RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS: FIELD ADVANCED CIVILIAN TEAM AND ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM INTEGRATION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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2010-02

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On 7 December 2005, President Bush signed the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. NSPD 44 established the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) as the lead agency for United States Government reconstruction and stabilization operations. Within the interagency framework, the S/CRS has roles at each level of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) and integrates with the Department of Defense at every echelon. At the tactical level the S/CRS will coordinate activities with Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) through Field Advanced Civilian Teams (FACTs). This thesis uses qualitative analysis to determine what doctrinal, organizational, and training factors will enable or constrain effective integration during future operations. The findings indicate that doctrinally, FACTs approach reconstruction and stabilization operations more conceptually while BCTs are highly procedural. FACTs also train at an individual level and rely on a more centralized ad-hoc organizational structure while BCTs train and operate as decentralized units. Further, each organization has its own set of terminology. If understood these differences can benefit the whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations; if they are not understood, they can constrain progress through confusion, redundancy, and a lack of unity of effort.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS: FIELD ADVANCED CIVILIAN TEAM AND ARMY BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM INTEGRATION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL, by Major Michael T. Jackson, 141 pages.

On 7 December 2005, President Bush signed the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. NSPD 44 established the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) as the lead agency for United States Government reconstruction and stabilization operations. Within the interagency framework, the S/CRS has roles at each level of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) and integrates with the Department of Defense at every echelon. At the tactical level the S/CRS will coordinate activities with Army brigade combat teams (BCTs) through Field Advanced Civilian Teams (FACTs). This thesis uses qualitative analysis to determine what doctrinal, organizational, and training factors will enable or constrain effective integration during future operations. The findings indicate that doctrinally, FACTs approach reconstruction and stabilization operations more conceptually while BCTs are highly procedural. FACTs also train at an individual level and rely on a more centralized ad-hoc organizational structure while BCTs train and operate as decentralized units. Further, each organization has its own set of terminology. If understood these differences can benefit the whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations; if they are not understood, they can constrain progress through confusion, redundancy, and a lack of unity of effort.
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<td>Army Capabilities Integration and Development System</td>
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<td>ACT</td>
<td>Advanced Civilian Team</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
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<td>Command Sergeant Major</td>
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<td>Deputy Commanding Officer</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DOTMLPF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities</td>
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<td>Government Accounting Office</td>
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<td>ICAF</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
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<td>Joint Interagency Coordination Group</td>
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<td>Maneuver Combat Training Center</td>
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<td>Military Decisionmaking Process</td>
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<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>Populace and resources control</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
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<td>SCA</td>
<td>Support to Civil Administration</td>
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<td>SNOE</td>
<td>Security for Non-traditional Operating Environments</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
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<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>USJFCOM</td>
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<td>USSOUTHCOM</td>
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<td>XO</td>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.

— The White House, National Security Strategy 2006

Background

Since the end of the Cold War and the catastrophic terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, scholars and policy makers have struggled to understand the emerging world order and the implications of globalization trends on U.S. security and global stability. The spread of technology, the rise in empowered sub-state extremism, global social and economic changes, and physical pressures associated with resources, population, energy, and climate have created new and complex threats. One significant threat in the current strategic environment is fragile, failing, or failed states.

Chronically fragile states, failing states, and failed states will have an increasingly significant impact on regional and global stability and enable emerging threats to the U.S. security and the security of its allies. Such a state lacks the capability to provide for the basic needs of its population and often creates large pools of impoverished, unemployed, disenfranchised and desperate individuals susceptible to radicalism and extremism. The 2008 National Defense Strategy notes that “ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned, and contested areas offer fertile ground for such groups to exploit the gaps in governance
capacity of local regimes and undermine local stability and regional security.”¹ As a result, the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report predicts that: “Over the course of the next several decades, conflicts are at least as likely to result from state weakness as from state strength.”² To address this growing threat, the United States Government (USG) has adopted a “whole-of-government” approach to prevent, resolve, and transform conflict.

The whole-of-government approach recognizes the need to leverage all elements of national power and all government agencies to “Expand the Circle of Development”³ in fragile, failing, or failed states with a focus on economic development, responsible governance, and individual liberty. However, executing a whole-of-government approach requires extensive interagency cooperation, coordination, and integration. Operationally, functional interagency cooperation, coordination, and integration can be difficult to achieve because of different institutional cultures, varying levels of resources and capabilities, divergent doctrines, and uncertain lines of responsibilities within the framework of unity of effort. As a result, the inherent challenges of interagency activities have become apparent in the current conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Due to its force structure, rapid deployability, and immense resources, the Department of Defense (DoD) has had a significant role in reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was both necessary and proper during the initial combat-focused phases of the USG involvement in both countries. However, it remains unclear how or when the DoD will transition control of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts to other USG agencies--most notably the Department of State (DoS). More importantly, it remains unclear if the DoS is capable of accepting the mission and
taking the lead in reconstruction and stabilization operations in areas that blur the line between enduring conflict and post-conflict such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

This presents a challenge for the DoD. From one perspective, the DoD acknowledges the need to subordinate military efforts to civilian reconstruction efforts, as expressed in the June 2008, *National Defense Strategy*:

> The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies.\(^4\)

However, in the February 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, the DoD also expresses concerns that “America’s civilian instruments of statecraft were allowed to atrophy in the post–Cold War era, and the lack of adequate civilian capacity has made prevailing in current conflicts significantly more challenging.”\(^5\) This observation is consistent with the 2006 *National Security Strategy* finding that the DoS must reorient itself toward “transformation diplomacy” and develop the capability to respond to post-conflict and failed-state situations. To address this capabilities gap within the DoS, the 2006 *National Security Strategy* directs the DoS to develop a civilian reserve corps similar to the military reserves and directs that the DoS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) will integrate all relevant USG resources and assets in conducting reconstruction and stabilization operations.\(^6\)

**Research Question**

What doctrinal, organizational, and training factors enable or constrain effective S/CRS Field Advanced Civilian Team (FACT) and Army brigade combat team (BCT)
integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations in a conflict or post-conflict environment at the tactical level?

**Secondary Research Questions**

1. What doctrinal factors will enable or constrain effective S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations in a conflict or post-conflict environment at the tactical level?

   2. What organizational factors will enable or constrain effective S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations in a conflict or post-conflict environment at the tactical level?

   3. What training factors will enable or constrain effective S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations in a conflict or post-conflict environment at the tactical level?

**Tertiary Research Questions**

1. What is the S/CRS doctrinal approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations in conflict or post conflict environments at the tactical level?

   2. What is the Army BCT’s doctrinal approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations in conflict or post conflict environments at the tactical level?

   3. How does the S/CRS organize FACTs to conduct reconstruction and stabilization in conflict or post conflict environments?

   4. How does the Army organize BCTs to conduct reconstruction and stabilization in conflict or post conflict environments?
5. How does the S/CRS train FACTs to conduct reconstruction and stabilization in conflict or post conflict environments?

6. How does the Army train BCTs train to conduct reconstruction and stabilization in conflict or post conflict environments?

Assumptions

The Strategic Environment while continue to be influenced by fragile, failing, or failed states and those states will remain a persistent threat to global stability and U.S. security that require an application of U.S. national power.

The conditions in fragile, failing, or failed states will include a level of violence that requires DoD intervention to establish or maintain security. As a result, the DoD will continue to have a significant role in the reconstruction and stabilization of those states, necessitating coordination and integration between the DoD and other USG agencies.

It remains preferable to transition the responsibility for reconstruction and stabilization to DoS when security allows. Accordingly, it is necessary for the DoS to develop and maintain the capacity to fully integrate with initial DoD reconstruction and stabilization efforts and eventually become the lead agency in reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Definition of Terms

Fragile, Failing, and Failed States. There is substantial literature discussing the characteristics, progression, and implications of fragile, failing, and failed states. While this thesis will not devote considerable time to delineating those nuances, the London School of Economics Crisis State Research Centre offers comprehensive definitions of
each that are useful in understanding the context of current and potential reconstruction and stabilization around the world:

A “fragile state” is a state significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its subsystems. (It is a state that is particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic and international conflicts). In a fragile state, institutional arrangements embody and perhaps preserve the conditions of crisis: in economic terms, this could be institutions (importantly, property rights) that reinforce stagnation or low growth rates, or embody extreme inequality (in wealth, in access to land, in access to the means to make a living); in social terms institutions may embody extreme inequality or lack of access altogether to health or education; in political terms, institutions may entrench exclusionary coalitions in power (in ethnic, religious, or perhaps regional terms), or extreme factionalism or significantly fragmented security organisations.

A crisis state [failing state] is a state under acute stress, where reigning institutions face serious contestation and are potentially unable to manage conflict and shocks. (There is a danger of state collapse). This is not an absolute condition, but a condition at a given point of time, so a state can reach a “crisis condition” and recover from it, or can remain in crisis over relatively long periods of time, or a crisis state can unravel and collapse. Such a process could lead, as we have always argued, to the formation of new states, to war and chaos, or to the consolidation of the “ancient régime.”

We define a “failed state” as a condition of “state collapse”--eg, a state that can no longer perform its basic security, and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence.

For additional definitions of fragile, failing, or failed states, refer to Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. Policy (RL34253), Appendix A: Definitions of Weak States. Within that appendix, the CRS report offers the varying definitions of weak states by U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the National Security Council (NSC), the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the U.S. Interagency Working Group on International Crime, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Political Instability Task Force (PITF), the U.S. Commission on Weak States, and the World Bank.¹⁸

Reconstruction and Stability Operations. There is little contextual difference between the Department of State (S/CRS specifically) and the DoD definitions for reconstruction and stability operations. Both DoS and DoD also refer to reconstruction and stability operations as stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTR). For clarity throughout this thesis, both the S/CRS and joint DoD definitions are provided below:

S/CRS: R&S planning is undertaken in support of achieving transformation in the specified country or region undergoing or projected to undergo violent conflict or civil strife. The goal of this approach, referred to as “conflict transformation,” is to reach the point where the country or region is on a sustainable positive trajectory, where it is able to address on its own the dynamics causing civil strife and/or violent conflict.⁹

Joint DoD: An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.¹⁰

Unity of Effort. Within the joint DoD lexicon, unity of effort is “Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action.”¹¹

Limitations

This thesis will rely heavily on qualitative document analysis of S/CRS FACTs and Army BCT doctrine, organization (or proposed organization), and training models to establish potential compatibility in a large scale whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and stabilization in conflict or post conflict environments. This is a
necessary limitation as the S/CRS has not reached full operational capacity or integrated fully into current operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. Conceptually, the S/CRS will deploy Advance Civilian Teams (ACTs) and FACTs during the next conflict to replace the ad-hoc Provincial Reconstruction Teams with more a developed model of a civil-military coordination body to lead reconstruction and stabilization operations.

Delimitations

The scope of this thesis is limited to the tactical relationship between the S/CRS and Army BCTs. Within the current and potential models for interagency organization and cooperation, the S/CRS will perform functions at the national level in Washington as well as the combatant command level; however, this thesis will not access S/CRS capacity at those levels.

The scope of this thesis is limited to S/CRS and Army BCT operations within fragile, failing, or failed state which require the DoD for security--areas of high conflict. That is, this is not an over-arching review of DoS or S/CRS role or capabilities in shaping operations or enduring reconstruction and stability initiatives.

Significance of Study

During his State of the Union address on 2 February 2005, President Bush pledged to “build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their own cultures.”12 In doing so, he acknowledged the increasing threat of fragile, failing, and failed states and fundamentally reframed the relationship between U.S. security and international development policy. This marked a changed from the 1990s when “many policymakers
considered the establishment of new institutions in troubled countries to be an overly expensive, if not futile exercise\textsuperscript{13} and necessitated dramatic changes in USG structure and practices. Within the DoS, these changes manifested themselves in two critical initiatives: the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) with a deployable civilian reserve corps; and the “transformational diplomacy” reorganization of DoS personnel and practices.\textsuperscript{14}

On 7 December 2005, President Bush signed the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, entitled \textit{Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization}. NSPD 44 established the S/CRS, as delegated by the Secretary of States, as the lead agency for USG reconstruction and stabilization operations. Specifically, NSPD 44 directed S/CRS to accomplish the following:

- Develop strategies for reconstruction and stabilization activities; provide US decision makers with detailed options for R&S operations; ensure program and policy coordination among U.S. Departments and Agencies; lead coordination of reconstruction and stabilization activities and preventative strategies with bilateral partners, international and regional organizations, and nongovernmental and private sector entities.

- Coordinate interagency processes to identify states at risk of instability, lead interagency initiatives to prevent or mitigate conflict, develop detailed contingency plans for integrated U.S. reconstruction and stabilization, and provide U.S. decision makers with detailed options for an integrated U.S. response.

- Lead U.S. development of a strong civilian response capability; analyze, formulate and recommend authorities, mechanisms and resources for civilian responses in coordination with key interagency implementers such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); coordinate R&S budgets among Departments and Agencies; identify lessons learned and integrate them into operational planning by responsible agencies.\textsuperscript{15}

While these efforts were designed to build USG capacity to effectively address the threat of fragile, failing, or failed states in the 21st Century, there is still considerable debate concerning the USG’s ability to effectively implement a whole-of-government
approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations in conflict or post-conflict environments. In fact, a 2008 Congressional Research Service Report for Congress entitled *Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debate*, suggests that shortcomings in the USG’s ability to coordinate and execute interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations has had “a deleterious impact on the success of those missions and on the reputation of the United States as a reliable partner.” While this has led to a more comprehensive debate on national security reform, it also highlights the importance of DoS and DoD integration at the operational and tactical levels.

As debate continues on the national framework for interagency cooperation, the capacity for DoS, specifically the S/CRS, to integrate into reconstruction and stabilization operations at the Army BCT level in conflict and post-conflict environments is critical to success in the on-going operations of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as any foreseeable conflicts in fragile, failing, or failed states around the world. As a result, this thesis will be of interest to military and civilian professionals currently planning for or executing reconstruction and stabilization efforts within the whole-of-government approach. Additionally, the subsequent analysis of this thesis will contribute to the larger debate on national security reform by discussing the specific capabilities of S/CRS and Army BCTs at the operational and tactical level, identifying potential gaps in the respective institutions’ capabilities, and by exploring potential constraints to effectively integrating DoS and DoD capabilities within the whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations in conflict or post-conflict environments.


11Ibid., 570.


13Ibid.

14Ibid., 3.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The United States’ involvement in reconstruction and stabilization operations around the world—including its enduring commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq—has encouraged scholars, national security professionals, and policy makers to develop a vast pool of related research, analysis, and literature. That pool of the existing literature is multidisciplinary in scope—it includes political science literature delineating the nuances of fragile, failing, and failed states, historical studies exploring the fundamentals of nation building, social movement theory and economic development research interpreting the implications of globalization, and security sector analysis on the convergence of global security and local-regional stability. A full review of all the concepts that influence the U.S. Government (USG) efforts to develop and execute reconstruction and stabilization programs is beyond the scope of this thesis. Accordingly, this literature review focuses on framing the role of the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) integration within the larger context of USG interagency operations as well as discussing the current initiatives, debates, and constraints that shape S/CRS and DoD operations in the current and foreseeable operational environment.

The first section of this literature review, Models for Interagency Operations, examines a Defense and Technology Paper from the National Defense University to provide context for the discussion on S/CRS and DoD integration within the broader scope of USG interagency coordination. Conceptually, this section reviews the current and developing models of interagency cooperation from national level to the tactical level.
with an emphasis on the role of S/CRS at each echelon. The second section of this literature review, The Interagency Reform Debate, reviews a Congressional Research Service Report to Congress on the on-going interagency reform debate to frame the broader challenges to interagency coordination. Again, this section will begin at the national level and then focus more directly on issues specific to the S/CRS at the operational and tactical level. The third section of this literature review, S/CRS Status and Accomplishments, examines another Congressional Research Service Report to Congress to provide a current snapshot of the S/CRS developmental progress, its on-going initiatives, and the vision for its future development and operational capability. The final section of this literature review, An Interagency Assessment, examines a comprehensive RAND report on integrating civilian agencies in stability operations.

Models for Interagency Operations

While this thesis is focused on the potential for the S/CRS and the Army BCT to conduct interagency reconstruction and stability operations at the operational and tactical level, that is only one aspect of the larger requirement to achieve interagency unity of effort within the USG. To understand the context of S/CRS and Army BCT integration, it is useful to understand the broader framework of interagency coordination from the national strategic level to the operational and tactical level. In a Defense and Technology Paper for the National Defense University, Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert Oakley provide a comprehensive overview of interagency coordination by discussing three tiers of interagency coordination (figure 1) and the current models of coordination within each tier.
Tier One models describe the strategic Washington-based interagency cooperation, including the past and present. The National Security Council (NSC) directives that guide current interagency policymaking.

Tier Two models focus mainly on operational interagency cooperation at the combatant command level and include existing mechanisms, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), and proposed new models.

