IS THERE RELEVANCE FOR CLASSICAL FRENCH COUNTERINSURGENCY
IN MODERN COUNTERINSURGENCY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2010-02

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Is There Relevance for Classical French Counterinsurgency in Modern Counterinsurgency

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With the advent of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, a debate has arisen concerning the manual’s origins and its applicability to today’s insurgencies. Critics, such as Colonel Gian Gentile, claim that the manual is overly influenced by French theories focused on stopping a Maoist type insurgency and this influence precludes its utility for other types of counterinsurgency campaigns. Those who support the manual, such as Colonel (retired) Peter Mansoor, point to the timing of its December 2006 publication in relation to the surge of forces into Iraq in January 2007 and the corresponding change in fortunes for the United States (US) led coalition as proof of its success. Does French Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, as developed and practiced in Algeria and Vietnam, have utility for the current American counterinsurgent? Using experiences gained in command during two tours of duty in Iraq, this thesis attempts to show that the following French theorists had utility for those commands: Bernard Fall, David Galula, and Roger Trinquier.

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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ABSTRACT

IS THERE RELEVANCE FOR CLASSICAL FRENCH COUNTERINSURGENCY IN MODERN COUNTERINSURGENCY, by Major Augustine C. Gonzales, 107 pages.

With the advent of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, a debate has arisen concerning the manual’s origins and its applicability to today’s insurrections. Critics, such as Colonel Gian Gentile, claim that the manual is overly influenced by French theories focused on stopping a Maoist type insurgency and this influence precludes its utility for other types of counterinsurgency campaigns. Those who support the manual, such as Colonel (retired) Peter Mansoor, point to the timing of its December 2006 publication in relation to the surge of forces into Iraq in January 2007 and the corresponding change in fortunes for the United States (US) led coalition as proof of its success. Does French Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, as developed and practiced in Algeria and Vietnam, have utility for the current American counterinsurgent? Using experiences gained in command during two tours of duty in Iraq, this thesis attempts to show that the following French theorists had utility for those commands: Bernard Fall, David Galula, and Roger Trinquier.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of A/1-36 Infantry and A/2-6 Infantry who made everything happen during our tours in Iraq. Without their efforts, none of this could have been possible. Next, I would like to thank my chair, Dr. Phil Pattee, and the rest of my committee, Jim Burcalow and Dr. Donald Stephenson, for their efforts to help me improve this thesis as much as possible. I would also like to thank LTC Celestino Perez for his suggestions. I also want to thank my two battalion commanders, COL Thomas Graves and LTC Michael Shrout, for the opportunity to command infantrymen in combat. We did not always see things the same, but I am grateful for the opportunity. Lastly, I want to thank my wife for the support she gave me while writing this thesis.
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ACRONYMS

AO Area of Operations
AQI Al Qaeda in Iraq
COIN Counterinsurgency
COP Combat Outpost
FM Field Manual
GOI Government of Iraq
GW Guerrilla Warfare
IA Iraqi Army
IP Iraqi Police
IN Infantry
ISF Iraqi Security Forces
JAM Jaysh Al Mahdi (Mahdi Army)
KLE Key Leader Engagement
MiTT Military Transition Team
PA Political Action
RW Revolutionary Warfare
SOI Sons of Iraq
TTPs Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures
US United States
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

With the advent of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, a debate has arisen concerning the manual’s origins and its applicability to today’s insurgencies. Critics, such as Colonel Gian Gentile, claim that the manual is overly influenced by French theories focused on stopping a Maoist type insurgency and this influence precludes its utility for other types of Counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns.¹ Those who support the manual, such as Colonel (retired) Peter Mansoor, point to the timing of its December 2006 publication in relation to the surge of forces into Iraq in January 2007 and the corresponding change in fortunes for the United States (US) led coalition as proof of its success.² Does French COIN theory, as developed and practiced in Algeria and Indochina, have utility for the current American counterinsurgent? In order to answer this question, the reader must ask and answer several other questions as well. Questions such as: What was French COIN as theorized and practiced by David Galula, Bernard Fall, and Roger Trinquier? What type of insurgency were the French forces fighting? What was the American COIN theorized and practiced by A/1-36 Infantry (IN) and A/2-6 IN (the American units described in this thesis for modern relevance)? What type of insurgencies were A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN fighting? Using experiences gained in command during two tours of duty in Iraq, this thesis attempts to show that the following French theorists had utility for those commands: Bernard Fall, David Galula, and Roger Trinquier.

The three men all wrote on the French experience in COIN warfare in Indochina and Algeria from the end of World War II to the end of the French war in Algeria in the
early 1960s. The type of COIN developed and practiced by Galula and Trinquier originated from their shared experiences as soldiers in Algeria during the late 1950s, and it could be termed population-centric. Trinquier had experience in French Indochina during tours that began in 1947 and 1951 respectively, while Galula served as a military attaché in China and a United Nations observer that exposed him to insurgencies in China and Greece from 1945 to 1956. Their contemporary, Bernard Fall, was a journalist and scholar, who wrote widely on the French experiences in Indochina and Algeria prior to his death in 1967. All three had extensive exposure to insurgent warfare as practiced in these two theatres. This type of insurgent warfare was a variant of Maoist insurgency, and all three men created definitions for this warfare as discussed later.

My COIN credentials consist of a 2006 tour to Iraq where I led a detachment and a company for a period, totaling seven months in command. The two units faced an Islamist insurgency with Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as the adversary in a predominantly Sunni area of Western Iraq. In my 2008 tour, I was in company command for ten months and faced an insurgency that had varying elements. The area was south of Baghdad and had both Sunni and Shia populations. Because of the mixed population, both AQI and Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) had operated in the area in support of the Sunni and Shia populations respectively. By the time A/2-6 IN arrived in the spring of 2008, the hard core elements had either fled or were in the process of fleeing the area. What remained behind was akin to what David Kilcullen describes in his book, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, as an accidental guerrilla. These accidental guerrillas fought for varying reasons and had a good chance of being co-opted and brought over to support the government if the right incentives were provided.
Overall, the type of insurgency A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN faced was similar in many respects to that of the three men mentioned above, but also had many differences. The more accurate example for similarity would be their experience in Algeria. The religious Islamic bond in the Algeria and Iraq conflicts is a strong one.

COIN theory has been around for a long time under varying names. Every empire from ancient times to the British has had to deal with insurgencies; however, with the advent of Mao Tsetung and his people’s army, insurgency has come to mean something different. Mao based his insurgency on ideology and required the people to support this insurgency until it had enough combat power to destroy its adversary. This form of war depended greatly on the implicit and complicit support of the population. After Mao’s success in defeating the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek, a few nationalist and communist movements who also were fighting imperialist occupation adopted the Maoist model in Indochina and Algeria. Bernard Fall described the exported version of Maoist insurgency as Revolutionary Warfare (RW). His definition of RW is: “the result of the application of guerrilla methods to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system.” Fall also gives the following equation for RW: $\text{RW} = \text{Guerrilla Warfare (GW)} + \text{Political Action (PA)}$. He defines GW as small war and PA as a political, ideological, and administrative system to control the population with PA being weighted the more important of the two. The West (Belgium, Britain, France, Portugal, and the US) has had to fight a flurry of similar type counterinsurgencies during the past 80 years. Malaya and currently Iraq have been COIN successes, but there have been many more failures. The Portuguese, Belgians, French, and Americans have all failed in Africa and Southeast
Asia, but why did they do so? This last question led political and military leaders, scholars, and pundits to study and develop COIN theory.

