AGILE C-17 SUPPORT OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

by

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# Agile C-17 Support of Special Operations

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## Abstract
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Biography

Colonel Daniel B. Hancock received his commission from the United States Air Force Academy, graduating in 1987 with a Bachelor of Science Degree. He earned a Master’s Degree in Aerospace Science Technology from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in 1991 and a Master’s Degree in Military Arts and Science from Air University in 2001. Colonel Hancock is a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officers School, a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and is currently an Air War College student at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

After graduating from pilot training at Laughlin AFB, Texas, Colonel Hancock served as an instructor pilot in the C-21A, C-141B and as a lead airdrop flight examiner in the C-17. Following graduation from Air Command and Staff College in June 2001 he was assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, NC. During his three years at Fort Bragg, he served as the Chief of the Fixed Wing Assault Operations Branch and Air Assault Division Chief. He returned to Charleston AFB as the 437th AW Chief C-17 Special Operations Division and served as the Operations Officer for the 17th Airlift Squadron. Colonel Hancock then served a year in Kuwait as the Commander, 386th Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron and returned to Charleston AFB as the Deputy Commander, Special Capabilities, 437th Operations Group. In this capacity, Colonel Hancock commanded Air Mobility Command special operations air assets during contingencies.

Colonel Hancock is a command pilot with over 5,100 hours in the T-37B, T-38A, C-21A, C-141B and C-17. He has logged nearly 200 hours of combat time on 98 combat sorties in the C-141B and C-17 in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.
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Introduction

“Children debate ownership,” stated a high ranking Royal Air Force official while discussing the role of the Combined Forces Air Component Commander in a presentation to the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base. This statement provides clarity in an era of ever tightening budgets and limited resources. A future military leadership challenge will be the ability to maximize efficiency and effectiveness of the limited but capable aviation assets available in the U.S. inventory. In order to meet future demands in a relevant manner, agile command and control relationships must be in place to best position commanders for success. This paper will specifically argue: There is a requirement for an agile command relationship between U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in regards to the utilization of C-17’s in support of intratheater special operations missions. This relationship is necessary to meet a growing airlift requirement that the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is not currently capable of fulfilling due to the size of its airlift fleet.

The C-17 provides an excellent example of a somewhat limited but highly versatile resource. The aircraft was designed to be both a strategic airlifter, similar in capability to the C-141B, and a tactical airlifter, similar in capability to the C-130. During its 15 years of operational service, the C-17 has proven itself extremely capable in both environments.

Historically, the C-17 has primarily filled a strategic airlift role and remained under the operational, centralized control of TRANSCOM. Though addressed in Air Force doctrine, rarely has transfer of command of intertheater airlift assets been passed to supported commanders. A centralized command relationship concept was necessary to ensure that all customers throughout

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1 The speaker’s name is omitted as the presentation was made in an academic freedom environment. Presentation on CFACC responsibilities to students at AWC, 15 Dec 2008.
the Department of Defense (DoD) had access to rapid global mobility provided by intertheater airlift. Single “ownership” of a high demand and low density asset makes sense in most cases but that relationship can get clouded when a highly versatile asset, such as the C-17, is capable of performing both an intertheater and intratheater role. The command relationship gets even cloudier when you consider the C-17’s special operations capabilities.

The 180th C-17 was delivered to Charleston AFB, SC in November 2008 and the weapon system also celebrated its 15th operational anniversary in 2008. The aircraft has proven itself in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq while sustaining zero losses. The C-17 continues to earn accolades as a versatile workhorse, comfortable in performing airlift around the globe, while at the same time performing complex multiple drop zone airdrops in Afghanistan. It is a weapon system at the apex of utility.

As the C-17 continues to flourish and prove its versatility, the highly specialized medium lift MC-130’s of AFSOC are in need of modernization, refitting and replacement due to aircraft lost in training and combat. AFSOC is currently short on lift but has a plan to meet its required needs by 2012 (See Appendix A). Based on the growing requirements for non-conventional forces to combat asymmetric threats, AFSOC might never have enough special operations airlift and requires an agile avenue to leverage non-AFSOC assets.

The C-17 has a special operations mission that was utilized during operations at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to augment the MC-130 and provide organic lift for special operations outsized cargo. The C-17 does not possess all the capabilities of the MC-130 nor is AFSOC seeking to acquire a MC-17, according to AFSOC Commander, Lieutenant General Donald C. Wurster. But there are situations when the fluid nature of special operations

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4 Donald C. Wurster, LtGen USAF. Addressing students and faculty at AWC, 12 Nov 2008.
missions requires time critical augmentation that can be specifically addressed by the C-17 and there must be an agile command relationship in place to ensure time sensitive missions are accomplished. The current command and control relationship between TRANSCOM and SOCOM does not thoroughly address this requirement.