Tier Three models focus only on formal interagency relationships in the field.

Figure 1. Three Tiers of Interagency coordination


At the national strategic level, Tier One, the S/CRS is in the process of developing the capacity as the lead civilian component for reconstruction and stabilization cooperation. In accordance with the NSC approved model, the S/CRS would form Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Groups (CRSG) to lead strategic planning, policy coordination, and resource allocation for reconstruction and stabilization operations as required. The S/CRS builds the CRSG from permanent Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) co-chaired by S/CRS and NSC representatives and ultimately reports directly to the NSC Deputies Committee. To integrate with DoD planning, a CRSG is organized for all DoD contingency plans and is activated for both exercises and during the run up for actual operations. Conceptually, the CRSG enhances contingency planning through its competencies in the following domains: governance, economic stabilization, humanitarian assistance, resource management, and infrastructure.¹

At the operational level, Tier Two, the JIACG is the primary mechanism for interagency coordination within combatant commands. The JIACG began as a prototype
to enhance interagency planning and coordination within the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) in May of 2000. However in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the NSC established a limited capability JIACG in each combatant command beginning in May 2002 with initial DoD-funded positions for Department of State, Department of Treasury, and Department of Justice representatives. Since that time, each combatant command has developed its own JIACG with unique structures and functions to meet its requirements--currently U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) has the largest and most functionally diverse JIACG to support the requirements of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  

At the operational level, the S/CRS would deploy a Humanitarian, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Team (HRST) to the support the combatant commander within the JIACG. Structurally, the HRST would consist of approximately six to eight planners with the appropriate expertise to assist in drafting the reconstruction and stabilization portion of the combatant commander’s military plan. Functionally, the HRST would nest with the combatant commander’s staff but reach back to the CRSG for policy guidance.

At the tactical field-level, Tier Three, the S/CRS would deploy Advance Civilian Teams (ACTs) with Joint Task Forces (JTF) and BCTs to execute the plans developed by the HRST. Structurally, an ACT Integration Cell would co-locate with the JTF headquarters and establish a permanent civilian reconstruction and stabilization presence responsible for oversight and support of subordinate ACTs deployed forward with BCTs. The tactical ACTs would consist of approximately twenty personnel with the appropriate expertise to provide direct humanitarian assistance, assist in restarting host national
essential services, develop host national government capacity and institutions, and develop the local economy. Functionally, the ACT Integration Cell would be responsible for taking request for additional tactical ACTs by military units, identifying and prioritizing the location of tactical ACTs, coordinating operations with the JTF level to achieve unity of effort, synchronizing operations with military Civil Affairs units, and coordinating tactical ACT operations with the HRST. At both the JTF and BCT level, the ACTs would be dependant on military security and logistic support.

While the National Defense University Defense and Technology Paper describes multiple existing and conceptual models for interagency cooperation at each echelon, it concludes that “only the S/CRS model has a conceptual structure that addresses national policy and strategy through tactical level implementation.” However, as the S/CRS continues to develop its organizational capabilities and refine its operational doctrine, debate continues on the structure and function of interagency coordination in the USG. The following two sections of this chapter help frame that debate from the strategic level to the tactical level and offer an assessment of current interagency operations that highlights the challenges the S/CRS and Army BCTs will have to address to effectively integrate interagency capabilities during reconstruction and stabilization operations.

The Interagency Reform Debate

In April 2008, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) published a report to Congress by Catherine Dale, Nina Serafino, and Pat Towell entitled Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates. The intent of that report is “to help frame the emerging debates by taking note of the leading advocates for change, highlighting identified shortcomings in key elements of the current
system, and describing categories of emerging proposals for change.” Methodologically Dale, Serafino, and Towell believe that much of debate on interagency reform has focused heavily on proposed “fixes” rather than on identifying and explaining why the current system is insufficient or non-optimal. As a result, they organized their discussion of shortcomings around the functional problems in the system rather than structural change options. This provides a useful framework for understanding S/CRS’s role within the larger interagency process and enduring issues associated with integrating S/CRS at each echelon of interagency coordination.

The first functional shortcoming of interagency coordination identified by Dale, Serafino, and Towell is simply that civilian agency capacity is too limited. With the overall growth in the requirements for civilian engagement since 11 September 2001, many debate participants now argue that “civilian agencies do not have sufficient capacity, or the necessary capabilities, to support their national security roles and responsibilities.” This limited civilian capacity has a direct impact on the USG’s ability to pursue its national security goals and has resulted in the DoD or contractors assuming missions for which civilian agencies would be best qualified. This has two implications: first, the organizations executing those missions are often less qualified and selected solely on the basis of availability; and second, the DoD has become the default solution which places “additional stress on already stretched forces and reduces their ability to train and prepare for other requirements.”
Limited civilian capacity has logically set the conditions for the second functional
crimean capacity has logically set the conditions for the second functional
shortcoming of interagency coordination identified by Dale, Serafino, and Towell: the
DoD role is too large. From this perspective, critics of the current balance of roles and
responsibilities among executive branch key players argue that the DoD is encroaching
on the purview of civilian agencies by actively pursuing “foreign affairs activities such as
economic reconstruction, the training of foreign police forces, and humanitarian
assistance.”10 As a result, the DoD is playing a disproportional role in executing
reconstruction and stabilization operations in the field and is receiving a disproportional
share of the resources required to execute those operations. Other critics argue that while
the DoD efforts provide short-term solutions, “this [stop-gap] problem-solving reduces
the impetus in Washington for more adequately resourcing and preparing civilian
agencies to do the job.”11

The third shortcoming of interagency coordination identified by Dale, Serafino,
and Towell is insufficient interagency coordination and integration mechanisms. This is
somewhat obvious as insufficient interagency coordination and integration has
necessitated the interagency reform debate. However Dale, Serafino, and Towell
elaborate that proponents for change discuss the implications of insufficient interagency
coordination and integration in the following terms: “it can leave gaps in planning
undetected; it can lead to wasted resources, duplication of effort, or even working at cross
purposes; it can send conflicting messages to partner states; it can inadvertently
demonstrate a lack of national unity; and most of all, it can lead to failures in
execution.”12
The forth shortcoming of interagency coordination identified by Dale, Serafino, and Towell is lack of rigor in National security decision-making. Within this context Dale, Serafino, and Towell define rigor as the timeliness of information, information and proposal sharing among agencies before committee meetings, and the ability of the NSC process to determine and act on the important issues. The failure to support a disciplined interagency debate with appropriate information sharing and decision mechanisms prevents the NSC from effectively considering the inputs across the spectrum of key interagency advisors. As a result, interagency planning and coordination results in incomplete courses of action that often include important logical gaps.13

The fifth shortcoming of interagency coordination identified by Dale, Serafino, and Towell is insufficient guidelines at the national security strategy-making level. According to some within the interagency reform debate, the individual agencies get little guidance on “balancing their own capabilities with those of other agencies.”14 As a result, individual agencies develop their own strategies, doctrines, and capabilities without considering their coordination and integration with other agencies. This creates an environment of competition instead of coordination and precludes leveraging the interagency capabilities in a coherent USG strategy for reconstruction and stabilization.15

The sixth shortcoming of interagency coordination identified by Dale, Serafino, and Towell is the misappropriation of resources within the Executive Branch: resources and strategy do not match.16 This shortcoming is a corollary to the previous shortcomings: without clear priorities and rigorous interagency dialogue, the President’s budget requests are developed around individual agency concerns instead of
comprehensive USG strategy. This also precludes cooperation and fosters competition resulting in sub-optimal interagency solutions to national security issues.\textsuperscript{17}

The final shortcoming of interagency coordination identified by Dale, Serafino, and Towell is poorly structured Congressional oversight. As with the other shortcomings, this issue relates directly to capacity for systematic interagency coordination. Within this argument, the ongoing oversight of standing committees does not encourage cooperation among USG agencies. Instead, Joint Congressional hearings and the existing oversight mechanisms provide more incentives for individual agencies to demonstrate competency in their individual mandates than to develop coordinated interagency strategies. Beyond stifling interagency cooperation, this arrangement also prevents the members of Congress from understanding the full potential of options that coordinate the use of military capabilities and other agencies’ soft power options to achieve national objectives.\textsuperscript{18}

While this CRS Report focuses primarily on the national level issues that constrain interagency cooperation and integrations, it provides a useful framework for understanding the potential role of S/CRS as the lead agency for coordinating USG reconstruction and stabilization operations. As already discussed, S/CRS is designed to perform functions at every level of interagency coordination. The S/CRS is still developing its full operational capacity; however, CRS has done extensive analysis on its current status and preliminary accomplishments to assess its potential in enhancing interagency coordination and integration. The following section outlines a CRS Report on S/CRS and offers a background on its development in that capacity.
S/CRS Status and Accomplishments

This section reviews a CRS Report by Nina Serafino and Martin Weiss entitled *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities* that discusses the developing S/CRS capacity with reference to reconstruction and stabilization operations. While S/CRS will have specific functions at every echelon of interagency coordination, this section focuses on its on-going efforts “to develop the capacity, procedures, and knowledge to deploy civilian government workers and reserve personnel to crises situations”\(^{19}\) that will support its integration with Army BCTs at the tactical level.

In 2006, S/CRS began the process of establishing the Active Reserve Corps (ARC) of government civilians capable of deploying with military forces for reconstruction and stabilization operations.\(^ {20}\) The analysis chapter of this thesis will consider S/CRS’s organizational develop in more detail; however, it is worth noting here that developing a civilian reserve capability is a fundamental component to “operationalizing” the DoS. Developing a civilian reserve capability within S/CRS will allow the DoS to transition from “an institution devoted to diplomacy to one that would effect change through ‘on-the-ground’ personnel and programs dedicated to promoting security and stability in transitions from conflict and post-conflict situations.”\(^ {21}\)

S/CRS is also building its capacity to monitor and plan for potential conflicts and integrate those efforts with DoD contingency planning. Currently, S/CRS has requested that the National Intelligence Council (NIC) provide it with a list of weak states that are most susceptible to crisis twice a year. S/CRS then selects one or more of those weak
states and develops contingency plans for possible interventions. To integrate its planning efforts with the DoD, S/CRS has been working with the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to develop a common civilian-military planning model for stabilization and reconstruction operations.22

To bridge the gap between planning and execution, S/CRS has worked with the military to develop civilian-military stabilization and reconstruction training exercises. While S/CRS, U.S. Army, and interagency training is covered in more detail in chapter four of this thesis, it is important to note that the CRS Report highlights S/CRS’s interagency training initiatives as an important early accomplishment. The CRS Report offers examples such S/CRS sponsoring a civilian-military exercise by the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at the Naval Post-Graduate School and the S/CRS involvement in developing the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) 2006 capstone exercise to demonstrate S/CRS’s potential to address the need for greater interagency planning and coordination for reconstruction and stabilization operations.23

An Interagency Assessment

The final section of this literature review examines a 2009 RAND monograph by Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, James E. Barnett II, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Terrence K. Kelly, and Zachary Haldemanon entitled “Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations.” The stated aim of the report is “to identify the key U.S. government agencies with capabilities that can augment Army assets in stability operations, assess their readiness to participate in interagency planning and execution of these operations, and provide options to Army leadership in making key civilian agencies more capable partners to the Army.”24 While this report considers the capabilities of multiple agencies
across the USG, the following section outlines the report’s findings that relate specifically to S/CRS and its potential relationship with Army BCTs in a tactical environment.25

In Chapter 3 of the RAND report, “Identifying the Key Agencies: The Bottom-Up Approach,” the authors draw on the lessons from past reconstruction and stabilization operations to build a recommended model of the required organization and expertise for future FACTs operating at the tactical level.26 As a starting point, the authors consider the role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan--the first “attempt at an interagency solution to a tactical-level capability gap in SSTR [Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction] operations.”27 From the PRT experience, U.S. Army and DoD doctrine, and S/CRS sources, the authors generated a list of eight mission-essential tasks that PRTs currently perform:

1. Deploy
2. Assess the operational environment
3. Promote effective and legitimate local political authority and civil administration
4. Implement programs to address operational environment needs
5. Assist local government to identify and resolve infrastructure needs
6. Security coordination
7. Protect the organization
8. Sustain the organization28

From their analysis of these mission essential tasks, as well as a more thorough analysis of required capabilities and cross-walked USG skill sets, the authors focus on an
analysis of the S/CRS proposed composition of the FACTs. This is an appropriate methodology as the FACTs are explicitly intended to fill the gap between the USG capabilities (in terms of domain specific expertise such as rule of law or civil administration) and the lack of a tactical organization to employ those capabilities to assist in host national reconstruction and stabilization operations at the local or provincial level.29 The authors’ analysis of the proposed FACT composition also considers the specific actions that S/CRS has identified for the FACTs, including:

1. “act as lead in negotiations or political discussions with local leadership;
2. coordinate and integrate U.S. government regional programs (and international when possible);
3. perform assessments ensuring consistency with strategy policies;
4. advise military commander on political/civil factors of area of operations.”30

From their analysis, the authors recommend a FACT structure that is both significantly larger and more decentralized than the existing S/CRS proposed FACT structure. Significantly, the authors assert that the current S/CRS operational concept for the FACT consolidates too much capability (in terms of personnel) at the Advanced Civilian Team (ACT) headquarters level instead of adequately resourcing the FACTs. This will limit the effectiveness of the FACTs at the tactical (local) level and has the potential of making the weaker FACTs more responsive to their headquarters than the operational environment. Further, the authors assess that the S/CRS proposed FACT structure fails to integrate enough military forces into the FACTs, which “ensures that some capabilities, not to mention capacity, will be lacking.”31 Among others, these are
critical concepts that the subsequent chapters of this thesis will address while providing a more thorough analysis of the S/CRS organization and doctrinal concepts.

The authors also acknowledge the significant obstacles to developing and implementing an ideal solution for deployable civil-military organizations to support reconstruction and stabilization operations. As with many of the other sources cited in this literature review, the authors of the RAND report devote considerable analysis to the interagency’s “lack of financial resources and constraints on use of these resources,” the “shortage of deployable, appropriate, and trained personnel,” and to the “approaches to planning that are not fully compatible with planning conducted by the military.” These impediments will continue to shape and often limit initiatives to develop a more credible and a more capable whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations.

However, the capacity for DoS, specifically the S/CRS, to integrate effectively with Army BCTs for reconstruction and stabilization operations at the tactical level is critical to success in the on-going operations of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as any foreseeable conflicts in fragile, failing, or failed states around the world. As a result, that capacity both deserves and requires rigorous study. The following chapter of this thesis, Methodology, outlines the analytic framework the remainder of this thesis will use to assess the potential for the S/CRS and the Army BCT to operate together effectively. By focusing on both institutions’ doctrinal approaches to reconstruction and stabilization, organizations, and training strategies, this thesis aims to contribute the on-going struggle to achieve unity of effort in the whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations.

2Ibid., 9. For a description of the unique organization of each JIACG within each combatant command: CENTCOM, U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (EUCOM), U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), 10-13

3Ibid., 15.

4Ibid., 21.

5Ibid., 24.


7Ibid., 6.

8Ibid., 7.

9Ibid., 8.

10Ibid.

11Ibid.

12Ibid., 10.

13Ibid., 11.

14Ibid., 12.

15Ibid.

16Ibid.

17Ibid.

18Ibid., 13.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., 1.

22 Ibid, 17.

23 Ibid, 17.


25 Ibid., xiii.

26 Ibid., 45.

27 Ibid., 49.

28 Ibid., 61-62.

29 Ibid., 75.

30 Ibid., 75.

31 Ibid. 85.

32 Ibid., 98.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The subsequent analysis, conclusions, and recommendations of this thesis reflect a qualitative analysis of selected public record documents. To assess the potential for the S/CRS and the Army BCT to operate together effectively, this thesis will analysis key documents from DoS, the S/CRS, and the DoD within a modified framework of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) construct used by the DoD and the Army. As an analytical framework, DOTMLPF offers a systematic tool for comparing each agency’s capabilities, institutional preferences, and limitations within those domains. This thesis will focus specifically on the doctrine, organization, and training domains. The analysis produces two sets of findings: first, it identifies capability gaps between each agency’s capabilities and that agency’s responsibilities or mission sets with reference to reconstruction and stabilization; second, it identifies capability gaps between the two agencies that create organizational constraints to cooperation, coordination, and integration at the tactical level.

In 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld responded to Soldier’s question regarding the lack of adequate armor for vehicles in Iraq by stating: “As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They are not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”1 While inherently true, Rumsfeld’s response did not address the underlying question of how the DoD and the Army identifies capability gaps within the force and determines appropriate solutions to close those gaps--the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and the Army Capabilities Integration and
Development System (ACIDS). Within both JCIDS and ACIDS, DOTMLPF is an analytical methodology used to address capability requirements and develop affordable, militarily useful, and supportable solutions across the domains of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. As a tool for breaking complex problems into more manageable parts, DOTMLPF looks for solutions within each domain and considers the subsequent impact of possible solutions across all domains.²

While DOTMLPF is a specific DoD framework, applying it to both the Army BCT and the S/CRS allows for a consistent analysis of both the military and civilian reconstruction and stabilization capabilities. Further, analyzing each institution’s doctrine, organization, and training methodology within the same framework allows for a more credible comparative analysis of what factors will enable or constrain the S/CRS and Army BCT’s ability to function together within the whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and stabilization in conflict or post-conflict environments.

