

AU/ACSC/DIESING/AY09

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

**RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE IMPLICATIONS  
OF HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS**

by

Duane J. Diesing, Maj, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Dr. John T. LaSaine, Jr.

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2009

# Report Documentation Page

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE <b>APR 2009</b>		2. REPORT TYPE <b>N/A</b>		3. DATES COVERED <b>-</b>	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>Russia and the United States: Future Implications of Historical Relationships</b>				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Air Command And Staff College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama</b>				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>The original document contains color images.</b>					
14. ABSTRACT <b>This paper examines historical relationships between Russia and the U.S. to determine how much they were motivated by individuals, by societal drivers like military, economic, or political ideologies or if the motivations were from the international system. This paper uses an historical analysis to explore four periods between 1815 and 2008 and concludes that the international structure and its movement can be explained by realist states working inside of the "Dcapitalist world system. The paper relates the theory to the current unipolar international structure and states how the U.S.-Russian relationship could proceed in the future multipolar environment. It then recommends how the U.S. can use its foreign policy towards Russia in order to influence outcomes of the international structure. The U.S. needs to recognize that countries with the size, population and economic capacity of Russia should always be treated like a major power, even when their current system of government or economy has them far behind the U.S. The techniques a nation uses against a rival are different than those used against an enemy and the U.S. should strive to be rivals versus enemies with other major powers.</b>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>SAR</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>43</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT <b>unclassified</b>	b. ABSTRACT <b>unclassified</b>	c. THIS PAGE <b>unclassified</b>			

## **Disclaimer**

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

## Contents

DISCLAIMER .....	II
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	IV
ABSTRACT.....	V
INTRODUCTION .....	1
ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS OF U.S. AND RUSSIA.....	4
1815-1916.....	4
1917-1945 .....	9
1945-1989.....	16
1990-2008.....	23
CONCLUSION.....	27
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	37

## **Acknowledgments**

I would like to thank Dr. John T. LaSaine, Jr. for his guidance on this paper. The humorous thing (to me) is that as I went back and reviewed the notes I took during my office visits with him, he had the problem and solution there the whole time. He knew which books I should read and which articles had the conceptual framework required to do the analysis but he let me chew on broad ideas and did not spell the answers out for me. Due to the complexity of the issues and the requisite amount of reading and actual thought that he and other scholars have put into this field, I more fully understand why a PhD is such an achievement. It basically took until I had read book after book, written summaries of the books, and written the facts of the paper before I laughed at my (poor) analysis and realized that Dr. LaSaine had actually already done the analysis and told it to me over the course of our previous meetings but I just could not comprehend it.

I would like to thank Jesus Christ for being my Lord and Savior and for giving me the strength to work on this paper. My final thank you is to my wife, Vicki. Her support during this year of school and especially of volunteering to take a trip to Arkansas so I could have time to focus on nothing but finishing up this paper demonstrates her love and dedication. I only hope I can show her the same thing. I hope this finds you, the reader, well and that you can take something from this paper besides sleep.

## **Abstract**

This paper examines historical relationships between Russia and the U.S. to determine how much they were motivated by individuals, by societal drivers like military, economic, or political ideologies or if the motivations were from the international system. This paper uses an historical analysis to explore four periods between 1815 and 2008 and concludes that the international structure and its movement can be explained by realist states working inside of the “capitalist world system.” The paper relates the theory to the current unipolar international structure and states how the U.S.-Russian relationship could proceed in the future multipolar environment. It then recommends how the U.S. can use its foreign policy towards Russia in order to influence outcomes of the international structure. The U.S. needs to recognize that countries with the size, population and economic capacity of Russia should always be treated like a major power, even when their current system of government or economy has them far behind the U.S. The techniques a nation uses against a rival are different than those used against an enemy and the U.S. should strive to be rivals versus enemies with other major powers.

## INTRODUCTION

*“Hegemony necessarily rests on both military and economic power, and the dilemma facing a maturing hegemon is that it cannot sustain both. Such is the nature of world system dynamics.”*

— **Thomas J. McCormick**<sup>1</sup>

Why did Russia invade Georgia in 2008? What has shaped the ups and downs of the U.S.-Russian relationship? To what extent does the changing structure of the international system versus social or individual factors explain the patterns of continuity and change in the U.S.-Russian relationship? The structure of the international system can explain the patterns of continuity and change in the U.S.-Russian relationship. It should guide American foreign policy in regards to future action towards Russia.

The international structure and its dynamics can be defined as realist states working inside a world system. One theory of the world system is based on the concept of a capitalist world economy whose efficiency-seeking transnational businesses will go anywhere in the world the market takes them.<sup>2</sup> The realist tradition is similar to world systems theory in many ways but treats the economy as a factor in state decisions rather than as the primary actor. There is an asymmetric interaction between the world economy and the state system and a tension between them. The world system oscillates “between unicentric hegemony and polycentric balance of power” through a cycle of centering, decentering, and recentering.<sup>3</sup> A country’s economic strength and productive base generates military power and together they generate political power.<sup>4</sup> McCormick says that in nonstandard state ventures like China and the Soviet Union, the global capitalist system will always win out.<sup>5</sup> Large-scale war is also important in the international structure as it can often lead to a hegemon’s ascent.<sup>6</sup>

How does the hegemon normally interact with the state system and the economic system? The single hegemon sets up free trade and the internationalization of capital to try to maintain its economic growth, and uses its military to protect that international system.<sup>7</sup> In time, it overstretches its military which sows the seeds of its economic destruction and the cycle begins again as new players struggle for power.<sup>8</sup> Britain in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and America in the 20<sup>th</sup> century are good examples of states unable to maintain permanently both economic and military power.<sup>9</sup> The “uneven pace of economic growth has had crucial long-term impacts upon the relative military power and strategical position of the members of the states system” demonstrating the asymmetric relationship between the economic and political worlds.<sup>10</sup>

An historical example from Europe illustrates how system change caused the 19<sup>th</sup> century to be more peaceable than the 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>11</sup> It was not that military factors maintained the balance of power; it was that states were looking for economic competitive advantage, “the ability to profit from the international system at little cost”.<sup>12 13</sup> States were not seeking total hegemony but used limited blocking coalitions to compete for world position.<sup>14</sup> They wanted “to enjoy freedom and choices others did not, and to escape burdens and payments that others had to bear.”<sup>15</sup> This shows the realist structure working inside of the “capitalist world system.” The Concert of Europe emerged at the beginning of this period, but even after the Crimean War wrecked the Concert and threatened to escalate into a general European war, the system held up.<sup>16</sup> The limited extent and duration of the German and Italian wars of unification were primarily due to European pressure.<sup>17</sup> The rapid integration of these movements into the European system by Austria, France, and Russia “involved not merely coming to terms with accomplished facts and present realities. It meant putting aside deeply rooted traditions and goals, and incurring real risks.”<sup>18</sup> Diplomatic pressure to conform to the new structure and the



desire to continue the economic growth offered by the recent industrial revolution drove these nations' actions.

Three features that were introduced into international politics between 1813-1815 helped statesmen manage international politics. The first was the creation of new diplomatic moves.<sup>19</sup> Second, was the fencing off of the European state system from overseas quarrels, which was accomplished by severing mainland political discourse from that of overseas territorial issues and specifically concerns about British colonial and naval superiority.<sup>20</sup> Third, was the establishment of intermediary bodies that served as buffers and spheres of influence between the great powers.<sup>21</sup> Examples of these are the Netherlands, Scandinavia, Switzerland, the German Confederation, and the Ottoman Empire.<sup>22</sup>

How can the U.S. use these features from the 19<sup>th</sup> century to influence the next system and U.S.-Russian relations? This paper uses an historical analysis to explore the structure of the international system in four periods between 1815 and 2008. It will examine historical relationships to determine if, and how much, Russia and the U.S. have been guided by individuals, by societal drivers such as the armed services, economics, or political ideologies; or if the most important motivational forces were structural. It will then recommend how the U.S. can use its foreign policy towards Russia in order to influence outcomes of the next international system. This could lead to a better U.S. understanding of Russian actions and how both states fit into the international structure.

