Impediments to the Effectiveness of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

A Monograph
by
LCol James E. Allen
Canadian Forces

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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## Impediments to the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

### Abstract

Within the UN, the “Mogadishu Line” is a reference to the failed UN mission in Somalia in 1992-1993, intended to mark the limit of UN peacekeeping capabilities. The UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has been so disastrous that more recently, the “Darfur Line” has gained currency as the new limit for UN peacekeeping missions. This paper takes into account the latest UN reports on UNAMID, Government of Sudan (GoS), and rebel actions that affected the mission’s operations. Interviews with well-informed, anonymous UN officials reveal chronic problems with force generation, and ongoing issues associated with the GoS. Case studies on three different UN missions permit comparative analysis and situate the UNAMID mission in a broader peacekeeping context.

This research finds that UNAMID’s force generation was problematic. Additionally, both the GoS and the rebels obstructed UNAMID operations in a deliberate and sustained manner. These factors hindered UNAMID’s ability to implement its mandate. However, the absence of a peace agreement has resulted in persistent conflict and an unstable security environment. Improved force generation and the cooperation of the Darfur Peace Agreement signatories can only have a limited impact on UNAMID’s ability to protect civilians as long as there is no peace to keep.

### Subject Terms

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LCOL James Edward Allen

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Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
Alex J. Ryan, Ph.D.

__________________________________ Second Reader
John J. Marr, COL, IN

__________________________________ Director,
Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr., COL, IN
School of Advanced Military Studies

__________________________________ Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
Graduate Degree Programs

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Abstract

IMPEDIMENTS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS-AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN DARFUR (UNAMID) by LCOL James E. Allen, Canadian Forces. 68 pages.

Within the UN, the “Mogadishu Line” is a reference to the failed UN mission in Somalia in 1992-1993, intended to mark the limit of UN peacekeeping capabilities. The UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has been so disastrous that more recently, the “Darfur Line” has gained currency as the new limit that the UN should not cross for future peacekeeping missions. Further investigation of UNAMID is relevant to any military force generation department that may contribute to a UN peacekeeping operation in the future. This paper takes into account the latest UN reports on UNAMID, Government of Sudan, and rebel actions that affected the mission’s operations. Interviews with well-informed, anonymous UN officials reveal chronic problems with force generation, and ongoing issues associated with the Government of Sudan. Case studies on three different UN missions are introduced to permit comparative analysis and situate the UNAMID mission in a broader peacekeeping context.

This research finds that UNAMID’s force generation was problematic. Additionally, both the Government of Sudan and the rebels obstructed UNAMID operations in a deliberate and sustained manner. These factors retarded the growth in UNAMID’s operational capability and hindered its ability to implement its mandate. However, the absence of a peace agreement has resulted in persistent military conflict and an unstable security environment. Improved force generation and the cooperation of the Darfur Peace Agreement signatories can only have a limited impact on UNAMID’s ability to protect civilians as long as there is no peace to keep.
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Introduction

Briefing the Council on UNAMID’s deployment, Mr. Adada said that the Mission had deployed in accordance with Council resolution 1769 (2007). The central expectation placed upon the Mission by the people of Darfur and the international community was to provide protection for the civilians there. “As I speak to you today, I must report frankly that there is a long way to go before we can say that we have met these expectations and fulfilled the promise made by this Council,” he said, adding, “our forces are serving under exceptionally difficult conditions, facing daily dangers and hardships.”

With the authorization of United Nations (UN) resolution 1769, the UN’s race to reinforce the ailing African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) had begun. This also afforded the UN with an opportunity to repair its damaged credibility because of the ineffectiveness of its diplomatic efforts in reducing the violence or improving the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.

Numerous interdependent factors caused the deployment and operations of the UN and the African Union (AU) Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to be complex. This included significant logistical challenges and a volatile security environment resulting from banditry, tribal clashes and persistent fighting between the GoS and rebel factions. Nevertheless, there has been a great deal of blame and speculation indicating that the force generation process and especially the obstructionist actions of the Government of Sudan (GoS) were detrimental to the operational capability of UNAMID to fulfill its mandate.

The question that drives this paper is once the GoS approved the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, how did force generation and obstructionist actions by the GoS, Darfur Peace Agreement signatories and non-signatories affect the operational capability of UNAMID and its ability to implement its mandate.

Intensive private and public diplomacy by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and several actors in the international community resulted in Sudan’s acceptance of this force on 16 June

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More specifically, the United States and United Kingdom voiced their skepticism of Khartoum’s sincerity and publically threatened sanctions against Khartoum to force the GoS to uphold its commitments to the Hybrid peacekeeping operation and peace process. The U.S. followed these threats by announcing at the end of May 2007 that it would impose sanctions against 31 Sudanese companies. These sanctions would prevent the Sudan from doing business with American companies or in the U.S. In early 2008, after being criticized for its relationship with Sudan, China advocated that if not for its lobbying with Khartoum, UNAMID would not have deployed. It is important to remember these conditions when considering the GoS attitude towards UNAMID. GoS consent for the force only came after extensive international pressure and threats of crippling sanctions as well as encouragement from its major trading partner and ally, China. The Hybrid force saw its formal establishment through Security Council Resolution 1769, adopted on 31 July 2007. However, it gave considerable latitude on political and logistical matters to Khartoum that made the complete implementation of UNAMID very difficult.

UNAMID’s force generation, deployment and implementation of its mandate are among the most problematic and controversial in the UN’s history. Within the UN, the coining of the “Mogadishu Line” was reference to the failed UN mission, in Somalia in 1992-1993, to mark the


5 Ibid.


limit of UN peacekeeping capabilities.⁹ UNAMID has been so disastrous that more recently, the
“Darfur Line” has gained currency as the new limit that the UN should not cross for future
peacekeeping missions.¹⁰ What was problematic with the force generation of UNAMID and was
it significantly different from the historical trend of UN peacekeeping force generation or
surprising given the logistical challenges and the volatile security environment in the Sudan and
especially Darfur? Was force generation a significant detractor and would the full and rapid
deployment have made a significant difference in protecting civilians? What GoS or rebel actions
affected the deployment and implementation of the mandate and why did they interfere with
UNAMID? Were GoS actions justifiable or reasonable given the security situation or were they
simply obstructionist as portrayed by the humanitarian community? What could and did the UN
do to mitigate the impact of obstructionism by GoS? These questions cast doubt on the UN’s
decision to send a peacekeeping force to Darfur and the suitability of a peacekeeping mission to
intervene in similar crises in the future. This research indicates that UNAMID’s force generation
was problematic and there was considerable GoS and rebel obstruction. These factors retarded the
growth in UNAMID’s operational capability and hindered its ability to implement the mandate.
However, the absence of a peace agreement and consequent military conflict and instability of the
security environment appeared to be the greatest detractor for UNAMID to be effect in protecting
civilians.

There is already considerable material concerning UNAMID’s troubled force generation
and obstructionist actions by the GoS. However, a further investigation is relevant to any military
force generation department, which may contribute to a UN peacekeeping operation in the future
and as information for the general military practitioner. This paper will take into account the

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⁹ Jones et al., Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty (New York:
Center on International Cooperation, April 2009), 12.
¹⁰ Ibid., 12.
latest UN reports on UNAMID and GoS or rebel actions that affected the Mission’s operations. In addition, it will provide the perspective of some UN officials on UNAMID concerning chronic problems with force generation and ongoing issues with the GoS. This will permit a detailed account and analysis of how complex issues encountered by the UN in its force generation and interaction with the major Sudanese actors affected UNAMID’s operational capability to implement its mandate.

**Methodology**

Problematic force generation is common for UN peacekeeping. However, the position adopted by the GoS that the Hybrid force keep an African character is novel, and led to different interpretations by the UN/AU and GoS. The implications of the African character on UNAMID’s force generation and capability are worth exploration. This paper also investigates reports of GoS obstruction towards the deployment and operations of UNAMID. Various UN missions experienced interference and/or attacks from one or several belligerents, who may or may not have been signatories to the peace agreements. Attacks on and interference with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) elements is an example dealt with later in the paper. However, the degree of obstruction by the GoS to UNAMID’s deployment and operations was unprecedented for a UN peacekeeping mission, considering the GoS had given its consent for UNAMID.

The study uses primarily secondary sources, including academic books, articles, and online publications. For details and accounts of the deployment and operations of peacekeeping missions, primary sources such as UN Secretary-General Reports, Security Council Reports and UN Resolutions are used. It also includes insights from interviews with two UN officials who had intimate knowledge and understanding of UNAMID’s force generation and operations. They preferred to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of some of the information, which provides
detailed insights into issues of force generation, deployment, operations, and GoS obstruction of UNAMID that often do not appear in official reports.

To put UNAMID in perspective, the first section provides a brief history of the North-South conflict in the Sudan and of the insurgency in Darfur up to the deployment of UNAMID in December 2007. It will provide a more detailed account of the conflict in Darfur, including a discussion of the failed peace negotiations, including the Darfur Peace Agreement. It also connects African solutions to African problems to the insistence that peacekeeping in Africa maintain an African character. It ends with a brief assessment of the effectiveness and challenges of African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) that set the stage for its transition to UNAMID.

The second section provides the context of the UN’s force generation situation and difficulties as the generation and deployment of a peacekeeping force to Darfur was under consideration and underway. This will highlight the challenges and consequences resulting from increasingly difficult force generation, caused primarily by the rapid expansion of peacekeeping operations in size, duration, and mandate. It will also introduce the UN’s concept of benchmarks and its intention to use them to measure progress of its missions.

The third section consists of three case studies: the United Nation’s Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). These case studies serve as a method of establishing a basis for comparison to the UN’s experience in Darfur. The case studies will begin with background information for context, and then summarize how the force generation, signatories, and non-signatories of the associated peace agreements affected each mission’s ability to implement its mandate.

The fourth section is a detailed case study that begins with background information and an overview of the security and logistical challenges facing UNAMID. It then explores UNAMID’s force generation, GoS delaying tactics of the deployment and other obstructionist actions by the GoS and rebel movement actions that affected the mission’s ability to implement
its mandate. Comparisons with the United Nation’s Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), will demonstrate trends and highlight where or if UNAMID is unique in peacekeeping operations to date.

The fifth and final section consists of observations and conclusions concerning the effect of military force generation and obstruction by the GoS/ rebel factions on UNAMID’s operational capability and its ability to implement the mandate. It also highlights questions raised during the paper, which merit further investigation but were outside its scope.

Context for Conflict in the Sudan and Darfur

Conflict in the Sudan

On 5 June 1983, the GoS imposed an Islamic constitution throughout the country resulting in a brutal civil war grounded in a sophisticated military insurrection. The largest of the Southern groups, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), was skillfully led by Colonel John Garang and its overarching goal was a united Sudan. In March 1988, the GoS, determined to seek a military victory over the south, armed and unleashed the Missiriya murahiliin upon Dinka civilians. Using the same tactics that the GoS sponsored Arab militias, referred to as Janjaweed, would in Darfur fifteen years later, the Missiriya murahaliin exterminated adult males, raped women, enslaved children, burned villages, and contaminated wells with dead Dinkas.

12 Ibid., 174.
13 Ibid., 176; For further information on the Arab militias known as “Janjaweed, ” the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M), the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Darfur insurgency see: Robert O. Collins A History of Modern Sudan; Ruth Ruth Iyob and Gilbert Khadiagala. Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace. and UN, UNMIS Guidelines to Troop Contributing Countries (2005).
By early 2003, with both parties exhausted by the fighting, peace talks between the National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum and Garang's SPLM began showing signs of progress. Since there was no guarantee that the North could defeat the South militarily and southern oil fields were too lucrative, Khartoum could not end the talks with the SPLM. On 9 January 2005, Africa's longest-running conflict ended when the GoS and SPLM signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which gave South Sudan religious and political autonomy as well as a share of the country’s oil wealth. U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell signed the agreement as a witness and told the audience in Nairobi that the two sides “must work together immediately to end the violence and atrocities that continue to occur in Darfur, not next month, or in the interim period, but right away, starting today.” UN Resolution 1590 established the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) with a maximum of 10,000 troops and 715 civilian police to monitor the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 24 March 2005. The two-year period resulting in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement also coincided with a distinct escalation of the insurgency in Darfur and subsequent humanitarian crisis.

