Doctrinal Framework

The Doctrinal Nesting of Joint and U.S. Army Terminology

U.S. Army
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
White Paper

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The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
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# The Doctrinal Nesting of Joint and U.S. Army Terminology

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Background

The complicated and confusing world involving fragile states and insurgencies, requiring stability operations, makes the mission of the US military more complex. The merging and blending of doctrinal terms, without a clear understanding of what each term entails, increases the difficulty to prepare our forces to fight and win the nation’s wars. The use of these terms by various constituencies and stakeholders in ways that would advance their agenda without tying those definitions into a comprehensive framework has exacerbated the confusion. To clarify this terminology, PKSOI, Doctrine, Concepts, Education and Training (DCET) Division presents the following doctrinal analysis.

Prior to our review, PKSOI expected to find that Joint and U.S. Army doctrine would not present a coherent framework integrating stability, irregular warfare and security cooperation. Upon our review, we realized that doctrine is indeed nested within a coherent framework with some exceptions.

This paper describes the combined U.S. Army and Joint framework to ensure a common basis for discussion. First, it will establish the combined framework and describe its constituent parts. Next, it will discuss some of the issues with the current framework and finally, provide a glossary of the official terms and references. Recommendations to correct the different interpretations identified in this document will be provided in a separate document to the Combined Arms Center, Combined Arms Doctrine Division, and Joint Staff, J7, for their consideration and implementation.

Framework

The U.S. Army’s continuum of operations incorporates the Spectrum of Conflict and Operational Themes. The Spectrum of Conflict is an ascending scale of violence from stable peace to general war that nests within the Joint doctrine Range of Military Operations (ROMO) construct. As the level of violence increases, both Army and Joint doctrine categorize operations with common characteristics. Army doctrine identifies the character of a military operation in five operational themes including peacetime military engagement, limited intervention, peace operations and irregular warfare, allowing commanders to distinguish operations by their characteristics. Different themes can demand different approaches and force packages.

Joint doctrine also recognizes military operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns. PKSOI developed Figure 1 to show how the U.S. Army concept of the Spectrum of Conflict and operational themes from FM 3-0 can overlay the Joint concept of ROMO from JP 3-0 to provide a coherent operational framework.
Clarifying this nesting process provides the commanders and their staff a method to organize their forces and develop the plans that will lead to their success. The coherence of Joint and U.S. Army concepts continues as themes and operations develop in their refinement, showing that nesting also occurs when aligning U.S. Army operational themes with Joint military operations as described in FM 3-0 (see Figure 2).
**Stability**

The foundations for U.S. Army operations conducted outside the United States and its territories are reflected in the elements of Full Spectrum Operations (FSO): continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Just like offense and defense, stability is an important element of all overseas operations and is not exclusive to any specific operational theme or type. In the complex environment over the past ten years it has been the stability portion of FSO that has caused the most confusion to the commander and staff in how to execute stability tasks. The Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM) and academic community across the world works to clarify and define what happens in, and how to conduct, stability. Some consider stability as an entirely separate operation or phase and thus lose the opportunity to affect the population when they benefit the most.

Stability activities and missions are conducted across the entire spectrum from peace to war; in peacetime, conflict, and post-conflict operations; and in both traditional and irregular environments. U.S. Army and Joint doctrine comply with DoDD 3000.07(IW), which states that SO are a part of both traditional and irregular operations. All Joint operations are composed of balanced elements of offense, defense and stability tailored to the environment to accomplish US National Objectives. Stability is not a standalone type of military operation but encompasses various military missions, tasks, and activities. The proportion varies based upon the operation’s phase and time. This applies also for Civil Support Operations. PKSOI developed Figure 3 to build on Figure 1 demonstrating how the U.S. Army concept of FSO is applied across the Spectrum of Conflict and ROMO concepts.
Building Partner Capacity (BPC)

BPC is a whole of government approach and a central tenet of national policy and strategic guidance. The Department of Defense enables BPC through sustained military engagement in security cooperation and security force assistance in support of efforts to build partner capacity, shape the context of the environment, and create the conditions for successful wide area security.