Since so many individuals have fought in these insurgencies, many have developed ideas for fighting them. David Galula defines insurgency as “the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means,”¹¹ and to defeat it, he developed an eight step model in his Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Roger Trinquier wrote his Modern Warfare in an effort to develop a system to fight what he termed modern warfare. His definition is: “an interlocking system of actions-political, economic, psychological, and military-that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime.”¹² David Hackworth and Samuel L. Marshall co-authored The Vietnam Primer: Lessons Learned for American soldiers in Vietnam. Unlike the other three men mentioned, their book primarily focused on the GW aspect of RW by addressing primarily tactics; however, Hackworth did realize that GW was different from conventional warfare and needed to be fought differently as well.¹³

The focus on GW is the primary point of disagreement among COIN theorists. Enemy centric theorists focus on GW. That is to say, those who focus on GW are focusing on the enemy and not on the population. The population is a secondary concern thought of solely for the purpose of attacking the enemy. Consider this the direct approach since the enemy centric theory hopes to deliver victory through direct battle. Population centric theorists focus on the PA. They believe that the only way to defeat the insurgency is to secure the population and provide services to prevent the insurgents from accessing the population, from which insurgents get their support. Consider this the
indirect approach because it will destroy the enemy without focusing on battle. The fight between theorists as to the primacy of GW or PA is the crux of the larger problem in dealing with insurgencies.

The natural inclination for many American military leaders is to use massive military force to solve the GW portion of the equation mentioned above. American superiority in technology and resources has led to this inclination because of the American public’s distaste of long and costly wars. This can be seen in the search and destroy missions of the Vietnam era and the clear and sweep operations of the Iraq War with their heavy reliance on firepower in search of decisive battle. That has started to change with the guidance published by Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal, but there is still a tendency for American forces to use overwhelming force. According to Fall’s metric, attacking the guerrilla force is the least weighted portion of his equation. Therefore, if attacking is the primary focus of a strategy, it will result in a weaker PA strategy which leads to an unbalanced equation.

Not all past American military leaders have used massive military force. The US Marine Corps used Combined Action Platoons that lived and worked with the local Vietnamese security forces with some success. In his book, *The Village*, Bing West describes how this principle worked in a particular village in South Vietnam. By indentifying the correct correlation of the problem between force and political action, we as a nation will better be able to prioritize the use of our resources.

For this thesis, it is necessary to make several assumptions. First, the assumption must be that an insurgency is more than a small war. It is also, as Bernard Fall states, the use of politics to gain control of the population. In an article written for the *Naval War*
College Review in the 1965, Fall stated his belief “that this concept of RW can be applied by anyone anywhere.”

Therefore, the thesis will assume Bernard Fall’s equation RW=GW+PA as the most appropriate strategy for COIN campaigns. Since this equation is very vague in detail, the thesis will next use David Galula’s eight steps and Roger Trinquier’s theories in an attempt to further define the right side of the equation. The thesis will then use the combat command experiences of the author to show how these theories fared in combat.

Another assumption is that isolated events in a COIN campaign can be indicative of the broader operational strategy for fighting in that particular theatre. The paper will use 17 months that spanned two tours of duty in Iraq from July 2006 to February 2007 and August 2008 to May 2009 to illustrate this broader strategy. Since these two tours encompass the time just prior to and just after the surge of forces into Iraq known as “The Surge,” an assumption will be made that the COIN strategy used during these two tours is indicative of the operational strategy at the time. Coalition forces had two primary objectives in 2006: create a smaller coalition footprint in Iraq by consolidating forces on larger bases and training Iraqi security forces to assume responsibility for security. In 2008, the coalition’s objectives were to locate bases amongst the population to provide security, partner with Iraqi security forces to develop professionalism, and co-opt the nationalist insurgents with financial incentives to separate them from AQI. For more information on these strategies, and broad background showing that many other units in Iraq at the time engaged in similar missions, reference Bing West’s The Strongest Tribe and David Cloud’s and Greg Jaffe’s The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army. The author’s units participated in
achieving these objectives during both tours. Also, since the location of these tours was Al Anbar and Baghdad Provinces and the casualties were highest in these two provinces, the research assumes that the experiences in these two locations can be used to show the decisive points of the Iraq war.

A few definitions are required to give the reader a base understanding of the paper and the topic covered herein. For our purposes here, I will again define RW, GW, and PA and add definitions for the following: conventional warfare, center of gravity, and the people. RW is the result of the application of guerrilla methods to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system. GW is small war; small war is war between two actors where there is a lack of military parity. Mao gives some clarification on GW by stating, “it is a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation.” PA is a political, ideological, and administrative system used to control the population. This thesis defines conventional warfare as the hostile engagement between two armies (armed forces) on the field of battle. Armies (armed forces), according to Carl von Clausewitz, are created, raised, armed, equipped, and trained. We will infer that a government is responsible for those aspects of an army’s formation. The center of gravity “is those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives it freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.” For this paper, the terms the people or the population will be defined as the population of the country in which the insurgency is occurring.

The scope of this thesis will be the use of the three French theorists already mentioned and two tours of duty in Iraq by the author to provide real life illustrations of the theories at work. Research will be done on other COIN theorists who question the
utility of the French experience as well as US Military COIN doctrine. This research will also allow for the identification of enduring principles employed while engaging in COIN. The information will mostly come from primary sources, such as, memoirs and after action reports and secondary sources such as academic books and professional journals, all from soldiers, scholars, and politicians. Neither interviews nor surveys will be conducted.

There are several limitations for this paper. First, the context of the theories could be misunderstood since all of the theorists to be used are deceased and will not be able to clarify the context. Next, history is usually written from afar. Even the writers who are writing firsthand accounts do not write as events are occurring. This leads to facts being missed or inadvertently changed. Having served in a Tactical Operations Center and seen the chaos of battle at an echelon removed from the fight, I know the confusion in initial reports leads to mistakes and how these mistakes are sometimes not corrected due to lack of information. Also, having served as a commander in the fight, I know that the truth of a situation is never fully understood and the best that can be hoped for is the accumulation of perspectives to get a better understanding of what has transpired. With this in mind, the reader must make best use of the information presented and draw the best conclusions possible. Another limitation is the lack of time and space needed to view, analyze, and report on the abundance of COIN information available. This limitation requires that the scope of the paper be relatively narrow since the focus is on utility of French influence in contemporary COIN. Finally, this paper will exclude the American experience in Afghanistan since the author has not deployed in support of that operation.
There are several constraints for this paper. First, the paper will primarily use the three French COIN theorists already stated. Second, the paper will use 17 months of command experience gained by the author that spanned two tours of duty in Iraq from 2006 to 2009. Also, the viewpoint will be that of a company grade officer who has a smaller view of the war that is limited to the tens of kilometers instead of the thousands.

The importance of this paper is to continue the dialogue on COIN theory and application. With the drawdown in Iraq and the publicly stated deadline for reduction of forces in Afghanistan set to begin next year, there will be the call to return to our core competencies. In the past, the US Military has been inclined to forget the nasty business of the insurgency fight and refocus on the big conventional fight. After the Vietnam War ended in 1975 and up to the fall of the communism in 1991, the European battlefield was the focus of military doctrine and training. The senior leadership’s greatest fear was another Vietnam or more succinctly another COIN fight. This fear lead to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and its call for the use of massive force and clearly defined goals. This return to core competencies after Vietnam forced the military to relearn lessons learned there and from many other past small wars while fighting in Iraq. By keeping the dialogue open, we can keep some resources focused on this very real problem to ensure that the capacity to conduct COIN does not die in the US Military.

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6 Mao Tsetung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tsetung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1972), 97.

7 Ibid., 373.


9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.


15 Fall, Last Reflection On A War, 211.


20 West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons From Iraq,” 2.

21 Fall, Last Reflection On A War, 210.

22 Ibid.


29 Ibid., 319.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Currently, literature on COIN theory is abundant. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have created a vast body of works pertaining to the theory of COIN. However, there are several other bodies of work on COIN as well. One of the largest bodies of work deals with the French and American experiences in Indochina and Vietnam. Another body of work on COIN theory to be covered is the one born in the aftermath of the American experience in Vietnam. This body of work ranged from the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 up to 2004. Lastly, there is a body of work that suggests that FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* is based on the wrong theoretical foundation and is too narrowly focused on population centric ideas and principles. These are the library of works that this literary review will cover.