**Conflict in Darfur**

**Escalation of the Insurgency in Darfur**

The current insurgency in Darfur began to take shape between 1994 and 2000 as the GoS further advanced its campaign of deliberate Arabization of Darfur through the successful

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15 Natsios, “Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide Toward Civil War,” 78.
16 Ibid., 78.
18 Ibid.
immobilization of Fur opposition and the unleashing of the Arab militias against the Masalit population with devastating results.\textsuperscript{20} Between July 2001 and February 2002, the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit activists set out to forge an alliance of non-Arabs in Darfur to oppose the Arabization of Darfur.\textsuperscript{21} 25 February 2002 marked the start of their insurgency with attacks on an army post in the southern mountains.\textsuperscript{22} According to Andrew Natsios, in early 2003, Garang encouraged the Darfur rebels to demand a power sharing agreement like the one he was negotiating for the South.\textsuperscript{23}

Between February and April of 2003, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice Equality Movement (JEM) conducted very successful attacks on military outposts, airports, and police stations in Darfur.\textsuperscript{24} Following continued heavy losses by the Sudanese Army in July and August of 2003, the GoS proved incapable of containing the insurgency and resorted to rearming and unleashing the Darfuri Arab militia, the Janjaweed, to rescue the army.\textsuperscript{25} Although the GoS had already provided the Janjaweed support in the past, it increased its provision of communications equipment, artillery, aviation and air support as well as small arms and advisors.\textsuperscript{26} This made it difficult to differentiate the Janjaweed from the state-controlled Popular Defense Forces (PDF).\textsuperscript{27} In October 2003, the Janjaweed directed their campaign away from directly engaging rebel forces to attacking villages of the ethnic groups that formed the

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 286.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Natsios, “Beyond Darfur: Sudan's Slide Toward Civil War,” 78.
\textsuperscript{24} Collins, \textit{History of Modern Sudan}, 286-288.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid. 289.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
support base for the rebel movements. These attacks on villages would often start with bombing, followed with attack helicopters, after which the Janjaweed would raid the village, looting, raping, killing and burning to prevent a return of those that had escaped. This campaign resulted in conservative estimates of 30,000 dead and 1 million displaced from their lands and another 200,000 in refugee camps across the border in Chad. This situation led Chad’s President, Idriss Deby, to start the first foreign-led negotiations over the Darfur situation.

Failed Attempts to Forge Peace

Attempts to find a peaceful solution to the crisis in Darfur had yet to be successful as of July 2010. A return to fighting historically followed each hint of success and this lack of meaningful peace settlement has been one of the fundamental challenges to progress of UNAMID and its predecessor, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement or the N’Djamena Agreement of April 2004, led to the deployment of the AMIS in July 2004 to monitor compliance. On 5 May 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed by only two of the four primary groups, the GoS and the largest faction of the SLM/A, which was led by Minni Arku Minnawi. There are sources that infer that the Darfur Peace Agreement’s likelihood of success was doubtful given the nature in which it was drafted and prematurely imposed. A lack of commitment from the warring factions resulted in a lack of ownership by

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32 Ibid., 14.
34 Linnea Bergholm, “The African Union-United Nations Relationship and Civilian Protection in Darfur, 2004-2007” (PhD diss., Aberystwyth University, 30 September 2009), 189; Savo Heleta,
several of the belligerents. Just prior to the deployment of UNAMID, no-shows, mistrust and chaos dogged the Sirte Peace Talks of October 2007. UN and AU officials said that without a peace deal, UNAMID was doomed to fail. This is a re-occurring sentiment expressed by numerous players throughout this paper. One of the predominant causal factors for the failure of peace talks has been the lack of cohesion among the rebel movements. During the Sirte Talks, a primary political representative for one of the larger factions of the SLA indicated that the rebels were not ready and needed more time to come to some form of consensus. Supposedly, UN officials said that the talks needed to take place regardless since the situation in Darfur was only getting worse. After considering the difficulties in establishing and implementing an enduring peace agreement in Darfur, it is important to understand the origin and implications of African solutions to African problems and its influence on the AU’s and UN’s efforts in Darfur.

**African Solutions to African Problems**

There was a desire by the AU and international community for intervention in Darfur. Because there was no credible military land option for a western coalition and the UN was


35 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
hesitant to assume responsibility for a mission, many viewed the AU as either the logical choice or only option at that time to manage the situation in Darfur.\textsuperscript{42}

In October 2004 the presidents of Libya, Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt and Chad, as well as the AU Commission Chairperson and former President of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konaré, met in Tripoli and stated their rejection of any non-African intervention in Darfur, as it was a purely African problem.\textsuperscript{43} In June 2005, during a meeting with US President Bush on Darfur, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa expressed strong support for AU-Sudanese cooperation in Darfur, particularly without interference from non-African troop contributors. “It's critically important that the African continent should deal with these conflict situations on the continent,” South African President Mbeki declared. “And that includes Darfur … We have not asked for anybody outside of the African continent to deploy troops in Darfur. It's an African responsibility, and we can do it.”\textsuperscript{44} According to Linnea Bergholm, there were officials inside the AU Secretariat that viewed the Darfur experience as a bridge towards progressively adopting a more substantial role for peace and security in Africa.\textsuperscript{45} They were willing to discuss the weaknesses in AMIS, and to work hard on the AU’s international status with a long-term perspective focused on building its capabilities. Meanwhile the AU Chairperson, Oumar Konaré, and AU Chairperson for Peace and Security, Said Djinnit, continued insisting that the military presence in Darfur needed to have an African character. The logic was that AMIS could do it with reinforcements and additional equipment.\textsuperscript{46} Not all African states were happy about this. In 2005, Senegal's Foreign Minister

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\textsuperscript{43} Paul D. Williams, “Keeping the Peace in Africa: Why “African” Solutions Are Not Enough,” Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 22, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 319.
\end{flushright}
Cheikh Tidiane Gadio expressed his frustration of the AU not being capable of stopping the suffering in Darfur:47

We are totally dissatisfied with the fact that the African Union … has asked the international community to allow it to be an African solution to an African problem, and unfortunately the logistics from our own governments did not follow.” Now, he said, “The U.N. Security Council, the European Union, the African Union, the United States … we should all come together in a new way of dealing with the suffering of the people of Darfur. … We have to do something.48

In March 2006, the AU Peace and Security Council approved an extension of AMIS for another 6 months, and, about a UN takeover, argued that Sudan’s consent was necessary and the force would need to have an African character.49 With the desires of the AU to keep operations in Darfur of an African character, GoS officials voiced strong opposition to non-African forces in Darfur and that AMIS was in Darfur based on its remaining an AU venture.50 GoS officials voiced concern of a ploy and hidden agenda of some countries and that there was no reason why the UN or international donors would not finance AMIS unless there were other motives.51

In summary, the AU was determined to demonstrate its ability to solve African peace and security problems. Additionally, Sudan had concerns and strong opposition to intervention from non-Africans due to a perception of ulterior motives. This meant that if the GoS eventually permitted the UN into Darfur, it would need to remain exclusively or predominantly an African venture, regardless of capability. While considering African solutions to African problems and the inherent desire of African leaders to ensure an ‘African character’ to peacekeeping efforts, it is useful to explore the challenges and issues of the AU’s peacekeeping force, AMIS, which operated in Darfur between July 2004 and December 2007.

48 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
AMIS – The Foundation of UNAMID

Since UNAMID built upon the existing force structure of AMIS, it is relevant to explore some of the fundamental challenges faced by this force and the ensuing problems carried over by its contingents after its transition to UNAMID. Beyond the difficulties caused by the harsh environment and absence of a peace agreement, AMIS suffered from force generation issues inherent to AU troop contributors as well as interference from GoS and the rebel movements. These factors were indicative of the challenges that UNAMID would inherit in terms of force generation difficulties within the AU. It also provided a glimpse of willingness by the GoS and the rebels to obstruct a peacekeeping force.

Three critical deficiencies in AMIS military capabilities emerged from a meeting to gather lessons learned in October 2006, by a group of senior military and police officers, with AMIS service experience.52 Firstly, AMIS could not generate enough adequately trained and equipped personnel, particularly military and police.53 The maximum strength reached by AMIS was 7,000, which had limited operational capability, given its lack of armored vehicles, transport assets and tactical air support.54 One of the notable effects of this was a limited patrol capacity (frequency, duration and range) and its lack of ability to patrol at night.55 This was despite numerous international actors providing considerable financial, material and training assistance.56 The second deficiency was an inadequate level of experience in strategic and operational military planning, and command and control within the AU secretariat and AMIS Headquarters for multidimensional peace operations. This was a hindrance to coordination between the military,

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
Finally, AMIS lacked important military specialties and technical capabilities, such as logistical planning and transport capability, intelligence, and communications, even though the UN and western partners improved this over time through augmentation. This indicated that most African Union forces contributing to UNAMID would probably require similar assistance in logistics, financing, training, and equipment if they were to meet UN standards. In addition to its weaknesses in force generation, logistics and command and control, the AMIS experience also demonstrated GoS and rebel willingness to obstruct the operations of peacekeepers. Ultimately, AMIS demonstrated that the AU did not possess the means, expertise or resources for intervention involving complex, modern peacekeeping. As the AU struggled to generate adequate support for AMIS in Darfur, the UN was facing increasingly complex and demanding peace support operations that strained its capacity to generate and sustain peacekeeping efforts. This would reduce the availability of troop contributing nations for UNAMID.

**UN Peacekeeping Strained**

**Rapid Expansion for Peacekeeping Operations**

Between 11 and 23 August 2006, the UN Security Council adopted three new resolutions for Lebanon, East Timor and Darfur, which would increase UN peacekeeping commitments by

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58 Ibid., 47.
over 50 percent.\textsuperscript{61} Resolution 1706 on Darfur, adopted on 31 August 2006, expanded the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) by 17,300 troops, 3,300 civilian police, and 16 formed police units comprising an additional 2,000 police.\textsuperscript{62} Numerous western troop contributing countries had large police and military deployments in Afghanistan and similar missions, which limited their ability to pledge troops and material or lead other UN peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{63}

As of July 2006, the UN had 72,822 uniformed personnel deployed. Resolution 1701, 1704 and 1706 would bring this total to approximately 115,655.\textsuperscript{64} This represented a 43 percent increase in military personnel.\textsuperscript{65} In 2007, as UNAMID began to deploy to Darfur, the UN had approximately 83,326 troops deployed from 117 countries, with 75 percent of them conducting operations in Africa.\textsuperscript{66} Almost one third of these forces were from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{67} In 2006, force generation for peacekeeping operations was nearly 6,000 short in troops and police of the authorized strengths.\textsuperscript{68} UNAMID would continue to suffer from problematic force generation in the overall context of what UN leaders in 2009 thought to be a crisis in peacekeeping.

In 2009 as UNAMID continued to face difficulties in both generating necessary capabilities and obtaining support from the GoS, trends among complex UN peacekeeping missions demonstrated overall shortages of critical force multipliers, enablers, and key


\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 1.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.


There was a perception of crisis in peacekeeping, which called for a serious examination and reform of UN peacekeeping, if it was to remain a viable instrument for global peace and order.

UN peace operations face an extended and dangerous period of strategic uncertainty. A series of setbacks have coincided with military overstretch and the financial crisis, raising the risk that UN peacekeeping may contract, despite high demand.

