DOING IT ALL:
SECURITY FORCES--THE USAF COIN FORCE?

BY
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Security Forces have transformed dramatically in the last twenty years. This transformation has been a continuous process, but may be broken into three distinct periods separated by key events: the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia and the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon. Each distinct phase of Security Forces transformation differed with respect to mission, organization, deployments, and training, requiring Security Forces to change mission focus to meet the emerging challenges. Some view counterinsurgency (COIN) operations as community policing on steroids, and therefore propose it as a logical next step for Security Forces. Security Forces have already demonstrated the ability to operate successfully outside an air base and build relations with the local populace. Security Forces have also demonstrated the ability to assume and execute new missions with great success. This thesis investigates the research question: Can Security Forces assume the COIN mission; if so, what challenges must the force overcome and what changes must it enact to be effective? In order to support a new mission, Security Forces must transform organizationally, solve the problem of increasing rates of deployment by resolving the inherent supply versus demand conflict, and refocus training on new mission sets to ensure deploying airmen are given the tools to be successful. The lessons learned from the challenges Security Forces faced and largely overcame during the transformations following the Khobar Towers and 9/11 attacks are significant. The Air Force must be mindful of these difficulties should it choose to have Security Forces adopt COIN operations as a new core competency.
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APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets masters-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.
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Lt Col Gooding is married to LeeAnne and has three children, Jeffrey, Cody, and Aeneas II (A.J.).
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ABSTRACT

Security Forces have transformed dramatically in the last twenty years. This transformation has been a continuous process, but may be broken into three distinct periods separated by key events: the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia and the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon. Each distinct phase of Security Forces transformation differed with respect to mission, organization, deployments, and training, requiring Security Forces to change mission focus to meet the emerging challenges.

Some view counterinsurgency (COIN) operations as community policing “on steroids,” and therefore propose it as a logical next step for Security Forces. Security Forces have already demonstrated the ability to operate successfully outside an air base and build relations with the local populace. Security Forces have also demonstrated the ability to assume and execute new missions with great success.

This thesis investigates the research question: “Can Security Forces assume the COIN mission; if so, what challenges must the force overcome and what changes must it enact to be effective?” In order to support a new mission, Security Forces must transform organizationally, solve the problem of increasing rates of deployment by resolving the inherent supply versus demand conflict, and refocus training on new mission sets to ensure deploying airmen are given the tools to be successful.

The lessons learned from the challenges Security Forces faced and largely overcame during the transformations following the Khobar Towers and 9/11 attacks are significant. The Air Force must be mindful of these difficulties should it choose to have Security Forces adopt COIN operations as a new core competency.
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INTRODUCTION

Each time the Air Force has gone to war, a great deal of emphasis was given to the protection of air bases. However, upon the cessation of hostilities, ABGD [Air Base Ground Defense] quickly lost any serious planning, funding, or training.

- Brigadier General Richard A. Coleman
USAF Air Bases: No Safe Sanctuary

Since their inception as the military police force of the US Army Air Corps, the United States Air Force’s law enforcement and security branch has transformed numerous times, both in name and responsibility. From the historic Air Police to the modern Security Forces, this group evolved with the changes in times, and answered the calls of Air Force leadership to take on additional responsibilities and perform more diverse missions. Security Forces have transformed dramatically in the last twenty years. This transformation has been a continuous process, but may be broken into three distinct periods separated by key, albeit tragic, events. The first period ended with the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia. The second era spanned the period after the attack on Khobar Towers and lasted until the attacks of 9/11. The latest period began after 9/11: deployments in support of contingency operations surged, and Security Forces began performing non-traditional tasks in support of US Army missions.

Each distinct phase of Security Forces transformation differed with respect to mission, organization, deployments, and training. Security Forces changed mission focus to meet the emerging challenges. The previous Cold War approach changed to air base defense, which in turn shifted into a more comprehensive emphasis on force protection. With the Global War on Terror, some propose that Security Forces should again expand its mission set. Successful offensive operations, with Task Force 1041 and Outside the Wire (OTW) operations at joint bases such as Balad Air Base (AB) in Iraq, have proven the force is capable, versatile, and can successfully execute new missions.

Some view counterinsurgency (COIN) operations as community policing “on steroids,” and therefore propose it as a logical next step for Security Forces. Successful COIN entails maintaining a presence within a community and fostering positive relations with citizens, while isolating insurgents and terrorists. Security Forces have already demonstrated the ability to operate successfully outside an air base and build relations
with the local populace. Security Forces have also demonstrated the ability to assume and execute new missions with great success. Successes bring new costs, however, and the Air Force must be prepared to pay the higher price of increased demand on Security Forces.

With that in mind, this thesis investigates the research question: “Can Security Forces assume the COIN mission; if so, what challenges must the force overcome and what changes must it enact to be effective?” To understand the required evolutions in the force, one must understand Security Forces’ transformation, especially in the last two decades.

This thesis examines this evolution chronologically within three distinct periods. For each period, it will examine Mission, Organization, Deployment and Training as well as challenges that marked each period. The Mission sections examine the manner in which Security Forces focus on and conduct home station and deployed security. The Organization sections will look at the composition and structure of the force. The Deployments sections analyze the number of airmen deployed and the focus of deployed security efforts. Finally, the Training sections quantify the increased training requirements and challenges observed during each period.

Chapter One examines the first of two predominant milestones in the recent evolution of USAF Security Police/Security Forces and the Air Force’s emphasis on air base defense and force protection. This first event was the attack Khobar Towers near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996. This attack highlighted the vulnerability of US forces in what had been formerly viewed as a safe environment, and led to significant force restructuring. Although its mission remained largely unaltered, Security Forces changed its organization to reflect a new focus on Air Base Defense (ABD) and force protection, developing new, innovative methods of protecting Air Force personnel, aircraft, and other resources. Security requirements at deployed locations increased, which drove higher deployments for the force. Finally, Security Forces adapted its technical training, and trained all airmen on security, law enforcement, and ABD operations.

Chapter Two examines the changes in Security Forces after attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The forward locations of US air bases
in both countries, and the dramatically increased operations tempo of US forces but especially USAF Security Forces drove significant changes in manning, training, equipment, and concepts of operation. The 1996 attack on Khobar Towers led to significant organizational changes, but it was only with the 2001 and 2003 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq that the Air Force implemented dramatic mission changes. Security Forces were tasked to expand on the traditional ABD construct, largely comprised of Inside the Wire (ITW) operations and assume non-traditional mission. These included both In-Lieu-Of (ILO), later termed Joint Expeditionary Tasking (JET), missions in support of the US Army, as well as OTW operations at bases supporting multiple services. While Security Forces organizational structure did not change significantly, deployments surged tremendously, as did pre-deployment training requirements. Security Forces perform these missions admirably, but continues to face challenges in maintaining the force, both in terms of sustaining high deployment tempo, and ensuring airmen receive vital training in traditional and emerging mission sets.

Finally, Chapter Three examines the emerging environment, under which some have called for Security Forces to assume the task of COIN operations. In order to support a new mission, Security Forces must transform organizationally. Additionally, Security Forces must solve the problem of increasing already high rates of deployment by resolving the inherent supply versus demand conflict. Continuing to rely on the Air Reserve Component (ARC), increasing the Air Force’s dependence on contract or civilian personnel, or increasing the size of force will address the supply side. Demand factors can be reduced in part by changing team composition or reducing JET deployments. In whichever manner the manpower and deployment challenges are solved, training must be refocused on any new mission sets, ensuring deploying airmen are given the tools to be successful.

The lessons learned from the challenges Security Forces faced and largely overcame during the transformations following the Khobar Towers and 9/11 attacks are significant. The Air Force must be mindful of these difficulties should it choose to task Security Forces with COIN operations.
CHAPTER ONE
USAF SECURITY POLICE, PRE-9/11

The 1996 attack on Khobar Towers near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, highlighted the vulnerability of US forces in what had been formerly viewed as a safe environment, and led to significant restructuring of the security force. This chapter will examine how the Security Police mission, organization, deployment mechanisms, and training requirements changed within the two distinct periods before and after the Khobar Towers attack.

Pre-Khobar Towers – Air Force Security Police

“Today our overseas air bases are set up to operate for peacetime efficiencies and convenience with USAF SP efforts directed toward peacetime security measures and law enforcement duties.”
- Lt Col Wayne Pursur

*Air Base Ground Defense: An Historical Perspective*

The Air Force has relied upon its Security Police to provide law enforcement and security of personnel and resources throughout its history. Formerly known as the US Army Air Corps Military Police, USAF Air Police, and finally USAF Security Police, the organization has played a key role in Air Force history. In the last two decades, the Security Police has undergone significant changes in mission and organization, in how it executes deployment and contingency operations, and in how core training prepares the force to execute its missions. The key event that drove the first major transformation of the force during this period was the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. This attack killed 19 Air Force service members and wounded numerous others, would change the Air Force’s focus on force protection, and drive significant changes to the Air Force Security Police. The transformation of the Security Police into Security Forces with increased emphasis on force protection reflected a greater understanding of the change from the Cold War linear battlefield to the new asymmetric threat posed by an unconventional enemy. Air bases were no longer confined to a secure rear area behind the front lines, and airbase protection measures had to change to meet the new threat.
Mission

The primary mission of the AF Security Police was “to provide internal security for Air Force warfighting assets and police services for Air Force bases, people and property in the continental United States (CONUS) and at overseas locations” (emphasis added). This mission largely entailed security of assigned valuable assets such as aircraft, communications, or other weapons systems, crime prevention and response, traffic enforcement, and installation entry control. The secondary mission of providing mobility forces for ABD operations was considered almost as an afterthought. Manpower allocation resulted from a determination of how many personnel were needed for the primary mission, and how many people were “left over.”

During the Cold War, the Department of Defense established enemy threats within three categories (see Table 1). The Level I threat is defined as small teams or individuals, to include agents, saboteurs, terrorists, etc. Level II threats consist of small tactical units, special operations forces, guerillas, etc. Security Forces are trained and equipped to meet and defeat these two threats in the course of their normal base security posture. The Level III threat includes large tactical units, and conventional forces. This threat requires a more substantial defensive capability, and Joint Service Agreement-8 (JSA-8) delineated the responsibilities of Air Force and Army forces required to defend an air base outside the perimeter (see Appendix A). This agreement directed “Army units to provide air base ground defense outside the base perimeter.” As a result, the Air Force seemed satisfied to rely upon the Army to provide the needed rear area security. With the implementation of JSA-8, AF Security Police was specifically delineated as an internal response force, and the US Army was identified as the external defense force.

As Lane and Riggle assess in their 1993 Air War College paper, under the Cold War construct, “Airfields are for the most part located in rear areas and are seldom located

\[\text{References}\]

based on ground tactical considerations. Many saw the agreement between the Army and Air Force dividing external and internal security respectively as the solution to base security concerns. “Many senior Air Force officers incorrectly believed this agreement answered the base defense question.” However, as subsequent events demonstrated it soon became obvious that the threats were not as clearly defined and the Army was unable to ensure the security of air bases as expected with JSA-8.

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<th>Threat Level</th>
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<th>SF Responsibilities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Level I</td>
<td>Agents - Saboteurs - Sympathizers - Terrorists</td>
<td>Base Defense Force</td>
<td>Detect and Defeat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level II</td>
<td>Small Tactical Units - Unconventional Warfare Forces - Guerillas</td>
<td>Base Defense Force - Base Response Force (RF) - Supporting Fires</td>
<td>Disrupt</td>
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In a resource-constrained environment, during a period of manpower and budget reductions, units focused on the immediate mission at hand: policing and security at home station. During the 1990s, the defense budget continued to shrink. In 1993 alone, the Air Force budget was 34 percent less than the budget in 1985. Additionally, with fewer forces to accomplish the mission, focus on secondary missions such as ABGD was minimal. In their 1993 thesis Lane and Riggle warned reducing the Security Police

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6 Coleman, *USAF Air Bases: No Safe Sanctuary*, ii.
forces from 40,000 to only 28,000 would endanger successful execution of home station
and ongoing contingency operations support.8

Organization

Historically, enlisted Security Forces members were separated by subspecialties:
Law Enforcement (LE) and Security. This separation began at the beginning of an
airmen’s enlistment with separate technical training for each and would usually continue
throughout an individual’s career. Officers were not aligned specifically with LE or
Security, but rather bore responsibility for leadership over both.

