely to have the greatest positive impact.

Major strategic and operational challenges remain to cut through the stovepipes that flow vertically through the traditional management practices of individual USG departments, agencies, and organizations. The goal is to ensure inclusion of the relevant skill sets, experiences, and resources needed to address the most pressing security challenges. Ideally, the USG interagency process will fit the appropriate expertise to the specific problem.

Predictably, the special operations warrior within the AO will face situations that do not fit traditional military problem-solving models. Even those most skilled and experienced within the SOF community will face expertise limitations from time to time.

For instance, special operations warriors are not necessarily well positioned to offer advice to local mayors on how to interact effectively with village councils and community opinion leaders to build a consensus for action in a given situation. Others within the USG and throughout the private sector, however, have those experiences and can contribute if properly engaged and deployed.

The broad question remains how best to gather the necessary human and material resources and set them on the path to achieve the nation's national security objectives. The USG interagency process has progressed to some extent in precisely defining those objectives.

Shortcomings remain, however, in determining how the interagency process should improve the efficiency of information exchanges; technology interface; analysis; assessment; development of policy options and operational courses of action; anticipation of consequences; presentation of recommendations; the translation of strategic guidance, policies, and Presidential decisions into workable operational plans; and the management and adaptation of those plans once introduced into the operational environment.

Put another way, how does the USG most efficiently and effectively employ all of the elements of national power (DIME-FIL: diplomatic, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence, and law enforcement) to address specifically the threats posed by terrorism overseas?

In the absence of standardized USG interagency work flow and coordination procedures, gaining agreement in identifying shared end states remains a challenge. This situation is particularly true overseas where HN, partner nation, IGO, and NGO influences beyond the USG interagency community inevitably complicate the factors of where we are going (goals), how we are getting there (ways), and how we are going to resource the effort (means).

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The presence of representatives from several different military forces—each with its own doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures—introduces similar confusion when all are advising the same HN military using their own familiar points of reference. The problem is compounded when those from different services from within the U.S. military and those of other countries train the HN more narrowly on “how we do it” in our service or, more narrowly, on our base.

Whether domestically or internationally, the USG interagency process seeks to achieve efficiencies by leveraging diverse human and material resources toward a shared end state. Part of the effort involves minimizing task duplication and structural redundancy. Elimination of either is not possible.

While horizontal coordination is necessary within the USG interagency process, it is essential within the AO. In the absence of the familiar unity of command, the special operations warrior must learn to work within an interagency process guided by lead agencies pursuing a unity of effort or, in some cases, the even softer unity of purpose.

As always, individual and organizational credibility is gained through producing results. Operating within the USG interagency process requires a difficult balancing act between loyalty to one’s own home agency and allegiance to the objectives of U.S. policy. Understandably, that loyalty to home agency is a powerful motivator, one correctly viewed as essential to self-preservation.

Those seeking to improve the functioning of the USG interagency process must wrestle with that reality and others. The USG interagency process is in a condition very similar to the one that led to the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-433). Goldwater-Nichols reorganized the DoD and redirected the efforts of the U.S. defense community.

Though shortcomings remain, the DoD is a vastly more efficient defender of U.S. national security than it was 25 years ago. The process has taken time, as will any broader effort to bring similar reform to the entire USG structure.

Though complex in its provisions, Goldwater-Nichols answered the basic question, “Who’s in charge?” Such clarity would quickly boost the effectiveness of the USG interagency process. Establishing responsibility within any context enables the reform of relationship-building, coordination, and work flow shortfalls.

It also leads to a harmonization of organizational cultures, but not their replacement. If done well, establishing clear responsibility and follow-on reform initiatives will improve interagency flexibility and responsiveness by creating consistency. It has worked in the IATF structures and can, with effort, in more complex organizations.

Just as many countries display maps that portray themselves as the center of their region or of the entire world, many participants regard the USG interagency process with themselves as the central point of focus. Thus the question for them becomes, How does the interagency process support my department, agency, or organization?

It is the wrong question. Rather we should ask how the interagency process can better support the achievement of U.S. national security objectives.

The seemingly simple act of identifying who’s in charge is an important first step in interagency reform. Until then, the 3-D special operations warrior must continue to navigate through a situationally and personality dependent environment, with all its attendant uncertainties and frustrations, to accomplish the CT mission.
Appendix A. List of Organizations

The following USG departments, agencies and organizations, IGOs, and NGOs provide the human and material resources to wage the fight against terrorists, their networks, and their ideologies. They also work to eliminate the conditions that breed terrorism and seek to replace them with reforms and initiatives that bring about stability and good governance. Some of the components listed here are not discussed in the text or have only a limited mention, but can be reached through the links to allow for individual research as required.

The CT environment is ever changing with new structures and programs regularly joining the fight. This list is not exhaustive, but it does identify the major players. As noted several times, this caveat is particularly apt for NGOs because there are many thousands that operate around the world. A comprehensive list would be more confusing than helpful; it would also never be completely accurate.

**ABCA Armies** (IGO)
www.abca-armies.org/Default.aspx

**Academy for Educational Development (AED)** (NGO)
www.aed.org

**Action Against Hunger** (USA) (NGO)
www.actionagainsthunger.org

**Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy** (DoS)
www.state.gov/r/adcompd

**Afghan New Beginnings Program** (UN) (IGO)
http://undpanbp.org/index.html

**Afghan Security Forces Fund** (ASFF) (DoD)

**African Union** (Regional IGO)
www.africa-union.org

**Africare** (NGO)
www.africare.org

**American Council for Voluntary Action (Interaction)**
www.interaction.org

**American Friends Service Committee** (NGO)
www.afsc.org

**American Refugee Committee** (NGO)
www.arcrelief.org/site/PageServer

**Antiterrorism Advisory Council (ATAC)** (DoJ)
www.justice.gov/usao/moe/attf.html

**Antiterrorism Assistance Program** (ATA) (DoS)
www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8583.htm
www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16885.htm

**Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation** (APEC)
www.apec.org

**Assistant Attorney General for National Security** (DoJ)
www.usdoj.gov/nsd/

**Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs)**

**Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)**

**Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**
www.aseansec.org

**Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF)** (Regional IGO)
www.state.gov/s/ct/intl/io/arf

**Broadcasting Board of Governors** (BBG)
www.bbg.gov

**Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives** (ATF) (DoJ)
www.atf.gov

**Bureau of Business and Security** (DoC)
www.bis.doc.gov
Bureau of Consular Affairs  
travel.state.gov

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) (DoS)  

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance-Office of Military Affairs (DCHA-OMA) (DoS)  

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL)  
www.state.gov/g/drl

Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) (DoS)  
www.state.gov/m/ds/

Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs (EEB) (DoS)  
www.state.gov/e/eeb

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DHS)  
www.ice.gov/index.htm

Bureau of Industry and Security (DoC)  
www.bis.doc.gov

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)  
www.state.gov/s/inr

Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP) (DoS)  
www.state.gov/t/iip

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)  
www.state.gov/p/inl

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)  
www.state.gov/t/isn

Bureau of Justice Assistance (DoJ)  
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM)  
www.state.gov/r/pm