Other sources elaborate on the perception of crisis, recommended actions and discussions on building peacekeeping capacity (including a capability-driven approach that moves away from a ‘number intensive’ strategy and UN operational standards). UN documentation provides details on the force generation process and peacekeeping operations framework. When considering the difficulties in generating suitable troops and equipment to for the military component of a peacekeeping operation, it has become very important to measure the performance of its peacekeeping missions and demonstrate progress so that an exit strategy can be developed based on a substantiated timeline. Benchmarks are supposed to measure the progress towards specific criteria or conditions concerning the implementation of the mandate.

In accordance with the request made by the Security Council in its resolution 1881 (2009), a strategic work plan was developed in consultation with the AU that contained benchmarks to measure and track progress made in implementing the mandate of UNAMID. The implementation of many of the mandated tasks of UNAMID remained contingent on the full deployment and staffing of the Mission, as well as the cooperation of the parties, especially

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69 UN non-paper, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, July 2009), 27.

70 Bruce Jones et al., *Building on Brahimi*, i.

71 UN non-paper, *Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*.


concerning the Mission’s freedom of movement in Darfur.\textsuperscript{74} Since these conditions do not exist as of June 2010, the benchmarks are not overly useful in measuring progress of the mission or its level of success.

**UN Peacekeeping Case Studies**

The following three summary case studies: the United Nation’s Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) will serve as a basis for comparative analysis to the UN experience in Darfur and what lessons and recommendations one can drawn from this experience. These particular UN peacekeeping missions will provide a basis for comparison of force generation processes and the impact of the host nation, signatories and non-signatories on the Mission’s ability to implement the mandate.

**United Nation’s Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)**

Following the cessation of hostilities, the gradual withdrawal of the IDF forces and deployment of Lebanese troops, the first elements of the expanded UNIFIL were deployed with record-breaking speed for any peacekeeping operation of such complexity, with battalions from France, Italy and Spain arriving to the area of operation by 15 September, and joining the contingents already in place from Ghana and India.\textsuperscript{75}

UNIFIL’s mandate and force level increased greatly after the Israeli-Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006.\textsuperscript{76} On 11 August 2006, after intense negotiations, the Security Council passed Resolution 1701 that grew UNIFIL from approximately 2,000 troops to an authorized 15,000 military personnel.\textsuperscript{77} Resolution 1701 called for the immediate cessation of hostilities by Hezbollah and a halt by Israel of offensive operations in Lebanon, for the withdrawal of Israeli


\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

forces from southern Lebanon, and for the Government of Lebanon to exercise authority over its territory.\textsuperscript{78} It also called on Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and comprehensive solution to the crisis.\textsuperscript{79} For the first time, the Council included a Maritime Task Force as part of UN peacekeeping operation.\textsuperscript{80} The European governments negotiated a chapter VI mandate that gave them notably increased freedom to protect themselves and endangered civilians than previously.\textsuperscript{81} The heavy armament of the expanded mission was noteworthy for a UN peace operation compared to the original UNIFIL, which was essentially an infantry force with the necessary support elements.\textsuperscript{82}

**Force Generation Issues Affecting Operations**

UNIFIL’s force generation did not pose any significant negative or limiting effects on its operations. Although it never reached its maximum authorized strength it was able to carry out its mandate effectively.\textsuperscript{83} The expansion of UNIFIL in 2006 was a rapid intervention, based upon European Union member states.\textsuperscript{84} The negotiations on the composition of the force took place in Brussels as well as New York, with the Secretary-General Kofi Annan travelling back and forth.\textsuperscript{85} Within two months of the signing of the resolution, UNIFIL had rapidly grown from 2,000 to approximately 9,000 troops, which was 58 percent of the authorized strength (Figure 1).\textsuperscript{86} By

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{80} UNIFIL website, Background.


\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{84} Gowan, “UNIFIL: Old Lessons for the New Force,” 47.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{86} UN, Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Police Personnel.
January 2007, five months later, the UNIFIL had reached 82 percent strength at 12,274.\textsuperscript{87} UNIFIL reached a maximum strength of 13,539, or 90 percent of its authorized strength, in July 2007.\textsuperscript{88} Notably, 80 percent of the force was from the European Union, while only 3 percent of UN forces in Africa came from Europe in 2006.\textsuperscript{89}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{UNIFIL troop growth authorized by Resolution 1701.}
\end{figure}

UNIFIL’s expansion occurred in three phases. The first phase was a rapid response deployment from mid-August to mid-October 2006 that brought the overall strength 5,000.\textsuperscript{90} By the end of the second phase at the end of December 2006, UNIFIL had 11,500 ground troops, 1,750 naval personnel, and 51 military observers from the United Nations Truce Supervision Office.\textsuperscript{91} In August 2006, the Government of Lebanon authorized and began the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese Armed Forces personnel into southern Lebanon for the first time in thirty

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{87} Ibid.
\bibitem{88} Ibid.
\bibitem{89} Gowan, “UNIFIL: Old Lessons for the New Force,” 47.
\bibitem{91} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
years. By the middle of August 2006, the Lebanese Armed forces had deployed 1,500 troops to southern Lebanon. However, would require significant support from the international community to deploy the remaining Lebanese forces quickly. By the end of December 2006, the combined UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces presence was considered adequate to implement the mandate. The rapid deployment of a robust peacekeeping force does not guarantee success as demonstrated by the factors that were beyond UNIFIL’s mandate or control.

Host Nation Issues Affecting Operations

Numerous issues within Lebanon and Israeli actions affected UNIFIL’s ability to implement its mandate. The instability and political weakness of the Government of Lebanon resulted in a lack of control and influence over its sovereign territory, particularly in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces lacked the capacity to establish security in southern Lebanon, although this was improving due to international assistance. The continued presence of heavily armed Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias outside of the Government’s control jeopardized the State’s stability and control over its sovereign territory. Because of persistent rocket attacks into Israeli territory and the uninhibited re-arming of Hezbollah, Israel refused to

respect the no fly zone and continuously conducted over flights with fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 99 Finally, civilians were regularly hindering freedom of movement of UNIFIL, especially in urban areas, through roadblocks, rock throwing, and occasional IED attacks by unidentified belligerents on UNIFIL contingents. 100

Conclusion

In summary, the swift and effective deployment and operations of a robust, predominantly European force and historic presence of the Lebanese Armed Forces contributed to preventing a recurrence of hostilities across the Blue Line and helped to establish a more secure environment in southern Lebanon. 101 Nevertheless, as of July 2010, neither the Government of Lebanon nor its armed forces in conjunction with UNIFIL had demonstrated the ability or willingness to disarm the numerous armed groups in southern Lebanon, and UNIFIL’s mandate did not demand that it monitor or prevent the re-armament of Hezbollah. Consequently, Israeli over flights and retaliatory artillery strikes continued in response to rocket attacks. Amid Israeli allegations of continued arms transfers to Hezbollah in violation of resolution 1701 (2006), a perceptible increase in tension between the parties was recorded in July 2010. 102 This raised the stark possibility that one of the parties making a miscalculation would ignite hostilities, with devastating results for Lebanon and the region. 103


100 S/2010/352, 1 July 2010, para. 59.

101 UNIFIL website, Background.

102 S/2010/352, 1 July 2010, para. 2.

103 Ibid., 1.
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

On 22 October 1999, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) of 6,000 troops through Resolution 1270, primarily to oversee the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration called for under the Lomé Agreement. This force deployed under the assumption that the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) would continue to be the main provider of security.

Although the Lomé Agreement was in place, the overall security environment in Sierra Leone was tense. The RUF was in control of over half the country and had approximately 30,000 soldiers, which included previous elements from Sierra Leone’s Army that had overthrown President Kabbah after the 1996 wartime election. The Kabbah regime was still weak, had no functional police force, and depended upon ECOMOG and pro-government militias to maintain power.

Table 1 demonstrates the multiple UN authorized increases in force and robustness of mandate for UNAMSIL to deal with the withdrawal of ECOMOG and a non-compliant and increasingly aggressive RUF. The next section will provide a summary of UNAMSIL’s force generation issues and highlight how they affected the mission’s overall capability to fulfill its mandate.

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106 James Dobins…et al. The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: from the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005), 131.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.
Table 1-Authorized increases to UNAMSIL.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Authorized strengths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1270 (22 Oct 1999)</td>
<td>6,000 military personnel including 260 military observers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1289 (7 Feb 2000)</td>
<td>11,100 military personnel including 260 military observers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1299 (19 May 2000)</td>
<td>13,000 military personnel including 260 military observers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1313 (4 Aug 2000)</td>
<td>Security Council expressed its intention to strengthen UNAMSIL’s mandate, and requested the Secretary-General to make recommendations on the restructuring and strengthening of UNAMSIL. The structure, capability, resources and mandate of UNAMSIL require appropriate strengthening; military component of UNAMSIL should be reinforced through accelerated troop rotations, as appropriate, and with, inter alia, further aviation and maritime assets, a strengthened force reserve, upgraded communications and specialist combat and logistic support assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1346 (30 Mar 2001)</td>
<td>17,500 military personnel including 260 military observers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Force Generation Issues Affecting Operations

Numerous circumstances and issues would complicate UNAMSIL’s force generation and necessitate three additional resolutions before it was able to implement its mandate. Table 1 shows that these new resolutions almost tripled UNAMSIL’s original strength over a 17-month period. Note that whereas other graphs of force strength show the percentage of the authorized strength, Figure 2 shows the numerical size of the force to illustrate changes in the authorized strength over time.

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UNAMSIL had reached 80 percent of the authorized 6,000 by January 2000, which was only three months after the adoption of Resolution 1270 with nearly 66 percent of its strength coming from Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya, and 30 percent from India. However, it would nearly reach or surpass 80 percent of its newly authorized strengths on multiple occasions, only to have the authorized strength increased again. In July 2001, 21 months after the adoption of the original Resolution, UNAMSIL would finally surpass 80 percent (82 percent) of its maximum authorized strength of 17,500 by Resolution 1346. By August 2001, 22 months after the signing Resolution 1270, it would reach 95 percent, which it remained above until the mission began its

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draw down in May 2003. In September 2001, 42 percent of the force was African with 52 percent coming from Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Perhaps the most salient issue affecting force generation was a series of inadequate assessments and poor assumptions by the UN, such as continued Nigerian participation in ECOMOG and RUF sincerity to respect the Lomé Agreement. These two factors were primary causes that necessitated changes in the mandate and increases to force strength and capability. Additionally, the Security Council consistently undercut or delayed the number of troops recommended by the Secretary-General for each increase, which necessitated additional resolutions to provide UNAMSIL the capacity and capability to implement its mandate. This rapid growth also resulted in numerous shortfalls associated with the rapid growth from a small observer mission to a large multidimensional and complex peace operation. Another significant force generation issue was shortfalls in training and equipment and ability for self-sustainment, especially of units carried over from ECOMOG, which limited the operational capability of the force. This necessitated a notable effort by the UN and international donors to move and/or

112 UN Department of Public Information, “UNAMSIL: The Story Behind the Success in Sierra Leone,” DPI/2311 (10) May 2003.
donate equipment, as well as provide training assistance to bring several contingents to UN standards.\textsuperscript{119} The initial Force Commander of UNAMSIL, Indian General Vijay Kumar Jetley expressed this in the following comment:

Most units have very little or no equipment with them. They have not been properly briefed in their country about the application of Chapter VII in this mission for certain contingencies. It is for [these] precise reasons that the troops do not have the mental ascendancy and thereby emboldened them to take on the United Nations in the matter in which they have done in the present crisis. Guinea, Kenya and Zambia [are cases] in point.\textsuperscript{120}

These numerous increases took place while the UN adopted four other multi-dimensional peace operations, which required resourcing as well.\textsuperscript{121} The UN’s inability to generate specialized logistics and signal units limited UNAMSIL’s logistical and communications capacity.\textsuperscript{122} Finally, the unforeseen withdrawal of the Indian and Jordanian forces significantly reduced UNAMSIL’s operational capability and delayed its timeline to deploy into the RUF-controlled areas.\textsuperscript{123}

Although there were numerous issues with force generation, there were also several positive outcomes. The Secretary-General and the international community rallied to provide funding, training and airlift to provide UNAMSIL with the necessary capability to meet its mandate.\textsuperscript{124} There was constant consultation with troop contributors and donors and excellent flexibility of several troop contributing countries in adapting their deployment timeline.\textsuperscript{125} Another factor was that the NATO mission in Kosovo drew down in mid-2000, which permitted a shift in focus of

\textsuperscript{120} Dobbins, et al., \textit{The UN’s Role in Nation-Building}, 139.
\textsuperscript{121} S/2000/13, 11 January 2000, para. 29.
\textsuperscript{122} S/2000/751, 31 July 2000, paras. 57-58.
\textsuperscript{124} Dobbins, et al., \textit{The UN’s Role in Nation-Building}, 141; S/2000/1055, 31 October 2000, paras. 45-47.
some major contributors to provide more assistance in Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{126} These force generation issues ultimately jeopardized UNAMSIL credibility and effectiveness where it could not counter RUF violence and authority and came close to collapsing in May 2000.\textsuperscript{127} These same issues also delayed UNAMSIL from extending the authority of the Government of Sierra Leone by forward deploying into RUF controlled Northern and Eastern provinces until October 2001, nearly two years after the signing of Resolution 1270. Although it took UNAMSIL 21 months to reach its final full strength, it was able to reverse what appeared to be certain failure into what is now heralded as a UN success story.\textsuperscript{128} After exploring some of UNAMSIL’s force generation issues, the next section will highlight the issues with the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF, which affected operations.

