Blurred Strategy:

Collaborating Civil-Military Interagency Doctrine for Post-Conflict Operations

A Monograph
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**Abstract:**
The premise for this study evolved during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). It stems from a perception that the combat plan for the Coalition force invasion worked brilliantly but noticeably absent was a detailed plan for transitioning to peace. This study conducts a thorough review of the current joint military doctrine and the interagency policy and guidance relevant to post-conflict operations, complex contingency and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). It includes a case study of the formal USG civil-military interagency planning effort for OIF’s post-conflict operations. It creatively employs a gap analysis research strategy in concert with a case study methodology, the research addresses its primary research question: Is joint military doctrine sufficiently robust to be adopted by the USG civil-military planning community as the framework for developing a single integrated doctrine for planning complex contingency and post-conflict operations? Several factors are cited as contributing reasons for the lack of a robust post-conflict plan: strategical errors by the Bush Administration, poor coordination between USG civil-military interagency planners, and the lack of a solid planning framework for complex contingency and post-conflict operations. The research concluded that a fundamental impediment to planning is fact that its departments and agencies do not focus and coordinate their activities effectively. There are a number of reasons degrading the integrated effort: unfamiliarity, ineffective coordination structures, incompatible approaches, underdeveloped lines of responsibility, incompatible architecture, organizational dogmas, and resource constraints. This study recommends that civil-military planners establish a solid and well-resourced planning framework that includes well-defined lines of coordination, a collaborative architecture, a means for continuous professional education and training, and a single common integrated doctrine. The proposed framework must operate in close and constant coordination with all of the elements of national power.

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Abstract


The premise for this study evolved during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). It stems from a perception that the combat plan for the Coalition force invasion worked brilliantly but noticeably absent was a detailed plan for transitioning to peace.

This study conducts a thorough review of the current joint military doctrine and the interagency policy and guidance relevant to post-conflict operations, complex contingency and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). It includes a case study of the formal USG civil-military interagency planning effort for OIF’s post-conflict operations. It creatively employs a gap analysis research strategy in concert with a case study methodology, the research addresses its primary research question:

Is joint military doctrine sufficiently robust to be adopted by the USG civil-military planning community as the framework for developing a single integrated doctrine for planning complex contingency and post-conflict operations?

Several factors are cited as contributing reasons for the lack of a robust post-conflict plan: strategical errors by the Bush Administration, poor coordination between USG civil-military interagency planners, and the lack of a solid planning framework for complex contingency and post-conflict operations. The research concluded that a fundamental impediment to planning is fact that its departments and agencies do not focus and coordinate their activities effectively. There are a number of reasons degrading the integrated effort: unfamiliarity, ineffective coordination structures, incompatible approaches, under developed lines of responsibility, incompatible architecture, organizational dogmas, and resource constraints.

This study recommends that civil-military planners establish a solid and well-resourced planning framework that includes well-defined lines of coordination, a collaborative architecture, a means for continuous professional education and training, and a single common integrated doctrine. The proposed framework must operate in close and constant coordination with all of the elements of national power. The essential first step is the creation of a common integrated doctrine for planning complex contingency and post conflict operations.
Chapter 1

Introduction to the Research

The premise for this study evolved over the weeks that immediately following the March 2003, coalition force invasion of Iraq--Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).\(^1\) It stems from a perception that US Government (USG) planners, military and interagency, failed to develop a comprehensive post-conflict campaign design.\(^2\) One current trend of public thought is that the combat plan for the Coalition force invasion worked brilliantly but noticeably absent was a detailed plan for transitioning from war to peace. Coalition forces had just completed a decisive victory in battle but they were failing miserable at transitioning to peace. Immediately after United States (US) troops seized control of Baghdad, Iraq’s capital city, an unintentional security vacuum formed within the cities and towns of Iraq. The world observed first hand, via television and newsprint media, as the post-conflict security situation turned decisive victory into state of chaos and uncertainty.

This study is about USG civil-military planning for post-conflict operations. It explores weather or not there is a need to establish a single common integrated doctrine for post-conflict operations. The study suggests that military and interagency coordination and collaboration is in

\(^{1}\) Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is a US lead Coalition operation in Iraq. The operation began on March 23, 2003. At the cut off date of this research, January 2004, OIF was an ongoing USG operation.

need of some immediate improvement.\(^3\) With this in mind, this study’s hypothesis statement was developed:

If USG civil-military agencies and departments were to adopt a single integrated doctrine then they would have a common set of standards and reference materials enabling them to build a better and more interoperative framework for future complex contingency operations.

The hypothesis suggests that the USG civil-military planning requires a common set of communication and coordination standards to provide the fundamental principals and guidance necessary to conduct future planning. To that end, improving coordination amongst USG civil-military planners is an essential first step. A thorough review of the current and relevant joint military doctrine and the interagency policy and guidance for crisis action planning and coordination for complex contingency operations in foreign lands, publications concerning Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) are required. Conducting an assessment of how doctrine, policy, and guidance was applied during OIF’s post-conflict planning enables this study to answer its primary research question:

Is joint military doctrine sufficiently robust to be adopted by the USG civil-military community as the central framework for developing a single integrated doctrine for planning complex contingency and post-conflict operations?

To support and assist in answering the study’s primary research question a series of secondary questions were develop:

What fundamental principals and guidance does joint military doctrine and USG policy and guidance provide?
Does doctrine and USG policy and guidance provide the necessary fundamental principals and guidance for planning complex contingency and post conflict-operations?
How did the USG civil-military interagency planners from CJTF-7, C-5 post conflict planning cell and ORHA apply doctrine?
Did the planning for OIF’s post-conflict operations expose any gaps in the joint military doctrine?

\(^3\) LTG Ron Christmas, remarks taken from a conversation with a distinguished visitor at the US Army Command and General Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies, (Leavenworth, KS, April 8, 2004).
This study has two objectives. Its primary objective is to determine whether or not current publications of joint military doctrine and interagency policy and guidance provide a sufficiently robust framework that enables USG civil-military planners to effectively conduct post-conflict campaign planning. Its second objective is to determine whether or not gaps exists between what is written in doctrine, policy, and guidance verses how it was actually applied during the OIF post-conflict planning process.

The purpose of this study is to influence USG civil-military planners to immediate begin work on the development of a robust and integrated planning framework that becomes deeply rooted within the USG civil-military planning vernacular and mindset. By applying history, theory and doctrine to an ongoing and relevant case study it hopes to influence how USG civil-military planners learn, anticipate, and adapt to future complex contingency and post-conflict planning requirements.4

**Study Methodology**

This study creatively blends a case study methodology within a gap analysis strategy to examine its two objectives. The case study explores how the two critical USG civil-military planning organizations, the Coalition Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) C-5 post-conflict planning cell and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) applied doctrine to plan for OIF post-conflict operations. Moreover, the study presents a venue for constructive critic of the USG’s planning environment. It provides USG civil-military planners with an informative perspective on the true nature of their planning relationship.5

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5 Interview with Colonel John R. Martin, Chief of Staff, Director of Operations for Coalition Provincial Authority from March – August 2003, interview conducted 27 January 2004. Of note: COL Martin served as a member of the advance party and was one of the original team members that forward deployed in January 2003 to establish the ORHA cell in Kuwait. He later remained in country and transitioned between ORHA and the replacing CPA organization.
Examining the security environment in Iraq is a large topic of study. A timeframe was established, June 2002 through April 2003, to reduce the breadth of study. The timeframe coincides with the establishment of the study’s two critical USG civil-military planning organizations, the invasion of Iraq, and the initial execution of post-conflict operations.

**Evaluation Criteria**

The use of doctrine as an evaluation means lends relevance and credibility to this research. It is useful because it facilitates a common understanding and enables a greater depth of discussion between this research’s target audience-- USG civil-military planners. Doctrine is an accepted professional medium for discussion.

*Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* offers this definition of doctrine: “Doctrine—the fundamental principles and guidance by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national aims. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines doctrine in terms of expressing the “fundamental principles” and “guidance.” These two definitional terms of joint doctrine will serve as the study’s evaluation criteria.

Webster’s Dictionary definition of doctrine offers additional insight, “Doctrine--- 2a-c something that is taught, held forth as truth…a principle law which is established by past decisions or interpretations and proposes the basis for actions.” Webster’s definition implies that history and the theory might also be incorporated when formulating doctrine.

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8 One of the most extensive works on mental models on which I have implicitly relied upon is Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline The Art & Practice of The Learning Organization, (New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, 1990),
To this thought Lieutenant Colonel Gary Cox, former student at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies, noted that if doctrine is to be useful in the field it should leverage history and theory, preferably both, to establish a set of fundamental principles and guidance. The idea of using history and theory in coordination with doctrine is one that is incorporated within the curriculum at the US Army’s Command and General Staff College and within its School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMs). This idea will be integrated throughout this study.

Assumptions

To constrain the breadth of discussion the author makes several assumptions. First, improving coordination and collaboration within organizations reduces the level of uncertainty in planning future operations. Second, the Department of Defense’s (DoD) joint doctrine is the most robust for conducting crisis action planning and planning for post-conflict security operations. Its depth of information lends itself to become a logical place to begin a research project of this nature. The final assumption is the integration, coordination, and logistics between the USG, coalition governments, and the host nation government are going to be resourced at a level necessary to sustain post-conflict operations thereby enabling the USG to achieve its strategic objectives.