Bureau of Public Affairs (DoS)  
www.state.gov/r/pa/index.htm

Business Executives for National Security (BENS)  
www.bens.org/home.html

Business Transformation Office (BTO) (DNI)  

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) (NGO)  
www.crs.org

Center for Security Evaluation (CSE) (DNI)  

Center for Special Operations (CSO) (USSOCOM/DoD)  

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)  
https://www.cia.gov

CIA Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC)  

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) (DoS)  
www.jcs.mil

Chief of Mission (COM) (DoS)  

Church World Service (CWS) (NGO)  
www.churchworldservice.org/site/PageServer

Civilian Response Corps of the United States of America  
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/07/107063.htm

Civil-Military Cooperation Center  

Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC)  

Civil-Military Information Center (CIMIC)  

Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) (DoD)  

Civil-Military Support Element (CMSE) (DoD)  

Coalition Support Funds (CSF) (DoD)  
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-735R

Combatant Commands Initiative Funds (CCIF) (DoD)  

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) (DoD)  

Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) (USAID)  
www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) (NGO)  
www.care.org

Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) (DoD)  
www.dtra.mil/oe/ctr/programs/index.cfm

Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)-related Training (DoD)

Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) (DoD)  

Counter Narco Terrorist (CNT) Training (DoD)  

Counterterrorism Financial Unit  
www.state.gov/s/ct/about/cl6662.htm

Counterterrorism Section (CTS) (DoJ)  
www.usdoj.gov/nsd/counterterrorism.htm
Appendix A. List of Organizations

Counterterrorism Training Coordination Working Group

Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG) (NSC/PCC)

Counterterrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement
www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/mission/index.html

Counterterrorism Training Working Group (DoJ)

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (DHS)
www.cbp.gov

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
www.darpa.mil

Defense Attaché (DATT) (DoD/DIA)

Defense Attaché System (DAS) (DoD/DIA)
www.dia.mil/history/histories/attaches.html

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)
www.dfas.mil

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
www.dia.mil

Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) (DoD)

Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS)
www.fas.org/irp/program/core/dodiis.htm

Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) (DoD)

Defense and Management Contacts (DMC) Programs (DoD)

Defense Planning Committee (NATO) (Regional IGO)
www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070102.htm

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) (DoD)
www.dsca.mil

Defense Security Services (DSS)
www.dss.mil

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
www.dtra.mil

Demining Test and Evaluation Program

Department of Agriculture (DoA)
www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome

Department of Commerce (DoC)
www.commerce.gov

Department of Defense (DoD)
www.defenselink.mil

Department of Energy (DoE)
www.energy.gov

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
www.hhs.gov

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
www.dhs.gov/index.shtm

Department of Justice (DoJ)
www.usdoj.gov

Department of State (DoS)
www.state.gov

Department of State Counterterrorism (S/CT)
www.state.gov/s/ct

Department of the Treasury (Treasury)
www.treasury.gov

Department of Transportation (DoT)
www.dot.gov

Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) (DoS)

Deputy to the Commander for Civilian-Military Activities (DCMA) (USAFRICOM)
www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp

Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) (USAFRICOM)
www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp

Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) (DoS)
www.state.gov/m/ds

Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
www.dni.gov

Directorate for Global Engagement (NSS/GE) (White House)

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)
www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance

Department of Defense Counterdrug Programs

Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications (DNSA/SC) (White House)

Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (NGO)
www.doctorswithoutborders.org

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (DoJ)
www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm

Economic Support Fund (ESF)

Energy, Sanctions and Commodities (EEB/ESC) (DoS)
www.state.gov/e/eeb/22734.htm
Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC)
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/index.htm

European Police Office (EUROPOL) (IGO)
www.europol.europa.eu

European Union (EU) (Regional IGO)
europa.eu

Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
www.dsca.mil/programs/eda/edomain.htm

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (DoJ)
www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/counterterrorism/waronterrorism.htm

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (DHS)
www.fema.gov

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center-International Programs Division (FLETC) (DHS)
www.fletc.gov/about-fletc/locations/fletc-international.htm

Federal Protective Services (FPS) (ICE/DHS)
www.ice.gov/about/fps/contact.htm

Field Intelligence Group (FIG) (FBI)
www.fbi.gov/page/2/april05/fig042705.htm

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (IGO)
www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2987,en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.html

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (UN) (IGO)
www.fao.org

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (DHHS)
www.fda.gov

Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) (DoA)
www.fas.usda.gov

Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) (DoS)
www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16664.htm

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (DoD)
www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_07_1.pdf

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) (DoD)
www.dsca.mil/home/foreign_military_financing%20_program.htm

Foreign Military Sales (FMS) (DoD)
www.dsca.osd.mil/home/foreign_military_sales.htm

Foreign Service Institute (FSI)
www.state.gov/m/fsi

Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm

Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) (DoJ)
www.fbi.gov/aboutus/transformation/ct.htm

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
www.gatt.org

Global Engagement Strategy Coordination Committee (GESCC) (DoD)

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) (DoS)
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi

Global Strategic Engagement Center (GSEC) (DoS)

Global Strategic Engagement Team (SGET) (DoS)

Global Train and Equip Program

Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC) (DHS)

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)

Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP)

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) (DoD)

Humanitarian Information Center (HIC)

Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) (DoS)

Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
www.ice.gov/index.htm

Information Sharing Council (ISC) (DNI)
www.isc.gov/pages/isc.html

Information Sharing Environment (ISE) (DNI)
www.ise.gov

Information Sharing & Fusion Centers
www.ise.gov/pages/partner-fc.html

Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) (DNI)

Intelligence Community (IC) (USG)
www.intelligence.gov/index.shtml

Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)
www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf

Intelligence Today Office (DNI)

Interagency Policy Committees (IPC) (White House)
Appendix A. List of Organizations

Interagency Policy Committee for Strategic Communication (IPC/SC) (White House)
Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) (DNI)
   www.iase.gov/pages/partner-itacg.html
International Alliance Against Hunger (IAAH) (IGO)
   www.iaahp.net
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (IGO)
   www.iaea.org
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (IGO)
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (IGO)
   www.icrc.org
International Communications and Information Policy (EEB/CIP) (DoS)
   www.state.gov/e/eeb/cip
International Cooperation Development Fund (ICD)
International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) (DoJ)
   www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/7262.htm
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) (IGO)
   www.interpol.int
International Development Association (IDA)
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (IGO)
   www.ifrc.org
International Finance and Development (EEB/IFD) (DoS)
   www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd
International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
   www.icrc.org/Eng/ihl
International Labor Organization (ILO) (UN) (IGO)
International Medical Corps (IMC) (NGO)
   www.imcworldwide.org
International Military Education and Training (IMET) (DoS/DoD)
   www.dsca.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (IGO)
   www.imf.org/external/index.htm
International Organization Affairs
   www.state.gov/p/io
International Organization for Migration
   www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp
International Rescue Committee (IRC) (NGO)
   www.theirc.org
International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) (UN Mandate/NATO)
   www.nato.int/isaf/index.html
INTERPOL United States Central Bureau (DoJ)
   www.usdoj.gov/usncb
Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) (DoD)
   www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy08/08-026.pdf
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (DoD)
   www.jcs.mil
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) (DoD)
   www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2007/92073.htm
Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (JICC) (DoD)
Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC) (DNI)
   www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32515.pdf
Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) (DoD)
Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) (DoD)
Joint Interagency Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JIATF-CT) (DoD)
Joint Interagency Task Force-CT (Afghanistan) (DoD)
Joint Interagency Task Force-South
   www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/
Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) (DoD)
Joint Operations Center (JOC) (DoD)
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) (DoD)
   www.fas.org/man/dod-101/usaf/docs/cwpc/4000-JS.htm
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) (DoJ/FBI)
   www.usdoj.gov/jtff
Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (N-DEx) (DoJ)
www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ndex/ndex_home.htm

Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF) (NGO)
www.doctorswithoutborders.org/donate/?msource=AZD0408H1001

Mercy Corps (NGO)
www.mercycorps.org

Military Committee (NATO) (Regional IGO)
www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1101.htm

Military Department Intelligence Services (DoD)
www.af.mil
www.army.mil
www.uscg.mil
www.quantico.usmc.mil/activities/?Section=MCIA
www.nmic.navy.mil

Military Group (MILGP)

Mission Management Teams (DNI)

Mission Support Center (DNI)

Mobile Training Team (MTT) (DoD)

Narcotics Control Officer (NCO) (DoS)

National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) (DNI)
www.ncix.gov/whatsnew/index.html

National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC)

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) (DNI)
www.nctc.gov

National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC) (DoJ)
www.ncirc.gov

National Defense Intelligence College (DoD)
www.dia.mil/college

National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP)
www.intelligence.gov/2-business_nfip.shtml
hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/Concepts/2001/PDF/C%26I%202001%20chapt%204%20part%205%20Other%20NFIP.pdf

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (DoD)
www1.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx

National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) (DoD)
www1.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx

National Intelligence Centers
www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21948.pdf

National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) (DNI)

National Intelligence Council (NIC) (DNI)
www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_home.html
www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-207.pdf

National Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C) (DNI)

National Intelligence Program (NIP)
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/intelligence.html

National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) (DoD)

National Intelligence University (NIU) (DNI)

National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) (DoD/FBI)
www.fbi.gov/page2/july04/njttf070204.htm

National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) (DoD)
https://www.cnic.navy.mil/nsaw/About/NationalMaritimeIntelligenceCenter/index.htm

National Military Joint Intelligence Center (MNJIC) (DoD)
nsi.org/Library/Intel/8.html

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (DoC)
www.noaa.gov

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) (DoD)
www.nro.gov

National Reconnaissance Program (NRP)
www.nro.gov

National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) (DoD)
www.nsa.gov

National Security Branch (NSB) (FBI)
www.fbi.gov/hq/nsb/nsb.htm

National Security Council (NSC)
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc

National Security Council Deputy’s Committee (NSC/DC)
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc
Appendix A: List of Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Website/Link</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc">www.whitehouse.gov/nsc</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Security Council Principal’s Committee (NSC/PC)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc">www.whitehouse.gov/nsc</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Division (NSD) (DoJ)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/nds">www.usdoj.gov/nds</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>National Security Staff (NSS) (White House)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Targeting Center (NTC) (DHS/CBP)</td>
<td>cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2005/March/ntc.xml</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCTC Online (NOL) (NCTC/DNI)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nctc.gov/docs/report_card_final.pdf">www.nctc.gov/docs/report_card_final.pdf</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) (DoS)</td>
<td>thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&amp;dbname=cp108&amp;sid=cp108OD42V&amp;refer=&amp;r_n=hr222.108&amp;item=&amp;sel=TOC_207044&amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Regional IGO)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nato.int">www.nato.int</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nuclear Incident Reporting Team (NIRT) (DHS)</td>
<td>orise.orau.gov/nsem/nit.htm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASDPA)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of Commercial and Business Affairs (EEB/CBA) (DoS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/cba">www.state.gov/e/eeb/cba</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (UN)</td>
<td>ochaonline.un.org</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/s/ct">www.state.gov/s/ct</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/s/cri">www.state.gov/s/cri</a></td>
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<td>Office of Counterterrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy (DoS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/c9997.htm">www.state.gov/e/eeb/c9997.htm</a></td>
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<td>Office of Democracy and Governance (USAID)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/">www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/</a></td>
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<td>Office of the Director General, Diplomatic Readiness Institute (DoS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13742.pdf">www.state.gov/documents/organization/13742.pdf</a></td>
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<td>Office of Economic Policy Analysis &amp; Public Diplomacy (EEB/EPPD) (DoS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/eppd">www.state.gov/e/eeb/eppd</a></td>
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<td>Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) (Treasury)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.treas.gov/ofac">www.treas.gov/ofac</a></td>
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<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) (USAID)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/">www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Mine Action (HDM) (DoS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm">www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm</a></td>
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<td>Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&amp;A) (DHS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_122086590914.shtm">www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_122086590914.shtm</a></td>
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<td>Office of International Affairs (OIA) (Treasury)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/oia">www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/oia</a></td>
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<td>Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (IN) (DoE)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.doe.gov/nationalsecurity">www.doe.gov/nationalsecurity</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) (DoJ)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/nds/oipr-redirect.htm">www.usdoj.gov/nds/oipr-redirect.htm</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of International Affairs (Treasury)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs">www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of International Security Operations (ISO) (DoS)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.gov/t/pm/iso">www.state.gov/t/pm/iso</a></td>
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<td>Office of Justice for Victims of Overseas Terrorism (OJVOT) (DoJ)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.usdoj.gov/nds/ojt.htm">www.usdoj.gov/nds/ojt.htm</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Office of Justice Programs (OJP) (DoJ)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov">www.ojp.usdoj.gov</a></td>
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Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (White House)
www.whitehouse.gov/omb
Office of National Security Intelligence (NN) (DEA)
www.usdoj.gov/dea/index.htm
Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) (DoJ)
Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis (PM/PPA) (DoS)
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa
Office of Policy (DHS)
www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0870.shtml
Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DoS)
www.state.gov/r/ppr/index.htm
Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) (DoS)
www.state.gov/g/prm
Office of Regional Affairs (ISN/RA) (DoS)
www.state.gov/t/isn/58372.htm
Office of Strategic Plans (DHS)
www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0873.shtml
Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) (Treasury)
www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/assistance
Office of Terrorism Analysis (OTA) (CIA)
Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) (Treasury)
www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement
Office of Terrorism Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy (DoS)
www.state.gov/e/eeb/c9997.htm
Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC)
www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/eotf.shtml
Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)
www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives
Office of Transitional Issues (OTI) (CIA)
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I))
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P))
Organization of American States (OAS) (Regional IGO)
www.oas.org
OAS/Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (Regional IGO)
www.cicte.oas.org/Rev/en
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (IGO)
www.opcw.org
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (IGO)
www.osce.org
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) (DoD/DoS)
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) (USG)
www.opic.gov
Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC)
www.osac.gov
www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8650.htm
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) (NGO)
www.oxfam.org
Pakistan Frontier Corps
Partners of the Americas (NGO)
www.partners.net/partners/Default_EN.asp
Political-Military Policy and Planning Team
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/pmppt
Populations, Refugees and Migration
www.state.gov/g/prm
President’s Daily Brief Staff (PDB) (DNI)
President’s Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) (White House)
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/02/20080229-5.html
President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) (White House)
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/02/20080229-5.html
Project Hope (HOPE) (NGO)
www.projecthope.org
Appendix A. List of Organizations

