AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY

STRANGLING IRAN'S NUCLEAR AGENDA: A TARGETED
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PLAN

by
Kyle Allen Benwitz, Major, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr. Charles E. Costanzo

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
April 2009

Distribution A: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
After the 2002 surprise revelation of Iran’s underground uranium enrichment and nuclear enterprise, the United Nations and other organizations have fought to uncover the extent of the regime’s progress towards a complete fuel cycle. Minor diplomatic successes in 2003 abated Iran’s program for a few years until Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reinvigorated his nation’s drive towards self-sustaining nuclear energy independence. Time is running out as global agencies continue to shorten the estimate when the Islamic Republic of Iran will have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Short of using military force to disable Iran’s program, the global community must undertake a universally supported and implemented plan to bring the regime’s leadership to the negotiating table. By utilizing a strategic communication plan built on the interests, concerns, fears, and desires of the international community and Iran’s leadership, the United States can revive the significance of the uranium enrichment situation and bring the world’s leaders under one plan to exert the maximum diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran and halt its march towards becoming a nuclear weapon-state. This paper investigates the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program, its economic impact on the civilian population, the leadership’s negotiating styles and motivations, and the global interests and fears of the international community with respect to a nuclear weapon-capable Iran. Using the problem/solution methodology, this paper offers two strategic communication plans to meet the objective of bringing the regime’s leadership into meaningful diplomatic negotiations for the cessation of their uranium enrichment program.
**Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.
Contents

Disclaimer ....................................................................................................................................... ii
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................... v
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... vi
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program................................................................................................. 5
   Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program – Facilities .......................................................................... 6
   Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program – Key Decision Makers ....................................................... 8
Nuclear Program's Impact on the Iranian Economy ..................................................................... 11
   The Iranian Economy .................................................................................................................. 12
   Uranium Enrichment Strangling the Economy ........................................................................... 13
Regional Responses and Concerns of a Nuclear-Weapon Capable Iran ........................................... 14
   Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) .............................................................................................. 15
   Israel ........................................................................................................................................ 16
   Russia and China .......................................................................................................................... 17
   Iraq ........................................................................................................................................... 18
Reasons to Halt Iran's Uranium Enrichment Program ................................................................. 18
   Active Proliferation ..................................................................................................................... 19
   Terrorist Affiliations and Support .............................................................................................. 20
Regime's Fear of Reform ............................................................................................................ 21
   Crushing the Opposition for Regime Survival .......................................................................... 21
   Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK) ...................................................................................................... 22
Strangling Iran's Uranium Enrichment: Strategic Communications Strategy .................................. 23
   Security Dilemma and Negotiating Style ..................................................................................... 24
   Strategic Communication Strategy Objectives .......................................................................... 26
   Option #1: Foreign Enrichment and Energy Investment ............................................................ 26
   Option #2: Targeted Economic Sanctions ................................................................................ 27
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 28
Notes ............................................................................................................................................. 30
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 33
List of Tables

Iran's Key Research and Production Facilities ................................................................. 8
Iran's Key Decision Making Groups and Negotiating Team ............................................ 11
Acknowledgements

Above all, I want to thank my wife and family for their patience during the long hours away from home while writing and finalizing this research paper for school. Additionally, my appreciation goes to Dr. Costanzo, Geoff Graze, and Nathan White for listening while I collected my thoughts on how to put my argument together.
Abstract

After the 2002 surprise revelation of Iran's underground uranium enrichment and nuclear enterprise, the United Nations and other organizations have fought to uncover the extent of the regime's progress towards a complete fuel cycle. Minor diplomatic successes in 2003 abated Iran's program for a few years until Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reinvigorated his nation's drive towards self-sustaining nuclear energy independence. Time is running out as global agencies continue to shorten the estimate when the Islamic Republic of Iran will have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Short of using military force to disable Iran's program, the global community must undertake a universally supported and implemented plan to bring the regime's leadership to the negotiating table. By utilizing a strategic communication plan built on the interests, concerns, fears, and desires of the international community and Iran's leadership, the United States can revive the significance of the uranium enrichment situation and bring the world's leaders under one plan to exert the maximum diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran and halt its march towards becoming a nuclear weapon-state.

This paper investigates the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program, its economic impact on the civilian population, the leadership's negotiating styles and motivations, and the global interests and fears of the international community with respect to a nuclear weapon-capable Iran. Using the problem/solution methodology, this paper offers two strategic communication plans to meet the objective of bringing the regime's leadership into meaningful diplomatic negotiations for the cessation of their uranium enrichment program.
Introduction

Effective 5 March 1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) established guidelines for the use and distribution of nuclear equipment and technology to nations who elected to become signatory members. The agreement, under Article IX, restricts the "nuclear-weapon State" status to those nations able to manufacture and detonate a nuclear device on or before 1 January 1967. The status, granted to only five nations, allowed these states to retain possession of their nuclear weapons with the understanding that under Article VI they would develop a plan for complete disarmament in the future. \(^1\) While the treaty does not restrict nations from acquiring nuclear technology, it does confine their activity to peaceful applications such as research and energy. The strained relationship between nations unable to meet Article IX limitations and nations unwilling to accommodate Article VI disarmament is due to the perceived double-standard by the five "nuclear-weapon State" nations who are averse to disarmament, but unbending on non-proliferation enforcement. Iran uses this argument to bolster its justification for the expansion of its uranium enrichment program and nuclear enterprise and to provide sustainable reserves for the nation's growing energy demands. Critical to this expansion is the objective to cut foreign reliance on fissile material and other energy consumables by perfecting their uranium enrichment process, resulting in a self-sustaining fuel cycle, the threshold for developing nuclear weapons. \(^2\)

Several options are available to address the growing concern over Iran's developing nuclear program. While a universally agreed upon course of action is an unfeasible goal of this report, it is possible to suggest a compelling strategy or strategic communication plan that can guide the US diplomatic efforts to gain international support and legitimacy for a campaign to halt the Islamic Republic of Iran's uranium enrichment activity. Any plan requires some basic
attributes and information to validate its consideration for execution. As a means to combine "coercive diplomacy, coercion, and deterrence," there are five conditions any strategic communications plan should possess to realize victory.³

- The threat conveyed must be sufficiently potent to convince the adversary that noncompliance is too costly.
- The threat must be perceived as credible by the adversary; that is, he must be convinced that the coercer has the will and the capability to execute it in case of noncompliance.
- The adversary must be given time to comply with the demand.
- The coercer must assure the adversary that compliance will not lead to more demands in the future.
- The conflict must not be perceived as zero-sum. A degree of common interest in avoiding full-scale war must exist. Each side must be persuaded that it can gain more by bargaining than by trying unilaterally to take what it wants by force.⁴

By using this as a template and gathering the necessary background information, diplomatic efforts can develop a complete strategic communication plan tailored to the target audience. The first portion of this report deals with assembling the salient data for use in the communication plan development and begins with the plan's target audience, the Islamic Republic of Iran's leadership.