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11 A review of USG doctrine, policy and guidance validates this assumption.
Research Presentation

This study is presented in five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research project. It identifies the study’s hypothesis, primary and secondary research questions, evaluation criteria, methodology, research strategy, and formats how the research material will be presented. Chapter 2 reviews the current and relevant joint military doctrine, and interagency policy and guidance for crisis action planning, complex contingency, and MOOTW operations. The information provides the basis for analysis of the primary research question and the case study. Chapter 3 is a case study of the post-conflict planning efforts the results of CJTF-7 C-5, post-conflict planning cell and the ORHA planners. Chapter 4 is an analysis of the case study. It discusses several of the challenges that USG civil-military planners faced as they attempted to integrate planning for post-conflict operations as well it includes several of the planning issues that arose during the transition into post-conflict operations. Finally, Chapter 5 provides recommendations and suggested means for improving future USG civil-military planning efforts. It illustrates a number of gaps that were exposed within joint military doctrine and it identifies topics for future related study.

Research Background

This study recognizes that there is US historical precedence for joint military and interagency planning in post-conflict operations. In fact, research disclosed that the USG has nearly sixty years of experience in planning for post-conflict and nation-building operations. Much of the USG’s experience is recent and relevant. Over the past ten years, the US has served as the lead nation in the Balkans, actively planning and executing post-conflict operations. Additionally, since 2002, the USG has occupied the lead nation role for post-conflict and nation building operations in Afghanistan. Despite all of this experience, USG civil-military planners continue to struggle with collaborative planning and integration.
A Change in the US’ Security Paradigm

On September 11, 2001, American citizens realized that they were not exempt from the terrorist grasps that had already gripped much of the free world. That morning terrorist struck symbolic targets on US soil and triggered a change in the US’ security paradigm. The stresses from the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks exposed deep divisions and large-scale coordination obstacles between USG civil-military departments and agencies. Government officials realized that in order to achieve a common national aim they quickly needed to establish a better means of coordination between their departments and agencies. Since 2001, government officials have created a number of Homeland Defense initiatives that have reduced the level of interagency bureaucracy and simultaneously improved coordination. The results of those initiatives continue to work well today; many of them are being refined as interagency coordination and collaboration evolves. Ruefully, the effects of military and interagency coordination failed to transition over to the planning effort for OIF.

This chapter outlined this study. It presented the primary research question, described the research methodology, evaluation criteria and assumptions. It closed by providing some general background information to the relevance and applicability of this study.

With nearly sixty years of experience in post-conflict operations one would expect the USG to be quite proficient. However, this study illustrates an immediate need for USG civil-military planners to improve how they plan, coordinate, and synchronizing efforts and effects for

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complex contingency and post-conflict operations.\textsuperscript{16} The time has come to review how well doctrine, policy and guidance actually provides the fundamental principals and guidance for USG civil-military planners to apply it towards planning for complex contingency and post-conflict operations.

\textsuperscript{16} Comments taken from remarks made by Marine LTG (ret) Ron Christmas during a visit to the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies, April 8, 2004.
Chapter 2

A review of the current and relevant joint military doctrine and USG policy and guidance is necessary to meet the study’s two objectives. This chapter examines the span of joint military doctrine and interagency policy and guidance for planning complex contingency, post-conflict operations, and MOOTW. It begins with a discussion of several key factors concerning joint doctrine’s: history, purpose, usefulness, limitations, and applicability towards the other elements of national power. This chapter intends to answers the question, what fundamental principals and guidance does joint military doctrine and USG policy and guidance provide?

Exploring Doctrine

The USG civil-military planning and coordination has a long history of fitful performance. It can be traced to 1912 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt first addressed the issue in his proposal for a “Joint Planning Body.” Later, in 1945, the USG emerged from World War II with a keen sense of awareness that it continued to have interagency coordination problems. Amidst a major war the elements of national power had failed to coordinate their efforts. In 1947, political leaders created the National Security Act (NSA). The NSA of 1947 was intended to diminish political, interagency, and military rivalries, as well as, improve the numerous civil-military coordination challenges that existed throughout World War II. Over its fifty-seven year history, the NSA of 1947 has been amended numerous times each time with an eye towards improving civil-military efficiency and effectiveness. In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Act made a monumental breakthrough by thwarting USG civil-military parochialisms

and improving interservice planning and coordination.\textsuperscript{18} In May of 1997, President William J. Clinton adopted Presidential Decision

Directive (PDD)-56. This document provided policy and guidance for foreign complex contingency operations. USG organizations are still attempting to reorganize and synchronize their efforts to fulfill the vision political leaders had when they created these documents.

Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz wrote that “war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by political objectives…”\textsuperscript{19} If one accepts the writings of Clausewitz as truths, and war is not a senseless act, then war must be an act of conscious political thought. Clausewitz on commented on how a nation should apply its resources when at war. He wrote a nation at war should leverage all of its resources to win as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{20} Again, if Clausewitz is correct, then victory in war requires political leaders to apply conscious thought to the use of all of its elements of national power. Following a Clauswitzian line of logic, it stands that war requires the elements of national power to share a high degree of coordination and communication. Joint military doctrine subscribes to this line of logic by stating, military and interagency forums should be established to enable constructive dialogue between agencies.\textsuperscript{21} It is with this purpose that military doctrine was established. It provides a common framework and vernacular for the application of military power, it is a tool to express the transformation of strategy into action.

If doctrine is to serve as a useful tool then it must remain fixed to its fundamental principles, while simultaneously demonstrating a degree of flexibility and adaptability in order to conform to a countless variety of circumstances. Doctrine must promote the integration and

\textsuperscript{18} The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was the mandate for the military services to collaborate on developing joint doctrine for the integrated employment of joint military operations.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
coordination of resources and provide a framework that enables a comprehensive analysis of the problem. In order to be effective, doctrine must function within the capabilities and limitations of the organizations that are employing it.22 History is filled with examples of how strategic objectives and future requirements benefited through the application joint doctrine, policy, and guidance.23 However, USG civil-military planners aren’t always quick to apply historical lessons within current operations.24

Doctrine has its limitations. There is no single doctrinal panacea that can be applied to all military operations. Logically, no single solution is capable of providing a correct answer in every situation. The intent of joint military doctrine is to provide the fundamental principals and guidance for planning and executing military operations.25 Military operations are effected by a plethora of stimuli that make each mission uniquely distinct from previous ones. Each mission occurs within its own settings: geographical, political, cultural, and military. Although characteristically, some missions appear similar they are in fact uniquely distinct.26

It is helpful when USG civil-military planners try to develop mental models from previous experiences. However, many planners get into trouble when they try to replicate solutions to like problems. What worked as a viable solution in one situation is likely to provide

23 Operation Eclipse was the successful post-conflict campaign following World War II combat operations in Europe. The interagency multinational planning effort began in 1943, two years prior to the end of the war. Operation Eclipse sets historical precedence that early interagency collaboration aide in achieving national aim.
24 The United States has nearly sixty years of historical experience in post-conflict. In the past twenty years it has been involved in Haiti, Grenada, Panama, Kosovo, the Balkans, and Afghanistan. In each of these endeavors interagency coordination and planning has been ad-hoc and formulated late, long after initial military planning began.
26 Complexity theory illustrates that systems are adaptive and evolve overtime therefore it is impossible to identically replicate circumstances within a system. Source: M. Mitchel Waldorp, Complexity, The Emerging Science At The Edge of Order and Chaos, (New York, Touchstone, 1992) 11.
distinctly different results in another.\textsuperscript{27} Likewise, US political objectives will vary with each given situation. It is imperative that during each operation planners maintain a focus on the current political objectives and the desired end state.\textsuperscript{28} The establishment of a common integrated doctrine ensures a universal set of standards and reference materials that enable a more interoperable framework for future post-conflict operations. If the US continues along its current path, as the world’s lone superpower nation, then its global interests and responsibilities will continue to direct that USG organizations coordinate their activities in a close and supporting effort to achieve US strategic objectives.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{Joint Publication 3-0}

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 \textit{Doctrine for Joint Operations}, is a keystone publication. It sets forth governing activities and establishes performance standards for military operations. JP 3-0 identifies the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. It states that all three levels must become inextricably linked noting that the operational level should serve as the medium for transitioning strategic guidance into tactical action.\textsuperscript{30} Planning is required at each of the three levels; this complicates collaboration and coordination requirements.

The range of military operations outlined in JP 3-0 is broad. It lists the fundamental principles of joint operations and addresses the planning considerations for both: war, which is dominated with the concerns of large scale combat operations, and MOOTW, which includes a

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{27} “All complex adaptive systems build mental models; it is what allows them to anticipate the world.” Source: M. Mitchel Waldorp, Complexity, The Emerging Science At The Edge of Order and Chaos, (New York, Touchstone, 1992) 177.
\bibitem{28} LTC Ron Christmas interview.
\bibitem{30} \textit{__________}, Joint Publication 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington D.C, Department of Defense, 2001) I-I.
\end{thebibliography}
wide range of operations that are concerned with: deterring war, resolving conflict, supporting civil authorities, or promoting peace.\textsuperscript{31}

JP 3-0 recognizes and openly embraces the integration of technology within the evolution of future planning models. Technology is serving as a catalyst to improve the collaboration and dissemination of information. For the first time in history, planners’ established interservice situational awareness, a common operational picture, while simultaneously, collaborate planning efforts across all three levels of war.\textsuperscript{32}

The prudent use of MOOTW doctrine is helping to maintain the day-to-day control of military activities as well as preventing the uprising of a full-scale insurgency in Iraq. With some minor modifications, JP 3-0 is proving to be sufficiently robust and is more than capable of meeting the expanding demands of US national interests.