As a unit of analysis, doctrine is the written collection of the fundamental principles and processes that guide an institution’s actions. The DoD defines joint doctrine as the “fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint doctrine contained in joint publications also includes terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”³ Other government agencies have not historically emphasized the development or use of doctrine to the extent of the military; however, the S/CRS has demonstrated its intent to develop civilian reconstruction and stabilization doctrine as the foundation for its operations. Accordingly, the S/CRS offers the following
definition: “Doctrine & Concepts are the core principles and best practices for the structures, processes, and systems that guide how the U.S. Government (USG) organizes and operates in reconstruction and stabilization efforts. They are the backbone of U.S. reconstruction and stabilization efforts abroad.”

To operationalize doctrine as a unit of analysis, this thesis will consider the following doctrinal variables: terminology, approach, and planning. Terminology refers to the specific words each institution uses within the context of reconstruction and stabilization operations and their corresponding definitions and implications. Within the whole-of-government approach, an analysis of S/CRS and DoD’s unique terminology will be useful in assessing to what extent that the two organizations are “speaking the same language” and share a common understanding of reconstruction and stabilization concepts. Approach refers to the fundamental assumptions each institution has with regards to how reconstruction and stabilizations should be conducted with reference to the host national government involved, multi-national partners, non-governmental partners, and USG interagency partners. Conceptually, understanding each institutions approach is fundamental to accessing its capacity for unified action and to identifying potential constraints to tactical cooperation and integration. Planning refers to the processes, organizations, and tools each institution uses to develop executable courses of action for reconstruction and stabilization operations. While planning efforts vary according to operational requirements and time available, understanding the doctrinal principles that guide each institution’s planning for reconstruction and stabilization operations is critical to assessing their potential to work together effectively in a whole-of-government approach.
To operationalize organization as a unit of analysis, this thesis will consider the following structure of each institution, the composition of its component parts, the core competencies resident in each component, and the lines of authority that control those component parts’ ability to perform their missions.

To operationalize training as a unit of analysis, this thesis will consider the following training variables: content, method, and frequency and duration. Content refers to what each institution includes in enduring and pre-deployment training for its individuals and component organizations. Method refers to how each institution conducts its training. Frequency and duration refers to the actual amount of training each institution’s individuals and component organizations receive prior to participating in reconstruction and stabilization operations.

1Command and General Staff College, DLRO, “Developing Army Organizational Capability,” F100 Managing Army Change, F102AA-1-12 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, August 2009), F102AA-1.

2Ibid., F102AA-2.

3Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 31 October 2009), 286.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

A second task we can take on together is to design and establish a volunteer Civilian Reserve Corps. Such a corps would function much like our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed Forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them. And it would give people across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve in the defining struggle of our time.

— President Bush, State of the Union Address

Introduction

This chapter presents a qualitative analysis of selected public record documents from the S/CRS and the Department of Defense focused on each organization’s doctrine, organization, and training methodology to answer the six tertiary research questions. To answer those questions, the subsequent sections assess each organization’s published standards individually. The following chapter, Chapter 5 Findings, builds on this analysis and offers a comparative perspective on what doctrinal, organizational, and training factors will enable or constrain S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations at the tactical level.

Doctrine

Tertiary Research Question 1

What is the S/CRS doctrinal approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations in conflict or post conflict environments at the tactical level?

Approach

In its introduction, the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction (hereafter referred to as Guiding Principles) asserts that unlike the U.S. military’s
reliance on doctrine: “more than a decade after U.S. troops crossed the River Sava to help build peace in Bosnia and years after entering Afghanistan, civilian agencies of the U.S. government still lack any comprehensive strategic guidance. No guidance exists to inform decision makers, planners, or practitioners who deploy from civilian agencies to understand exactly what these missions are all about.”¹ The Guiding Principles manual attempts to fill that gap and provides a doctrinal framework for S/CRS’s conduct of reconstruction and stabilization operations in conflict or post-conflict environments.

As a doctrinal framework, the Guiding Principles manual focuses on host national outcomes rather than process driven inputs or outputs.² The desired outcomes are derived from the five purpose-based end states that form the doctrinal core of the Guiding Principles manual: a safe and secure environment, the rule of law, stable governance, a sustainable economy, and social well-being. Within its Strategic Framework, the Guiding Principles manual associates necessary conditions with each of the major end states and introduces cross-cutting principles that affect every end state. The Strategic Framework also recognizes that the major end states are interdependent and a comprehensive development plan cannot pursue development toward one end state in isolation. Figure 2 is a graphic depiction of the Guiding Principles manual’s doctrinal framework.³
From the outcome focused perspective, the *Guiding Principles* manual describes each of the major end states in terms of the perception of the host nation population. Figure 3 lists those definitions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Safe and Secure Environment. Ability of the people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law. Ability of the people to have equal access to just laws and a trusted system of justice that holds all persons accountable, protects their human rights and ensures their safety and security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Governance. Ability of the people to share, access or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable Economy. Ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound by law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Well-Being. Ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3. Definitions of Major End States**


While the major end states are divided into logical domains for specific guidance, the *Guiding Principles* manual also acknowledges that there are overarching standards that apply to all participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations across all domains. As a result, the *Guiding Principles* manual provides the following cross-cutting principles as guidance to every participant and relevant to every reconstruction and stabilization activity: host nation ownership and capacity, political primacy, legitimacy, unity of effort, security, conflict transformation, and regional engagement. Maintaining an outcome based focus; the *Guiding Principles* manual defines each cross-cutting principle as:

Host nation ownership and capacity means that the affected country must drive its own development needs and priorities even if transitional authority is in the hands of outsiders. Ownership requires capacity, which often needs tremendous strengthening in S&R [stabilization and reconstruction] environments.
Political primacy means that a political settlement is the cornerstone of a sustainable peace. Every decision and every action has an impact on the possibility of forging political agreement.

Legitimacy has three facets: the degree to which the host nation population accepts the mission and its mandate or the government and its actions; the degree to which the government is accountable to its people; and the degree to which regional neighbors and the broader international community accept the mission mandate and the host nation government.

Unity of effort begins with a shared understanding of the environment. It refers to cooperation toward common objectives over the short and long term, even when the participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures.

Security is a cross-cutting prerequisite for peace. The lack of security is what prompts an S&R mission to begin with. Security creates the enabling environment for development.

Conflict transformation guides the strategy to transform resolution of conflict from violent to peaceful means. It requires reducing drivers of conflict and strengthening mitigators across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres, while building host nation capacity to manage political and economic competition through peaceful means.

Regional engagement entails encouraging the host nation, its neighboring countries, and other key states in the region to partner in promoting both the host nation’s and the region’s security and economic and political development. It has three components: comprehensive regional diplomacy, a shared regional vision, and cooperation.5

Under each of these cross-cutting principles, the Guiding Principles manual describes key considerations that are required for successful and lasting development. For host nation ownership and capacity, participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations must understand the local context of the operation, foster ownership through the active involvement of the host national government and society through the planning and execution of the stabilization and reconstruction process, and ensure inclusivity through impartiality within an understanding of the local context. Further, participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations must build local national capacity by
“transferring technical knowledge and skills to the host nation, individuals, and institutions to help them develop effective policies and administer public services across the economic, social, political, and security realms.”\textsuperscript{6} This involves understanding and building existing formal and informal systems, reforming those systems when required, leveraging early resources and quick impact projects, and engaging women “to ensure sustainable peace, economic recovery, and social well-being.”\textsuperscript{7}

To promote political primacy, participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations must also assess the local context to understand the unique political, social, and economic “rules of the game” that govern the local population’s perceptions about rewards and punishments, and winners and losers.\textsuperscript{8} Participants must foster and sustain a political process that effectively addresses the relationships among conflicting parties and addresses the unresolved issues that underlie the conflicts. Further, the political development of the host national government must follow a realistic timeline with measurable goals that have been agreed upon by all parties. This requires the host nation’s government and the participants in reconstruction and stabilization to engage the warring parties and the marginalized groups within the population and to offer a legitimate political mechanism to address their grievances in order to prevent them from turning to violence to obstruct the developing political system. Finally, promoting political primacy requires effective strategic communications to ensure that there is a productive public dialogue between the civil society and the developing government.\textsuperscript{9}

Such a public dialogue is also essential to achieving the third cross-cutting principle of legitimacy. The \textit{Guiding Principles} document establishes three components to legitimacy (see figure 4).
The degree to which the local population accepts and supports the mission, its mandate and its behavior over time.

The degree to which the local population accepts and supports the host nation government (which can include informal governance structures as well), and the manner in which the government attains power.

The extent to which regional neighbors and the international community accept the mission’s mandate and its actions and the host nation government and its actions.

Figure 4. Three Components to Legitimacy


To promote legitimacy, the *Guiding Principles* manual describes several considerations for participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations. These include establishing the mission under a credible mandate and authority, such as a UN Security Council Resolution, and establishing accountability and transparency for both the actions of the reconstruction and stabilization mission and the host national government. Promoting legitimacy also requires matching resources to goals and delivering a timely peace dividend while actively managing the expectations of the local population and the international community through clear and concise communications.¹⁰

The fourth cross-cutting principle, unity of effort, is “the outcome of coordination and cooperation among all actors, even when the participants come from many different organizations with diverse operating cultures.”¹¹ While inherently challenging, unity of effort begins with a shared understanding of the situation, ideally developed through shared assessment tools or a shared common picture compiled from multiple disparate assessment mechanisms, and a shared strategic or overarching goal. Working off of a
common understanding of the environment and shared goals, participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations must work to integrate their activities when possible, such as the US interagency “whole-of-government” approach, and develop cooperation and coordination mechanisms when full integration is not possible. Such coordination includes civil-military cooperation; however, participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations must also understand the need for “humanitarian space” and maintain a clear separation between “politically motivated actions to end violent conflict and movement toward development, and apolitical humanitarian assistance based exclusively on impartial response to assessed need.”

While normally associated with the military’s role in reconstruction and stabilization operations, the Guiding Principles manual also establishes security as the fifth cross-cutting principle. Beyond the physical security required for a safe and secure environment, human security is an enduring requirement shared by all participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations. Human security involves sharing information on threats or potential threats to the peace process or the population from a variety of sources throughout the population. This includes identifying and managing individuals or parties threatened by the peace process who may seek to spoil progress for personal gain as well as maintaining a human rights approach involving a mandate “to protect and promote human rights and ensure that the host nation has the will and capacity to do so on its own.”

The sixth cross-cutting principle, conflict transformation, focuses on reducing the drivers of conflict and increasing the host nation’s capacity to both independently manage violence within its borders and to independently manage the root causes of the violence.
Within the *Guiding Principles* framework, conflict transformation represents the “end game:”

- a safe and secure environment that enables development; the rule of law that allows grievances to be addressed through a system of justice and confronts impunity; stable governance that permits contestation for power to take place peacefully; a sustainable economy that provides the framework for licit economic competition; and social well-being that affords equal access to basic human needs and the opportunity to live in communities that have mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflict.\(^{14}\)

The final cross-cutting principle, regional engagement, recognizes that “a long-term solution for the host nation must include a consideration of the effects of both its conflict on the region and the region on its conflict.”\(^{15}\) At the regional level, reconstruction and stabilization operations often take place in an environment of enduring interstate conflict, divergent regional interests, and among other states suffering from domestic instabilities. These conditions can become worse as a result of increasing violence, the flow of refugees across borders, and increased arms trafficking. To mitigate these risks and set the conditions for a sustainable long term peace, regional engagement requires a comprehensive “diplomatic offensive” to prevent regional players from sabotaging the reconstruction and stabilization efforts and to elicit their support for regional peace and stability. The efforts for regional diplomacy should work to produce a shared regional vision and develop cooperation mechanisms such as providing economic and military assistance, giving political support and engaging in trade and commerce, and developing regional structures that promote cooperation, shared security, economic growth, and social and political development.\(^{16}\)

Participants in reconstruction and stability operations should consider the cross-cutting principles while planning, preparing for, and executing all activities related to
their mission. However, the *Guiding Principles* manual acknowledges that many decisions in complex reconstruction and stabilization missions will involve difficult trade-offs because of inherent conflicts between the objectives. As a result, the *Guiding Principles* manual outlines three “high-level trade-offs” and six “high-level gaps and challenges” to help guide the decision making process. The first high-level trade-off is between stability and host national legitimacy. In conflict or post-conflict environments, participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations will often face an urgent need to secure the peace and establish a safe environment. However, participants must be aware that when an external entity imposes peace, the host nation population may lose confidence in their local leaders or national government, threaten the legitimacy and degrading the capability of the host nation. The second high-level trade-off is between expediency and sustainability. The expediency of short-term, high pay-off actions may have an immediate effect on stability, but may not be sustainable by the host nation in the long-term. As an example, the *Guiding Principles* manual recommends considering the long term sustainability of large infrastructure projects, security sector reform such as oversized armies, and expensive national elections that a host nation will have to maintain over time. The third high-level trade-off is between meeting the needs of the population and building capacity of the host nation. Conflict or post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations often correspond with humanitarian crises. However, participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations must balance the need to provide immediate relief directly to the population with the long term objective of building host nation capacity to deliver critical assistance and sustainable support to their own population.¹⁷
The high-level gaps and challenges relate to a recurring lack of knowledge from mission to mission (gaps) and to recurring shortfalls in practice even when best practices have been previously identified (challenges). The first high-level gap and challenge is the recurring lack of an agreed upon overall vision or storyline for the reconstruction and stabilization effort. The need for a shared strategic vision relates directly to unity of effort and is a prerequisite for political primacy; however, achieving an agreed upon overall vision continues to be a challenge in complex reconstruction and stabilization efforts with multiple governmental, non-governmental, and international organizations operating in the same environment with divergent interests and approaches. The second high-level gap and challenge is insufficient realism in the timelines for key recovery outcomes. Establishing unrealistic and unsustainable goals creates counterproductive expectations by the local population, the host nation’s government, and international partners. Further, failing to achieve those goals along the established timeline can challenge the legitimacy of the reconstruction and stabilization mission and the host nation’s government and degrade continuing support. The third high-level gap and challenge is inadequate links between priorities. This challenge also relates unity of effort as disparate organizations pursue individual initiatives across the domains of security, rule of law, governance, economic development, and social development without a coherent plan for each initiative to support the overall vision for long term development. The fourth high-level challenge is the tendency to lose momentum after a key transition event. Previous experience indicates that reconstruction and stabilization efforts can become overly focused on key events such as a peace agreement or national election; however, a failure to follow those events with long-term development initiatives can threaten the host nation
ownership and capacity cross-cutting principle. The fifth high-level gap and challenge is ineffective transitions from international to local control. Again relating host nation ownership and capacity, transitions of control must be planned and executed to ensure that the host nation can sustain the peace and prevent further conflict. The final high-level gap and challenge is the overarching lack of understanding of host nation context and needs.\(^{18}\)

To address these challenges and incorporate the cross-cutting principles into reconstruction and stabilization efforts, the *Guiding Principles* manual outlines the fundamentals of a comprehensive approach as a doctrinal framework for reconstruction and stabilization operations. The fundamentals of a comprehensive approach include both the conceptual unpinning of successful reconstruction and stabilization operations and practical advice on achieving the long term objectives. The first fundamental is interdependence; the concept that “everything is connected to everything else.”\(^{19}\) From a practical perspective, the linkage between security, governance, rule of law, and economic and social development necessitates that reconstruction and stabilization participants in those domains be linked to each other: “interdependence requires that all actors break out of their stovepipes.”\(^{20}\)

Building on interdependence, the second fundamental to a comprehensive approach is cooperation. Cooperation is an extension of the unity of effort cross cutting principle. To achieve cooperation, participants must develop a shared strategic vision, understand the organization culture and interests of other participants, and build the communication mechanisms that support a continuing dialogue and a constant flow of information.\(^{21}\)
The third fundamental to a comprehensive approach is prioritization. The *Guiding Principles* manual outlines two key points regarding prioritization. First, priorities must be flexible and participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations must be capable of changing as conditions on the ground change. Second, experience indicates that the focus of priorities for societies emerging from conflict are: Sources of conflict and stability; implementation of a political settlement; and provision of services that meet basic human needs.\(^{22}\)

The forth fundamental to a comprehensive approach is nesting short term objectives with long term goals. Nesting short term objectives with long term goals rests on the premise that reconstruction and stabilization operations restore peace to enable long term sustainable development. Therefore, participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations must continually assess the impact of addressing immediate needs on longer term goals. The *Guiding Principles* manual also stresses the importance of the medium term and warns that reconstruction and stabilization operations often neglect the “slower, more sluggish, middle-age period, where interest and resources decline.”\(^{23}\) Failing to build a medium term framework to transition from short term crisis management to long term host nation sustainability creates a dangerous environment that can result in a resurgence of violent conflict.