The end of World War II brought about the advent of RW.¹ The initial theorists on fighting RW came from France during the time that country fought to re-establish its authority over its empire. They were David Galula, Bernard Fall, and Roger Trinquier. These men developed their theories from experiences in Northern Africa and Indochina fighting insurgents who fought a war similar in style to the warfare Mao defined and developed. On the British side, Sir Robert Thompson wrote of his experiences in Malaya and Vietnam, which is considered a must read for COIN theorists and practitioners. American theorists who came from this era include Major General Edward Lansdale, General Creighton Abrams, William Colby and arguably David Hackworth and Bing West.
David Galula, Bernard Fall, and Roger Trinquier wrote their COIN beliefs based on their knowledge and experiences of French COIN theory and practice from World War II to the end of the Algerian War in the early 1960s. Galula wrote about his observations on RW while stationed in China. While there, he had exposure to Mao, the British effort in Malaya, and the Philippine COIN against the Huk. Galula also had an opportunity to see the civil war in Greece. These observations led him to theorize about COIN. Galula tested his theories as a company commander in Algeria. This opportunity allowed him to validate many of his ideas. He articulated this experience and these ideas in his two books, *Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958* and *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, respectively.

Trinquier had combat experience in Indochina during two tours of duty in 1947 and again in 1951, and he also spent some time in Algeria from 1957 to 1961. Based on these experiences, he wrote his book *Modern Warfare*. Both Galula and Trinquier developed ideas such as population control via census operations and population isolation. These measures allowed the French to gather intelligence that led to the neutralization of the insurgents. In Algeria, this led to the military defeat of the insurgency; however, for reasons that had more to do with Paris than the Casbah, the French lost the war. Two things separated the men in their views, Trinquier believed that specially trained personnel could use torture to help end the war quickly, and his theories focused more on the GW than the PA aspect of RW.

Fall was a scholar and journalist from France who fought for the French underground during World War II. Later in life he married an American and became an American citizen. He died in 1967 during an ambush in Vietnam while on a patrol with
US Marines. His wrote mainly about Indochina and the theoretical aspects of RW. His writings include: *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu*, *Street Without Joy*, and posthumously *Last Reflections On A War*. In the first two books, he details the reasons for French failure in Vietnam. Mainly this failure stems from not understanding the true nature of the war. The French made it a conventional war when it was more than that. In North Vietnam, by 1954, the Viet Minh had become a conventional force, but the Viet Minh’s strength did not come from its capability; it came from the people and their nationalism. His wife published the last book after his death. It is a collection of essays and unpublished material. Two of the essays deal with RW; one details what it is and why it is applicable throughout the world, and the other describes the end of RW.

Two books that give background information on the French experience in Algeria are the 2001 book, *The Battle of the Casbah: Counter-Terrorism and Torture*, by General Paul Aussaresses and the 1977 book, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962*, by Alistair Horne. Aussaresses’ book details the battle for Algiers and the French methods to win it. Aussaresses led the security and intelligence apparatus for the French command in Algiers. In his book, he details how he used torture and execution to crush the insurgents. He explained that his support for torture came from not wanting to tell his countrymen he failed to prevent an attack that took countless civilian lives which could have been prevented had torture been used. Aussaresses worked with Trinquier on the command staff, and he provides some background information on Trinquier. Part of this information describes how Trinquier developed his idea for census operations. According to Aussaresses, Trinquier got the idea by studying Napoleon’s actions in the Rhineland where he had soldiers number houses and annotate who lived in them. Horne’s book
spans the entire eight year war. His first Chapter also provides background information dating from 1830 up to the start of the Algerian war in 1954. His last Chapter provides details on the governments and important individuals from the two sides after the war from 1962 to the mid 1990s after several reprints.

The British experienced insurgencies in several locations most notably in Northern Ireland and Malaya. For this paper, I will cover Sir Robert Thompson’s 1966 book *Defeating Communist Insurgency* which covered his experiences in Malaya and Vietnam. In this book, Thompson provides five principles for the counterinsurgent government to follow: have a clear political aim; function in accordance with the law; have an overarching plan; priority goes to defeating the political subversion and not the guerrillas; and the government must secure its base areas first. Also, according to Thompson, when both sides of the war have parity, the government must be able to answer one question in the mind of the people: “Who is going to win?” The answer to this question will decide the fate of the country. Besides the five principles mentioned above, the government must operate with the understanding that the COIN campaign must follow the following operational concepts: clear, hold, win, and won. This means to clear an area of insurgents, hold the area, win by building government institutions, and when won, move resources to a new area to restart the process. By using these concepts for the overall campaign plan, the government will gain the loyalty of the people which will lead to greater intelligence. This intelligence will lead to the destruction of the insurgents and the end of the war. He warns that insurgents will fight back, and since a small percentage of the population actively supports the insurgent cause, “insurgency is not people’s war but a revolutionary form of war designed to enable a small ruthless
minority to gain control over the people.”¹¹ For this reason, the four operational concepts mentioned above must be followed in order to protect the population from the insurgent. There is not a short easy way to defeat an insurgency. That is why Thompson states that the “three indispensible qualities in COIN are patience, determination, and an offensive spirit.”¹² However, this spirit must “be tempered with discretion and should never be used to justify operations.”¹³

American theorists and practitioners mostly developed their COIN ideas and experiences in Vietnam from 1954 to 1972. However, Major General Lansdale worked with Philippine Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines from the fall of 1950 until the end of 1953 fighting the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (The peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army). The Huks (the Hukbong’s short name that sounds like “hooks”) were the army of the communist party formed in 1942 to fight the Japanese.¹⁴ In his book, In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia, Lansdale describes how with his advice Magsaysay defeated the Huk insurgency. They based the premise of their COIN practice on winning the support of the Philippine population. They believed that if they could address the grievances of the population against the Philippine government, the Huks would have nothing to offer the population in order to gain its support. Magsaysay was able to win the population from the Huks by reforming the national election process, developing a land distribution system, and offering amnesty to Huk members who surrendered. Militarily, the two transformed the Philippine Army from an undisciplined and corrupt gang into a disciplined and effective organization. This change in the army allowed the military to apply constant offensive pressure on the Huks and with the population focused programs caused their defeat.
In his 1999 book, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam*, Lewis Sorley describes how General Abrams transformed the military effort in Vietnam. The book describes how Abrams, William Colby, and Ellsworth Bunker brought the military, intelligence, and political organizations in the country under the “one war concept.” According to Sorley, this change in organization and focus ended the COIN as fought by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam by 1972. To back this assertion, Sorley argues that the four year interval between the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the 1972 Easter Invasion showed that the US and South Vietnamese had beaten the Viet Cong, and it took the North those four years to build enough combat power for an invasion. The book goes on to suggest that with American help the South Vietnamese could have held and forced the North Vietnamese government to accept a two state solution. He uses the fact that it took the North another three years to build enough combat power, after the losses suffered in the 1972 Easter Invasion, to finally subdue the South. Retired Lieutenant General Dave Palmer, in his 1978 book *Summons of the Trumpet*, gives credence to Sorley’s view. In his book, Palmer gives a general history of the war, and in his later Chapters, describes how the Vietnamization policy destroyed and frustrated the Viet Cong in South Vietnam and the North Vietnamese high command respectively. Palmer also states that the American refusal to continue supporting the South Vietnamese government allowed the North Vietnamese to win the war.