BPC was introduced in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2006 QDR Execution Roadmap for Building Partnership Capacity defined BPC as “targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners.” The Department’s partners include all those with whom it cooperates to achieve the national goals.

In 2008, OSD published the first Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF grouped security cooperation activities into eight focus areas, one of which was *Operational Capacity and Capability Building* and defined it as “build usable, relevant and enduring partner capabilities while achieving US and partner objectives.” The GEF directed the
U.S. Army to focus roughly half of its security cooperation resources in terms of time, funding, and level of effort on the Global Core Partners (GCP) identified in the GEF.

The concept has been used in subsequent national level security documents.

- According to the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), Shaping Abroad, building this stronger foundation will support America’s efforts to shape an international system that can meet the challenges of our time.

- According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), Build Security Capacity of Partner States. “Security cooperation activities include bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales (FMS) and financing (FMF), officer exchange programs, educational opportunities at professional military schools, technical exchanges, and efforts to assist foreign security forces in building competency and capacity. U.S. forces, therefore, will continue to treat the building of partners’ security as an increasingly important mission.”

- According to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), America’s Interests and the Roles of Military Power. “Strong regional allies and partners are fundamental to meeting 21st century challenges successfully. Helping to build their capacity can help prevent conflict from beginning or escalating, reducing the possibility that large and enduring deployment of U.S. or allied forces would be required.”

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) and the PKSOI authored FM 3-07 (Stability Operations) in October, 2008 and defined the term “capacity building - the process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems.” Normally military forces support the host nation with security tasks however; the military may assist the host nation in the execution of the tasks for which the host nation is responsible. These capacity building tasks may include logistics, medical and administrative support.

TRADOC PAM 525-3-0, U.S. Army Capstone Concept states:

- U.S. Army leaders must “seek to integrate the activities of interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and private sector partners into U.S. Army operations. U.S. Army leaders must facilitate unity of effort despite diverse cultures and interests.”

TRADOC PAM 525-3-1, U.S. Army Operating Concept states:

- “The U.S. Army conducts sustained military engagement activities to increase partner security capacity, improve visibility of current and emerging threats, and contribute to combatant commander theater security cooperation efforts. Deployed U.S. Army forces and those operating overseas contribute to U.S. defense commitments and remain critical to the joint force’s efforts to deter conflict and advance common interests without resort to arms.”
This capacity building effort and support to other nations understandably requires a whole of government approach. References to this whole of government approach and the military’s support of this effort can be found in military doctrine. Military doctrine addresses BPC efforts through Nation Assistance, Security Cooperation and Foreign Internal Defense. Because BPC is at the national policy level, akin to Nation Assistance, and the military portion of BPC is clearly organized in doctrine, the military support of BPC should not require further explanation in doctrine.

- **Lexicon Nesting**

  In an effort to understand the logical build of taxonomy that follows, refer to Figure 4 for a pictorial description of proposed nesting relationships among nation assistance (NA), security cooperation (SC), security assistance (SA), security force assistance (SFA), irregular warfare (IW), foreign internal defense (FID) and counterinsurgency (COIN) within a host nation’s territory. Development of Figure 4 assumes:

  - NA is whole of government and/or military assistance within a host nation’s territory
  - IW is a violent struggle and does not occur in a stable environment
  - FID is a whole of government effort to support another government in IW
  - SC involves DOD interaction with foreign defense establishments and includes all US military activities in FID
  - SC and FID cannot occur without a host nation/coalition-civilian governing authority
  - SA programs are funded by DOS and administered by DOD/DCSA
  - FID Indirect Support, FID Direct Support, and FID Combat Operations may occur simultaneously
  - FID Indirect Support can incorporate elements of SFA and SA
  - FID Direct Support can incorporate elements of SFA, but not SA
  - FID Combat Operations cannot incorporate SA or SFA
  - SA can incorporate SFA, but not all SFA is SA
  - SFA can include some FID Indirect Support and some FID Direct Support, but not FID Combat Operations
  - COIN can be part FID Indirect Support, Direct Support and/or Combat Operations, but not all are part of COIN
  - COIN can occur outside of FID when the insurgency is against a military governing authority
Figure 4 does not show how offense, defense and stability cut through these concepts because as already stated above, in FSO there are always continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.