\textbf{Joint Publication 3-07}

The USG’s current actions and operations in Iraq are best described as MOOTW. \textit{Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War} describes the planning considerations for MOOTW operations. It explains how MOOTW operations differ from war, discusses the six principles of MOOTW, and how its distinguishing characteristics are influenced by political objectives.\textsuperscript{33} MOOTW doctrine provides a wide range of responses; sixteen military tasks are included within the spectrum of MOOTW operations.\textsuperscript{34} JP 3-07 recommends that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{31}Ibid. vii–I-1.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} OIF leveraged technology to establish a collaborative interservice environment. The environment created collaborative picture that shared friendly unit dispositions thereby increasing situational awareness. This collaborative picture is referred to as a common operational picture, (COP).
  \item \textsuperscript{33} The six principles of MOOTW are: Objective, Unity of Effort, Security, Restraint, Perseverance, and Legitimacy. Source: \textit{Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War} (Washington D.C, Department of Defense, 1995) I-2.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} The sixteen types of MOOTW operations are: Arms Control, Combating Terrorism, Support to Counter drug Operations, Enforcement of Sanctions and Maritime Intercept, Enforcing Exclusion Zones, Ensuring
\end{itemize}
MOOTW operations be of short durations. However, it recognizes that political objectives and the security situation do not always permit this to occur.

A number of factors can influence the duration of a MOOTW: the overall condition of the occupied state has a large impact that directly influences the length of the military operation. States that have been deteriorating or destabilized for a period of time, such as Iraq, will require greater military involvement in order to repair the deteriorated state. Achieving the stated national objectives in a post-conflict scenario requires commitment, time, and resources. Political leaders must ensure that USG civil-military planners have sufficient support in all three areas. In the future, USG civil-military planners can anticipate that combat-termination and MOOTW activities will likely occur simultaneously during the transition from war to peace.35

**Joint Publication 3-07.1**

*Joint Publication 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)* discusses the application of the elements of US national power in support of host-nation efforts to combat lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency.36 The USG has a long history of providing security assistance to friendly and allied nations.

FID training is a sub-element of the MOOTW and falls beneath a broader concept of US security assistance. FID is a MOOTW activity. JP 3-07.1, discusses in significant detail: the

35 Kenneth O. McCreedy, Planning The Peace: Operation Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany, (Fort Leavenworth: KS, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1995) pg. 36-37.
planning fundamentals for FID operations, organizational responsibilities, and the necessary planning and training considerations.

JP 3-07.1, prescribes three basic planning imperatives that all FID operations should consider: a long-term design strategy, tailor military support to meet the needs of the operating environment, and responsibility for security must lie with the Host Nation (HN) government.

JP 3-07.1, emphasizes USG civil-military planning concerns of cultural awareness as well as the threat to the HN forces and its indigenous population. FID operations are long-term US commitments. They require each element of national power to coordinate within its lane of responsibility to establish a full spectrum approach to enhancing the host nation’s capability to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

JP 3-07.1 thoroughly discusses the development of an Internal Defense And Development (IDAD) strategy. Internal defense strategies are broad and integrate tasks and responsibilities for numerous interagency organizations. IDAD strategies attempt to integrate five key interdependent functions: grand strategy, national objective, military strategy, operational strategy, and security force operations to prevent or counter a country’s internal threats.37 Doctrine states that there are four principles to IDAD: unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and government legitimacy. An IDAD strategy must create viable political, economic, military, and social institutions to enhance a foreign partner’s security capabilities, as well as address the long-term needs of the population. IDAD programs should always be the foundation from which FID programs are developed.

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37 Ibid. C1-C6.,
Joint Publication 3-08

Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, states that coordination is the critical link between the military and other USG agencies. It states, “Agencies should integrate the elements of national power and synchronize their efforts to optimize resources towards a single objective or end state.”

JP 3-08 identifies eight basic steps for building interagency coordination. It identifies the Combatant Commander as the focal point for regional military operations while the State Department, via the Ambassador, holds overall responsibility for activities on foreign soil.

JP 3-08 indicates that led agencies may change during operations so it is important to establish liaisons and interface with other agencies participating in the mission. There are no hierarchical relationships between government agencies; therefore, it is imperative that agencies stress interoperability, coordination, and resourcing. It is important for USG civil-military planners to understand that each agency provides a unique capability, brings its own: culture, objectives, philosophy, and skill sets. Each agency is a valuable member however; it must be employed properly within its lane of responsibility and capability.

JP 3-08 speaks to the issue of interagency training and education. It states that the Combatant Commander is responsible to schedule and conduct joint military and interagency training. It further states that the focus of the training is to identify capabilities, enhance

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39 The eight basic steps for interagency coordination are: Clearly define the problem, define the objective, establish a common frame of reference, develop course of action options, capitalize on experience, establish responsibility, plan for transition of key responsibilities/capabilities/ and functions, establish unity of effort. Source: ________, Joint Publication 3-08 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, (Washington D.C., Department of Defense, 1996) vi.
integration and coordination, and identify procedural disconnects in order to sustain a high level of interagency readiness.\(^{40}\)

**Joint Publication 5-0**

There are a number of factors in joint doctrine that enable military planners. *Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operation*, promulgates doctrine, principles, and concepts that establish planning responsibilities for joint operations.\(^{41}\) *Joint Publication 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operation*, covers the joint operation planning process (JPP) and addresses both the deliberate and crisis action planning (CAP) models.

The JPP supports the planning and execution of joint conventional military operations across the full-spectrums of military mission requirements. The JPP enables coordination and interpretability between all elements of the military. The JPP is a series of four interrelated planning systems.\(^{42}\)

JP 5-0 describes the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES is the principal framework for translating policy decisions into operational plans in support of national security objectives. A discussion of the JOPES system is one of immediate relevance to this study because it describes the framework for the conduct of joint military planning. JOPES enables military officers to conduct planning and execution across a full-spectrum of military missions, including post-combat security operations. The JOPES process consists of two approaches: a Deliberate Planning Process (DPP) and a Crisis Action Process (CAP).

\(^{40}\) Joint Publication 3-08, III-13.
\(^{41}\) Ibid., Joint Publication 5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, (Washington D.C., Department of Defense, 1995) vx.
\(^{42}\) The four planning systems are: the National Security Council (NSC), Joint System Planning System (JSPS), Planning Programming and Budget System (PPBS), and finally, the Joint Operational Planning and Executing System (JOPES). Source: ______., Joint Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, (Washington D.C., Department of Defense, 2000) 4-20-4-25.
The CAP process is most relevant to planning post-combat operations.\textsuperscript{43} CAP is DOD’s basic military planning process adopted in time sensitive situations to provide decision-makers with a means to rapidly respond to US global interests. CAP consists of six phases.\textsuperscript{44} It is inherently flexible, the six steps do not need to occur in sequential order and in some instances, the steps may occur simultaneously or, at the discretion of the lead planner, might even be omitted. Within the CAP, joint military and interagency organizations are directed to coordinate efforts. Some organizations might play a more vital role than others might, but all are necessary in the development of a complete and robust campaign design.

\textit{Joint Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide} also addresses JOPES planning. Both documents mention the requirement for military planners to rapidly respond to the request of the National Security Council (NSC). Doctrine states that planners will provide a timely and relevant array of flexible deterrent options (FDO) in support of political decision makers.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Non Department of Defense Planning Policy and Guidance}

The final planning documents reviewed are non-Department of Defense policies and guidance for foreign complex contingency operations. In May 1997, PDD-56 directed the creation of a cohesive education and training program to establish a cadre of interagency

\textsuperscript{43} The Deliberate Planning Process the most thorough method available to military planners. It incorporates a detailed and methodical systems approach to problem solving; because of its thoroughness and its consideration for the plans tertiary aspects, it is the military’s preferred planning model. The solutions generated by the DPP may take months to over a year to derive. Due to time constrains the DPP approach is generally unacceptable when planning complex contingency operations. Source: \underline{Joint Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, (Washington D.C., Department of Defense, 2000) 4-1-4-107.}

\textsuperscript{44} The six phases of CAP are: Situation Development, Crisis Assessment, Course of Action (COA) Development, COA selection, Execution planning, Execution. Source: \underline{Joint Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide, (Washington D.C., Department of Defense, 2000) 4-1-4-107.}

\textsuperscript{45} Flexible Deterrent Options are a planning construct intended to facilitate ear2/16/2004ly political decision making by prescribing a wide range of deterrent options this may include: economic, political, diplomatic, or military responses. Source \textit{The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 2000}, Joint Forces Staff College Publication 1, National Defense University, Joint Staff Officers College, US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. G-35.
planners. It served as a catalyst for interagency working groups to assist in policy development, planning, and the execution of complex contingency operations.46

Above all else, PDD-56 generated the Complex Contingency Handbook. The handbook is intended to assist in institutionalizing policy and procedures and provide an operational framework for planning, monitoring, and assessing US participation in complex contingency operations.47

Updated in January 2003, the Complex Contingency Handbook provides a written five-paragraph field order that states the intent and guidance for political-military actions in foreign complex contingency operations. The handbook clearly articulates the USG’s mission, purpose, objectives, concept of operations, and end state. It serves as a directional guide for USG agency planning. It clarifies agency roles and responsibilities for each mission area, assigns accountability for specific functional elements of the plan, provides a method to raise key planning issues early, and captures the lessons learned to aid planning for future operations.48 Its procedures outline the means for interagency organizations to provide timely and integrated guidance to those agencies and individuals executing operations on the ground. The integrated planning process outlined in the handbook provides interagency planners with a set of operational tools to overcome many of the difficulties that plague the interagency’s strategic planning process.