Command and Control Relationships

‘Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates including authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion.”

Controlling authority over resources often comes to the forefront in discussions of assets for mission accomplishment. TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command (AMC) have made great strides since the outset of combat operations in late 2001 to ensure that its centralized command and decentralize execution model best serves both the global fight and the regional fight. Through my research and discussions with key personnel at AMC headquarters and personnel in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR), agile command relationships are in place and unprecedented airlift support is being provided in that theater. That has not always been the case and we must ensure that future operations anywhere around the globe meet the current standards established within CENTCOM. Established doctrine allows airlift assets to be attached to a special operations joint force commander but there must be a clear language agreement in place to allow SOCOM to leverage those assets.

What is meant by an “agile” command relationship? The concept of agility is discussed in AFDD-1 and is described as: “our innovation to meet future challenges and our ability to

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5 Joint Publication1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 May 2007, IV-1
adapt to the changing world around us."\textsuperscript{6} This statement is validated in the asymmetric combat environment we find ourselves in today. In order to meet future challenges, command and control relationships must be put under constant scrutiny to ensure their relevance.

Air Force command and control relationships mirror those of joint doctrine and ensure clear lines of authority in most circumstances. “The COCOM (combatant commander or command authority) will attach various forces to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and will specify the degree of control over each force element in terms of OPCON, TACON or support.”\textsuperscript{7} However, there are some cases where Operational Control (OPCON) and Tactical Control (TACON) authorities are blurred, unclear or transfer of authority not deemed appropriate.

As the COCOM for transportation, TRANSCOM serves primarily as a supporting command to the regional combatant commands. TRANSCOM’s air component, Air Mobility Command (AMC) controls nearly all of the intertheater airlift assets and many intratheater airlift assets. To maximize efficiency AMC maintains centralized control over these aircraft and rarely relinquishes control of these assets. With the limited number of intertheater aircraft available to support the huge number of global airlift requirements, this makes sense in most cases. But, there are always exceptions and special operations are one of the exceptions detailed both in Air Force Doctrine and Air Force Mobility Operations doctrine.

AFDD-1, \textit{Doctrine/Command Relationships}, discusses the complexities in regards to support of special operations. “Such employment should be carefully coordinated to prevent conflict with other operations.”\textsuperscript{8} The coordination process can be streamlined when the JFC responsible for operations has control over the assets being utilized to the maximum extent possible. Air Force Mobility Operations doctrine discusses authorities during large scale

\textsuperscript{6} Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, \textit{Air Force Basic Doctrine}, 17 November 2003, 82
\textsuperscript{7} Ibid, 80
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid, 54
operations. “During large scale operations, TRANSCOM assets may be tasked to augment intratheater airlift operations, and may be temporarily attached to a joint force commander.”

Air Force Mobility doctrine specifically discusses support of special operations forces (SOF) in an intratheater context:

“When airlift is needed, SOF units usually request support through the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) and the special operations liaison element (SOLE) in the AOC. When SOF units require intratheater airlift in excess of available assets, or their airlift requirements exceed the capacity of assets in the theater, the JFSOCC or the SOLE in the AOC will coordinate appropriate support. Airlift forces capable of performing specific special operations receive appropriate training and equipment to maximize SOF integration. Airlift forces may be attached to the joint special operations task force (JSOTF) or JFC for specific operations.”

There are two areas of concern encompassed in the doctrinal discussion above. First, what is the best way to authorize airlift forces to a special operations task force when a robust theater air operation center (AOC) is not in place? The CENTCOM AOC transformation over the past eight years in support of major combat operations has been phenomenal. Lessons learned have driven required changes and led to adaptation. But what about the next conflict in another theater that does not maintain a robust AOC? As COCOM for the Global War on Terror (GWOT), SOCOM requires an agile command relationship with TRANSCOM that includes augmenting forces. Special operations missions often precede major combat operations. There are rare cases when transfer of forces for a short period of time will be required. An agile command relationship that allows for SOCOM to leverage assets should be maintained in a Command Arrangements Agreement (CAA).

Second, there is the question of what constitutes intratheater assets? Most doctrinal discussions refer to intratheater assets when discussing transfer of control of forces. C-17’s are

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10 Ibid, 35
normally considered an intertheater asset but the aircraft is capable of tactical operations
normally associated with intratheater assets. Since 2006 two C-17 squadrons have rotated in and
out of CENTCOM in order to provide intratheater lift while the rest of the C-17 fleet continues
to provide intertheater lift. Unlike the C-130’s that are under CENTCOM OPCON, or chopped
to that command, the C-17’s are simply forward deployed and remain under AMC authority.
This unique relationship will be discussed later.