The fifth fundamental to a comprehensive approach is flexibility in the sequencing and timing reconstruction and stabilization activities. Conceptually, participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations must continually learn and adapt their practices as conditions on the ground change, transitioning between the phases of the operation as required by local conditions not according to a set linear plan.
Practically, the *Guiding Principles* manual asserts that “locally led input on sequencing and timing actions is essential for success” and “the opening days and months of an S&R [stabilization and reconstruction] mission provide an opening to seize the initiative.”

The sixth fundamental to a comprehensive approach is developing and using measures of progress that effectively translate long term goals into discrete measurable outcomes. Conceptually, the *Guiding Principles* manual asserts that an effective system of metrics cannot measure success against inputs: an effective system of metrics must measure outcomes. For example, “rather than measuring progress by the number of police trained, the system should assess whether there has been a reduction in crime.”

To facilitate measuring outcome based progress, the *Guiding Principles* manual provides a tool called Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE). MPICE “is organized according to the five end states presented in this manual and offers a means to assess whether conflict drivers have been diminished and whether host nation institutions can maintain stability without significant international assistance.”

**Planning**

As a planning model, the S/CRS established the Planning Framework in its 2008 publication entitled *Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation*. The Planning Framework is a four-stage process consisting of situation analysis, policy formulation, strategy development, and interagency implementation. While sequential, each stage should be considered as a planning cycle that informs and potentially changes the previous stages as well as subsequent stages. Further, the S/CRS developed the Planning Framework as a whole-of
government planning approach to promote the “inclusion of all relevant USG agencies in the planning process.”

The first stage of the Planning Framework is situation analysis. During situation analysis, planners analyze the current environment for a reconstruction and stabilization operation by gathering as much information as possible from all available sources. This includes “consultations and information exchanges with U.S. personnel and other multilateral, governmental and non-governmental partners in the field.” However, situation analysis is also an on-going activity, continually gathering information and building a base of knowledge on vulnerable countries for potential reconstruction and stabilization operations in the future. When possible, a thorough situation analysis includes a comprehensive interagency assessment using the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) that: “1) diagnoses the conflict or civil strife and 2) completes a pre-planning mapping of current efforts against Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors.” During the situation analysis, planners will also develop a Situation Analysis Overview. A comprehensive document drawing on the results of the ICAF and other analysis, the Situation Analysis overview includes:

a clear depiction of the Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors that mitigate civil strife or conflict, current USG and international efforts as well as U.S. interests relating to the country and region, the expected actions of key actors (both partners and competitors), gaps in current and expected efforts to address the instability or conflict, risks associated with both action and inaction, legal considerations for providing assistance to the country, and critical gaps in knowledge/intelligence.

A thorough Situation Analysis Overview is the foundation for the second step in the Planning Framework, policy formulation. During policy formulation, planners produce a Policy Advisory Memo for Principals/Deputies that articulates policy options
with their associated risks and benefits. The Policy Advisory Memo establishes the connection between an overarching reconstruction and stabilization policy goal and the strategic objectives required to meet that goal, known as the Major Mission Elements (MMEs). The MMEs correspond directly to the drivers of conflict and local capacity needs identified in the Situation Analysis Overview.31

After reviewing the planner’s Policy Advisory Memo, the Principals/Deputies either issue a Policy Statement accepting one of the policy options or request new policy options for review. The Policy Statement establishes the overarching reconstruction and stabilization goal, provides guidance on critical planning considerations for developing the USG Reconstruction and Stabilization Strategic Plan, and gives an estimate of the USG resources available for planning.32

Once the Principals/Deputies have approved a Policy Statement, a strategic planning team develops the USG Reconstruction and Stabilization Strategic Plan. The strategic planning team is either a part of the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) or part of the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization (IMS) when the Reconstruction and Stabilization Policy Coordinating Committee has initiated whole-of-government planning with the concurrence of the State Regional Assistant Secretary and Chief of Mission. The Strategic Plan establishes “how the [reconstruction and stabilization] operation will address the prioritization, sequencing and cross-sectoral linkages of USG efforts.”33

In addition to producing the overarching Strategic Plan, the strategic planning team also establishes Major Mission Element planning teams responsible for developing MME Concepts. The MME Concepts are a proposed approach to accomplishing the
MME objective as well as the sub-objectives that support the primary objective. MME Concepts include the items listed in figure 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How the MME relates to other MMEs;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rough order of magnitude capability requirements (both foreign assistance and operational) to achieve the MME;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sub-Objectives that are necessary and sufficient to achieve the MME, including a discussion of Sub-Objective sequencing and priority decision points;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for success for each MME to ensure that there is a shared understanding of the desired outcomes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How additional planning considerations not in the Policy Statement relate to the MME;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of critical information requirements and knowledge gaps;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential impediments to success; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential strategic, regional, and local consequences, positive and negative, of successful achievement of the MME.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5. Major Mission Elements Concepts


When the planning effort is complete, the strategic planning team submits the Strategic Plan to the CRSG Policy Coordinating Committee for approval. A complete Strategic Plan consists of the following six parts (figure 6).
Plan Overview Template, a one-page graphic depiction of the plan;

Strategic Plan Narrative addressing the situation analysis, the overarching policy goal for R&S, critical planning considerations, Major Mission Elements, MME prioritization, sequencing and linkages;

Comprehensive Resource and Management Strategy (laying out rough order of magnitude requirements and availabilities for each MME);

MME Concepts;

Relevant technical annexes (e.g., security, personnel, knowledge management, logistics, etc.); and

A determination of what decisions remain in Washington (e.g., the decision whether to work with host nation armed forces).

Figure 6. Six Parts of the Strategic Plan


The fourth stage of the Planning Framework is interagency implementation planning: “an iterative process to synchronize diplomatic, development and defense implementation planning and tasks, towards the goal of executing the USG [reconstruction and stabilization] Strategic Plan.” Implementation planning is the responsibility of the Department of State Chief of Mission for the host nation; however, the ACT forms the actual implementation planning team consisting of S/CRS personnel, personnel from other implementing Agencies, and other Mission staff. The ACT implementation planning team forms multi-sectoral sub-objective teams for each MME and consolidates sectoral implementation plans across the MMEs. When the implementation of a sub-objective falls within the mandate of an agency other than the DoS, that agency will plan with its own planning process and provide the operational and
technical specialists to the ACT implementation planning team to support the overarching planning process. The Planning Framework specifies that every planning team must have the “the authority, command over resources, and field expertise to operate flexibly in uncertain and changing environments;” however, the ACT implementation planning team remains responsible to the Chief of Mission throughout the reconstruction and stabilization mission for overall planning, monitoring, and achieving the policy goal by performing the functions outlined in figure 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide the [Chief of Mission] and the CRSG with strategic information and facilitate communications;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design, coordinate, organize and manage the interagency implementation planning process, including provision of data collection and analytic support;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide interpretation and guidance on the intent of the senior policy makers and strategic planning team decisions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate stakeholder input into the planning process;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate the operations and inputs from sub-objective teams;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide support in the development of indicators, performance monitoring plans, and data collection, analysis, interpretation and reporting; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve as the mechanism for communicating feedback, including proposed revisions to the USG [reconstruction and stabilization] Strategic Plan, and additional planning requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. ACT Planning Functions

The implementation planning team produces a comprehensive Interagency Implementation Plan (IIP) for the Chief of Mission’s approval. Once approved, the Chief of Mission submits the Interagency Implementation Plan and any subsequent iteration to the CRSG Policy Coordinating Committee for final approval. The implementation planning team also monitors the progress of sub-objective programs at three-month intervals to ensure the activities are synchronized and to recommend the timing of transfers of authority from military to civilian, from USG to host country, etc.37 The comprehensive Interagency Implementation Plan will:

- Provide an overview of the operating environment, including critical elements/impediments that may affect implementation of the plan that were not described in the USG R&S Strategic Plan;

- Map donor and international organization program inputs and determine gaps that the USG approach will address, including tracking negotiations on the use of common approaches and on roles and responsibilities;

- Refine MME Concepts based on Sub-Objective Concepts developed by Sub-Objective planning teams that focus on required accomplishments in three-month benchmarks throughout the course of the plan;

- Determine program approaches at all levels in the implementation plan: short-term/long-term trade-offs, geographic priorities, and targets;

- Address the multi-sectoral nature of Sub-Objectives for each MME;

- Determine an approach to strengthening host-government short and long term capacity (e.g., resident advisor vs. technical assistance);

- Determine what mechanisms will be used to implement the program approach (use of pre-positioned agreements, new procurements, etc.); which contractors can stand-up programs rapidly; what requests for assistance might be required from the Department of Defense and how to include civil society partners in the implementation process to avoid creation of parallel systems;

- Develop a performance monitoring plan with short and long term stability and social indicators, targets and benchmarks, including use of negotiated common indicators with other partners whenever possible;

- Identify/refine resource and logistics requirements;
Employ an interagency Knowledge Management system for sharing and accessing information; and

At the appropriate time, begin the process of transitioning into out-year normal budgeting processes of participating agencies.38

Terminology

There are two documents useful in understanding the S/CRS’s reconstruction and stabilization terminology: the Guiding Principles manual and the “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks” document. The Guiding Principles manual defines the five end states of reconstruction and stabilization operations, describes the conditions necessary to achieve those end states, and provides guidance on how to achieve those conditions and end states. In “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” the S/CRS introduces an essential task matrix divided into five technical sectors: security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation.39

The first end state discussed in the Guiding Principles manual is a safe and secure environment: “a safe and secure environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent, or large-scale violence.”40 Establishing a safe and secure environment is the foundation of any reconstruction and stabilization operation. Economic, political, and social development are not possible until parties to the conflict disarm and the local population resumes normal activities such as “sending their children to school, opening shops for business, or traveling to the market.”41 The Guiding Principles discusses five conditions necessary for a safe and secure environment:
Cessation of Large-Scale Violence is a condition in which large-scale armed conflict has come to a halt, warring parties are separated and monitored, a peace agreement or ceasefire has been implemented, and violent spoilers are managed.

Public Order is a condition in which laws are enforced equitably; the lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected; criminal and politically motivated violence has been reduced to a minimum; and criminal elements (from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks) are pursued, arrested, and detained.

Legitimate State Monopoly Over the Means of Violence is a condition in which major illegal armed groups have been identified, disarmed and demobilized; the defense and police forces have been vetted and retrained; and national security forces operate lawfully under a legitimate governing authority.

Physical Security is a condition in which political leaders, ex-combatants, and the general population are free of fear from grave threats to physical safety; refugees and internally displaced persons can return home without fear of retributive violence; women and children are protected from undue violence; and key historical or cultural sites and critical infrastructure are protected from attack.

Territorial Security is a condition in which people and goods can freely move throughout the country and across borders without fear of harm to life and limb; the country is protected from invasion; and borders are reasonably well-secured from infiltration by insurgent or terrorist elements and illicit trafficking of arms, narcotics, and humans.

Section six of the Guiding Principles manual discusses establishing a safe and secure environment in great detail including general guidance that relates the cross-cutting principles to the end state and more specific “how-to” guidance for achieving each required condition. The general guidance stresses building host nation ownership and capacity from the beginning and the importance of understanding the local context while developing a security strategy. The general guidance also establishes security priorities that are essential for initial stabilizing, including: “promoting a political settlement, neutralizing hostile groups, providing basic protection for vulnerable populations and individuals, and securing critical sites and evidence of mass atrocities.” Finally, the general principles stress that participants in a reconstruction and stabilization
operation must consider development through a conflict lens, understanding the
interdependence between security, development initiatives, and the fragile peace that
exists as societies emerge from conflict.\textsuperscript{44}

Finally, the \textit{Guiding Principles} includes a “how-to” guide for achieving each
required condition by outlining appropriate approaches for each and discussing
considerations that should guide the application of those approaches. Briefly, the
approach to achieving the cessation of large-scale violence includes separating the
warring parties, instituting an enduring cease-fire or peace agreement, managing the
spoilers, and integrating intelligence into all activities, including coordinating military
and police intelligence sharing. Achieving public order is also a condition for second end
state, rule of law: section seven of the \textit{Guiding Principles} manual, rule of law, discusses
the approach to achieving public order. The approach to achieving the legitimate state
monopoly over the means of violence includes implementing a disarmament and
demobilization program, reintegrating the ex-combatants into society, and implementing
a comprehensive security sector reform program. The approach to achieving physical
security includes securing vulnerable populations, and protecting war crime evidence.
The approach to achieving territorial security includes maintaining the freedom of
movement within the state and securing international borders.\textsuperscript{45}

Section seven of the \textit{Guiding Principles} manual discusses the second end state for
reconstruction and stabilization operations, rule of law: “rule of law refers to an end state
in which all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held
accountable to the law, which is supreme.”\textsuperscript{46} Establishing the rule of law is fundamental
to ensuring a long-term sustainable peace. If the local population does not have access to
a legally and procedurally transparent justice system that consistently applies publicly
promulgated laws, then criminal and politically motivated violence will perpetuate a
cycle of violence that precludes lasting development or long-term peace. The conditions
necessary to establish the rule of law are:

Just Legal Frameworks is a condition in which laws are consistent with
international human rights norms and standards; are legally certain and
transparent; are drafted with procedural transparency; are equitable, and are
responsive to the entire population, not just powerful elites.

Public Order is a condition in which laws are enforced equitably; the lives,
property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected; criminal and
politically motivated violence has been reduced to a minimum; and criminal
elements (from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks) are
pursued, arrested, and detained.

Accountability to the Law is a condition in which the population, public officials,
and perpetrators of past conflict-related crimes are held legally accountable for
their actions; the judiciary is independent and free from political influence; and
horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms exist to prevent the abuse of
power.

Access to Justice is a condition in which people are able to seek and obtain a
remedy for grievances through formal or informal institutions of justice that
conform with international human rights standards, and a system exists to ensure
equal and effective application of the law, procedural fairness, and transparency.

Culture of Lawfulness is a condition in which the general population follows the
law and seeks to access the justice system to address its grievances. 47

The general principles to achieving the rule of law are similar to the general
principles to achieving a safe and secure environment, including building host nation
ownership and capacity, understanding the local context from a rule of law perspective,
and recognizing the impact of conflict and interdependence on rule of law programs. The
priorities for achieving the rule of law should focus on a human rights-based approach,
including: “pay special attention to marginalized groups, and focus on urgent problems
including major crimes, human rights violations, and politically motivated violence.” 48
The approach to achieving a just legal framework includes conducting a thorough assessment of the current legal framework, affecting short-term law reform, initiating a long-term law reform process, and determining the content of new laws. The approach to achieving public order includes developing a comprehensive system (policing agencies, courts, prosecution services, and prisons), affecting interim law enforcement, affecting an interim judiciary system, and ensuring there are humane detention and imprisonment systems and facilities. The approach to achieving accountability to the law includes managing transitional justice for past crimes associated with the conflict, and ensuring horizontal and vertical accountability throughout the legal system. The approach to achieving access to justice includes ensuring equal access to all segments of the society, harmonizing informal practices with international human rights laws to remedy grievances, and ensuring fairness in the processing and application of laws. The approach to achieving a culture of lawfulness includes building a system that promotes participation and communication, and promoting education.⁴⁹

Section eight of the Guiding Principles manual discusses the third end state for reconstruction and stabilization operations, stable governance: “Stable governance refers to an end state where the state provides essential services and serves as a responsible steward of state resources; government officials are held accountable through political and legal processes; and the population can participate in governance through civil society organizations, an independent media, and political parties.”⁵⁰ As with the rule of law, stable governance is required for long-term sustainable peace. In societies emerging from conflict, criminal groups, warring factions, terrorist organization, and other political spoilers will compete for control over a state’s resources, destabilizing the state and
perpetuating violent conflict. If legitimate state institutions do not exist to provide for the needs of the population, people will be more likely to support opponents of the peace process or commit crimes to provide for themselves and their families making sustainable development more challenging if not impossible. The conditions necessary to prevent this and achieve stable governance are:

Provision of Essential Services is a condition in which the state provides basic security, the rule of law, economic governance and basic human needs services; essential services are provided without discrimination; and the state has the capacity for provision of essential services without significant assistance from the international community.

Stewardship of State Resources is a condition in which national and subnational institutions of governance are restored, funded, and staffed with accountable personnel; the security sector is reformed and brought under accountable civilian control; and state resources are protected through responsible economic management in a manner that benefits the population.

Political Moderation and Accountability is a condition in which the government enables political settlement of disputes; addresses core grievances through debate, compromise, and inclusive national dialogue; and manages change arising from humanitarian, economic, security, and other challenges. A national constituting process results in separation of powers that facilitates checks and balances; the selection of leaders is determined through inclusive and participatory processes; a legislature reflects the interests of the population; and electoral processes are free and fair.