Despite all of the handbook’s useful guidance and tools, it has not been universally accepted as the interagency standard. The civilian planning component of the interagency team rarely has the resources or personnel to practice the procedures as they are outlined in the Complex Contingency Handbook.

This chapter began with a discussion of joint doctrine’s: history, purpose, usefulness, limitations, and applicability towards the other elements of national power. It reviewed the span of joint military doctrine and interagency policy guidance relevant to planning for post-conflict operations, complex contingency, and MOOTW. It answered the question, what fundamental principals and guidance does joint military doctrine and USG policy and guidance provide? The research illustrates that the majority of information available to USG civil-military planners is joint military doctrine. This is significant to the case study because CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners almost exclusively used JP 3-0and JP 5-0 during their preparation and planning for post-conflict planning in OIF.49

49 COL Kevin CM Benson, was the senior planning officer for CJTF-7 C-5 Planning cell for post-conflict operations during the timeframe of this study. The remarks were taken from a number of conversation with him in his current position as the Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies at the US Army Command and General Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies, (Leavenworth, KS.).
Chapter 3

At some point in the future, it is likely that historians and theorists will reflect upon the USG experiences in Iraq and attempt to reason their way through the chaos. When they do, it is likely that they will attempt to apply new theories and mental models in an effort to explain how and why the USG responded in the manner it did.

This chapter presents a case study of how the two USG civil-military planning organizations, CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planning cell and the ORHA conducted formal post-conflict planning for OIF. It begins with a background overview as to how the USG became involved in post-conflict operations in Iraq. This chapter answers the questions, did US joint military doctrine provide the necessary fundamental principals and guidance to design a campaign strategy for post-conflict operations, and how did the USG civil-military planners from CJTF-7 and ORHA apply doctrine and policy guidance towards planning post-conflict operations in Iraq?

Road to War in Iraq

September 11, 2001 was a defining day in US history. Initially, there was nothing particularly different on this day from any other Tuesday morning. The eastern coast of the US was busy readying itself for another routine business day when, four near simultaneous, terrorist attacks struck their predetermined targets. In each of the respective attacks, the terrorists employed a commercial airliner as weapons of mass destruction. Three of the four attacks reached their targets successfully; two airliners exploded on impact with New York City’s Twin Trade Tower buildings and a third aircraft exploded when it crashed into the Pentagon building in Washington D.C. The fourth airliner never reached its target. Several courageous airline passengers foiled the attack in the skies above rural Pennsylvania. To this day, the target of the fourth aircraft remains uncertain. It is speculated that its target may have been the White House. The world may never know exactly how many terrorist attacks were planned that September
morning. However, what is known is that those terrorist attacks provoked the US into a global war—the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Immediately following the attacks, interagency planners began developing a strategic campaign against international terrorism. Initially, political leaders went into a security frenzy attempting to establish a protective curtain around the US homeland. The entire nation unified and responded to address the new national security dilemma. Military leaders immediately ordered an increase in the protective posture of all military installations. The military mobilized and activated their highest alert level, threat condition Delta. The President activated the military reserves and governors responded nation-wide by mobilizing their national guards. Even local police and private security organizations responded by attempting to increase their security posture.

As time passed, interagency working groups at the strategic level were able to isolate problems. Their efforts led to the development of better security response plans and enabled a better allocation of resources, which focused assets on securing America’s critical nodes and facilities. The post September 11, 2001, security quagmire revealed a number of deep fissures and government inefficiencies within interagency system. It exposed dysfunctional lines of coordination, ineffective collaboration designs, and gaps in functional responsibilities that were preventing agencies and departments from working effectively together.50

The Bush Administration immediately dedicated the financial resources to alleviate many of the interagency coordination challenges, at least those disclosed at the national level and within the scope of US homeland security issues and concerns. To their credit, in a relatively short time the Bush Administration resolved many of the resistance issues and coordination challenges.

Later in 2001, the Bush Administration adopted a new GWOT strategy. The new strategy included a bold and dynamic military offensive, taking America’s power to the doorstep of the enemy, Iraq included. Two years have passed since America adopted an offensive strategy for the GWOT. Americans, in coordination with its coalition partners, are now engaged in the sequels of its GWOT strategy. The GWOT strategy currently incorporates three major theaters of operations: the US homeland, Afghanistan--Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Iraq—OIF. The USG interest in Iraq grew as political and military leaders allegedly discovered more information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program and its possible ties to global terrorist organizations. Based on the commitment of national resources, it is clear that OIF is the US’s main political and military effort.

Post-Conflict Planning Organizations

In November of 2001, the Department of Defense began planning for the projection of military power into Iraq--OIF. The US’s strategic intent was to overthrow the repressive dictator, Saddam Hussein, and his Ba’athist regime and replace it with a new form of democratic government.

Similarly, in 2002, the State Department began its own planning effort to develop an Iraqi needs plan. However, subject matter experts recommended removing the heavy State Department influence citing that it was unnecessary because coalition forces would receive strong

51 President Bush mentioned these three deployments in his 7 December 2003 speech, there are other areas of operation such as the Philippines however; the three largest deployments remain the US homeland, OEF, and OIF.
popular support from the Iraqi citizens. Therefore, by late December 2002, work on the State Department’s Iraqi needs plan ceased, leaving the Department of Defense as the lead government agency for planning post-conflict reconstruction, specifically, the CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners.

Shortly after the State Department was directed to cease post-conflict planning the CJTF-7 was confronted with the probability of war with Iraq. The planners were facing a dilemma pulling them in two complex planning directions: planning for a major war and planning for post-conflict and nation building operations. A retired senior military officer stated, "Shifting the mindset from being deeply engaged in planning for one scenario to another is an extremely difficult task. Asking planners to do it overnight is not the way the USG ought to be doing business." 

CJTF-7

The CJTF-7 is a sub-component of the Central Command headquarters, it was established to plan and prosecute the war and facilitate the initial transition from war to peace. CJTF-7 was involved in post-conflict planning over the span of its existence; however, it did not establish a formal post-conflict planning cell until June of 2002. The CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planning cell initially consisted of just ten military planners: an army colonel, five army majors, a marine and an air force officer, and two coalition partners - an Australian and a British officer. Of the initial ten assigned, two were assigned to serve as liaison officers with immediate duty at Central

56 Woodward.
57 LTG Ron Christmas, remarks taken from a conversation with a distinguished visitor at the US Army Command and General Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies, (Leavenworth, KS, April 8, 2004).
Command Headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.\textsuperscript{58} Those two officers were not available for direct planning, leaving just eight officers available to conduct 24 hour planning for post-conflict and nation building operations in Iraq. In January 2003, four additional Army officers joined the eight forward deployed members to bring the total number of CJTF-7, C-5 post–conflict planners in theater to twelve. Of the twelve, seven were graduates of the Army’s primer planning school, School of Advanced Military Studies.\textsuperscript{59}

One of the initial planning problems facing CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners was a result of inept lines of communication. Despite planning in parallel since June 2002, USG civil military organizations had been planning post-conflict operations in a vacuum. Information exchange between USG civil-military organizations was non-existent. They never meet, spoke or shared information despite working towards the same end state.\textsuperscript{60} Even after being designated as the lead planning organization in late 2002, the CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners never obtained any of the independent studies, briefings, or occasional information papers that were produced by other USG organizations.\textsuperscript{61} Their independent stovepipe efforts alienated themselves from a collaborated interagency planning effort.\textsuperscript{62}

By adopting a unilateral planning approach CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planning cell departed from joint doctrine. Joint Publications 3-0, 3-08, and 5-0 all promote the integration of a multi-agency planning framework during crisis or complex contingency operations. Doctrine recommends the multi-agency planning model because it ensures decision makers are provided

\textsuperscript{58} COL Kevin CM Benson, was the senior planning officer for CJTF-7 C-5 Planning cell for post-conflict operations during the timeframe of this study. The remarks were taken from a number of conversation with him in his current position as the Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies at the US Army Command and General Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies, (Leavenworth, KS.).

\textsuperscript{59} Taken from interviews with military members of CJTF-7 planning cell for post-conflict operations.