**Intertheater vs. Intratheater Airlift Command and Control**

“*Air mobility doctrine represents an accumulation of best practices from World
War II through the most recent conflicts, including Operation IRAQI FREEDOM*”

Strategic airlift capability emerged in World War II as technological advances in aviation
allowed for the transportation of personnel and equipment in a global context. The Korean War
brought the establishment of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). MATS developed the
concept of strategic intertheater airlift in combination with tactical intratheater airlift which led
to the development of the C-141, C-5 and C-130 aircraft. These aircraft allowed the United
States to deliver power anywhere around the globe. This concept served the U.S. military well
into the mid 1990’s. C-141’s and C-5’s airlifted men and equipment from outside the theater
into a strategic hub where the cargo could be transferred to a C-130 for movement within the
area of operation (AOR). The C-17’s ability to provide direct delivery of cargo from stateside
locations directly to the battlefield required a change in mindset and planning.

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11 Ibid, 1
12 Major Robert C. Bruno, Planting the Seeds of Rapid Global Mobility: The Roots of Airlift Control Elements in the United
Command and control of airlift assets was based on roles and missions. Historically, strategic airlift aircraft and tanker aircraft that provided essential aerial refueling to maximize airlift range were centrally controlled due to the limited number of assets, the high demand, and the complex nature of world-wide operations.\(^{13}\) Tactical airlift assets were more plentiful with a number of C-130’s being assigned directly to a regional commander. When operations required, tactical airlift would be “chopped” to a theater commander for a specific period of time to accomplish operations within that AOR. As mentioned before, C-130’s are currently assigned to CENTCOM having been chopped from EUCOM, PACOM and NORTHCOM.

Based on the staggering volume of lift delivered in support of regional commanders and the GWOT, Air Mobility Command can take pride in the efficiency of its operational doctrine. In 2007 AMC moved nearly 570,000 short tons of cargo and nearly 2,000,000 passengers on various airlift missions.\(^{14}\) (2008 figures were not yet available) It is difficult for any entity to argue that the current airlift system is not meeting or exceeding the needs of customers based on the output mentioned above. But, there is always room for improvement and the need to adjust to an ever changing environment.

In the latest AFDD 2-6 published in 2006, air mobility moved away from the concepts of strategic and tactical lift and moved to the concept of intertheater and intratheater lift. The intertheater lift mission describes airlift movement between geographic regions or from the Continental United States (CONUS) around the globe.\(^{15}\) In the intertheater discussion, command and control of this mission and the assets is executed by components of the 18 AF: “Normally,

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\(^{13}\) Keith Hutcheson, Air Mobility The Evolution of Global Reach, Point one VII, Inc., Vienna, Virginia 1999, 54
\(^{14}\) USTRANSCOM 2007 Annual Report, Scott AFB, Il, 2
\(^{15}\) AFDD 2-6, 8
operational control (OPCON) of the air mobility forces involved in intertheater operations is not transferred.”16 The assets referred to in the intertheater context include the C-17.

Discussion of the intratheater mission is a little more complex, especially in the context of command and control. The following are excerpts from the doctrine document description of intratheater: “The term "intratheater operations" covers two types of operations, those of a single geographic combatant commander during peacetime or when a joint operational area (JOA) has not been established, and those operations inside a JOA. In both of these situations, operations are normally conducted using forces assigned or attached or made available for tasking to the JFC.”17 “When theater air mobility requirements exceed the capability of the assigned or attached forces, the geographic combatant commander may request augmentation from, or the establishment of, a “supported/supporting” relationship with, either USTRANSCOM or another geographic combatant commander. Similarly, a JTF/CC would first request augmentation from the geographic combatant commander who may pass that request along as described above.”18

The discussion clearly lays out the ability to transfer control of assets when necessary to a JTF/CC and recognizes that the area of operations may not always have a robust AOC structure. SOCOM deals with this type of operations on a daily basis. What is missing from the intratheater discussion is the type of assets involved. While not specifically mentioned, C-130’s are often the asset chopped to a regional commander to provide the required airlift. Over the past three years chopping C-17’s to JTFs for intratheater operations has been discussed but control of the assets has remained with AMC. The C-17’s tested capability in the intratheater environment

16 Ibid
17 Ibid, 9
18 Ibid
and its current numbers, 180 aircraft in the inventory, require a paradigm shift in its utilization. It is an asset that is easily incorporated in either the intertheater or intratheater environment.

Where does the C-17 fit?