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) (DoS)
www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390.htm
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS21881.pdf

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/91433.htm

Public Affairs Officer (PAO)

Public Designations Unit (DoS)
www.state.gov/s/ct/about/c16816.htm

Public Diplomacy Office Director (PDOD) (DoS)

Refugees International (RI) (NGO)
www.refugeesinternational.org

Regional Centers for Security Strategies (DSCA)
www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/gsa/ctfp/sections/community/dod_centers.html

Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) (DoD)

Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation Programs (RDT&E)

Resident Legal Advisor (RLA) (DoJ)

Rewards for Justice Program
www.state.gov/m/ds/terrorism/c8651.htm

Salvation Army World Service Office (SA/WSO) (NGO)
www.sawso.org

Save the Children (SC/US) (NGO)
www.savethechildren.org/about

Security Assistance (SA)

Security Assistance Officer (SAO)

Security Assistance Team
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)
www.defenselink.mil/osd/

Senior Director for Global Engagement (SDGE) (White House)

Special Operations Forces (SOF)
www.socom.mil

Special Operations Support Team (SOST) (DoD)

Special Security Center (SSC) (DNI)

Stop Hunger Now (NGO)
www.stophungernow.org/site/PageServer

Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) (DoJ/FBI)
www.fbi.gov/hq/siocfs.htm

Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs) (DoD)

Technical Support Working Groups (TSWG) (DoS/DoD)
www.tswg.gov

Terrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS) (DoJ)
www.fbi.gov/aboutus/terrorism/ct.htm

Terrorism and International Victim Assistance Services Division (TIVASD) (DoJ)
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/welcovc/tivu.html

Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) (NCTC/DNI)
www.nctc.gov/docs/Tide_Fact_Sheet.pdf

Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)
www.state.gov/about/c16663.htm

Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) (FBI)
www.fbi.gov/aboutus/terrorism/ct.htm
www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel03/tscpr091603.htm

Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS) (DoD/USAF)
ftp.fas.org/irp/budget/fy98_usaf/0207217f.htm

Trade Policy and Programs (EEB/TPP) (DoS)
www.state.gov/e/eeb/tpp

Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (DoS/USAID/DoD)
www.africom.mil/tsctp.asp

Transportation Affairs (EEB/TRA) (DoS)
www.state.gov/e/eeb/tra

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) (DHS)
www.tsa.gov

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence-USD(I) (DoD)
www.intelligence.gov/0-usdi_memo.shtml

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy-USD(P) (DoD)
www.defenselink.mil/policy

Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
www.state.gov/r

United Nations (UN) (IGO)
www.un.org/english

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (IGO)
www.unama-afg.org
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (IGO)
www.unicef.org

UN Development Program (UNDP) (IGO)
www.undp.org

UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) (IGO)
www.un.org.in/undmt/home.htm

UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (IGO)
portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=29008&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) (IGO)
www.ohchr.org/EN/Pages/WelcomePage.aspx

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (IGO)
www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home

UN Humanitarian Operations Center (UNHOC) (IGO)
www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/services/HOC/index.asp

UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA) (IGO)
www.unmaca.org

UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
ochaonline.un.org

UN Peacekeeping Operations (IGO)
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko

United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)
www.africom.mil

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
www.usaid.gov

United States Army Corps of Engineers
www.usace.army.mil/

United States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) (DoD)

United States Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
https://pksoi.army.mil

United States Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (NGO)
www.usaforunhcr.org

United States Coast Guard (USCG) (DHS)
www.uscg.mil/default.asp

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) (DHS)
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis

United States Marine Security Detachment (MSG)

United States Mission to the United Nations
www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov

United States Navy Oceanographic Office (NAVOCEANO) (DoD)
https://oceanography.navy.mil/legacy/web

United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) (DoD)
www.northcom.mil

United States Secret Service (USSS) (DHS)
www.secretservice.gov

United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM)
www.socom.mil

United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) (DoD)
www.stratcom.mil

USSOCOM Center for Special Operations (CSO) (DoD)

USSOCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group (USSOCOM/JIACG)

USSOCOM Interagency Executive Council

USSOCOM Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (USSOCOM/JICC)

USSOCOM Interagency Task Force (USSOCOM/IATF)

USSOMCOM Joint Operations Center (USSOCOM/JOC)

Voice of America (BBG)
www.voanews.com/english/news

Warsaw Initiative Funds (WIF) (DoD)

Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) (CIA)

White House
www.whitehouse.gov
Appendix A: List of Organizations

- World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (WANGO) (NGO)
  www.wango.org

- World Bank
  www.worldbank.org

- World Food Program (WFP) (UN) (IGO)
  www.wfp.org/english

- World Health Organization (WHO) (UN) (IGO)
  www.who.int/en

- World Intelligence Review (WIR) (DNI)

- World Trade Organization (WTO) (IGO)
  www.wto.org

- World Vision (United States) (NGO)
  site.worldvision.org
### Appendix B. Ranks of Military, Foreign Service, and Civil Service Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Foreign Service</th>
<th>Civil Service</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General, Vice Admiral</td>
<td>FE-CM (Career Minister)</td>
<td>SES-6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major General, Rear Admiral (Upper Half)</td>
<td>FE-MC (Minister Counselor)</td>
<td>SES-3/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier General, Rear Admiral (Commodore)</td>
<td>FE-OC (Counselor)</td>
<td>SES-1/2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonel, Captain (USN)</td>
<td>FO-1, FP-1</td>
<td>GS-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel, Commander (USN)</td>
<td>FO-2, FP-2</td>
<td>GS-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major, Lieutenant Commander (USN)</td>
<td>FO-3, FP-3</td>
<td>GS-12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captain, Lieutenant (USN)</td>
<td>FO-4, FP-4</td>
<td>GS-11</td>
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<td>First Lieutenant, Lieutenant (Junior Grade)</td>
<td>FO-5, FP-5</td>
<td>GS-9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second Lieutenant, Ensign (USN)</td>
<td>FP-7</td>
<td>GS-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C. Interagency-Related Definitions

**Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement.** Agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis with U.S. allies or coalition partners that allow U.S. forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the combatant commander by the Secretary of Defense. Authority to execute these agreements lies with the Secretary of Defense and may or may not be delegated. Governed by legal guidelines, these agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies, or exercises to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be adequately corrected by national means. The support received or given is reimbursed under the conditions of the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. (JP 1-02, JP 4-07)

**Ambassador.** A diplomatic agent of the highest rank accredited to a foreign government or sovereign as the resident representative of his own government; also called the Chief of Mission. In the U.S. system, the Ambassador is the personal representative of the President and reports to him through the Secretary of State. (JSOU Special Operations Forces Reference Manual)

**Antiterrorism (AT).** Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorists acts, to include limited response and containment by local and civilian forces. (JP1-02, 3-07.2)