**Security Cooperation (SC)**

In Joint doctrine SC activity is defined as “military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan.” (JP 3-0)

In U.S. Army doctrine, SC is incorporated within the military peacetime engagement theme. These peacetime engagement activities support the combatant commander’s theater security plan through the implementation of training events, security assistance, recovery
operations, arms control and counterdrug activities. These activities will normally have participation by other nations as a combined training event or cooperative action. (FM 3-0)

By using both definitions, we can deduce that SC includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments that build defense relationships to promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

Therefore SC is an encompassing set of activities supporting not only peacetime military engagement but overlaps IW engagement. It incorporates elements of Security Assistance (SA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Security Force Assistance (SFA).

**Security Assistance (SA)**

SA encompasses programs or other statutes “by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.” (JP 3-0) SA supports Peace Operations intending to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and antiterrorism measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property.

In Joint doctrine, SA is how “…the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency.” (JP 3-22)

U.S. Army doctrine incorporates SA within the military peacetime engagement theme and the IW theme. SA includes many programs that provide assistance to foreign militaries in a variety of means. SA is a Peacetime Military Engagement when the country is not under a threat to its institutions and therefore special attention and focus does not need to be paid. SA can also be used in an indirect support role for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), as part of Irregular Warfare (IW) (FM 3-0). Both FID and SC incorporate SA as a means to assist a host nation.

**Irregular Warfare (IW)**

When a country is beset by violence that challenges its legitimacy then a different response is required. At this point, Army and Joint operations are assumed to be beyond peacetime engagement and have transitioned into IW.

The concept of IW has been used in different ways across the military and civilian communities. This inconsistency has caused confusion at the strategic level both in military use and civilian use. This inconsistency, regardless of how subtle, results in disparate interpretation across the community.
Joint doctrine portrays the nature of warfare as traditional or irregular warfare. Irregular Warfare is defined as: “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s),” and states “Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.” IW typically manifests itself as one or a combination of several possible forms including insurgency, terrorism, disinformation, propaganda, organized criminal activity (such as drug trafficking) (JP 3-0) This explanation identifies IW as an environment in which warfare takes place.

U.S. Army doctrine uses the Joint definition of IW, but uses it as an operational theme in full spectrum operations. Operational themes allow commanders to distinguish operations by their characteristics. Different themes can demand different approaches and force packages. Like any other full spectrum operation, IW includes combinations of offense, defense, and stability. Special operations are normally active in these types of operations, but conventional forces may also be involved, particularly in counterinsurgencies. IW differs from conventional operations dramatically in two aspects. First, it is warfare among the people. The conflict is waged not for military supremacy but for political power. Second, IW emphasizes the indirect approach.

**Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Counterinsurgency (COIN)**

The U.S. Government supports a host nation through that nation’s internal defense and development (IDAD) programs. The IDAD strategy is a whole of government approach “...to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other threats to its security.” (JP 3-22) The USG can support IDAD programs when the host nation experiences peace or conflict. During peace, the USG provides Nation Assistance support; however, when the nation falls into conflict, the USG focuses applies a whole of government approach into FID programs. This is where differences begin with regards to interpreting FID. Will the USG apply FID programs when there is no instability or will it only apply SC programs?

FID programs are conducted by civilian and military government agencies in support of another government, or designated organization, “to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.” (JP 3-22) This definition focuses USG support efforts during crises and instability and this instability would occur as a result of IW. The words “to free and protect” imply there is some level of crisis. FID programs, therefore, will only be implemented when a nation is experiencing internal security challenges or instability. The focus of FID assistance falls to the drivers of conflict and the ways to address the cause of instability.