**Host Nation Issues Affecting Operations**

The Government of Sierra Leone had much to gain from UNAMSIL’s presence and made great efforts to assist the deployment and mission. The government was entirely dependent upon UNAMSIL, the international community and the UK to extend its authority, and provide a secure environment, in addition to financial and humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{129} Contrarily, even though RUF had initially voiced support for UNAMSIL, for numerous reasons, it refused to participate in the DDR program and became increasingly hostile towards UNAMSIL forces.\textsuperscript{130} As UNAMSIL expanded its operations into the RUF controlled diamond mine rich areas of Sierra Leone’s northern and eastern provinces, RUF elements interfered with UNAMSIL’s freedom of

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\textsuperscript{126} Dobbins, et al., *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building*, 147.

\textsuperscript{127} Berman and Melissa T. Labonte, “Sierra Leone,” 180-182.

\textsuperscript{128} UN Department of Public Information, “UNAMSIL: The Story Behind the Success in Sierra Leone,” DPI/2311 (10) May 2003; Dobbins, et al., *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building*, 147.

\textsuperscript{129} Dobbins, et al., *UN’s Role in Nation-Building*, 131, 134-135.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 133-134, 140.
movement, attacking them on a regular basis, holding peacekeepers hostage, and stealing weapons, vehicles and equipment.\textsuperscript{131}

Conclusion

In summary, UNAMSIL’s force generation became problematic primarily due to poor assumptions and assessments by the UN, which led several iterations of seeking new troop contributing countries to reach the increases to authorized strength and capability. The associated logistics and command and control problems of expanding so rapidly from a small observer force to a complex multidimensional peace support operation also had an impact on UNAMSIL’s effectiveness and cohesion. The standing up of four other complex peacekeeping operations during the same period reduced the available pool of troops and equipment for UNAMSIL. The unexpected withdrawal of key contributors also significantly delayed the buildup of forces and operational capacity. The initial troop contributors also had deficiencies in equipment and training, which limited their operational capability and overall effectiveness. These factors complicated the force generation process and stalled the necessary growth in UNAMSIL’s operational capacity to implement its more robust mandate. However, the successful lobbying by the Secretary-General to garner international support from troop contributors and international donors, as well as the draw down in Kosovo, provided UNAMSIL with the necessary personnel, equipment, funding and training assistance to compensate for the lack of Government of Sierra Leone capacity overcome RUF aggression and non-compliance to successfully implement its mandate.

United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)

On 31 January 2005, the Secretary-General recommended the deployment of a multidimensional peace support operation to the Sudan that would consist of up to 10,000 military personnel. On 24 March 2005, the Security Council, by Resolution 1590, established the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). Latent terrorist threats, heavily mined areas, multiple mission support and logistical problems and increasing demands to support its growing role in Darfur would complicate the mission. Although the Force Headquarters and key military observers met their established deployment timelines, the enabling and protection forces were delayed for the above reasons as well as issues with force generation. In addition to a delayed deployment, interference by the GoS and SPLM/A would also impede the operations of UNMIS.

Force Generation Issues Affecting Operations

Several force generation issues had a limiting effect on UNMIS’s ability to implement its mandate. The intended timeline to complete the UNMIS deployment to the Sudan was 240 days, which was the end of October 2005. However, as demonstrated by Figure 3, it was not until 4 March 2006, one year after the adoption of Resolution 1590, that the military contingent would surpass 80 percent strength. However, it was missing essential Russian and Pakistani aviation

137 UN, Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Police Personnel.
units, three demining companies, the majority of the Kenyan contingent and three Chinese enabling units, whose deployment was dependent upon the Kenyans for force protection.\textsuperscript{138} By June 2006, UNMIS would approach full strength at 96 percent, which was seven months later than the original forecast.\textsuperscript{139} By September 2006, the Russian and Pakistani aviation units were fully deployed and operational.\textsuperscript{140} Compared to the average of 13 months derived by Kavitha Suthanthiraraj, this was only two months over the average.\textsuperscript{141} Although there were logistical and security issues, the UN military deployment was five to eight months behind schedule, primarily because of delays in the force-generation process.\textsuperscript{142} The delayed deployment of critical units by several troop-contributing countries limited the logistics, protection and mobility support necessary for the huge ceasefire zone.\textsuperscript{143} These lags in deployment hindered UNMIS’s capacity to implement its mandate in key areas of the ceasefire zone.\textsuperscript{144}


\textsuperscript{139} UN, Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Police Personnel.

\textsuperscript{140} Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, S/2006/728, 12 September 2006, para. 29.

\textsuperscript{141} Kavitha Suthanthiraraj and Mariah Quinn. Standing for Change in Peacekeeping Operations, (Project for a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS), Global Action to Prevent War, May 2009), 24.


Host Nation Issues Affecting Operations

As of June 2010, UNMIS continued to face impediments to fulfilling its mandate by the GoS and the SPLM/A. There were occasions of delayed allocation of land for camp construction by both the GoS and the SPLM/A.\textsuperscript{145} Even though the GoS signed the status-of-forces agreement on 28 December 2005, it did not ensure freedom of movement.\textsuperscript{146} This included denial of access by the GoS to investigate reports of violence, abuse and extortions by GoS police on internally displaced persons and increased interference with UN flight operations in the summer of 2006.\textsuperscript{147} In June 2010, freedom of movement restrictions continued to hinder UNMIS patrolling, especially by SPLM/A factions in southern Sudan.\textsuperscript{148} The GoS Customs clearance throughout the Sudan continued to create serious problems for UNMIS, which occasionally left the military

\textsuperscript{145} S/2005/579, 12 September 2005, paras. 24-27.
\textsuperscript{148} Interview with anonymous UNMIS Military Observer, July 26, 2010.
component short of rations and vital communications equipment as well as contingent owned equipment delayed aboard vessels.\textsuperscript{149} Finally, the GoS refusal to allow UNMIS Radio to broadcast in northern Sudan was also in breach of obligations under the status-of forces agreement.\textsuperscript{150}

Conclusion

The force generation of UNMIS continued at a steady pace, albeit eight months behind schedule, partially because of security and logistical issues, but primarily because of delays in the force generation process. Although it reached 80 percent strength six months behind schedule, the additional three month delay in Russian and Pakistani aviation and de-mining units further limited UNMIS quantity and range of patrols and deployment to areas of responsibility. However, it assisted the parties in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and resolving ongoing conflicts. As of July 2010, the preponderance of restrictions on UNMIS freedom of movement came from various factions of the SPLM/A in southern Sudan. Although the force generation issues delayed the full deployment of UNMIS by approximately eight months, the impediments to freedom of movement and other obstructions had a greater impact on UNMIS operations. Although these individual issues did not prove to be detrimental to UNMIS operations, in aggregation they detracted from the overall effectiveness on UNMIS capability to implement its mandate by delaying it’s the build-up of its full operational capacity, limiting its access to areas and depriving it of communications gear and even rations over extended periods. It also demonstrated Sudanese willingness to and potential methods of obstructing a peacekeeping operation in Darfur.


\textsuperscript{150} S/2006/778, December 2006, para. 57.
UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)

On 30 July 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the adoption of a bipartisan resolution, House Resolution 1351, calling on the international community to provide UNAMID with the resources needed to ensure success. The introduction of the resolution by Representative Steve Chabot restated concerns of UNAMID.

The UN-African Union mission in Darfur (UNAMID) “lacked critical resources, including troops, police officers, and air transport, hindering UNAMID’s effectiveness.” The resolution also states that UNAMID “has been hampered not only by obstruction on the part of the regime in Khartoum, but also by the failure of the international community to commit the resources…needed to carry the peacekeeping mission.”

This case study will explore UNAMID’s force generation, GoS/Darfur Peace Agreement signatories, non-signatories, and their affect on UNAMID’s ability to implement its mandate. It will consider the period from 16 June 2007, when the GoS voiced acceptance of the force, until July 2010, and will draw upon the previous case studies to make comparisons. Before exploring the factors that limited UNAMID’s ability to implement its mandate, it is useful to review Resolution 1769 and initial indications of a problematic force generation and obstructive GoS attitude towards UNAMID.

Uncertain Beginnings of UNAMID

The basis for Resolution 1769 was the ongoing humanitarian crisis within the region of Darfur in Sudan. Darfur constitutes three of Sudan’s 26 States, and geographically is the size of France. Its core mandate was the protection of civilians, but also included contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements,


assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). In addition to its mission headquarters in El Fasher and sector headquarters in El Fasher, El Geneina and Nyala, UNAMID was to have up to 55 deployment locations throughout the three Darfur states.

After the signing of Resolution 1769, the UN Secretary-General stated to the Security Council that the establishment of UNAMID was “sending a clear and powerful signal of your commitment to improve the lives of the people of the region, and close this tragic chapter in Sudan’s history.” He called the decision “historic and unprecedented” but warned that it was “only through a political process that we can achieve a sustainable solution to the conflict.”

An urgent request went to member nations to facilitate the full deployment of the UN light support package (LSP) and heavy support package (HSP) to AMIS and prepare for UNAMID. Troop contributing countries had 30 days after the signing of Resolution 1769 to finalize their contributions. The Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission were also to agree on the final composition of the military component of UNAMID within the same period. October 2007 was the deadline set for UNAMID to establish an initial operational capability (IOC) for the headquarters, including the necessary management and command and

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control structures. UNAMID’s operational mandate was to commence on 31 December 2007.

As of 1 January 2008, UNAMID’s military strength was 6,880 troops and 645 staff officers and military observers. Forces pledged by Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Malawi had yet to materialize. Although force composition should have been determined 30 days after the resolution, the GoS refused non-African troop participation in UNAMID and negotiations persisted for the pledged forces from Bangladesh, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan and Thailand. Force Commanders admitted on 1 January 2008 that UNAMID had little, if any, additional capacity than the previous failed AMIS observer force. Two years after taking over from AMIS, UNAMID had only reached 70 percent of its authorized strength and lacked numerous critical enablers, such as a medium transport unit, multi-role logistics unit, as well as military transport and attack helicopters.