David Hackworth and Bing West also wrote about their experiences in Vietnam as officers in the Army and Marine Corps respectively. In his book, *Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts*, retired US Army Colonel David Hackworth describes his battalion’s fight in the
In the Mekong Delta region south of Saigon in 1969, Hackworth described how he took a battalion of draftees who lacked cohesion and created an organization that began to fight effectively against its enemy. Hackworth stated that he had “to out G (guerrilla) the G” in order to win. By changing the tactics used by his unit, Colonel Hackworth got results that had quantifiable metrics showing a decline in enemy activity. However, he did not have a political aspect to his operations. Bing West wrote *The Village* based on his experience and the experiences of other marines who served in a combined action platoon in the village of Binh Nghia. This village complex consisted of several small villages in the northern Quang Ngai province of South Vietnam. The marines occupied an outpost on the outskirts of the village and partnered with a local militia force. The combined force conducted patrols, ambushes, and security operations in the local area. These marines got to know not only the militia members who worked with them but also the local villagers. This acquaintance did not necessarily win them the support of the people, but it did give the marines a greater appreciation of the human terrain. This knowledge paid off on various occasions when the marines were able to identify subtle changes in the area that they would not have been able to identify had they been transient patrollers. Hackworth and West describe an unconventional fight and show alternative methods for fighting it.

The era following the end of World War II in 1945 until the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 initiated the West to a new way of war. Mao developed this new way of war in China during that country’s civil war, and communists exported the idea to third world nations looking to end Western imperialism. This era exposed the world on how to fight RW and how to defeat it. The literature of this era contains the principles of RW.

The US Army last published a doctrinal manual to address COIN prior to its current FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* in 1986 with FM 90-8, *Counter Guerrilla Operations*. This manual contained some good information on COIN. It too split COIN in a similar fashion as Bernard Fall with his RW=GW+PA; however, the Army intended to leave the PA portion of the equation to the host nation. The doctrine did this by separating COIN from counter guerrilla operations. COIN operations belonged to the diplomatic elements of government while counter guerrilla operations belonged to the military and would be conducted only after all else failed. Thus, the army would focus on the GW portion, and its only connection to the PA portion would come by insuring the operations it conducted supported the “goals and consequences of the host nation’s COIN program.” To that end, the manual stated that all US actions “must be appropriate, justifiable, use the minimum force required, provide the maximum benefit, and do the minimum amount of damage.” Before operations began, the army had to understand the guerrilla. Once this understanding had occurred, the army could conduct operations to
defeat the enemy. Chapter 3, “Counterinsurgency Operations,” defined the operations used to include strike campaigns, consolidation campaigns, offensive operations, defensive operations, and common operations that had both offensive and defensive elements. The army intended to do all this using the elements of AirLand Battle doctrine. According to this doctrine, found in Chapter one, the army faced four challenges on the battlefield. These challenges were the battlefield, leadership, readiness, and training. To understand the battlefield commanders needed to understand the political, military, economic, and social aspects of the environment. Leadership in counter guerrilla operations required “expertise and the ability to operate independently at lower levels of command.” Readiness did not get mentioned in depth. According to the doctrine, commanders were responsible for the readiness of the force to fight the conventional as well as the counter guerrilla war. Training included training for intelligence collection and analysis, civil affairs, population and resource control, psychological operations, and advisory assistance. The manual also covered counter guerrilla operations in conventional war. Overall, FM 90-8, Counter Guerrilla Operations provided a reasonable way to accomplish COIN. Even though the US military published the following manuals after the time frame of this section, I will describe the doctrine that replaced FM 90-8 in order to provide a comparison.

In December 2006, the Army and Marine Corps published FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), Counterinsurgency as US military doctrine. This document differed from FM 90-8 in several ways. First, the FM 3-24 removed AirLand Doctrine since it was no longer applicable to military doctrine. Next, the manual defined the aspects of counterinsurgency operations as stability, offense, and defense. FM 3-24 stated that “the
proportion of effort devoted to the stability, offense, and defense within
counterinsurgency is changed over time in response to the situation.\textsuperscript{24} In doing so, PA
was given a more important role in the overall US military effort because stability
operations covered the following aspects: civil security, civil control, essential services,
governance, economic and infrastructure development. Chapter 2, “Unity of Effort:
Integrating Civilian and Military Activities,” discussed how to integrate civil and military
activities. Also, instead of stating, as FM 90-8 did, that US activities would support the
host nation’s COIN plan without describing the plan, FM 3-24’s Chapter 4, “Designing
COIN Campaigns and Operations,” states what that COIN plan should look like. Chapter
5, “Executing COIN Operations,” provides an example of Logical Lines of Operations in
COIN. This example lists fives broad tasks that a counterinsurgent should use to gain
support from the population and correspondingly take support from the insurgent. These
Logical Lines of Operations (combat operations, host nation security forces, essential
services, governance, and economic development), provide a road map for success when
the proper emphasis is placed in the proper combination for the particular COIN
campaign. This manual provided a more intellectual and analytical doctrine than did FM
90-8, but it did not provide the tactics for lower echelons. That led to a subsequent
publication of another manual for tactics.

In April 2009, the army published FM 3-24.2, \textit{Counterinsurgency Tactics}. This
manual fills the void at the tactical level that FM 3-24 did not address. The first three
Chapters of the manual provide the theoretical foundations of the operational
environment in which an insurgency occurs, of an insurgency, and of a
counterinsurgency. Chapter 4 details the planning process at the tactical level. It
introduces the seven Lines of Effort for which units must plan. These Lines of Effort, (establish civil security, establish civil control, support to host nation security forces, support to governance, restore essential services, support to economic and infrastructure development, and conduct information engagement) allow the tactical commander to “develop tactical tasks and tactical missions, allocate resources, and assess the effectiveness of the operation.” Chapters 5 through 8 cover offensive, defensive, and stability considerations and support to host nation security forces respectively. This manual made COIN more digestible for tactical level leaders.

In October 2008, the army published FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*. This manual gave voice to the stability aspect of COIN operations, and defined stability operations as using a comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach integrates the cooperative efforts of the total government toward a shared goal and consisted of the following: accommodation, understanding, purpose based goals, and cooperation. This produced the following end-state: a safe and secure environment, with established rule of law, social well being of citizens, stable governance, and sustainable economy. FM 3-07 also renamed the aspects of counterinsurgency operations as full spectrum operations. Chapters 1 through 3 laid the theoretical foundations and Chapters 4 through 6 discussed how to plan and execute them. Thus, FMs 3-24, 3-24.2, and 3-07 provided the army with a doctrinal method to conduct full spectrum operations. As stated in FM 3-24, full spectrum operations are nothing more than aspects of COIN operations.

The Marines published *The Small Wars Manual* in 1940. This manual has not lost relevance in the interim and continues to grow in popularity. Therefore, I will discuss it in the same section as the doctrine mentioned above. The manual has fifteen Chapters
that cover various topics to include: an introduction that defines small wars, training, logistics, techniques and tactics, and various civil operations such as disarming the population, arming native organizations, military government, and the supervision of elections. The manual is dated so not all of the information is usable today; however, the spirit of the document maintains relevance. The manual states that “the military strategy of small wars is more directly associated with the political strategy of the campaign than is the case in major operations.”27 This is the case “because the fundamental causes of the condition of unrest may be economic, political, or social.”28 Since this is the case, the manual tells its readers to train marines to respect the population and that marines need to be familiar with the language, geography, political, social, and economic conditions of the country.29 The manual may have been written in 1940, but its message still holds true today.

Colonel Thomas Hammes wrote of a new type of war in his 2004 book, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. In this book, Hammes describes fourth generation warfare. He also discusses the theory of three generations of warfare and adds a fourth. He uses a simplified definition provided by Bill Lind and Gary Wilson to describe the first three generations of warfare. These definitions state that first generation war “reflected the tactics of line and column.”30 Hammes shows that Lind and Wilson state second generation war “evolved due to quantitative and qualitative improvements in weapons and relied on massed firepower.”31 Finally, they define “third generation as maneuver.”32 Hammes defines fourth generation warfare as using “all available networks- political, economic, social, and military- to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the
perceived benefit.” He believes that Mao Tsetung was the first to theorize and practice fourth generation war. In his book, Hammes gives examples from the Chinese Civil War, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Al Qaeda. In one of the more interesting parts of the book, he details recommendations for dealing with fourth generation war. These recommendations include a 360 degree evaluation system for officers; training in realistic environments; education grounded in military history; and longer tours of duty in key development positions. With these recommendations, Hammes believes that the American military can create an officer corps that can effectively deal with fourth generation warfare.

Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl wrote his 2002 book, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, in order to compare the British experience in Malaya to that of the US in Vietnam. In this book, Nagl describes the organizations, leaders, and tactics used by the two armies in their respective counterinsurgencies. He describes traits from the two organizations, British and American militaries, that led to the results of each war. He found that the British organization allowed for learning, adaptation, and flexibility while its American counterpart did not.

Several authors wrote during this time describing the American experience in insurgencies. Brian McAllister Linn and Max Boot wrote books detailing past American involvement in small wars and insurgencies. Linn wrote several books on the American experience in the Philippines after the Spanish American War during the Philippine War of 1899 to 1902. In these books, *The Philippine War: 1899-1902* and *The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902*, Linn describes how the terrain and
a lack of good communications dictated that small unit leaders had to create and implement their own counterinsurgency operations.\textsuperscript{35} This practice led to the end of the war, but also had mixed results, since the leader dictated whether operations succeeded or failed. Max Boot wrote \textit{The Savage Wars of Peace}. In this book, he details how small wars and insurgencies are nothing new for the US. He details these past campaigns because he wants American leaders to “not be afraid to fight ‘the savage wars of peace’ if necessary to enlarge ‘the empire of liberty.’ It has done it before.”\textsuperscript{36}

The thirty year period following the end of the Vietnam War created a varied discussion on the American way of war. Most in the American military looked for the reasons for defeat in Vietnam and decided to fight the war that we as Americans have always sought, but have usually never found, conventional war against a conventional foe in the future. However, American experiences during that span showed once again that our conventional foe would not appear. The First American Iraq War being the exception, most of our military engagements came from the future and past enemies described by Hammes, Nagl, Boot, and Linn. Doctrine initially reflected the American ideal conventional war and took 30 years to catch up to the realistic one. It did catch up and did so because of the shared experiences of the soldiers and marines fighting in modern counterinsurgencies.

With the advent of the second phases of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (the end of conventional operations and the start of the insurgencies), retired Australian Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen has written extensively about the COIN fight. His assistance contributed to coalition success in Iraq during the Surge of 2007 to 2008. Mark Moyar an instructor at the US Marine Corps University recently published a work on leadership in
COIN. Also, many who have fought in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have contributed to COIN theory in memoirs, after action reviews, and professional journals.

David Kilcullen’s 2009 book, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, describes a form of modern insurgency. In this book, he describes the “Accidental Guerrilla Syndrome.” This syndrome details how an insurgent group, namely Al Qaeda, “moves into a remote areas, creates alliances with local traditional communities, exports violence that prompts a Western intervention, and then exploits the backlash against that intervention in order to generate support for its “takfiri” agenda.” Kilcullen describes a four stage scenario for the syndrome. First, the insurgents infect the local population with their presence in the local area. Next, they spread their ideology to the local population. This alone does not cause the West to act, but the insurgents’ use of the remote area as a staging ground for attacks on the West does lead to intervention which is the third stage. In the final stage, the local population rejects the intervention and fights alongside the insurgents. Kilcullen gives examples from Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Asia. As a solution for this problem, he gives five “practical steps”: develop a new lexicon that clearly defines the problem, get the grand strategy right, remedy the imbalance in government capability, indentify the new “strategic services” which means placing the mission with a new organization other than special operations forces who tend to be tactical operators and not strategic ones, and develop the capacity for information warfare. The book describes a situation observed by US forces in Iraq in 2008, and it provides COIN a new idea that calls for co-opting the accidental insurgent with incentives instead of bullets.
In his 2009 book, *A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq*, Mark Moyar adds a new approach to COIN. He describes two of the better known approaches as “population-centric” and “enemy-centric.” These approaches deal with an insurgency as their names describe, with the counterinsurgent focusing most of his resources either toward the population or the enemy. Next, he argues for a third approach that is “leader-centric.”41 This approach calls for effective leaders at all levels to solve problems at their respective level that will contribute to the end of the insurgency at the operational level. Moyar lists ten attributes that a successful counterinsurgent leader should have: initiative, flexibility, creativity, judgment, empathy, charisma, sociability, dedication, integrity, and organization.42 He then uses nine insurgencies as examples to show where leadership succeeded and failed in concluding the insurgency. He lists his recommendations for providing effective leaders in COIN in the last Chapter which include: improving leader attributes, recruiting candidates with the necessary attributes, leadership development, command selection, lines of authority that allow the senior counterinsurgent leader control over civil-military affairs during the insurgency, delegation of authority to lowest levels, method of command that allows leaders to circulate the battlefield, and co-opting of local elites.43 This book provides another way of looking at what is necessary to successfully conduct COIN operations.

A plethora of COIN articles have been written since 2004. They vary in scope and emphasis, but they definitely have relevance for the modern counterinsurgent. A journal, *Military Review*, has published two collections of these articles in its COIN Reader series. Kalev Sepp, in his 2005 article “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” sums up the reason for studying COIN by stating “we can discern ‘best practices’ common to
successful counterinsurgencies by studying the past century’s insurgent wars.” In his article, he cites both best and worst practices found in counterinsurgency. They include but are not limited to: “emphasis on intelligence; focus on population, their needs, and security; and secure areas established and expanded,” as best practices and the following as examples of bad practices: “primacy on military direction of counterinsurgency; priority to “kill-capture” the enemy, not on engaging the population; and battalion sized operations as the norm.” General Petraeus also wrote an article for Military Review while he served as the head of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. In his 2006 article, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldering in Iraq,” he provides 14 observations from his two tours of duty in Iraq. These observations include guidance such as the following: “Act quickly, because every army of liberation has a half-life; money is ammunition; and there is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders.” One other article I will mention from the COIN Reader series is David Kilcullen’s 2006 article “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency.” As the title mentions, it provides 28 articles of advice for company grade officers in their preparation for and execution of counterinsurgency operations. It also provides four “what ifs” in case of change. One last article is Bing West’s 2009 article, “Counterinsurgency Lessons from Iraq.” In this article, West summarizes the events that changed the Iraq War in 2006 through 2008. First, he discusses Al Anbar and then Baghdad because he believes that these two locations were the main fronts in the war. He then points to the applicability of these lessons for Afghanistan. His main point is that the Iraqis helped change the direction of the war and our doctrine does not necessarily take that into account. Instead, doctrine tends to define all encompassing tasks
that are not in the purview of the military and are creating unwinnable situations because doctrine does not take the desires of the local leaders into account.  

The previous section summarizes writings based mostly on experiences gained during the last nine years of war. The authors did not focus solely on Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, quite a few looked to historical examples to help garner lessons from these current conflicts. These writings are important to the modern counterinsurgent because several had influence for the writers of FM 3-24. As will be seen in the next section, not all current authors agree on how to do counterinsurgency.

The group of writers, theorists, and practitioners who disagree with FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency do so for varied reasons. First, some like US Army Colonel Gian Gentile, disagree with using counterinsurgency theory derived from French COIN. He believes that the French focus was population centric and FM 3-24 focuses solely on winning the population. He would like FM 3-24 to have alternatives that are enemy focused. Another argument against counterinsurgency is that it is too expensive and takes too long to accomplish. The proponents for this reasoning, such as John Arquilla, believe that redefining strategic goals would lead to a new force structure and new ways of fighting. This new method of fighting would make COIN irrelevant since we would no longer prioritize it. As will be seen, alternatives to FM 3-24’s methods exist.