Joint doctrine recognizes that in supporting IDAD through FID, the military is normally focused on Counterinsurgency (COIN), but states that FID activities can also assist the host nation in areas such as civil disorder, drug trafficking, and terrorism. FID is civil and military assistance that helps a country respond to a threat that it cannot handle on its own. FID
consists of three categories of programs: FID Indirect Support, FID Direct Support, and FID Combat Operations. FID indirect support provides equipment or training support in order to enhance the HN’s ability to conduct its own operations. FID direct support involves US forces actually conducting operations in support of the HN. In FID combat operations the US military may be required to conduct operations directly in the place of HN forces, particularly if HN security force capacity is still being developed.

U.S. Army doctrine states that FID and COIN occur as part of Irregular Warfare. FM 3-0 also recognizes indirect and direct support within FID. Indirect support to FID works to build host nation self-sufficiency where direct support involves U.S. forces directly assisting the host nation’s civilian populace or military forces. As part of FID, COIN involves activity taken by a government to defeat insurgency to reestablish the host nation government’s legitimacy.

Since an insurgency can occur anytime there is a governing authority, therefore COIN can also occur anytime, as long as there is a governing authority to defend its legitimacy. U.S. military forces can conduct COIN operations in support of a host nation or when no host nation governance exists. COIN in support of a host nation can occur through any category of FID, whether separately or simultaneously. COIN can also occur outside FID programs when only supporting a military governing authority. Based on these explanations, COIN can occur as a part of IW, but is not an element of FID since it can occur with or without a host nation or civilian-coalition governance.

**Security Force Assistance (SFA)**

SFA encompasses DOD activities that support SC, elements of SA and FID and can occur during IW. Again, Figure 4 depicts that SFA can incorporate elements of SC, SA and FID. DODI 5000.68, dated 27 Oct 10 and JP 3-22 define SFA as, “The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.” FM 3-07 defines SFA as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority” and therefore requires actions across FSO. Elements of SA and FID could occur separate from SFA and there can be FID activities that are not SFA. SFA is not an operation in itself, but are activities conducted across the spectrum of conflict or in any of the operational themes that supports unified action.

In most situations involving this assistance, there is relatively little weight on offensive and defensive operations from a U.S. perspective. However, when U.S. forces accompany Foreign Security Forces (FSF) in combat, the weight of offensive and defensive operations will change to address the situation and align with the FSF efforts as already laid out. SFA is not just a stability activity, although it is a key contributor to the primary stability tasks of establishing civil security and civil control. This assistance could focus on improving the FSF of a host nation that is currently under no immediate threat, on paramilitary forces to counter an insurgency, or on advising FSF in major combat operations against an external threat.
Issues with the Current Structure

Although for the most part Joint and U.S. Army doctrine are in congruence, there are some inconsistencies and outliers that are addressed below. The clarification and nesting of Joint and U.S. Army doctrine, while coherent, can be improved. The same elements that were discussed above will be discussed again, but with a more critical viewpoint provided.

Framework

Joint doctrine does not offer a comprehensive framework in the world requiring stability operations with regards to fragile states and insurgencies. Such a framework must be able to provide a holistic look at the complexity of the environment and provide a foundation from which to determine priorities for doctrine. Joint doctrine identifies the nature of warfare as traditional and irregular, and then explains that some operations involve only routine, recurring military activities that do not relate directly to either traditional or irregular warfare. Joint doctrine then introduces four concepts including: 1) Range of Military Operations (ROMO), 2) Joint Military Activities from the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), 3) Offense, Defense and Stability Operations and 4) a list of Types of Military Operations and related activities that is not synchronized with the ROMO. These four concepts are contradictory and confusing when attempting to integrate their meanings and implications. These contradictions do not provide an ability to clarify the framework required in complex operations.

Recommendation: Develop a single doctrinal concept that clearly provides a framework for Joint military activities. This framework will provide a structural design from which Joint and Service doctrine can apply supporting and nested concepts, such as described in Figure 2.

Stability

Confusion arises from the implementation of the DoDD 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), 1 Dec 08, through the draft CJCS Instruction and the draft IW JOC. Some have misinterpreted the language of the DoDD to imply that stability operations, as a whole, should fall under IW. For example, the CJCSI includes post-conflict security, transition, stabilization, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) in activities covered under IW. This categorization, however, is only partially correct in limited circumstances. For example, Iraq and Afghanistan fit the definition of IW as “violent conflicts” but Post World War II Security, Stability, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) in Germany and Japan do not fit the IW definition in this reference. DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations, 16 Sep 09, emphasizes the importance of supporting all Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) Stability activities across all phases of conflict and ROMO.