Civic Participation and Empowerment is a condition in which civil society exists and is empowered, protected, and accountable; media are present, professional, and independent of government or political influence; equal access to information and freedom of expression are upheld; and political parties are able to form freely and are protected.

Again, the general guidance for stable governance addresses the need to build host nation ownership and capacity from the beginning of the reconstruction and stabilization operation, to understand the local context before acting, and to consider all stable governance programs through a conflict lens that recognizes the interdependence of governance, security, rule of law, economic development, and social development.
Stable governance programs should focus on government functions that directly support delivering essential services to the population and contribute to political settlements that resolve conflicts not addressed in the peace agreement.52

The approach to achieving the provision of essential services includes developing the core administrative and institutional capabilities to provide for core services (security, rule of law, economic governance, and basic human needs services), ensuring equal access to and the nondiscriminatory distribution of the state resources, and continually building host nation capacity to provide essential services independent of international support. The approach to achieving stewardship of state resources includes restoring execute institutions and public administration, implementing a comprehensive security sector reform program, and protecting state resources from internal and external threats. The approach to achieving political moderation and accountability includes promoting an inclusive and participatory national constituting process, developing the mechanisms to manage conflicts through inclusive debates over the core grievances and challenges facing a government, developing a system of representation that reflects the local population, and strengthening the legislative branch of the government. The approach to achieving civic participation and empowerment includes promoting a civil society, ensuring there is an independent media and widespread access to information, and fostering the creation of inclusive and participatory political parties.53

Section nine of the Guiding Principles manual discusses the fourth end state for reconstruction and stabilization operations, sustainable economy: “a sustainable economy is one in which people can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a predictable system of economic governance bound by law.”54 While conflict normally cripples a
state’s economy and destroys critical economic infrastructure, reconstruction and stabilization efforts that promote economic growth can vastly increase opportunity, give the population a stake in the peace efforts, and mitigate the risk of political or social grievances escalating into violence. The conditions necessary to achieve a sustainable economy include:

Macroeconomic Stabilization is a condition in which monetary and fiscal policies are established to align the currency to market levels, manage inflation, and create transparent and accountable systems for public finance management. This condition requires a robust and enforceable legislative and regulatory framework to govern issues such as property rights, commerce, fiscal operations, and foreign direct investment.

Control Over the Illicit Economy and Economic-Based Threats to Peace is a condition in which illicit wealth no longer determines who governs, predatory actors are prevented from looting state resources, ex-combatants are reintegrated and provided jobs or benefits, and natural resource wealth is accountably managed.

Market Economy Sustainability is a condition in which a market-based economy is enabled and encouraged to thrive. Infrastructure is built or rehabilitated, and the private sector and the human capital and financial sectors are nurtured and strengthened.

Employment Generation is a condition in which job opportunities are created to yield quick impact to demonstrate progress and employ military-age youths, and a foundation is established for sustainable livelihoods.55

As with the other end states, the general guidance for a sustainable economy stresses the need to build host nation ownership in and capacity to maintain its own economy, to understand the local economic context, and to consider the implication of economic development across governance programs, security, rule of law, and social development. Economic development in conflict or post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations can be especially challenging and must be prioritized and timed properly; however, the Guiding Principles manual asserts that there is no consensus on
the exact sequencing of economic reform. As a guide, political imperatives should always take precedence over economic reform and initial economic programs should focus on macroeconomic stabilization, emergency activities (e.g. restoring key economic infrastructure), addressing property rights disputes, and combatting organized crime.\textsuperscript{56}

The approach to achieving macroeconomic stabilization includes stabilizing the currency, building a transparent and accountable fiscal management system, and developing a functional legislative and regulatory framework. The approach to achieving control over an illicit economy and economic based threats includes controlling illicit economic activity, developing the host nation capacity to manage natural resources, and reintegrating ex-combatants into society and the economy. The approach to achieving a sustainable market economy includes restoring and developing key economic infrastructure, promoting private sector development, promoting human capital development, and promoting financial sector development. The approach to achieving employment generation includes affecting quick impact projects, rehabilitating the agricultural sector, and developing sustainable livelihoods that provide a predictable income to the population.\textsuperscript{57}

Section ten of the \textit{Guiding Principles} manual discusses the fifth end state for reconstruction and stabilization operations, social well-being: “social well-being is an end state in which basic human needs are met and people are able to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement.”\textsuperscript{58} To sustain long-term peace, states must address the humanitarian crises created by conflict so that the population can resume the functions of normal life and move beyond conflict. The conditions necessary to achieve social well-being include:
Access To and Delivery of Basic Needs Services is a condition in which the population has equal access to and can obtain adequate water, food, shelter, and health services to ensure survival and life with dignity. These services should be delivered in a manner that fosters reliability and sustainability.

Access To and Delivery of Education is a condition in which the population has equal and continuous access to quality formal and nonformal education that provides the opportunity for advancement and promotes a peaceful society. This condition involves system-wide development and reform, and equal access to relevant, quality, and conflict-sensitive education.

Return and Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons is a condition in which all individuals displaced from their homes by violent conflict have the option of a safe, voluntary, and dignified journey to their homes or to new resettlement communities; have recourse for property restitution or compensation; and receive reintegration and rehabilitation support to build their livelihoods and contribute to long-term development.

Social Reconstruction is a condition in which the population is able to coexist peacefully through intra- and intergroup forms of reconciliation—including mechanisms that help to resolve disputes non-violently and address the legacy of past abuses—and through development of community institutions that bind society across divisions.59

The general principles for social-being acknowledges the need for international assistance in meeting immediate needs of people, controlling internally displaced persons, and promoting reconciliation. However, it also stresses the need to design assistance programs that involve the host nation from the being and continually build host nation capacity to provide for the needs of its population independent of external support. When focusing the priorities for social well-being activities, reconstruction and stabilization activities should address what is necessary for survival and what will resolve enduring disputes that could escalate into violence first. The top priorities should include: “preventing further loss of life and displacement, delivering aid and services to vulnerable populations, mitigating public health epidemics, and collecting evidence and witness statements to address the legacy of past abuses.”60 However, as with the other
end states, participants in reconstruction and stabilization operations must consider the impact of social well-being programs across the interdependent domains of security, governance, economic development, and rule of law within the post-conflict environment.

The approach to achieving access to and delivery of basic needs includes providing appropriate and quality assistance, enforcing minimum standards for water, food, and shelter, and enforcing minimum standards for health services. The approach to achieving access to and delivery of education includes designing a system-wide development and reform program, offering equal access to quality education, and providing conflict-sensitive education. The approach to achieving the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons includes instituting a safe and voluntary return or resettlement program, implementing mechanism to resolve property disputes, and addressing reintegration and rehabilitation for returned or relocated populations. The approach to achieving social reconstruction includes initiating long-term programs to facilitate the inter-group and intra-group reconciliation process, and promoting community-based development programs.  

Tertiary Research Question 2

What is the Army BCT’s doctrinal approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations in conflict or post conflict environments at the tactical level?

The Army is a doctrine-centric organization. There is a vast pool of doctrinal guidance for Army units governing the conduct of operations from planning and preparing to executing and assessing. Therefore, to assess the Army BCT’s doctrine approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations, it is necessary to consider

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multiple Department of the Army Field Manuals (FMs). FM 3-0, Operations, is one of the two capstone doctrinal documents and “constitute[s] the Army’s view of how it conducts prompt and sustained operations on land and sets the foundation for developing the other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals.”62 Chapter 3 of FM 3-0 is of particular importance to this thesis because it describes how the Army’s operational concept of full spectrum operations integrates offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability or civil support operations to achieve decisive results. FM 5-0, The Operations Process, builds on the concept of full spectrum operations in FM 3-0 by addressing planning, preparation, execution, and assessment in the continuous learning cycle of the operations process. FM 3-07, Stability Operations, is the Army’s keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. It presents the “overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals.”63 Finally, FM 3-90.6, The Brigade Combat Team, provides specific doctrinal guidance on the “tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for the tactical employment of the BCT, which includes the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).”64

Approach

The Army’s operational concept, full spectrum operations, is the core of its doctrine. Through full spectrum operations, Army units conduct offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability or civil support operations to “apply landpower as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land and establish the conditions that achieve the
joint force commander’s end state.” Figure 8, Full Spectrum Operations, graphically depicts the Army’s approach of integrating offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support tasks proportional to the mission and an understanding of the operational environment to achieve the desired end state.

![Figure 8. Full Spectrum Operations](image)


FM 3-07, Stability Operations, expands the discussion of full spectrum operations by discussing the mutually supporting role offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations in a comprehensive campaign to “establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.” Doctrinally, offensive and defensive operations involve the use of combat power to achieve a lethal effect against an enemy
force. Offensive operations focus on achieving and maintaining the initiative by revealing, creating, and exploiting enemy weakness through four primary offensive tasks: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Offensive operations are critical to establishing a safe and secure environment because they “seek to throw enemy forces off balance, overwhelm their capabilities, disrupt their defenses, and ensure their defeat or destruction by maneuver and fires.” Similarly, defensive operations employ the lethal effects of combat power to control physical terrain, guard populations, and protect critical capabilities, infrastructure, and resources.

FM 3-07 discusses the balance between the use of combat power for offensive or defensive operations and stability operations in terms of lethal and nonlethal actions. In a population-centric approach to stability operations, the host national population’s perception of the credibility and legitimacy of both the international forces and the host national government often requires the commander to place a greater emphasis on nonlethal actions. Thus, while lethal actions are a necessary component to stability operations, a commander must consider the second and third order effects when balancing the use of violence with restraint. To develop a concept of operations that effectively incorporates offensive, defensive, and stability operations into a coherent course of action, a commander and his staff rely on a robust planning process to synchronize a series of well-defined tasks in an area of operations. The following sections describe that planning process and the terminology associated with specific stability tasks in more detail.
Planning

According to FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, planning is “the process by which commanders (and the staff, if available) translate the commander’s visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results.”68 Within the concept of battle command, planning is the process through which commanders and staffs develop an understanding of their operational environment, envision a desired end future that achieves their objectives, and determine an operational approach to achieve that future. In the Army, the formal planning process is known as the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).

FM 5-0 defines MDMP as “an iterative planning methodology that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners to understand the situation and mission; develop and compare courses of action; decide on a course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an operation plan or order for execution.”69 As a problem solving methodology, MDMP consists of seven steps with associated inputs, processes, and outputs. The output of each step increases situational understanding, facilitating parallel planning with subordinate units and other planning partners, as well as informing the next step of the process. However, conducting a full MDMP is a time consuming process; therefore, commanders will often modify MDMP in accordance with the time available, the resources available, and the experience level of commander and staff. Appendix B of FM 5-0 describes each step of MDMP in great detail. However, Figure 9, The Military Decisionmaking Process provides a graphic overview of each the process including the key inputs, steps (processes), and key outputs for each step of the process.
Figure 9. The Military Decisionmaking Process

However, the current edition of FM 5-0 (published March 2010) recognizes that the rigorous application of MDMP is not always sufficient to develop an effective course of course in complex, ambiguous, and dynamic operational environments such as conflict or post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. Therefore, the current edition of FM 5-0 “increases the scope of the manual over previous versions from strictly a manual on planning and orders production to a manual that addresses all activities of the operations process.” Two important additions to FM 5-0 are categorizing problems based on complexity and the concept of design.

FM 5-0 establishes three categories of problems based on factors related to the problem’s structure, its potential solution development, its potential execution, and need for adaptive iteration in planning and execution. These three categories are well-structured problems, medium structured problems, and ill structured problems. Well-structured problems are relatively straightforward: the problem is easy to identify, there is adequate information to inform decision making, and there is an existing method to plan for and achieve a satisfactory solution. While it can be difficult to plan and execute correctly, detailed logistic support is an example of a well-structured problem. To solve a well-structured problem, an individual must perfect the techniques associated with its problem solving and execution. Medium-structured problems introduce a level of interactive complexity that precludes a single solution for all circumstances. For example, in conventional offensive and defensive operations the problem is normally easy to identify, there is often adequate information available for planning, and there is existing doctrine that governs the tactics, techniques, and procedures during planning and execution. Yet, commanders may disagree completely on how to apply that doctrine to
specific terrain and against a specific enemy to achieve the same end state. Further, a technique that worked in the past under similar circumstances or against a similar enemy may not be effective when attempted again. As a result, individuals must learn to adjust to the situation to successfully plan and execute medium structured problems. Ill-structured problems present the greatest challenge because they are highly interactive and occur in complex, dynamic environments which are difficult to understand or predict. When confronted with ill-structured problems, professionals will often disagree on the nature of the actual problem, the methods appropriate to address the problem, and the desired end state. Thus, problems solvers must use adaptive iterations in understanding the problem, assessing the results of potential solutions, and refining the solutions that produce productive results.\textsuperscript{71}

To address ill-structured problems, FM 5-0 introduces the concept of design into the Army’s planning process. Design facilitates the conceptual component to problem solving and planning by focusing on the fundamentals of applying critical thinking, understanding the operational environment, solving the right problem, adapting to dynamic conditions, and achieving the designated goals.\textsuperscript{72} FM 5-0 devotes an entire chapter to concept and application of design; however, it essentially involves developing three distinct yet interrelated elements: the environment frame, the problem frame, and the operational approach to solve the relevant problems. There are multiple variables and considerations within each of those elements; however, the power of design is its holistic systems approach to problem solving. Applying design effectively enables commanders to understand their environment and visualize how discrete changes can fundamentally alter the larger system and collectively produce change that create the desired end state.\textsuperscript{73}
Stability operations are inherently ill-structured problems that require applying the principles of design during planning. Before and during stability operations, commanders must understand complex and dynamic environments and visualize solutions that balance offensive tasks, defensive tasks, and stability tasks to establish “the conditions of a stable, lasting peace necessary to plant the seeds of effective governance and economic development.” Further, stability operations focus on the population; therefore, defining progress is often challenging and measuring significant change can span years. To facilitate the planning for stability operations, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, discusses two significant concepts: stability mechanisms and lines of operations.

A stability mechanism is “the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace.” Conceptually, stability mechanisms are not individual tasks which a commander could assign to a subordinate unit. Instead they are part of the broader operational approach, allowing a commander to visualize how he can “shape the human dimension of the operational environment” to achieve the desired end state. To be successful, commanders must understand the second and third effects of combining stability mechanisms with each other and with defeat mechanisms focused on an active enemy. There are four stability mechanisms: compel, control, influence, and support. FM 3-07 defines each in accordance with figure 10.
Compel involves maintaining the threat—or actual use—of lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, or other arrangements. Compliance and legitimacy interrelate. While legitimacy is vital to achieving host-nation compliance, compliance itself depends on how local populace perceives the force’s ability to exercise force to accomplish the mission.

Control involves establishing public order and safety; securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals; and physically occupying key terrain and facilities. . . . However, control is also fundamental to effective, enduring security.

Influence involves altering the opinions and attitudes of the host-nation population through information engagement, presence, and conduct. It applies nonlethal capabilities to complement and reinforce the compelling and controlling effects of stability mechanisms.

Support involves establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to function effectively; coordinating and cooperating closely with host-nation civilian agencies; and assisting aid organizations as necessary to secure humanitarian access to vulnerable populations.

Figure 10. Definitions of Stability Mechanisms

A commander incorporates those stability mechanisms into his operational approach by developing lines of efforts to coordinate tasks, missions, effects, and changing conditions with the desired end state. In stability operations, lines of effort are particularly important because physical or positional references to an enemy force or key terrain is often less significant than the complex human dimension of the operational environment. Thus, at the brigade level and below, units use lines of effort to focus the broader primary stability tasks into discrete measurable tasks, missions, or effects within the commander’s operational concept. For example, during a commander’s visualization,
he may realize the need to use the stability mechanism of “support” in order to bolster the legitimacy of the host national government and set the conditions for enduring stability. One of the primary stability tasks available to the commander to achieve that effect is “restore essential services.” At the tactical level, efforts to restore those essential services can be synchronized using lines of efforts based on the memory aid SWEAT-MSO which stands for sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations. This allows a unit to identify measurable tasks, missions, and effects at an appropriate level to align its lines of efforts, objectives, and end states with its capabilities. FM 3-07 offers an example of how a brigade might develop lines of efforts for restoring essential services using the memory aid SWEAT-MSO in figure 11.

Figure 11. Notional BCT Lines of Effort to Restore Essential Services
Terminology

Within Army doctrine, the use of precise terminology is fundamental to a commander’s ability to visualize, describe, direct, and assess operations through battle command. As a result, there are doctrine definitions for the terms associated with each of those processes. This section focuses specifically on the terminology associated with the “direct” process, the primary stability tasks which a commander assigns to a subordinate unit to achieve a desired end state. As the proponent document for stability tasks, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, establishes five primary stability tasks:

1. Establish Civil Security
2. Establish Civil Control
3. Restore Essential Services
4. Support to Governance
5. Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development.