The threat of a complete fuel cycle in Iran is growing every day as the regime continues to push its nuclear enrichment research and missile delivery system programs. A plan to delay or halt their nuclear program requires a comprehensive look into the various elements that comprise the program: key facilities and decision makers. By analyzing the nuclear enterprise's key facilities, inspectors can establish an estimate for the intent of the program. The extent of facility dispersal, business camouflage, and equipment function adds to the difficulty of uncovering the regime's nuclear intentions. To assist in creating an opinion, it is vital to include a study of the program's decision-making organization to determine the members' historical decisions and political affiliations as well as their susceptibility to outside influence. Understanding these
elements will strengthen any organized negotiating strategy designed to delay or halt Iran's enrichment endeavors. Part and parcel to these elements' importance to the overall strategic communication plan is the nation's economy and its role in Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Boasting a tremendous foreign exchange reserve from the recent oil boom, Iran's economy should be maintaining or gaining ground on the world's financial stage. A look into the state's economic expenditure practices, though, suggests undeclared disbursements that are crippling the domestic population while the energy infrastructure struggles to stay afloat. Although this information does not conclusively reveal the existence of an undeclared nuclear weapons development and production project, it does generate doubt as to the government's publically declared desire for energy independence. After compiling the background data, it is necessary to analyze the anticipated responses and assuage the concerns of Iran's regional neighbors with the intent to incorporate them into the overall communication plan.

The nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in addition to Israel, Russia, China, and Iraq have a vested interest in the outcome of international diplomatic negations with Iran to halt their uranium enrichment progress. Their views reflect their governments' fears and anxiety over Iran becoming a "nuclear-weapon State" and removing itself as a signatory of the NPT. They will also aid in shaping the strategic communication message to gain their support for multi-lateral action against the Iranian regime's enrichment program. Before delineating a strategic communication strategy; however, the overall reason for developing this plan must be explained. This explanation provides the foundation of why other states must join together as one team to deny the Islamic Republic of Iran the complete fuel cycle, which is among the final steps towards producing a nuclear weapon.
It is not the denial of technology that is at the heart of the argument, rather it is the lack of confidence and trust of the current regime to limit the technology's use to peaceful purposes. Consistent remarks from the regime's leadership demonstrate their view of nuclear weapons as tools for use instead of tools for deterrence only. Consequently, it is necessary to present significant rationale for halting their nuclear enrichment program: the active proliferation within the global community of states and the possible spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the state's terrorist affiliates.

In addition, Iran's proclivity towards crushing any opposition makes their mindset all the more dangerous because of their perceived lack of morality. The regime's pervasive attitude of feeling threatened by opposition and lack of hesitation towards assassination and incarceration, goes to further defining their decision-making skills as having a lack of consideration with regard to human life. Their actions after the revolution in 1979 and use of an unarmed populace to fight against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War demonstrate their willingness to use whatever means is available to achieve their political goals. It is the regime's resolve not to withhold any capability in order to exert their power that makes them so dangerous to regional and international security and stability.

The comprehensive background, as laid out, provides the necessary information to address possible strategic communication strategies for dealing with the encroaching realization of Iran as a "nuclear-weapon State." The plan will involve convincing key negotiating members of Iran's inability to be coerced or deterred and their absolute demand for the enrichment cycle. Because of this and the lack of time remaining before current estimates say Iran will complete the fuel cycle, some concessions must be made to ensure Iran's leadership does not feel threatened to the point of armed retaliation. These concessions must be part of an overall plan
and should carry with them consequences for non-compliance. The Iranian leadership's lack of receptiveness to coercion demands a different approach to convincing them to renounce their enrichment activities. This approach must include incentives tailored to the regime's political desires, the domestic cultural needs, and the neighboring states' regional fears to fulfill the requirements of a successful strategic communication plan. As a starting point, this report begins with an investigation into the regime's nuclear program and economic status since "any threat based strategy must incorporate an understanding of the interests and incentives of the targets' leadership structure, as well as knowledge of the processes through which decisions are made by that structure."  

**Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program**

After the August 2002 revelation of Iran's clandestine nuclear enrichment program by members of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) Foreign Affairs Committee, the global community commenced its efforts to recover from this surprise disclosure and began the process of uncovering the specifics of the clandestine program. The trust and support given to the non-proliferation regime and watchdog organizations threatened to collapse under questions attempting to determine how this program could develop unnoticed for almost 20 years. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), determined to overcome the surprise and lack of insight, set about scheduling inspections and interviews to establish the extent of the Islamic Republic's success with enriching uranium and constructing a heavy-water reactor. Additionally, other organizations, such as the NCRI, began pooling their intelligence resources to assist the IAEA investigations in order to reveal the scope and pervasive nature of the Iranian regime's nuclear fuel enrichment research during the decades-long cover up. The successful concealment
of the clandestine enrichment activity relied upon subterfuge, the dispersed nature of the research facilities, and the limited number of government officials associated with the program.

Iranian diplomatic impediments delayed IAEA inspections until February 2003. Inspectors soon realized the initial declaration of the Natanz and Arak facilities were the tip of the iceberg of the robust network of facilities dedicated to the research, enrichment, and production of nuclear materials. Further inquiries revealed numerous facilities and personnel dedicated to the goal of creating an indigenous and self-sustaining nuclear fuel cycle. The operation required the support of influential government leaders for it to thrive in near obscurity. Select government leaders carried out this oversight and ensured the project remained unimpeded from outside organizations. Future negotiations and actions taken by the international community necessitate a thorough understanding of the scale of Iran's nuclear endeavor and the people determined to have it succeed.

**Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program – Facilities**

Until 14 August 2002, the IAEA and international community were aware of only one planned reactor in Iran, the unfinished Bushehr nuclear reactor located on the Persian Gulf. Subsequent declarations by the Islamic Republic of Iran revealed plans for the construction and procurement of critical capabilities related to the enrichment of uranium. The scale of the project and lack of cooperation from the government continued to deepen the level distrust felt by the IAEA and other inspectors as to the peaceful intent of the regime. The government claims the program's purpose is to develop an alternative source of domestic electricity using nuclear technology as guaranteed by the NPT, yet in the opinion of John Bolton, then-Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, no one operates a program of that magnitude for almost 20 years in secret for peaceful purposes. For example, the Arak heavy-water
reactor will not produce enough electricity for domestic electrical needs and the Natanz uranium enrichment plant has the capacity to house over 5,000 centrifuges in cascades, a quality only necessary for large-scale uranium enrichment.\textsuperscript{11,12} Other facilities, listed in Table 1, specialize in laser enrichment, ballistic missile guidance, reentry vehicle shielding, and uranium molding. Admittedly, some of these capabilities serve as nonviolent methods of research and conventional force enhancement, but together they suggest a nefarious aim to acquire nuclear weapons. Only those government leaders involved in the architecture of the organization can provide the explanation for these questions.
### Table 1. Iran's Key Research and Production Facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>(Cover) Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arak</td>
<td><em>(Mesbah Energy Company)</em> 40 MW heavy-water reactor – 130% increase in plutonium by-product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ardakan</td>
<td>Conduct graphite composite production methods - $450 million earmarked to build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushehr</td>
<td>1,000 MW light-water reactor – contract with Russia to construct plant/supply fuel¹³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farayand Technique</td>
<td>Conducts centrifuge quality control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemmat Industries Group</td>
<td>Builds Shahad-3 and Ghadar missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam Hossein University</td>
<td>Conducts neutron generator research – catalyst in generating fusion chain reaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRGC Nuclear Research</td>
<td>Conducts graphite composite research – used for shielding on space or ballistic missile reentry vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isfahan</td>
<td>Uranium conversion plant – produces uranium hexafluoride, tetrafluoride, and dioxide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karimi Industries</td>
<td>Builds nuclear warheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khoshomi Uranium Mine</td>
<td>Yazd uranium mining operation – goal to indigenously supply Arak &amp; Bushehr plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lashkar Ab’ad</td>
<td>Conducts laser enrichment – backup enrichment facility for Natanz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavizan</td>
<td><em>(Lavizan-ShianTechnical Research Center)</em> biological/nuclear weapons research – demolished under premise of impending city park before IAEA could inspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavizan 2</td>
<td><em>(Center for Readiness and New Advanced Defensive Technology)</em> laser research and isotope separation – capabilities for enrichment, neutron accelerators, and recycling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malek-Ashtart Industrial University</td>
<td>Conducts trigger research and beryllium oxide production – beryllium is a reportable to IAEA...used for spacecraft, satellites, missiles, nuclear weapon neutron initiators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials and Energy</td>
<td>Uses hot isostatic press machines – equipment used to mold HEU into a sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movahed Industries</td>
<td>Conducts missile production and assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pars Tekash</td>
<td>Conducts centrifuge research and production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natanz</td>
<td><em>(Kaylae Electric Company)</em> Uranium enrichment plant¹⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rah-e Kar-e Sanayea Novin</td>
<td><em>(Mesbah Energy Company)</em> Conducts the deuterium production program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San’at Gostar Majd Company</td>
<td>Specializes in beryllium shipments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahid Karimi Industrial Group</td>
<td>Maintains the nuclear warhead group¹⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehran Nuclear Research</td>
<td><em>(Kaylae Electric Company)</em> centrifuge research and production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center (TNRC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Varamini Industries</td>
<td>Builds missile guidance and control equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Iran's Nuclear Enrichment Program – Key Decision Makers

The regime of Iran is unique in that its organization centers on the Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as both the nation's spiritual guide and state administrator and by blending the religious and political aspects of the government. Several influential government organizations specializing in various aspects of the nuclear program advise the Supreme Leader on issues requiring a resolution. The Supreme Leader, and in some cases the president, will
appoint individuals to serve as the groups' leaders. Invariably, the chosen leaders reflect the popular mood of the regime, such as reformist, pragmatic conservative, or ideological conservative, and the personality they wish to project to the world audience. Reformist thinkers view the nuclear program as a means to further the nation's energy options, but should not isolate or damage international relations. Conservative thinkers, on the other hand, divide into two factions, the pragmatic, which seek nuclear power, but are willing to concede aspects of the program's control to outside agencies, and the ideological, which seek nuclear power and will not accept outside efforts to minimize their potential to elevate their standing within the region.

The appointed leaders and their associated political affiliation reflect three distinct bodies of expertise related to Iran's nuclear enterprise: the strategic decision committee, the policy-making committee, and the expert committee. Together they form the nucleus of the decision making body of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear enrichment program. The most recent changes to the organizations' make-up occurred after the last presidential election held in 2005.

Prior to elections, European representatives attempting to resolve the uranium enrichment crisis with Iran were familiar with the regime's negotiating tactics. Much to their astonishment the enrichment program and its associated diplomatic inquiries took a distinctly adversarial flavor after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's president in 2005. The previous administration, under President Mohammad Khatami, demonstrated a pragmatic conservative view of politics resulting in the acquiescence to multi-lateral negotiations by implementing a halt to the enrichment program in 2003, while IAEA members performed inspections of declared nuclear facilities. Determined to restart the nuclear program without external controls and promote his ideological conservative views of government, President Ahmadinejad replaced key members of the decision making body creating the current organization shown in Table 2. This
dynamic shift in diplomatic fervor to continue and retain the enrichment program is indicative of the regime's determination to achieve the full fuel cycle. Future negotiations and maneuvering will require knowledge of these key decision makers and their viewpoints with regard to Iran's nuclear ambitions. This allows the negotiating team the ability to analyze exactly who will be amenable to concessions and have the influential capacity to sway the Supreme Leader and his nuclear decision making apparatus. It also serves as a means to predict the outcome for future negotiations once the current presidential elections conclude in the summer of 2009. This election is vital to the success of future negotiations considering Iran's estimated timeline for attaining the capability to produce nuclear weapons is no later than the fall of 2010 according to David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security.²⁰
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 2. Iran's Key Decision Making Groups and Negotiating Team</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Decision Committee</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali Khamenei</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hashemi Rasfanjani</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali Larijani</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mustafa Mohammed Nijar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mahmoud Ahmadinejad</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy-Making Committee</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R. Aghazadeh</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manuchehr Mottaki</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali Larijani</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hasan Rowhani</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expert Committee</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hossein Mousavian</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alaedin Boroujerdi</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mohammad Saeidi</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dr. Hossein Tash</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engineer Jahangir Sirus Naseri</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiating Team</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali Larijani</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Javad Vaidi</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali Hossein Tash</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mohammad Nahavandian</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mohammad Saeidi</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdol Reza Rahmani-Fazil</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ali Monfared</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Manuchehr Mottaki</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mustafa Mohammed Nijar</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Nuclear Program's Impact on the Iranian Economy**