**Area of Operations (AO).** An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operation of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Asset (Intelligence).** Any resource—person, group, relationship, instrument, installation, or supply—at the disposition of an intelligence organization for use in an operational or support role. Often used with a qualifying term such as agent asset or propaganda asset. (JP 2-0)

**Assistance.** Activities that provide relief to refugees, conflict victims, and internally displaced persons. Such relief includes food, clean water, shelter, health care, basic education, job training, sanitation, and provision of physical and legal protection. Humanitarian assistance is often given in emergencies, but may need to continue in longer-term situations. (State Department)

**Asylum-Migration Nexus.** Refers to “mixed flows” of migrants—an undifferentiated combination of documented and undocumented travelers, smuggled migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and trafficking victims—moving through an area. (State Department)

**Attaché.** A person attached to the embassy in a diplomatic status who is not normally a career member of the diplomatic service. In the U.S. system, attachés generally represent agencies other than the Department of State such as the Department of Defense (DoD) and others. (JSOU Special Operations Forces Reference Manual)

**Bilateral.** Bilateral discussions or negotiations are between a state and one other. A bilateral treaty is between one state and one other. “Multilateral” is used when more than two states are involved. (www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

**Capacity-Building Activities.** Training staff of humanitarian organizations to provide better quality service to refugees and internally displaced persons. (State Department)

**Chargé D’affaires, A.I.** Formerly a chargé d’affaires was the title of a chief of mission, inferior in rank to an ambassador or a minister. Today with the a.i. (ad interim) added, it designates the senior officer taking charge for the interval when a chief of mission is absent.
from his or her post. (www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

**Chief of Mission (COM).** The principal officer (the Ambassador) in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual assigned to be temporarily in charge of such a facility. The chief of mission is the personal representative of the President to the country of accreditation. The chief of mission is responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government (USG) executive branch employees in that country (except those under the command of a U.S. area military commander). The security of the diplomatic post is the chief of mission's direct responsibility. (JP 1-02, JP 3-10)

**Civil Administration.** An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02, JP 3-10)

**Civil Affairs (CA).** Designated active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CA activities and to support civil-military operations. (JP 1-02, JP 3-57)

**Civil Affairs Activities.** Activities performed or supported by CA that 1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present and 2) involve application of CA functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 3-57)

**Civil-Military Operations (CMO).** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. (JP 1-02, JP 3-57)

**Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).** An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces and other USG agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Civil Society Entities.** Nongovernmental associations of citizens, charitable or otherwise, formed for the purpose of providing benefit to the members and to society. The term includes nongovernmental organizations engaged in humanitarian work. (State Department)

**Coalition.** An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

**Collection.** In intelligence usage, the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements. (JP 2-0)

**Combatant Command (COCOM).** A unified or specified command with a broad continuing command under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

**Combatant Commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Combating Terrorism.** Actions, including AT (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and CT (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)
Capacity Building. The process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems. (FM 3-07)

Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF). A task force composed of special operations units from one or more foreign countries and more than one U.S. military Department formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The CJSOTF may have conventional nonspecial operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (JP 3-05)

Comprehensive Approach. An approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)

Consequence Management. Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. (JP 1-02, JP 3-28)

Consulate General/Consulate. A constituent post of an embassy in a foreign country located in an important city other than the national capital. Consulates General are larger than Consulates, with more responsibilities and additional staff. (JSOU Special Operations Forces Reference Manual)

Counterinsurgency (COIN). Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (JP-2)

Counterterrorism (CT). Actions taken through approaches applied directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05)

Country Team. The senior, in-country, U.S. coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency, as desired by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

Crisis State. A nation in which the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory. (FM 3-07)

Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. Those activities and measures taken by the DoD components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts from the USG. (JP-2, JP 3-13)

Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS). The combination of DoD personnel, procedures, equipment, computer programs, and supporting communications that support the timely and comprehensive preparation and presentation of intelligence and information to military commanders and national-level decision makers. (JP 2-0)

Developmental Assistance. U.S. Agency for International Development function chartered under Chapter 1 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, primarily designed to promote economic growth and the equitable distribution of its benefits. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Direct Action (DA). Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage targets. DA differs from conventional offensive actions in the level of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and precise use of force to achieve specific objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05)

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance provides this rapidly deployable team in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions with the management of USG response to disasters. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

Displaced Person. An individual who has been forced or obliged to flee or leave his or her home temporarily and who expects to return eventually. Internally displaced
persons (IDPs) have moved within their country, while externally displaced persons have crossed an international border. Depending upon their ability to return, and whether they are subject to persecution in their home country, externally displaced persons may be entitled to recognition as refugees under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) mandate. (State Department)

**End State.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Essential Elements of Information (EEI).** The most critical information requirements regarding the adversary and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. (JP 2-0)

**First Asylum Country.** A country that permits refugees to enter its territory for purposes of providing asylum temporarily, pending eventual repatriation or resettlement (locally or in a third country). First asylum countries usually obtain the assistance of UNHCR to provide basic assistance to the refugees. (State Department)

**Foreign Assistance.** Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters; U.S. assistance takes three forms — development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA).** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. The FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Foreign Internal Defense (FID).** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Fragile State.** A country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. (FM 3-07)

**Fusion.** In intelligence usage, the process of examining all sources of intelligence and information to derive a complete assessment of activity. (JP 2-0)

**Governance.** The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. (FM 3-07)

**Host Country/Host Nation (HN).** A nation that permits, either by written agreement or official invitation, government representatives and/or agencies of another nation to operate, under specified conditions, within its borders. (JP-2, JP 2-01.2) A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP-2)

**Host Country/Host Nation Support (HNS).** Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (JP 1-02, JP 4-0)

**Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.** Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to 1) medical, dental, veterinary, and preventive medicine care provided in rural areas of a country; 2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; 3) well drilling and construction of
basic sanitation facilities; and 4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

**Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC).** An interagency policymaking body that coordinates the overall relief strategy and unity of effort among all participants in a large foreign humanitarian assistance operation. It normally is established at the direction of the government of the affected country or the United Nations (UN), or a USG agency during a United States unilateral operation. The HOC should consist of representatives from the affected country, the United States Embassy or Consulate, the joint force, the UN, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and other major players in the operation. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Indications and Warning (I&W).** Those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or allied and/or coalition military, political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of hostile actions or intentions against the United States, its activities, overseas forces, or allied and/or coalition nations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**Information Operations (IO).** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, military information support operations (MISO), military deception, and operations security — in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities — to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (JP 1-02, JP 3-13)

**Information Sharing.** Providing a common platform for ideas, information (including databases), strategies, approaches, activities, and plans and programs. (UN)

**Insurgency.** An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05)

**Intelligence Community (IC).** All departments or agencies of a government that are concerned with intelligence activity, either in an oversight, managerial, support, or participatory role. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).** An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. (JP 2-01)

**Interagency.** USG agencies and departments, including the DoD. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Interagency Coordination.** Within the context of DoD involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of DoD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Internal Capacity Building.** Facilitating capacity building and skills development of members with critical expertise to support actors in disaster management and other activities through training, joint activities, and sharing lessons-learned experiences. (UN)

**Internal Defense and Development (IDAD).** The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. (JP 3-07.1)

**Internally Displaced Person (IDP).** Any person who has left his residence by reason of real or imagined danger but has not left the territory of their own country. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.6)

**Irregular Warfare (IW).** A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (JP 1, JP 1-02)

**Intergovernmental Organization (IGO).** An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed
to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force.** A joint task force composed of civil-military operations units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force commander in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or CMO concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies within the theater. (JP 1-02, JP 3-05.1)

**Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC).** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking SOF and assets; planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The JFSOCC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. (JP 3-0) The inclusion of a CJSPOTF into a JFSOCC changes the title to a Combined/Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (C/JFSOCC).

**Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC).** An interdependent, operational intelligence organization at the DoD, combatant command, or joint task force (if established) level that is integrated with national intelligence centers and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

**Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE).** A subordinate joint force element whose focus is on intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. (JP 2-01)

**Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).** An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported joint force commander, the JIACG provides the joint force commander with the capability to coordinate with other USG civilian agencies and departments. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Lead Agency.** Designated among USG agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies, and is responsible for implementing decisions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Letter of Assist (LOA).** A contractual document issued by the UN to a government authorizing it to provide goods or services to a peacekeeping operation; the UN agrees either to purchase the goods or services or authorizes the government to supply them subject to reimbursement by the UN. A letter of assist typically details specifically what is to be provided by the contributing government and establishes a funding limit that cannot be exceeded. (JP 1-02, JP 1-06)

**Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA).** Standard DoD form on which the USG documents its offer to transfer to a foreign government or international organization U.S. defense articles and services via foreign military sales pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act. (JP 1-02, JP 4-08)

**Local Integration.** One of the three “durable solutions”—voluntary return, local integration, third-country resettlement—sought for refugees. When voluntary return to their home country is not possible, refugees can sometimes settle with full legal rights in the country to which they have fled (also known as the country of first asylum). This is local integration. (State Department)

**Measure of Effectiveness.** A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)
Measure of Performance. A criterion used to assess friendly actions that are tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

Military Civic Action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

Military Information Support Operations (MISO)—formerly Psychological Operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of MISO is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-53)

Mobile Training Team (MTT). A team consisting of one or more U.S. military or civilian personnel sent on temporary duty, often to a foreign nation, to give instruction. The mission of the team is to train indigenous personnel to operate, maintain, and employ weapons and support systems or to develop a self-training capability in a particular skill. The Secretary of Defense may direct a team to train either military or civilian indigenous personnel, depending upon HN requests. (JP 1-02)

Multinational. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

Multinational Force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1, JP 1-02)

National Defense Strategy. A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with DoD agencies and other instruments of power to achieve national security strategy objectives. (JP 3-0)

National Intelligence. The terms “national intelligence” and “intelligence related to the national security” each refers to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside of the United States, which pertains, as determined consistent with any guidelines issued by the President, to the interests of more than one department or agency of the Government; and that involves a) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; b) the development, proliferation, or use of WMD; or c) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or other IC agencies as required. (JP 1-02, JP 2-0)

National Policy. A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives. (JP 1-02)

National Security. A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by a) a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, b) a favorable foreign relations position, or c) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP 1-02)

National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service Representative. The senior theater or military command representative of the director, NSA/chief, Central Security Service in a specific country or military command headquarters who provides the director, NSA with information on command plans requiring cryptologic support. The NSA/Central Security Service representative serves as a special advisor to the combatant commander for cryptologic matters, to include signals intelligence, communications security, and computer security. (JP 1-02, JP 2-01.2)

National Security Strategy. A document approved by the President of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national
power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Nongovernmental Organization (NGO).** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. (JP 1-02, JP 3-08)

**Partner Nation (PN).** Those nations that the United States works with to disrupt the production, transportation, and sale of illicit drugs or to counter other threats to national security, as well as the money involved with any such activity. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.4)

**Peacekeeping.** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.3)

**Persona Non Grata (PNG).** An individual who is unacceptable to or unwelcome by the host government. (www.ediplomat.com/nd/glossary.htm)

**Preventive Diplomacy.** Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence. (JP 1-02, JP 3-0)

**Protection.** Any of the activities that provide safety, meet basic needs, or secure the rights of refugees in the places to which they have fled. Examples of protection include the following:

a. Providing documentation to stateless persons
b. Preventing forced returns
c. Preventing and combating rape and domestic abuse
d. Securing education and job training for refugees
e. Maintaining an international presence in places where refugees have fled. (State Department)

**Refugee.** Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. (State Department)

**Repatriation.** Voluntary return of a refugee to his or her country of origin when conditions permit. Worldwide, this is the “best case scenario” in which a refugee feels comfortable returning home to rebuild his or her life. Recent examples of repatriation have been in Kosovo and South Sudan. (State Department)

**Resettlement.** The process of relocating a refugee from the country of first asylum to another country. When it is clear that a refugee will not be able to return to his or her home and cannot be integrated into the country to which he or she has fled, resettlement is often the only solution left. However, worldwide refugee resettlement figures are very low; fewer than 1 percent of refugees will ever be considered and accepted for resettlement. The U.S. has the largest refugee resettlement program in the world. (State Department).

**Rules of Engagement (ROE).** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JP 1-02)

**Security Assistance (SA).** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JP 1-02)

**Security Assistance Organizations (SAO).** All DoD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.1)
Security Cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host country. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.1)

Security Force Assistance (SFA). The unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, HN, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. (FM 3-07)

Security Sector Reform. The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (FM 3-07)

Stability Operations. An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

Statelessness. According to UNHCR, a stateless person is “someone who, under national laws, does not enjoy citizenship—the legal bond between a government and an individual—with any country.” While some people are de jure or legally stateless (meaning they are not recognized as citizens under the laws of any state), many people are de facto or effectively stateless persons (meaning they are not recognized as citizens by any state even if they have a claim to citizenship under the laws of one or more states). (State Department)

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as Civil Affairs agreements. (JP 1-02, JP 3-16)

Strategic Communication. Focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 1-02, JP 5-0)

Strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 2-0, JP 3-0)

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

Terrorist. An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

Terrorist Group. Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological goals. (JP 1-02, JP 3-07.2)

Trafficking in Persons. Any person who is recruited, harbored, provided, or obtained through force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjecting that person to involuntary servitude, forced labor, or commercial sex qualifies as a trafficking victim. (State Department)

Unity of Effort. The coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

Vulnerable State. A nation either unable or unwilling to provide adequate security and essential services to significant portions of the population. (FM 3-07)

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/
or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. WMD can be high explosives or nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. (JP 1-02, JP 3-28)

**Whole-of-Government Approach.** An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)
Appendix D. USG IA Abbreviations/Acronyms