"After more than eight decades of experience, the logistical value of airlift in counterinsurgency is obvious and springs from the dependence insurgents have for sanctuary."\(^{19}\)

Forward deployment of C-17 units for intratheater operations while still under centralized control of AMC has been the standard model since the aircraft entered the operational inventory in 1995. In support of Bosnia operations, C-17’s flew out of Rhein Mein Air Base, Germany into the same airfields of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FYOM) supported by EUCOM C-130’s. The C-17’s received their taskings from the 18\(^{th}\) AF’s Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) in Scott AFB, Illinois while the C-130’s were tasked by EUCOM.

As the number of C-17’s grew, their utilization in the mobility picture became more complicated. Their ability to provide direct delivery from the CONUS directly to the battlefield meant that they had a foot in both the strategic and tactical worlds.\(^{20}\) In the 1999 Kosovo operations, the C-17 forward deployed mission had matured as the increased numbers of aircraft allowed a larger footprint. For this operation, 12 C-17’s were assigned to support operations out of Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Charleston AFB deployed the equivalent of a C-17 operational squadron along with a group commander. The Charleston AFB Wing Commander, Colonel Rod Bishop also deployed to Ramstein as the Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) and would

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\(^{20}\) Dr. David R. Mets. *Between Two Worlds: Fodder for Your Professional Reading on Global Reach and Air Mobility*, *Aerospace Power Journal*, Spring 2002, 47.
remain in place until Kosovo airlift support was completed. Once again, control of the C-17’s remained under control of AMC and received their tasking from TACC. Transfer of the assets to EUCOM or the JTF/CC was not deemed necessary. Overall, the C-17’s forward deployed participation was generally deemed a success though questions remained with regard to the C-17’s ability to perform in a more hazardous and austere environment.21

Those questions were answered by the C-17’s intertheater and intratheater roles in support of operation in Afghanistan. C-17’s conducted 26 hour round trip intertheater operations out of Ramstein, Germany into austere airfields in Afghanistan on Night Vision Goggles. In an intratheater capacity, C-17’s deployed two Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU’s) into a dirt airstrip in southern Afghanistan using recently established special operations C-17 crews and aircraft from Charleston AFB, South Carolina. The success of the C-17 at the outset of Afghanistan operations in both the intertheater and intratheater capacity allowed for the possibility of an OPCON or TACON relationship.

There were other factors that effected the command relationship discussion. By 2001, Boeing was delivering a C-17 a month to the USAF which provided AMC greater capacity. The C-17 also took over the AMC special operations mission from the C-141 in 2001. As preparations for Iraqi Freedom were made, it was determined the C-17 was required to support the special operations task force in an intratheater capacity. From March 2003 to April 2003, the 781st Expeditionary Airlift Squadron (EAS) commanded by Lt Col Matt Whelan, the special operations division chief at Charleston AFB, deployed seven C-17’s, aircrews, maintenance and logistical support to Saudi Arabia specifically to support the special operations JTF/CC. In this role, the C-17’s not only augmented AFSOC’s MC-130’s but also provided their unique capability. Though not completely autonomous from AMC, this is the first instance of C-17’s

21 Ibid
operating in a special TACON relationship with the JTF/CC. Specifics of this relationship will be discussed in a later section.

**AFSOC Airlift Capability (Pre 9/11, Today, the Future)**

As it became clear that the war in Iraq would continue, CENTCOM increasingly required intratheater lift to augment and replace C-130’s in theater. Air National Guard and Reserve C-130 units had flown beyond their time requirement and active duty C-130 units were strained from years of constant deployment. The harsh environment of both Iraq and Afghanistan was also having a negative impact on the C-130 airframe and maintenance in-commission rates were falling. AFSOC MC-130’s also felt the strain of years of constant deployment with a much smaller fleet of aircraft to rely on. The effects of combat and the harsh environment were being reported in 2005 when a study by AFSOC logisticians showed that mission-capable rates had fallen by 9 percent and aircraft non-availability rates had increased in order to get aircraft into depot maintenance.\(^{22}\) MC-130 variants in CENTCOM continue to face maintenance challenges.