Colonel Gian Gentile has become an outspoken critic of FM 3-24. In a 2009 article, “The Selective use of History in the Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Gentile states that the “Army’s new COIN doctrine is singularly premised on what has become known as the population-centric theory of counterinsurgency warfare.” He also asserts that the use of the new doctrine in 2007 did
not directly lead to the Iraq turn around. Instead, it was the rise of the Awakening movement and the Moqtada al-Sadr cease fire. In another 2009 article, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” Gentile states that “population–centric counterinsurgency has perverted a better way of American war which has primarily been one of improvisation and practicality.” With this article, he argues that the population-centric method is not the only way to fight counterinsurgencies and points to the British model at the end of the nineteenth century. The British, he argues, “understood the essence of linking means to ends.” What he is saying here is that FM 3-24’s methods of counterinsurgency are costly, take a long time, and do not correspond to a national strategy of quick and inexpensive war. Colonel Gentile’s main point to his many articles is that FM 3-24 with its focus on population centric warfare is not the only way to conduct COIN, and he fears that military leaders might follow the tenets espoused in it without using the improvisation and practicality previously mentioned.

In his 2010 article, “The New Rules of War,” John Arquilla proposes a different method for the US government to use in the wars of the future. He offers the following three rules for the US to follow in order to reduce the complexity of modern war: “‘many and small’ beats ‘few and large;’ finding matters more than flanking; and swarming is the new surging.” These three rules translate into many smaller US units using a better understanding of networks to swarm enemies in order to neutralize, disrupt, or destroy them. With these rules, Arquilla believes he offers an ends, ways, and means for future success. In another 2010 article, “In Praise of Aerial Bombing: Why Terror from the Skies Still Works,” Edward Luttwak suggests using aerial bombing as a cheaper alternative to the costly methods proscribed by FM 3-24. This method would look like
what is currently happening in Afghanistan and Pakistan with drones and what happened to the Taliban in the fall and winter of 2001. Luttwak also suggests in his 2007 article “Dead End: Counter-Insurgency as Malpractice,” that FM 3-24’s “prescriptions are in the end of little use.” He does so for two reasons. First, the US is not interested in governing conquered countries; and second, the US is unwilling to “out-terrorize” its enemies. Both men suggest that the current size and methodology of the US military does not work for its current and future wars.

The 2009 book, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the US Military for Modern Wars, by David Ucko “assesses the efforts of the US Department of Defense since 2001 to improve the US military’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations.” Ucko describes the effort of the military as having mixed results, but he is impressed with the results achieved in the nine years since the start of the War on Terrorism. However, Ucko states that he is unsure of the permanence of the change because of the longstanding organizational culture of the US military. This book does not disagree with the new COIN doctrine, but challenges the assertion that it will have lasting appeal.

As has been shown, not all people agree with COIN practice as framed by FM 3-24. Some authors want a more enemy-centric approach to COIN. Others want a more cost effective approach. Still, some do not believe that a change in organizational mindset has occurred to ensure that FM 3-24 will have lasting impact. The previous section proves that COIN practice is not universal in appeal or approach.

Although these books do not necessarily deal with COIN theory, they do provide a picture of COIN practice and a context for the decisions at the highest levels of the US
command in the Iraq War. *The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army* by David Cloud and Greg Jaffe provides insight into the reasons behind the decisions of Generals John Abizaid, George Casey, Peter Chiarelli, and David Petraeus while they held various high command positions during the Iraq War.\(^6\) Bing West wrote two books that also provide insight into the decisions of the Iraq War in *No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah* and again in *The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq*. The first book describes the decision process for the first attack on Fallujah in April of 2004, its subsequent halt, and the second attack in November 2004.\(^6\) This battle is one of the few major battles during the insurgency phase of the war. The second book provides a summary of the events and major decisions of the Iraq War from 2003 to the start of 2009.\(^6\) These three books provide the reader with a basic understanding of the major decisions and events of the Iraq War.

A solid academic grounding in COIN theory and practice is the best way for the theorist and practitioner to understand and develop theories and to learn how to apply them. A deeper understanding of the limitations of theory and in what environment it will work is the goal of this thesis. By developing a good understanding of what has already occurred, theories become malleable to match the challenges of the current environment wherever that may be. For this reason, it was important to begin with this literary review.

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\(^1\)Trinquier, *Modern Warfare*, 5.


\(^3\)Trinqueir, 19.
4 Dorothy Fall, “Preface,” in Last Reflections On A War, by Bernard Fall, 3-6 (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole, 2000), 4.

5 Ibid., 6.


7 Ibid., 93.

8 Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005), 50.

9 Ibid., 69.

10 Ibid., 111.

11 Ibid., 49.

12 Ibid., 171.

13 Ibid.


17 England and Hackworth, 7.


19 Headquarters Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 90-8, Counter Guerrilla Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1986), 1-5.

20 Ibid., 1-6.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 1-7.

23 Ibid., 1-8.


28 Ibid., 15.

29 Ibid., 41.


31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid., 2.


36 Boot, 352.


38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., 294.


42 Ibid., 8.
43 Ibid., 259.


48 West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons From Iraq,” 2.

49 Ibid., 5.


53 Ibid., 30.


55 Ibid., 15.

56 Arquilla, 63-65.


58 Edward Luttwak, “Dead End: Counter-Insurgency as Malpractice,” Harpers Magazine (February 2007), 42.

59 Ibid.


CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology conducted for this thesis attempted to answer the following questions: Does French COIN theory as developed and practiced in Algeria and Vietnam have utility for the current American counter-insurgent? Subordinate questions include: what was the French COIN as theorized and practiced by David Galula, Bernard Fall, and Roger Trinquier? What type of insurgency were the French forces fighting? What was the American COIN theorized and practiced by A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN? What type of insurgency were A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN fighting? The method of research conducted was self-study on French COIN literature as written by Galula, Fall, and Trinquier, reflection and study of past experiences with A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN, and comparing and contrasting those experiences with those of the three men to see if the French theory and practice still held relevance for today’s counterinsurgent. I measured relevance by creating three tables. The first table identifies Bernard Fall’s theory of RW=GW+PA and how it related to the experiences of A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN. The second table identifies the tactics used by Galula and Trinquier with rows listed as: identifying insurgents, clearing of insurgents, bases amongst the population, and the use of local population security forces and columns listed as: A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN. The rows represent the commonalities of Galula and Trinquier and the columns represent the companies which I led in combat. This chart measured the shared experience between the two men and the two companies studied in this thesis. The third table identified the characteristics of the insurgencies faced by the men in this thesis. This table lists the characteristics of the insurgency in the rows and has the experiences studied in the
columns. I measured effectiveness by using quantifiable metrics to determine the efficacy of the respective approach. The metrics used were: (1) change in the number of attacks, (2) effectiveness of attacks, (3) change in enemy Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTPs), and (4) increase in actionable intelligence. I placed these metrics in a fourth table to show the effectiveness of the experiences studied.

The self-study showed what counterinsurgent theories David Galula, Roger Trinquier, and Bernard Fall developed and, in the case of Galula and Trinquier, practiced in RW. These men wrote specific TTPs based on theories they developed from experiences gained from exposure to insurgencies. Studying these TTPs allowed for reflection on their applicability in current times. I also learned the reasons for the insurgencies in which they fought. The reasons specifically led to the development of their theories and TTPs. Self-study also produced exposure to theories and TTPs from other theorists who not only fought in the same wars but others as well. This exposure allowed for comparisons between them. These comparisons showed me that there are many good theories and TTPs applicable to today’s counterinsurgency fight.

Next, I reflected on my experiences of fighting an insurgency war in Hit and Salman Pak, Iraq. Through the self-study mentioned above, I was able to show where my units tried to use the theories and TTPs similar to those used by the three Frenchmen plus many others. This reflection allowed for me to write about my experiences in order to share them with readers so that they could draw their own conclusions using the criteria mentioned previously.