Deployments

During this period, Security Police forces largely deployed to established bases,
and the deployment missions reflected the relationship between the Air Force and US
Army or Host Nation forces. Non-US forces assured external (and in some cases
internal) base defense, leaving SPs responsible for internal (or sectorized) security
operations. For example, one of the largest continual deployments was to Prince Sultan
AB, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. AF Security Police bore significant internal security and
police responsibility, but relied upon the Saudi forces to maintain external law and order
and security for the base. As part of the new Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct,
Security Forces aligned along AEF guidelines, which established 120-day rotations in
support of contingency operations. Each AEF postured airmen to deploy a maximum of
4 months out of every 20 months, and enable training and reconstitution, along with
meeting home station mission requirements.9

Training

Although periodically emphasized and driven into resurgence by senior leaders
during the 1980s and 1990, the ABGD mission and its required skills were largely
ignored. Security specialists were the only enlisted personnel to attend air base ground
defense training, which “led to a plethora of mid to senior noncommissioned officers and

8 Lane and Riggle, Airfield Defense for Global Reach/Global Power, 19.
9 “Dr Rebecca Grant Generals Group,” HQ USAF/A7S, PowerPoint briefing, Nov 2006.
senior company and field grade officers without formal ground defense training.”

Many thought ABGD consisted of wartime skills that would never be used again in a Cold War environment. Many expected that Air Force operations would originate from bases located behind friendly lines in “permissive” environments. Additionally, emphasizing ABGD as a force capability would require resources, and include additional training, equipment and funding. “Air operators had never been interested in this ground mission, they looked on it as a siphoning of funds that could be spent on airframes.”

The combination of these factors ensured ABGD remained underfunded and underemphasized. By regulation, SPs assigned to mobility were required to attend formalized regional training at least every three years, and to maintain currency on perishable ABGD skills at home station. Attendance at regional training was recorded in unit records, and unit compliance could be checked during inspections, but home station training was often accomplished just-in-time or abbreviated and conducted during precious off-duty time, if at all. Only select NCOs and officers attended ABGD training beyond the basic school, and all sustainment training occurred at home station.

Post-Khobar -- Air Force Security Forces

“The Khobar Towers bombing in June 1996 highlighted the need for increased emphasis on force protection.”

- John McBrien

Security Forces Digest, March 1998

In 1996, terrorists used a fuel truck laden with explosives to attack the barracks at the Khobar towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The attack killed 19 airmen and wounded hundreds more. While the specific details of the attack have been the subject of many papers and reports, the importance of the Khobar towers attack for this paper is the impact it had on the Air Force, and specifically the Security Police. Then Major Eugene Robinett summed up the Air Force’s perspective on force protection prior to the attack in his 1997 Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) paper: “Force protection was not a

11 Coleman, USAF Air Bases: No Safe Sanctuary, ii.
12 Lane and Riggle, Airfield Defense for Global Reach/Global Power, 16.
primary issue when the bomb went off at Khobar Towers.”\textsuperscript{13} As a result of the attack, force protection became a critical capability for the Air Force.

**Mission**

After the Khobar Towers attack, the non-deployed missions remained largely unchanged. Security Forces’ mission of protection of deployed assets remained primarily an ITW operation. Security Forces developed new, innovative methods of protecting Air Force personnel, aircraft, and other resources, but these methods dealt mainly with increasing standoff distances, implementing more effective entry control procedures and vehicle searches, and procuring equipment. In Fiscal Year 1997, the Air Force increased its force protection-related equipment budget by almost $162 million, procuring sensors, perimeter security upgrades, thermal imaging devices, and under-vehicle surveillance systems.\textsuperscript{14} OTW operations remained the primary purview of the US Army and Host Nation forces.

However, the Air Force’s greater emphasis on force protection was indicative of the perceived change in threat. While the traditional tasks of base security of resources and personnel and law enforcement remained critical, the emphasis on force protection grew, with the Security Forces serving as the foundation. The newly redesignated Security Forces members focused on the same day-to-day priorities as before Khobar Towers, but the training mission evolved. The Khobar Towers attack underscored the need for organic force protection capability. In his 1998 ACSC research paper, then Major William Delaney asserted that prior to the 1996 attack, the Air Force had not understood the critical nature of force protection, and it took a terrorist attack to force the Air Force to react. Major Delaney asserted, “service leadership does not truly comprehend the value of indigenous force protection, given their indoctrination that ground defense is a land service, not air service responsibility, or they lack familiarity with the concept due to its conspicuous absence from airpower doctrine until 1997.”\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} Robinett, *Force Protection in the Wake of the Dhahran Bombing*, 25.
\textsuperscript{15} Delaney, *USAF Force Protection: Do We Really Care*, 29.
Organization

In 1997, the Air Force began to transform its defenders. First, Security Police become Security Forces. This name change seemed superficial to some, but it signified a change in mindset and a shift in mission focus. Air Force “cops” began to evolve from being primarily military police and started providing enhanced capabilities for protecting the force. Airmen were no longer Law Enforcement or Security Specialists, but rather force protectors and defenders of the force. The consolidation postured a combined career field to provide increased deployment and ABD capabilities, and signified a change in focus throughout the chain of command. While this created large ripple effects through the career field, and one could hear some among the career Law Enforcement enlisted force complain “I didn’t join the Air Force to be in the Army,” these changes reflected the idea that a professional force could and should do more than simply provide law enforcement support to an installation. The wartime mission, for which Security Forces had previously prepared “when possible,” became an important part of what the career field could and must do.

The second definite step in the force protection evolution was activation of a new unit with a unique mission. The 820th Security Forces Group (SFG) stood up March 17, 1997 at Lackland AFB, Texas. Designed as a rapidly deployable, highly trained force comprised of numerous Air Force specialties including Security Forces, explosive ordnance disposal, communications, intelligence, Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and more, the 820th SFG provided commanders with an on-call, quickly deployable force protection capability. Activation of the 820th SFG led Lt Col Herbert Brown to conclude USAF Air Base Ground Defense was “in the best shape it’s ever been in the history of air power.” The 820th SFG represented an evolution in the way the Air Force looked at allocating manpower and training resources to develop a highly specialized air base defense capability. The Air Force envisioned the 820th SFG as not only a first-in, quick response force provider, but also as the lead for AEF steady-state support. Initially

comprised of a group headquarters and seven flights, the 820th SFG would grow to its current group and three squadron configuration. Unfortunately, before this proof of concept could be fully validated, the Air Force’s deployment posture changed with increased deployments in support of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.

The stand-up of the Force Protection Battlelab (FPB) was the third step taken to add resources to the new focus on force protection. Designed as a highly responsive organization, the FPB was charged to “rapidly identify and prove the worth of innovative Force Protection ideas which improve the ability of the Air Force to execute its Core Competencies and Joint Warfighting.” 18 The FPB delivered force protection enhancement products such as the Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide and the “Desert Hawk” remote controlled aerial vehicle, which deployed forces used prior to and during combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The consolidation of the career field, and activation of the 820th SFG and the FPB were the most visible measures taken to enhance the force protection capabilities of Security Forces. Beyond that, however, these events signified a change in focus, and an evolution in force protection for the Air Force.

Deployments

Doctrinally, Security Forces changed the way they conducted deployed operations. Supporting ongoing operations such as Northern and Southern Watch, Security Forces continued to deploy to Main Operating Bases (MOBs) within the confines of allied nations. The attack on Khobar Towers emphasized the change in environment, however, and focus on blast mitigation, increased standoff, and other force protection measures underscored the new perspective. The number of Security Forces deploying in support of these operations increased as bases increased their Threat Conditions (THREATCON) to reflect heightened states of alert (see Table 2). Each level of increase in THREATCON correlates to an increased defensive posture requiring

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additional forces, and Security Forces taskings soared at deployed bases as security requirements increased.\(^{19}\)

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<th>THREATCON</th>
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<td>NORMAL</td>
<td>Applies when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine security posture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALPHA</td>
<td>Applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher THREATCONs resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAVO</td>
<td>Applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, or aggravating relations with local authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLIE</td>
<td>Applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implantation of this measure for more than a short period probably creates hardship and affects the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELTA</td>
<td>Implementation applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely.</td>
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Increasing deployment requirements created secondary effects, as well. In an undermanned career field (in 1997, enlisted manning hovered at just over 91 percent),

\(^{19}\) Although specific deployment figures are unavailable for 1996-1997, during the author’s interview with Col John Salley, USAF, ret, now AF/A7S (May 18, 2009), he discussed the increase in both security requirements and deployment levels for security forces. He concluded that the “AEF after Khobar was not a good fit, …deployments went up dramatically.”
deployments took their toll. Many bases were manned at 85-90 percent, and deployments drove those numbers to 70-75 percent present for duty. Diminished manning forced most bases to move from 8-hour shifts to 12-hour shifts, with no relief in sight. Additionally, the AEF structure quickly failed to provide the expected stability to Security Forces, and a 179-day tour of duty replaced the standard 120-day deployment. After Khobar Towers, the AEF structure no longer worked for Security Forces; “AEF worked for iron, but not for Security Force.” Security Forces deployments surged to an average 1,335 airmen deployed in support of ongoing operations.

Training

Under a new technical training program, all new Security Force members received training in the basics of law enforcement, security, and air base defense operations. Instead of selecting either security or law enforcement as a specialty, all airmen were trained and expected to be proficient in both; however, this led to decreased proficiency as a result. Follow-on air base defense courses grew in size, and more of the force attended them. All Security Forces airmen were required to maintain ABD proficiency by attending a Regional Training Center (RTC) at least once every three years. While Security Forces would remain the mainstay of force protection, Air Force training was redesigned to provide “every Air Force member with the necessary skills to assist in the force protection mission and give them a place in the base defense scheme.”

Conclusion

The USAF’s emphasis on force protection changed dramatically with the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers. Renewed attention on organic Air Force force protection capabilities drove dramatic changes to security police organization and training. Moving from a military police and security organization, Security Forces evolved into the foundation of protection for air force personnel and resources, in both home station and

deployed environments. The combining of separate Security and Law Enforcement career fields drove an increased training burden, and led to decreased proficiency in specific tasks. Security Forces traded depth of knowledge and training for breadth, and the service struggled with the culture change; both within Security Forces and across the Air Force as Force Protection became an integral part of the lexicon. Deployment taskings increased, and drove units into nearly continuous 12-hour shifts. This personnel deployment tempo (PERSTEMPO) contributed to reduced retention, which compounded the manning challenges, and Security Forces struggled to meet home station manning and deployment requirements (see Table 3).