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<td>93.4</td>
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*Figure 1*\(^{23}\) 2007-2008 MC-130H/P Mission Capability Rates

Prior to Sept. 11 2001, AFSOC’s fleet of airlifters provided adequate support for SOCOM operations and had excelled in numerous special operation missions around the globe. Fixed wing airlift was provided primarily by the MC-130E/H variants while the MC-130P could


\(^{23}\) Nicholas Bender, MSgt USAF, AFSOC MC-130E/PJ Program Manager, email correspondence to the author 15 Dec 2008.
provide limited lift but primarily served in a tanker role. There were 59 MC-130E/H/P’s in the AFSOC inventory in 2000.24

Since the start of post 9/11 combat operations the MC-130H, the most capable aircraft of the AFSOC airlift fleet, has suffered four lost aircraft reducing its numbers from 21 to 17 aircraft.25 With no immediate replacement available and no program replacements scheduled the remaining aircraft were forced to fly beyond their annual programmed flying hours. This affected the entire MC-130 fleet. The situation has been further exasperated by the age of the MC-130E which is now in its fifth decade of service.26 The MC-130E was not programmed to fly in the CENTCOM AOR in 2008 putting further strain on the MC-130H and MC-130P. (See Figure 1 on page 11)

The future is somewhat brighter for AFSOC airlift but it will take a couple of years to bring the programmed aircraft on line. Currently, AFSOC has a total 61 MC-130H/E/P/W’s in the inventory.27 AFSOC has three programs on going that impact their fixed wing airlift fleet. AFSOC is in the process of refurbishing the MC-130H center wing boxes. This program should be completed in 2013.28 To fill the airlift gap, originally to replace the lost MC-130H’s, AFSOC has been converting standard C-130’s to the MC-130W.29 While they do not provide the same combat capability as the MC-130H, they do provide the airlift. AFSOC plans on buying 12 MC-130W’s. They currently posses eight of the aircraft and plan on the first aircraft being mission

25 Ibid
27 Derry McKinney, AFSOC/A5RM, email correspondence, 8 Dec 2008.
28 Ibid
29 Ibid
ready in February 2009 and the last aircraft scheduled for delivery in 2010. AFSOC is also investing in 37 MC-130J’s to replace its 37 MC-130E and MC-130P models.

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**Figure 2 MC-130J Delivery Schedule**

SOCOM has a decision to make about the airlift capability they require/desire. The MC-130H showcases a medium threat penetration capability that is not integrated in the MC-130W. To go beyond the current upgrade to the MC-130W would take extra time and money that SOCOM does not have. The road ahead for the SOCOM/AFSOC leadership is whether they need to modify the MC-130W to meet the MC-130H capabilities or work toward a new special operations airlift platform. Based on the current numbers and program overlaps, special operations airlift aircraft availability will be stretched thin through 2011. Having the C-17 in the CENTCOM AOR has offset some of the lift requirements to both the C-130 community and the MC-130 community but the C-17 does not possess all of the MC-130 capabilities.

**MC-130 Strengths and Weaknesses**

The MC-130 is the primary special operations airlift platform in the Air Force inventory. The MC-130E Talon I is in its fifth decade of service but received upgrades through the

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30 Ibid
31 Ralph McDonald, AFSOC/A5RM, email correspondence to the author, 8 December 2008.
32 Ibid
33 Derry McKinney, AFSOC/A5RM, email correspondence, 8 Dec 2008.
The MC-130H Talon II is relatively young compared to the MC-130E having entered operational service in 1992 but possess a glass cockpit, greater mission computer integration, a better avionics suite and a an upgraded communication suite. The main characteristics that set the Talons apart from other airlift aircraft is their extensive electronic warfare capability combined with terrain-following radar that allows the Talons to penetrate an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) in any weather condition or terrain. This capability is essential to insert, recover and resupply special operations forces either by airdrop or airland. The MC-130 size in comparison to the C-17 allows them greater access to airfields. The Talons only require a 60 foot wide airfield in comparison with the 90 foot wide requirement for the C-17. The Talons are also air refueling capable which allows them to cover distances at speeds helicopters cannot provide. They also have an obvious cargo capacity advantage over helicopters.

The MC-130 has served the special operations community well since the 1960’s but the growing requirement for special operations lift is outpacing their numbers. While extremely capable in the intratheater environment their speed, range and cargo capacity do not provide a rapid intertheater option demanded by SOCOM to meet the GWOT. Special operations units have also brought on new systems, such as the Stryker, that are not compatible with the MC-130 cargo compartment. Seven years of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have taken a huge toll on the airframes as it has with the entire force but with limited numbers of assets the MC-130’s have paid a higher toll. This can be witnessed in the comparison of maintenance reliability between the MC-130H and the C-17. (See Figure 1 and Figure 3). Three years separate the operational dates of the two aircraft but the Talon II has paid a higher price due to operations.

36 Ibid
tempo. The number of each asset available, 19 Talon II’s vice 180 C-17’s, illustrate the need for an agile command relationship between SOCOM and TRANSCOM. The C-17 is not as capable as the MC-130 in the special operations mission but it can help to augment the MC-130 requirements. The forward deployment of C-17’s has helped to relieve some of the CENTCOM intratheater load.