Within each of these primary tasks, FM 3-07 establishes supporting sub-tasks with associated initial response tasks, transformation tasks, and sustainability tasks. Recreating the list of all sub-tasks and associated initial response tasks, transformation tasks, and sustainability tasks is not necessary here (it occupies 20 pages of FM 3-07); however, it is useful to briefly define the primary tasks and mention the supporting sub-tasks to establish the Army’s baseline terminology with reference to stability operations. The intent of the first primary stability task, Establish Civil Security, is to establish a safe and secure environment, develop host nation security institutions, and consolidate host nation capacity-building activities. Sub-tasks that support Establish Civil Security include: Enforce Cessation of Hostilities, Peace Agreements, and Other Arrangements;
Determine Disposition and Constitution of National Armed and Intelligence Services; Conduct Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration; Conduct Border Control, Boundary Security, and Freedom of Movement; Support Identification; Protect Key Personnel and Facilities; and Clear Explosive and Chemical Biological Radioactive and Nuclear Hazards. Achieving the desired end states associated with Establish Civil Security is necessary for enduring stability and peace within a conflict or post-conflict environment.\textsuperscript{80}

The second primary stability task, Establish Civil Control, “regulates selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups” in order to reduce the risk to the host national population and promote security.\textsuperscript{81} Establish Civil Control is related to Establish Civil Security; however, Establish Security has more of an external focus, concentrating on a host national defense force (i.e. Army) and sovereignty (i.e. international borders). In contrast, Establish Civil Control has an internal focus, concentrating on public order, justice system reform, and internal law enforcement reform (i.e. police). Sub-tasks that support Establish Civil Control include: Establish Public Order and Safety; Establish Interim Criminal Justice System; Support Law Enforcement and Police Reform; Support Judicial Reform; Support Property Dispute Resolution Processes; Support Justice System Reform; Support Corrections Reform; Support War Crimes Courts and Tribunals; and Support Public Outreach and Community Rebuilding Programs. Significantly, many of the sub-tasks associated with Establish Civil Control are “support” tasks; this reflects the doctrinal recognition that civilian agencies will often have the lead in executing those tasks.\textsuperscript{82}
The third primary stability task, Restore Essential Services, includes both addressing the immediate effects of humanitarian crises and establishing the foundation for long-term development to resolve the root causes of conflict. Sub-tasks that support Restore Essential Services include: Tasks Related to Civilian Dislocation (assistance and support to dislocated civilians and camps); Support Famine Prevention and Emergency Food Relief Programs; Support Nonfood Relief Programs; Support Humanitarian Demining; Support Human Rights Initiatives; Support Public Health Programs; and Support Education Programs. As with Establish Civil Control, Army forces normally perform Restore Essential Services tasks in support of other civilian agencies. However, Army forces can execute those tasks directly when the host national government is unable to perform its roles and other civilian agencies are either unavailable or incapable of meeting the immediate needs of the affected people.83

The forth primary stability task, Support to Governance, includes providing limited support to a legitimate functioning host national government as well as providing basic civil administration functions under the auspices of a transitional military authority when civil government is completely dysfunctional or absent. Sub-tasks that support Support to Governance include: Support Transitional Administrations; Support Development of Local Governance; Support Anticorruption Initiatives; and Support Elections. In extreme circumstances, Army forces will have no choice but to directly a fill a void in governance; however, the intent of Support to Governance is to eventually transition all civil administrative functions to sovereign, capable, and legitimate host national government. The Army often performs Support to Governance tasks in support of other civilian agencies.84
The fifth primary stability task, Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development, facilitates a host nation’s progress toward economic recovery and long term economic development. Sub-tasks that support Support Economic and Infrastructure Development include: Support Economic Generation and Enterprise Creation, Support Monetary Institutions and Programs, Support National Treasury Operations, Support Public Sector Investment Programs, Support Private Sector Development, Protect Natural Resources and Environment, Support Agricultural Development Programs, Restore Transportation Infrastructure, Restore Telecommunications Infrastructure, and Support General Infrastructure Reconstruction Programs.\(^85\) According to FM 3-07, “appropriate civilian or host-nation organizations can accomplish much of this effort at the macro level through development mechanisms but may look to the military for security or other types of assistance.”\(^86\) Most significantly, the Army is capable of promoting economic recovery and development at the local level by “generating employment opportunities, infusing monetary resources into the local economy, stimulating market activity, fostering recovery through microeconomics, and supporting the restoration of physical infrastructure.”\(^87\)

To promote unity of effort during reconstruction and stabilization operations, FM 3-07 directly links the Army primary stability tasks to DoS stability sectors. Although the terminology differs slightly, nesting Army primary stability tasks with DoS stability sectors is useful to focus interagency activities “toward a common set of objectives and a shared understanding of the desired end state” at the tactical level (see figure 12).\(^88\)
Figure 12. Army Stability Tasks and DoS Stability Sectors


Organization

Tertiary Research Question 3

How does the S/CRS organize FACTs to conduct reconstruction and stabilization in conflict or post conflict environments?

The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 (H.R. 1084) identifies one of the functions of the S/CRS as “[c]oordinating with relevant agencies to develop interagency contingency plans and procedures to mobilize and deploy civilian personnel and conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations to address the various types of such crises.” S/CRS fulfills this function through the Interagency Management System (IMS) by forming crisis-specific CSRGs, HRSTs, ACTs, and FACTs with the required subject matter expertise from the Civilian Response Corps. The Civilian Response Corps consists of the Active Component, the Standby Component, and the Reserve Component:
Active Component (CRC-A) officers are full-time Government employees whose specific job is to train for, prepare, and staff reconstruction, stabilization and conflict prevention efforts. They are able to deploy within 48 hours and focus on critical initial interagency functions such as assessment, planning, management, administrative, logistical, and resource mobilization.

Standby Component (CRC-S) officers are full-time employees of their departments who have specialized expertise useful in reconstruction and stabilization operations and are available to deploy within 30 days in the event of a reconstruction and/or stabilization operation.

Reserve Component (CRC-R) officers are U.S. citizens who have committed to be available within 45-60 days of call-up to serve as U.S. Government temporary employees in support of overseas reconstruction and stabilization operations. Reserve officers are critical to efforts to bring “normalcy” to countries by filling capabilities career U.S. Government employees simply cannot match in expertise or in number. (Please Note: the Reserve component has not yet been funded.)

As of June 2010, the Civilian Response Corps includes 117 Active Component full-time members (projected to be 264 by the end of FY 2010) and 924 Standby Component members (projected to be 1000 by the end of FY 2010). Members of the Civilian Response Corps are subject matter experts in the following six technical domains defined in figure 13. As of June 2010, 26 percent of Active Component members are experts in planning, operations, and management, 17 percent are experts in rule of law, 25 percent are experts in diplomacy and governance, 18 percent are experts in essential services, 13 percent are experts in economic recovery, and 1 percent are experts in diplomatic security.
Planning/Operations/Management: assessment planning, base set-up, operations management, and strategic communications

Rule of Law: policing, legal administration, justice systems, and corrections programs design and management

Diplomacy/Governance: political reporting, civil administration, democracy and good governance, civil society/media development, and security sector reform

Essential Services: public health, public infrastructure, and education and labor assessment

Economic Recovery: agriculture, rural development, commerce, taxes, monetary policy, and business/financial services

Diplomatic Security: support to U.S. Embassies in assessing and planning for security/force protection requirements in support of broader contingency and field operations.

Figure 13. Six Technical Domains


There is no standard organizational structure for ACTs and FACTs; conceptually, they are “rapidly deployable, cross-functional interagency teams that are flexible in size and composition” that the S/CRS can tailor to specific reconstruction and stabilization operations. However, according to the S/CRS publication Interagency Management System for Reconstruction & Stabilization, ACTs and FACTs generally organize their staffs along eight functional areas that support the major mission elements of the operation. Figure 14 defines those eight functional areas.
Leadership: Providing a leader and a deputy;

Sectoral Expertise: Providing expertise to manage the implementation of major mission elements (strategic objectives) of the U.S. R&S plan;

Operations: Conducting and coordinating current ACT/FACT operations;

Plans/Evaluation: Maintaining and revising the R&S implementation plan as appropriate, and monitoring and reporting on implementation;

Support: Managing logistics, information technology, contracting and administration;

Knowledge Management: Maintaining and disseminating a common operating picture throughout the ACT/FACT;

Strategic Communications: Supporting public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations associated with R&S operations; and,

Security: Managing safety and security of ACT/FACT personnel and resources.

Figure 14. ACT and FACT Staff Functional Areas

Significantly, FACTs structure their staffs around their major mission element objectives not individual agencies. Each objective will have a single team coordinator responsible for coordinating the efforts of individuals working toward that objective from all agencies involved. The integrated structure promotes unity of effort and facilitates the “integration of operations with military, international, and host nation organizations working to achieve similar objectives.”

The RAND Monograph, “Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations,” also outlines S/CRS draft force structure options for deploying ACTs and FACTs in different contingencies. According to the S/CRS draft force structures, the ACT has the majority of the capability with a 130 member staff including a lead, a deputy, a support
cell with 25 members, an operations cell with 7 members, a plans cell with 10 members, an information management cell with 12 members, a security cell with 14 members, a strategic communications cell with 10 members, and programmatic staff cell with 50 members (10 per each of the five MMEs). The ACT would work directly for the Chief of Mission, potentially partnered with a Joint Task Force headquarters, and control up to five subordinate FACTs. The draft force structures for those FACTs vary from six personnel to twenty personnel based on the contingency. Table 1, Draft IMS Staffing Summary (ACT/FACT Units Only) for Military Engagement Scenario, depicts the various FACT draft force structures and their capabilities.94

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>1 ACT HQ</th>
<th>3 Division FACTs</th>
<th>9 Regional FACTs</th>
<th>19 Provincial FACTs (embedded w/military)</th>
<th>17 Provincial FACTs (independent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staffing per unit</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrative staffing</td>
<td>Lead (1) Deputy (1) Support (25) Operations (7) Plans, M&amp;E (10) IM (12) Security (14) Strategic Communications (10) Programmatic staff @ 10 per MME (50)</td>
<td>Lead (1) Plans, Support, Operations (5)</td>
<td>Lead (1) Deputy (1) Communications, logistics, security, operations (8) Plans officer (2) Programmatic staff @ 1.5 per MME (8)</td>
<td>Lead (1) Communications, logistics, security, operations (3) Plans officer (1) Programmatic staff @ 1 per MME (5)</td>
<td>Lead (1) Deputy (1) Communications, logistics, security, operations (8) Plans officer (1) Programmatic staff @ 1 per MME (5)</td>
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Tertiary Research Question 4

How does the Army organize BCTs to conduct reconstruction and stabilization in conflict or post conflict environments?

To understand the composition of the BCT, the core competencies resident in each component, and the lines of authority that control those components’ ability to perform their missions, it is useful to consider the BCT on three levels: the BCT staff, the BCT subordinate units, and the integration of Army Civil Affairs into BCT operations. While there are currently three types of BCTs (the Heavy BCT, the Infantry BCT, and the Stryker BCT), the functional composition of every BCT’s staff is similar. The BCT commander has “total responsibility for the BCT and its actions.” As part of the command team, the commander is assisted by his second in command, the Deputy Commanding Officer (DCO), and his Executive Officer (XO), who serves as his chief of staff with executive management authority over the coordinating and special staff elements. The commander is also assisted by his special staff officers including a Chaplain, a Brigade Judge Advocate (BJA), a Public Affairs Officer (PAO), and a Command Sergeant Major (CSM). The BJA serves as the commander’s personal legal advisor and is responsible for operational and administrative law support to the BCT. In this capacity, the BJA works with other coordinating and special staff sections to advise on issues such as providing humanitarian support to local nationals, understanding the rules of engagement, and the legal considerations of the civilian population during targeting meetings. The PAO is responsible for advising the commander on his public affairs program, coordinating media operations within the command, and advising the
commander on the public release of information through print, audio-visual, or web-based products.  

BCT commanders organize their staffs and designate specific integrating cells and working groups based on the needs of the current mission and the individual commander’s professional knowledge, experience, and leadership style. Therefore, the specific structure of a BCT staff and the mechanisms for coordinating with FACTs will vary significantly from one BCT to another. However, doctrinally, the BCT staff organizes around six functional cells: operations; intelligence; information operations; civil-military operations; sustainment; and command, control, communications, and computers (C4). The chiefs of each of those cells form the commanders coordinating staff. For the sustainment function, the two coordinating officers are the logistics officer (referred to as the S4) and the personnel officer (S1). For the intelligence function, the coordinating officer is the intelligence officer (S2). For the operations function, the coordinating officer is the operations officer (S3). For the C4 function, the coordinating officer is the communications officer (S6). For the information operations function, the coordinating officer is the information operations officer (S7). Finally, for the civil-military function, the coordinating officer is the civil-military operations officer (S9).  

Figure 15 is a graphic representation of the BCT staff structure.
Figure 15. BCT Staff Organization


FM 3-90.6 gives a full description of each coordinating staff sections composition, roles, and responsibilities. While each section is integral to the BCT’s staff, the following paragraphs will only briefly describe the roles of the operations officer (S3), the information operations officer (S7), and the civil-military operations officer (S9) in the context of reconstruction and stabilization operations. The operations officer (S3) is “the coordinating staff officer for all matters concerning tactical operations of the BCT”\(^9^8\) including training, plans and orders, force development and modernization, managing current operations, and synchronizing the activities of multiple special staff officers including: the fire support coordinator (FCOORD), the air liaison officer (ALO), the engineer coordinator (ENCOORD), the chemical officer (CHEMO)
responsible for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) operations, and liaison officers (LNOs) to other commands as required.99

The information operations officer (S7) is the coordinating officer “responsible for integration of non-lethal effects to destroy or disrupt the information flow of threat forces.”100 In this capacity, the information operations officer (S7) coordinates both defensive and offensive information operations with various other staff sections. In a defensive capacity, the information operations officer (S7) coordinates with the communications officer to ensure to protect the BCT C4 network and with the intelligence officer to ensure the operational security of sensitive information. In an offensive capacity, the information operations officer (S7) coordinates with the operations officer (S3) for military deception, psychological operations, and electronic warfare. The information operations officer (S7) also works with the public affairs officer to disseminate information and ensure that there are no discrepancies between the information released through the information operations section and the public affairs section.101

The civil-military operations officer (S9) plays a critical role in reconstruction and stabilization operations as the “coordinating staff officer responsible for advising the commander on the relationship between the civilian population and military operations.”102 Within the BCT staff, the civil-military operations officer (S9) has multiple duties directly relevant to successful reconstruction and stabilization operations, as outlined in figure 16.
| Advising the commander on the effects of the civilian population on BCT operations. |
| Assisting a CA [civil affairs] company in the operation of a CMOC [Civil-Military Operations Center]. |
| Assisting the S3 to integrate attached CA units into the BCT. |
| Assisting in the development of plans to deconflict civilian activities with military operations. |
| Planning community relations programs to gain and maintain public understanding and support of military operations. |
| Coordinating with the BJA and chaplain to advise the BCT CDR on legal and moral obligations incurred from the effects of military operations on civilian populations. |
| Coordinating with the PAO on supervising public information media under civil control. |
| Coordinating with the FSCOORD on culturally sensitive sites and protected targets. |
| Coordinating with the CA units on the preparation and integration of area assessments in support of CMO [civil-military operations]. |

Figure 16. Civil Military Operations Officer’s Duties


The civil-military operation officer (S9) also serves as the BCT’s primary link to multiple external agencies including: other U.S. government agencies, indigenous population and institutions, non-governmental organizations, and other international organizations in the BCT area of operations.103

The second level of analysis that is useful to understand a BCT’s organizational structure and capabilities is an analysis of its subordinate units. Under the Army’s transformation into a modular force, there are three types of BCTs: the Heavy BCT
(HBCT), the Infantry BCT (IBCT), and the Stryker BCT (SBCT). In broad terms, FM 3-90.6 outlines the organization of each BCT in accordance with figure 17.

The HBCT is designed around two combined arms battalions (CAB); each battalion consisting of two infantry and two armor companies.

The IBCT is designed around two infantry battalions; each battalion consisting of three rifle companies and a weapons company.

There are six SBCTs in the Army, designed around three infantry battalions, each consisting of three rifle companies with organic mobile gun system (MGS) platoons.

Each BCT has a RS [reconnaissance squadron], a fires battalion, and a support battalion in addition to their maneuver elements. The three types of BCTs vary in their CS [combat support] units and the C2 [command and control] of those units. The HBCT and IBCT have the brigade special troops battalion (BSTB); the SBCT has separate companies under brigade control.

