A Strategy to Protect and Strengthen Development in Southern Africa

by

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This paper offers an overarching strategy for the United States (U.S.) and USAFRICOM in protecting and strengthening social economic development in central and southern Africa. First, this paper provides a background of the recent and current political conflicts in the region. These include Hutu/Tutsi ethnic strife, Zimbabwean economic ruin and corrupt leadership, and the recently-ended Angolan civil war (2002). This paper also identifies HIV/AIDS as a major impediment to development. Then, an overarching U.S. strategy is postulated; the U.S. should contain and effectively respond to these impediments through a strategic partnership with Zambia. This state is perfectly situated in the heart of southern Africa. U.S. diplomacy should be the primary instrument of power employed, but Zambia should still be encouraged to participate in FLINTLOCK military exercises and allow limited intelligence-gathering and information operations against Zimbabwe. These limited military actions would prepare Zambia to flex to other regional crises as they arise. USAFRICOMs supporting, low-profile role would allow the U.S. Department of State to assist southern Africans in protecting and strengthening their development.
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Preface

I wrote this paper to focus on an area of the world that has many complexities but relatively little US media attention (currently). While there are a myriad of ways to strategically tackle any one of southern Africa’s potential crises, I wanted to specifically highlight how United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) can play a role in the near future.
Abstract

This paper offers an overarching strategy for the United States (U.S.) and USAFRICOM in protecting and strengthening social economic development in central and southern Africa. First, this paper provides a background of the recent and current political conflicts in the region. These include Hutu/Tutsi ethnic strife, Zimbabwean economic ruin and corrupt leadership, and the recently-ended Angolan civil war (2002). This paper also identifies HIV/AIDS as a major impediment to development. Then, an overarching U.S. strategy is postulated; the U.S. should contain and effectively respond to these impediments through a strategic partnership with Zambia. This state is perfectly situated in the heart of southern Africa. U.S. diplomacy should be the primary instrument of power employed, but Zambia should still be encouraged to participate in FLINTLOCK military exercises and allow limited intelligence-gathering and information operations against Zimbabwe. These limited military actions would prepare Zambia to flex to other regional crises as they arise. USAFRICOM’s supporting, low-profile role would allow the U.S. Department of State to assist southern Africans in protecting and strengthening their development.
Introduction - Difficult Task of Protecting Development in Sub-Saharan Africa

For over fifty years, many parts of the African continent have been filled with turmoil and impediments to development. The euphoric hope prevalent at each nation’s inaugural day of independence waned quickly in the aftermath of a myriad of problems – many still persist on the continent today. Political corruption, insurgencies, poverty, and the AIDS epidemic are among Africa’s most notorious crises. A large portion of the continent’s population has been neglected by globalization’s positive effects, and many of its peoples are struggling for survival. The sub-Saharan continent has received more than 294 billion dollars in foreign aid from 1970 to 2002. According to historian Martin Meredith, this is the highest amount given to any area in the world. However, the entire African economy totaled a mere 1.3 percent of the 2005 global gross domestic product (GDP).

At the present time, two major political conflicts threaten the stability of central and southern Africa. The most significant in terms of area involved and levels of past violence involves ethnic rivalries in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and Burundi. The second conflict involves the rampant political corruption and authoritarianism imposed on Zimbabwe by its president, Robert Mugabe. These two conflicts have had ramifications well beyond the immediate borders of the involved states. Additionally, Angola emerged only in 2002 from a costly civil war, which plagued the state for over a quarter century. History has shown time after time that chances of conflict expansion are high in Africa.

The problems of sub-Saharan Africa may seem distant and non-pressing to the United States (U.S.), especially with two ongoing wars in the Middle East. However, according to the most recent U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance,” and the U.S. aims “to promote economic development and the expansion of
effective, democratic governance so that African states can take the lead in addressing African challenges.”6 Moreover, “[U.S.] security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies.”7 Although a change of administration occurred in January 2009, a new strategy has not been posted as of the writing of this paper, but it is unlikely Africa will lose its status of strategic importance. United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), a new combatant command, was created in October 2007 to focus on this area.8 According to its combatant commander, General William E. “Kip” Ward, USAFRICOM’s purpose “is to assist Africans in providing their own security and stability and helping prevent the conditions that could lead to future conflicts.”9 These important and complex tasks need an overarching strategy to ensure all efforts are effective and focused.