# **ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS OF U.S. AND RUSSIA**

*“There exists a dynamic for change, driven chiefly by economic and technological developments, which then impact upon social structures, political systems, military power, and the position of individual states and empires.”*

— Paul Kennedy<sup>23</sup>

## **1815-1916**

### **Structure of the International System**

The international systems after the defeat of Napoleon can be characterized as a multipolar system whose primary feature was the beginning of an integrated global economy.<sup>24</sup> This underpinned the Concert of Europe which was differentiated from the previous century by a shift in state behavior working toward economic advantage versus a quest for military dominance. Another feature of this international structure was the lack of general great power wars, although there were still small wars fought in colonies over colonies and wars against less developed peoples during this time as states continued to seek raw materials and prestige.<sup>25</sup> The third major feature of this international structure was the technological aftermath of the Industrial Revolution which had a large impact on the military.<sup>26</sup> The small wars and short great power wars that were fought put emphasis on readily-mobilized military strength incorporating the latest technology.<sup>27</sup>

States were still governed by a balance of power mindset, but the beginnings of liberal-institutionalist thinking emerged among the great powers reflected in the use of diplomacy as the primary tool for solving great power rivalries avoiding general war.<sup>28</sup> That was certainly the case on the continent of Europe for the first fifty years of the century. The last twenty years saw structural movement toward more rigid alliances, and the breakdown of diplomatic means of

solution to longstanding problems.<sup>29</sup> This period ended with a World War, the likes of which had never been seen (there will be more specifics in the next section).

Russia was at the peak of its power in 1815, but then began a steady decline relative to other great powers.<sup>30</sup> Russia had the largest GNP but lowest per capita GNP amongst the European Great Powers and, with a poor program of modernization, became mostly a supplier of primary materials.<sup>31</sup> On the military side, Russia's number of troops (800,000 in 1815) awed foreign militaries even though Russian logistics were poor and the troops were often unavailable due to the Empire's required border patrols and police actions.<sup>32</sup> The Russian defeat in the Crimean War demonstrated how far they had fallen both militarily and economically.<sup>33</sup> From that time up until WWI, Russia increased its industrial power, but its losses to Japan in 1904-1905 and resultant domestic unrest, further reduced its position in the international system.<sup>34</sup>

The U.S. was similar to Russia in some ways such as natural resources, continental size, and increasing population.<sup>35</sup> Unlike Russia, the U.S. economy drastically expanded and modernized between 1815 and 1860.<sup>36</sup> The U.S. military numbered only 26,000 in 1860, but impressively mobilized for the Civil War.<sup>37</sup> Despite the horrendous loss of life in that War, the U.S. continued to exploit its vast land and raw materials as well as technology and the absence of nearby, external threats to continue to increase its power-potential after the Civil War.<sup>38</sup> In the late 1890s, the "New Manifest Destiny" re-shaped U.S. foreign policy; the U.S. became more assertive in its diplomacy, and began a shift towards imperialism.<sup>39</sup>

### **Substance of U.S.-Russian relationship**

Russia was a major power, but prior to the Civil War, the U.S. remained a minor power with a limited foreign policy. Russian-U.S. interaction involved primarily balance of power

actions against Britain as each country used the other when it was useful for security or economic interests. An example of this is Russia's offers of protection to the U.S. as Russia was the lead advocate of neutral shipping rights against British naval practices.<sup>40</sup> Another example are the agreements on northwestern America made during the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century by Russia, the U.S., and Britain where the spheres of influence and boundaries of trade were settled and resettled with much compromise.<sup>41</sup> The security and economic interests of both Russia and the U.S. were interwoven showing the tension between the realist security system and capitalist economic system. At one point, the U.S. had to give up some economic rights (fishing) to Russia in order to get security assurances against the British while at another point the Russian's agreed to reduce their claims on the Pacific Northwest in favor of U.S. claims in order to decrease the overall British position in the world.<sup>42</sup>

The Russian fleet's visit to San Francisco and New York in 1863 helped early U.S.-Russian relations. Although the U.S. press presented the visit as the Czar's show of support for the Union, this was wishful thinking. Russia actually deployed their ships from home ports in order to improve their overall strategic situation against the British. The Russians hoped to reduce their vulnerability to the British Royal Navy, as Russia and Britain were nearing a conflict over the Polish revolt.<sup>43</sup> Although the U.S. Government knew the actual reason for the visit, it was good propaganda for the Lincoln administration and gave the American people an overall positive notion of Russia.

The next major interaction between the U.S. and Russia was the Alaska Purchase. After its Crimean defeat, Russia feared losing Alaska altogether and therefore tried to sell Alaska to the U.S. or Britain several times after 1860.<sup>44</sup> Russia hoped to sell to the U.S. so "the cession would lead ultimately to the expulsion of England from the whole Pacific coast of North

America.”<sup>45</sup> Secretary of State Seward was interested in American expansion in the Pacific and also wanted to reduce Britain’s role there and so pushed for the purchase.<sup>46</sup> Both parties were pleased with the outcome, which boosted U.S.-Russian relations, although the Czar’s treatment of Russian Jews and disagreement over Chinese trade soon strained relations.<sup>47</sup>

The success of American industrialization drove businessmen into the global marketplace in search of raw materials and markets for finished products—the world capitalist system at work. This drive to expand the economy was one factor that contributed to the U.S. movement toward a more “aggressive and expansionist phase in its diplomatic history” starting around the year 1890.<sup>48</sup> This phase was in answer to several economic and security concerns.<sup>49</sup> The U.S. began looking to Asia, specifically China for business. The European Great Powers were already there. After the “Boxer Rebellion”, the U.S. sent 2,500 troops to help the international community restore order.<sup>50</sup> The U.S. also promoted the “Open Door Policy” in hopes that, fresh off its victory in the Spanish-American war and resulting Asian territorial gains, it could increase its position relative to other powers in China. As a growing economic powerhouse, the U.S. wanted to increase its trade in China/Manchuria. Secretary of State John Hay used diplomacy to entice the Great Powers, including Russia, to agree to the Open Door policy and thus more American trade with all of China; showing how diplomacy in the political system was used to increase American economic opportunity abroad.<sup>51</sup>

As the U.S. increased its economic stature and overseas holdings, President Teddy Roosevelt also increased U.S. diplomatic activity. The Russians and Japanese had long standing territorial disagreements in the Pacific, and their inability to solve Chinese and Korean territorial and trade problems led to the Japanese-Russo War of 1904-1905.<sup>52</sup> The U.S. gave its diplomatic support to Japan.<sup>53</sup> During the war, the Japanese won several decisive naval battles and a few

ground battles (but with heavy casualties); the Russians realized they could not win this war without reinforcements and reorganization.<sup>54</sup> At the same time, revolution was spreading in Russia. These two factors together led the Czar to end the war.<sup>55</sup> Roosevelt had the diplomatic stature to successfully mediate a settlement in the Treaty of Portsmouth, NH (1905.)<sup>56</sup>

### **Quality of U.S.-Russian Relationship and Motivations of Actors**

The U.S.-Russian relationship from 1815 – 1916 can be characterized as two states with realist worldviews working inside of the “capitalist world system” trying to maximize their economic and political power. Specific individuals’ ideologies as well as societal factors (military, economic, and political) were a result of the influence of the multipolar international structure. Paul Kennedy made a good characterization of Russia’s mentality in the 19<sup>th</sup> century when he said: “what was happening was that a country of extreme economic backwardness was being propelled into the modern age by political authorities obsessed by the need to acquire and retain the status of a European Great Power.”<sup>57</sup>

Russia’s motivation for their port visit in 1863 was an attempt to keep their navy viable in order to maximize their power and standing as a Great Power in the multipolar world. One of the U.S. government’s motivations for not correcting the false press reports was to increase its prestige and associated power in the multipolar structure by suggesting that a great power, Russia, was cultivating good relations with the U.S. This action also had underlying societal (political) inducement to lift the spirits of the wearied Union populace embroiled in a bitter Civil War and to try to show foreign policy prowess in order to get more votes in the 1864 election.

Russia’s motivation for the sale of Alaska was to maintain its Great Power status within the multipolar structure for the long term to try to keep pace with Britain. This realist motivation

was interrelated to Russia's desire to improve its financial position because of its heavy debt, and its military position to avoid having to defend over-extended territory with an unsupportable troop level. The U.S. motivation for the purchase was to increase its stature to that of a Great Power within the multipolar structure and possibly gain territory with even more resources. One reason the Senate gave it a favorable vote was because it wanted to "please Russia, America's good friend."<sup>58</sup>

Structural factors provided the principle motivation for the U.S. pursuit of the "Open Door Policy." As an up and coming Great Power, the U.S. wanted to increase its stake in the "game" and used diplomacy to gain that economic and political advantage. Although the economic gain would benefit American business, the driver was the international system impelling America to expand its power. The Russians were driven to accept the Open Door Policy because they did not want to be the only Great Power holding out when there appeared to be consensus amongst the other powers; they were not prepared to fight all of the other powers over Manchuria.