UNAMID was a novel UN peacekeeping operation in many respects: it operated without a ceasefire or prospects of a viable peace agreement; it was a hybrid UN/AU structure; it was to be comprised of predominantly African troops; it operated in extreme climate conditions; and it faced significant logistical challenges. Although Khartoum grudgingly accepted the UN’s repeated requests to deploy a UN/AU hybrid force, it skillfully undermined UNAMID’s force generation process, emplaced numerous measures to delay and complicate the deployment, and

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159 Ibid., para. 5(a).
160 Ibid., para. 5(e).
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
placed numerous restrictions on operations that detracted from UNAMID’s ability to fulfill its mandate.\textsuperscript{167}

Prior to investigating the force generation and GoS obstruction, it is important to understand the environment in which UNAMID deployed and operated. Therefore, a summary of the immense logistical challenges and the volatile security environment that complicated UNAMID’s deployment and operations is useful. A comparative analysis to provide insights on how force generation and GoS/ Darfur peace Agreement signatories and non-signatories affected the ability of the UNAMID to fulfill its mandate will follow.

Logistical Challenges with No Peace to Keep

Logistical challenges constituted one of the most significant factors that protracted UNAMID’s build-up and impeded its ability to fulfill its mandates. The dilapidated and inadequate facilities of Port Sudan, insufficient material-handling equipment, and the local market’s lack of capacity to fulfill the cargo transport requirements of UNAMID were significant logistical obstacles.\textsuperscript{168} Additionally, the poor condition of transportation infrastructure, which became even more restrictive during the rainy season, complicated UNAMID’s buildup of forces in Darfur.\textsuperscript{169} Not only did UNAMID face huge logistical challenges, it also had to navigate an incredibly complex and volatile security environment of Darfur.

According to General Martin Luther Agwai, UNAMID’s first Commander, in an interview on 26 October 2007, “Without a new peace deal, even with the force numbers we are bringing into Darfur, it will still be a big task because you cannot keep peace if there is no peace.

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 5; Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, June 24, 2010.
\textsuperscript{168} S/2008/304, 9 May 2008, para. 15.
The complex and volatile security environment in Darfur proved to be a significant detractor to UNAMID’s ability to fulfill its mandate. Perhaps the most detrimental impediment to UNAMID’s fulfillment of its mandate was the absence of a comprehensive peace deal or political solution. There was regular conflict between GoS forces and their militias with an extremely fractured rebel movement and inter-rebel conflict. Additionally, rampant banditry, sporadic border conflicts between Sudan and Chad, and inter-tribal clashes also affected the security environment. Problematic force generation and obstructionist actions by the GoS and other actors were limiting factors on UNAMID’s ability to fulfill its mandate in an environment constrained by significant logistical and security challenges.

**UNAMID’s Military Capability to Implement its Mandates**

Numerous force generation issues negatively affected UNAMID’s operational capability and the pace at which it increased. A major factor was the GoS insistence on an ‘African character’ for UNAMID. Another was the lack of readiness or unwillingness of troop contributing countries to pledge critical enablers, multipliers and specialized units. Other issues that affected UNAMID were the numerous tactics employed by the GoS to delay UNAMID’s deployment and restrict its freedom of movement. In a statement on 26 October 2007 just prior to the Sirte Peace

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Talks in Libya, General Martin Agwai, the Commander of AMIS and future Commander of UNAMID said:

I hope the right numbers of troops, equipment and the right capabilities are introduced to the mission because then our chances of success are much, much greater... If they are not then we will be bogged down by the same problems that we face today.\(^{174}\)

In order to understand how UNAMID intended to implement its mandates, an overview of its deployment (Figure 4) and military concept of operations follows. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations chose to organize the military component in three sectors corresponding with the three Darfur regions.\(^{175}\) The general concept of operations that drove the military force structure and tasks for UNAMID was that the mobile infantry battalion framework would be the core of its protection element and that company-level operations were crucial to achieving stability quickly.\(^{176}\) These infantry companies were to patrol proactively, day and night, using high mobility vehicles to increase coverage, as well as foot patrols to build confidence with the local population. Armored personnel carriers would enable patrolling in high threat areas. Given the enormous area to cover, airmobile patrols would be critical to improving security in remote areas.\(^{177}\) Military liaison would maintain close liaison with authorities at all levels as well as police and humanitarian assistance actors to create synergy.\(^{178}\) In addition to the protection and liaison functions, the monitoring of the Darfur Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements was also a crucial task. The entire force would monitor and verify compliance with the Darfur Peace Agreement, but military observers, ground surveillance companies in each sector, and air

\(^{175}\) *Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid operation in Darfur*, S/2007/307/Rev. 1, 5 June 2007, paras. 73-79. UNAMID’s organization of military component is outlined in Appendix 1 to the TCC guidelines (Source *UNAMID Guidelines for TCCs Deploying Military Units, Annex B, Summary of the Concept of Operations* (December 2008 - Draft)).
\(^{178}\) Ibid., para. 76.
surveillance would have the primary responsibility for this task.\textsuperscript{179} UNAMID’s key operational requirements were high troop density in order to provide wide area coverage; highly mobile forces to move rapidly to deal with emerging crises; and a robust military capability to deter violence, which may be pre-emptive in nature.\textsuperscript{180} While considering this concept of operations and its fundamental operational requirements, this paper will explore the challenges with force generation and actions of the GoS/Darfur Peace Agreement signatories and non-signatories that affected the implementation of UNAMID’s mandate.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., para.78.
In an address to the Security Council, the African Union–United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur, Rodolphe Adada, made a plea to the international community to provide the necessary support to UNAMID for it to accomplish its mission.
It is disturbing that, even though Darfur is at the top of the international agenda, this
attention has not thus far been matched with action to provide UNAMID with the
wherewithal to accomplish the tasks assigned to it.\textsuperscript{181}

UNAMID’s force generation process experienced numerous difficulties that negatively
affected its growth and overall operational capability to fulfill its mandate. Although it started its
mission with 38 percent of its authorized strength by absorbing the African contingents from
AMIS, it would take 23 months to reach 80 percent strength and 26 months to reach 88 percent
(Figure 5).\textsuperscript{182} The insistence by the GoS that UNAMID be of African character constrained the
availability and capability of the force. Additionally, the inability of troop contributing countries
to generate and deploy the essential engineering, logistics and transport capacity delayed the
preparation of camps and deployment, which in turn inhibited a rapid build-up of forces capable
of long-range patrolling and other security tasks. The absence of military aviation limited
UNAMID’s operational reach and flexibility to quickly move forces and material, rapidly
evacuate wounded peacekeepers or provide fire support to troops in contact. Finally, the absence
of fixed-wing reconnaissance made it virtually impossible to patrol gaps in and between sectors
as well as the Chadian and Central African Republic borders.

\textsuperscript{181} Security Council Report, April 2008,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWL/eMTIsG/b.3967539/k.1FED/April_2008_brSudanDarfu
r.htm (accessed June 5, 2010).

\textsuperscript{182} UN, Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Police Personnel.
Implications of the African Character of UNAMID

One of the most significant factors that handicapped the force generation and limited the operational capability to implement its mandate was the GoS insistence on an African character for UNAMID, even though the AU had agreed to the requirement of non-African contingents. In accordance with the Addis-Ababa conclusions and the 30 November 2006 communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council, UNAMID would have a predominant African character.\textsuperscript{183} Therefore, to the greatest extent possible, first priority would go to suitable pledges from African countries.\textsuperscript{184} If the Africans were unable to meet force requirements, there would be consideration of pledges from other troop contributors. The UN and AU would jointly agree upon the final choices after consultation with the GoS.\textsuperscript{185} However, the GoS interpretation of this was not


\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.

accommodating when there was a requirement for non-African forces, which was consistent with other GoS obstructionist actions. This stance was questionable considering that 76 percent of UNMIS was non-African in January 2007.\textsuperscript{186} As of January 2010, 88 percent of UNAMID’s contingents were African with 11 percent being from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and China.\textsuperscript{187}

The first negative implication of the African character of UNAMID was that the GoS did not accept a critical Norwegian engineer unit.\textsuperscript{188} The GoS denial of this engineer company in January 2008 removed a capability to expand and construct camps and facilities to receive the deploying units of UNAMID. This seriously undermined the ability to deploy new units.\textsuperscript{189} Of note was that Norway already had a small contingent participating in UNMIS.\textsuperscript{190} There was no other apparent reason for this denial beyond it being a deliberate choice by the GoS to delay or complicate UNAMID’s deployment by handicapping the engineer capacity to prepare camps.

Another associated problem with the African character was the lack of capacity of the AU to generate the required numbers of sufficiently trained personnel. According to Festus Aboagye, it was very doubtful in 2007 that the African defense and security capacity held enough well-trained and equipped personnel to maintain an African character to UNAMID.\textsuperscript{191} For both the military and police, Africa’s global peacekeeping commitments stood at about 28,725

\begin{itemize}
\item UN, Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Police Personnel, \url{http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2007/jan07_5.pdf} (accessed August 8, 2010); 58 percent from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, 24 percent from Africa and 18 percent others.
\item Ibid.
\item S/2007/759, 24 December 2007, para. 18. Non-African countries were an infantry battalion from Thailand, the force reserve/special forces and sector reserve companies from Nepal and the Nordic engineering company.
\end{itemize}
uniformed personnel by May 2007. Based solely upon these numbers, Aboagye argued that generating the required numbers of troops, both initially and on a sustained basis, posed significant challenges to the AU. The AMIS experience demonstrated that the AU had difficulty generating the authorized military personnel and equipment for AMIS, let alone significantly more troops and equipment to meet the GoS desire for a predominantly ‘African character’ of UNAMID.

This appears to be a simple case of inadequate force generation capacity of the AU, as demonstrated by the AMIS experience, and the delayed deployment of the Kenyan contingent to UNMIS. However, there was no evidence of significant pledges from non-African troop contributors during the initial force generation process, besides the Thai battalion and Nepalese companies. Additionally, by 19 June 2008, a European Union-led bridging mission deployed in Chad and the Central African Republic numbered 3,000, which limited a European response even with the consent of the GoS. Therefore, despite the African contributors having trouble in generating the necessary troops and equipment, there does not appear to have been an overwhelming non-African desire or availability to take their place. Additionally, the UNMIS case study demonstrated that other nations also experience force generation issues, such as the Pakistani and Russian aviation units. Not only would it prove difficult for the AU to generate the necessary number of troops, it would also mean that many of these forces would need training and equipment assistance to bring them to UN standards.

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192 Ibid., 17.
193 Ibid.
In an address to the Security Council on 5 August 2009, UNAMID’s Commander General Agwai, expressed that his force did not possess the training or equipment to conduct long-range patrols to provide the necessary coverage for situational awareness and security in Darfur.