**Thesis: Strengthen Ties with Zambia and Increase Regional Interagency Efforts**

Protecting and strengthening development in Africa’s states in pursuit of U.S. strategic goals is a massive endeavor. In order to meet these goals as outlined in the 2006 NSS, the U.S. must prioritize and concentrate efforts. Due to the massive scope of Africa and its indigenous problems, this paper offers an overarching strategy for only the southern half of the continent. This suggested strategy involves the region south of the Central African Republic, and excluding the Horn of Africa (HOA). This southern area needs additional emphasis, because its strategic importance has been obscured by the Islamic extremist threat in the north and east areas of the continent.

For the purposes of this paper, development refers to the advancement of social and economic quality of life. This quality should apply to a large majority of a state’s population
instead of just for an elite few. Stability refers to a government’s ability to effectively control its people and provide for essential needs (i.e. food, water, law, etc.).

In order to effectively protect and strengthen development, the US should concentrate efforts in a geographically significant state. This state should be relatively stable, democratic, and adjacent to all of the troubled locations in southern Africa. Along these lines, the United States should choose Zambia. This state has the ideal mix of strategic location, stability, willingness to improve its region, and need for additional assistance in development. With the help of the strong Zambian leadership in the African community, USAFRICOM should coordinate diplomatic and interagency efforts toward tackling southern Africa’s major obstacles to development. The most pressing objective is to contain and diminish the crisis in Zimbabwe.

Another objective of USAFRICOM should be to prepare Zambian and other regional players for humanitarian assistance and political crisis response in the DRC and elsewhere in southern Africa. Anti-colonial sentiment will greatly limit US military legitimacy and presence in southern Africa. Thus, diplomacy should be the prime instrument of power to employ in this region. However, USAFRICOM should still have a limited but important role. Specifically, USAFRICOM should assist in training Zambian and allied southern African military forces to deal with a potential societal collapse in Zimbabwe. Preparing for this conflict through coalition interagency exercises would ensure adequate readiness for all other likely crises. USAFRICOM could also provide limited, low-profile military support through intelligence-gathering and information-dissemination air sorties. Combined diplomatic and (limited) military efforts should protect and strengthen development in southern Africa.
Background – Southern and Central Africa’s Major Crises

While numerous problems have plagued Africa in the post-colonial era, four current crises collectively threaten progress in the southern portion of the continent: ethnic conflict in the DRC, corrupt authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe, the AIDS epidemic in the entire region, and recently-quieted civil war in Angola (2002).

The violent ethnic rivalry in the eastern DRC originated in neighboring Rwanda and Burundi. During the 1930s, the Belgians, like the Germans before them, highlighted ethnic differences between the minority Tutsis and majority Hutus in these two small neighboring colonies. The European powers did not intend to antagonize ethnic rivals; they merely wanted one ethnic group (the Tutsis) to efficiently administer the colony for them by ruling over the Hutus. The ensuing antagonism led to violent clashes starting in November 1959, after a Hutu leader was attacked by Tutsi militants. In response, the Belgians sided with the Hutus and dismissed the Tutsi leaders in Rwanda. This ultimately led to “a mass exodus in which some 130,000 Rwandan Tutsi sought refuge in the DRC, Burundi, Uganda, and Tanganyika [present day Tanzania].”

In the decades that followed, the new Rwandan Hutu politicians developed and garnered support for the myth that the ethnic Tutsis were invaders of their nation and had no claim or citizenship. In neighboring Burundi, the Tutsi elite remained in power. The anti-Tutsi hatred reverberated into this bordering state, and led to a Hutu uprising in 1972. The following genocidal quelling by the Tutsi further ignited ethnic hatred in Rwanda.