The creation of the 820th SFG as a robust expeditionary force protection unit and the FPB as an innovative technology and proof of concept unit were indices of new thought. However, while Air Force Security Police became Security Forces, and their organization and training transformed to incorporate new focus on force protection, the basic nature of their deployment mission remained unchanged: ITW operations with increased reliance on technology and stand off. It would take the invasion of two countries after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to change the nature of the Security Forces deployment mission.
Table 3. Security Forces Transformation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Focus</th>
<th>Pre-Khobar</th>
<th>Post-Khobar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Home station Security</td>
<td>Home station Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nuclear Security</td>
<td>Nuclear Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ITW/ABD</td>
<td>ITW/ABD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Separate Security &amp; Law Enforcement career fields</td>
<td>Consolidated career field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SP =&gt; SF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>820th SFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FP Battlelab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployments</td>
<td>Steady-state AEF</td>
<td>Increased tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Average: 1335 airmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Separate Tech Schools</td>
<td>Combined tech schools, inc ABD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited ABD slots</td>
<td>3 yr RTC req</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challenges</td>
<td>Capability to protect force</td>
<td>Airmen skills too thin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reduced Manning/ increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>taskings forced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12-hr shifts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Retention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Culture change—defenders vs. cops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15
CHAPTER TWO
POST 9/11 ENVIRONMENT

Every Airman is a sensor.
Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4.1

Get outside the wire with the Office of Special Investigations folks…and begin to think about what’s a threat to this airfield.
- General T. Michael Mosley
  Chief of Staff, USAF 2005

After the attacks of 9/11, the United States went to war, deploying combat forces into Afghanistan and surrounding countries in 2001, and into Iraq in 2003. Along with the major commitment of combat forces came the requirement to provide force protection to American and Allied personnel as well as security of aircraft and combat support resources throughout Southwest Asia. Security Forces have borne the brunt of the security requirements for the large numbers of Air Force forces and assets deployed to the region. Additionally, the Army was quickly overextended and the Air Force began deploying in support of ILO taskings, performing traditional Army missions. Deployments surged as Security Forces deployed in record numbers.

Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF respectively) represent the third significant period of evolution in the post-Cold War Security Forces. Although more difficult to categorize than the pre- and post-Khobar Towers periods because its evolution continues, the contemporary Security Forces era has distinct features. First, the Security Force mission drove the force to seek balance between home station security, law enforcement requirements, and deployment operations. Second, the organizational construct continued to evolve as more forces deployed into the theaters of operations. Third, the nature of the deployment mission and the specific capabilities of the force continued to evolve as Security Forces were tasked to perform new missions. Finally, the training required for successful operations, both at deployment locations and home station, has evolved to meet the needs of the service.
Mission

After the attacks of 9/11, Security Forces maintained its missions from previous eras: providing both force protection to USAF personnel and assets as well as the capability to provide deployment-ready personnel to combatant commanders. While the basic missions remained unchanged, the magnitude of these missions dramatically increased after 9/11.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 refocused USAF energy on force protection. It became clear that deployed forces were not the only ones facing terrorist threats—the US could be struck as well. The Air Force implemented new standards for force protection for locations within the CONUS, outside the CONUS (OCONUS), and deployed bases, with additional requirements for installation entry control, vulnerability assessments, new building construction standards, and more. Minimum standards for Security Forces posting requirements increased, raising the number of airmen required to provide required security at any given base. Additionally, force protection efforts also emphasized personnel protection. After the attacks, all AF bases went to Force Protection Condition (FPCON) Delta. Most CONUS bases subsequently dropped back to Charlie, Bravo, and finally normalized at an “Alpha-plus” level, and overseas bases dropped to either Charlie or Bravo. Although the terminology change between THREATCON and FPCON appears superficial, two significant differences are clear. Specific security measure are unique to each base, and classified, but in general, new protection measures were developed and associated with each level of FPCON. Second, the Air Force established the minimum security baseline at the new Alpha-plus standard (and higher in overseas or other high threat areas). These new initiatives required such security measures as enhanced entry control measures at the installation entry points, increased random personnel and vehicle checks, and more robust installation anti-terrorism and response plans. Overall, however, the post-9/11 environment proved to be more security-intensive, with force protection requirements at higher levels than previously seen. These new requirements included use of sensor detection technology,

2 AFI 10-245, Antiterrorism.
enhanced entry control and screening procedures. Most importantly, the new requirements significantly increased manpower posting requirements.3

The deployment mission for Security Forces took on new life as well. Deployments in support of OEF and OIF may be parsed into three primary deployment missions. First, the traditional base defense mission remains a priority. Second, Security Forces are heavily tasked to support the “In Lieu Of” or “Joint Expeditionary Tasking” (ILO/JET) mission. Finally, the newest mission has been the emerging OTW mission.

With the 2004 publishing of AFTTP 3-10.1, *Integraged Base Defense (IBD)*, the Air Force base defense mission changed from ABD to Integrated Base Defense (IBD). IBD is defined as “the integrated application of offensive and defensive action, both active and passive, taken across the ground dimension of the force protection (FP) battlespace to achieve local and area dominance in support of force protection.”4 The most significant change between ABD and IBD is the latter’s incorporation of a total force approach to force protection. ABD relied upon the Security Police to defend an airbase, whereas IBD included all as part of the base defense system. This new approach to the force protection mission endeavored to use the total force to reduce the USAF’s vulnerability and risk. In the deployed environment, IBD relies upon the foundation of highly trained Security Forces, but incorporates all airmen as part of the consolidated detection capability and “virtual perimeter,” facilitated by increased awareness and responsiveness.5 In 2007, IBD transformed into Integrated Defense (ID), which “…is the application of active and passive defense measures, employed across the legally-defined ground dimension of the operational environment, to mitigate potential risks and defeat adversary threats to Air Force operations.”6 Security Forces continue to provide both law enforcement (Provost) support and ID at air bases throughout the region.

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3 Manpower increases will be addressed below in the Organization section.
5 AFTTP 3-10.1, *Integraged Base Defense (IBD)*, 17.
Beginning in January 2004 Security Forces began to deploy in support of the Army under what was initially termed ILO taskings. These ILO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan would serve as one of the biggest changes to Security Forces, as they required large numbers of airmen to deploy in support of non-security force missions. These missions predominantly relied upon Security Forces’ core competencies as the foundation for non-Security Forces missions. These include detainee operations, customs enforcement, convoy operations, mobile training teams, and provincial reconstruction teams (see Table 4).

Table 4. Security Forces ILO Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detainee Interrogation</th>
<th>Heavy Construction Teams</th>
<th>Detainee Guard Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convoy Driver</td>
<td>Counter-IED Teams</td>
<td>Army Base Security (Defense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Control Teams</td>
<td>EOD (Bomb Technician)</td>
<td>Military Working Dog Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocation Assistance Teams</td>
<td>Utility Support Detachment</td>
<td>Police Transition Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stress Counseling Teams</td>
<td>Well-Drilling Teams</td>
<td>Personal Security Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Training Teams</td>
<td>Facility Engineering Teams</td>
<td>Convoy Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction</td>
<td>Iraqi Forces Support &amp;</td>
<td>Army Base Law &amp; Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teams (Iraq and Afghanistan)</td>
<td>Training Teams</td>
<td>Detachment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reprinted from Marttala, *The “In Lieu Of” Myth*

Due to the perceived pejorative nature of the term ILO, the AF renamed non-traditional AF “tasking in support of the US Army.” On 1 Oct 08, the DoD replaced the ILO designation with “Ad Hoc” or “Joint Force Solutions.” These new terms implied more of a joint warfighter perspective, and not that the Air Force was taking on Army responsibilities. To complicate terminology further, the USAF would classify these two new categories of taskings as JET. As Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen Norton Schwartz articulated, “The JET term properly characterizes our combat-focused mindset and our joint posture… We are not fighting in lieu of anything. We [the Air Force] are

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7 ILO was defined as “A standard force, including associated table of organization and equipment, deployed/employed to execute missions and tasks outside its core competencies.” DoD Force Sourcing Categories, HQ USAF/A7S PowerPoint slide, undated.


10 This author’s review of emails and discussion regarding the change in terminology led to the conclusion that ILO was determined to be a pejorative term; it appeared to indicate the Air Force was deploying into Army missions, and implied the USAF was not fully committed to the joint fight.

fully committed to winning today's fight with the innovative combat spirit our Airmen demonstrate every day.”\textsuperscript{12}

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the third evolutionary piece of Security Forces deployment mission emerged, and the delineation of the Base Security Zone (BSZ) became critical. AFTTP 3-10.2, \textit{Integrated Base Defense Command and Control}, defines the BSZ as the area in and around an airbase from which the enemy can attack base personnel and resources or aircraft approaching/departing the base.\textsuperscript{13} A BSZ differs from a base boundary, which is the line that “delineates the surface area of a base for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas.”\textsuperscript{14} Under optimal conditions the BSZ and the base boundary would be the same (see Figure 1); however, in many of environments, the two are not colinear (see Figure 2).

![Figure 1. Optimal Base Boundary & BSZ Relationships](image)

Source: Reprinted from AFTTP 3-10.2. \textit{Integrated Base Defense Command and Control}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{12}] Gen Norton A. Schwartz, HQ USAF/CC. To ALMAJCOM/DRU/FOA/CC. Memorandum, 4 Dec 2008, 4 Dec 2008.
\end{itemize}
With the termination of the agreement between the AF and Army delineating OTW security responsibility in 2005 (JSA 8, see Appendix A), it became clear that the USAF bore responsibility for security within the BSZ; the mission of providing that security fell upon the Security Forces.\textsuperscript{15} Although JP 3-10, \textit{Joint Security Operations in Theater}, directs base commanders to assume responsibility for self-protection, the Air Force had historically depended on Army for security in the immediate vicinity of the base. While base commanders had historically commanded security inside the base, and understood “overall command of the base-protection mission is an AF responsibility,” extending that responsibility outside the perimeter was new.\textsuperscript{16} The OTW mission became the newest piece of the security force’s deployment mission and perhaps the most significant recent change for Security Forces.

The foundation of the OTW mission is the idea that a successful defense incorporates offensive action and can seize the initiative and interrupt the enemy’s planning cycle.\textsuperscript{17} On January 1, 2005, the Air Force seized a key opportunity to

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{15} Marttala, \textit{The ‘In Lieu Of’ Myth}, 26.
\textsuperscript{17} Brig Gen Robert H. Holmes, Col Bradley D. Spacy, Lt Col John M. Busch, and Lt Col Gregory J. Reese, “The Air Force’s New Ground War: Ensuring Projection of Aerospace Power through Expeditionary}
\end{flushleft}
demonstrate its security capabilities for the OTW by executing Task Force (TF) 1041.\textsuperscript{18} TF 1041 was a 60-day operation conducted outside Balad AB, Iraq that yielded 17 high value targets, over 100 other insurgents, and eight major weapons caches.\textsuperscript{19} “Task Force 1041 demonstrated that the Air Force possessed the capabilities needed to successfully dominate the base security zone and provide a secure operating environment from which to launch, recover, and sustain airpower.”\textsuperscript{20} This operation would serve as a proof of concept for later Security Force OTW operations.

In mid-2005, the USAF assumed primary responsibility for the traditional air base defense and law enforcement missions inside Joint Base Balad (JBB). This included provost and security responsibilities within the base perimeter, as well as patrol and security operations within the BSZ. As then-Director of Air Force Security Forces Brigadier General Robert Holmes stated, the wing commander of a deployed base is responsible “for their base security zone, which means they’ve got to be able to protect their aircraft coming in and out of that air base. And that could be five to ten klicks [kilometers] outside [the base perimeter], depending on what the threat is.”\textsuperscript{21} After the successes of TF 1041 and the termination of JSA 8 in 2005, it became clear that the Air Force was required not only to provide security in, and now, around the air bases, but also that it had the robust capability to do so.