The factors listed for relevance came from the theory of Fall and the common practices of Galula and Trinquier. Fall created his theory to show that military action
alone cannot defeat an insurgency. Political action must take place and it is the more important of the two. Both Galula and Trinquier stated that to gain control of the population one had to separate the insurgents from the population. To do this, the security forces had to first identify the insurgents with good intelligence. After identifying the insurgents, the security forces then cleared them from the local population. To ensure the insurgents did not return, the security forces must establish bases amongst the population. To minimize the risk to the security forces, they had to get the local population to create local security forces to actively participate in the defense of the civilian population. Finally, after all this, identify local leaders to administer the local population. This last task ties into what Bernard Fall said about political as well as military ways and means. See tables 1 and 2 for the relevance of tactics table. Next, the characteristics of the insurgencies faced show how the experiences were similar and different. The characteristics used for analysis follow: actors, ideology, external supporters, active sanctuary, and insurgent tactics. The actors define all who opposed the government in its attempts to defeat the insurgency. Ideology defines the type of ideology used by the insurgents as their alternative to the current ideology of the government. External support defines who provided foreign assistance to the insurgents. Active sanctuary defines where the insurgents could hide from the counterinsurgents under the aegis of international law. Insurgent tactics defines if the insurgents had to use asymmetrical tactics against the counterinsurgent. See table 3 for the characteristics table.
Table 1. Bernard Fall’s Theory of RW=GW+PA

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<tr>
<th>Companies</th>
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<th>PA</th>
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<td>A/1-36 IN</td>
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<td>A/2-6 IN</td>
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Table 2. Common practices of Galula and Trinquier

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<tr>
<th>Common practices of Galula and Trinquier</th>
<th>Authors Companies and relevance of their actions in comparison with tasks at left</th>
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<td>A/1-36 IN</td>
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<td>Identifying Insurgents</td>
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<td>Clearing Insurgents</td>
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<td>Bases Amongst the Population</td>
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<td>Local Population Security Forces</td>
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Table 3. Characteristics of Insurgency Faced

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<th>Characteristics of Insurgency Faced</th>
<th>Counterinsurgents</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galula</td>
<td>Trinquier</td>
<td>Fall</td>
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<td>Actors</td>
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<td>Ideology</td>
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<td>External Supporters</td>
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<td>Active Sanctuary</td>
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<td>Insurgent Tactics</td>
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*Source:* Created by author.

The metrics used for measurement of effectiveness give the reader a visible measure of progress or the lack thereof. Since the purpose of COIN is to provide a level
of security that allows the government to provide for the needs of its citizens, the following metrics give an idea of the security levels in an area: (1) change in the number of attacks, (2) effectiveness of attacks, (3) change in enemy TTPs, and (4) increase in actionable intelligence. The numbers of attacks show how active an enemy is and how safe that enemy feels to maneuver in an area. The effectiveness of the attacks show the quality of the enemy since his level of attrition will correspond to the effectiveness of his attacks. In other words, higher losses in personnel lead to lower quality attacks due to lack of experience, and lower losses lead to higher quality attacks since the enemy has time to perfect his TTPs. A change in enemy TTPs comes about when that enemy changes because of a lack of effectiveness or the cost of current TTPs are too high to maintain. An increase of actionable intelligence tells the counterinsurgent a couple of things. First, the population feels safe enough to provide information without fearing retaliation from the insurgents. Also, it explains the improvement of the other three matrices since the cycle builds on itself. These matrices are not perfect. A counterinsurgent cannot win the war by gaining success in one or even all the matrices alone as reconciliation at the national level defines true success. However, when the counterinsurgent can see visible improvement in two or more of the matrices, these improvements become an indicator of successful TTPs. Table 4 gives a visual representation of the metrics as they applied to the experiences of the practitioners and theorist studied in this thesis.
Table 4. Metrics Used to Identify Effectiveness

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<tr>
<th>Metrics Used to Identify Effectiveness</th>
<th>Counterinsurgents</th>
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<td>Galula</td>
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<td>Change in Number of Attacks</td>
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<td>Effectiveness of Attacks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Change in Enemy TTPs</td>
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<td>Increase in Actionable Intelligence</td>
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Source: Created by author.

The strength of this methodology comes from its diversity and depth of theorists and practitioners. By studying modern insurgency and counterinsurgency from their inception in the Chinese Civil War up to the present, it is possible to develop an understanding on what makes each work and fail. The more cases that are studied leads to more information which allows to better analysis and interpretation. It also gives a quantifiable method for measuring effectiveness. The weakness with this methodology is that one insurgency does not make insurgency theory. It takes studying many insurgencies from their root causes to the TTPs followed. The wealth of information makes analysis a difficult and time consuming task. Another weakness lies in the subjectivity of the analysis. One reader can read and understand one thing while another can read the same text and understand something completely different. Also, since there is not a lot of published information on the COIN in Hit and Salman Pak, Iraq while I was located in those locales during the period, it will take the reader considerable time.
and research to prove the facts of my experiences. It will than take even more time to see and understand those facts as I have. Finally, the measures of effectiveness that I used are debatable. Every organization has its own measures of effectiveness. The four used here are what I used as a commander to comprehend the effectiveness of my approach and to explain that effectiveness to my subordinates.

By studying the reasons for past insurgencies, the motivations of the insurgents and counterinsurgents, and their respective strategies and tactics, it becomes possible to compare and contrast theories and practices for certain situations. The more insurgencies studied, the better one becomes at doing this. By using the measures of relevance and effectiveness mentioned above, facts support the conclusions. In the next Chapter, the study of Galula, Fall, Trinquier, and my past experience will lead to the comparing and contrasting that will show the applicability of the French theorists to today’s counterinsurgent.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

A quick summary of Chapters 1 through 3 will allow the reader to tie the information covered in each Chapter together and will assist in understanding the following Chapter. Chapter 1 provided the reason for research of this topic and covered the academic generalities. The reason for this research is to show the relevance of French COIN theory and practice as developed and practiced by Bernard Fall, David Galula, and Roger Trinquier. Chapter 2 covered the academic foundations of COIN through a literary review of past and current COIN literature; Chapter 3 discussed research methodology. This summarizes the past three Chapters.

The purpose of this Chapter is to analyze the perspectives of Fall, Galula, Trinquier, and the commander of A/1-36 and A/2-6 IN in the hopes of answering the following primary question and four secondary research questions respectively: Does French COIN theory as developed and practiced in Algeria and Vietnam have utility for the current American counterinsurgent? What was French COIN as theorized and practiced by David Galula, Bernard Fall, and Roger Trinquier? What type of insurgency were the French forces fighting? What was the American COIN theorized and practiced by A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN? What type of insurgencies were A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN fighting? Chapter 4 will provide evidence to answer the primary research question by first answering the four secondary research questions. Also, at the end of the Chapter, a section will be devoted to addressing the arguments that Gentile, Arquilla, and Luttwak level against COIN. The analysis will follow the research methodology outlined in Chapter 3. At the end of the Chapter, completed tables from Chapter 3 with a section
discussing their contents will give visual representation to the questions above. Chapter 5 will provide my conclusions and recommendations for future counterinsurgents. Now, we will delve into the information provided by the research in order to provide analysis.

What was French COIN as theorized and practiced by Galula, Fall, and Trinquier? French COIN as characterized by David Galula follows his Four Laws of COIN and his strategy of eight steps for COIN practice. In his four laws, he talks about the support of the population. His eight step plan provides a road map to accomplish a successful COIN approach. Bernard Fall stressed that victory in COIN came when the people and the military “emerge on the same side of the fight.”¹ Defeat is the result when this does not occur. He goes on to argue that no matter how well the military fights in COIN “it cannot possibly make up for the absence of a political rationale.”² For Fall, the political rationale drives all else in COIN. Roger Trinquier also argues that the aim of the insurgent organization “is to impose its will on the population. Victory will be obtained only through the complete destruction of that (insurgent) organization.”³ He offers three principles for fighting COIN. Trinquier’s principles deal with the population, but his primary focus is on the insurgent. To answer the question at the beginning of the paragraph, we will look at the three men’s ideas and practices separately.