As one might expect, Iran's economy survives on its oil revenue, which dictates that economic forecasting be as informed and accurate as possible. Being the focus of the entire nation, there are few domestic trades that produce much in the way of income outside of the oil and natural gas industry. Since 2003, the price of oil has risen from $31.97 to $99.65 per barrel, yet Iran's unemployment has maintained an average of 13.4 percent with no significant decrease. With an estimated $70 billion in foreign exchange reserves due to the booming oil market, why has the unemployment rate remained virtually unchanged? Scarse information
exists with respect to Iran's guarded nuclear enrichment program and the financial burden to maintain it, but indentifying the costs other nations have devoted in comparable programs will provide an estimate of the investment Iran has made to this endeavor. Additionally, to analyze the impact this investment has had on the state's economy, a declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report provides an analogy for comparison. Controlling the third largest oil and second largest natural gas reserves in the world, how is it that Iran continues to struggle with achieving a stable economic infrastructure?24

**The Iranian Economy**

A published report in 2000 regarding proven oil reserves estimates that Iran's oil holdings contain some 130 billion barrels of unrecovered oil.25 This estimate does not include recent findings in the southern Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea regions. Along with approximately 62 percent of unrecovered natural gas, Iran stands to dominate the global energy market in the future. Unfortunately, the regime's "support for terrorism and economic mismanagement…have damaged oil and gas development in Iran."26 Jim Saxton, Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, lists four reasons for the Islamic Republic's dismal capability to tap into its wealth of energy reserves and court likely investors: OPEC membership which actively manipulates the oil market for personal gain, antiquated buy-back contracts for energy development are unattractive to foreign investment, confrontational political rhetoric that "provoke(s) US trade and investment sanctions," and damaging domestic energy controls.27 Despite these weaknesses, the country's gross domestic product (GDP) has risen by over 4 percent since 2002 and on paper seems unaffected by international scorn.28 Taking a closer look, though, reveals that over this same period of time Iran's global ranking has fallen every year, based on GDP alone, with the largest drop between 2006 and 2007.29 Interestingly, this also coincided with Iran's decision to
renew its uranium enrichment program which breached their 2003 agreement to suspend activity until the regime addressed all of the IAEA's concerns. What has caused this chain of events where a booming oil market produces tremendous capital for a nation, yet their anticipated wealth disappears?

To understand this dilemma, it is important to determine, as much as possible, where the government spends its funds and who makes those decisions. Current information from a report to the Joint Economic Committee reports that Iran spends 40-50 percent of its annual budget on its energy sector. Another large percentage, 33-40 percent, goes to the state's bonyads or social welfare system. This program, administered exclusively by the Supreme Leader and his clerics, provides subsistence to the poor through direct financial support or supply of the basic essentials. At this point, nearly 90 percent of Iran's economy goes to either the energy sector or the social welfare programs. Instead of having an efficient disbursing organization, it falls to the leadership in Tehran to spend the revenues made by the oil export business since they are the sole administrators of the country's central bank account. Of the remaining 10 percent, there is not enough published information to accurately determine the economic investment the regime puts into the nuclear enterprise, but a comparison of similar programs in other nations can lead to an educated guess.

**Uranium Enrichment Strangling the Economy**

Lacking concrete data of the Islamic Republic's nuclear program, current nuclear reactor programs around the world give a baseline figure of the costs involved with a nuclear program. As a whole, nuclear reactors for electricity production and their associated support facilities operate more efficiently than comparable oil and gas electrical facilities. What sets them apart, financially, are the set-up costs which are, on average, almost 50 percent more expensive than
gas plants.\textsuperscript{33} Traditional set-up costs will include "spent fuel management, plant
decommissioning and final waste disposal."\textsuperscript{34} These costs do not, however, include the annual
operating costs for reactor plant operation and uranium mining and processing. A CIA report
recommends a comparison or analogy method to determine the effect a nuclear program has on
the economy of a nation. From 1960-65, France was developing their nuclear program and
registered a 33 percent increase in spending each year. By 1965, their entire program consumed
a $5.9 billion budget, which would be approximately $38 billion in 2007.\textsuperscript{35} Local officials in
Florida announced a comparable nuclear reactor project in November 2008 and proposed a $17
billion price tag for the entire program.\textsuperscript{36} With only a 10 percent undeclared budget of $27.8
billion, based on a 2007 real growth rate GDP of $278.2 billion, it appears that the regime is
spending a tremendous amount of capital on programs that are not significantly working to
improve their energy sector infrastructure. Based on the fact of their continuous slide in global
economic rankings and increase in enrichment activity, an obvious conclusion is that they are
proceeding without delay towards completing their objective to a full fuel cycle and the
possibility of nuclear weapons production. In order to use this information to energize support
for multi-lateral action, it is necessary to appreciate the responses this information could generate
within the region and around the world.

\textit{Regional Responses and Concerns of a Nuclear-Weapon Capable Iran}

Successful negotiations with Iran will hinge on the support received from the
international community, specifically the surrounding regional nations. Tailoring the plan
requires a comprehensive appreciation for the security concerns and desires of neighboring states
and how they would respond if Iran successfully produced a nuclear arsenal. The consequences
of inaction could result in the brute force takeover of Persian Gulf oil and natural gas fields and
their associated shipping, which equates to 57 percent and 45 percent of the world's respective oil and natural gas supplies. Key states within the region must implement any measure available to curb Iran's nuclear program, if for no other reason than their countries will be the first to deal with the situation. Foremost among the nations needed to enforce any multi-lateral action are the Gulf Cooperation Council, Israel, Russia and China, and Iraq. Though their interests and concerns vary by degree, they each understand the dire consequences of inaction and complacency.

**Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)**

Founded in 1981, the GCC banded together for collective security, according to balance-of-threat theory, against the warring countries of Iran and Iraq. The member nations consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman face, once again, the threat from a regional power on the verge of becoming unstoppable. Their willingness to actively work as a unified group to counter any threat to their security will be essential to provide an effective balance to Iran's expansionist tendencies. Unfortunately, this cooperative agreement could take two paths, support and acceptance of Iran as the regional hegemon to balance US and Israeli power or continue in-line with their founding premise of balancing Iran's power and integrate external assistance. Either alternative requires the GCC to take action to protect their nations from powerful threats to their sovereignty.

The first alternative to recognize Iran's regional supremacy is possible, but the compromises associated with this decision would lead to a reduction in the GCC's distinctiveness as a source of authority in the Middle East. Compromises, such as conceding to Iran's primacy and agreeing never to challenge their nuclear might, would open Persian Gulf energy resources to hostile takeover and embolden Iran's non-state affiliates to greater acts of terror destabilizing
an already fragile region.\textsuperscript{40} The second alternative, however, offers a less permanent influence on the states' governments. There are currently US area defense batteries based in the Persian Gulf providing limited airspace protection. By expanding these in-place assets, the GCC could incorporate US theater ballistic missile defense basing as a substitute for their own nuclear weapons deficiency. The ballistic missile defense option, being considered by member nations, serves as short-term protection while GCC members deliberate long-term solutions.\textsuperscript{41} Avoiding an escalation to this security dilemma would require the Islamic Republic's regime to display "moderation and self-restraint" in their public declarations of nuclear progress.\textsuperscript{42} This would also help to allay the fears of Israel as the primary target of Iranian aggression.

**Israel**

Targeted by Middle Eastern aggression, ridicule, and angst for years, Israel remains a considerable power in the international community by using force only when outside nations threaten its security. The prospect of Iran attaining a cache of nuclear weapons deepens the unease of the Israeli government because of the continuous Iranian rhetoric for "Israel to be wiped off the map of the world" and the Islamic Republic's ties to terrorist organizations operating on the Israeli border.\textsuperscript{43} When faced with an impending nuclear menace, Israel took direct action to neutralize the threat from Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007.\textsuperscript{44,45} So how will the state of Israel respond to the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons? Two interviews with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert provide some insight into the growing anxiety over the situation. The first interview in 2005 resulted in the Prime Minister refusing to discuss any aspect of the issue while he openly supported diplomatic action to resolve the situation. In his opinion, there was no cause for alarm since the international community was aware of the threat and taking appropriate action to mitigate it.\textsuperscript{46} The second interview occurred in 2007 during a conference in Israel.
This interview's marked difference in tone reflects an increasing level of tension as he was not hesitant to address the use of force, but he did continue to maintain confidence that multi-lateral negotiations would resolve the situation as long as they would also achieve universal enforcement. Regardless of the public support for a diplomatic solution, Prime Minister Olmert ended with a firm answer to Israel's response to any aggression, "We will not place the lives of our people, the life of our country, at risk. We have the right to full freedom of action to act in defense of our vital interests. We will not hesitate to use it." Outside of the immediate area of concern, Russia and China are able to objectively employ their formidable diplomatic might to bring all the parties to the negotiating table especially if it alleviates their own concerns.

**Russia and China**

Similar to the GCC and Israel, Russia and China share grave concerns over a nuclear-weapon capable Iran. Of primary concern to both nations is the danger to the vast amount of natural resources indigenous to the Persian Gulf. Russia maintains an outstanding contract with Iran to complete the Bushehr light-water reactor and competing interests in the exploration and development of the Caspian Sea. China, whose demand for oil rose 10 percent over a five-year period since 2000 and continues to increase, remains dedicated to a peaceful resolution to ensure protection for its growing demand of this natural resource. Because of this reliance, China could also become a major hurdle to overcome during negotiations, though the state's recent agreement to UNSC Resolutions 1803, 1810, and 1835 speaks to their willingness to compromise on the side of multi-lateral action. Like Russia and China, Iraq's proximity and natural resource interests create a tenacious drive to force an immediate cessation to Iran's uranium enrichment.
Iraq

All too familiar with Iran's desire to spread the Islamic Republic's rule, Iraq continues to demonstrate distrust towards its neighbor. Since the invasion by US military and coalition forces in 2003, Iraq has been the target of Iranian influence through the infiltration of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and insurgents across their shared border. To counter a more robust and nuclear-backed Iranian state, Iraq looks to bolster its air and missile defense capabilities with US technology and equipment. Additionally, it is conceivable that the Iraqi government would increase its military preparedness levels and presence in the border towns noting numerous counts of bribery, corruption, voting fraud, and IRGC manipulation in these same areas. The situation, far from being untenable, requires serious consideration and definitive action by the international community and regional states before it is too late. Outside of the issues specific to neighboring and regional nations, two other vital aspects of Iran's uranium enrichment program must be addressed to understand the full scope of the global security threat.

Reasons to Halt Iran's Uranium Enrichment Program

Provisions within the NPT assure signatory nations the entitlement to peaceful nuclear technology to enhance medical research or energy demands as long as those same nations adhere to the stipulations to guard against the technology's misuse. The proliferation of nuclear technology and equipment to rogue states in their efforts to further the development and production of nuclear weapons has been at the forefront of UNSC and IAEA interests since the NPT went into force in 1970. These two facets of concern constitute the main reasons these same multi-lateral organizations are working to halt or delay the uranium enrichment program being conducted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. More than the issues raised by regional states
in the Middle East, these two violations cause the greatest danger to global security. By understanding the actions taken by Iran to proliferate and their non-state actor connections, a stronger argument is possible to take to diplomatic negotiations justifying the demand for Iran to discontinue its nuclear fuel cycle activities.

**Active Proliferation**

Iran's nuclear enterprise, kept out of the public eye until its discovery in 2002, continues its progression towards a complete fuel cycle and the subsequent capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Iran's enrichment pursuits weaken the Non-Proliferation Regime by highlighting its inability to fully prevent the active proliferation of nuclear technology and equipment. By flouting the requests to arrest enrichment activities, Iran minimizes the effectiveness of future restraints on other states wishing to pursue illicit nuclear programs. On record with the IAEA, Iran admitted to purchasing centrifuges and hardware from the A.Q. Khan network and hundreds of kilograms of uranium hexafluoride, uranium tetrafluoride, and uranium dioxide from China. The equipment and materials are reportable transactions to the IAEA because of their use in producing highly-enriched uranium (HEU), the fissile core of a nuclear warhead. The non-proliferation regime also restricts the spread of ballistic missile technology and equipment as this is a primary means to deliver a nuclear bomb. CIA reports list the shipment of six containers of NoDong missile parts from North Korea to Tehran by IL-76 aircraft, but advances in non-proliferation regime coordination stopped subsequent shipments of missile parts to Tehran in August 2008. While there are successes in stopping the proliferation of nuclear technology, they are overshadowed by the failures presented by rogue states determined to attain nuclear weapons. The other aspect of incredible danger to global
security is the spread of this technology to other rogue states, such as Syria, or non-state actors, such as Iran's terrorist associates, Hezbollah and Hamas.