**Organization**

The military structure of Security Forces remained largely unchanged after the initiatives implemented in 1997 discussed in the previous chapter. However, the significant increase in post-9/11 deployments and increased home station security requirements exacerbated the challenges facing security force commanders. Although

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\textsuperscript{21} Robert Holmes, Interview with Jim Conrad and Jerry Bullock, The Pentagon, 8 June 2005.
Security Forces evolved to address increased force protection requirements, “…most tasks and manpower structure remain focused on running the home station.” In a era of heavy deployments, this construct hindered Security Forces’ ability to “balance day-to-day law enforcement and security operations of a home-station Air Force base with the critical task of preparing troops for combat deployments.” As Brigadier General Hertog, Air Force Director of Security Forces has stated, “The war on terror has forced us to rethink how we need to defend our bases, both home station and deployed, and what our force must look like.” Large deployments of Security Forces caused immediate hardship at CONUS bases, and the DoD responded with a multi-tiered approach. This approach included reliance on the Air Force Reserve Component volunteers (ARCv), augmentation from the Army National Guard, contract guards, and finally converting staff and entry controllers from uniformed to civilian positions.

Immediately after 9/11, the Air Force activated Air Force Guard and Reserve personnel to fill the increased requirement for posting to meet the heightened security standards. The next solution was to activate Army National Guard units; in 2002, the Air Force and Army reached an agreement that would enable 8,000 (with an additional 10 percent allocated for command and control) Army National Guardsmen to augment Security Forces across the CONUS. Although largely limited to entry control operations, which included identification checks, vehicle searches, and visitor control procedures, these forces nonetheless proved an invaluable addition to Security Forces units. These forces were largely in place by January 2003, and were projected to have a two-year sustainment period. By October 2003, FPCON Alpha Plus posting requirements were normalized, and Air Force Security Forces determined the service faced a shortfall of 8,000 airmen. In December 2003, the Army National Guard reduced its AF augmentation by approximately 40-50 percent, likely due to increased Army National Guard (ArNG) deployment requirements. As a result, the AF became

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25 Matecko, Mat. AF/A7SX. Email to author, February 23, 2009.
26 “Mission Timeline,” PowerPoint slide, PowerPoint Briefing to FORSCOM, undated.
increasingly dependent on the ARCv program, with guardsmen and reservists reporting for duty across the nation.

In 2003, Brig Gen Holmes introduced Security Force Transformation as a mechanism to meet the high PERSTEMPO that resulted from increased deployments and security requirements. Brig Gen Holmes initiated an effort to enable Security Forces to better support both home station security and deployment requirements. His vision of transformation centered on expansion of the force, primarily through civilianization of non-deployment duties such as administrative and base support police functions. Current Director of Security Forces, Brigadier General Mary Kay Hertog, continued this endeavor, identifying the way ahead through a change in military and civilian force composition. “Information security, personnel security, a lot of our combat arms, a lot of our training, and our police services—that can be civilianized…That’s what we want to do to free more blue suiters to make them available to deploy.”  

More civilians, either government service or contracted, cost the service more money, but enable the service to support the increased deployments required after 9/11.

As part of the security force transformation efforts initiated by Brig Gen Holmes, the service began funding General Schedule (GS) over hires each fiscal year to augment the assigned forces. These positions were initially restricted to staff functions, but in 2004, the USAF initiated its first contract for base entry control security personnel. During the first year of the contract, 425 contractors augmented Security Forces, and, like the Army soldiers, assumed entry control, vehicle search, and visitor processing responsibilities. By 2006, these numbers swelled to nearly 2,000 personnel.

As the USAF continued to work toward a long-term manpower solutions for the increased security requirements and heightened operational deployment tempo, individual units bore the brunt of the hardship. Beginning in FY05, the manpower augmentation program was one of “backfill only,” meaning Security Forces funded a replacement for each airman that deployed from the unit. These funds covered ARCv, GS overhires, and contract personnel. These additional forces assigned to Security

28 Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog, Interview with Jerry Bullock, Crystal City, VA, 15 September 2006.
29 GS over hires are civilians temporarily hired using current fiscal year operations and maintenance funds, instead of funding the position permanently through the normal budget process.
30 Matecko, Email to author, February 23, 2009.
Forces across the Air Force enabled them to meet the security mission. Deployments remained high, however. By 2006, even with the 450 additional civilian overhires, 2,000 contract guards, and 1,400 guard and reserves serving man-day tours, 68 percent of Security Force Squadrons remained in 12-hour shifts.31

In 2007, Headquarters Air Staff published Capability-Based Manpower Standard (CMS) 43SXXX, *Manpower and Organization; Security Force Squadron*. This study represented the first comprehensive manpower allocation standard since 1994, and recalculated not only the post manning factors that dictate manpower allocation for homestation requirements, but also include AEF deployment credit. During this process, the Air Force also validated a 6,000 person Security Forces shortfall.32 These two efforts are the first steps in solving many of the force-structure related challenges Security Forces have faced after 9/11. While these additional manpower positions have been validated, Security Forces deployment and home station security requirements have continued to exhaust the force.

**Deployments**

“*OIF has taught us there is no rear area.*”

- Brig Gen Mary Kay Hertog  
  AF Director Security Forces

Regardless of the terms used to categorize the missions, these emerging requirements proved to be a substantial addition to Security Forces deployments. Although starting modestly with five JET taskings in Jan 2004, by May 2007 JET (i.e., non-traditional) deployments actually outnumbered core AF taskings (See Figure 3). After this peak, JET deployments receded, but remain a significant component of Security Force deployments, remaining at 26 percent of deployment requirements in April 09.

31 Hertog, “Annual Meeting Speech.”
Increased Security Forces deployments have exacted a toll on the force. The challenge of meeting deployment requirements while balancing home station needs is daunting. Although the service prides itself on being an expeditionary force, there is a large segment of Security Forces that cannot deploy. These “alibis” include forces that are exempt from deployment requirements due to critical nuclear or presidential security duties, personnel pending reassignment or separation, as well as other categories. After deducting these non-deployable forces (alibis) from the total forces available, the picture becomes even bleaker. Of the almost 23,000 Security Forces assigned, less than 8,000 remain available for deployment (see Figure 4).³³ Based on Security Forces deployment requirements, averaging 3,500 airmen since 9/11, Security Forces deploy at a rate of 1:1.9, meaning that on average, Airmen in deployable positions deploy one day for every 1.9 days not deployed.³⁴ As Lt Col Marttala points out, however, pre-deployment training and travel time add to the deployment time, and drive deployable Security Forces

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³³ Forces listed as alibi forces are “fenced,” meaning they are unavailable for deployment. These forces include those that serve in direct support of specific missions or are assigned to a specific combatant commander. These include forces serving in support of US nuclear missions (Nuke forces); AMC flyaway aircraft security missions (AMC Ravens); Presidential Security (POTUS), Special Operations Command missions (SOCOMPEC Forces); and contingency response group (AMC CRG). Also fenced are airmen serving in instructor billets (AETC and RTC Instructors), on short tours, and serving in special duty billets (Non-SF Billets).
Airmen to a 1:1 “effective dwell ratio.” With overall manning approaching 96 percent, it would appear the career field is a healthy, deployable force; but when the alibis are deducted, only 33 percent of the authorized personnel are deployable. Finally, when JET taskings are deducted, the available forces for core AF taskings are even fewer.

![Figure 4. MAJCOM Alibi Pyramid, Authorized & Assigned](image)


The Air Force measures its deployment tempo with a new construct by placing Air Force Specialty Codes within Tempo Bands. Each Tempo Band corresponds to a ratio between “Boots on the Ground” (BOG) Dwell time (the time spent non-deployed at home station). This ratio is commonly referred to as BOG-Dwell. The AEF standard a 20-month cycle of four months deployed with 16 months non-deployed time entails Low risk and is designated Tempo Band A. Other less optimal deployment ratios correspond to different Tempo Bands (see Figure 5), culminating with the High Risk bands, E (Active Duty) and N (ARC). Security Forces have been in the High Risk Tempo Band E since the introduction of this new construct, and is projected to remain in that category for the foreseeable future.

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Lt Col Bryan Gillespie, AF/A7SX, in discussion with author, 4 May 09.

Gillespie, in discussion with author, 4 May 09.
Training

The 1997 policy under which Security Force trainees received training in the three core competencies of Security Forces (Law Enforcement, Security, and ABD) continued after 9/11. In fact, this robust training continued to expand with additional emphasis on IBD and force protection skills. To accomplish this task, the technical school received increased funding and the authorization to expand the enlisted course from 51 to 65 training days, and the officer course from 60 to 78 training days. The expansion of course curricula increased the quality and depth of training, incorporating lessons learned, and increasing the students’ proficiency level. The courses added emphasis on law enforcement (provost operations), force protection, and IBD capabilities such as patrolling operations and military operations in urban terrain.60F

Continuation training for ABD and IBD continues at both regional training centers (RTC) and home station. This training continues to be a challenge for CONUS units, as there has been no direct correlation between IBD skills and the law enforcement and security functions Security Forces units performed at home station. These highly perishable IBD skills are not routinely trained, practiced, or validated in the course of an

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airman’s normal duties. Many units continue to implement just-in-time mobility training, or depend on attendance at the two-week regional training center to ensure their airmen are prepared for deployment. This led one Air Force major to conclude in 2004 that, “Most members of provisional security force squadrons do not receive the level of training required to move beyond a perimeter-based defense [and perform the OTW mission].” Even as late as 2006, a Headquarters Air Force briefing indicated, “Airmen do not receive adequate ground combat tactics and skills during initial and continuation training.” The 820th SFG and regional Contingency Response Groups continue to be the most well trained Security Forces in the service; however, they represent only a fraction of the airmen required for the deployed missions.

The Air Force recognized the pre-deployment training deficiency and took steps to fix it. The biggest challenge was improving training consistency. Prior to 2008, airmen would attend a training center determined by home station Air Force Major Command (MAJCOM) assignment (for example, airmen from an Air Combat Command [ACC] unit attended the ACC RTC at Creech AFB). To reduce training inconsistency and promote preparedness, airmen began attending RTCs tied specifically to deployment bases. Airmen deploying to Balad AB to perform the OTW mission receive 45 days of specialized training at Creech AFB, NV, to include patrol and convoy training that included sessions on improvised explosive device (IED) identification and avoidance. In fact, RTC are now able to tailor each specific course to ensure it meets the needs of the gaining deployment location. The combination of specific deployment base training and customized course development has increased the effectiveness of Security Forces deploying into the OEF/OIF areas of responsibility (AORs).

41 “Dr Rebecca Grant Generals Group,” HQ USAF/A7S, PowerPoint briefing, Nov 2006, slide 17.
43 Rolfsen, “Security Forces Take on a New Mission.”
Airmen deploying in support of JET missions attend US Army-run training. Initially, this training was inefficient, and many airmen spent hours and days waiting for training or receiving training on competencies they already possessed.\footnote{This assessment is based on the author’s personal experience as the commander of a unit providing steady-state support to JET missions (then called ILO) and talking with airmen and noncommissioned officers attending training. In one specific case, the Army unit that was to provide the training purportedly had not received notification that the airmen were arriving at their location for training, and it took several days for instruction to begin.} The Air Force Security Force Center coordinated with TRADOC to eliminate redundancies, inefficiencies, and duplicative training. As of September 2008, Army training for specific JET missions was aligned at 23 corresponding CONUS locations. Additionally, the courses have incorporated new training standards that eliminate redundant training of Security Forces’ core competencies. Courses train both specific mission training and small team and individual generic combat skills training.\footnote{Lt Gen Gary L. North, USAFCENT/CC, To HAF/A3/A30, HAF/A4/7Z, HAF/A1D, “USCENTCOM Combat Skills Requirements,” Memorandum, 11 Sep 08.} JET training has become more efficient and most importantly, more effective for Security Forces airmen.