Structural factors also motivated the U.S. as an up and coming power to mediate the Russo-Japanese War. Although TR was the right person at the right time to do this, he was given his opportunity by the structure of the international system. The Russians agreed to the U.S. mediation and used diplomacy to attain empathy over Japanese actions.

## **1917-1945**

### **Structure of the International System**

As World War I entered its third year, the positions of the powers in the system were in flux. Russia left World War I because it could not handle the attacks of the German army and was strategically isolated from its allies.<sup>59</sup> At the conclusion of the war, Europeans were war

weary, and the total loss on all sides during the war period approached 60 million casualties (military and civilian from war, disease, etc.) and \$260 billion spent. Much of this expenditure was actually debt held by the U.S.<sup>60</sup> Changes in the structure of the international system included the formation of new nation-states out of the former Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires.<sup>61</sup> The world system was still European-centered, with the French “search for security” against the Germans as a major focus, but the system was “much more fragile” than fifty years prior.<sup>62</sup> The economic problems from the war created an environment of intense diplomatic effort focused on finance which asymmetrically affected the global political system as the relations between the Great Powers were strained.<sup>63</sup>

The post WWI world, horrified by the carnage of trench warfare and the consequences of a European-dominated world system, saw the emergence of two disparate increasingly influential views. The Wilsonian worldview held a desire for peace and individual freedom. It entailed a world free of aggression and the creation of a League of Nations where all differences would be resolved under the rule of international law, and the “League” would back up any victim of aggression.<sup>64</sup> The Bolshevik view was a “systemic criticism of the existing order”, derived from the ideas of Marx and Lenin.<sup>65</sup> Many people across Europe and beyond bought into the Bolshevik view.<sup>66</sup> All of this hurt the League and finally it was discredited after failing to stop Japan’s aggression against China and Mussolini’s aggression against Ethiopia.<sup>67</sup> Conservative politicians throughout the West were virulently anti-Bolshevik but also opposed to liberal institutionalist ideas of giving up power to the “League”.<sup>68</sup>

This ideological heterogeneity of the great powers at the core of the system in the post-WWI period led the structure of the international system to be inherently unstable. The U.S. was liberal-idealist, the U.K. was liberal-realist, France was conservative-realist, the USSR was



communist and Germany and Italy were fascist. The conflict between the ideologies complicated international relations in the 1920s and 1930s as it broke world society into political blocs which did not fit neatly with the post-war economic blocs.<sup>69</sup> The worldwide economic depression in the early 1930s threw the political scene into further turmoil. The fascist governments in Germany, Japan, and Italy rejected both the Wilsonian and Bolshevik ideas and as they geared their economy, industry, and military up, they required more raw resources, which led to expansionist policies.<sup>70</sup> The British and French were status quo powers and wanted to recover economically from WWI but security interests and public pressure led them to give security assurances to Poland after the annexations of Czechoslovakia by Germany and Albania by Italy.<sup>71</sup> After the unappeasable Hitler moved into Poland anyway, Europe was again at war.<sup>72</sup> The structure of the system then had a major shift as France disappeared as a great power and the remaining powers were polarized into two warfighting coalitions.

Russia's economy had been devastated by WWI; it "had cost Russia thirteen years of economic growth."<sup>73</sup> The Soviet command economy greatly decreased its farming production but invested more money in education, science, the military, and industry.<sup>74</sup> In the late 1930s, Stalin realized that as Japan was covetously looking at Siberia; he also had a need to forestall the expansion of Germany into Southeastern Europe and he needed more time to prepare for that, so he signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact appeasing Germany in 1939.<sup>75</sup> The deal also set up raw materials to flow from the Soviet Union to Germany and with Hitler's victories, Stalin increased the supplies to Germany, which clearly demonstrates his realist tendencies.<sup>76</sup> After the Germans attacked, the Soviet Union was fighting for its survival and asked for any help it could get.

The U.S. was the only Western great power to benefit from WWI with economic growth during the war up through the 1920s. American economic growth then declined in the 1930s

(more so than any other great power), but America continued as the largest producer of food and manufactured items, and ended up with spare industrial capacity which was of immense importance during WWII and after.<sup>77</sup> The U.S. became more isolationist during the 1930s, however, and was still a military middleweight.<sup>78</sup> After the U.S. entered the war, its industrial machine went into high gear and produced more than any other country. The U.S. military became the strongest in the world overall by the end of WWII.

### **Substance of U.S.-Russian relationship**

After Czar Nicholas II abdicated in March 1917 and Miliukov announced the formation of the new Provisional Russian government, the U.S. was the first state to recognize it.<sup>79</sup> The U.S. joined WWI three weeks later, and began supporting its new “associate” by pledging supplies, relief assistance, and aiding the new Provisional government in its attempt to set up a functional government and keep its war effort going.<sup>80</sup> The U.S. was unable to provide sufficient, timely support to sustain the Provisional government or help solve any of the Russian war, economic, or social problems.<sup>81</sup>

The Russian experiment in democracy did not last very long. Six months after Kerensky established the Provisional government, it was overthrown by the Bolsheviks in October 1917.<sup>82</sup> The Wilson administration declined to recognize the Bolshevik regime, but undertook detailed political discussions with the Bolsheviks.<sup>83</sup> The Bolsheviks signed a separate peace with Germany in March 1918 and left WWI. Although the Bolshevik reasons for getting out of the war included the consolidation of domestic power as well as departing an “imperialist” war to let the imperialists continue to kill each other, Saul says there was a missed opportunity for the U.S. to keep Russia in the war; but the lack of a U.S. promise of military and logistical support sealed

Lenin's push to end Russian participation in WWI.<sup>84</sup> U.S. policy continued to be inconsistent, ranging from humanitarian and prisoner of war relief to economic support.<sup>85</sup> The U.S. intervention in Siberia and North Russia in 1918 was approved as a realist security measure in order to assist the Czecho-Slovak force stranded in Russia, to ensure the Bolshevik weakness did not force a German occupation, to guard military supplies, and to aid local Russian governments asking for help (maybe even have a better political environment to work in, i.e. new government).<sup>86</sup> The U.S. forces at Archangel and Vladivostok did very little in the way of military engagements against the Bolsheviks as they battled other parties in Russia.<sup>87</sup>

“By May 1919, with opposition escalating against Wilson, the League, and the peace, continued American intervention was doomed” and by April 1920 the U.S. had withdrawn.<sup>88</sup> The U.S. began an uneasy relationship with the Bolsheviks but still did not recognize the government of the USSR until FDR did so in 1933.<sup>89</sup> Although both the U.S. and USSR tried to figure out how to meaningfully engage each other, the differing economic systems and ideologies left them at a contemptuous distance. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the U.S. began to send supplies to the USSR through the Lend-Lease Act and FDR “proclaimed the survival of the Soviet Union vital to the defense of the United States.”<sup>90</sup> This developed into an uneasy wartime coalition in which the U.S. and USSR were “Allies” in the sense that they were working to defeat a common enemy but the interaction was neither smooth nor unified. This was evidenced by the continual sparring on the conduct of the war, the demand for a second front, and the disparate views on the future peace.<sup>91</sup>

Stalin first practiced *entente*, defined here as an understanding between allies, from June 1944 – April 1945, as he tried to expand global Soviet power.<sup>92</sup> After enough pressure from the U.S., he switched to *detente*, normally defined as a relaxation of tensions but here defined by

Taubman as “competitive (and not especially peaceful) sort of coexistence characterized by less tension and more negotiation than during a cold war and by the most serious sort of rivalry.”<sup>93</sup>

Stalin maintained that until 1948, when after the “struggle” for Germany culminated in the USSR’s failure of the Berlin blockade, he switched to a cold war strategy. Follow-on Soviet leaders continued to use *détente* as according to Taubman, the Soviets thought they could take advantage of western conflicts, increase Soviet power, and still avoid war with the U.S.<sup>94</sup>

### **Quality of U.S.-Russian Relationship and Motivations of Actors**

The U.S.-USSR relationship from 1917 – 1945 can be characterized as two states attempting to shape the world structure in their own image, but when neither side would bend, the two nations distanced themselves from each other until forced to become allies to defeat a common enemy. There were opportunities for U.S.-Soviet cooperation between 1917 and 1920. After the communist revolution did not spread immediately across Europe, the Bolsheviks tried to establish a pragmatic, working relationship with the U.S. and made many compromises to get there.<sup>95</sup> These political and economic successes could have been productive but the American leaders’ ideological opposition to Bolshevism and Bolshevik hostility to any sort of liberalism prevented closer relations.<sup>96</sup> Even though presidential advisor Colonel Edward House was open to the idea of the normalization of relations for pragmatic political and economic reasons, and the U.S. diplomatic mission-lead William Bullitt’s prospective agreement with Lenin was on track; it was rejected by Secretary of State Colby.<sup>97</sup> President Wilson then reluctantly intervened militarily and then went to a policy of non-recognition that lasted until 1933.<sup>98</sup>