**Terrorist Affiliations and Support**

International terrorist organizations "particularly if armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)…are the most formidable threat to international stability."\(^{59}\) While the production, technology, and industrial requirements are out of reach of terrorist organizations, illicit transfers are not. This is why Iran and its terrorist ties are so worrisome. IRGC and Qods Force organizations, responsible for the security of the entire nuclear apparatus of Iran, permeate Iranian embassies around the world.\(^{60}\) These same forces, whose mission is to actively spread the Islamic Republic beyond Iran's borders and train terrorist organizations worldwide, are also responsible for eliminating the leaders and followers of opposition groups protesting Iran's regime.\(^{61}\) Growing evidence from the CIA, FBI, and German terrorist experts link Hezbollah leader, Ayatollah Fadlallah, to the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.\(^{62}\) Reports of financial support to the tune of $100 million per year to Hezbollah and shipments of weapons to the Palestinian Liberation Organization further strengthen this relationship between the government of Iran and known terrorist organizations.\(^{63}\) The fear of WMD devices ending up in the hands of Syria, Iran's ally and recently divested of a supposed nuclear reactor by Israel, or Hezbollah is real. It is plausible that the Iranian regime would use these organizations as proxies to further their regional agendas with little fear of reprisal since it would be IRGC and Qods Force personnel in control of the weapons and not foreign organizations themselves. This compulsive drive to exert its power and influence in the region is alarming and suggests a deep seated character flaw that could bring ruin to the Middle East.
**Regime's Fear of Reform**

The Islamic Republic of Iran's quality of megalomania and paranoia coalesced following the 1979 revolution and over time has demonstrated a constant need to prove its legitimacy and power to the world. Determined to ensure no competitor remained from the shah's or regime resistance groups, the Ayatollah Khomeini purged the government and military of any personnel suspected of dissent or opposition. At every opportunity, the regime has dispensed deadly force to crush any possibility of a coup. This fear of resistance pervades every aspect of their operation and poses a credible threat to the regional stability should the government complete the fuel cycle and begin production of HEU. By embracing this flaw, however, a UN negotiating team can manipulate it and use it as leverage to undermine Iran's refusal to stop the enrichment program.

**Crushing the Opposition for Regime Survival**

From the beginning of the revolution, the followers of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, exhibited similar personality traits of elitism and unquestionable faith to Islam and the regime. The government fosters these character attributes in their leaders and IRGC forces to validate their loyalty to the regime above all else, thus perpetuating the need to repress opposition for fear of being ousted by revolutionaries themselves.\(^\text{64}\) Realizing early on the need for protection, the Supreme Leader organized the IRGC, Qods Force, and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) so that they were answerable only to him and would provide for his government's safety and survival.\(^\text{65,66}\) Feeding off of the Ayatollah Khomeini's fanaticism, the ruling clerics charged with writing the country's new constitution further solidified the regime's powerbase by centralizing government authority in the Supreme Leader and outlawing opposition to the regime in any form of freedom of expression.\(^\text{67}\) The constitution
gave the Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors the ability to remove any elected or appointed official from office with a majority vote of the Majlis or parliament. The implied oversight of the Majlis was in name only since the majority of the governing body is loyal to the Supreme Leader and the Council of Guardians, a twelve-member committee made of six persons appointed directly by the Supreme Leader, can overturn any ruling made by them. The lengths the Iranian leadership went through to ensure its continuation implies a significant crack in their mask of power and the identification of a source that could exploit this weakness would prove invaluable to force acceptance of a negotiated halt to the regime's uranium enrichment program.

**Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK)**

Two rebel groups vied for supremacy leading into the 1979 revolution. The MEK along with the followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini worked out of universities to influence and gain support from the nation's youth. The Shah's secret police persecuted the rebels and decimated the ranks of the MEK making them easy prey for the Supreme Leader's forces when he rose to power. Years of imprisonment, torture, and murder forced the group to live in exile where they operate from to this day. The state's domestic populace voices their displeasure with the regime by operating in secret within Iran and reporting information to the MEK leadership. In a twelve-month period, civilians participated in over 4,000 anti-government protests leading to the arrest and beating of thousands. A polling institution in Tehran reported that 85 percent of the citizens want change. It is the MEK that distributes this information to the international community to undermine the Iranian regime and expose the government's illegitimacy and illegal dealings with terrorist groups. Their efforts make them the focus of the regime's diplomatic discussions, which is to silence the MEK in return for nuclear program concessions. It is a testament to their successful revelations concerning the true nature of the Islamic Republic's
leadership and their clandestine programs that the European Union removed the group from their registry of terror blacklist on 26 January 2009.\textsuperscript{74} Time is running out for the international community to deal with the burgeoning power of a nuclear Iran. The previous discussion concerning the make-up of the nuclear program, the struggling economy, the regional responses and concerns, the motivation to halt the uranium enrichment activity, and the regime's fear of reform build upon one another to provide the foundation for a comprehensive strategic communication strategy able to galvanize the international community into unified action to stop Iran's march towards a nuclear device.