**Conclusion**

In 1993 two Air Force lieutenant colonels warned that, “the lack of ground tactical considerations [for air base placement] coupled with the ever-expanding shortage of security police highlights the criticality of close and careful Air Force coordination and integration with whatever combat forces are co-located in the immediate area of an airfield.”\footnote{Lt Col Lawrence R. Lane and Lt Col Albert F. Riggle, *Airfield Defense for Global Reach/Global Power*, Research Report (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1993), 37.} JSA-8 formerly delineated Army responsibility for security of air bases outside their perimeter; however, it became clear that the Army was unable to execute that mission and in 2005 the agreement was terminated.

TF 1041 demonstrated the capabilities of a motivated and highly trained group of Security Forces in an expanded OTW mission. However, the majority of deployed Security Forces still come from traditional units and receive only basic deployment skills. While pre-deployment training might sharpen these skills, the average Security Forces airman receives far less air base defense type training throughout his career than the average 820\textsuperscript{th} SFG member. To expect these airmen to perform at the same level not...
only sets expectations too high, but also puts the Air Force in the dangerous position of promising more than it can deliver.

The AF continues to work to resolve the organizational restrictions to facilitate training and strives to reduce the PERSTEMPO of its forces. High deployment rates translate into the majority of Security Forces units continuing to post airmen in 12-hour shifts. Contracted and then civilianized entry control and pass and registration functions are intended to lighten the home-station requirements. Security Forces training requirements continue to expand as the Air Force continues to add tasks and requirements. Regional training and Army-run JET training have continued to improve, expanding in scope, intensity, and realism. As a result, the most highly trained Security Forces members are deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq and performing tremendously. Security Forces have risen to the challenge of increased missions and responsibilities.

The force remains stretched thin, and increased deployments have compounded the retention challenges. Security Forces have been able to meet posting and deployment requirements through heavy reliance on the ArNG, ARC, and contractors. This dependence, however, is unsustainable without continued organizational changes. The temporary funding solutions that provide the basis for augmentation are not included in the permanent budget. The CMS provides for increased manpower authorization based on AEF deployers, but until the positions are fully funded and billets filled with airmen, Security Forces will continue to face challenges in meeting the demands placed upon them (see Table 5).

Lt Col Brown posits that the 820th SFG placed the Air Force in its highest state of AEF readiness in the history of airpower, but air base defense operational and tactical doctrine remained incomplete in providing an effective framework for effective force protection to our deployed assets. In fact, the increased deployments following the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have further compounded Security Forces’ challenges. In addition to the traditional force protection mission that had been developed over the previous decades, senior AF leaders emphasized the joint commitment to the conflicts, and Security Forces began assuming non-traditional and increased traditional roles.

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Aside from the normal ITW operations that had been the hallmark of the force, Security Forces units have increasingly assumed an OTW responsibility. TF 1041 was an effective proof of concept showing the capabilities of Security Forces to assume greater offensive roles.
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<td>Increased tempo</td>
<td>Surge</td>
<td>Average: 1335 airmen</td>
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EMERGING ENVIRONMENT

_SF has evolved to a versatile force, going ‘outside the wire’ and taking on an offensive role. We now have the opportunity to show ourselves and the world why we are the best and most professional force in the world._

Technical Sergeant Aaron Otte
Then deployed to Uzbekistan

“One thing that is clear is that, going forward, the distinction between high-end and low-end war, between mechanized battles and stability operations, are [sic] blurring to the point where the old definitions of conventional and unconventional are no longer useful. War in the future will often be a hybrid blend of tactics.”

Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense
Air War College Brief, 15 Apr 09

Air Force Security Forces have undergone significant changes in the past two decades. Some recent assessments of the force have proposed Security Forces can continue to transform, and take on new missions. In his 2006 School of Advanced Air and Space Studies thesis, Major Glenn Palmer proposes Security Forces should assume the offensive OTW role demonstrated by TF 1041. That same year, Security Force OTW operations at Joint Base Balad showed the force’s capacity to effectively assume this newest mission.

Other authors have proposed that Security Forces can assume additional missions beyond the OTW mission, and recommend adding a counterinsurgency (COIN) capability to the Security Forces mission set. Maj D.T. Young and Maj Ronald Gray, in their 2005 and 2006 Naval Postgraduate School theses, conclude that Security Forces has the capability of assuming this new capability, and outline specific tenets (Young) and tactics (Gray) that would enable successful integration. In his 2008 Air Command and Staff College thesis Maj Chris Bromen addresses some of the training requirements needed to execute Young’s new ABD/COIN construct.

Security Forces has proven to be a versatile, effective force, providing traditional support at home station and deployed bases as well as non-traditional support to US Army missions. Additionally, what were formerly considered traditional deployment
missions have expanded to include more robust responsibilities including OTW operations. As the US enters its eighth year of the war in Afghanistan, and its seventh year in Iraq, Security Forces may be called upon to continue its transformation and incorporate additional core capabilities. While recent academic discussions have concluded Security Forces can assume the COIN mission, none have fully measured the costs of doing so.

**Mission**

Security Forces have demonstrated the ability to perform a significant number of missions. Traditional Security Forces missions such as law and order (provost) and base defense have been constant since the career field’s inception as the police force of the Air Force. Other missions have emerged, evolved, and continued to change in response to a changing environment.

To address these changes, Security Forces have devoted significant intellectual resources to crafting the edifice to maintain current missions and prepare for new ones. The newest Headquarters Air Force Security Forces *Master Action Plan 2010-2015* delineates the Security Forces missions, which are to:

- Secure, protect, and defend Air Force nuclear assets, other weapons systems, personnel and resources.
- Provide the Expeditionary Air Force with an effective, balanced mix of Security Operations and Air Provost Services.
- Execute effective policy and programming for integrated base defense, antiterrorism, Air Provost, combat arms, corrections, and the DoD Military Working Dog (MWD) Program.1

This newest Master Action Plan affirms Security Forces commitment to the two primary capabilities and the administrative functions required to facilitate them: security and law enforcement at home station, as well at deployed locations. Deployed security operations includes traditional ABD (ITW) operations as well as the newest OTW mission.

Security Forces have also simplified its approach to protecting assets and people. The consolidation of AFPD 31-1, *Physical Security*, and AFPD 31-3 *Air Base Defense* into AFPD 31-1 *Integrated Defense* (ID) establishes the framework for how Security

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Forces must approach these stated missions. The ID construct effectively directs the force to take the same basic approach to security, defense, and resource protection within the CONUS as well as OCONUS and deployed bases. Commanders first determine asset criticality, level of threat, and vulnerability; they then develop an integrated defense plan that provides a level of security commensurate with his/her determined acceptable level of risk. While the specific techniques or measures used will differ from CONUS to OCONUS to deployed air bases, the process for developing the integrated defense plan (IDP) will remain largely the same.

The net effect of these changes is that Security Forces have shown great effectiveness in providing Security Operations and Air Provost Services to the Expeditionary Air Force. The Air Provost mission largely consists of transferring home station law enforcement to a deployed environment and capitalizes on long standing Security Forces core competencies. After the dramatic Security Forces transformation in 1997, the security operations component largely follows the same model, relying on core base defense and security competencies, only applying them to a contingency environment. The efficiencies gained by capitalizing on core Security Forces competencies certainly hold true in the permissive environments that much of the Air Force in the Gulf States faces. Within the boundaries of Iraq and Afghanistan, however, Security Forces have evolved to provide non-traditional capabilities. At a joint base like Balad AB, Iraq, the Air Force maintains responsibility for security within the BSZ. This means Security Forces must ensure protection of personnel and resources within the base perimeter, but also influence events outside the base perimeter but within the boundary of the BSZ. Current OTW operations foster this influence around the base, and the close integration of Security Forces with other units operating within and around the BSZ maximize the effectiveness of operations.

Security Forces have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to take on new, traditionally non-Security Forces missions. For example, highly trained 820th SFG members initially assumed the Tactical Security Element (TSE) missions in support of OSI; however these missions have been transitioned into the mix of Air Force-owned Security Force taskings. The successful execution of these challenging missions shows

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2 Lt Col Craig Allton, AF/A7SO, In discussion with author, 5 May, 2009.
“the defender with the right training solution can do those non-traditional missions. We have a capable, versatile force.”\(^3\) This expectation can lead to mission creep; however, if a force is flexible and capable enough to accomplish non-traditional tasks well, it is often perceived that they must be suited for and capable of expanding into other areas as well.

Col Spacy designed TF 1041 “Operation Desert Safeside,” based upon the premise that “the only way to stop the enemy from attacking our air bases was to go out and kill or capture him and take his weapons.”\(^4\) Effective COIN operations, however, incorporate more than just the ability to kill the enemy. As examined above, Security Forces are trained and equipped to accomplish the OTW mission, including offensive combat operations that entail engaging the enemy. If Security Forces are going to execute COIN operations, they also need to conduct non-combat operations in order to win hearts and minds of the populace. Security Forces have the capability to conduct COIN operations, provided the airmen receive the proper resources and training.

While an in-depth analysis of COIN is beyond the scope of this paper, a few observations are in order. David Galula states in *Counterinsurgency Warfare* that defeating an insurgency cannot be achieved solely with the destruction of their forces and political organization. Rather, it is that destruction, “plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population.”\(^5\) The government forces must provide security and stability to the population. Only after it has gained control of the political battlespace may the government finally defeat the insurgency.

There are many models of counterinsurgency. David Kilcullen’s Security Components construct (Figure 6), graphically shows the prominent role civil authorities and police play in counterinsurgent operations. Gordon McCormick’s unpublished Mystic Diamond,\(^6\) similarly depicts the importance of controlling the political battlespace

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\(^3\) Lt Col James C. Lowe, USAFCENT/FPD, In discussion with author, 4 February 2009.
\(^6\) McCormick, an instructor at NPS, teaches his as-yet unpublished model of unconventional warfare which he calls “the Mystic Diamond.” This model is explored in print in Major David T. Young, *Applying*
from which an insurgency operates with and through the support of the local populace. As can be seen by the construct at Figure 6, Security Forces have many capabilities to add to this effort. Successful OTW operations such as TF 1041 and ongoing efforts at JBB illustrate the capabilities of the force to maintain a local presence, interact with and foster positive relations with the populace, and isolate the insurgents. Current Security Forces’ core competencies provide the capabilities to support all levels of Kilcullen’s model, by taking direct action as well as providing support to local authorities.

![Figure 6. Security Components in Iraq 2007](image-url)

Source: Reprinted from Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency in Iraq.”

In his 2005 Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Maj David Young presents a new framework under which Security Forces could assume a counterinsurgency mission. In doing so, he defines three centers of gravity (COG) in an air environment. First, the insurgent’s COG is the population, who likely judge successful attacks against an air base as a sign of insurgent strength or US weakness. Second, the US strategic COG is the American public, who similarly view the ability of the US to minimize attacks and casualties as measures of success. Finally the US operational COG is the air base itself, which enables the projection of airpower. Security Forces could influence these COGs in a COIN environment, by providing security in and around the air base. Successfully

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7 Young, *Applying Counterinsurgency Theory to Air Base Defense*, 20.
defending the BSZ and defeating insurgents operating in the area successfully strengthen US presence, reassure the American public, and facilitate ongoing air operations.

An anecdote illustrates how the Air Force approach to presence patrols can produce the needed results. Instead of a “four-vehicle convoy moving at 25-50 miles an hour” through an area that is the typical Army approach, the Air Force (illustrated during TF 1041) conducts dismounted patrols, interacting at a personal level with the populace. This difference in approach led to Young’s anecdotal conversation between local children outside Balad and members of TF 1041 in which the children called the Army “the enemy,” but viewed the Air Force Security Forces as their friends. Young concludes Security Forces can execute COIN operations by incorporating five new principles of ABD: Act First, Unity of Effort, Protection, Penetration, and Perseverance. These principles ensure friendly forces’ freedom of action in the air base’s “physical, informational, and moral realms” and deny the insurgent’s freedom of action therein.