At present, we are like 32 ink spots on a very large piece of blotting paper. Each spot must grow and be connected to the others. That means considerably longer patrols, ranging from base for several days at a stretch. Many of the troops deployed do not currently have the skills, discipline and equipment required for this type of patrolling. This, in turn, puts further strain on UNAMID to establish in-mission training units.\footnote{Security Council 6178\textsuperscript{th} Meeting, S/PV. 6178 Provisional, 5 August 2009, 7.}

The demonstrated trend implied by an African character was that many African troop contributors had insufficient and inadequate equipment, lacked capabilities in self-sustainment, mobility, protection, logistics, medical and maintenance.\footnote{Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operations to Darfur, S/2008/249, 14 April 2008, para. 24; S/2009/83, 10 February 2009, para. 10; Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, June 4, 2010.} This meant that several AU contingents would not meet UN standards and require substantial assistance in training and equipment before they met the standards and level of expected readiness, especially for self-sustainment and ability to conduct long-range patrols.\footnote{UNAMID Guidelines for TCCs Deploying Military Units, Annex B, Summary of the Concept of Operations (December 2008 - Draft), Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, June 4, 2010; Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operations to Darfur, S/2008/558, 18 August 2008, para. 28; S/2009/83, 10 February 2009, para. 12; Report of the Secretary-General on the Deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operations to Darfur, S/2010/50, 29 Jan 2010, para. 73; A long range patrol is defined as the capability to sustain operations away from base camps for a period greater than 72 hours (Source: UN Official, DPKO).} The AU had very little capacity to fill these gaps and many of the upgrades and associated training requirements had to come from international donors such as Friends of UNAMID and Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), as well as from troop contributing countries outside the AU.\footnote{S/2008/249, 14 April 2008, para. 24. On 6 March, the “Friends of UNAMID” group was launched with US and Canadian support. The group, comprising Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the UK, the US and the EU is expected to support UNAMID troop contributors with training and equipment (Source: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.gIKWLeMTIsG/b.3967539/k.1FED/April_2008_brSudanDarfu)} With the exception of the
Rwandan equipment received on 8 March 2010, as of June 2010, the self-sustainment capability of most infantry units in Darfur remained a significant challenge. This presents an urgent need for the international community and UNAMID partners to step up their commitments to bridge the gaps in capacities. Consequently, many of these forces had to delay their deployment to meet training requirements or they deployed without adequate training and consequently were not as effective as they should have been. In addition, the vast majority of medical facilities provided by a great number of contributing countries remained at an unacceptably low standard and was of great concern to the Mission. The net result of these training and equipment deficiencies, which continued into 2010, was a relatively a small operational footprint and limited capacity to patrol away from the vicinity of camps without aviation support. Although UNAMID reports publish the quantity and types of patrols conducted, these numbers were not necessarily indicative of progress or increased security since they did not portray the existence of huge gaps in coverage and consequent lack of situational awareness and influence on the security environment. They measure inputs and outputs, but do not address the outcomes in terms of the mandate.

The first long-range patrol conducted by UNAMID occurred from 25 to 27 July 2009, 20 months into the mission. Night patrols did not occur in IDP camps, with the exception of

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202 Ibid.


204 Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, May 7, 2010.

205 Ibid.

Kalma IDP camp, until August 2009.\textsuperscript{207} According to UNAMID reports in January 2010, the increased deployment and patrolling capabilities of UNAMID enabled increased patrolling to escort humanitarian delivery throughout Darfur, including long-range patrols, patrols in urban areas and patrols to protect farming activities in rural areas.\textsuperscript{208} Given that the force strength grew by approximately 2,230 troops between July 2009 and January 2010, which equates to roughly 3 infantry battalions, this may be a plausible justification.\textsuperscript{209} These additional troops resulted in a marked increase in the number of long-range and night patrols between 1 November 2009 and 31 January 2010, which saw 289 long-range patrols, 958 night patrols and 364 escorts to Humanitarian aid convoys.\textsuperscript{210} Between 1 February and 30 April 2010, there were 314 long-range patrols, 922 night and 165 escorts to humanitarian convoys.\textsuperscript{211} These numbers declined significantly to 141 long-range, 392 night and 89 to Humanitarian escort based upon restrictions instigated by the GoS for security reasons.\textsuperscript{212} This demonstrated that even though the force was near full strength and had been able to conduct extensive patrolling to implement the mandate, GoS restrictions for military operations cut the patrolling significantly and limited UNAMID effectiveness, regardless of force size or capability.

The shortfalls associated with African troop contributors is supported by the UNAMSIL case study where African troops lacked mobility, logistics and sustainment capabilities which hindered operations and necessitated great efforts by the UN and international community to bring them up to UN standards. However, as demonstrated by UNIFIL, even the rapid deployment of a robust, well-trained and equipped force cannot impose a peace or fully

\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., para. 48.
\textsuperscript{208} S/2010/50, 29 January 2010, para. 57.
\textsuperscript{209} UN, Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Police Personnel.
\textsuperscript{210} S/2010/50, 29 January 2010, para. 35.
\textsuperscript{211} S/2010/213, 28 April 2010, para. 37.
\textsuperscript{212} S/2010/382, 14 July 2010, para. 64.
implements its mandate when the mandate or the parties do not facilitate the necessary conditions for continued success.

**No Pledges for Multiple Critical Military Units and Enablers**

The UN Secretary-General made continuous appeals to the international community to provide the mission with crucial capabilities. As of April 2010, 18 medium lift utility helicopters, a fixed-wing reconnaissance unit, and two medium transport units had not been pledged which seriously hindered UNAMID’s ability to fully discharge its mandate by limiting monitoring and verification activities, hindering quick reaction capability, and curtailing UNAMID’s logistical and transport capacity.

Less than one month before UNAMID assumed authority for the mission, the Secretary-General made an explicit statement that the mission could not implement its mandate without the requested aviation assets.

These capabilities are indispensable not only for the timely deployment of UNAMID, but also for the implementation of its mandate. The lack of helicopters is of particular concern. As I explained to the Security Council in my letter dated 6 December, UNAMID must be capable of rapid mobility over large distances, especially over terrain where roads are the exception. Without the missing helicopters, this mobility — a fundamental requirement for the implementation of the UNAMID mandate — will not be possible.

The few contracted civilian helicopters at UNAMID’s disposal were of limited utility since they were not under UNAMID’s direct control and could not be operated in an area of conflict. This resulted in the death of eight peacekeepers in July 2008 because the helicopters...

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214 Ibid.

215 S/2007/759, 24 December 2007, paras. 7-16. Jordan had pledged In one utility helicopter unit and one light tactical helicopter unit which were to have deployed by November 2007, however these offers were withdrawn following the reconnaissance visit to Darfur.

could not fly into a hot landing zone.\footnote{217} Situations like these reinforced the necessity of military aviation assets for UNAMID’s effective operations, since the civilian contractors were unreliable.\footnote{218} Of note, the GoS indicated that its helicopters would no longer be painted using UN markings as of 7 October 2008.\footnote{219} As of 16 February 2010, five Mi-8 helicopters from Ethiopia were in Darfur.\footnote{220} The absence of military aviation negatively affected UNAMID’s capacity to implement its mandate by limiting monitoring and verification activities, hindering quick reaction capability.\footnote{221} Although several non-African troop contributing countries discussed the deployment of helicopters, with or without crews, nothing materialized.\footnote{222} Perhaps the extensive GoS restrictions on aviation operations as well as the frequent attacks on unescorted helicopters dissuaded potential helicopter contributors of having these assets and crews destroyed or in peril without necessary protection.\footnote{223} Although not one of the case studies in this paper, the United Nations mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) was still short 11 of the 18 requested helicopters six months into its mission.\footnote{224}

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{218} Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, May 27, 2010; Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade website, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sudansoudan/security-securite.aspx?lang=eng (accessed July 15, 2010).
\item \footnote{219} S/2008/659, 17 October 2008, paras. 23, 77.
\item \footnote{221} S/2008/558, 18 August 2008, para. 18; S/2009/592, 16 November 2009, para. 43.
\item \footnote{223} S/2008/659, 17 October 2008, para. 46.
\end{itemize}
Additionally, the UN request for three fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft or an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit remained unfulfilled as of July 2010.\textsuperscript{225} This ensured that UNAMID did not have the capability to regularly monitor the Chad and Central African Republic borders or maintain situational awareness in areas inaccessible to its patrols.\textsuperscript{226} Another critical shortfall in capabilities was UNAMID’s insufficient transport capacity, which limited transport and logistics support.\textsuperscript{227} As of April 2010, there were still no pledges for two medium transport units.\textsuperscript{228} The effect of this lack of transport capacity was that contingent-owned equipment and supplies took significantly more time to move to the sectors and it often sat in logistical hubs for lengthy periods, which further delayed the deployment of units and affected operations.\textsuperscript{229} Although there were several measures taken to mitigate the lack of UNAMID capacity through civilian contractors, these measures could not fully compensate for the lack of military transport.\textsuperscript{230}

After exploring the implications of the African character as well as the lack of aviation, fixed-wing reconnaissance and ground transport assets on UNAMID’s capability to fulfill its mandate, it is worthwhile considering the reasons and repercussions of the failed deployment of the heavy support package.

\textsuperscript{225} S/2010/382, 14 July 2010, para.63; Interview with anonymous UN official, DPKO, July 7, 2010; Subject to pre-deployment visits, Pakistan had pledged one aerial reconnaissance unit which was to deploy by November 2007, however this offer was withdrawn following the reconnaissance visit to Darfur. (Source: S/2007/759, 24 Dec 2007, para. 7)

\textsuperscript{226} Interview with anonymous UN official, DPKO, June 4, 2010.

\textsuperscript{227} UN, Internal Audit Division Audit Report, Office of Internal Oversight Services, \textit{Logistics Operations in UNAMID}, prepared by Fatoumata Ndiaye, May 28, 2010, paras. 4 -54.

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid; S/2008/98, 14 February 2008, para. 27; S/2010/213, 28 April 2010, para.66.


Cascading Effect of the Failed Heavy Support Package

According to UN Secretary-General Reports, the problematic deployment of the heavy support package was due to the poor security environment, logistical challenges, the lack of readiness of troop contributing countries and administrative obstacles. The lack of available water and land, as well as the capacity of military and contracted civilian engineers for camp construction also affected the deployment of heavy support package units and follow-on forces.

The heavy support package was to support AMIS until the deployment of a hybrid operation as well as play a crucial role in building and upgrading UNAMID camps, airfields and the necessary systems to ensure the effective reception and deployment of incoming units. To do this, it was to consist primarily of engineer units, transport units, and logistics units. As General Agwai spoke to the Security Council on 5 August 2009 concerning the UN “New Horizon” non-paper, he stated:

Yet, as the New Horizon non-paper makes clear, effective deployment is not just a question of total numbers of the ground. It is about the right types of capabilities arriving in the right sequence. As UNAMID’s integrated deployment plan illustrated, sequencing of deployment — logisticians, engineers and medics first, as the United Nations Light and Heavy Support Packages, and new battalions thereafter — makes sense. But UNAMID also demonstrates that this is often very difficult in practice. Even now, there remain significant shortfalls to effective operating capacity of the mission.

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232 Ibid; The heavy support package, as agreed upon by the African Union and the United Nations, was to be composed of military, police and mission support personnel and equipment, as well as civilian staff to provide support in a range of areas, including civil affairs, humanitarian liaison, public information, mine action and support for the Darfur political process. The package was to include: 2,250 military personnel in the areas of transport, engineering, signals and logistics, surveillance, aviation and medical services; 301 police personnel and three formed police units; and 1,136 civilian personnel, including 74 substantive and 78 support staff dedicated to supporting AMIS, as well as 984 mission support staff to support the military and police deployment (Source: S/2007/307/Rev. 1, 5 June 2007, paras 44 – 45).
234 Ibid.
Although the concept of implementing the heavy support package was practical, it never materialized as planned. Ultimately, according to knowledgeable UN Officials, the UN grossly overestimated troop contributing countries’ readiness and capacity to generate the heavy support package to meet the ambitious timeline. By the end of 2008, its generation had proved entirely unsuccessful, and units were deployed as they became available, regardless of the type and capability of unit and its overall effect on operational capability. According to a reliable UN source, the capacities announced by some troop contributing countries were often different from the ones pledged to UN, while others delayed their “load documents” or hesitated on when to deploy, or they were not ready. As a result, conditions for a rapid deployment and associated growth in capability were not set. Although the UN took action in 2008 and 2009 to compensate for the lack of engineers and logistic resulting from the failed heavy support packages, the net effect was a significant delay in the deployment timeline and consequently slow growth in operational capacity.

A comparison to the force generation of UNAMSIL is relevant when considering the UN’s assessment of Sierra Leone that necessitated multiple changes to the force structure and capability in order to provide the force with the necessary capability. In the case of UNAMID, it was a poor assessment by the UN of conditions on the ground and gross overestimation of troop contributing nation’s capabilities to generate the heavy support package on time to prepare for UNAMID’s deployment and expansion.