Using ethnic hatred to rally support for their regime, the Rwandan Hutu leaders ultimately would start a genocidal campaign against the Tutsi in the early 1990s. The crisis escalated when several prominent Hutu were killed in 1993-1994. For weeks, mass killings of
Tutsis occurred across the countryside by machete-wielding Hutu *genocidaires*, until ex-Ugandan military Tutsi forces led by Paul Kagame expelled them from Rwanda in July 1994. In the aftermath of the slaughter of 800,000 Tutsi, these Hutu *genocidaires* then took refuge in neighboring Zaire [current-day DRC].

Although the United Nations dispatched a peacekeeping force (UNAMIR 2) to the area, it was inadequately resourced. Furthermore, the Security Council did not have the will to intervene months after a debacle in warlord-controlled Somalia, where UN forces suffered 91 casualties on Oct 3, 1993. Violence from this bitter conflict ultimately spread to Zaire, as ethnic tensions from indigenous Hutus and Tutsis sparked an insurgency in the Kivu region starting in 1993. Soon, Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola all meddled in this insurgency. Their support led to regime change in 1997, with President Kabila taking over and changing Zaire’s name back to the DRC. Despite the change of regimes, violence in the DRC continued. Rwandan President Kagame became disillusioned with the new DRC leader, and organized another insurgency against him. Again, other regional players meddled, including Angola and Zimbabwe.

The DRC was now mired in a complex civil war, with multiple insurgent groups sponsored by regional powerbrokers looting the countryside of natural resources. In 2002, the death toll from four years of prolonged fighting had reached over three million. Although all foreign state militaries left the nation when peace accords were signed in July 2002, proxy insurgent groups continued fighting in the eastern provinces. In fact, there are dozens of these groups, despite the presence of over 17,000 U.N. peacekeepers.

While the DRC suffered through a prolonged civil war, Zimbabwe’s population dealt with the corrupt authoritarian regime of Robert Mugabe. Mugabe became the first president of Zingabe.
the newly independent state in 1980. He intimidated political opponents and rigged several elections over the years, and his reign persists today. While many African nations are advancing to fair multiparty democracies, Zimbabwe remains in the era of selfish autocrats.

The dangers of Mugabe’s leadership are evident in his background before the presidency. His skill at coordinating insurgencies was seen in the years leading up to Zimbabwean independence. After release from jail in Rhodesia [colonial name of present-day Zimbabwe], Mugabe successfully organized an insurgency with his nationalist Zanu movement. He launched attacks into eastern Rhodesia from neighboring Mozambique, while another group attacked Rhodesia from the north and west. His successful campaign led the white Rhodesian government to the negotiating table, and his actions ultimately led to Zimbabwe’s independence on 18 April 1980.

In addition to his desire to meddle in the affairs of neighboring states, Mugabe also has a ruthless hunger for power. He sanctioned violence against his opponents during the 2000 elections, leading the nonprofit National Democratic Institute to determine that conditions did not exist to make the vote credible and fair. In fact, Mugabe and his party won due to an intimidation campaign. His corrupt political tactics reached new heights of terrorism during the 2002 campaign, when he outlawed criticism of the President and energized his militant party against his opponents. Again, he secured victory.

Mugabe’s aspirations as a regional power-broker are well-established. For example, he intervened in the neighboring DRC to temporarily save Kabila’s presidency in 1998. Even though there was no strategic interest in the conflict for Zimbabwe, Mugabe wanted to increase his influence and garner concessions.
His corrupt, brutal, coercive political tactics ruined the Zimbabwean economy. His use of food as a political weapon, combined with his controversial attempts at redistributing white farm lands, ruined the agricultural market, deterred foreign investment, and caused thousands of whites to emigrate. By 2004, his methods caused the Zimbabwean economy to recede by one-third. Although there is currently a power-sharing agreement as a result of the most recent elections of June 2008, Mugabe’s authoritarian personality likely makes this agreement a mirage. Zimbabwe currently has the highest inflation rate in the world, and the government faces riots from a cholera epidemic and inability to pay its military personnel.