Security Forces have many skills that enable them to conduct COIN. Security Forces are trained in standard police operations; however, the “Air Force does not view those skills as useful in the base defense role.” In fact, those very skills provide the foundation for Security Forces to conduct COIN operations. RAND analyst Alan Vick has stated that, “there may be little that the USAF can do to affect an adversary’s means or motivation for attacking its bases, but it can try to reduce the enemy’s opportunity to do so.’ The community policing and force protection skills that Security Forces have developed enable them to operate effectively within a community, both within an airbase, or outside its confines. As TF 1041 and ongoing operations at JBB indicate, effective security is best achieved with close interaction between the military, the local police forces, and the public. By working with local authorities to protect the public “against the acts of the insurgents, criminals, critical or dangerous incidents, etc, will the state’s

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8 Young, Applying Counterinsurgency Theory to Air Base Defense, 23.
9 Young, Applying Counterinsurgency Theory to Air Base Defense, 93.
10 Young, Applying Counterinsurgency Theory to Air Base Defense, 103; AF IBD objectives See First, Understand First, and Act First are discussed in greater depth in AFTTP 3-10.1
11 Young, Applying Counterinsurgency Theory to Air Base Defense, 26.
forces look strong, supportive of the public, and dominate the moral high ground.”13 This ability to maintain a presence and interact with local authorities highlights Security Forces’ greatest capability to perform aspects of the COIN mission, and while current operations execute some of these tasks, they fall short of concerted COIN efforts.

Expanding Security Forces’ missions to include COIN operations capitalizes on some of the force’s current core capabilities. However, to assume COIN operations fully, Security Forces face additional challenges. First, to build cohesive relationships with a local population, a force must maintain persistent contact with them. The majority of Security Forces deploy in 179-day rotations, and while this clearly provides more consistency than a shorter rotation, is hardly sufficient for establishing the trust and confidence required for COIN operations. Thus, rotation length would need to increase to maintain the presence needed for success in COIN. Second, the force also faces training challenges in incorporation COIN as a new capability, which will be addressed in the training section below.

Organization

Security Forces evolved dramatically after the attack on Khobar Towers in 1996, with the most notable changes revolving around the merger of the security and law enforcement career fields and the increased focus on force protection. Since then, the Air Force has struggled to balance home station security and provost requirements with the need to provide trained, deployable forces to the combatant commanders in support of contingency operations. After 9/11, Security Forces were able to deploy large numbers of airmen with the augmentation of ANG, ArNG, and AFR personnel. The initial surge transformed into a steady state deployment rotation, and the Air Force continues to struggle with how to alleviate the pressure on an Air Force-designated “stressed” career field while providing the needed capabilities to the warfighter. If Security Force missions are to expand, either by increasing the number of USAF-owned joint bases, or by adding COIN as a new core competency, the force must increase the available number of airmen available to support new missions. One of two things needs to happen: increase the

13 Young, Counterinsurgency Theory to Air Base Defense, 72.
number of Security Forces airmen available to deploy (supply) or reduce the current
tasking requirements currently supported (demand).

**Increasing Supply**

In order to increase the supply side of the equation, one (or more) of three things
needs to happen. First, increase the overall number of Security Forces; second, increase
the number of airmen available to deploy; or third, increase ARC deployment taskings.

The MAJCOM Alibi Pyramid (Chapter 2, Figure 4, p. 27) illustrates how Security
Forces must adapt to support expanded mission requirements. Of the 23,710 forces
authorized, and 22,751 assigned, only 7,989 are available to deploy. First, assuming the
number of airmen unavailable for deployment (14,762) will remain constant for the
foreseeable future, an increase to the total number of forces assigned to Security Forces
would lead to a direct increase in the number of forces available to support the
deployment mission, either to ease the burden of the current PERSTEMPO, or to enable
an expansion of Security Forces missions as discussed above. The Security Forces
Capabilities-based Manpower Standard (CMS) published in 2007 demonstrated an
acknowledgement of the need to include deployments as a key component in the
manpower allocation for Security Forces, and recommends an increase in Security Forces
manpower. While the CMS serves as the first steps toward resolving the manpower
deficiencies, a gap remains in deployment requirements and manpower assigned. With
current budget restrictions and force structure constraints, additional increases in force
end strength are extremely unlikely.  

Second, assuming force end strength is likely to remain constant, the only way to
free up additional forces for deployment is make additional airmen available to deploy by
reducing the total number of fenced positions that cannot deploy. Reducing the number
of non-deployable alibis would entail addressing each level of the alibi pyramid
(Chapter 2, Figure 4, p. 27). There are three primary areas from which alibis could be
recouped. MAJCOM/CCs could accept additional risk by reducing the number of
Security Forces posted on an installation and replacing active duty forces with contracted
or government civilian personnel. Next, Combatant Command commanders

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14 Author’s conclusion based on discussions with several action officers at AF/A7S between Sep 08 and
May 09.
(COCOM/CC) could release fenced forces currently unavailable for deployment. Finally, the Air Force could release Security Forces from the special duty assignments levied upon them.

While appealing as a solution to deployment shortages, the reduction of alibis is problematic. While the single largest category of alibis might appear to represent a large pool of airmen that could be made available, the recent Air Force nuclear surety mishaps and string of Nuclear Surety Inspection failures make it likely the assigned to protect nuclear forces will remain untouchable. COCOM assigned forces (TRANSCOM-assigned Ravens and SOCOM PEC forces) already deploy in significant numbers, but because they do not support Air Force missions, they are not computed into the total of Security Forces airmen available to deploy. Finally, owning MAJCOMs are not likely to quickly surrender the quick reaction force capability provided by the Contingency Response Groups. As discussed below in the training section, expanding the Security Forces core competencies to facilitate COIN operations will entail a greater training requirement; reducing instructor capabilities while endeavoring to increase training is incompatible. Those airmen in the “Not Available” category range from those that have recently been reassigned, are pending separation or retirement, are medically non-deployable, etc. While the exact number might fluctuate, the Not Available category cannot be reduced by assuming risk or other creative techniques. The last category unlikely to be reduced is the short tour billets. Because most of these are one-year assignments, to deploy an airmen for six months of that, in addition to the two-to-three months of pre-deployment training, effectively eliminates their mission effectiveness for the duration of their tour. Therefore, the likely category from which to glean additional airmen is the Non-Security Forces Billet category. These positions include Security Forces assigned to the Air Force Intelligence Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) Agency, Air Force Elements, and various staff positions. Recent efforts from Brigadier General Hertog, Air Force Director of Security Forces, called “Return to the Core” have already endeavored to reduce these numbers, and Phase I has netted 300 additional deployable airmen.\textsuperscript{15} Assuming a 1:1 dwell for these forces, this enables Security Forces

\textsuperscript{15} Gillespie, in discussion with author, multiple dates.
to deploy an additional 150 airmen every 6 months.\textsuperscript{16} Continuing efforts may yield additional results, but if manpower remains a zero sum game, any effort to strip these airmen from other authorized billets will continue to meet with resistance.

The third mechanism that could provide additional forces for deployment is mobilizing the ARC at a higher rate; however, any increase brings additional challenges. As of May 2009, ARC Security Forces are already in the High Risk Category of Tempo Band N, and an increased deployment rate would be even more strenuous and into a category not established for the ARC under the current Tempo Band system (see Chapter 2, Figure 5, p. 28). If the ARC were tasked at a 1:3 level vice the 1:4 current tasking, an additional 300 airmen would be available for deployment. This would free up 75 airmen for each of the four deployment periods in a 1:3 cycle.\textsuperscript{17} The recent Air Staff proposal to increase the already strenuously tasked force was met with significant resistance as an unsustainable option.\textsuperscript{18}

None of choices individually offers a solution, and even a combination of alibi reductions and increased reliance on ARC forces is unlikely to widen the deployment pool sufficiently to enable Security Forces to assume new missions such as COIN. As discussed above, belt tightening in these two areas would likely provide approximately 250 additional airmen for each deployment cycle. This number represents less than 10 percent of Security Forces manpower needs for each deployment cycle, hardly a staggering increase (see Deployment section). Increased civilianization of Security Forces units will decrease the burden on Security Forces units, but will not significantly expand the overall pool of deployable airmen. While Security Forces will continued its evolution into an increasingly hybrid organization comprised of both military and AF civilian personnel, even creative utilization of the ARC and efforts to tap into the current group of fenced forces will produce limited results. The Director, Security Forces’ strategy is to pursue additional, permanent DoD civilians in patrol, entry control, and

\textsuperscript{16} Assuming a 1:1 BOG-Dwell, with 2 deployment periods.
\textsuperscript{17} 1:3 BOG-Dwell means for every cycle deployed, the member (or team) would spend three cycles non-deployed. Gillespie, in discussion with author, multiple dates.
\textsuperscript{18} Gillespie, in discussion with author, multiple dates.
management positions, increased reliance on ARC forces, and expanded use of force protection and security technologies.\textsuperscript{19}

**Decreasing Demand**

As increasing the supply of airmen available for deployment looks bleak, decreasing the demand for deployed Security Forces is the second option for facilitating mission expansion. Demand could be reduced in three primary areas: changing the configuration of some security teams deploying into the Gulf States by adding a security force-led, but any AFSC-supported, Unit Type Code (UTC); reducing or eliminating JET taskings; and relieving Security Forces from the “any AFSC” taskings.

First, Security Forces Director has proposed the introduction of a new deployment UTC. The new team, designated UTC QFEZU,” mirrors the traditional Security Forces 13-person squad. Instead of 13 Security Forces airmen, the new QFEZU team would be comprised of four Security Forces members and nine airmen from other AFSCs. These teams are designed to replace Security Forces currently tasked in support of CENTAF missions in the Gulf States, and enable those forces to perform more demanding missions within Iraq and Afghanistan requiring core Security Forces members. The QFEZU teams would be tasked to provide entry control, vehicle search, weapons system security, base patrol, perimeter defensive, as well as pass and visitor control. Fully activating the QFEZU concept would free approximately 350 Security Forces from current taskings, allowing them to be tasked to fill “more demanding combat related” duties.\textsuperscript{20}

The second demand reduction measure would be to decrease or eliminate the number of Security Forces tasked to support JET missions. This reduction could be an Air Force reduction of JET support, or a shifting of tasked career fields away from Security Forces to other specialties. As of May 1, 2009, Security Forces filled 1,027 JET taskings, nearly 25 percent of the total force deployed. If large numbers of Security Forces airmen were relieved of these duties, they could be deployed to fill core Air Force taskings, to include expansion into COIN operations.

\textsuperscript{20} Lt Col Bryan Gillespie, AF/A7SX, “CPEC Concept and QFEZU Update,” PowerPoint briefing, 16 Apr 09.
The final measure to reduce the demand on Security Forces would be to relieve them of the non-Security Forces specific taskings, or those allotted to “any AFSC.” Much like special duty jobs that draw significant number of airmen for non-Security Forces assignments, these “any AFSC” deployments take experienced Security Forces away from their primary duties and task them with general theater responsibilities. One of the largest sources of any AFSC taskings is in support of Third Country National (TCN) escort duties. The Air Force has acknowledged the stress on high demand career fields such as Security Forces, and the next version of AFI 10-401 will direct that AFSCs falling into Tempo Bands D and E will be exempt from TCN Escort taskings.²¹ Codifying all “any AFSC” taskings in this manner will ensure that the heavily tasked Security Forces can deploy in support of traditional Security Forces or emerging missions such as COIN.