\textsuperscript{60} Information is from a fusion of interviews with CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners and data presented from CBS News 60 minutes interview with Bob Woodward.

\textsuperscript{61} Benson.

\textsuperscript{62} Anthony Cordesman, 346.
with a thorough analysis and assessment of potential future problems and they can receive broad range of deterrent options.

CJTF-7’s assumption had always been that they would prosecute the war and follow on with an initial degree of post-conflict responsibilities. Leaving the vast majority of post-conflict reconstruction and nation building responsibilities to be quickly transitioned to other, more capable, government or non-government agencies. This assumption is based on JP Keystone primer, which states that the military should work to rapidly transition authority to another, legitimate and capable organization.63

Up to June 2002, the amount of effort, time, and resources dedicated towards post-conflict planning was minuscule when compared to that given to plan for major combat operations. Any attention that was given towards post-conflict planning was predominantly done by military planners and virtually void of any interagency collaboration or integration.64 Once given the mission, CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners quickly went to work on forming new lines of operations, analyzing a new center of gravity, and designing new command and control structure, collaborating with interagency organizations and other non-governmental agencies, of which little was known or understood of their capabilities and limitations.

Developing a full spectrum post-campaign design requires a great deal of a time and expertise. Most planners would agree that the scope of long-term nation building operations was well beyond the capabilities and resources of the CJTF-7, C-5 planning cell for post-conflict operations. The twelve military planners simply did not have the resources nor could they have all of the subject matter expertise required to address the detailed tasks and responsibilities associated with post-war nation building.

63 Joint Publication Primer.
64 Discussions with COL Kevin CM Benson.
In late January 2003, the twelve-member cell was augmented by the ORHA. Together, they had the ominous task of redirecting an entire coalition of force of over 170,000 men and women, within two months time.

**ORHA**

In the months that preceded the invasion the Bush Administration came to realize that a war with Iraq was probable. As a result, they began considering the US’s post-conflict responsibilities. Civil interagency planning for post-Saddam Iraq started in late summer 2002, but was not formalized until January 20, 2003, when President Bush created the ORHA, an interagency post-conflict planning organization. ORHA included representatives from the following departments and specialized agencies: State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, Agriculture, the Agency for International Aid, and the Office of Management and Budget. The immediate purpose of the ORHA was to assist CJTF-7 in the development of detailed plans for administering post-war Iraq. Beyond collaborating plans with the CJTF-7 planners, ORHA planners were also expected to establish working relationships with members from the United Nations’ and other non-governmental organizations that would be playing a role in reconstruction of post-war Iraq.

Retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner was selected to lead the ORHA. He was uniquely qualified for the job. In 1991, Lieutenant General Garner led a UN humanitarian relief operation in northern Iraq. He possessed operational insight and had useful regional experience. He gave the ORHA four functional areas of responsibility and appointed a civilian coordinator to head

67 Ibid.
each area: Humanitarian Relief, Reconstruction, Civil Administration, and Governance. He created a separate sub organization within OHRA to oversee communications, logistics, and budgetary support. Although the ORHA had the right senior leadership and experience, it lacked the subordinate backbone to support and sustain operations.

When the ORHA team deployed into the theater of operations in January 2003 they were grossly unprepared to conduct post-conflict planning operations. The ad hoc interagency organization arrived without the necessary equipment to establish operations. The ORHA team deployed without secure telephones, classified computers, and without other essential administrative and coordination materials. They didn’t have the necessary equipment to collaborate and plan with their military counterparts.68 Initially, the ORHA team relied heavily upon the military for assistance. Aside from their initial hardware challenges, ORHA members faced a slew of other dilemmas. For example, many of the ORHA planners did not possess the appropriate security clearances that made cross talk and efficient and effective coordination difficult. The pending invasion caused CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners to face further planning dilemmas that complicated coordination with the ORHA planners.

Although it greatly inhibited their ability to jointly plan for post-conflict operations, the ORHA leadership and staff respected the immediacy of the planning priorities of CJTF-7 planners.69 Eventually, despite their initial challenges, the ORHA did become a functional organization and the two organizations were able to establish a working relationship that resulted in some constructive post-conflict planning. In the end, time was the critical factor. It worked against the two organizations and they were unable to generate a detailed plan for post-conflict operations.

68 Martin, interview.
69 Ibid.
The war began in March 2003, and by early April, US forces were already conducting
post-conflict operations. Almost immediately, the effects of poor post-conflict planning began to
manifest themselves. Once again, proclaimed subject matter experts inaccurately led planners to
believe a misconception. The ORHA had miscalculated Iraqi requirements for humanitarian
assistance; before the war commenced, the international community foresaw a great humanitarian
disaster. Relief agencies estimated an internal displacement of two million people. They also
predicted that 1.5 million Iraqis were going to flee to neighboring countries. Because the war
would that up to 10 million Iraqis would need emergency food assistance in the first days of the
war.70 Since its conception the ORHA planners invested a large degree of their time, effort, and
resources to develop an elaborate and well-constructed humanitarian assistance plan.
Unfortunately, their effort focused on a problem that did not exist. Beyond planning for a famine,
plans to administer other post-conflict responsibilities were so vague that when the war ended, the
ORHA seemed to be crafting and executing a strategy at the same time.71

Planning for Post-Conflict Operations in Iraq

The US led coalition invasion into Iraq to destroy Saddam Hussein and replace his
Ba’athist regime achieved its initial objectives, soundly defeating most of the Iraqi military and
capturing Baghdad, Iraq’s capital city. However, despite achieving an overwhelming combat
success, victory continues to elude the coalition forces. They have yet to fulfill the US’ strategic
objective of recasting Iraq as the Middle East’s “beacon of democracy.”72

70 Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Iraq: Reconstruction, 108th Cong., 1st sess., March
71 Yordan.
72 Tim Ripley, Unstable Iraq Looks To New Security Forces, Jane’s Intelligence Review, volume 15
number 12 December 2003, Thanet Press Ltd. United Kingdom
The timely allocation and commitment of planning resources might very well be the single most important factor contributing to the incomplete post-conflict campaign design in OIF. US military planners’ primary focused on planning combat operations in Iraq. Likewise, Department of Defense planners spent well over a year collaborating and coordinating for the military invasion of Iraq. During that time span there was very little effort allocated towards planning post-conflict operations. The volume of time, energy, and resources committed to planning combat operations so greatly exceeded the effort dedicated to planning post-conflict operations that it is almost impossible to accurately measure. As an example, interviews with military planners from CJTF-7 reveal that hundreds of planners from across the Department of Defense meet periodically throughout the year to discuss future combat operations. In comparison, it was not until June of 2002, just nine months prior to the invasion that the CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict began planning with a core of dedicated post-conflict planners.

The first time CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners experienced a deliberate effort for interagency planning was late in January 2003, when members from the ORHA deployed forward into theater and joined them in Kuwait. This ad hoc execution of post-conflict planning illustrates that initially just eight military planners were given the responsibility to plan post-conflict and nation building operations. In contrast, likely thousands of planners had participated in planning the invasion of Iraq and its major combat operations. Not only were there significant disproportions in the number of resources that were committed to planning the invasion verses planning post-conflict operations but arguably more important, the time available for planning the more complex operation, post-conflict operation, was greatly reduced. The USG had already invested the past twelve years refining general war plans for Iraq. The last fifteen months of that time had been specifically dedicated to planning OIF. In comparison, CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners were given just over nine months with minimal resources, eight planning members, later expanding to twelve, and just the last two short months to plan post-conflict operations with the
ORHA. In light of this information, the planners for post-conflict operation in OIF did a phenomenal job.

Many of planners interviewed for this study agreed that they were led to believe the situation in Iraq would play out vastly different than it actually did. The planners commonly agreed that most of the Iraqi analyst and proclaimed subject matter experts agreed as to the state of readiness of the Iraqi conventional forces, however, there were varying opinions when it came to the issue of how Iraqi citizens would respond to the coalition’s invasion.\(^73\)

Two basic schools of thought formed around this issue, there was the pro coalition camp and the anti-coalition camp. There was a lot of discussion over this. In the end a number of military analyst as well as many other individuals with extensive knowledge of the region persuaded the planners to believe that Iraqi citizens would openly welcome the coalition forces with warm hearts, viewing them as “liberators.”\(^74\) One planner put it this way, “We had equally conflicting opinions, someone was going to be right, and someone was going to be wrong. We debated the matter for along time, in the end we went with what we thought was the most likely, we were wrong.”\(^75\) The planners commonly agreed if they had had a better understanding of the potential security challenges, then they would have been better able to address them.

The issue of how the Iraqi population would receive the coalition forces is just one of a number of factors that are feeding into the complexity of the post-conflict security situation. The rapid and decisive defeat of the Iraqi military initiated the destabilization of every element of Iraqi national and local security. When Iraq’s centrally controlled security network fell, \(^\)  

\(^{73}\) Interviews with planners from CJTF, ORHA, and CPA as well as news media reports reference reports, and briefings by Iraqi subject matter experts suggesting that the Iraqi population would openly welcome a US invasion.  
\(^{74}\) The Editorial Board, *The Iraq war and the debate on phony intelligence*, 19 July 2003  
\(^{75}\) Interview with Interagency planner December 2003.
everything associated with it fell too, including the local and regional security structures and Iraq’s economy. The collapse of the regime totally destabilized Iraq, leaving the entire nation in a quagmire. The collapse of Iraq’s economy further exacerbated the problem because jobs were no longer available. Iraqi males had no means to support themselves or their families. As a result, the mass unemployment problem generated legions of idle and angry men that were targeted as recruits for the former regime’s loyal militant resistance.  