While political turmoil exists in several areas in southern Africa, an even more pervasive threat exists throughout the area – Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for two thirds of the HIV-infected people in the world. The epicenter of this disease is in the heart of southern Africa. Seven states in this area contain HIV infection rates higher than 15%. These states include Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. This high infection percentage dramatically increases mortality rates while significantly decreasing life expectancy and birth rates in this region; these HIV impacts seriously jeopardize economic development for many future generations.

As two looming political crises and an AIDS epidemic threaten southern Africa, another situation promises to exacerbate conflict if conditions deteriorate. Angola, located on the southeast coast of the African continent, emerged from a twenty-seven year civil war in 2002. This deadly conflict escalated into a proxy war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the 1980s, as Jonas Savimbi’s Unita insurgency was supported by the West and the Marxist regime was supported by the Soviets. Yet the end of the Cold War did not stop the conflict in Angola;
Savimbi’s insurgency developed into a regional conflict that lasted until after the turn of the century.40

**Zambia – the “Strategic Heart” of Central and Southern Africa**

Zambia is the ideal state to concentrate U.S. assistance for several reasons: the state strategically borders recent and current crisis hot spots; its government is stable and friendly to the U.S.; the government’s regional focus is compatible with U.S. interests; and its leaders can make the most improvement to its people’s economic and social development with the U.S.’ concentrated effort. While other states in the region would benefit from a priority partnership with the U.S., Zambia has the best mix of need for assistance and ability to influence the region.

Zambia, a land-locked state in the center of southern Africa (blue-colored state in figure A.1), is ideally situated among the recent and current crises hot spots of the region (red-colored state in figure A.1). Most significantly, Zimbabwe shares its southern border. To the north, the ethnic strife between Hutu and Tutsi simmers in the eastern provinces of the DRC. To the west, Angola has a nascent but fragile democracy after decades of brutal civil war.42 Finally, Zambia is collocated with the epicenter of the high HIV infection rates (see figure A.2). Zambia is one of the eight African states that USAID considers in this epicenter.43

This central location offers easy access to all of southern Africa’s most likely areas to have reinvigorated political violence and humanitarian crises. Furthermore, improving Zambia’s ability to respond to these issues would better insure a geographic buffer exists between any two potential crises (e.g. buffer between ethnic violence in the DRC and governmental collapse in Zimbabwe); this could significantly reduce the spread of isolated conflicts to regional disasters. Its geographic importance is evident in the amount of refugees its government hosts from other
African states; as of January 2009, Zambia shelters 87,000 refugees, mainly originating from Angola and the DRC.\textsuperscript{44}

A key enabler to Zambia’s strategic importance is the government’s stability and dedication to democratic principles. This trend in Zambian stability was evident when President Kenneth Kaunda conceded defeat when he lost the election in October 1991 to the first multi-party opposition candidate.\textsuperscript{45} In contrast to Mugabe’s draconian tactics to hold onto power in Zimbabwe, President Kaunda set a rare example in post-colonial Africa by stepping aside peacefully for a rival to lead Zambia. The tradition of peaceful Zambian opposition and power transition has continued over the past 17 years. For example, when President Mwanawasa died in August 2008, Vice President Banda took over, as Zambia’s constitution dictates. Furthermore, the legally-required elections were held within 90 days, and Banda legitimately remained the new president.\textsuperscript{46}

According to the \textit{Economist}’s 2007 democracy index, Zambia received relatively high scores for the region, placing similarly to Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda (see figure A.3). Although Zambia ranked in the “hybrid regime” category, the state places well above regimes considered authoritarian (e.g. Zimbabwe and Angola). Yet, two positive traits of Zambia’s stability is the government’s willingness to acknowledge its internal flaws and the leaders’ desire to improve its governance. Zambia’s willingness to improve is evident from its completion of the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Threshold Program in 2008. This program is designed to “[root] out administrative corruption”\textsuperscript{47} by According to USAID, this program successfully led to Zambia’s increased credibility in business assessments and its decrease of government corruption.\textsuperscript{48}
Zambia’s current government also has regional views very compatible to those listed in the 2006 U.S. NSS. For example, Zambia has persistently taken a leading role in solving recent regional conflicts. It has unilaterally pursued regional stability, democracy, and development. For example, former President Kaunda supported numerous liberation causes during the 1970s and 80s in southern Africa, including those in Angola, Namibia, and Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe).49 Furthermore, Zambia led the effort to broker a DRC cease-fire in 1998. 50 Additionally, Zambia leads through regional organizations like the Southern African Development Community (SADC). For example, numerous human rights groups recently lauded the Zambian government’s plea to the SADC for a proactive role in curbing the economic and political deterioration in Zimbabwe.51 Zambia is also an active supporter of UN efforts, contributing peacekeeping forces to Sudan in the current decade.52