Security Forces are currently deploying in significant numbers. COIN operations would increase the number of Security Forces required within the theater of operations, and further expansion of Security Forces missions without resolving the supply versus demand conflict is to posture the force to fail. The supply side of the force is greatly constrained. As examined above, the force is unlikely to expand significantly. Reducing the number of MAJCOM alibis only frees a modest number of forces for deployments. Finally, the force currently relies on an already heavily-tasked ARC, and even a more strenuous ARC mobilization tempo yields limited numbers of forces. The most effective mechanism for freeing Security Forces for an emerging COIN mission is a combined approach to increasing the supply and reducing demand. The Air Force could increase the number of Security Forces by continuing the efforts started with the most recent CMS and “Return to Core” efforts. Additionally, the Air Force could reduce current demand by incorporating the QFEZU UTC, reducing the number of JET taskings, and excusing Security Forces from “any AFSC” taskings. Only with sufficient numbers of available forces could Security Forces assume a new COIN mission.

Deployments

US force presence in Iraq is declining in accordance with the President’s announcement of the termination of combat operations by summer 2010; however, increased numbers of US forces are deploying into Afghanistan. While specific numbers and bases remain classified, the announcement of an Afghanistan surge is not, nor is the corresponding rise in Security Forces deploying in support of OEF. Although Security Forces determined its “redline” ceiling for deployed personnel to be 4,200 airmen (including 800 ARC), immediate projections for the surge supporting OEF quickly drives deployment figures beyond that limit for the third time since the beginning of OIF (see Figure 7). Current deployment projection data shows no expected reductions in Security Forces deployments (see Table 6).

Figure 7. Security Forces Deployments with Projections
Table 6. Projected Security Forces Taskings

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<td>Sep 09</td>
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<td>Oct 09</td>
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Training

For Security Forces to effectively accomplish new and emerging missions such as COIN, the current training must be expanded dramatically to meet the new requirements. This expanded training must include basic technical training, ongoing unit-run training, and pre-deployment regional training. In his 2008 Air Command and Staff College thesis, Maj Chris Bromen addresses training requirements needed for Security Forces to execute an expanded COIN capability. Although he specifically links his training structure with Young’s new ABD/COIN construct, his basic tenets can be applied to any of the COIN models mentioned above.

First, Bromen concludes Security Forces must incorporate COIN theory into Air Force formal training for the individual airman: “COIN theory must be trained at the lowest level, because the lowest level is where Young’s new Principles will be implemented.” While emphasis on general warrior skills has increased during Basic Military Training (BMT) and commissioning programs, additional COIN theory must be incorporated into Security Forces technical training for both officers and enlisted, home station recurring training, and pre-deployment regional training center curriculum. This training will develop airmen’s capabilities to collect intelligence, interact with the local population, and enable greater understanding of how second order effects of their actions can help or harm higher objectives.

Second, Security Forces needs increased foreign language proficiency. “Having the ability to communicate with indigenous forces and the local populations is essential for every one of Young’s Principles.” The Defense Language Institute (DLI) provides in-depth language immersion courses, producing officers and enlisted members fluent in 23 different languages and several dialects. These programs can entail up to several years of study and are costly. This immersion is prohibitive in both time and resources, and is thus not appropriate for every Security Forces member; however, basic language familiarity could be incorporated into an RTC as part of the airman’s predeployment training. Because RTCs have been tailored to meet the needs of specific deployment locations, each course could incorporate particular language skills instruction.

Third, Bromen asserts Security Forces need to develop cultural proficiency. While he acknowledges it would be impossible to train every airmen on every culture in every region to which they might deploy, it would be possible to focus training on specific areas. This training could be incorporated into all levels of training, beginning with Basic Military Training (BMT), Officer Training School (OTS), Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), and USAF Academy, providing airmen general cultural awareness and understanding. The Air Forces’ Cross Cultural Competency (3C) program is intended to teach airmen “the ability to quickly and accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively act, to achieve the desired effect in a culturally complex environment—without necessarily having prior exposure to a particular group, region or language.” Additionally, the Air Force could capitalize on and expand existing capabilities. Many deploying airmen attend the Middle Eastern Orientation Course (MEOC), conducted by the United States Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field in Florida. While MEOC is currently designed for Special Operations Forces personnel currently serving or en route to the Middle East region, it accepts others and could be used as a baseline for expanded pre-deployment training, possibly incorporated into the location-specific pre-deployment RTC.

23 Bromen, Security Forces Skills for Counterinsurgency Theory, 22.
24 Air Force Culture and Language Center (AFCLC), Information brochure, Maxwell AFB, AL. undated.
Bromen identifies the final requirement as better training in the intelligence cycle, including the understanding of “how to apply and fuse the [intelligence] products.”

This is perhaps the most difficult of the training components required for an expanded Security Forces mission. Bromen therefore proposes a mix of training Security Forces airmen to be able to incorporate basic intelligence principles into their daily operations and adding increased numbers of intelligence specialists, who attend extensive specialized training and take years to become proficient in their core tasks, to Security Forces units when they deploy.

Although not included in Bromen’s construct, a fifth requirement must be included as part of the COIN training requirement. An integral component of COIN operations is the ability to relinquish law enforcement responsibility to the local force when it is ready to assume these responsibilities. “The goal in COIN operations is to turn over law enforcement functions to a capable and legitimate host nation police force in which they assume the lead the military supports as required.”

Galula concluded that British success in Malaya was due in great part to emphasis on law enforcement operations, with the military serving in a subordinate, supporting role. In Kilcullen’s model, the military serves as a supporting force in the Counterterrorism and Peacekeeping/Enforcement stages. Police, on the other hand, serve as lead during the Peacekeeping/Enforcement stage, and support civil or intelligence authorities in the other three (Chapter 2, Figure 6, p. 38). Regardless of the specific model, experts agree civilian law enforcement is a critical component of COIN success. While Security Forces currently maintain capable instructors throughout the force, it must ensure any COIN core competencies include provisions to train the host nation force. Incorporating a mobile training team capability into the COIN structure must be designed to train the local forces to first partner with Security Forces and then assume primary responsibility for stability and law enforcement operations.

COIN operations require significant additions to the Air Force training programs. While likely not exhaustive, Bromen’s training requirements lay the foundation for

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Security Forces COIN capabilities. Security Forces will need increased training on COIN theory, foreign language skills, cultural awareness and the intelligence cycle, in addition to maintaining the capability of developing a competent, professional local police and security force. If Security Forces are given the COIN mission, further analysis would be required to determine the exact training requirements at all levels. A few observations are clear, however. These skills need to be incorporated into Air Force training at all levels: initial military training curricula, technical schools, and advanced Security Forces training courses and home station requirements. Moreover, Security Forces have done well to adapt the pre-deployment RTC training to site-specific training curriculums. By endeavoring to join up teams from different bases to go through the same training course not only builds team cohesion, but also establishes an expected training baseline for that team. To add COIN operations as a core capability, these pre-deployment RTCs must increase in length to incorporate additional requirements; expanding on the core skills Security Forces need to receive at the initial and continuation training points in their careers. But RTC pre-deployment comes at a cost in time away from home station and funding.

Conclusion

“The USAF base defense forces already have the right foundation [for COIN operations] because they can act like a cop while thinking like a cop but can also act like an infantryman while still thinking like a cop. This policeman’s attitude allows the defense force to see and interdict problems in the community, apply practical solutions, seek out dealing with the population, and not be frustrated by the restraints of Rules of Engagement...”

- Maj D. T. Young

*Applying Counterinsurgency Theory to ABD*

Security Forces have demonstrated expanded capabilities with successful OTW operations at JBB and elsewhere. If called upon to execute more robust COIN operations as part of a core capability, Security Forces must evolve again. One key step is to establish a more rigorous training and manning foundation for expanded COIN operations. Security Forces have the basic skill set from which COIN capabilities could
be built. As Young, Gray, Engel, and Palmer examine in their theses, Security Forces could embrace a new doctrinal framework, but such an expansion of core capabilities will require the types of training and skills examined by Bromen.

The second piece of the mission expansion is restructuring the organization and increasing Security Forces manning to create a larger pool of deployable airmen. To levy additional tasks upon an already overstressed career field is likely to truly break the force. Already projected to crest the deployment redline, Security Forces would not be able to sustain additional COIN taskings without a correlating expansion of deployable manpower. While reducing the pool of non-deployable forces and increasing the tempo of the ARC would produce a limited number of additional deployers, the manpower deficit must be met by other measures. Civilianization and continued re-evaluation of the manpower standards will contribute to the force’s capabilities, but without significant additions, the already heavily tasked force is unlikely to be able to assume more responsibility and missions.

Finally, significant levels of funding would be required to effectively equip an expanded force, and support development of required training capabilities. Although the Security Forces technical training extended its curriculum after 9/11, further expansion would be required to prepare Security Forces to execute the COIN mission effectively.

Security Forces personnel will likely continue to deploy at significant levels for the foreseeable future. An expansion of mission to include COIN in support of the joint fight only highlights the value and flexibility of USAF Security Forces, and may come to prove the old adage “the reward for excellence is more responsibility.” While Security Forces may be able to adapt to new requirements, the Air Force must resolve the organizational, training, and funding challenges that accompany the new mission. The Air Force must learn from the challenges faced during previous evolutions of Security Forces to ensure any new missions are properly organized and funded (see Table 7). If Security Force is to assume the COIN mission, the Air Force must answer the following questions: where do we get the personnel, how do we restructure the training, how do we fund the new requirements, and how do we prepare for unforeseen challenges? This paper has endeavored to show that Security Forces are a capable, versatile force as well as lay the foundation for further study to examine these questions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7. Security Forces Transformation Matrix</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mission Focus</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-Khobar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITW/ABD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
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| **Organization** |
| Separate Security & Law Enforcement career fields |
| Pre-Khobar | Post-Khobar | Post 9/11 | The Future |
| Separate Security & Law Enforcement career fields | Consolidated career field | Consolidated career field | Consolidated career field |
| Home station | Home station | Home station | Home station |
| Security | Security | Security | Security |
| ITW/ABD | ITW/ABD | ITW/ABD | ITW/ABD |
| Force Protection | Force Protection | ILO/JET | Force Protection |
| | | OTW | ILO/JET |
| | | | OTW |
| | | | COIN/IW |
| 820th SFG | 820th SFG | 820th SFG | 820th SFG |
| FP Battlelab | FP Battlelab | FP Battlelab | FP Battlelab |
| Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians | Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians | Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians | Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians |
| Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians | Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians | Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians | Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians |
| Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians | Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians | Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians | Reliance on ArNG, ARCv, Contract guards, civilians |

| **Deployments** |
| Pre-Khobar | Post-Khobar | Post 9/11 | The Future |
| Pre-Khobar | Post-Khobar | Post 9/11 | The Future |
| Steady-state AEF | Increased tempo | Surge | Increased Surge |
| Average: 1335 airmen | Average 3,500 airmen | Average ?? 1:1 Dwell | Average ?? 1:1 Dwell |

| **Training** |
| Separate Tech Schools | Combined tech schools, inc ABD | Expanded tech schools, inc ABD | Expanded tech schools, inc ABD |
| Limited ABD slots | 3 yr RTC req | 3 yr RTC req/focused Army-run JET tng | 3 yr RTC req/focused AF-run tng |
| Separate Tech Schools | Combined tech schools, inc ABD | Expanded tech schools, inc ABD | Expanded tech schools, inc ABD |
| Limited ABD slots | 3 yr RTC req | 3 yr RTC req/focused Army-run JET tng | 3 yr RTC req/focused AF-run tng |
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| Limited ABD slots | 3 yr RTC req | 3 yr RTC req/focused Army-run JET tng | 3 yr RTC req/focused AF-run tng |

| **Challenges** |
| Pre-Khobar | Post-Khobar | Post 9/11 | The Future |
| Pre-Khobar | Post-Khobar | Post 9/11 | The Future |
| Capability to protect force | Airmen skills too thin | Airmen skills too thin | Potential for the same challenges as previous periods if not addressed |
| Reduced Manning/ Increased taskings forced 12-hr shifts | Retention | Retention | Retention |
| Retention | Ad hoc fixes | Temp $ solutions | Ad hoc fixes |
| Culture change—defenders vs. cops | | | |
| Culture change—defenders vs. cops | | | |
CONCLUSION

Security Forces have transformed dramatically from the military police force of the US Army Air Corps to the contemporary security and provost force of the modern Air Force. During their existence, the United States Air Force’s law enforcement and security branch has transformed numerous times, both in name and responsibility. Security Forces have shown the capability to evolve in response to external threats to the Air Force, and continues to assume additional responsibilities and perform more diverse missions. The most recent transformations driven by the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia and the attacks of 9/11 dramatically changed Security Forces missions, organizational structure, deployment, and training requirements.