Confusion also arises with the identification of Stability Operations as “operations” when actually talking about missions, tasks or activities. Per JP 3-0, stability operations is, “An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States...and humanitarian relief.” As offense and defense have missions,
tasks, and activities, so does stability. Stability must be viewed in the same manner as offensive and defensive operations incorporating nested missions, tasks and activities.

**Recommendation:** The terminology in JP 3-0 needs to be reviewed and adjusted for clarity. Stability is clearly defined in FM 3-0, but in JP 3-0 the term is used in three separate contexts: 1) “Offense-Defense-Stability Operations,” 2) as a “Type of Military Operation,” and 3) as a “Phase” (stabilizes).

**Building Partner Capacity (BPC).**

BPC is an important USG concept in supporting other nations. BPC is, however, a term that does not reflect an operation that requires a DOTMLPF review. BPC describes an overarching whole of government concept consisting of elements for which selected agencies within the government are responsible as already defined in Joint doctrine by Foreign Nation Support (FNS) and Nation Assistance (NA). Currently there are existing military operations within NA already contributing towards the concept of BPC. As stated earlier, FID incorporates elements of SC, SA, and SFA. FM 3-07, Chapter 6 provides the doctrinal foundation for security sector reform, and introduces security force assistance as the capacity-building activity that encompasses organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising host-nation security forces.

**Recommendation:** From an Army perspective, there is no need to introduce BPC as an additional operational term since military operations are already defined to support the USG concept.

**Irregular Warfare (IW)**

While there is no separate U.S. Army or Joint IW doctrine, the difference in the application of IW in Joint and U.S. Army doctrine has led to confusion. The Joint and U.S. Army use of IW in their doctrinal publications are compatible. Both use the same definition, but use the term differently within their doctrine. Most misunderstandings occur because some people have not read or understand the doctrine; others apply the doctrine incorrectly. Joint doctrine uses IW to describe the nature of warfare, in other words the environment in which warfare takes place. U.S. Army doctrine uses IW to describe a campaign theme to assist commanders and their staff in planning and executing FSO.

However, it is significant that the IW JOC and the DODD 3000.07 consider IW similar to the way U.S. Army doctrine does as they talk about “conducting IW.” It is not part of the nature of war environment as much as an operation to be conducted.

It is the application of the term IW and how IW is used that causes the improper application within concept development. Interpreting the definition of IW differently has led to confusion across FSO missions, tasks and activities. Clarifying IW and those activities within IW such as SFA, FID and COIN will simplify the understanding of Joint doctrine.
**Recommendation:** By accepting both Figure 1 and that IW is an operational theme, Joint operations can affect IW by using selected elements of the ROMO convention. This proposal is valid as IW can occur through the spectrum of conflict, and since the ROMO convention also incorporates operations across the spectrum of conflict, to combat IW.

**Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Counterinsurgency (COIN)**

The relationship of FID and COIN are not depicted completely in Joint Publications and do not show a complete linkage with SC, SA and SFA. By comparing and nesting the definitions of FID, SC and SA it becomes apparent that FID is the overarching term to SC and further to SA only during crisis or instability, as depicted in Figure 4 above. JP 3-22, Figure 5, shows the relationship of Security Cooperation, Security Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense, but does not show proper nesting per their definitions.

![The Relationship of SC, SA and FID, JP 3-22](image)

Figure 5 – The Relationship of SC, SA and FID, JP 3-22

Figure 6 below taken from JP 3-24 (COIN) shows the relationship between COIN and FID. This figure though correctly depicting the relationship of FID to COIN, misses the opportunity to show the full relationship of security cooperation, security assistance, security force assistance, irregular warfare, foreign internal defense and counterinsurgency as thoroughly as Figure 4.
**Recommendation**: Accept Figure 4 above to depict the proper relationships of FID, SC, SA, SFA and COIN based on the definitions found in JP 1-02, 31 December 2010.