Figure 17. The Three Types of BCTs

Just as FM 3-90.6 establishes the doctrinal basis for BCT operations, each subordinate maneuver battalion has a corresponding field manual describing the employment of that organization as part of the BCT. For the combined arms battalions (CAB) within the HBCT, FM 3-90.5, The Combined Arms Battalion, provides the “basic doctrinal principles, tactics, techniques of employment, organization, exercise of command and control (C2), movements and tactical operations appropriate to this maneuver battalion.” Similarly, FM 3-21.20, The Infantry Battalion, and FM 3-21.21, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion, describes the employment of each
of those subordinate units within their corresponding BCT’s operations. While numerically smaller, each maneuver battalion has a battalion staff capable of performing the same functions as the BCT staff including an operations section, an intelligence section, a sustainment section, a communications section, and a civil-military operations officer and fire support coordinator. Further, each field manual includes a chapter on stability operations that discusses stability operations at the battalion level and provides planning considerations for maneuver battalions operating as “part of a larger, multinational, or unified team” or independently.\(^\text{105}\)

The third unit of analysis that is useful to understand a BCT’s organizational structure and capabilities is an analysis of the integration of Army Civil Affairs into BCT operations. FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, is the doctrinal foundation for planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing Civil Affairs operations in support of Army Service Component Commands, modular Army corps, modular Army divisions, Army BCTs, and joint operations. According to FM 3-05.40:

> The mission of CA forces is to engage and influence the civil populace by planning, executing, and transitioning Civil Affairs operations in Army, joint, interagency, and multinational operations to support commanders in engaging the civil component of their operational environment, in order to enhance civil-military operations or other stated U.S. objectives before, during, or after other military operations.\(^\text{106}\)

> Within the operational framework of Full Spectrum Operations, Civil Affairs Operations are specific activities “planned, supported, executed, or transitioned by [Civil Affairs] forces to enhance [civil-military operations] or other U.S. objectives.”\(^\text{107}\) While civil-military operations include all activities of a military commander to “establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace,”\(^\text{108}\)
Civil Affairs Operations are a smaller subset of those operations conducted by Civil Affairs Soldiers (see figure 18). Civil Affairs operations include the following core tasks: Populace and resources control (PRC), Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), Civil information management (CIM), Nation assistance (NA), and Support to civil administration (SCA).¹⁰⁹

![Diagram of Full Spectrum Operations, Civil-Military Operations, and Civil Affairs Operations]

Figure 18. Civil Affairs Operations within Full Spectrum Operations

Doctrinally, a Civil Affairs company is attached to a BCT during operational deployments. The Civil Affairs company consists of a company headquarters, a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), and five Civil Affairs Teams (CATs). The CMOC provides the BCT with a mechanism for civil-military coordination, limited expertise in public health, public works, and public safety, and a command and control system to
manage the subordinate CATs. The five CATs support both the CMOC’s operations and
the maneuver battalions subordinate to the BCT. To enhance the maneuver battalion’s
capabilities, the CATs: provide civil information to the supported units; conduct key
leader engagements; plan, coordinate, and enable Civil Affairs operations and project
management; conduct area studies and assessments; and liaison with special operations
forces, non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations, interagency
organizations, and the local populace within the battalion’s area of operations.

Training
Tertiary Research Question 5

How does the S/CRS train FACTs to conduct reconstruction and stabilization in
conflict or post conflict environments?

Content
The S/CRS has developed a series of training courses to prepare individuals for
reconstruction and stabilization operations in conflict or post conflict environments.
These courses include instruction on the fundamentals of reconstruction and stabilization
operations, an introduction to practical field craft skill, and programs focused on more
specific skill sets. The following section discusses many of the S/CRS training programs,
including the course duration, training goal, and content.

The Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations
(RS500) course is run by the DoS Foreign Service Institute and the S/CRS and is required
for all members of the Civilian Response Corps. It is also offered to other USG
employees participating in reconstruction and stabilization operations as well allied
partners. The Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations course is a two-week classroom-based course taught at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington, VA. The course goal is: “To familiarize participants with U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations, including the different types of operating environments, people, and organizations that Civilian Response Corps members are likely to encounter in the field.”

The course content includes a discussion of reconstruction and stabilization institutions, frameworks, and tools as well as instruction on building effective partnerships with U.S. civilian agencies and international partners.

Prior to a deployment, Civilian Response Corps personnel must also complete the Security for Non-traditional Operating Environments (SNOE, OT401) course. SNOE is run by the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the S/CRS at the Diplomatic Security Training Center in Dunn Loring, VA. SNOE is required for deploying Civilian Response Corps personnel and is offered to other USG employees who may be operating in remote locations. The course is three weeks long and includes both classroom training and a field training exercise. The course goal is: “To provide participants with the critical knowledge and field skills necessary to operate safely in high-threat and austere environments.”

The course content includes surveillance detection, trauma medical assistance, tactical communications, weapons familiarization, hostage survival, personnel recovery, land navigation, high-threat and off-road driving techniques, mission planning, basic survival techniques, and improvised explosive device (IED) awareness.

Prior to a deployment, Civilian Response Corps personnel must also complete the Whole-of-Government Planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization: Level One course. This course is run by the National Defense University and the S/CRS at the National
Defense University at Fort McNair. The course is three weeks long and includes classroom training and a simulation exercise. Prior to attending the Whole-of-Government Planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization: Level One course, individuals must have completed the online Introduction to Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization (PD573) course and the Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (RS-500) course. The course goal is: “To develop Whole-of-Government planners who can coordinate, facilitate, and participate in planning processes for reconstruction and stabilization operations.”\textsuperscript{114} The course content includes participating in the whole-of-government planning process, contributing specialized functional and technical information to a plan or operation, and working effectively with other USG agencies in the planning process. The course also covers working with other actors commonly involved in reconstruction and stabilization operations such the host nation government, other international partners, and non-governmental organizations. Finally, the course covers how to account for the conflict dynamic while planning and executing reconstruction and stabilization operations.\textsuperscript{115}

The S/CRS also offers a series of shorter specialized training courses to Civilian Response Corps personnel and other USG employees who are deployable and considered operationally ready. The Basic Facilitation and Delivery Skills Workshop (PD513) is a three day course at the Foreign Service Institute designed to increase improve an individual’s ability to deliver a presentation, speak to groups, and facilitate discussion. The Building Capacities for Cross-Cultural Communication course is a five day course at the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies of the Naval Post Graduate School designed to improve an individual’s understanding of the cultural differences they
will encounter during peace operations, security sector reform, humanitarian assistance, and sustainable development activities. Similarly, the Cultural Adaptability in Complex Operations course is a five day course at the United States Institute for Peace designed to improve an individual’s ability to communicate and negotiate across cultures, understand cultural differences as drivers of conflict, and incorporate culture into the planning process.\textsuperscript{116}

The Working in the Same Space course is a four day course at the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies of the Naval Post Graduate School that emphasizes cross-community education and communication skills for working effectively in an insecure environment with multiple government civilian agencies, non-governmental organization, intergovernmental organizations, and the military. This course introduces individuals to different organizations’ cultures, capabilities, motivations, and emerging issues. The Outreach Diplomacy: Engaging the World (PY141) course is a three day course at the Foreign Service Institute that provides participants with the skills to explain U.S. foreign policy to a range of international audiences, including the international media. The Strengthening Local Capacity: Training, Mentoring, Advising course is a five day course at the United States Institute for Peace that covers developing professional capacity in host nation institutions and transferring professional responsibility through proper teaching and training programs, recruitment programs, and mentorship programs. The Leading Adaptive Teams in Conflict Environments course is a five day course at the United States Institute for Peace providing an introduction to the leadership skills required to make decisions, lead, and coordinate activities in complex conflict environments.\textsuperscript{117}
Within the S/CRS, the Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Training and Education Division is responsible for maintaining the readiness of the Civilian Response Corps and other personnel involved in an S/CRS lead reconstruction and stabilization operation. The Training and Education Division does this through an operational body responsible for the day-to-day planning and implementation and a core of professional and administrative personnel who coordinate the training needs of the USG interagency community. By managing attendance to the training courses discussed above, the Training and Education Division ensures that S/CRS provides the training, education, and exercise opportunities for the Civilian Response Corps, USG military personnel, and civilian personnel involved in USG reconstruction and stabilization operations. These personnel include: “U.S. Embassy/Mission staff, regional/functional bureau staff, S/CRS staff, members of the strategic or implementation planning teams (including the National Security Council), USG civilian agencies, and counterparts within military and international institutions.”

While it offers training opportunities to personnel throughout the interagency community, the S/CRS is primarily responsible for ensuring the readiness of the Civilian Response Corps to form the core of deployed ACTs and FACTs. To do so, the S/CRS has established minimum annual training for active Civilian Response Corps personnel and standby Civilian Response Corps personnel. Active personnel must complete eight weeks of training per year, consisting of the two week Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations course, the three week Security for Non-
traditional Operating Environment (SNOE) course, and the three week Whole-of-Government Planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization: Level I course. Once operationally ready for a specific deployment, active personnel will also be required to complete the appropriate specialized training courses discussed above and up to an additional three weeks of country specific training, if required.\textsuperscript{119}

Standby Civilian Response Personnel must complete the two week Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations course annually. If called to deploy, standby personnel must also complete the three week Security for Non-traditional Operating Environments (SNOE) course and any country-specific pre-deployment training required.\textsuperscript{120}

Tertiary Research Question 6

How does the Army train BCTs train to conduct reconstruction and stabilization in conflict or post conflict environments?

Content

As the Army’s keystone doctrine for training, FM 7-0 \textit{Training for Full Spectrum Operations} establishes the “fundamentals of training modular, expeditionary Army forces to conduct full spectrum operations--simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations--in an era of persistent conflict.”\textsuperscript{121} Conceptually, FM 7-0 expands the scope of the Army’s training requirements by outlining the four categories of threat that exist in the current operational environment. Historically, the Army optimized its forces and training to counter what FM 7-0 defines as “tradition threats.” Traditional threats are those threats which “emerge from states employing recognized military
capabilities and forces in understood forms of military competition and conflict.”

While preparing for traditional threats is still relevant and necessary, it is no longer sufficient to guarantee America’s security in the current operational environment. Therefore, FM 7-0 also addresses training for irregular threats, catastrophic threats, and disruptive threats as defined in figure 19.

Irregular threats are those posed by an opponent employing unconventional, asymmetric methods and means to counter traditional U.S. advantages. A weaker enemy often uses irregular warfare to exhaust the U.S. collective will through protracted conflict. Irregular warfare includes such means as terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare.

Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, also called weapons of mass destruction. Possession of these weapons gives an enemy the potential to inflict sudden and catastrophic effects.

Disruptive threats involve an enemy using new technologies that reduce U.S. advantages in key operational domains. Disruptive threats involve developing and using breakthrough technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.

Figure 19. Irregular, Catastrophic, and Disruptive Threats


Further, FM 7-0 asserts that future combat operations will likely occur “among the people” rather than “around the people;” a fact which “fundamentally alters the manner in which Soldiers can apply force to achieve success.” To prepare units to be successful against each of the potential threat categories in the current and anticipated operational environment, the Army has adopted the aim point concept of training. The
aim point concept recognizes that Army units must remain prepared to conduct major combat operations while preparing to simultaneously conduct sustained stability operations. As a significant cultural shift in the Army’s training methodology, the aim point concept focuses Army training across the spectrum of conflict and across the potential operational themes to ensure that units are prepared to conduct offensive, defensive, and stability operations as required by the situation, objectives, and desired end state of individual operations (see figure 20).124

**Figure 20. The Aim Point Concept for Army Training**


Within the aim point methodology, Headquarters, Department of the Army, has established a standardized mission essential task list (METL) for each brigade and higher echelon unit throughout the Army.125 However, these standardized METLs are only one
of many inputs for a brigade commander to develop an approved brigade METL. Through mission focused planning, a brigade commander considers the standardized METL, training guidance from high headquarters, operational plans or orders, the anticipated operational environment, external guidance, and doctrine or other publications to develop a METL appropriate for his individual brigade. Once a commander has an approved METL (approved by the higher headquarters’ commander, i.e. a division commander approves a brigade commander’s METL), a commander identifies the task groups of collective tasks that support his METL, identifies the individual tasks that support those collective tasks, and identifies the standards of assessment that will determine his unit’s proficiency in each task. This process begins with the approved METL. Once a commander has an approved METL, he references FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List, to determine the task groups of collective tasks that support his METL. FM 7-15 provides a comprehensive, though not all-inclusive, list of Army task, missions, and operations in a numeric reference hierarchy including task title, a task description, a doctrinal reference for the task, and usually recommended measures of performance for executing the task.\textsuperscript{126} Once a commander has identified all required tasks down to the individual level, existing combined arms training strategies (CATS) provide a standardized template for task based, event driven organizational training including the purpose, outcome, execution guidance, and resource requirements for individual training events.\textsuperscript{127} Figure 21, Notional METL and Supporting Tasks, is graphic representation of how a commander identifies subordinate collective tasks and individual tasks from an approved notional METL.
Figure 21. Notional METL and Supporting Tasks


In addition to the collective and individual tasks derived from the METL analysis, commanders must also conduct directed external training requirements. For units scheduled to deploy in support of an on-going operation, a U.S Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) tasking order dated 27 October 2009 establishes four categories of units based on their deployed mission from Category-1 units which will remain on contingency operating bases and will rarely, if ever, travel off of an established base to Category-4...
maneuver units which will be responsible for an area of operations. For each category, FORSCOM has identified required collective, individual, and leader training requirements that should support METL development and training, but must be completed within six months or one year of the unit’s deployment. These requirements will likely change for future operations; however, the current FORSCOM requirements are an example of such directed external training requirements.128

Method

To provide combatant commanders with trained and ready Army forces, the Army uses three distinct but linked training domains: institutional training, operational training, and self-development. Each of these domains plays a role in a Soldier’s development from initial entry throughout his or her service in garrison or deployed. Further, within each domain, the Army applies its seven principles of training to planning, preparing, executing, and assessing individual and organizational training regardless of topic, component, location, or duration (see figure 22). While each of three domains is important, the preceding discussion on METL development and identifying collective, individual, and leader tasks falls largely within the operational training domain which prepares individuals, units, and leaders for full spectrum operations during operational deployments. FM 7-0 defines the three training domains as:

The institutional training domain is the Army’s institutional training and education system, which primarily includes training base centers and schools that provide initial training and subsequent professional military education for Soldiers, military leaders, and Army civilians.129

The operational training domain consists of the training activities organizations undertake while at home station, at maneuver combat training centers, during joint exercises, at mobilization centers, and while operationally deployed.130

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The self-development training domain includes planned, goal-oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth and breadth of an individual’s knowledge base, self awareness, and situational awareness; complements institutional and operational learning; enhances professional competence; and meets personal objectives.

The Army’s Seven Principles of Training


Within the operational training domain, developing a training plan is a two step process: a commander-to-commander dialog and a training brief. During the initial commander-to-commander dialogue, a unit’s commander and the commander of his higher headquarters will discuss: “Training conditions and corresponding resources required. The proportion of effort to be allocated among offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support tasks. The risks to readiness. The core capabilities required of a unit as it adjusts its training focus to prepare for a directed mission.”

Once the subordinate commander has developed a training plan for his unit, he conducts a training brief to his senior commander for approval. The training brief is essentially a contract between the commanders that establishes the tasks to be trained, the
training conditions, the risks associated with the planned training, and the resources required to execute the plan. To prepare Soldiers for the complexity of the current operational environment, commanders build realism into their training plans whenever possible to replicate the conditions of potential operations. This includes training tasks associated with media engagements, working with coalition partners, integrating special operations forces, and incorporating cultural factors into scenario based training.\textsuperscript{133}

Commanders execute their training plans through a series of training activities at home station, at maneuver combat training centers, during joint exercises, at mobilization centers, and while operationally deployed. Within the operational training domain, these training activities include unit training, major training events, and operational missions. Unit training includes individual training, collective training, and leader training that a unit conducts to develop and sustain its readiness across the full spectrum of operations. Unit training begins at home station, but continues at maneuver combat training centers, during joint exercises, at mobilization centers, and while operationally deployed. Major training events are more planning and resource intensive activities that allow commanders to assess their unit’s mission-essential task proficiency through situational training exercises, external evaluations, command post exercises, and deployment exercises. Finally, training continues throughout an operational deployment. Commanders conduct unit training when possible to maintain individual and unit proficiency and use operational missions to confirm, refute, or refine the tactics, techniques, and procedures on which they have trained based on operational experiences.\textsuperscript{134}
**Frequency and Duration**

Under the direction of the Army Chief of Staff, the Army G-3/5/7 developed a comprehensive *Army Training Strategy* (ATS) (dated 12 November 2009) to guide Army training within the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. The ATS includes a vision statement, the specific goals and objectives, and the supporting training models, guidance and systems designed to generate cohesive, trained, and ready forces within ARFORGEN. According to FM 7-0, ARFORGEN is the model by which the Army “prepares and provides campaign capable, expeditionary forces” through a three-phased readiness cycle: reset, train/ready, and available.

Units enter the reset phase when they redeploy from long-term operations or complete their planned deployment window in the available force pool. Units conduct individual and collective training on tasks that support their core or directed mission-essential task lists.