**C-17 Strengths and Weaknesses**

C-17 operations ongoing in CENTCOM provide a good example of both the strengths and weaknesses of the aircraft. In 2006 AMC established two C-17 Expeditionary Airlift Squadrons to service the CENTCOM AOR. Prior to the establishment of the EAS’s, C-17 support was provided simultaneously by as many as six stage locations in Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. This operation proved to be an inefficient model for both aircraft and aircrews.

The EAS construct typifies how the C-17 can best be utilized in the intratheater construct and highlights its strengths in the tactical environment. The EAS’s deploy as a squadron on 120 day cycles and come under the leadership of the 385 Air Expeditionary Group Commander (AEG/CC). The 385 AEG/CC is a deployed AMC group commander and currently controls two C-17 squadrons, with 17 aircraft and a KC-135 detachment with three aircraft. The C-17 squadrons are dispersed to three locations allowing operations into Iraq and Afghanistan. The C-17’s cargo capacity, range, speed and air refueling capability allow it the flexibility to service multiple airfields inside the AOR in a crew duty period providing nearly three times the lift of a C-130. The C-17 has also made headlines for its flexibility to rapidly adjust to an aero-

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medical (AE) role and transport wounded soldiers out of Iraq and Afghanistan back to medical specialists in the United States without a need for aircraft or crew changes.

The C-17 has also had the opportunity to increase its air drop productivity and highlight this capability. Air drop riggers were moved from Balad AB Iraq to Al Udeid AB, Qatar so they could rig airdrop for C-17 deployment in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{38} Once again the capacity and range of the C-17 has a huge impact on its airdrop capability. By rigging in Qatar, the C-17’s can airdrop on six different drop zones in Afghanistan, land at Bagram, Afghanistan, receive more airdrop supplies, airdrop to more locations and return to Qatar in a single crew duty day.\textsuperscript{39} During the 816\textsuperscript{th} EAS deployment from 1 Sep-30 Nov 2008 the C-17 airdropped 2,197 bundles covering 79 drop zones as compared to the C-130’s that delivered 986 bundles.\textsuperscript{40}

C-17 airdrop accuracy continues to improve with advances in technology. The C-17’s are now utilizing the Integrated Container Delivery System (I-CDS) which allows the aircraft to remain at an altitude above small arms fire yet deliver supplies more accurately.\textsuperscript{41} This is important in the combat environment in ensuring that the airdropped supplies make it to the customer and not the enemy. The I-CDS is a less expensive version of the Joint Precision Air Drop System (JPADS) that holds a very promising future for airborne delivery of supplies. Current JPADS system allow delivery from up to 16 miles away at altitudes up to 25,000 feet which offers tremendous capability to resupply ground forces while evading hostile fire.\textsuperscript{42}

The C-17 has held up well in the CENTCOM theater despite the harsh environment and increased flying hours. AMC retains control of the aircraft and the C-17’s usually remain in theater for 30-45 days before they are sent home for scheduled maintenance. The home station

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{38} Mike Mitchell, Lt Col USAF, 816 EAS/DO, interview with the author, 17 Dec 2008.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid
\textsuperscript{40} Mike Mitchell, Lt Col USAF, 816 EAS/DO, email correspondence with the author, 10 Dec 2008.
\textsuperscript{41} Erin Staine-Pyne, Maj USAF, AMC A3/DT, email correspondence with the author, 17 Dec 2008.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid
\end{footnotesize}
maintenance schedule and the aircraft’s relative young age compared to other assets in the AOR along with exceptional intratheater maintenance have produced outstanding mission capability rates.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Average</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft C-17 I/O</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>5,622</td>
<td>517.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depart Reliability % MX (C-17)</td>
<td>94.30</td>
<td>94.49</td>
<td>95.69</td>
<td>93.19</td>
<td>88.10</td>
<td>76.80</td>
<td>88.58</td>
<td>91.41</td>
<td>92.16</td>
<td>95.10</td>
<td>94.37</td>
<td>91.29</td>
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An area of friction worthy of discussion is the complex command relationship of the C-17 forces in CENTCOM. The 385 AEG is located at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, in the EUCOM AOR and a large portion of his assets reside in the CENTCOM AOR but he reports back to the 18 AF/CC. All of the deployed C-17 aircraft and aircrews remain under AMC control. Mission taskings are provided by two cells in 618th TACC at Scott AFB, Il. The C-17 EAS in Turkey receives its missions from the channel cell which mainly consist of airland delivery of cargo into Iraq. The C-17’s in Qatar and a small contingent at Ali Al Salem, Kuwait receive their taskings from the Theater Direct Delivery (TDD) cell. The TDD receives its inputs from the CENTCOM CAOC AMD TDD cell. While all those interviewed agreed that the system was efficient and was successful, there are more efficient command relationships available.