![Figure 6 – The Relationship of FID and COIN, JP 3-24](image)

**Security Force Assistance (SFA)**

Although Joint doctrine recognizes that SFA has a relationship to COIN and that SFA is integral to successful FID, COIN and stability, it does not establish a clear relationship among these terms. SFA is discussed in JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, and JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, as DOD activities supporting FSF. U.S. Army doctrine uses the same Joint definition and recognizes that SFA can occur across all operational themes and across the spectrum of conflict. JP 3-22 also states, “Both FID and SFA are subsets of SC. Neither FID nor SFA are subsets of each other.” By using Joint definitions, however, SFA nests within SA, SC and FID and supports FID though FID Direct and Indirect Support.

**Recommendation.** Accepting Figure 4 as the means to graphically display the nesting of FID, SC, SA, IW, SFA and COIN, Army and Joint doctrine will provide a coherent nesting of these terms and explanations.

**Summary.** Clarification of terminology in words and presenting the nesting of Joint and U.S. Army terms graphically provides the military a coherent framework in which we operate.
Showing how the terms, operations and activities work together doctrine will establish an improved picture of how to execute the missions, tasks and activities required of the military.

As discussion has continued through the recent decades about the implementation of these linked concepts, doctrine writers need to develop a comprehensive framework for commanders so they can organize all the resources available to them. By organizing the terminology, doctrine writers also assist those in the field and make doctrine a useful element and not just theoretical ideas from those in the Generating Force.
GLOSSARY: These definitions are to provide a quick and common reference for use within this White Paper.

**Antiterrorism** - Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces (JP 3-07.2).

**Building Partner Capacity** - The ability to assist domestic and foreign partners and institutions with the development of their capabilities and capacities, for mutual benefit, to address U.S. national or shared global interests. (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0)

**Building Partnership** - The ability to set the conditions for interaction with partner, competitor or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior and capabilities. (TRADOC Pam 525-3-0)

**Civil Support Operations** - Department of Defense support to U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (JP 3-28)

**Combating terrorism** - Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (JP 3-07.2)

**Comprehensive Approach** - An approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)

**Conflict Prevention** - A peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Activities aimed at conflict prevention are often conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Conflict prevention can include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring. (JP 3-07.3)

**Conflict Termination** - Represented by a negotiated or imposed settlement. (FM 3-07)

**Conflict Transformation** - The process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations. (FM 3-07)

**Counterinsurgency** - Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (JP 1-02)
**Counterterrorism** - Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. (JP 3-26)

**Defensive Operations** - Combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. (FM 3-0)

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)** - Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (JP 3-29)

**Foreign Internal Defense (FID)** - Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

**Foreign Nation Support (FNS)** — Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation when operating outside its national boundaries during military operations based on agreements mutually concluded between nations or on behalf of intergovernmental organizations. Support may come from the nation in which forces are operating. Foreign nation support also may be from third party nations and include support or assistance, such as logistics, rendered outside the operational area. (JP 1-06)

**Fragile State** - A country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government. (FM 3-07)

**Full Spectrum Operations (FSO)** – Combined use of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of U.S. Army forces. (FM 3-0)

**Homeland Defense** - The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. (JP 3-27)

**Insurgency** - The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24)
**Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)** – The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

**Irregular Warfare (IW)** – A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (JP 1)

A U.S. Army operational theme that describes the character of the dominant major operation being conducted at any time within a land force commander’s area of operations. This broad form of conflict has insurgency, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare as the principal activities. (FM 3-0)

**Limited Intervention** – Operations executed to achieve an end state that is clearly defined and limited in scope. An U.S. Army operational theme that describes the character of the dominant major operation being conducted at any time within a land force commander’s area of operations. The operational theme helps convey the nature of the major operation to the force to facilitate common understanding of how the commander broadly intends to operate. The most common types of limited interventions are the following: (FM 3-0)

- Noncombatant evacuation operations.
- Strike.
- Raid.
- Show of force.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Consequence management.
- Sanction enforcement.
- Elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