AAH-USA. Action Against Hunger—United States of America (NGO)
AED. Academy for Educational Development (NGO)
AFIAA. Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency (DoD)
AFISRA. Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (DoD)
AFRICOM. U.S. Africa Command (DoD)
AFSC. American Friends Service Committee (NGO)
ANBP. Afghan New Beginnings Program (UN, IGO)
AO. Area of Operations (DoD)
AOR. Area of Responsibility (DoD)
APEC. Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Regional IGO)
ARC. American Refugee Committee International (NGO)
ARF. Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (Regional IGO)
ASD. Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD/GSA. ASD for Global Security Affairs
ASD/ISA. ASD for International Security Affairs
ASD/ISP. ASD for International Security Policy
ASD/SOLIC&IC. ASD for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities)
ASEAN. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Regional IGO)
ASFF. Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (DoD)
AT. Antiterrorism
ATA. Antiterrorism Assistance Program (DoS)
ATAC. Antiterrorism Advisory Council (DoJ)
ATF. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (DoJ)
ATFC. Afghan Threat Finance Cell
AU. African Union (Regional IGO)
BBD. Broadcasting Board of Governors (DoS)
BENS. Business Executives for National Security
BIS. Bureau of Industry and Security (DoC)
BJA. Bureau of Justice Assistance (DoJ)
BTO. Business Transformation Office (DNI)
CA. Bureau of Consular Affairs (DoS); Civil Affairs (DoD)
CARE. Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (NGO)
CBM. Confidence-Building Measures
CBP. Customs and Border Protection (DHS)
CCDR. Combatant Commander (DoD)
CCIF. Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund (DoD)
CCIR. Commander’s Critical Information Requirement (DoD)
CDC. Civilian Deployment Center (USAID)
CERP. Commander’s Emergency Response Program (DoD)
CFIUS. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (DoJ)
CFSOCC. Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command (DoD)
CI. Counterintelligence
CIFA. Counterintelligence Field Activity (DoD)
CIMIC. Civil-Military Cooperation; Civil-Military Information Center
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (DoD)</td>
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<td>C/JFSOCC</td>
<td>Combined/Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (DoD)</td>
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<td>CJSTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (DoD)</td>
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<td>CMCC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Coordination Center</td>
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<td>CMM</td>
<td>Conflict Management and Mitigation (USAID)</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations (DoD)</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Center (DoD)</td>
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<td>CMPASS</td>
<td>Civilian-Military Planning and Assessment Section (DoS)</td>
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<td>CMSE</td>
<td>Civil-Military Support Element (DoD)</td>
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<td>Counter Narco-Terrorist Training (DoD)</td>
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<td>CSG</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Support Group (NSC/PCC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism; Finance (DoS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTFP</td>
<td>Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (DoD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (DoD); Cooperative Threat Reduction-related Training (DoD)</td>
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<td>CTS</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Section (DoJ)</td>
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<td>DAS</td>
<td>Defense Attaché System (DoD/DIA)</td>
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<td>DCHA</td>
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<td>DCHA/OMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission (DoS)</td>
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<td>DCMA</td>
<td>Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DoD/AFRICOM)</td>
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<td>DCMO</td>
<td>Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DoD/AFRICOM)</td>
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<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
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<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DoD)</td>
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<td>DIME</td>
<td>Defense, Information, Military, Economic [traditional elements of national power]</td>
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<td>DIME-FIL</td>
<td>Finance, Intelligence, Law Enforcement [expanded elements]</td>
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<td>DNI</td>
<td>Director of National Intelligence</td>
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<td>Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications (White House)</td>
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<td>DoA</td>
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<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
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<td>F3EAD</td>
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<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (UN; IGO)</td>
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<td>Financial Action Task Force (IGO)</td>
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<td>FIRST</td>
<td>Federal Incident Response Support Team</td>
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<td>FISA</td>
<td>Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act</td>
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FISC. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
FLETC. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center-
International Programs Division (DHS)
FMF. Foreign Military Financing (DoD)
FMS. Foreign Military Sales (DoD, DoS)
FPS. Federal Protective Services (ICE/DHS)
FSI. Foreign Service Institute (DoS)
FTO. Foreign Terrorist Organizations (DoS)
FTTTF. Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (DoJ)
GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GESCC. Global Engagement Strategy Coordination
Committee (DoD)
GMSC. Global Mission Support Center (DoD/USSOCOM)
GPF. General Purpose Forces (DoD)
GPOI. Global Peace Operations Initiative (DoS)
GSEC. Global Strategic Engagement Center (DoS)
GSET. Global Strategic Engagement Team (DoD)
HACC. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center
(DoD)
HA/DR. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (DoD)
HAP. Humanitarian Assistance Program (DoD)
HCA. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HDM. Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief,
and Mine Action (DoD/DSCA)
HIC. Humanitarian Information Center
HIU. Humanitarian Information Unit (DoS)
HN. Host Nation/Host Country
HNS. Host Nation/Host Nation Support
HOC. Humanitarian Operations Center
HOPE. Health Opportunities for People Everywhere
(Project Hope, NGO)
HSCC. Homeland Security Coordinating Committee
(DoS)
HSI. Homeland Security Investigations (DHS)
HSIC. Homeland Security Intelligence Council (DHS)
HUMINT. Human Intelligence
IA. Interagency (USG)
I&A. Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS)
IAAH. International Alliance Against Hunger (IGO)
IACG. Interagency Coordination Group (DoD)
IAEA. International Atomic Energy Agency (IGO)
IARPA. Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity
(DNI)
IATF. Interagency Task Force (DoD)
I&W. Indications and Warning (DoD)
IBRD. International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (IGO)
IC. Intelligence Community (USG)
ICAF. Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (DoS)
ICE. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(DHS)
ICITAP. International Criminal Investigation Training
Assistance Program (DoJ)
ICRC. International Committee of the Red Cross (IGO)
IDA. International Development Association (IGO)
IDAD. Internal Defense and Development (DoD)
IDP. Internally Displaced Person
IE. Intelligence Enterprise (DHS)
IFRC. International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IGO)
IGO. Intergovernmental Organization
IHL. International Humanitarian Law
IIP. International Information Programs (DoS)
IMAT. Incident Management Assistance Team
IMC. International Medical Corps (NGO)
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training (DoS, DoD)</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund (IGO)</td>
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<td>IMS</td>
<td>Interagency Management System</td>
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<td>IN</td>
<td>Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DoE)</td>
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<td>INCLE</td>
<td>International Narcotic Control and Law Enforcement Program</td>
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<td>INL</td>
<td>Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DoS)</td>
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<td>INR</td>
<td>Bureau of Intelligence and Research (DoS)</td>
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<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization (IGO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERPOL-USNCB</td>
<td>United States National Central Bureau (DoJ)</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>Bureau of International Organization Affairs (DoS); Information Operations (DoD)</td>
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<td>IOB</td>
<td>President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (White House)</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration (IGO)</td>
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<td>IPC</td>
<td>Interagency Policy Committee (White House)</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee (NGO)</td>
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<td>IRTPA</td>
<td>Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004</td>
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<td>International Security and Assistance Force (UN Mandate/NATO)</td>
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<td>ISE</td>
<td>Information Sharing Environment (DNI)</td>
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<td>Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (DoS)</td>
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<td>Office of Regional Affairs (DoS)</td>
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<td>ISPI</td>
<td>International Stabilization and Peacebuilding Initiative (DoS)</td>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (DoD)</td>
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<td>Iraq Security Sector Fund (DoD)</td>
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<td>Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (DNI/ISE)</td>
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<td>Joint Collaboration Center (DoD/USSOCOM)</td>
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<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training (DoD)</td>
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<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JFCC-ISRS</td>
<td>Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence (DoD/USSTRATCOM)</td>
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<td>Joint Force Special Operations Component (DoD)</td>
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<td>JIACG</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Coordination Group (DoD)</td>
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<td>Joint Intelligence Community Council (DNI); Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (DoD)</td>
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<td>Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DoD)</td>
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<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (DoD)</td>
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<td>Joint Intelligence Support Element (DoD)</td>
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<td>Joint Operations Area (DoD)</td>
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<td>Joint Operations Center (DoD)</td>
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<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (DoD)</td>
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<td>Joint Task Force (DoD)</td>
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<td>LOA</td>
<td>Letter of Assist (UN); Letter of Offer and Acceptance (DoD)</td>
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<td>Management and Administration (DHS)</td>
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<td>Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc. (BBG)</td>
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<td>Military Committee (NATO)</td>
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<td>Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (DoD)</td>
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<td>Military Department (DoD)</td>
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<td>MILGP</td>
<td>Military Group</td>
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</table>
**MIP.** Military Intelligence Program (DoD)