\textit{Strangling Iran's Uranium Enrichment: Strategic Communication Strategy}

The need to engage the Islamic Republic grows stronger every day as their nuclear program nears maturity bringing with it the capacity to initiate nuclear weapon production. It is paramount for the global community to act in concert and to support a plan that will benefit all of the states involved in the negotiations, including Iran, because "it is not enough simply to possess overwhelming firepower. Successful execution of a coercive strategy demands that we…maintain a realistic understanding of what we can hope to accomplish."\textsuperscript{75} By using the previous sections' information to establish the baseline justification for multi-lateral action, one can begin devising an overarching argument to bring together disparate states for the goal of resolving the uranium enrichment program within Iran. The established baseline will rally the international community behind a common purpose as defined by the shared threat and provides the needed multi-lateral legitimacy for the negotiating team to start the diplomatic process. Next, it becomes necessary to ascertain the reason behind Iran's obstinate behavior towards the cessation of its nuclear enrichment program and to anticipate the negotiating method the government will use to control the process. After that, the negotiating team's objectives will
provide the context to evaluate two alternatives for action. In essence, the strategic communication plan will transmit the baseline information to unify support for action, devise a diplomatic plan to engage Iran based on the state's nuclear capability needs and its traditional negotiating style, broadcast the desired outcomes from the discussions, and offer alternatives for action to achieve the stated objectives. Now that the collection of the baseline data is complete, the discussion will identify the regime's purpose for pursuing the complete fuel cycle and what tactics they will employ to control the pace of negotiations.

**Security Dilemma and Negotiating Style**

After the UN-mandated cease-fire ended the war between Iran and Iraq, both states took a hard look at the consequences of their eight-year struggle. Iran, having lost hundreds of thousands of soldiers and civilians, was militarily devastated and their GDP decreased an additional 4.4 percent from the previous four years' average decrease of 1.7 percent.\(^{76,77}\) These dire circumstances left Iran in a security dilemma in which the regime was in an asymmetric balance of power and unable to withstand any subsequent challenge to their power.\(^{78}\) Left with few options to recover from this inadequate position, Iran's leaders decided to invest the state's limited economic funds into their undeveloped nuclear research program. The government rationalized that the potential for nuclear weapons would be an easier to maintain and cheaper alternative than revitalizing a conventional military force.\(^{79}\) The regime's lack of emphasis on air force and army hardware and concentration on missile inventory, accuracy, range, and payload underscore the use of this capability as a mainstay for their power projection designs.\(^{80}\) By thinking of a nuclear missile arsenal as a gap-filler, the regime has mentally determined it is acceptable to use these weapons for both offensive and defensive purposes as illustrated by Iran's former President and Chairman of Iran's Expediency Council: "Nuclear weapons would be not
just for their deterrent effect, but rather to pursue ideological goals. This departure from Cold War politics with respect to WMD deterrence requires the negotiating team to carefully determine what diplomatic technique will bring Iran to a compromise. This determination must take into account the regime's trademark style of discourse with the international community.

After the NCRI disclosed the long-hidden nuclear ventures of the Islamic Republic, the IAEA and European Union representatives (EU3) immediately embarked on high-level discussions and investigations to determine the extent of progress Iran had made towards HEU and to halt this program. Reminiscent of Iraq and North Korea, Iran displayed the tactic of deny, distract, and deceive in order to delay the entire process. The regime accepted initial inspection team requests and then slow-rolled their admittance into the country followed by unforeseen complications with the target facility effectively cancelling any inspection. As the IAEA Director General noted in 2003, the finalized agreement whereby Iran would suspend enrichment activities lacked any legally-binding verbiage or course of punishment for violating the agreement. Taking advantage of the weak language, Iran "misread" the demands for cessation of activity to mean that 20 centrifuges dedicated to research were exempt from this agreement. Without a unified front to enforce the demands of the 2003 agreement, Iran was able to continue its program while working within the larger non-proliferation framework. This tactic served North Korea very well and now serves Iran in similar fashion. Acknowledging and accepting the importance Iran attaches to nuclear enrichment and recognizing the way they do business presents the negotiating team with the tools necessary to develop a set of objectives that will meet Iran's political desires and domestic needs, allay the fears of regional states, and strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
Strategic Communication Strategy Objectives

The development of the strategic communication objectives necessitates that the global community acquiesce to the reality that a nuclear-weapon capable Iran is unacceptable and represents a security threat to the entire international order. Consequently, the actions taken to neutralize the magnitude of this threat will impart some level of risk and burden on all nations. The potential gains, though, far outweigh the likely costs to implement and enforce the strategic communication strategy. The key to gaining Iran's capitulation to outside pressure is to remove the regime's ability to offer resistance to the demands of the negotiating team. The signing of the cease-fire to end the Iran-Iraq War and the signing of the Additional Protocol in October 2003 represent two instances where international influence played a significant role in the regime's decision to acquiesce to outside interests. In each case, due to the decimation of IRGC and military forces and the unification of Iran's major trading partners against further delay in signing the Additional Protocol, Iran's leaders lacked the powerbase to continue its stance of resistance. In the current situation, the government's powerbase lies with the inability of any international decision or UNSC resolution to be multi-laterally enforced, IRGC repression of the populace to express their opinion, and the skill of Iranian negotiators to actively resist while only marginally straying outside the boundaries of the NPT. By stripping away or isolating the powerbase, the negotiating team will remove any further opportunities to delay and force the regime to halt their uranium enrichment program by capitulating to one of two possible options.

Option #1: Foreign Enrichment and Energy Investment

Respecting Iran's right to nuclear technology and energy for peaceful purposes forms the basis for the first option. Publically, the regime has stated that its growing electrical demands require a new means of meeting this need. With the exception of the enrichment process, the
negotiating team will agree to the regime retaining all of the nuclear technology it has gained from its current research endeavors. Iran will also retain all of its facilities associated with their nuclear program. In return, Iran will cease all enrichment activities, implement the Additional Protocol they signed in 2003, and turn over all enrichment equipment, facilities, and documents to the IAEA for inspection and cataloguing. Additionally, Iran will allow UN-sponsored uranium enrichment teams, under IAEA safeguards and control, into their facilities to provide the service of uranium enrichment to feed the Bushehr, Arak, and any future nuclear reactors. By allowing Iran to keep and operate their mines, nuclear facilities and technology, the international community will show respect for the state's energy crisis, their cultural aversion to intrusion from outside nations, and the regime's extreme desire for legitimacy. Furthermore, the UN enrichment teams will serve to invest in the nation's economy as a foreign energy investor, utilize the sunk costs spent in the existing nuclear infrastructure, and secure the enrichment apparatus from proliferation to non-state actors. All of this together will strengthen the non-proliferation regime and validate the existing system to ensure the protection of the global nuclear enterprise. Should Iran remain unyielding in its desire to retain the uranium enrichment program, the negotiating team can implement the second option.