The WWII wartime coalition was also driven by the structure of the international system. In order to keep the Germans from becoming a standing hegemon and continuing to hold the vast

majority of Europe, the realist U.S. and USSR were able to get past their social and political principles in order to work together to fight the Germans.<sup>99</sup> Initially, FDR wanted to preserve peace and the current multipolar structure but if that failed, he wanted to ensure national security.<sup>100</sup> FDR was much more worried about the Japanese and German threats than he was of a Soviet threat and wanted to keep Stalin on the side of the democracies.<sup>101</sup> FDR thought the survival of the U.S. was at stake and an Axis-dominated Eurasia (including the U.K. and USSR) predominant across the world would spell the end of the capitalist world system and the international structure as the U.S. wanted it. FDR saw that Japanese and German militarism was being spread by force and called it a threat to civilization; whereas the USSR was focused on promoting native communist movements with propaganda and was not nearly as high of a threat, so FDR chose to go with security over idealism.<sup>102</sup> Both nations knew that having a system of collective security would benefit them and block Axis expansion but they could not work out a way to resolve their suspicions as both thought collaboration would only work on the other's terms.<sup>103</sup> They became allies and fought in order to save their place as Great Powers.

FDR's priorities, in order, were a military victory, the wartime alliance, then postwar diplomacy.<sup>104</sup> "During the war itself, moreover, differences on political and social principles could be subsumed under the overriding need to combat fascism."<sup>105</sup> Eastern Europe became a tough problem as goals of self-determination and the unity of the alliance were contradictory at that point.<sup>106</sup> Although the U.S. wanted the trade with Eastern Europe to increase its share in the "capitalist world system", FDR's agreement on the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and lack of preparation of the American people for it "inadvertently undermined the domestic consensus necessary for his postwar policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union."<sup>107</sup> FDR's private negotiations did not match up with his public policies so his compromises on Poland and

Romania led to the slow hardening of U.S.-Russian relationships.<sup>108</sup> Abolishing democracy in Poland and Czechoslovakia and Stalin's purges hurt any enthusiasm the West may have had for the Soviet system.<sup>109</sup>

As WWII drew to a close, both sides looked towards a structure in which they dominated. FDR sought to integrate the Soviet Union into a new system that was U.S./U.K. centered but the Soviet system was incompatible with the liberal political economy and the Soviets rejected it. The failure to achieve common ground on the new international structure in regards to free trade and security were two primary factors leading to the Cold War.<sup>110</sup> FDR was a realist but did not use leverage and instead tried conciliation, aid, and a collective security arrangement to try to integrate the Soviet system. Stalin's desire for dominance minimized the functionality of FDR's tactics. It also led to his push for post WWII security against Germany and a communist sphere in Eastern Europe and Asia set the stage for the Cold War.

## **1945-1989**

### **Structure of the International System**

The structure of the system at the end of WWII with a defeated Germany and Japan was one which moved from a multipolar world to one centered on two economic and military superpowers (U.S. and USSR). The economic and military power these two brought was tremendous. The USSR had suffered devastating economic and human loss but its wartime victory came with territorial gains and restored Russia to "something akin to that of the period 1814-1848."<sup>111</sup> By 1950, that included a massive military with 4.3 million men and expenditures of \$15.5 billion on defense that year.<sup>112</sup> Russia's economic growth would not recover from WWII for about ten years and during this time it was still very poor.<sup>113</sup> The U.S. was the superior superpower. It was the only country to have grown richer during WWII and its

economy was the largest in the world.<sup>114</sup> Its Navy, Air Force, and nuclear weapons arguably gave it the strongest military in the world as in 1950 it had 1.38 million men and spent \$14.5 billion on defense.<sup>115</sup> It had dominated atomic weapons but with the Soviet detonation of a bomb in 1949, the two superpowers were again alone at the top, but atomic weapons gave them a totally new aspect of strategy to consider.<sup>116</sup> Another WWII lesson was that “in a protracted and full-scale coalition war, the countries with the deepest purse had prevailed in the end.”<sup>117</sup>

A bipolar international structure had formed by 1947 as the two superpowers sought to put more nations into their respective camps. The U.S. used things like NATO, the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine to keep the west together and to hold back the social discontent in Europe and the emerging Soviet influence.<sup>118</sup> The U.S. security treaties and forward military bases were tied in with economic influence and this led to the Korean War.<sup>119</sup> France pulling out of NATO in 1966 challenged the U.S. and as the Europeans got stronger, they pushed *rapprochement* on the U.S. and the USSR. This was driven by the structuralist argument of re-centering and returning to a multipolar structure and was also a rebellion against Russia’s drive to push Western Europe down and against U.S. support of corrupt regimes (like Vietnam).<sup>120</sup> Henry Kissinger saw a shift towards a multipolar world in 1973, and according to Kennedy by 1979 the U.S. was pursuing balance-of-power politics.<sup>121</sup> In the 1950s, China and Russia became friends as China accepted Russian aid and they were both outspoken critics of U.S. policy. Things unraveled between China and Russia from 1959-1972 and the communist side of the bipolar world was badly split (although the U.S. did not realize how bad for years).<sup>122</sup> By 1972, the USSR had 1/3 more divisions along the border with China than it did in Eastern Europe.<sup>123</sup>

The volume of world trade and growth in industrial output after 1945 was extraordinary; the third world did not think it was getting a fair share and pushed to remedy that situation.<sup>124</sup> America's exaggerated view of the threat led it to focus on the bipolar conflict with the Soviet Union above all else.<sup>125</sup> Even though there may have been a mutual U.S.-Soviet interest on a Third World issue, the U.S. would not pursue it because of "ideology", and ended up getting less cooperation than they might have otherwise received.<sup>126</sup> Through aid or coercion, superpowers pushed most third world nations into one camp or the other. In the late 1970s, a Non-Aligned Movement formed in which some countries tried to stay out of the bipolar fray. These countries showed that they were not just pawns but were influential as they destabilized the superpower relationship and détente could not be sustained.<sup>127</sup> The U.S. and Russia thought too highly of their impact in Third World areas as nationalism (and the structure and desire for national prominence) was of higher priority than an ideology or being part of a great east-west battle.<sup>128</sup>

The economic and ideological difficulties in the Third World were part of a more complex international environment which ended up changing the international structure to a point where the U.S. and USSR ended the bipolarity of the Cold War. The economic failure of the Soviet system was also instrumental in its collapse. The Soviet Union had a long-term decline in growth starting in 1959, and its relative economic standing continued to fall.<sup>129</sup> Its satellites had the same problem and used "creeping capitalism" to try to fight it but could not.<sup>130</sup> The actual end came when Soviet leaders saw that they could not maintain the economic strain and needed to integrate into the world's capitalist system and reduce defense spending.<sup>131</sup> As the Warsaw Pact and other Soviet Republics broke away, the USSR dissolved, effectively ending the bipolar world and showing the predominance of the "world capitalist system" over nonstandard state ventures and its impact on the world's political structure.



## **Substance of U.S.-Russian relationship**

The uneasy WWII alliance between the U.S. and USSR turned into realist power struggles of disagreements over spheres of influence and by 1947 these disagreements had turned into a Cold War between the two superpowers. The Soviets used their proximity to neighboring countries and the Americans used their monopoly on atomic weapons and economic muscle to try to increase their positions. The U.S. cut off the lend-lease program and the Soviets rejected further American money as they had political conditions tied to them.<sup>132</sup>

Four chief features of the Cold War emerged as the U.S. and USSR both sought to establish a new balance of power, which individually favored them from a security and economic perspective. The first is the “intensification of the split” in Europe.<sup>133</sup> The Eastern and Western blocs increasingly were divided. The political, economic, and military rivalries hardened and both superpowers challenged each other’s will.<sup>134</sup> The U.S. used a strategy of containment to tell the Soviets areas that absolutely could not become communist and also used aid to help nations resist Soviet subversion.<sup>135</sup> A second feature of the Cold War was the “steady *lateral* escalation from Europe itself into the rest of the world.”<sup>136</sup> These conflicts occurred all over the world, even as the U.S. picked up guarantees that the British once held.<sup>137</sup> These crises pitted communist against free (or better said, “anti-communist”) forces to see who could head a country’s government and the other to see how far an insurgency could go. The U.S. had a deep fear of losing Asia; the Korean War and support of Taiwan and Allied efforts in Malaya and Indochina confirmed this.<sup>138</sup> China itself became a bitter foe in the bipolar matchup in the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>139</sup> The third feature of the Cold War was the increasing arms race between these two blocs. The arms race had many levels and many sides including a large increase in naval and space expenditures.<sup>140</sup> The nuclear race was critical as neither side felt they could fall behind or

they would risk “losing”.<sup>141</sup> The last feature of the Cold War was the “creation by both Russia and the West of alliances across the globe.”<sup>142</sup> The U.S. felt it had to “contain” the communist plan and action showing a perceived quest for world domination.<sup>143</sup> The USSR felt it was defending its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and surrounding countries from Western forward bases and anti-Communist forces who were trying to “pack” the United Nations.<sup>144</sup> The Soviets used this to justify its domestic actions to fight the Cold War and the cycle continued for four decades.<sup>145</sup>

The U.S. was the sole atomic power from 1945-1949, but it was unsure how to use the nuclear strategy to its benefit.<sup>146</sup> According to Taubman, the threat did not appear to influence Stalin in any of his actions in Eastern Europe.<sup>147</sup> With the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in September 1949, the atomic and soon to be nuclear arms race was on. This nuclear capability added a new variable to all negotiations. The “nuclear diplomacy” brought with it the constant threat of escalation and concepts like flexible response and mutually assured destruction.