Security Forces have responded to meet emerging challenges. The Cold War mentality yielded to a focus on air base defense, which in turn morphed into a more comprehensive emphasis on force protection. With the global war on terror, some propose that Security Forces should again expand their mission set. Successful offensive operations, with TF 1041 and OTW operations at joint bases like Balad AB, have proven the force is capable, versatile, and can successfully execute new missions. Some view COIN operations as the next logical next step for Security Forces. Successful COIN entails maintaining a presence within a community and fostering positive relations with citizens, while isolating insurgents and terrorists. Security Forces have already demonstrated the ability to operate successfully outside an air base and build relations with the local populace. Security Forces have also demonstrated the ability to assume and execute new missions with great success. Successes bring new costs, however, and the Air Force must be prepared to pay the higher price of increased demand on Security Forces.

This thesis addressed the question, “Can Security Forces assume the COIN mission; if so, what challenges must the force overcome and what changes must it enact to be effective?” Yes, Security Forces can assume these new missions. Any such expansion must account for the lessons learned from the recent evolutionary periods of USAF Security Police/Security Forces and the Air Force’s emphasis on air base defense and force protection can be brought forward to the next stage of proposed transformation.
to COIN operations. After the attack on Khobar Towers, Security Forces changed its organization to reflect a new focus on ABD and force protection, developing new, innovative methods of protecting Air Force personnel, aircraft, and other resources. Security requirements at deployed locations increased, which drove higher deployments for the force. Finally, Security Forces adapted its technical training, and trained all airmen on security, law enforcement, and ABD operations. This increased number of tasks led to a force of airmen spread thin; it reduced the proficiency previously gained by airmen specializing in security or law enforcement.

After the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Security Forces changed it focus once again. The forward locations of US air bases in both countries, and the dramatically increased operations tempo of US forces, but especially USAF Security Forces drove significant changes in manning, training, equipment, and concepts of operation. After the 2001 and 2003 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Security Forces were tasked to expand on the traditional ABD construct, largely comprised of ITW operations and assume non-traditional mission. These included both ILO/JET missions in support of the US Army, as well as OTW operations at bases supporting multiple services. While Security Forces organizational structure did not change significantly, deployments surged tremendously, as did pre-deployment training requirements. Security Forces perform these missions admirably, but continue to face challenges in maintaining the force, both in terms of sustaining high deployment tempo, and ensuring airmen receive vital training in traditional and emerging mission sets.

In order to support a new mission such as COIN operations, Security Forces must again transform organizationally. Security Forces must solve the problem of increasing already high rates of deployment by resolving the inherent supply versus demand conflict. Continued reliance on the ARC, increasing dependence on contract or civilian personnel, or increasing the size of the force will address the supply side. Demand factors can be reduced in part by changing team composition or reducing JET deployments.

Assuming the COIN mission will also drive additional training requirements. Deploying airmen must be given the tools to be successful, and Air Force training must incorporate additional training into the military training curricula. Basic military
training, Security Forces technical schools, and advanced courses and RTCs must all expand to include COIN theory, foreign language familiarity, cultural proficiency, intelligence fusing, and law enforcement and security transition training. These additional training requirements must be paid for: more instructors adding to the non-deployable alibi pyramid, increased training time away from home station for deploying airmen, and increased funding requirements for the training itself.

Security Forces have shown the flexibility and capabilities to assume new missions, and could incorporate a COIN operations capability. Security Forces have taken on new, more demanding missions throughout its history and performed them admirably. It is clear, however, that Security Forces cannot meet the expected standards of the Air Force or the nation without proper manning, training, or equipping. Our senior leaders must be careful what they ask of our Security Forces. Air Force Defenders will do what leaders ask, but the service must be prepared to pay the cost.
APPENDIX A: JOINT SECURITY AGREEMENT (JSA) 8

Department of the Army
Headquarters, US Army
Washington, D.C.

Department of the Air Force
Headquarters, US Air Force
Washington, D.C.

25 April 1985

JOINT SERVICE AGREEMENT
USA – USAF AGREEMENT FOR THE
GROUND DEFENSE OF
AIR FORCE BASES AND INSTALLATIONS

This Agreement sets policies for the Departments of
the Army and the Air Force for the ground defense of Air
Force bases and installations.

The policies set forth in this Agreement will be used
to guide appropriate Army and Air Force regulations,
manuals, publications, and curricula. This Agreement also
serves as a basis for future development of joint doctrine
and supporting procedures for ground defense of Air Force
bases and installations. It recognizes the Army’s
fundamental role in land combat and the need to protect
the Air Force’s ability to generate and sustain air power
for joint airland combat operations. This Agreement is
effective immediately and shall remain in effect until
rescinded or superseded by mutual written agreement
between the Army and the Air Force. It will be reviewed
every two years.

JOHN W. WICKHAM, JR.
General,
United States Army
Chief of Staff

CHARLES A. GABRIEL
General,
United States Air Force
Chief of Staff

1 Atch
JOINT SERVICE AGREEMENT
ON
UNITED STATES ARMY - UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
GROUND DEFENSE OF
AIR FORCE BASES AND INSTALLATIONS

ARTICLE I
REFERENCES AND TERMS DEFINED

1. REFERENCES:


   b. JCS Pub 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 1984.


   e. AFR 206-2, Ground Defense of Main Operating Bases, Installations, and Activities, 22 September 1983.

   f. FM 90-14, Rear Battle, September 1984.

2. TERMS DEFINED:

General: The following terms form the basis for the remaining articles of this agreement.

   a. Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD): Local security measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify and reduce the effectiveness of enemy ground attack directed against USAF air bases and installations.
b. Base or Installation Boundary: Normally the dividing line between internal and external defense. The exact location of the dividing line is subject to minor deviation from the local base boundary on a case by case basis to accommodate local conditions. Such delineations should be incorporated into appropriate OPLANS.

c. Rear Battle: For the purpose of this Agreement, rear battle consists of those actions taken by all units (combat, combat support, combat service support, and host nation), singly or in joint effort, to secure the force, neutralize or defeat enemy forces in the rear area, and ensure freedom of action in the deep and close-in battles.

d. Base: A locality from which operations are projected or supported, or an area or locality containing installations that provide logistic or other mission support (JCS Pub 1).

e. Base Defense: The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base or installation so as to insure that the maximal capacity of its facilities is available to US forces (JCS Pub 1).

f. Installation: A grouping of facilities, located in the same vicinity, which support particular functions. Installations may be elements of a base (JCS Pub 1).

g. Level I Threat: Enemy activity characterized by enemy-controlled agent activity, sabotage by enemy sympathizers, and terrorism.

h. Level II Threat: Enemy activity characterized by diversionary and sabotage operations conducted by unconventional forces; raid, ambush, and reconnaissance operations conducted by combat units; and special mission or unconventional warfare (UW) missions.

i. Level III Threat: Enemy activity characterized by battalion size or larger heliborne operations, airborne operations, amphibious operations, ground force deliberate operations, and infiltration operations.
ARTICLE II

BACKGROUND

The references in Article I provide guidance to the Army and the Air Force on rear battle operations, including the ground defense of air bases and installations.

a. The Army has responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces for the conduct of sustained operations on land, specifically to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, secure, occupy, and defend land areas.

b. The Air Force base or installation commander is the officer responsible for the local ground defense of his base or installations (reference c). The forces of Services other than his own, assigned to his base or installation for the conduct of local ground defense, shall be under his operational control.

2. The Army has responsibility (reference d) for the provision of forces for ABGD operations outside designated Air Force base or installation boundaries.

3. Overseas, a variety of existing arrangements for ABGD are explicitly recognized by international agreements. In some countries, both within the NATO alliance and elsewhere, external ABGD is a host nation responsibility prescribed by status of forces agreements or separate negotiation. In other countries, responsibility is shared between the host nation and US Forces.

ARTICLE III

OBJECTIVE
The objective of this Agreement is to develop combat forces for ABGD to ensure Air Force sortie generation and missile launch capability. ABGD forces must be capable of:

a. Detecting and defeating Levels I and II attacks;

b. Delaying a Level III attack until the arrival of friendly tactical combat elements capable of defeating this level of attack.

ARTICLE IV

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Army and the Air Force will establish a Joint Air Base Ground Defense Working Group (JABGDWG). The tasks of the JABGDWG are to monitor, coordinate, examine, and report to the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans and the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations on the actions necessary to ensure the implementation of policies and preparation of forces for ABGD.

   a. The Army and the Air Forces will appoint co-chairmen for the JABGDWG. Support will be provided by functional staffs from the Departments of the Army and the Air Force, and by the appropriate subordinate commands.

   b. The JABGDWG will conduct a yearly review of ABGD requirements in time for joint recommendations to be made in July of each year prior to the initiation of the following DOD POM cycle. This review will recommend specific planning and programming actions designed to ensure mutual support for respective service programs.

2. The Army and the Air Force are jointly responsible for:

   a. Participating in the JABGDWG.

   b. Developing joint doctrine for rear battle, to include ABGD.
c. Coordinating proposed changes in ABGD concepts, doctrine, and force structure.

d. Ensuring the provisions of this Agreement are addressed appropriately in operational and contingency plans to avoid any security degradation.

3. The Army is responsible for providing forces for ABGD operations outside the boundaries of designated USAF bases and installations.

   a. When assigned the ABGD mission to counter the level I and level II threats to specific USAF bases or installations, Army forces will be under the operational control of those Air Force base or installation commanders.

   b. Within 90 days of approval of this Agreement, the Army will provide a transition plan to the JABG DWG for a time-phase transfer of responsibility for external ABGD. Transfer will start 1 October 1985.

   c. The Army will initiate, where feasible, requests for host nations to provide ABGD external to Air Force bases and installations (except as noted in paragraph 4f below).

   d. The Army will provide multi-source intelligence on enemy ground forces for Air Force threat assessments and tactical counterintelligence efforts.

4. The Air Force will provide for physical security and internal defense within the boundaries of its bases and installations.

   a. Air Force base and installation commanders are responsible for the local ground defense of their installations.

   b. As dictated by the threat, environment, and availability of Army or host nation forces provided for external defense, the Air Force, in coordinating with the local ground force commanders, may employ external safeguards to provide early warning and detection of, and reaction to, enemy threats to air bases and installations.
c. The Air Force will provide the command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) resources required by Air Force base and installation commanders to affect operational control of forces assigned to them for ground defense. C3I provided by both services in supporting rear battle operations will be interoperable.

d. The Air Force will lead in the collection of data and assessment of the overall threat to air bases and installations worldwide. It will retain the lead in Ground Combat Intelligence and Tactical Counterintelligence covering each ABDG area of influence, as defined in reference e.

e. The Air Force will submit requirements for ABDG to the Army, to include a list of locations to be defended, updated as required.

f. The Air Force will seek host nation commitment for ABDG in agreements relating to the use of Collocated Operating Bases (COBS) and Aerial Ports of Debarkation (APODs)

5. Army and Air Force delineations of responsibilities will not preclude the deployment of forces from either Service to support the other should the tactical situation dictate.


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