Additionally, Zambian officials recently made harsh statements against Mugabe. For example, Zambia’s foreign minister criticized Zimbabwe’s human rights record during a 2007 parliamentary session,53 and then President Mwanawasa followed this criticism with his own. During a 2007 SADC meeting, he described Zimbabwe as a “sinking Titanic”54 where “quiet diplomacy has failed”55 and suggested the SADC take more proactive measures soon against the state. These aforementioned statements and acts of regional leadership provide evidence of Zambia’s dedication to African stability and development.

Finally, Zambia is a state that could most effectively utilize increased attention from the West. Although Zambia was the recipient of 1.4 billion dollars in 2007,56 it still has two thirds of its population living in poverty and is one of the world’s poorest states.57 Furthermore, “social indicators continue to decline, particularly life expectancy at birth (about 37 years)… And the country's rate of economic growth cannot support rapid population growth or the strain which
HIV/AIDS related issues place on government resources." With an HIV infection rate above fifteen percent of the population, Zambia’s economy is at risk. The crux of this problem is the significant increase in mortality rates and decrease in the productive worker population.

Thus, Zambia could use more support – more than what money can provide. A partnership that brings increased military assistance, economic diversification, and educational development would greatly benefit this strategically-important state. Focused assistance along this approach has worked in the past in Zambia, as with the aforementioned Threshold Program that ended in September 2008.

Although Zambia’s leadership has given indications that it is against a USAFRICOM headquarters within the state’s borders, the new combatant command has had effectiveness in working with the Zambian government in limited programs. According to the Zambia Chronicle, in 2007, the now-late President Mwanawasa said, “Zambia would not allow the establishment of a military base in the country ... as Zambia, we will not be giving sanctuary and I think I can speak on behalf of the SADC region that none of us is interested.” However, this stance appears not to be completely against all U.S. military assistance to Zambia. For example, Zambia graduated its first battalion of peacekeepers under the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program in August 2007. Although this is a program managed by the Department of State, USAFRICOM does participate through military mentors. Additionally, Zambia does currently participate in the U.S. military’s International Military Education and Training Program (IMET).

Thus Zambia, like most African nations, is resistant to host or mingle with U.S. military forces; however, the government has shown limited and growing interest in establishing ties. This willingness to improve in the military arena, as well as in civil governance, makes Zambia an excellent candidate for partnership.

Although Namibia, Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique all receive money from USAID and are not themselves embroiled in heated political turmoil, they are not ideally
located in central, southern Africa like Zambia is. Each only borders Zimbabwe, the DRC, or neither; this geographic reality makes these other states less ideal as a hub for regional operations. Zambia, for all of the aforementioned reasons, is the ideal candidate for a strategic partnership.

**USAFRICOM role in Tackling Southern Africa’s Potential Crises**

The severe consequences of apathy or delayed reaction to crises were evident in the turmoil in the first few decades of the post-colonial era. Inaction of UN forces during the Rwandan Hutu massacres of Tutsis during the 1990s resulted in hundreds of thousands killed. Individual state agendas led to pillaging, chaos, and disaster during the Angolan civil war which ended in 2002. Although significant political and economic progress has occurred in the last two decades in southern Africa, history may repeat itself unless significant precautions are taken to anticipate likely crises. Currently, a Zimbabwean collapse seems the most likely scenario. Zimbabwe’s economic ruin, combined with an egocentric president’s ruthless tactics, could lead to a massive humanitarian crisis. Mugabe’s actions in the past also show he is capable of invading other nations when it suits his purpose. For example, President Mugabe intervened with forces in the DRC to save the regime of Kabila in 1998 for no other reason than a power-play for influence in the region. In the case of a near-economic collapse, Mugabe may try to invade another nation in order to secure resources for his troops and supporters. A surge in refugees fleeing Zimbabwe is likely in any case.