One area of command relationship refinement in the intratheater environment has been in the tactical use of the C-17. Airdrop requests in the AOR are made by all customers, to include special operations forces, to the AMD. Airdrop missions are planned and executed within the CENTCOM AOR and are normally executed within 36 hours of the request. There have been instances when the missions were planned and executed in 12 hours. Two issues have made

43 Fred Boehm, Lt Col USAF, 8 EAMS/CC, email correspondence with the author, 11 Dec 2008.
45 John Roscoe, Lt Col USAF, AUAB CAOC AMB Chief, email correspondence with the author, 12 Dec 2008.
46 Ibid
this possible. First is the requirement for a C-17 WIC graduate or airdrop qualified pilot to be in the CAOC tactics cell. According to Col Wiley, “Our weapons officers are paying off in spades at the CAOC as they understand the tactical capability of the C-17 and are familiar with the collaborative planning process.”48  The second issue is the delegation of tactical employment of the C-17 in theater from the 18th AF/CC to the 385th AEG/CC. Until recently, airdrops and semi-prepared surface landings had to be approved at the AMC headquarters level.49  The delegating of this authority is a huge step in the right direction and allows for greater flexibility when employing the C-17 in theater.

**Recommendations**

There must be an agile command relationship is in place between SOCOM and TRANSCOM for intratheater airlift augmentation. The C-17 has the training, special operations relationship and capability to augment AFSOC airlift forces and provide unique capabilities required by special operations forces. To that end, I would make the following recommendations:

1. The Command Arrangements Agreement (CAA) between SOCOM and TRANSCOM needs to be updated. It needs to contain plain language that includes SOCOM’s ability to receive TACON command and control of special operations C-17 crews and aircraft when needed for intratheater operations. The guidance should allow for the C-17’s to operate under AFSOC rules, enforced by the Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander (JSOACC) in

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48 Ibid
49 Ibid
regards to drop zone and landing zone approvals. This would allow C-17’s to airdrop and land on the same airfields certified in the combat environment by AFSOC combat controllers for MC-130 use, when the LZ’s and DZ’s met C-17 standards. It should be noted that the Air Mobility Division (AMD) inCENTCOM has streamlined this function for AMC over the years and they are very responsive to certifying LZ’s and DZ’s. The DZ and LZ provisions are for fluid operations encountered in the special operations environment that may not occur in a region that has a robust AMD capability. The only way this CAA will work is if AMC believes that components are in place to ensure that proper risk mitigation is observed and the aircraft will be efficiently utilized while chopped to the JSOACC and returned to AMC upon completion of operations. While the C-17 EAS’s are not chopped to CENTCOM, there is an efficient operation in place between AMC, TACC, CENTCOM AMD, the 385th AEG/CC and the deployed Sq/CC’s. These operations have been refined over time and the lessons need to be captured or be lost to time and rediscovered during the next conflict. Ralph Van Wagner, Col (Ret) USAF from the AMC special ops division said, “We need to establish the relationships that have been built from our current experience…but what about three years from now? We need to get this on paper.”

Ralph was in the unique position of briefing AMC leadership on C-17 special operations missions during the 781st EAS deployment in 2003. On a number of occasions he was seeking approval for operations as aircraft were loaded and awaiting execution approval. A more agile command relationship must be in place.

2. The first component required to mitigate AMC leadership’s reservations of losing centralized command of its assets is deployed leadership. For more robust operations, usually conducted at the beginning of a major campaign, a standing C-17 OG (preferably w/C-17 Spec Ops

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50 Ralph Van Wagner, Col (Ret) USAF, AMC A3DJ, interview with the author, 11 Feb 2009.
51 Ibid
knowledge) should go forward as the AMC representative with the C-17 package (paired and tailored to fit mission). With the downgrading of the Charleston AFB Deputy Group Commander for Special capabilities 437 OG/CDS position to 0-5, the horsepower and responsibility no longer exists beyond J-Alert Operations. Deploying a standing OG is doctrinally sound, has historical precedence and more importantly relationships matter! The OG would work with the JSOACC (Spec Ops OG equivalent) to mitigate risk and ensure the C-17 was utilized correctly and transferred back to AMC for other missions when not in use. An AMC OG provides an established level of AMC leadership to make the correct call in regards to proper utilization of assets and risk mitigation and management. This will allow for fluid operations to occur without having to receive AMC HQ leadership approval for every operation. An example of this delegation to the OG level by the 18th AF/CC is the recent approval of airdrops by the C-17 in the CENTCOM AOR by the 385th OG/CC.