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236 Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, May 27, 2010.
237 Ibid.
238 Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, June 4, 2010.
240 Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, June 4, 2010.
Force Generation Summary

The force generation process negatively affected UNAMID’s capability to fulfill its mandates. It took two years to reach 80 percent strength and as of 28 June 2010, UNAMID had reached 88 percent of its authorized troop strength. The slow increase in strength, related to the AU’s lack of capacity for peace support operations and the failed heavy support package, are important factors that limited the effectiveness of operations. However, the additional limitations inherent to the missing enablers, such as military aviation, fixed-wing reconnaissance, and the shortfalls in training and equipment associated primarily with African troop contributors were more important when understanding the capability of this force. Consequently, as of June 2010, although greatly improved, the force still did not possess the required operational capability to discharge its mandate, despite being close to full strength. As of June 2010, three years after the passing of Resolution 1769, of the 88 percent of authorized strength, most infantry units did not possess the necessary self-sustainment capability. In addition to force generation problems and complications limiting the capability to implement its mandates, interference from the GoS and rebels were considerable detractors to UNAMID’s operations.

Obstruction of UNAMID Operations

The GoS use of delaying tactics, such as protracted authorizations for UN requests, lengthy customs procedures, protracted or restrictive land clearance, and denial or withholding of VISAs for UNAMID personnel, complicated and delayed UNAMID’s growth in capacity and capability. The GoS and rebel movements also detracted from UNAMID’s efforts to fulfill its

\[242\] S/2010/382, 14 July 2010, para 55. UNAMID had reached a total strength of 17,308, representing 88 per cent of the authorized strength of 19,555. This included 16,747 troops, 312 staff officers, 66 liaison officers and 183 military observers. The advance party of the second Senegalese infantry battalion arrived in Darfur on 17 May 2010, increasing the number of infantry battalions in UNAMID to 17 of the mandated 18; UN, Monthly Summary of Contributors of Military and Police Personnel.

mandate by continuously interfering with its freedom of movement during patrols and aviation operations. The Secretary-General expressed his position clearly that UNAMID’s success was dependent on GoS cooperation.

The effectiveness of UNAMID hinges on the Government’s cooperation to ensure its freedom of movement in compliance with the Status-of-Forces Agreement; provide customs clearance, visas, security, and convoy protection; and facilitate UNAMID deployment and resupply by air, rail, and road. I welcome the agreement reached in these areas on 7 October 2008 in Khartoum by the Tripartite Committee on UNAMID. I count on the Government of the Sudan to ensure its implementation at all levels of Government, both local and national…

GoS Delaying Tactics during UNAMID’s Deployment

The GoS used several delaying tactics to protract UNAMID’s deployment or impede its operations. The most common methods consisted of lengthy and bureaucratic customs procedures, drawn-out processes for the clearance of land to expand existing camps and construct new camps, and the delay or denial of UN personnel visa applications.

The GoS tactic of lengthy or randomized customs procedures delayed the deployment of some units by up to six months or deprived them of essential equipment. In order to alleviate the customs backlog of cargo in Port Sudan delaying the movement of military and police units to Darfur, the UN requested that the GoS streamline the customs clearance process for UNAMID cargo, and provide security along the main transportation routes. GoS customs bureaucracy and procedures delayed UNAMID’s deployment by insisting that UNAMID remove communications equipment from the vehicles of numerous units. This necessitated that the radios be uninstalled and packaged separately. Consequently, these units waited an additional four months for their

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245 Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, May 27, 2010.
vehicles. This tactic became a regular occurrence and had disastrous second- and third-order effects on units either having no equipment for operations or throwing off the readiness cycle and deployment schedule of follow-on forces. In addition to the use of lengthy customs procedures, the GoS also made use of bureaucracy to delay the selection and clearance of land for UNAMID camps. These methods were consistent with GoS obstruction of UNMIS, although the impact on UNMIS was not as significant.

The delayed selection and clearance of land by the GoS national and regional authorities for the expansion of existing camps and construction of new camps for UNAMID was one of the most significant and common detractors to UNAMID’s deployment and operations, especially during the first 18-months of the deployment. Reasons varied from local demands for more money or simply because the local authorities did not want UNAMID there. The GoS Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to all Walis in Darfur in July 2008, asking that they provide the requested land to UNAMID. This was expected to facilitate UNAMID efforts to secure the dozen remaining sites. Unfortunately, the GoS national authorities were not proactive and did not or could not enforce this at the local level to ensure respect for national directives or policy. As of June 2010, the battalions from Thailand and Tanzania still had no land allocated for their second camps. Consequently, they would need to operate out of a super camp over 300 miles north of

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248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
251 Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, May 27, 2010.
254 Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, June 24, 2010.
its area of responsibility.\textsuperscript{255} Because the GoS would not authorize the expansion of the airport in Nyala super camp to accommodate the Ethiopian helicopter unit and ammunition storage facilities, the helicopters operated from Nyala airport while the remaining unit personnel operated from the Nyala super-camp.\textsuperscript{256} This needless action delayed the deployment of these tactical helicopters by four months, as the GoS had initially agreed to have the helicopter unit operate out of the Nyala super camp.\textsuperscript{257} The allocation of land for camps was also an issue with UNMIS, which raises questions if this was intentionally obstructionist or if it was merely a lack of capacity of authority by National agencies over local actors, given it was in the GoS interests to have UNMIS in place and effective. In addition to protracting the allocation of land for the expansion and construction of camps, the GoS used the approval process for visa applications to delay or prevent the entry of UNAMID personnel into the Sudan.

The GoS complicated and interfered with the deployment of UNAMID by protracting or denying UNAMID visa applications, especially for individual augmentation for UNAMID headquarters staff.\textsuperscript{258} This became typical for western military officers tasked to augment the headquarters.\textsuperscript{259} In October 2008, the GoS reiterated its commitment to continue expediting the processing of visas for UNAMID personnel and stated that it would appoint a focal point to solve the problem.\textsuperscript{260} This was still an issue in 2010, although UNAMID began to notice improvement with the pace of visa issue in July 2010.\textsuperscript{261} Perhaps one of the most controversial accusations by

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\textsuperscript{255} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{256} Ibid; S/2010/50, 29 January 2010, para. 4.

\textsuperscript{257} S/2009/297, 9 June 2009, para. 38; Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, June 24, 2010.


\textsuperscript{259} Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, May 27, 2010.

\textsuperscript{260} S/2008/659, 17 October 2008, para. 32.

\textsuperscript{261} S/2010/382, 14 July 2010, para. 59.
the UN against the GoS was the severity and regularity of restrictions on UNAMID’s freedom of movement.

Interference with UNAMID’s Freedom of Movement

There was extensive UN reporting concerning restrictions on UNAMID’s freedom of movement by ground, implying that it was detrimental to the implementation of its mandate. According to the numerous Secretary-General reports on UNAMID, the various rebel movements, the GoS and its militias denied UNAMID access for several reasons, such as security and UNAMID failure to provide prior notification. Although GoS and Darfur Peace Agreement signatories’ denial of UNAMID access to areas was supposedly in direct violation of the status of forces agreement and Resolution 1769, it is important to understand each side’s perspective.
Table 2-UN document restrictions on UNAMID freedom of movement (ground).

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<td>SLA-AW</td>
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<td>Others*</td>
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In accordance with Resolution 1769, under chapter VII, UNAMID could take necessary action to protect itself and ensure freedom of movement for its personnel and humanitarian workers.\(^{263}\) It could also support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and protect civilians, without the prejudice of the GoS.\(^{264}\) One of UNAMID’s fundamental tasks was to provide protection to civilians in imminent threat of physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians.\(^{265}\) Given the GoS history of indiscriminate targeting of civilians and human rights violations during operations, it was understandable that peacekeepers felt obliged to intervene or take measures to protect civilians in danger.\(^{266}\) When UNAMID was denied access to areas where clashes were reported, the mission was unable to implement its mandate to protect civilians in imminent danger.\(^{267}\) In addition to protecting civilians, UNAMID also sent patrols to investigate

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\(^{262}\) Others are Chadian opposition groups or unknown armed groups.


\(^{264}\) Ibid., para 15(a)(ii).


\(^{267}\) S/2010/382 14 July, para. 77.
breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law such as bombing of civilians or rape and torture.\footnote{268} 

There were 32 documented restrictions on UNAMID’s freedom of movement by GoS forces before and/or after military engagements (Table 2), which were justified on the grounds of security and UNAMID safety.\footnote{269} Some of these GoS restrictions were for several days and interfered with UNAMID’s ability to investigate sites of recent fighting or alleged bombings of civilians by the GoS.\footnote{270} Other restrictions by various actors were to prevent UNAMID from entering an area where there were planned, potential or recent combat operations.\footnote{271} Although it would appear that these were blatant infractions of the status-of-forces agreement, which guaranteed UNAMID full and unrestricted freedom of movement throughout Darfur, it is worth considering the GoS perspective. As stated by the Secretary-General in his July 2010 report,

The continued denial of access to UNAMID by the various parties — particularly to areas in which clashes have reportedly occurred, such as Jebel Marra — significantly constrains the mission’s ability to implement its mandate to protect civilians in imminent danger. In addition, deliberate attacks on UNAMID and the threatening posture of some commanders on the ground often impede UNAMID patrols to vulnerable areas, particularly those under the control of non-signatories to the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.\footnote{272}

Considering that the GoS was engaged in an active counter-insurgency against rebel movements, what is often perceived as obstruction may in fact be what the GoS considers necessary military operations. These movements have refused to negotiate with the GoS and have


\footnote{272} Ibid., para. 77.
repeatedly attacked UNAMID, killing numerous peacekeepers. The rebel movements also used IDP camps and villages as staging grounds for their attacks, which provoked a GoS response in civilian areas. Whether conducting offensive operations to defeat or destroy the rebels or to retaliate for a previous rebel attack, it was in the best interests of the GoS to ensure UNAMID did not interfere with or be endangered by GoS military operations by straying into a combat zone. Numerous cases of restrictions on UNAMID’s movement appear to be legitimate reasons for a sovereign nation that is fighting an insurgency to limit access or movement of a peacekeeping force before or shortly thereafter to establish security. Mr. Adada, the Joint Special Representative of UNAMID stated on 25 June 2008,

Some of our more impassioned critics call on us to intervene more forcefully. I would remind them that Unamid is a peacekeeping force. We are here to keep a peace that doesn’t exist. It is the duty of the belligerents – and there are many – to make peace. As Gen. Martin Luther Agwai, our force commander, stated recently, even if we were at full deployment our peacekeepers are not here to stand between rival armies and militias engaged in full-scale combat.

However, protracted denial or delay of investigative patrols to battle sites raises questions of whether the GoS had intentionally breached international human rights and humanitarian law by targeting, raping or torturing civilians. The exploration of these examples and perspectives concerning restrictions on freedom of movement for security reasons raise several questions that are more difficult. Is it the responsibility of a peacekeeping mission to interfere with the military operations of a sovereign nation fighting an insurgency? Does a sovereign nation have the right to fight insurgents without worrying about UN forces moving into a combat zone? What is a

reasonable delay, citing security reasons, before allowing investigative patrols to move into recent combat zones? Given that there are well-documented examples of rebel and government breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law, what actions are possible other than those already taken by the International Criminal Court, which resulted in charges that have proven difficult to enforce. Would a peace enforcement operation be more suitable and how feasible would it be? While these are important questions, they are beyond the scope of this paper. UNAMID freedom of movement was restricted for security reasons, as well as for not having coordinated or provided notification to the various actors.