**Major Combat Operations** – Operations that occur usually characterized as general war. An operational theme that describes the character of the dominant major operation being conducted at any time within a land force commander’s area of operations. The operational theme helps convey the nature of the major operation to the force to facilitate common understanding of how the commander broadly intends to operate. States, alliances, or coalitions usually resort to war because significant national or multinational interests are threatened. Combat between large formations characterizes these operations. Major combat operations conducted by U.S. forces are always joint operations, although an U.S. Army headquarters may form the base of a joint force headquarters. These operations typically entail high tempo, high resource consumption, and high casualty rates. (FM 3-0)

**Nation Assistance** — Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10, US Code programs,
and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations. (JP 3-0)

**Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)** - Operations directed by the Department of State or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. (JP 3-0)

**Offensive Operations** - Combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander’s will on the enemy. (FM 3-0)

**Peace Building** - Stability actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 3-07.3)

**Peace Enforcement** - The application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 3-07.3)

**Peacekeeping** - Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 3-07.3)

**Peacemaking** - The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. (JP 3-07.3)

**Peace Operations** - A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. (JP 3-07.3)

An U.S. Army operational theme that describes the character of the dominant major operation being conducted at any time within a land force commander’s area of operations. The operational theme helps convey the nature of the major operation to the force to facilitate common understanding of how the commander broadly intends to operate. U.S. Army forces conduct the following types of peace operations: (FM 3-0)

- Peacekeeping.
- Peace building.
- Peacemaking.
• Peace enforcement.
• Conflict prevention.

**Peace enforcement.**

**Conflict prevention.**

**Peacetime Military Engagement** - All military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. An U.S. Army operational theme that describes the character of the dominant major operation being conducted at any time within a land force commander’s area of operations. The operational theme helps convey the nature of the major operation to the force to facilitate common understanding of how the commander broadly intends to operate. It includes programs and exercises that the United States military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Peacetime military engagement activities are designed to support a combatant commander’s objectives within the theater security cooperation plan. Examples of joint operations and activities that fall under peacetime military engagement include the following: (FM 3-0)

• Multinational training events and exercises.
• Security assistance.
• Joint combined exchange training.
• Recovery operations.
• Arms control.
• Counterdrug activities.

**Range of Military Operations (ROMO)** - Military operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns. (JP 3-0)

**Recovery Operations** - Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (JP 3-50)

**Security Assistance** - Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation funded and authorized by Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (JP 3-22)

**Security Cooperation (SC)** — All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational
operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22)

**Security Cooperation (SC) Activity** - Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan. (JP 3-0)

**Security Force Assistance (SFA)** – The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-22)

**Security Sector Reform (SSR)** - The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 3-24)

**Show of Force** - An operation designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve that involves increased visibility of U.S. deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to U.S. interests or national objectives. (JP 3-0)

**Spectrum of Conflict** - The backdrop for U.S. Army operations. It places levels of violence on an ascending scale marked by graduated steps. The spectrum of conflict spans from stable peace to general war. It includes intermediate levels of unstable peace and insurgency. (FM 3-0)

**Stability Operations** - An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)

**Stable Peace** - Characterized by the absence of militarily significant violence. (FM 3-0)

**Terrorism** – The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political. (JP 3-07.2).

**Traditional Warfare** - (not an official joint term) (description is extracted from JP 3-0, Joint Operations). Characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states. In this traditional paradigm, nation-states wage war for reasons as broad and varied as the array of national interests. This confrontation typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other. The objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war making capacity, or seize or
retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. Military operations in traditional warfare normally focus on an adversary’s armed forces to ultimately influence the adversary’s government. The near-term results of traditional warfare are often evident, with the conflict ending in victory for one side and defeat for the other or in stalemate.

**Unified Action** - The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

**Unity of Effort** - Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

**Unstable Peace** - When one or more parties threaten or use violence to achieve their objectives, stable peace degenerates into unstable peace. Unstable peace may also result when violence levels decrease after violent conflict. (FM 3-0)

**Whole of Government Approach** - An approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)