3. Having planners in place that understand C-17 capabilities and the joint planning process is imperative. As more C-17 pilots graduate the Weapons Instructor School (WIC) the C-17 will enjoy a larger cadre of planners that can integrate in planning cells. The special operations division (OGS) also trains their pilots to integrate in a joint special operations planning cell. This training is validated in multilateral training exercises and planners are also sent to regional virtual training exercises in a planning capacity. Qualified planners, should be sent as planners/liaison officers (LNO’s) to the following locations: The Special Operations JOC (especially if there is no C-17 experience at that location), and the AMD or CAOC tactics cell, if one is up and established. I would also include a rep from AMC/A3DJ as an LNO to the deployed OG. Relationships and expertise in the right locations matters.
4. The final recommendation is based on the three previous recommendations being met. There are numerous examples that I can provide in which the C-17 is required to augment or provide unique special operations airlift/airdrop to a special operations JTF. During these operations a TACON command relationship, where the assets are transferred to the JTF for a determined period time, makes sense. This is not a matter of control but a matter of mission accomplishment. AFSOC is short on airlift for at least the next three years and AMC can help fill that requirement when necessary. This relationship would be different in that the C-17's chopped to the JSOACC would still have to provide TACC lines in theater when tails were not in use. Having an AMC OG in place makes this a more palatable solution. My experience is that the need for a TACON requirement of the C-17 is only for initial footprint operations and the MC-130's can provide sustainment operations.

Conclusion

USAF Commander General Norton Schwartz recently remarked, "I'm less worried about ownership" of kinds of planes "than I am about the end results," Schwartz said. "This is a versatility issue, not an ownership issue. "We have to get off of these theological debates,"52 This is the leadership mindset required to meet the challenges of an aging aviation fleet and a tightening of resources.

The versatility of the C-17 allows it to operate in both the intertheater and intratheater environment. As the numbers of C-17's continue to grow there is an opportunity to use this previously limited asset in non-traditional roles to compliment other weapon systems that are

older or are limited in numbers. The C-17 has proven its tactical prowess in Afghanistan and Iraq and is providing much needed relief to traditional intratheater assets in the CENTCOM AOR.

AMC maintains a special operations capability at Charleston AFB. The AMC special operators have a robust training relationship with joint special operations forces. The C-17 is expected to provide additional airlift and airdrop capability in compliment with AFSOC airlifters and provides a unique mission set. The GWOT has thrust SOCOM to the forefront of a global asymmetric threat that requires both a intertheater and intratheater response capability. The fluid nature of this “no fail” mission requires an agile command relationship that allows SOCOM control of assets needed for mission accomplishment. In a moment of crisis there is no time to debate ownership when results are required.
Appendix A

AFSOC Force--2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TALON II</th>
<th>SHADOW</th>
<th>AC-130U</th>
<th>MH-53</th>
<th>MH-60</th>
<th>AC-130H</th>
<th>TALON I</th>
<th>EC-130</th>
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AvFID SQ

TALON 1: Beginning of year 6 AD and 8 AFRES. At the end of 2000 all aircraft were AFRES.
Removed two MH-53s; Feb 2000 Maintenance Inventory shows 19 HRT, 6 ROK, 8 EGUN
Added 1 EC-130 based on Feb 2000 Maintenance Inventory
X = Aircraft Lost/Retired/Transferred
/
= Guard/Reserve Assigned

### AFSOC Force--2006

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<tr>
<th>TALON II</th>
<th>SHADOW</th>
<th>AC-130U</th>
<th>MH-53</th>
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SHADOW: 4 Transferred to Guard, 1 aircraft lost in Feb 02
Reflecteds day ONE of 2007
Decreased Preds to 6 CAPS
This slide reflects day ONE of FY 2008. NSA will deliver in FY08 and will be shown on 2009 slide.
Preds reduced from 8 to 6 to show 6 CAPs
Based on current utilization, if we do nothing, this is what Talon II availability will look like for the FYDP. We’ve been working with WR-ALC on software tool to help us manage CWB life on individual tail numbers.

W model availability from FY09 is 8-10
Potential solution to save two Gunships in FY11;
- We are exploring options with Depot to swap two AC-130U with 2 MC-130H in the line up.
-- Requires major re-engineering and details not worked out at this time
<table>
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<tr>
<th>TALON II</th>
<th>SHADOW</th>
<th>AC-130U</th>
<th>MC-130W</th>
<th>U-28</th>
<th>CV-22</th>
<th>AC-130H</th>
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AvFID SQ

PC-12
This slide reflects day ONE of FY 2008. NSA will deliver in FY08 and will be shown on 2009 slide.
Preds reduced from 8 to 6 to show 6 CAPs
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