In addition to Iraq’s security collapse, a security vacuum formed because of the coalition’s incomplete campaign design. In the wake of the coalition’s overwhelming combat success Iraqi citizens massed on the streets in celebration, elated to finally be freed from persecuting grasps of the former Ba’athist regime, an Iraqi joy filled celebration quickly transitioned into public chaos and sparked uncontrolled rioting and large scale looting. Under the occupying gaze of US forces, and with Baghdad still burning from the aftermath of combat, Iraqi citizens participated in an orgy of looting and pillaging. They created an unintentional security vacuum that US soldiers initially did nothing to stop.

Immediately, it became apparent that campaign design had fallen short; it failed to include specific post-conflict security guidance. Unfortunately, looting is a byproduct of a lapse in security. Unknowingly, coalition forces had failed to uphold their legal responsibility of protecting civilians, not just during combat but in the aftermath of fighting. The probability of

looting and the formation of a security vacuum should not have come as a surprise to USG civil-
military planners. There is sufficient historical reference to post-conflict lawlessness.\textsuperscript{79}

In February of 2003, just prior to the invasion, The Human Rights Watch organization presented a briefing paper to Secretary of State Colin Powell that warned and reemphasized the issue of security responsibilities.\textsuperscript{80} Moreover, the long-standing laws of the fourth Geneva Convention provide guidance for the conduct and responsibilities of occupying forces. The US was obligated to ensure public order within the territories that it occupies, which includes the prevention looting and other forms of lawlessness.\textsuperscript{81} The lapse in security should have never occurred; it should have been planned. A current assessment of Iraq’s security problems indicates that the looting and civil unrest that immediately followed the coalition forces occupation of Iraq were an indicator of just how volatile Iraq would become.

This chapter presents a case study of how the two USG civil-military planning organizations, CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planning cell and the ORHA conducted formal post-conflict planning for OIF. It disclosed a number of reasons that can explain why victory in Iraq remains so elusive. However, none escapes the fact that the USG invaded Iraq without a clear and decisive post-conflict campaign design.\textsuperscript{82}

The Bush Administration made numerous strategical errors: establishing the ORHA to late to seriously influence post-conflict operations, under staffing the ORHA, expecting two ad hoc organization who had never worked together to function effectively, establishing time

\textsuperscript{79} Operation JUST CAUSE after action reports reveled wide spread looting and lawlessness following the US invasion of Panama.
\textsuperscript{81} Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (Fourth Geneva Convention), art. 147; Protocol I, art. 85(2); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998 art. 8(2) (viii).
\textsuperscript{82} Borston.
constrains without serious consideration of external influences, under committing troop resources when requested by military leadership, and misinterpreting how Iraqi citizens would confront US forces.

There were a number of departures from joint doctrine and USG policy that negatively influenced planning and coordination for OIF’s post-conflict operations. It discloses that joint military intervention alone is incapable of providing the transition from war to peace. Indeed, it may prolong a pause of violence; however, without leveraging the expertise and resources from across the spectrum of USG power the conditions of peace are likely be short lived. Violence usually returns at and escalated rate, fueled by conditions and resources that were intended for peace. Post-conflict and nation building operations require a well-organized and coordinated effort.

During their preparation for OIF, the CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planning cell adopted a unilateral planning approach. Joint Publications recognize the value of a multi-agency planning model; it ensures that decision makers are provided with a thorough analysis and provided a better range of deterrent options.

Each passing day service members in Iraq place their lives on the line. For USG civil-military planners, time is of the essence. There is a pressing need for USG civil-military planners to assess, learn, and apply tomorrow’s lessons in post-conflict operations, today.
Chapter 4

Assessing Iraq

Victories should not be measured by the sum of battles won, but rather, by measuring the sum of the coordinated actions levied to achieve the greater strategic objectives.

Max Manwaring

A year has past since American forces led the initial invasion into Iraq but the post-conflict security situation remains in a volatile quagmire. The operations in Iraq are providing plenty of lessons worthy of the interagency planners’ attention. The purpose of this chapter is to draw upon history, theory, and doctrine to assist in the analysis of the case study. It answers the questions:

How well did the USG civil-military planners from CJTF-7 and ORHA apply doctrine? Did the planning for OIF’s post-conflict operations expose any gaps in the joint military doctrine?

The post-conflict situation in Iraq presents interagency planners with a number of future challenges to which there are no quick and single-source solutions. Iraq’s challenges are broad and future solutions must address cultural, historical, economical, political, as well as threat related concerns. There are several theoretical approaches that USG civil-military planners can adopt to reduce the uncertainty of post-conflict planning: Clausewitz trilogy, Center of Gravity Analysis, Blurred Strategies, Shared Vision, and Mental Models.

Clausewitz Theories Applied to Iraq

Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote, war and politics are a continuation of the same struggle. To that end, interagency planners must understanding that politics, the population, and the military are all part of an interrelated system that will influence the

Clausewitz, On War, p. 259
battlefield. It behooves USG civil-military planners to employ battle as a shaping tool, always keeping in mind the aim of achieving the political end state. To their credit CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners clearly understood this, they realized the war in Iraq would be a limited war; they considered the consequences of military actions and understood the causes and effects that war has on the indigenous population. The planners ensured the CJTF-7’s leadership understood the necessity to refrain from completely annihilating the Iraqi Army, they foresaw the consequences of tertiary effects and ensured the leadership enforced the necessity for troops to refrain from placing undue hardship upon the populace and avoided indiscriminate attacks upon Iraq’s critical infrastructure. They understood that the manner in which coalition forces prosecuted the combat phase of battle would have a direct influence on the transition to peace.84

In the aftermath of war, the road to a peaceful resettlement is likely to be marred with hatred and undesired destabilizing violence. It seems clear that developing a strategy and vision for post-conflict operations is equally imperative as developing the war campaign itself.

The US is great at dealing with the symptoms. It’s great at dealing with the tactical problems—the killing and breaking things. However, the US is lousy at solving strategic problems having a strategic plan.

General (Ret) Anthony Zinni

**Applying Center Of Gravity Analysis**

Military theorist Dr. Joe Strange, professor at the US Marine Corps War College, developed the Center of Gravity theoretical model. CJTF-7, C-5 post conflict planners used it to identify essential and influential elements within Iraq’s post-conflict operating environment. Dr. Strange’s work provided CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners with the framework to establish logical relationships between the centers of gravity (COG) and the critical lines of operation as

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84 Multiple Authors, Planning and Execution of Conflict Termination, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. May, 1995. p.
well as assessing Iraqi critical capabilities (CC) and critical vulnerabilities (CV). Dr. Strange quotes from Army Field Manuel, FM 100-5 Operations, “Identification of the enemy’s center of gravity and the design of actions that will ultimately expose it to attack and destruction while protecting our own, are the essence of the operational art.”

**Blurred Strategies**

In January 2003, the President announced the establishment of ORHA. His intent was to resolve many of the nation-building challenges by deploying an interagency organization to work in close coordination with the military post-conflict planners. Attempting to join a team, CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planning cell for post-conflict operations that has been in full stride preparation for the past seven months is a challenge in itself. The working relationship between the two organizations never really got into an effective rhythm. ORHA’s initial challenges likely presented images of an organization that was incapable of conducting its assigned mission. Both organizations, CJTF-7 and ORHA could have avoided a great deal of frustration and planning challenges had they collaborated ideas and efforts to maximize their efforts and facilitate a rapid progression towards their prescribed end state. Joint military doctrine recommends interagency coordination by consensus. However, executing doctrine amidst a bureaucracy is difficult, time consuming, and borders on improbable under such circumstances. In crisis planning a clear line of authority and lanes of responsibility are required to facilitate effective and efficient coordination. Also a degree of familiarity and training is required. JP 3-08 recommends that the

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85 Clausewitz definition of COG.
86 Dr. Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the Same Language, Perspectives on Warfighting, Number Four, Second Edition (Quantico, Virginia, Marine Corps University, 1996), 35.
87 Martin, interview
88 Joint Publication 3-08, II-1.
combatant commander coordinate and conduct interagency training.\textsuperscript{89} Had these two planning organizations had some previous association many of the simple coordination problems likely would have already been identified and resolved well before any considerations for combat were ever discussed. The issue of organizational structure and simple command and control issues would have been addressed long before too. Additionally, had the organizations unified their efforts and collaborated under a single chain of command as suggested in joint military doctrine then they could have avoided a duplication of efforts and focused on clear lanes of responsibility and thereby been able to dedicate more effective efforts towards problem solving and rapidly arriving at their objectives. The current ad hoc form of interagency integration and collaboration is not optimal for planning in crisis situations. Ideally, organizations are structured to facilitate their intended performance. There should be a positive relationship between form and function. Interagency planners must plan together and share the same vision.