Southern African states must prepare thoroughly for this very possible situation. In order to ensure a Zimbabwean collapse is contained and a speedy recovery is in place, the US Department of State should discuss forming more substantive military partnerships with the Zambian leadership. Anti-colonial sentiment pervasive throughout Africa will likely limit any
large or permanent U.S. military presence in southern Africa, at least in the near to mid-term. Therefore, any type of offer would have to ensure that the US military does not appear to infringe Zambian sovereignty.

Although the Department of State should lead the diplomatic efforts in southern Africa, USAFRICOM still can have an important role in protecting and strengthening development. When dealing with the current crises in Zimbabwe, USAFRICOM can better enable Zambia to lead deterrent and containment efforts against Mugabe’s brutal tactics. The consequences of a total Zimbabwean collapse could be severe. A total collapse may overwhelm Zambia which already has a significant refugee population. Furthermore, without a significant, prepared force in case of Zimbabwean collapse, reaction to the crises could be slow. By preparing for this very possible situation, Zambia could then quicken Zimbabwean recovery from this hypothetical collapse.

US State Department personnel should specifically encourage Zambian leadership to agree to the following activities for increased U.S. military assistance to Zambia: participation in FLINTLOCK military exercises and regular but limited U.S. air sorties focused on Zimbabwe.

FLINTLOCK exercises are U.S. military-hosted exercises focusing on Trans-Sahara Africa, and they have participation from European and African states.66 The goal of these exercises is to “establish and develop military interoperability, regional relationships, synchronization of effort and capacity-building.”67 These exercises would be ideal for Zambia and other southern African states to develop effective coordination in the event of a Zimbabwean collapse. State Department representatives should attempt to have Zambia host one of these exercises, as it could provide a visible deterrent to Mugabe if combined with an effective information operations campaign. If anti-colonial sensitivities from hosting a FLINTLOCK in
Zambia cannot be downplayed, southern African forces can travel to other locations to receive the training in a lower-profile setting. For example, the 2008 FLINTLOCK exercise was held in Mali, far removed from southern Africa.

FLINTLOCK exercises would be an already-established method to provide southern African troops the training they need to respond to Zimbabwe. The next step after attending an exercise would be for Zambia to lead their own FLINTLOCK-type exercise in their territory. This Zambian-run exercise would contain only southern African forces, and serve as an additional preparation for a Zimbabwean political collapse. USAFRICOM could provide limited mentors.

While FLINTLOCK exercises would allow Zambian forces to prepare for a Zimbabwean collapse, it would not effectively prepare them for the warning signs of an imminent collapse. Specifically, the Zambian Air Force does not possess robust intelligence-gathering or information-transmitting air assets. Intelligence-gathering on Mugabe’s regime and information-transmission to the Zimbabwean people would be critical in containing a societal collapse and expediting recovery. Towards these ends, USAFRICOM and State Department personnel should coordinate for the availability of air sorties over southern Africa. These sorties should contain low-visibility operations, conducted at high altitude. They should focus on gathering intelligence on Mugabe’s actions.

Furthermore, special operations aircraft like the EC-130 Commando Solo should be utilized to transmit targeted messages against Mugabe and for civil humanitarian assistance. A plan for disseminating radios to the Zimbabwean populace would be required in conjunction with Command Solo flights. The messages transmitted should discourage Mugabe’s Zanu political party from supporting the corrupt leader any longer. Furthermore, the Zimbabwe
population should be informed of where relief supplies are and to remain calm during the crisis. This asymmetric ability to gather information and disseminate desired information would allow Zambia and its allies to influence the situation toward more favorable outcomes. These military actions should compliment diplomatic efforts to contain or resolve the situations while protecting strides made in development to this point in time.