**MISO.** Military Information Support Operations (formerly PSYOP) (DoD)

**MIST.** Military Information Support Team (DoD)

**MOA.** Memorandum of Agreement

**MOE.** Measures of Effectiveness (DoD)

**MOP.** Measures of Performance (DoD)

**MOU.** Memorandum of Understanding

**MSF.** Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (NGO)

**MSG.** U.S. Marine Security Guard detachment

**MTT.** Mobile Training Team (DoD)

**NADR.** Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (DoS)

**NATO.** North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Regional IGO)

**NAVOCEANO.** U.S. Navy Oceanographic Office (DoD)

**NCIRC.** National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCTC)

**NCIX.** National Counterintelligence Executive (DNI)

**NCO.** Narcotics Control Officer (DoS)

**NCPC.** National Counter-Proliferation Center (DNI)

**NCR.** National Capital Region

**NCS.** National Clandestine Service (CIA)

**NCTC.** National Counterterrorism Center (DNI)

**N-DEX.** Law Enforcement National Data Exchange (DoJ)

**NDIC.** National Defense Intelligence College (DoD)

**NDS.** National Defense Strategy (DoD)

**NEO.** Noncombatant Evacuation Operation

**NGA.** National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (DoD)

**NGO.** Nongovernmental Organization (NGO)

**NIC.** National Intelligence Council (DNI)

**NIC-C.** National Intelligence Coordination Center (DNI)

**NIMA.** National Imagery and Mapping Agency (DoD)

**NIP.** National Intelligence Program (DoD)

**NIPF.** National Intelligence Priorities Framework (DNI)

**NIIRT.** Nuclear Incident Reporting Team (DHS)

**NISP.** National Intelligence Support Plan

**NIST.** National Intelligence Support Team (DoD)

**NIU.** National Intelligence University (DNI)

**NJTF.** National Joint Terrorism Task Force (DoJ/FBI)

**NMCC.** National Military Command Center (DoD)

**NMIC.** National Maritime Intelligence Center (DoD)

**NMJIC.** National Military Joint Intelligence Center (DoD)

**NOAAA.** National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (DoC)

**NOL.** NCTC Online (NCTC/DNI)

**NORTHCOM.** U.S. Northern Command (DoD)

**NRO.** National Reconnaissance Office (DoD)

**NRP.** National Reconnaissance Program

**NSA/CSS.** National Security Agency/Central Security Service (DoD)

**NSB.** National Security Branch (DoJ/FBI)

**NSC.** National Security Council (White House)

**NSC/DC.** Deputy’s Committee (White House)

**NSC/IPC.** Interagency Policy Committee (White House)

**NSC/PC.** Principal’s Committee (White House)

**NSC/PCC.** Policy Coordination Committees (Bush Administration)

**NSD.** National Security Division (DoJ)

**NSG.** National System for Geospatial Intelligence (DoD)

**NSPD.** National Security Presidential Directive (Bush Administration)

**NSS.** National Security Staff (White House); National Security Strategy
<table>
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<td>NSS/GE</td>
<td>National Security Staff Directorate for Global Engagement (White House)</td>
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<td>NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Nuclear Trafficking Response Group</td>
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<td>Operations, Activities, and Actions (DoD)</td>
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<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States (Regional IGO)</td>
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<td>OAS/CICTE</td>
<td>Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (Regional IGO)</td>
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<td>Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (DoD)</td>
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<td>Public Diplomacy Office Director (DoS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIAB</td>
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<td>PIR</td>
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<td>PKO</td>
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<td>PKSOI</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (DoS)</td>
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<td>PM/PPA</td>
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<td>POLAD</td>
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<td>PPD</td>
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<td>PRM</td>
<td>Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (DoS)</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>Radio Free Asia (BBG)</td>
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<td>RI</td>
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<td>Resident Legal Advisor (DoJ/FBI)</td>
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<td>RSO</td>
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<td>SA</td>
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<td>SAO</td>
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<td>SA/WSO</td>
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<td>SC</td>
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<td>S/CRS</td>
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<td>S/CT</td>
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<td>SC/US</td>
<td>Save the Children Federation, Inc. (NGO)</td>
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<td>SDGE</td>
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<td>Special Security Center (DNI)</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
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<td>TARS</td>
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<td>Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (IGO)</td>
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UNHCR. High Commissioner for Refugees (IGO)
UNHOC. Humanitarian Operations Center (IGO)
UNICEF. Children’s Fund (IGO)
UNJLC. Joint Logistics Center (UN)
UNMACA. Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (IGO)
UNRWA. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East
USACIL. United States Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (DoD)
USA for UNHCR. United States Association for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (NGO)
USAID. United States Agency for International Development
USAID/FFP. Office for Food for Peace
USAID/OFDA. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
USCG. United States Coast Guard (DHS)
USCIS. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS)
USD/I. Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (DoD)
USD/P. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (DoD)
USG. United States Government
USSOCOM. United States Special Operations Command (DoD)
USSOCOM JICC. Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (DoD)
USSS. United States Secret Service (DHS)
USSTRATCOM. United States Strategic Command (DoD)
VOA. Voice of America (BBG)
WANGO. World Association of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO)
WFP. World Food Program (UN, IGO)
WHO. World Health Organization (UN, IGO)
WIF. Warsaw Initiative Fund (DoD)
WINPAC. Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center (CIA)

WIRE. World Intelligence Review (DNI)
WMD. Weapons of Mass Destruction
WRI. World Relief Institute
WTO. World Trade Organization (IGO)
WVUS. World Vision United States (NGO)
Appendix E. Bibliography

The following references provide both sourcing material and content for additional understanding about the USG IS process.


**Center for Defense Information Terrorism Program.** www.cdi.org/program/index.cfm?programid=39.

**Center for Strategic and International Studies-Terrorism & Transnational Threats.** www.csis.org/researchfocus/TNT.


**Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence.** www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~wwwir/research/cstpv.


**Combating Terrorism Center-West Point.** www.ctc.usma.edu.


**Council on Foreign Relations.** www.cfr.org.


RAND-Terrorism. www.rand.org/research_areas/terrorism.