### **Quality of U.S.-Russian Relationship and Motivations of Actors**

The U.S.-Russian relationship from 1945-1989 can be characterized as two hostile states, vying for dominance in a bipolar world; however, neither side wanted to risk a nuclear war so each stopped short of actions they thought would trigger one. These two actors continued to have a realist worldview and were motivated by the bipolar structure they were in. Soviet security and protection from a strengthened Germany but also economic viability were motivators in the USSR’s initial moves to provide a buffer zone in Eastern Europe. “Promoting the Communist world revolution was a secondary but not unconnected consideration, since Russia’s strategic and political position was most likely to be enhanced if it could create other

Marxist-led states which looked to Moscow for guidance.”<sup>148</sup> This demonstrates that as the leader of one side of the bipolar system, Russia would use ideology to maintain and increase that leadership position. The two superpowers went through cycles of confrontation and détente throughout the Cold War. Despite one more cycle of heating up in the 1980s, the economic and political seed had been sewn for the Soviet Union to lose its control of Eastern Europe and thus for the start of another structural change; this time to a unipolar world enroute to a multipolar world.

The setup of post-WWII Europe laid the foundation for the Cold War. FDR tried to set all of Europe up with free elections that he thought would lead to a democratic, capitalist Europe and a U.S./U.K. centered world system.<sup>149</sup> Stalin tried to setup Eastern Europe to provide that security buffer to Germany as well as provide a world system that had a large communist contingent of which the Soviet Union was the security and economic center.<sup>150</sup> At the end of the Yalta Conference, FDR used the Declaration of Liberated Europe as a way to achieve his vision of the international structure by obtaining agreement that all parties would help solve the economic and political problems of the people in former Axis occupied territory by democratic means.<sup>151</sup> He hoped that Stalin would abide by the agreement but if not, FDR could use it to rally domestic and international support against the USSR (and Truman ended up doing that).<sup>152</sup> Stalin thought this was only rhetorical cover for FDR and took a very different view of the definitions inside of the Declaration.<sup>153</sup>

One cause of the Cold War was the “tension between the American principle of self-determination and Russian security needs.”<sup>154</sup> The Cold War is marked as starting in 1947, and not when the Bolshevik revolution occurred in 1917, because it really was not about ideology but about the shift in balance of power and the structure of the system.<sup>155</sup> Ideology did play a role in

the bipolar structure but instead of being the cause, it became what the leaders used to endorse their idea of what the international structure should be.<sup>156</sup> The Truman Doctrine laid out the good versus evil mantra and stated there was a choice between the two sets of ideological principles.<sup>157</sup> The USSR did want to make the world communist but this falls second to the desire of the USSR to improve its standing as a world power. As a realist, Stalin would limit himself to what he thought he could get away with but he still had to “put food on the table.”

There was a perception throughout the Cold War by both sets of leaders that the other side had hostile intent.<sup>158</sup> Truman’s “get tough” policy started in February 1946, when the U.S. said, “negotiations would continue, but future concessions would have to come from Moscow.”<sup>159</sup> Truman interpreted Soviet policy as hostile and seeing the influence from Republican hostility to the Soviet Union and fearing U.S. public opinion turning, he proceeded down the simplistic road of the “ideological” Cold War and Stalin’s unwillingness to change did not detour it.<sup>160</sup> Although both states are responsible for the Cold War, Stalin was less domestically constrained and had more freedom of action to stop it.<sup>161</sup> Once the lines were drawn and the Cold War started, the Soviets were more aggressive in their expansion efforts than the U.S.; however once on defense, the U.S. often used offense to push back. The U.S. then committed to this bipolar structure in order to try to make it “beneficial to the needs of western capitalism”.<sup>162</sup> It created the International Monetary Fund and the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and was able to set the world’s economic rules, thus pressing its advantage in the capitalist world system and increasing its standing in the world political system.<sup>163</sup>

Each societal factor (military, economic, and political) as well as individual leaders reacted to this bipolar structure to hold proxy wars. The militaries were both constantly trying to one up each other with conventional or nuclear capabilities.<sup>164</sup> Both states produced new and

better military hardware and provided aid to other nations to try to win them over. The personality and ideology of leaders like Stalin, FDR, Truman, Kennedy, and Khrushchev along with their domestic political audience and their states' political system (democracy vs communism) certainly impacted how the states did things but the state was reacting to the structure, not to the leader or ideology. The bipolar structure itself is what kept these two adversaries trying to increase their power at the expense of the other.

The main reason the U.S. won the Cold War is that it was part of “two overlapping but distinct systems”: the Cold War system and the world capitalist system; whereas the military burdened, economically inefficient Soviet Union only fit into the Cold War system “defined by the geopolitical division of Europe and its extension to parts of the Third World, the existence of nuclear weapons, and ideological conflict.”<sup>165</sup> Although U.S. economic growth was in relative decline, it was still number one by far.<sup>166</sup> This author agrees with Crockatt that economics and security are the two main players that drove the end of the Cold War.<sup>167</sup>

## **1990-2008**

### **Structure of the International System**

The structure of the system at the end of the Cold War moved to a unipolar world with the U.S. as the sole global hegemon. The economic and military advantage the U.S. maintained over the rest of the world was stunning. As this new system evolved in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, states such as China and Russia have attempted to increase their economic and military power at the expense of U.S. power. More states have joined the European Union as it attempts to compete with the United States in global commerce. The United Nations has taken a

more prominent role in worldwide issues from war to social rights. Here again is the friction of realist states seeking political power operating within a “capitalist world system”.

When Russia looks at the international system, it sees a shift in the distribution of material power, a fractured western alliance, new and unresolved conflicts and security threats.<sup>168</sup> The costly ongoing U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan (2001-present) and Iraq (2003-present) plus the economic recession starting in 2008 have decreased U.S. dominance of the system. The U.S. is declining and losing control of the global political environment.<sup>169</sup> U.S.-Russian relations should be viewed within this larger global systems framework of centering, de-centering, and re-centering in that “decades of playing global policeman weaken the economic underpinnings of hegemony itself” and have lead to the upcoming multipolar world.<sup>170</sup> All of this has pushed the system back towards a multipolar one.

### **Substance of U.S.-Russian relationship**

When the Soviet Union dissolved, neither the U.S. nor Russia had a clear road map of how things could or should proceed in the former Soviet bloc. Russia’s transition from communist state to pseudo-capitalist democracy showed the strains of having had inefficient governance and no substantive capitalist economic methodology. The U.S. supported Boris Yeltsin heavily for the first few years with economic and political advice as well as private investment but the transition from a communist command economy to a capitalist democracy was challenging and Yeltsin did not have the domestic structure or support to actually set up functioning, effective institutions.<sup>171</sup> After a tumultuous eight years in office where he governed poorly, corruption and mob crime was rampant, foreign investment had fled the country, and anti-western sentiment was high, he left office in 1999.<sup>172</sup>

During the first decade after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. attempted to put Russia into the European camp and treat it as a middle-tier European country that, if they straightened out their economy, government, and foreign policy, they might eventually join the top tier of European states. The U.S. was attempting to maintain its political and economic dominance of the international structure and bring Russia within that structure; however, the U.S. drive for dominance also distanced the Russians in many areas. The U.S. encouraged eastern European states and former Soviet republics to join NATO and was supportive of European efforts to get them into the EU. The US pressed former Soviet republics to ensure gas and oil pipeline routes would run west and not north through Russia, trying to give the U.S. access to these resources and more access for U.S. business.<sup>173</sup> Russia (who still saw themselves as a superpower) perceived U.S. actions as a direct military threat and as a way to infringe on Russia's near abroad.<sup>174</sup> The Russians did not go along with this and retreated from any semblance of Atlanticism they showed and have vowed to be their own nation with their own foreign policy and own rules.<sup>175</sup> Russia challenged the western normative agenda by rejecting western attempts to enforce "democratizationism".<sup>176</sup>

The War on Terror has been an area where Russia and the U.S. have had some common ground. In the 1990s, the U.S. was critical of Russian treatment of breakaway republics and dissenters. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S., Russia offered overflight rights and gave approval for U.S. aircraft to operate from countries in Russia's immediate neighborhood. The U.S. returned the favor by providing increased moral support for Russia in its fight against Chechen rebels.