Units move to the train/ready phase when they are prepared to conduct higher level collective training and prepare for deployment. Units with a directed mission . . . progress as rapidly as possible to achieve directed mission capability. Prior to receiving a directed mission, units focus on developing their core capabilities.

Forces and headquarters deploying to an ongoing operation or available for immediate alert and deployment to a contingency are in the available phase. At the end of the available phase, units return to the reset phase, and the cycle begins again.

For active component forces, the ATS forecasts fully implementing its training strategy based on a one year deployed and two years at home station (1:2) timeline for BCTs by fiscal year 2011 when the Army has completed its modularization and the demands of the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have decreased. Within the 1:2 timeline, BCT will execute a six month reset cycle after completing an operational deployment or completing their planned deployment window in the available force pool. Consistent with FM 7-0, the ATS states that the focus for units during reset is “to slow
things down for our returning units, to provide local opportunities for professional military education, Soldier reintegration with families . . ., and to restore units to deployable levels of readiness in preparation for their next mission." To support this focus, the ATS directs that commanders limit their training during reset to tasks such as: Officer Education System and Non-Commissioned Officer Education System schooling, physical training, critical functions training, new equipment training, individual training and qualifications, crew and team training and certification, Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, family reintegration, battle staff training, post-deployment health screening, and property accountability.

After completing reset, active Army units enter the 18 month train/ready cycle during which a commander executes the majority of his training plan (discussed in the previous section of this chapter). During an 18 month train/ready cycle, the ATS directs active BCTs to plan and execute two major training events as part of their training plan: a broad FSO training event and a theater-focused Mission Rehearsal Exercise. The broad FSO training event can occur either at home station with the support of the Exportable Training Capability, through a Force Generation Platform or regional training center, or at a maneuver combat training center (MCTC) if possible. The Mission Rehearsal Exercise will take place at a MCTC and include a BCT area of operations that replicates the conditions in the theater to which the BCT will deploy.

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16 Ibid., 3-22 – 3-23.
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CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS

Challenges to the integration of military and civilian agencies include different organizational cultures, capabilities and structures. Some civilian organizations may not be trained and equipped to operate in austere, unsecured environments or they may not be able to sustain themselves in remote areas. Some organizations may be averse to assuming risk, which may hinder the overall COIN effort. Military and governmental organizations are heavily dependent on establishing and implementing their internal operating procedures and they are often reluctant to adapt or change those procedures to accommodate the addition of new actors. Different expectations amongst the organizations can also serve to further heighten tensions and create friction among agencies.

— Department of the Army
FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency

Introduction

This chapter presents a comparative analysis of S/CRS and Army BCT doctrine, organization, and training to identify general trends within each domain that will potentially enable or constrain S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations at the tactical level. While individual personalities and organizational cultures will inevitably affect interagency integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations, the following findings derive from the analysis of each organization’s published standards, not individual case studies. The following sections answer the three secondary research questions and conclude by addressing the primary research question.
Secondary Research Question 1: Doctrine

What doctrinal factors will enable or constrain effective S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations in a conflict or post-conflict environment at the tactical level?

Trend 1: The Conceptual FACT and the Procedural BCT.

A comparative analysis of the S/CRS FACT and Army BCT’s doctrinal approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations indicates that the FACT is highly conceptual and end state focused while the BCT is highly procedural and output focused. The S/CRS Guiding Principles manual is the first attempt to fill a doctrinal gap and institutionalize standard practices for interagency civilians participating in reconstruction and stabilization operations. However, the Guiding Principles manual deliberately focuses on host national outcomes rather than process driven inputs or outputs.

The S/CRS desired outcomes are derived from the five purpose-based end states and form the doctrinal core of the Guiding Principles manual: a safe and secure environment, the rule of law, stable governance, a sustainable economy, and social well-being. To guide the decision making process during planning and execution, the Guiding Principles manual defines those end states in great detail and discusses the cross-cutting principles, high-level trade-offs, and high-level gaps and challenges that impact reconstruction and stabilization operations. The fundamentals of a comprehensive approach include both the conceptual unpinning of successful reconstruction and stabilization operations and practical advice on achieving the long term objectives. However, the practical advice or “how-to” approaches are also outcomes based, describing the conditions necessary to achieve the desired end state vice describing a
course of action. For example, the approach to achieving a culture of lawfulness includes building a system that promotes participation and communication, and promoting education.

In contrast, the Army’s doctrinal approach to reconstruction and stabilization relies on a robust planning and execution process to synchronize a series of well-defined tasks in an area of operations. As with an S/CRS FACT, an Army BCT begins by defining the desirable end states. To account for the complexity of reconstruction and stabilization operations, the most recent addition of FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, added the concept of design to assist commanders and staffs in understanding ill-structured problems and formulating a response that will have the desired effect within the environment. However, unlike the *Guiding Principles*, FM 5-0 includes the formal planning process is known as the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). MDMP is an iterative process driven by a series of inputs and outputs that govern the formulation of a military plan. Further, FM 3-0, *Operations*, and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, provides detailed guidance and direction on conducting reconstruction and stabilization operations by defining initial response tasks, transformative tasks, and tasks that foster sustainability.

Using both the conceptual and procedural approaches to reconstruction and stabilization during the same operation can be useful; however, each organization needs to understand the other’s process and approach to achieve unity of effort. The S/CRS FACT’s understanding of the host nation and the cross-cutting principles should heavily influence the more formalized processes of battle command and MDMP. Similarly, the BCT’s detailed planning, executing, and assessing mechanisms should be leveraged to
ensure that all reconstruction and stabilization activities are synchronized in time and space and achieving the desired effects.

Trend 2: Disparate Terminology and Shared Understanding.

The DoS and the DoD have developed distinct vocabularies with precise terminology that is relevant to their individual institutions. An S/CRS FACT will talk primarily in terms of the five end states discussed in the *Guiding Principles* manual. An Army BCT will talk primarily in terms of the five primary stability tasks described in FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*. The differing terminology has the potential to create confusion and constrain integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations at the tactical level; however, each organization’s doctrine acknowledges the discrepancies in terminology and discusses the cross organizational linkages. The nexus for S/CRS terminology and Army BCT terminology is the five DoS Stability Sectors.

The five DoS Stability Sectors (also referred to as the USG Technical Sectors) are Security, Justice and Reconciliation, Governance and Participation, Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure, and Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being. The *Guiding Principles* manual translates these sectors into the desirable Guiding Principles End States that form the core of its doctrine: Safe and Secure Environment corresponds to Security; Rule of Law corresponds to Justice and Reconciliation; Stable Governance corresponds to Governance and Participation; Sustainable Economy corresponds to Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure; and, Social Well-Being corresponds to Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being. Similarly, FM 3-07 links the five primary stability tasks back to the DoS Stability Sectors: Establish Civil Security relates to Security; Establish Civil Control relates to Justice and Reconciliation; Restore
Essential Services relates to Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being, Support to Governance relates to Governance and Participation; and, Support to Economic Infrastructure Development relates to Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure. Table 2 graphically depicts the relationships among these three sets of terminology:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DoS Stability Sector</th>
<th>S/CRS End State</th>
<th>BCT Primary Stability Task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Safe and Secure Environment</td>
<td>Establish Civil Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Reconciliation</td>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Establish Civil Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Participation</td>
<td>Stable Governance</td>
<td>Support to Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure</td>
<td>Sustainable Economy</td>
<td>Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being</td>
<td>Social Well Being</td>
<td>Restore Essential Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To enable effective S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations, participants from both organizations must understand each other’s terminology. A shared understanding of each other’s terminology will allow S/CRS FACT members and Army BCT staff officers to synchronize their efforts, reduce redundancy, and avoid unnecessary confusion. For example, an S/CRS member working toward the end state of rule of law who does not understand Army terminology may not engage with a BCT staff officer focusing on establishing civil
control. As a result, their initiatives will develop independently with little integration or unity of effort. Similarly, a BCT staff officer developing plans to restore essential services who is unaware of the S/CRS terminology may waste time and duplicate efforts by not collaborating with the S/CRS FACT member focused on social well-being.

**Secondary Research Question 2: Organization**

What organizational factors will enable or constrain effective S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations in a conflict or post-conflict environment at the tactical level?

**Trend 3: The Ad-hoc FACT and the Permanent BCT.**

By design, the FACT is an ad-hoc organization created from individuals across the USG to bring a specific set of skills to a specific reconstruction and stabilization operation. In contrast, Army BCTs are permanent formations that train for and deploy in support of a wide range of contingencies from major combat operations to reconstruction and stability operations. The flexible design for FACTs allows the S/CRS to draw civilian expertise from across the USG to address the unique needs of a host nation during reconstruction and stabilization operations. This is a significant advantage as host nation requirements differ from one operation to the next. Further, the modular design of the FACT allows the S/CRS to bring in additional personnel during operations as conditions change or in response to a specific requirement. For example, during the initial phases of a reconstruction and stabilization operation, tax reform and spending policies for a province may not be a priority so the FACT may not include an individual with expertise in that domain. However, as the reconstruction and stabilization operation progresses, the
S/CRS has the capability to identify that requirement and augment the FACT with an individual from the Treasury Department who can competently design and implement a local tax reform and spending program.

While beneficial in many ways, the ad-hoc nature of FACTs also produces organizational challenges for the FACT and across the interagency. The individuals that form the FACT are civilian employees with full time jobs in agencies across the USG. Those individuals come from disparate organizational cultures with divergent operating norms and are asked to operate as part of a cohesive element during complex, dynamic, and often dangerous reconstruction and stabilization operations in post-conflict environments. The lack of a habitual team structure creates the potential for inefficiency, role confusion, and stove-pipe specialization as each member focuses on his or her area of expertise.

The permanent nature of the BCT creates the opposite conditions, both negative and positive. As enduring formations, BCT staffs and their subordinate units train and operate together continually. Staffs have rehearsed their deployment related roles and functions through a series of training events, command post exercises, and full mission readiness exercises at robust combined arms training centers. Further, they function together as an element daily during normal garrison operations. As a result, BCT staffs are able to develop the organizational culture and organization norms that promote efficiency, clearly defined roles, and staff integration. However, a BCT staff does not have inherent expertise across all the domains relevant to reconstruction and stabilization operations. While there is resident knowledge throughout the officer corps (military
police, engineers, signal officers, staff judge advocates, etc.), officers in the Army are not formally trained as anthropologists, political scientists, or economists.

To enable successful integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations, S/CRS FACTs and Army BCTs must understand how to leverage the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of each organization model. The flexible subject matter expertise available through the FACT should inform the planning and execution of all BCT operations. Further, the organizational capacity of the BCT should support FACT initiatives through detailed planning, execution, and assessment.

Trend 4: FACT Centralized Capability and BCT Decentralized Capability.

The FACT organizational design includes a plans section with one or two individuals responsible for each MME; however, the S/CRS Planning Framework consolidates the preponderance of planning activities at the ACT level and above. Within the S/CRS Planning Framework, a planning team from the CRSG is responsible for developing the USG Reconstruction and Stabilization Strategic Plan that identifies the MME Concepts, prioritization, sequencing, and linkages. Once the Strategic Plan is approved, a planning team from the ACT supporting the Chief of Mission is responsible for producing the Interagency Implementation Plan that refines the MME Concepts and Sub-Objective Concepts, determines program approaches and mechanisms at all levels, and establishes the performance monitoring plan. Within the Planning Framework, there is no prescribed planning process or requirements for the FACT planner responsible for implementing the Interagency Implementation Plan. This creates a capability gap if, for example, one or two subject matter experts in governance are responsible for a governance MME that includes community planning, organizing and executing elections,
and advising local officials without an established system for planning, executing, and assessing those efforts.

In contrast, Army BCT staffs and their subordinate battalion staffs are manned and trained to conduct full planning, execution, and assessment cycles through MDMP and battle command. As with S/CRS FACTs, BCTs receive orders and direction from their high headquarters. For example, a Joint Task Force’s campaign plan should include lines of efforts that were developed with the ACT and are closely coordinated with the S/CRS MMEs. However, BCT and battalion staffs are doctrinally responsible for conducting their own mission analysis and developing complete plans to accomplish their mission. At the tactical level, these plans will include a refinement of the desired end state, the operational approach, lines of efforts, detailed synchronization, and phasing and transitions.

Understanding each organization’s capabilities is essential to integrating FACTs and BCTs during reconstruction and stabilization operations. While a FACT planning team does not have the organizational capacity or doctrinal foundation for developing full plans, they do have access to the Interagency Implementation Plan and Strategic Plan through the ACT. Every FACT member should understand those plans and be able to explain to their BCT counterpart to ensure that the BCT’s planning efforts support the broader USG objectives.

**Secondary Research Question 3: Training**

What training factors will enable or constrain effective S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations in a conflict or post-conflict environment at the tactical level?
Trend 5: FACT Individual Training and BCT Unit Level Training.

The S/CRS training methodology supports many of the trends already identified; the S/CRS trains individuals to serve on FACTs by managing the annual training requirements for Civilian Response Corps and individuals throughout the USG. Prior to deploying, FACT members must complete the two-week Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations (RS500) course which includes a discussion of reconstruction and stabilization institutions, frameworks, and tools as well as instruction on building effective partnerships with U.S. civilian agencies and international partners. They must also complete the three-week Whole-of-Government Planning for Reconstruction and Stabilization: Level One course which covers participating in the whole-of-government planning process, contributing specialized functional and technical information to a plan or operation, and working effectively with other USG agencies in the planning process. The course also covers working with other actors commonly involved in reconstruction and stabilization operations such the host nation government, other international partners, and non-governmental organizations. Additionally, they must complete the three-week Security for Non-traditional Operating Environments (SNOE, OT401) course focusing on the field skills required in conflict or post-conflict environments such as trauma medical assistance, tactical communications, weapons familiarization, basic survival skills, and improvised explosive device (IED) awareness. However, since FACTs are not permanent organizations, there are no formal training, evaluation, or certification programs at the unit level.

In contrast, the Army trains at both the individual and unit level through institutional training, operational training, and self-development. The institutional
training domain includes military professional education such as officer basic courses and the Command and General Staff College programs which prepare individuals similar to the S/CRS courses. However, as permanent organizations, Army BCTs also conduct unit training, major training events, and operational missions within the operational training domain. Unit training includes individual training, collective training, and leader training that a unit conducts to develop and sustain its readiness across the full spectrum of operations. Unit training begins at home station, but continues at maneuver combat training centers, during joint exercises, at mobilization centers, and while operationally deployed. Major training events are more planning and resource intensive activities that allow commanders to assess their unit’s mission-essential task proficiency through situational training exercises, external evaluations, command post exercises, and deployment exercises. The Army manages unit training and maintains the readiness of its forces through the ARFORGEN model which outlines the specific unit requirements during the reset phase, the train/ready phase, and the available phase.

As discussed in Trends 1, 3, and 4, the different approaches to training do not have to constrain S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration at the tactical level. Understanding each organization’s training methodology, their individual skills, and their organizational capacity can enable successful corporation, coordination, and unity of effort. An S/CRS FACT does not train extensively as a unit; however, it consists of trained individuals with specific expertise relevant to reconstruction and stabilization operations. Similarly, an Army BCT is highly trained as an organization; however, it does not have individuals with the expertise required for all facets of reconstruction and stabilization operations. Recognizing these discrepancies can allow both organizations to
leverage their strengths, incorporating S/CRS FACT subject matter expertise into Army BCT planning and operations, and utilizing Army BCT staff capacity to support S/CRS FACT initiatives with detailed planning, execution, and assessment.

Conclusion

The primary research question for this thesis is: What doctrinal, organizational, and training factors enable or constrain effective S/CRS Field Advanced Civilian Team (FACT) and Army brigade combat team (BCT) integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations in a conflict or post-conflict environment at the tactical level?

To answer that question, the preceding chapter presents a qualitative analysis of selected public record documents from the S/CRS and the Department of Defense to establish each organization’s doctrinal approach, organizational structure, and training methodology. The preceding sections of this chapter present a comparative analysis of that information to identify general trends within each domain that will potentially enable or constrain S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration during reconstruction and stabilization operations at the tactical level. The findings indicate that doctrinally, FACTs approach reconstruction and stabilization operations conceptually while BCTs are highly procedural. FACTs also train at an individual level and rely on a more centralized ad-hoc organizational structure while BCTs train and operate as decentralized units. Further, each organization has its own set of terminology. Each of these differences has the potential to constrain S/CRS FACT and Army BCT integration at the tactical level through confusion, redundancy, and a lack of unity of effort if they are not understood. However, if understood these differences can benefit the whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and stabilization operations.
Each member of an S/CRS FACT brings a level of specialized training and expertise to reconstruction and stabilization operations that do not exist in an Army BCT. However, an Army BCT brings a level of organizational capacity for detailed planning, decentralized execution, and continuous assessment that is not possible for an ad-hoc FACT. Successful integration at the tactical level requires each organization to understand these differences and actively work to leverage their strengths together by incorporating S/CRS FACT subject matter expertise into all Army BCT activities, and utilizing Army BCT staff capacity to support S/CRS FACT initiatives.
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