By preparing for this likely crisis, Zambian forces, along with allied southern African forces should be able to adequately respond to other political or humanitarian crises. A flare-up of Hutu and Tutsi rivalry would be dangerous, but southern African forces would have assistance of UN peacekeeping forces in place in eastern DRC. Additionally, a FLINTLOCK-rehearsed response force would be able to flex to smaller-scale humanitarian needs like food shortages or disease outbreaks. Preparing against President Mugabe’s failing regime enables a Zambian-led force to respond to any other likely impediment to development in southern Africa.

Conclusion

In the past two decades, central and southern Africans witnessed numerous improvements in stability and development. Many states in this region lost their first generation of power-hungry, egocentric leaders and gained growing, multi-party democracies. Even citizens of Angola and the DRC emerged from decades of bloody strife to sense hope for a better future. However, amidst the signs of development, major threats loom. Most significantly, the political corruption and economic disaster in Zimbabwe threaten to disrupt the bordering states. Likewise United Nations peacekeepers attempt to quell insurgents in the DRC and Angola from spreading ethnic rivalries throughout the region. Yet an even more pressing threat to continued development exists with indigenous diseases. The extremely-high HIV infection percentages in
many sub-Saharan states may cripple economies in the future if aggressive prevention and mitigation methods are ignored.

Zambia lies in the midst of all these threats – a geographic “heart” of central and southern Africa. It is this land-locked nation-state that offers the United States a potent strategic partner in dealing with these numerous obstacles to strong, sustained social and economic growth.

Due to anti-colonial sentiments US military assistance will not dominate interactions in southern Africa. Diplomacy will be the first and foremost instrument in protecting and strengthening development on southern Africa. However, the military instrument can and should serve a limited purpose in this region. The State Department, in conjunction with USAFRICOM civilians, should encourage Zambia to accept limited military assistance. This assistance would be low profile and targeted to deal with the potential threats to development. This assistance should help with protecting against political crises, of which a Zimbabwean collapse is most likely. FLINTLOCK exercises would prepare the African forces to work together and contain crises. The US could offer very limited military support through nearly invisible intelligence-gathering and information operations air operations. These efforts, combined with significant diplomatic finesse, would protect the significant development the southern continent has seen in the last two decades and promote lasting development in the future.

3 Ibid, 682.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
10 Meredith, *Fate of Africa*, 159.
12 Ibid, 160.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid, 488.
15 Ibid, 487.
16 Ibid, 500-507.
17 Ibid, 523.
19 Meredith, *Fate of Africa*, 483, 517-519.
20 Ibid, 529-530.
21 Ibid, 535-536.
22 Ibid, 538-539.
23 Ibid, 540.
24 Ibid, 544.
26 Meredith, *Fate of Africa*, 327-328.
28 Meredith, *Fate of Africa*, 322-328.
29 Ibid, 639.
31 Ibid, 539.
32 Ibid, 644-45.
36 Ibid, 39.
39 Meredith, *Fate of Africa*, 600.
40 Ibid, 609-613.
41 “Strategic Heart” is the author’s metaphor for the significance of Zambia to the region.
USAID, “USAID: HIV/AIDS,” http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_health/aids/Countries/africa/saregional.html (accessed 5 April 2009). The eight southern African states considered the global epicenter of the AIDS epidemic are the following: Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. As of 2005, each of these states had at least 15% of their respective populations HIV positive, as reported on the USAID website (at the preceding link).


Meredith, Fate of Africa, 406-7.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid, 539.


68 Ibid.


US Africa Command. “About USAFRICOM.”


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Appendix A
Supporting Figures

Southern and Central Africa’s
Major Political Crises Areas and Best Strategic Location for
Concentration of Development Efforts

Figure A.1. Southern Africa with Major Crises Areas & Best Strategic Location
Figure A.2. UNAID’s Estimates of HIV Infection Percentage (2007)
The Economist’s Democracy Index

- Full Democracies
- Flawed Democracies
- Hybrid Regimes
- Authoritarian Regimes (Top half)
- Authoritarian Regimes (Bottom Half)
- Not Measured

Number in parenthesis indicates ranking of democracy rating (out of 167 governments worldwide)

Figure A.3. Graphical Representation of The Economist’s Democracy Index for 2007\textsuperscript{72}