## **Quality of U.S.-Russian Relationship and Motivations of Actors**

The U.S.-Russian relationship from 1990-2008 can be characterized as the interaction between a now victorious hegemon, who believes it is well-meaning, trying to help the vanquished foe, who does not think it needs helped and does not see the hegemon as well-meaning. These two actors continued to have a realist worldview and were motivated by the unipolar structure they were in. Russia has several structural factors that affect it: the evolving international order, the normative constraints of international society, and pressures arising from democratic development.<sup>177</sup> According to Averre, Russia's only real ideology currently is material gain, in which Russia will push realist policies but specifically those that maximize economic gain.<sup>178</sup>

The U.S. motivation in trying to help Russia with its initial transition to “democracy” and capitalism was structural—to maintain the U.S. role as *the* superpower and not allow Russia to be a bipolar rival any longer. Other factors spurring this action included the desire for liberty to spread (political-societal) and for access to new markets for American goods (economic-societal). These certainly supported Presidents G.H.W. Bush and Clintons' decisions (individual) in their drives to help, but it was structure based, not who the Russians were. After its defeat in the Cold War and the resulting system shift, Russia was driven by that system to accept help from the remaining hegemon to get back on its feet economically and politically and into the system so it could be a major power again.

Although mutual war on terror support initially eased tensions, Russia showed its displeasure with the U.S. drive for EU and NATO membership for Russia's near-abroad by pointing out U.S. human rights' violations at Guantanamo Bay and Abu-Ghraib. Russia's new struggle in trying to move the structure from unipolar to multipolar ensured it would push back



against the U.S. perceived encroachment on its near-abroad. Russia was trying to draw a line so when it violated human rights while expanding its power, the U.S. would be less able to voice an objection. Russian actions were a result of its realist desire to maximize power while still maximizing its economic growth.

## CONCLUSION

What will be the character of the next system? What will U.S.-Russian relations be like? This paper used historical analysis to explore the structure of the international system in four periods between 1815 and 2008. It examined historical relationships to show that Russia and the U.S. were motivated by the international structure that they were in and that structure can explain the patterns of continuity and change in the U.S.-Russian relationship. It gave some specific examples of U.S. and Russian interest-based realist reactions within the “capitalist world system.” Below are some recommendations on how the U.S. can use its foreign policy towards Russia in order to influence outcomes of future state alignments and how the U.S.-Russian relationship can proceed in the current environment.

The international structure and its movement can be explained by realist states working inside of the “capitalist world system.” As learned from the Cold War, “the rule seems common to *all* national units, whatever their favored political economy, that uneven rates of economic growth would, sooner or later, lead to shifts in the world’s political and military balances.”<sup>179</sup> The structure change is not based on ideology. The previously discussed Soviet-Chinese split from 1959-1972 is an example that shows the two states’ decisions were not based on a communist ideology but on realist policies of structure and security.<sup>180</sup> The U.S. even

considered siding with the Soviets against the Chinese in 1960; that shows the realist mentality that leaders have as they work within the international structure.<sup>181</sup>

This writer agrees with one constructivist idea that, “in all politics...actors reproduce or alter systems through their actions” and that fundamental changes to the systems occur when those actors change the rules and norms of their political practices.<sup>182</sup> But what makes the actor take action? The answer lies in the existing world capitalist system and the realist desire to maximize power within “their pain-gain equilibrium” to either maintain the status quo system or to try to change the system.<sup>183</sup> Individuals themselves, societal factors (military, economic, political), and even identity factors explain the result of how leaders implement where the structure takes them. The motivation is to shape the system to what is best for the power of one’s state while knowingly working within a capitalist world system.<sup>184</sup>

## **Recommendations**

The question for the U.S. is how to balance the tension between the capitalist world system (businesses, banks, etc.) and the political world (diplomacy and grand strategy). The historical lessons of Europe’s 18<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> century systems changes can be useful when looking at today’s, but especially tomorrow’s structure. The European Concert “protected the rights, interests, and equal status of the great powers above all” but committed them to “respect for treaties, noninterference in other states’ internal affairs...and a general observance of legality and restraint in their international actions.”<sup>185</sup> As a multipolar world emerges, the great powers should incorporate this mentality. Another lesson learned is that a state does not need to “eliminate the threat posed by the existence of their rivals” by trying to reduce major powers to second-rate states.<sup>186</sup> The U.S. needs to recognize that countries with the sizes, populations and

industrial capacities like Russia and China should always be treated like major powers, even when their current system of government or economy has them far behind the U.S. Lastly, the U.S. should emulate the post-Vienna (1815) practice that “each power saw the other as a potential rival to be managed by ostensible friendship” versus as an enemy.<sup>187</sup> The techniques a nation uses against a rival are different than those used against an enemy.

How can the U.S.-Russian relationship better proceed in the current and future international systems? The U.S. first needs to acknowledge that the existing international structure drives the current U.S.-Russia relationship. That structure is comprised of a realist state system asymmetrically interacting with a capitalist world system. The world is now moving from a unipolar to a multipolar world and the U.S. needs to make decisions that are in the best long term economic health of the U.S. instead of those that are for short term political gains. Since the capitalist world system ends up providing states with their economic and military power, the U.S. must stay competitive in the global economy or its decline will be more rapid. U.S. foreign policy should look at Russia as a competitor but not as an enemy. The U.S. should examine each issue from the Russian perspective within the current structure. If the U.S. acknowledges where Russia is and why, it may at least understand the logic of Russian policy and may not over interpret immediate problems that arise.

As the new multipolar structure emerges, the U.S. must acknowledge it, and know the end goals of the U.S. in that structure. The U.S. should use a deliberate realist policy to achieve those end goals. If the U.S. accurately understands its relative strength in the capitalist world system, it can better drive long-term U.S. policy in the political and economic systems. The U.S. should anticipate other actors follow their roles in the structure and should plan accordingly and not be “surprised” when someone makes a move counter to U.S. intentions. The U.S. should use

all four of its instruments of power to influence other actors in the international system and to influence how fast the international structure changes.

When dealing with other states like Russia, there is a fine line in shaping the global environment between the dangers of accommodation and that of bellicose rhetoric. Accommodation encourages states to take when they can because they do not see any external limits set for them, like when Russia took Poland after WWII.<sup>188</sup> Bellicose rhetoric allows the opposing state to undermine one's goals by organizing peace offensives and getting international support against "the aggressor", as the Soviet Union did right after WWII and in 1983. The Soviets in the Cold War committed a lot of economic and scientific resources to stay modernized and avoid the increasing obsolescence it faced after 1815, as it was determined not to be left behind.<sup>189</sup> The Russians' determination to not be left behind will be ever-present and the U.S. needs to put that reality in its' calculation when establishing its Russian foreign policy.

When the U.S. has established military bases in many countries that neighbor Russia, invited many former Eastern European and former Soviet states to become part of NATO, implemented missile defense in Eastern Europe, and pushed Russia to the side on the diplomatic world stage, does the U.S. not expect Russia to push back? With the invasion of Georgia in August 2008, Russia took a step in setting its boundaries for its near abroad and moving towards a multipolar structure. The question now is in this increasingly multipolar world, is the U.S. going to learn from lessons in the past and treat Russia as a competitor or as an illogical enemy?

## Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

<sup>1</sup> McCormick, "World Systems", 130.

<sup>2</sup> McCormick uses Immanuel Wallerstein's 1975 work *The Modern World-System* as a basis for his discussion on World system theory. There is a longer definition on McCormick, "World Systems", 125.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 128.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 129.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 127.

<sup>6</sup> See Britain after 1815 and the U.S. after 1945.

<sup>7</sup> McCormick, "World Systems", 129.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 130.

<sup>10</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Power*, 439.