Between January 2008 and June 2010 there have been approximately 15 UN documented cases of restrictions on UNAMID’s freedom of movement by land for reasons such as needing special authorization or the requirement of advance notification (Table 2). In several of these cases there did not appear to be a valid reason beyond obstruction or not wanting conditions in the IDP camps reported. There were even cases where UNAMID patrols were threatened with attack if they failed to conduct prior coordination with the GoS. What is more troublesome is that UNAMID had chapter VII authority to ensure its freedom of movement. Although UNAMID could not use force when denied access by the GoS and other Darfur Peace Agreement signatories, it was troublesome that unidentified armed groups could stop and detain sizeable UNAMID patrols, stealing vehicles, communication gear and weapons and personal belongings without any resistance. There were examples of the UNAMSIL, UNIFIL and UNMIS having their freedom of movement restricted by either non-compliant signatories (as in the case of RUF), by civilians for UNIFIL, and by both the GoS and SPLM/A for UNMIS. However, there was a

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peace agreement in each of these cases. When RUF became aggressive and targeted UNAMSIL, the force was afforded the mandate and resources to deal with it. For UNMIS, both the SPLM/A and GoS restricted movement, but often at the local level and not necessarily condoned or ordered by higher level leadership. UNAMID did not have this and if it wanted to implement its mandate, there needed to be a comprehensive peace deal or it needed to use for when denied access by rebel movements or Chadian opposition groups. This would have clearly jeopardized its impartiality and placed it on the GoS side. Perhaps even more detrimental to UNAMID’s operations were the severe restrictions placed upon the Mission’s limited aviation assets.

**GoS Restrictions on UNAMID Rotary-Wing Assets**

The restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNAMID’s military and civilian aviation assets were significant impediments to its operations from the outset of the mission. UNAMID had to provide the GoS authorities with a request 48 hours prior to flights, which unnecessarily limited the planning horizon for flight operations as well as crippled UNAMID’s flexibility to react to unforeseen requirements.\(^{280}\) The GoS restricted the number and type of flights for the five Ethiopian tactical helicopters to 94 flights between April and July 2010.\(^{281}\) Overall, flight cancellations due to GoS restrictions rose from 21 percent in May 2010 to 77 percent in June 2010.\(^{282}\) Additionally, as of July 2010, the GoS had not yet provided authorization for the Ethiopian helicopters to operate with weapons.\(^{283}\) Of more concern than restrictions on planned missions was the denial or delay of emergency use of helicopters that resulted in the

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\(^{280}\) Interview with anonymous UN Official, DPKO, June 24, 2010.

\(^{281}\) The authorized flights were limited to training, crew currency and area familiarization. Moreover, the helicopters were flown without weapons, pending approval by the GoS of the relevant standard operating procedures. While the Government agreed to hasten its response on the standard operating procedures, no progress had been achieved as of 30 June 2010. Ibid.


\(^{283}\) S/2010/382, 14 July 2010, para. 61.
death of wounded peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{284} In a similar incident, after an attack on UNAMID troops on 21 June 2010, the GoS local authorities at Nyala and El Fasher would not grant flight clearances, consequently preventing UNAMID from pursuing the attackers and search for the missing vehicle.\textsuperscript{285} There was no plausible excuse to delay or deny the use of UNAMID helicopters when peacekeepers were in jeopardy or critical equipment stolen. However, restricting a peacekeeping force’s aviation operations in a combat zone is understandable given the Sudanese Armed Forces requirement to coordinate airspace for fires from artillery, air support and direct fires.\textsuperscript{286} In light of these numerous and continuous restrictions, the UNAMID Force Commander met Sudanese General Magzoub Rahma on 2 July 2010 to reiterate the mission’s concern over movement restrictions and was assured that the Government would take the measures necessary to lift both air and land restrictions.\textsuperscript{287}

In summary, the GoS inhibited UNAMID aviation operations with numerous restrictions. When the GoS restricted flight operations citing security grounds, it was reasonable to expect their desire for uninhibited military operations without the requirement to coordinate or worry about UN helicopters straying into a combat zone. However, the other reasons cited appear to be obstructive in nature and overly restrictive without just cause, especially when the lives of peacekeepers were at risk and in some cases lost. After investigating numerous reports of obstruction on UNAMID’s deployment and operations, it is worthwhile exploring the use of the GoS, AU and UN Tripartite Committee mechanism to seek formal compromise, decisions and agreements to resolve the issues.

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid., para. 60.
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid.
Seeking GoS Compromise through Tripartite Meetings

The Tripartite Committee for the deployment of UNAMID consisted of representatives of the GoS, the AU and the UN. The Tripartite Committee met eight times between October 2008 and June 2010 to discuss the challenges facing UNAMID deployment, and the steps required from each of the three parties to ensure expeditious deployment and effective operation of the mission.\(^\text{288}\) The GoS had established two separate committees on 10 October 2007 to facilitate aspects of peacekeeping operations in Darfur and consisted of senior officials and representatives of the GoS.\(^\text{289}\) Despite several issues, the UN indicates that there was noteworthy improvement in the quality of the GoS cooperation with UNAMID and the tripartite mechanism had become an effective tool to identify and address operational impediments.\(^\text{290}\) It appears that UN and AU did not make use of tripartite mechanism until October 2008, therefore there is little use in speculating on the impact of earlier coordination, but given the apparent success of the mechanism, it would be a valid assumption that it may have helped resolve issues earlier.\(^\text{291}\) The issues discussed during the Tripartite Committees reveal a level of success, as well as issues that were consistent with GoS failure to keep promises or implement directives at the local level. There were some examples of success, such as the facilitation of flight operations for UNAMID’s deployment, reinforcing police capacity in El Fasher to assist UNAMID, and the distinguishing of GoS air platforms from the UN to resolve identification issues and engagements of UN helicopters.\(^\text{292}\) However, equally disappointing results accompanied these relative successes.


There was a lack of progress on visas and problematic coordination for the Ethiopian helicopters.\textsuperscript{293} There was also a continued GoS inability and/or failure to ensure local level adherence to National directives or policy on freedom of movement, land clearance and customs despite the designation of a GoS Liaison staff in El Fasher.\textsuperscript{294} This may have been indicative of deliberate GoS obstruction, lack of government capacity or a combination of both. Finally, 21 months of UNAMID efforts to obtain permission to operate a UN radio station had yet to get GoS approval as of June 2010.\textsuperscript{295}

On 10 May 2010, the eighth Tripartite Committee meeting apparently led to consensus on several issues of contention such as: security; medical evacuation; investigations into security incidents; freedom of movement; tactical helicopters; visas; the radio license; and land for the construction of policing centers.\textsuperscript{296}

**Summary of GoS Obstruction**

GoS obstructionist actions negatively affected the growth of UNAMID’s capability and capacity through numerous delaying tactics such as protracted authorizations for UN requests, lengthy customs procedures, protracted or restrictive land selection and clearance as well as the denial or withholding of visas for UNAMID personnel. There was substantial documented evidence that the GoS and rebel factions restricted UNAMIDs freedom of movement, which had a negative impact on its ability to implement its mandate, especially when considering investigative patrols to locations where there were reports of civilians killed by indiscriminate attacks. However, the GoS appears to have a degree of legitimacy when denying access to areas


\textsuperscript{294} S/2009/352, 13 July 2009, para. 43; S/2008/659, 17 October 2009, para. 34.


\textsuperscript{296} S/2010/382, 14 July 2010, para. 58.
by ground or air before during and shortly after combat operations, for UNAMID’s own security and to prevent UN disruptions to operations. This does not however excuse the severe restrictions placed on UNAMID’s rotary-wing assets when its troops were in peril.

**Conclusion**

At the outset of this paper, initial research indicated that force generation and GoS obstruction were detrimental factors to UNAMID’s ability to fulfill its mandate. This paper provides ample proof that these factors indeed delayed limiting UNAMID’s operational capability and hindered the Mission’s ability to implement its mandate. Although the force generation and deployment were problematic, beyond taking longer than average to reach its full strength, these was not significantly different from other UN peacekeeping experiences given its large size and the logistical challenges it had to overcome. GoS delaying tactics also contributed to the slow growth in UNAMID’s operational capability in addition to the significant logistical challenges and volatile security environment. GoS and rebel obstruction of UNAMID’s freedom of movement was a significant detractor to UNAMID’s ability to implement its mandate. Although some of these restrictions were nothing other than obstruction, many instances appear to have been legitimate. However, it is critical to understand that more than the growth of UNAMID’s operational capability or obstructionist trends, the most debilitating factor to UNAMID’s operation was the lack of a peace agreement. The fact that there was still a war being conducted in Darfur provided the GoS with justification, whenever it deemed necessary, to restrict UNAMID’s movement for security reasons whether it was under strength or at its fully authorized strength, with all of its requested enablers.

Was force generation a significant detractor and would the full and rapid deployment have made a significant difference in protecting civilians? There was no readily apparent justification for the GoS restrictions on units from Norway, Thailand or Nepal given the initial list of troop contributors was predominantly African. As demonstrated by UNAMSIL, AMIS and
UNAMID, the AU had a low capacity to train and equip, meaning its contributions to peacekeeping operations would have limiting effects on the operational capability of the force. Consequently, it necessitated considerable assistance from international donors to meet UN standards. However, there did not appear to be an overwhelming desire or availability of non-African contributors to take their place. Therefore, it is not certain that the African character was as detrimental as some would suggest in light of the lack of alternatives. UNAMID took 23 months to reach 80 percent of its authorized strength and still lacked military transport helicopters and fixed-wing reconnaissance, which is 10 months longer than the average UN deployment to full strength of 13 months. The lack of pledges for transport aviation limited UNAMID’s operational reach and flexibility. Given the security environment, proof of GoS helicopters painted similarly to those of the UN’s, and restrictions on movement and employment, it is not surprising that there were no commitments from troop contributors besides Ethiopia. The failed generation and deployment of the heavy support package delayed UNAMID’s deployment, preventing a more rapid build-up and limiting operational reach. Once UNAMID was near full strength, it was able to expand its influence by increasing the number and range of its patrols, both day and night, although there remained significant gaps in coverage due to limited aviation assets. However, as stated by several UN and UNAMID officials, the full strength of UNAMID was more or less irrelevant given the GoS and rebel movements frequently placed severe restrictions on UNAMID’s freedom of movement without warning and often without justification. Although force generation is important, the UNIFIL case study also demonstrates that a rapid deployment or robust composition of the force does not guarantee a successful implementation of the mandate.

There was substantial evidence that the GoS delayed the deployment of UNAMID and all parties were obstructionist towards UNAMID operations, especially concerning freedom of movement. The severe restrictions by the GoS on UNAMID aviation operations brings the plea for additional aviation assets into question, given UNAMID’s aviation assets often sat idle.
However, some of the restrictions may have been legitimate and justifiable given the GoS was conducting military operations against insurgent or rebel movements or it was potentially a lack of GoS capacity or influence over local authorities to impose national directives. There are also many examples of pure GoS and rebel obstruction of UNAMID operations without just cause.

There was little that the UN could do to mitigate the impact of obstructionism by GoS beyond efforts to reach consensus or solutions via the tripartite mechanism. UNAMID could not openly interfere with GoS or rebel military actions without jeopardizing its impartiality. Although beyond the scope of this paper, the UNAMID experience raises questions that cast doubts on the UNSC decision to deploy a peacekeeping force where there was no viable peace agreement and where the international community coerced and pressured the GoS to consent to the Mission. Consequently, there should have been no surprises when the GoS did not fully support or facilitate the deployment and operations of UNAMID. The crossing of the “Darfur-Line” has seriously damaged UN credibility since it deployed into a situation without the genuine consent of the host nation, and was unable to implement its mandate given it was at the mercy of all armed groups for its freedom of movement. UNAMID also demonstrated that the will of the international community to contribute forces and equipment to dangerous missions has become increasingly doubtful and African solutions to African problems would require a concerted and prolonged effort to build African peace and security capacity to the point where it is a viable option for complex peacekeeping operations.
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