\textbf{Shared Vision}

Management theorist Peter M. Senge prescribes communication as the essential element for organizations with a shared vision.\textsuperscript{90} Senge writes, “Shared vision is answer to the question, what we wanted to create.”\textsuperscript{91} The rapid and ad hoc planning approach to OIF was detrimental to establishing a civil-military shared vision. Before the creation of the ORHA, there was no deliberately coordinated military and interagency planning effort for OIF. The joint military planners did the bulk of the planning. From their initial start they omitted a true interagency planning approach to post-conflict operations in Iraq has manifested a number of tertiary challenges. The two USG organizations, CJTF-7 and ORHA, failed to apply a shared vision that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{89} Joint Publication 3-08 vi.
  \item \textsuperscript{90} Senge,
  \item \textsuperscript{91} Ibid. 206.
\end{itemize}
led to a number of disjointed efforts, the misunderstanding of security responsibilities, and the miscalculation of humanitarian requirements.

The speed of combat and the self-demobilization of the Iraqi military as well as the collapse of local police all contributed to the security confusion immediately following the fall of Baghdad. However, one cannot overlook the fact that interagency planners did not develop a robust campaign plan for post-conflict operations. Joint military and civilian planners failed to communicate post-conflict security requirements. The lack of communication contributed to the security vacuum. Military and interagency planners failed to clearly articulate post-conflict security requirements. The poor communication resulted in a failure to identify clear military and interagency lanes of responsibility. Consequently a security vacuum formed after the military failed to prevent the widespread rioting and looting that occurred. A misunderstanding exacerbated the security vacuum, ORHA planners assumed the military understood the laws established within Geneva Convention and the military’s post-conflict responsibilities and it would immediate conduct security operations. Likewise, military planners had assumed ORHA planners had conducted an accurate assessment. The failure to share information caused the ORHA to focus limited resources on the wrong problem. Clearly, military and interagency organizations did not share information as well as they could have. A major reason for the confusion can be linked to a failure to communicate and apply a shared vision.

Peter Senge warns that a shared vision cannot be directed from the top, it must be integrated at every level. Shared vision is not limited to US interagency organizations; Iraq’s citizens must also share the same vision of a democratic state. They must be willing subscribers of the vision. Iraqi’s must buy into the concept that they have a stake in their future. No amount

of money, no western marketing approach can sell a democratic state to the Iraqi’s. Iraqi citizens cannot become passive followers; they must actively enroll in their future, electing to freely change and willingly providing the energy and necessary effort to transform Iraq. The Iraqi people must be responsible for their own future; they must firmly establish their own form of democracy at the national, provincial, and local levels. Overloading newly established Iraqi organizations by initially pushing too many responsibilities upon them would undermine an otherwise positive development. The USG must ensuring Iraqi success by slowly and deliberately transitioning responsibility upon newly formed Iraqi organizations.

**Adopting Mental Models**

Peter Senge’s discussion of mental models is another lesson to capture. The value of mental models cannot be understated. Interagency planners had a number of current and historical examples of ad hoc interagency organizations conducting collaborative planning.

One current and extremely effective model is illustrated in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In 1979, President Jimmy Carter merged many of the USG’s separate disaster-related responsibilities under the same organization-FEMA. The FEMA model is proof that there is precedence for effective interagency planning and coordination in time sensitive scenarios. Shortly after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the FEMA expanded its organizational model to coordinate its activities with the newly formed Office of Homeland Security. Thereby ensuring the nation’s first responders were well trained and equipped to deal with the full scope of possibilities for national emergencies involving the US homeland and its

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93 Senge, 219-224.
territorial possessions. Currently, every state in America conducts training to exercises and ensures its emergency management systems remain relevant and responsive.94

There are a number of historical models that establish precedence for interagency participation in post-conflict and nation-building operations. The USG has nearly sixty years of experience, dating back to the planning for post World War II, Operation ECLIPSE. More recently, over the past twenty years, 1983-2003, the USG has participated in post-conflict operations in: Grenada, 1983- Operation URGENT FURY, Panama, 1989 - Operation JUST CAUSE, Somalia, 1992- Operation RESTORE HOPE, Bosnia, 1995- Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, Kosovo, 1999- Operation JOINT GUARDIAN, and most recently in Afghanistan, 2002- Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

CJTF-7, C-5 post conflict planners referred to historical examples to gain insight as well as establish a framework for creating their post-conflict lines of operation. The post-conflict planners from CJTF-7, C-5 post conflict planning cell leveraged historical models to aide in the identification of future post-conflict tasks, however not all historical lessons learned were applied to post-conflict planning in OIF.95

For example, in 1945, at the conclusion of operations in World War II’s European Theater, US interagency planners initiated Operation ECLIPSE. In preparation for Operation ECLIPSE interagency planners recognized the need to collaborate often and conduct early preparation for post-combat operations. Their planning for Operation ECLIPSE gradually evolved over a three-year planning period 1943-1945. Planning representatives were included from the two other allied powers: Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Although the planners fell

95 Major Brian Sparling was the a plans officer for CJTF-7 C-5 for post-conflict planning cell. The remarks were taken from a conversation with him when he visited SAMs as a guest speaker in December, 2003 US Army Command and General Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies, (Leavenworth, KS.).
short of developing the entire solution for transitioning from war to peace, they nevertheless made significant contributions to the post-war planning effort…they formulated the terms of the German surrender, codified the zones of occupation, and it provided insight into the political deliberations that shaped future military planning requirements.  

Another example of a use of models is Senge’s theory of mental models. It can be applied to describe the poor interaction between CJTF-7, C-5 post-conflict planners and the ORHA planners. Although doctrine prescribes coordination and the planners from both of the organizations generally understood they were supposed to work together, they did not. The planners maintained the spurious interagency relationships that existed in the US. Their poor interaction complicated their ability to unify efforts and streamline the decision making process. Since CJTF-7 and ORHA were both ad hoc organizations and the planners had never worked together, they did not have a relevant mental model of how they were supposed to coordinate with one another. Therefore, when they did establish coordination it appeared to them to be sufficient and effective.

Theoretically, organizations work or fail to work based upon how its members think and interact. Senge writes, “We all have mental models, bias, that are the medium through which the world and we interact…learning changes those metal models…to learn we must study and practice constantly.” Senge’s comments on metal models and team learning provide an academic foundation for analysis organizational relationships. Organizations that are expected to work together must train together to experience and develop mental models of how to function and establish working relationships. Organizations that are expected to coordinate with each other must have a common appreciation of how they intend to function. Establishing a single common

96 McCreedy. 36-40.
97 Senge, xiv.
98 Ibid. xv.
integrated doctrine for post-conflict operations would be a beneficial first step towards
developing an even greater military and interagency crisis and complex contingency planning
framework.

This chapter analyzed the case study. It draw upon history, theory, and doctrine to assist
answers the questions:

How well did the USG civil-military planners from CJTF-7 and ORHA apply doctrine?
Did the planning for OIF’s post-conflict operations expose any gaps in the joint military
document?

The use of history, theory, and doctrine to develop mental models is applicable to USG
civil-military planners at all echelons. The manner in which they USG civil-military planners
employ these tools to develop a post-conflict campaign design has serious implications for the
US’s national strategy.
Chapter 5

Recommendations and Conclusions

Learning how to embrace change is a useful characteristic for any organization. It is a common characteristic of most successful organizations. When an organization fails to review its actions then it reduces its ability to expand its learning horizon. This study had two objectives:

Its primary objective was to determine whether current publications of joint military doctrine and interagency policy and guidance provide a sufficiently robust framework that enables USG civil-military planners to effectively conduct post-conflict campaign planning.

Its second objective was to determine whether or not gaps exists between what is written in joint military doctrine and interagency policy and guidance vice how it was actually employed during the planning for OIF post-conflict operations.

It used a gap analysis strategy applied through a case study of OIF to examine how doctrine, policy, and guidance was applied during the planning of OIF. Its purpose is to influence future military and interagency planners to change their current ad hoc and unilateral approach to planning. This chapter revels the study’s significant findings. Doctrine, policy and guidance for post-conflict operations is woefully insufficient, there are other relevant interagency planning models, a number of gaps exist in doctrine, Iraq’s current security situation was negatively effected by political strategic errors, the US failed to learn from historical post-conflict models, and the current form of bureaucratic leadership in post-conflict operations must be avoided in the future. In addition, several recommendations for future study are included.

99 Ibid. XV-16.
Doctrine and Policy Review

A paradox of uncertainty exists in planning for complex contingency and post-conflict security operations. The more uncertain the environment becomes the more decision makers will rely upon a forecast to predict what actions they should take.\textsuperscript{100} Uncertainty, to some degree, is inherent in all problems; therefore, it is imperative that planners engage in proactive and focused planning to reduce the risks of uncertainty. One of the major concepts found in both doctrine and policy is that in order to achieve national aim, devise the best options for decision makers, and to plan efficiently and effectively USG agencies must to coordinate, collaborate, and synchronize their efforts as early as possible during the planning process.\textsuperscript{101} The study concluded that although joint military doctrine does provide an excellent model for establishing a framework for the designing post-conflict operations, it is woefully insufficient at providing the fundamental principals and guidance necessary to address the broad scope of nation building requirements. However, with augmentation from additional publications joint military doctrine could serve as a logical place to begin formulating a single common integrated planning doctrine for planning complex contingency and post-conflict operations. As an example, JP 3-07.1 provides the detailed principals and guidance for developing an IDAD strategy. If other joint publications were developed to address the essential nation building tasks then joint military doctrine would be a more useful tool for planning.