<sup>11</sup> Schroeder cites stats showing a 7:1 or 8:1 difference when taking into account population size and years compared. Schroeder, "19<sup>th</sup>-Century International System", 11.

<sup>12</sup> Schroeder, "19<sup>th</sup>-Century International System", 11.

<sup>13</sup> Reasons normally given for the 19<sup>th</sup> century being more peaceable than the 18<sup>th</sup> century that do not hold up because they were very similar in both centuries are: war weariness or desire for peace; Holy Alliance spirit; leaders moving away from nationalism. For more details, see Schroeder, "19<sup>th</sup>-Century International System", 11.

<sup>14</sup> Schroeder, "19<sup>th</sup>-Century International System", 11.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> The Crimean War did not become a major war as no boundaries moved and the treaty system did not change. Schroeder, "19<sup>th</sup>-Century International System", 5-6.

<sup>17</sup> Schroeder, "19<sup>th</sup>-Century International System", 8.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 7-8.

<sup>19</sup> Questions raised from the 19<sup>th</sup> century are questions that need answers in any era: "How to ensure the security and status of great powers while curbing great-power hegemony and imperialism"; "how to shield the overall system and its central power-political relationships from shocks emanating from peripheral conflicts"; and "how to reconcile the independence and security of smaller states with the inevitable determination of great powers to exercise influence beyond their borders and to protect their wider interests". Schroeder, "19<sup>th</sup>-Century International System", 26.

<sup>20</sup> Examples of this diplomacy can be found in Schroeder, "19<sup>th</sup>-Century International System", 13-15.

<sup>21</sup> Schroeder, "19<sup>th</sup>-Century International System", 17.

<sup>22</sup> Poland was the exception. Schroeder, "19<sup>th</sup>-Century International System", 17-25.

<sup>23</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 439.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 143.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> "Second half of century that railways, telegraphs, quick-firing guns, steam propulsion, and armored warships really became decisive indicators of military strength." K, 143.

<sup>27</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 144.

<sup>28</sup> "Even Russia, whose claims to the lion's share of Polish territories had finally to be conceded, was considerably shaken at the beginning of 1815 by the threat of an Anglo-French-Austrian alliance to resist dictation over the future of Saxony, and quickly backed down from a confrontation. No power, it appeared, would be permitted to impose its wishes upon the rest of Europe in the way Napoleon had done. The egoism of the leading states had in no way been evaporated by the events of 1793-1815 but the twin principles of "containment and reciprocal compensation" meant that a unilateral grasp for domination of Europe was now unlikely; and that even small-scale territorial changes would need the approval of a majority of the members of the Concert." Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 138.

<sup>29</sup> "The alliance system itself virtually guaranteed that the war would *not* be swiftly decided, and meant in turn

## Notes

that victory in this lengthy duel would go—as in the great coalition wars of the eighteenth century—to the side whose combination of both military/naval *and* financial/industrial/technological resources was the greatest.” Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 256.

<sup>30</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 170.

<sup>31</sup> Russia had a “general lack of capital, low consumer demand, a minuscule middle class, vast distances and extreme climates, and the heavy hand of an autocratic, suspicious state made the prospects for industrial “takeoff” in Russia more difficult than in virtually anywhere else in Europe.” The government was more concerned about political reliability and so “emphasized hierarchy, obedience, and caution” over reforms. K 170-172.

<sup>32</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 169-172.

<sup>33</sup> The loss caused an attempt at many reforms including getting rid of serfdom, industrializing, building railroads, and an increase in military spending.. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 173-177

<sup>34</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 233-234, 252.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 178.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 179.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 178-182.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 242.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 246-247.

<sup>40</sup> Thomas, *Russo-American Relations*, 167-169.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 168-170.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 168-170.

<sup>43</sup> Beisner, *Old Diplomacy to the New*, 46.

<sup>44</sup> Thomas, *Russo-American Relations*, 147.

<sup>45</sup> Diplomatic correspondence quoted by Thomas, *Russo-American Relations*, 165.

<sup>46</sup> After the deal was made, Seward was roundly criticized for wasting taxpayer money and it took some political wrangling to get the treaty ratified and the money paid to Russia. More details on the House proceedings, bribery, and delayed payment at Jensen, *The Alaska Purchase*, 100-141 and Thomas, *Russo-American Relations*, Thomas, *Russo-American Relations*, 151-164.

<sup>47</sup> Thomas, *Russo-American Relations*, 166.

<sup>48</sup> Beisner, *Old Diplomacy to the New*, 2.

<sup>49</sup> New Diplomacy was created when there was a mix of social problems, an economic crisis, and a threat to exports to Europe and China along with natural growth, nationalism, and imperialist thought. More detail in Beisner, *Old Diplomacy to the New*, 72-84.

<sup>50</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 247.

<sup>51</sup> This included sending letters to foreign ministers telling each one that all others had agreed to Hay’s ideas when in actuality they had not. Hay used this tactic to pressure states to sign onto the “Open Door Policy”. For more specifics, see Beisner, *Old Diplomacy to the New*, 145-152.

<sup>52</sup> A treaty in 1855 and another in 1875 settled some of the disputes but continual friction over territory and China remained. Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire*, 438-445, 579-597.

<sup>53</sup> Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire*, 590.

<sup>54</sup> Details on the siege of Port Arthur, the Battle of Mukden, and other battles can be found in Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire*, 590-596.

<sup>55</sup> Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire*, 586.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 597 and Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 247.

<sup>57</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 235.

<sup>58</sup> Beisner, *Old Diplomacy to the New*, 46.

<sup>59</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 263.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 278-279.

<sup>61</sup> Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were some of the nations formed. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 275.

<sup>62</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 277-278.

<sup>63</sup> German reparations and Allied war debts hurt relations between all. With the allies in debt to the U.S., “Bolsheviks’ repudiating Russia’s massive borrowings of \$3.6 billion”, Germans saying they can’t possibly

## Notes

pay, and allies saying they won't pay the U.S. until they get paid, this set the scene "for years of bitter wrangling, which sharply widened the gap in political sympathies between western Europe and a disgruntled United States." Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 278-281.

<sup>64</sup> The Wilsonian worldview was initially the dominant western view but faded as the Russians' were left out of the League, the U.S. did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles which created the League, and the WWI losers did not gain membership for several years Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 290.

<sup>65</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 284.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 335.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 284.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 285.

<sup>70</sup> Germany's heavy military growth started in 1933 and it needed more raw materials to keep that going. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 285, 307.

<sup>71</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 338-339..

<sup>72</sup> Hitler's double cross of the Soviet Union started a second front and Japan's attack and Germany's subsequent declaration of war on the United States brought the U.S. into the war on the side of the Allies in 1941. Japan was growing strong militarily and economically but needed to stop the western economic blackmailing. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 299.

<sup>73</sup> Population, industrial production, and agriculture all suffered. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 321.

<sup>74</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 322.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 326-327, 339-340.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 339-341.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 327.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 328.

<sup>79</sup> Saul, *War and Revolution*, 93.

<sup>80</sup> The Root commission looking at assistance in government setup can be found in Saul, *War and Revolution*, 124-135. War and relief information is in Saul, *War and Revolution*, 95-, 98.

<sup>81</sup> More details in Saul, *War and Revolution*, 156-177.

<sup>82</sup> Saul, *War and Revolution*, 184.

<sup>83</sup> More detail on Bolshevik revolution and U.S. reaction is in Saul, *War and Revolution*, 182-242.

<sup>84</sup> Saul, *War and Revolution*, 242.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 248-249.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 293, 311.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 312-327.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 372, 375..

<sup>89</sup> Bennett, *Search for Security*, 23.

<sup>90</sup> Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 5.

<sup>91</sup> Bennett, *Search for Victory*, 69-70.

<sup>92</sup> Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy*, 5.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>95</sup> Discussions were held on issues ranging from military and economic relations to settlement of previous political disputes. Soviet representative Martens established an office in the U.S. to encourage trade relations. American business had significant interest in pursuing trade relations with Russia. A "large number of concrete agreements were reached between the two countries including continued operation of the American Red Cross in Russia, the transfer of war materials from the Russian army to the Americans, the sale of strategic supplies of platinum from the Bolsheviks to the United States, and the exemption of a number of American corporations from Soviet government nationalization decrees." These could have been viewed as a success. McFadden, *Alternate Paths*, 187-188.

<sup>96</sup> U.S. Secretary of State Lansing thought Bolshevism was evil and advised President Wilson against diplomatic recognition and for a military dictatorship. He ignored information on cooperation and eventually

## Notes

broke relations in August 1920. President Wilson and his advisors allowed their personal ideals versus the demands of practical politics and did not maintain the friendship with Russia. McFadden, *Alternate Paths*, 50-54.