Option #2: Targeted Economic Sanctions

While the first option isolated Iran's powerbase to negate the regime's ability to provide opposition, the second option isolates the powerbase to prevent the government's ability to operate by targeting the Islamic Republic's energy revenues and their fear of opposition within the state. This logic agrees with a study conducted in 1998 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on the connection between economic sanctions and other instruments of power which stated that "targeted sanctions are often more effective when coupled with either an
explicit or implicit threat of military force; thus a synergistic relationship between economic and military threat-based coercive strategies is suggested. This choice will require the unwavering and sustained actions by the international community to willingly incur financial sacrifices for the higher purpose of stopping the possibility of Iran from gaining nuclear weapons. The first step focuses on Iran's economic revenues, which hinge on their energy sector's exports and infrastructure contracts. Working as a united front and with the authority of UNSC resolutions enacted under Article 41, Chapter 7, which allows for economic sanctions for non-compliance, the negotiation team will advocate the suspension of all foreign investment contracts to repair, modernize, develop, and explore Iran's territorial oil fields in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea, as well as freeze all IRGC related assets around the globe. Russia and the GCC will increase oil and natural gas production to compensate for the interruption of Iranian energy resources. Simultaneous removal from the US Foreign Terrorist Organization list and public support of the MEK will delegitimize the Iranian regime by providing an internationally recognized and alternative government to the current establishment. Finally, US and Iraqi forces will actively seek and arrest members of the IRGC and Qods Force within Iraq's borders. The move to aggressively isolate and remove Iran's economic and security powerbase will, over time, bolster the domestic populace to actively seek the Supreme Leader and government to concede to the demands of the negotiating team. Both measures focus on the isolation of the government's powerbase in order to limit their ability to exploit any loophole and further delay the cessation of the uranium enrichment program.

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a nation located in Southwestern Asia and home to a vast majority of the world's oil and natural gas reserves. It also accommodates a government bent on
attaining a nuclear power status and all the trappings that title holds without regard for the ramifications this effort will cause the civilian populace. A recent polling agency in Tehran determined that 69 percent of the population does not support President Ahmadinejad's emphasis on the nuclear program and 86 percent do not want this issue to bring their nation to war with the international community.\textsuperscript{90} Additionally, the domestic economic strife unfolding within the country is important to understand because it reveals the true desire of the populace for a stable economy over self-sustaining nuclear power. The populace is not willing to sacrifice a further decrease in their livelihood just to achieve a full fuel cycle for uranium enrichment, yet the government is reluctant to show any margin of withdrawing from their nuclear power stance for fear of losing face and legitimacy to the leadership's opposition groups around the world. This comprehension of the dynamics between the regime's government and its people are vital to the development of a strategic communication plan to persuade the regime to halt their uranium enrichment activities and open their nuclear-related facilities to UN inspectors. Fundamental to finalizing this plan will be the appreciation and inclusion of international and regional states' concerns of a nuclear Iran, its terrorist affiliates, and the regime's rhetoric intimating an indifference to using a nuclear device. The way ahead requires a tenacious determination to resolve this issue and a resolute acceptance of the need to compromise in order to achieve a more secure and stable region. Above all, it is the final outcome of halting the Islamic Republic of Iran's uranium enrichment program that must remain at the forefront of the international community as they implement a strategic communication strategy. The options laid out in this report serve as a guideline for US diplomatic efforts to galvanize the international community into action. Any hesitation with regard to this conviction could lead to the unintentional nuclear arming of a state known for sponsoring terrorism.
Notes

6 Jafarzadeh, *The Iran Threat*, xi.
9 Russell, *Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East*, 76.
10 Corsi, *Atomic Iran*, 35.
12 Russell, *Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East*, 78.
13 Ibid., 77.
14 Ibid., 78.
16 Russell, *Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East*, 38.
17 Ibid., 31-2.
18 Ibid., 39.
19 Ibid., 32.
21 InflationData.com, "Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table)," http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp.
22 Index Mundi, "Iran – Unemployment Rate," http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=ir&v=74.
25 Corsi, *Atomic Iran*, 86.
26 Saxton, *Iran's Oil and Gas Wealth*, 1 and 3.
27 Ibid., 1.
28 Venter, *Iran's Nuclear Option*, 325.
34 Ibid., 2.
37 Corsi, *Atomic Iran*, 185 and 189.
38 Russell, *Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East*, 17 and 25.
39 Ibid., 18.
40 Ibid., 91-2.
41 Ibid., 65-70.
42 Ibid., 8-9.
43 Olmert, CNN Interview, http://www.iranwatch.org/government/Israel/israel-mfa-cnn-
   interview-olmert-052106.htm.
45 Raddatz, "Exclusive: The Case for Israel's Strike on Syria," http://abcnews.go.com/WN/Story?
id=3752687.
46 Olmert, CNN Interview, http://www.iranwatch.org/government/Israel/israel-mfa-cnn-
   interview-olmert-052106.htm.
   olmert-herzliya-012407.htm.
48 Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat, 168.
49 Venter, Iran's Nuclear Option, 332.
50 Russell, Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East, 123-8.
52 Russell, Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East, 94-5.
54 Corsi, Atomic Iran, 151-3.
55 Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat, 133-5.
56 Venter, Iran's Nuclear Option, 137-9.
57 Ibid., 127.
59 Russell, Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East, 1-2.
60 Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, 49.
61 Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat, 6-10, 64-9.
62 Venter, Iran's Nuclear Option, 215-8.
63 Corsi, Atomic Iran, 136, 142, 150-1.
64 Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat, 6-10.
65 Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, 14.
66 Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat, 18.
67 Ibid., 55-6.
68 Venter, Iran's Nuclear Option, 36-7.
69 Ibid., 40.
70 Ibid., 31.
71 Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat, 225-30.
72 Corsi, Atomic Iran, 194.
73 Jafarzadeh, The Iran Threat, 232-3.
74 Jafarzadeh, "EU Does the Right Thing," http://ncr-iran.org/content/view/6018/123/.
75 Cooper, "Air Power and the Coercive Use of Force," 18.
   war/iran-iraq.htm.
78 Russell, Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East, 7-9.
79 Ibid., 33-4.
80 Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, 46-7.
81 Venter, *Iran's Nuclear Option*, 128.
82 Russell, *Weapons Proliferation and War in the Greater Middle East*, 80-1, 89.
83 Corsi, *Atomic Iran*, 30-1.
87 Ibid., 42.
89 Jafarzadeh, *The Iran Threat*, 32.
90 Ibid., 192.
Bibliography


InflationData.com. "Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table)." http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp.


Smith, Alan B. Costing Nuclear Programs. Center for the Study of Intelligence. Washington,