Through research, the study came across another interagency planning model worthy of discussion. The FEMA model was discovered during this research. It presents a well-resourced and robust model for developing future military and interagency planning and coordination. It is a functioning interagency planning model worthy of further research. The FEMA model also

\textsuperscript{100} Mitzberg .225. 
\textsuperscript{101} Joint Publication 3-08, II-1.
addresses the issues of training and education. Annual FEMA exercises are conducted, they accomplish many of the objectives outlined in JP 3-08: establishing working relationships, testing coordinating structures and architectures, and exercising the robustness of FEMA doctrine and its ability to address complex emergency crises. The model includes a continuous professional education system. FEMA has two academic centers and multiple traveling teams available to conduct education and training. The FEMA education program also leverages technology to provide remote training and education. FEMA is currently reorganizing under homeland defense initiatives and will continue to improve as functioning interagency planning model. The FEMA model should be considered along with joint military doctrine as potential models for future interagency doctrine for complex contingency and post-conflict operations.

The study addresses its second objective by stating that a number of gaps exist between what is written in doctrine, policy, and guidance and how it was applied during the planning for OIF post-conflict operations. For example, DOD planners diverted from joint military doctrine and attempted to unilaterally plan the war and post conflict operations, doctrine, and USG policy suggest the use overwhelming force to win but despite serious protest by senior military leaders troop list were constrained; the tertiary effects of those constraints continue to have a significant negative effect on post-conflict security operations. Additionally, there are notable gaps in FID doctrine, specifically, the issue of establishing security forces in an occupied nation. Currently FID doctrine assumes that the host nation already is active government and has an established security force to train. In Iraq, planners were tasked to develop and employ a long-term IDAD strategy model but there was no host nation government to coordinate the necessary support nor provide long-term sustainment and training focus. Moreover, Iraq did not have a security force to train. USG civil-military planners had to first design a concept to recruit new Iraqi security forces. An IDAD strategy is an essential element of mission success. It will serve as the cornerstone for transition to a long-term peace.
Strategic Level Errors

USG civil-military planners inherently understand that they are the agents of change; they develop the plans that set the conditions for a successful transition from war to long-term peace and stability. However, if time and resources handicap them, as was the case in OIF, then their ability to shape and set conditions to achieve national aim becomes greatly reduced.

The current security situation in Iraq is an indication that the Bush Administration committed several strategic level errors. One can only speculate that had the Bush Administration adhered to the fundamental principals and guidance outlined in joint military doctrine and USG policy then the events of post-conflict Iraq would have unfolded much differently. Clausewitz wrote, “No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”

This study discussed a historical example, Operation ECLISPE, to illustrate that the political leadership in World War II recognized the value of early post-conflict planning. Prior to the end of hostilities in Europe, the planners from the three Allied nations planed for the post war reconstruction of Germany. According to Clausewitz, the degree and effort that a nation should apply to war should depend upon the political demands placed upon it. Clausewitz advises that the greater the political demands then the more willing politicians should be to commit greater resources to achieve those demands.

102 Clausewitz, p.579
103 Ibid.
The Bush Administration made another strategic error by relying on network centric warfare to win in Iraq.\textsuperscript{104} The Bush Administration insisted that technology and near real time collaboration would reduce the number of troops necessary to complete the mission. What America is experiencing in Iraq is that there is no substitute for boots on the ground. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen are what make the difference in battle. They are irreplaceable. Technology is good it provides leaders with a great resource but technology cannot go door to door, it cannot go face to face with the Iraqi’s, and it cannot win their hearts and minds. It will take boots on the ground to win this war.\textsuperscript{105} The Bush Administration failed to support the to provide the necessary ground troops for post-combat operations. The Bush Administration denied ground commanders’ requests to increase the troop strength up to 250,000. This strategic error could be cited as a contributing factor as to why the security vacuum formed in Iraq. The speculation is that if coalition forces had the additional 70-80,000 troops then military leaders would have been able to immediately influence post-conflict security operations.

The Bush Administration errored again when it endorsed the decision not to employ Iraqi military as future security forces. The invasion in Panama, Operation JUST CAUSE, demonstrated the benefits of using host nation, enemy forces, to augment post-conflict security missions and assist in suppressing rioting and looting. The political decision not to use Iraqi military forces significantly increased coalition responsibility and greatly decreased the coalitions ability to rapidly transition to peace. This issue of committing personnel goes beyond just military troops. It extends into the commitment of subject matter expertise, the commitment of funding and resources as well as establishing unrealistic timelines that do not enable change to occur.

\textsuperscript{105} Christmas.
These strategical errors are all actions that support the notion that the Bush administration was not of clear in its approach towards how it intended to conduct post-conflict operations in Iraq.

**Leadership by Consensus**

A key challenge to interagency coordination is the issue of leadership by consensus. In a bureaucratic consensus there is no single agency or department that has the authority to assume leadership and direct and coordinates the efforts of the other agencies in crisis situation. Without a dedicated leader to provide guidance, direct decisions, and take action then decisions take too long to gain commitment. Time is a precious commodity in a crisis planning environment it can not be recreated, therefore an organizational leadership must be created to take advantage of situations as they present themselves within a fluid environment such as post conflict operations. By de facto and presence, the military had to become more than it was trained to do. It is not uncommon for military members to participating in or leading organizations that are well beyond their traditional military roles and responsibilities, such as serving as acting mayors or residing on local governing councils. Often this occurs out of necessity, however if not careful, the division of responsibility within this post-combat environment can quickly spin out control. The point is better planning and resourcing is required.

Our nation is at war and we are a critical part of the joint team…War is ambiguous, uncertain, and unfair. When we are at war, we must think and act differently.\(^\text{106}\) There are a number of important lesson for planers to take away from this study. Foremost, civil-military planners must avoid falling into the dogma of doctrine. They must avoid holding onto doctrine as a prescriptive recipe, something to be followed systematically in order to achieve success.

\(^{106}\) General Peter J. Schoomaker, 35TH Chief of Staff of the Army Arrival Message, website accessed 28 February 2004, [http://www.army.mil/leaders/csa/messages/1aug03.htm](http://www.army.mil/leaders/csa/messages/1aug03.htm).
Doctrine is not the “Golden Screw,” it does not provide the single answer for all operations. The inherent value of applying history and theory and adopting mental models to support doctrine cannot be understated. It can be extremely helpful, especially when the situation is unfamiliar. Planners must recognize the value of history, theory, and doctrine. They are valuable tools that provide templates and mental models; they bring chaos into order and recognizable patterns. Most of the events that are occurring in post-conflict Iraq have occurred within previous US experiences. USG civil-military planners have an obligation leverage history, theory, and doctrine to develop sensible strategies provide subject matter expertise and enable a more rapid transition to end state.

The current ad hoc planning organizations are providing fitful results. The time has come for the USG to develop a common integrated doctrine for planning complex contingency and post-conflict operations. USG civil-military planners must seek other ways and means to identify a better framework for planning post-conflict roles and responsibilities. There is inherent strategic value, if, interagency and coalition planners are established early, coordinate often and collaborate efforts. British military strategist Basil Liddell-Hart reminds us that the objective of war is a better state of peace; hence “it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you devise.” It would be shortsighted for interagency planners to analyze Iraq’s problems as independent variables that can be separated from one another. Coordination must improve; military and interagency planners must break away from their respective parochial dogmas and guide their actions in support of the national aim.


guidance must transcend all three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical—and become inextricably linked.\textsuperscript{109} The time has come to adopt a single common integrated doctrine for planning interagency actions within post-combat environments. This framework must establish well-defined lines of coordination, collaborative architecture; and it must include a means for continuous professional education and training.

**Recommendations for Further Study**

There are a number of options being explored to address the problems of poor military and interagency collaboration. The current model is focused on strategic level integration while operational and tactical levels are without an agency for integrating strategic level guidance. Future studies on the role and impact of the following ideas are worthy of study to military and interagency planners.

**Joint Interagency Cell**

The creation of a subordinate level interagency planning group, Joint Interagency Cell (JIAC) is currently being considered within each of the Combatant Command Headquarters. The purpose of the JIAC to carry out the coordination, integration, and translation of strategic level interagency working groups. The JIAC will create a position for a standing liaison and subject matter expert form each of the USG organizations and agencies that habitually participate in foreign complex contingency operations.

**Federal Emergency Management Agency and Joint Military Doctrine**

A study of integrating the new Federal Emergency Management doctrine with Joint military doctrine may provide interagency planners with a relevant model to develop complex

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid.
contingency planning. Taking two proven models, FEMA and Joint military doctrine, may provide the right mix of interagency and military doctrine to create the appropriate tool for complex contingency planning.

**Transitioning Responsibility and Authority in Post – Conflict**

The upcoming 30 June 2004, transition of responsibility from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to a new Iraqi government provides an excellent research topic. With all the current security issues the role of the military within this environment may provide a unique opportunity for a case study.

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