<sup>97</sup> McFadden, *Alternate Paths*, 40.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 50-54.

<sup>99</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 371.

<sup>100</sup> Bennett, *FDR and Search for Security*, xiv.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, xiii.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, xiii, 94.

<sup>103</sup> Norman A. Graebner in Bennett, *FDR and Search for Security*, viii.

<sup>104</sup> The balancing act between the three can be seen in Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 1-31.

<sup>105</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 371.

<sup>106</sup> Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 133.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, 134.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.

<sup>109</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 364.

<sup>110</sup> Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 357-359.

<sup>111</sup> Its territorial boundaries expanded at the expense of Finland, Poland, Rumania, Prussia, Czechoslovakia. It also occupied Manchuria and North Korea. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 361.

<sup>112</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 384.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 362-263.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, 357-358.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 384.

<sup>116</sup> Britain was third with 680,000 men and \$2.3 billion in defense spending. Italy, France, and the other powers were hit hard with massive debt and their numbers were below those of the top three (China was technically \$0.2B higher in 1950 but Kennedy says the figures are imprecise and Britain was higher in the surrounding 6 years.) Japan and Germany were occupied and their military, infrastructure, and economy were in shambles. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 384.

<sup>117</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 356.

<sup>118</sup> Leffler, *Specter of Communism*, 56-57.

<sup>119</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 360.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, 403, 407.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, 408, 410.

<sup>122</sup> Mao did not always follow Stalinist dogma, USSR worked with Chian Kai-shek's Nationalists, debates over India clashes, lack of Soviet nuclear support of China, K 397.

<sup>123</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 399.

<sup>124</sup> See Kennedy's charts. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 413-414, 416.

<sup>125</sup> Johnson, *Improbable Dangers*, 212.

<sup>126</sup> Examples of exaggeration costing the U.S. in Europe, the Third World, and with nuclear issue are in Johnson, *Improbable Dangers*, 210-213.

<sup>127</sup> Nijman, "Limits of Superpower", 681.

<sup>128</sup> Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War*, 113, 178.

<sup>129</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 430.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, 431.

<sup>131</sup> Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War*, 357-359.

<sup>132</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 362.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 374-375.

<sup>134</sup> Military rivalries included the Berlin crisis of 1948-1949. An example of the political rivalry is the Brezhnev Doctrine "any country which had become Communist should not be permitted to abandon that creed". Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 377-378.

<sup>135</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 376.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 379.



## Notes

- <sup>137</sup> Examples of the spread include crises or conflicts in: Iran, East Indies, Malaya, Vietnam, and China. Turkey and Greece had their guarantees pass from Britain to the U.S.. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 380-381.
- <sup>138</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 382-383.
- <sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 383.
- <sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 383-388.
- <sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, 387.
- <sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, 388.
- <sup>143</sup> The Berlin Wall and Cuban Missile Crisis showed the U.S. that the USSR was aggressive. The U.S. fear was of the third world countries looking for planned economies. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 388-391.
- <sup>144</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 372.
- <sup>145</sup> The Soviets said Western actions was pushing a U.S./UK dominated world. That justified “its crackdown upon internal dissidents, its tightening grip upon eastern Europe, its forced industrialization, its heavy spending upon armaments.” Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 372
- <sup>146</sup> Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War*, 54-58.
- <sup>147</sup> Taubman, *Stalin’s American Policy*, 110.
- <sup>148</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 373.
- <sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 374.
- <sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, 373.
- <sup>151</sup> Bennett, *FDR and Search for Victory*, 160-161.
- <sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, 160, 168.
- <sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, 160-161.
- <sup>154</sup> Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 17.
- <sup>155</sup> Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War*, 88.
- <sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>157</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 371-372.
- <sup>158</sup> Taubman, *Stalin’s American Policy*, 8-9.
- <sup>159</sup> Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 356.
- <sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, 296-297, 313, 352.
- <sup>161</sup> More detail on the origins of the Cold war can be found in Gaddis, *Origins of the Cold War*, 353-361.
- <sup>162</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 359.
- <sup>163</sup> Minus Russia of course, who saw that this was incompatible with socialist controls. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 360.
- <sup>164</sup> Nuclear diplomacy was also motivated by the bipolar structure. As neither power could afford to appear as the weaker opponent for fear of losing power, both parties had to have enough nuclear weapons to bring an unbeatable capability to the negotiating table (from a civilization standpoint). As each world event heated up, the U.S. and USSR’s adherence to the bipolar structure was essential in ensuring things like mutual assured destruction worked. Nuclear weapons had the possibility to make every issue important as now every disagreement had a potential for nuclear escalation and that had to be factored in to the actors’ realist calculations.
- <sup>165</sup> Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War*, 370-371.
- <sup>166</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 432-435.
- <sup>167</sup> Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War*, 370-371.
- <sup>168</sup> Averre, “Russian Foreign Policy”, 30.
- <sup>169</sup> Nijman, “Limits of Superpower”, 681, 693.
- <sup>170</sup> McCormick, “World Systems”, 132.
- <sup>171</sup> LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, 392.
- <sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, 391-395.
- <sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, 389.
- <sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, 383.
- <sup>175</sup> Smith, “Masks of Proteus”, 490.
- <sup>176</sup> Averre, “Russian Foreign Policy”, 32.

## Notes

<sup>177</sup> According to Averre, “Russia’s necessary engagement with the international system requires external adaptations and influences internal developments.” Averre, “Russian Foreign Policy”, 28, 34.

<sup>178</sup> Averre, “Russian Foreign Policy”, 34.

<sup>179</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 436-437.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, 397-399.

<sup>181</sup> Dunbabin, *International Relations since 1945*, 283, 435.

<sup>182</sup> Koslowski and Kratochwil, “Understanding Change”, 216.

<sup>183</sup> McCormick, “World Systems”, 130.

<sup>184</sup> The constructivists stress the importance of “civil society, nationalism and self-identification.” They also say “international politics is not an autonomous sphere but always part of a larger endeavor...of institutionalizing both identities and political communities as well as their interactions.” This does not undo the logic of systems theory. Koslowski and Kratochwil, “Understanding Change”, 228.

<sup>185</sup> Schroeder, “19<sup>th</sup>-Century International System”, 12.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>188</sup> Taubman, *Stalin’s American Policy*, 8.

<sup>189</sup> Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, 363-364.

## Bibliography

- Averre, Derek. "Russian Foreign Policy and the Global Political Environment." *Problems of Post-Communism* 55, no. 5 (September 2008): 28-39. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 10, 2008).
- Beisner, Robert L. *From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900*. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1986.
- Bennett, Edward M. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1985.
- Bennett, Edward M. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Victory: American-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945*. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1990.
- Cohen, Warren I. *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Vol. IV: America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991*. New York: Cambridge University, 1993.
- Crockatt, Richard. *The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in world politics, 1941-1991*. New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Dunbabin, J.P.D. *International Relations since 1945: Vol. 1: The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies*. New York: Longman, 1994.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
- Jensen, Ronald J. *The Alaska Purchase and Russian-American Relations*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973.
- Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York: Vintage, 1987.
- Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline. "International History and International Relations Theory: A Dialogue beyond the Cold War." *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 76, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), 741-754. Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626457> (accessed 10 November 2008).
- Koslowski, Ray and Friedrich V. Kratochwil. "Understanding Change in International Politics: the Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System." *International Organization*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), 215-247. The MIT Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706931> (accessed 10 November 2008).

- Johnson, Robert H. *Improbably Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After*. New York: St. Martin's, 1994.
- LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-2006*. New York: McGraw Hill, 2008.
- Leffler, , Melvyn P. *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994.
- McCormick, Thomas, J. "World Systems." *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 77, No.1 (Jun., 1990), 125-132. Organization of American Historians. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2078644> (accessed 25 November 2008).
- McFadden, David W. *Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans, 1917-1920*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Nijman, Jan. "The Limits of Superpower: The United States and the Soviet Union since World War II." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 82, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), 681-695. Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Association of American Geographers. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2563695> (accessed 10 November 2008).
- Saul, Norman E. *War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914-1921*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001.
- Schroeder, Paul W. "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure." *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Oct., 1986), 1-26. The Johns Hopkins University Press <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010296> (accessed 10 November 2008).
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. *The Russian Empire: 1801-1917*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Smith, Graham. "The Masks of Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1999), 481-494. Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers). <http://www.jstor.org/stable/623236> (accessed 10 November 2008).
- Taubman, William. *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1982.
- Thomas, Benjamin P.. *Russo-American Relations: 1815-1867*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Man, the state, and war; a theoretical analysis*. New York: Columbia University, 1959.