David Galula’s Four Laws of COIN deal with the population. The four laws state the following: First, “the support of the population is as necessary to the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent.”⁴ This means that the two sides are fighting for the active or passive support of the population. Second, “support is gained through an active minority.”⁵ The insurgent and the counterinsurgent each have an active minority in the population at large that will get the majority of the population to choose sides. Third, “support of the
population is conditional.”⁶ Since a majority of the population has not decided which side to support, the majority has less passion for the cause and can change sides quickly depending on the latest outcome. Lastly, “intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential.”⁷ COIN operations require vast amounts of resources. To successfully execute COIN operations, a nation needs to maintain its limited resources by using them effectively in a deliberate manner one part of the country at a time. These four laws identify the heart of the problem in COIN according to Galula. He then developed an eight step strategy that addressed these four laws and thus the heart of the COIN problem.

Galula’s Eight Steps to COIN provide the counterinsurgent with a means to attain victory. The first four steps deal with gaining security. The last four steps deal with establishing local governance once security has reached a level that will allow for it. First, “concentrate enough forces to destroy or to expel the main body of insurgents.”⁸ This step is arguably the easiest to accomplish because a weaker force will either not fight or will retreat once losses become large. Second, “detach troops for the area in strength to oppose a comeback; place amongst the population.”⁹ Placing troops amongst the population is hard because of the security risks, but it allows the counterinsurgent to learn the geographical and human terrain. Third, “establish contact with the population and control movement in order to separate from the insurgents.”¹⁰ This gets harder with the increase in size of the area occupied and/or the population in it because it will require more forces to accomplish. Fourth, “destroy local insurgent political organizations.”¹¹ By dropping “political” and leaving “organizations,” this law maintains its relevance to today’s insurgents. The fifth step states, “setup new authorities through elections.”¹² Elections are not necessary in all parts of the world. Some populations do not understand
elections and would accept traditional leaders i.e. sheiks or elders. Sixth, “test authorities with concrete tasks; fire weak leaders and keep strong ones; organize self-defense forces.” The only way to identify good and poor leaders is to test them. Also, weak leaders will not be able to form and control self-defense forces. Seventh, “group and educate leaders in national political movement.” Perfection is not required. Good governance in the traditional sense for the particular nation is what matters. Lastly, “win over or suppress insurgent remnants.” This last step does not require outside forces. The presence of outsiders at this stage is more harmful than good. Since suppressing the remnants can take years, the host nation should deal with this last one on its own.

After taking command of a company, Galula had a chance to implement these theories in Algeria from 1956 to 1958. After conducting an initial assessment, Galula realized that his soldiers could tell the inhabitants of the villages in his zone to tear down propaganda posters and support the government, but once the soldiers left the village and returned to base, the insurgents would return to put up new posters and would threaten the population to disregard what the French had told them. To combat this problem, he began a process of gathering intelligence on the insurgents in his zone, arresting them, and then occupying their village. When he was ready to occupy a village, he had his men occupy a defensible building in the village. The soldiers then began a census of the village to learn who lived there. In time, this census as well as the familiarity of living side by side allowed the soldiers to know the natural inhabitants of the village. The men also began three civil functions: providing information to the populace by reading them the most current newspaper in the village meeting area, schooling the children, and providing medical care for the inhabitants. To augment the combat power of his small
force in the village, Galula had the town provide a civil defense force to conduct
combined security at night. This action made the village inhabitants active participants in
the security of the village. These actions caused insurgent activity to decrease and led to
inhabitants providing actionable intelligence on insurgents in the area because the
villagers no longer feared retaliation from the insurgents. This intelligence led to the
captures and deaths of many insurgents. Once security had improved in the village,
Galula looked for local leaders to run the village. After accomplishing this in one
village, Galula spread his control to the next village. In like fashion, he began the process
over again. Galula did this for a couple more villages. The issue that stopped him from
doing it to every village in his zone was the lack of available combat power. However, in
every village that this scenario played out, the French had total control over the
population, since the insurgents fled the area, died or were captured.

Bernard Fall believed that the COIN the French needed to use in Vietnam should
have had a political focus. As stated earlier, Fall postulated that \( RW=GW+PA \). RW was a
method used “to the furtherance of an ideology or political system. This is the real
difference between partisan warfare, guerrilla warfare, and everything else.” Since
furthering an ideology was the purpose for the war, the counterinsurgent needed to
counter the insurgent ideology. To be effective, a political means had to be found since
“the insurgency problem is military in a secondary sense, and politically, ideologically,
and administratively in a primary sense.” To stress this methodology, he goes on to
state “when a country is being subverted, it is not being outfought; it is being out
administered.” The French tried to use mobile warfare in Vietnam. Their purpose in
doing so was to get the Vietminh into a battle of attrition in which the material resources
of the French could be brought to bear to destroy the resource inferior Vietminh. This was a purely military solution. The Vietnamese desire for independence made the war a political one. The French did not apply a political means in Vietnam to counter their Communist and Nationalist adversaries’ ideologies; this led to their defeat.

Roger Trinquier’s three principles of COIN deal with separating the insurgent from the population. The three principles state the following: (1) cut the guerrilla off from the population; (2) render guerrilla zones untenable to the guerrilla; and (3) coordinate actions over a wide area for a long enough time to yield results. He proposed to put these principles into action after first identifying the enemy. To do this, he proposed to create local intelligence networks to help identify the enemy. Since this proved difficult, Trinquier believed that a nation must “declare a state of war at the earliest moment” to strip the protections provided by peacetime laws from the insurgent. He believed this necessary because “terrorism is a weapon of warfare which can neither be ignored nor minimized,” and because “the goal of modern warfare is control of the populace, and terrorism is a particularly appropriate weapon, since it aims directly at the inhabitant.” To Trinquier, insurgents used terror because their aim was to create insecurity. Insurgents successfully used terrorism as is shown by the fact that people knew the insurgents who lived among them but did not denounce them out of fear of retribution. A negative aspect of Trinquier’s ideas arose as he tried to get intelligence from a recalcitrant enemy. Since insurgents used terrorism, he thought that counterinsurgents could use specially trained interrogators who “always strive not to injure the physical and moral integrity of the individuals.” These interrogators would use their methods to get information, but would stop once the enemy conceded. If that
prisoner died in interrogation, Trinquier believed the insurgent knew the possible consequences of joining the insurgency, and death was a possible outcome after capture. This goes against American ideals and laws, but it shows the difficulty in getting information from a highly indoctrinated individual to an ideological cause.

After identifying the insurgents, the process espoused in his three principles could begin. To cut the guerrillas off from the population, Trinquier offered a system similar to Galula. First, a unit should occupy a house in the village. Next, it should build a perimeter defense for the village. Once this had been done, the unit should conduct a clearance operation to clear guerrillas from the village. Next, the unit should conduct a census to learn who remained in the village. Concurrent to this operation in the village, another unit should be operating in the area surrounding the village to neutralize the guerrillas who exposed themselves trying to escape from the village. During this process to separate the guerrillas from the population, Trinquier believed it necessary to get the villagers to actively participate in their defense to protect from becoming isolated targets of the insurgent by becoming members in a local defense force. Once this entire process had been accomplished, it could begin over again with the next village. Administratively, Trinquier believed that to accomplish this operation the military should organize its boundaries to match the civil government’s boundaries. This simplified the command and civil administration requirements. Trinquier’s methods worked while his units used them in Algiers in 1957 and along Algeria’s Tunisian border in 1958.

Overall, both practitioners succeeded in their efforts. Bernard Fall’s belief that political factors outweighed military ones in insurgencies also mirrored the beliefs of Galula. Between the practitioners, Galula focused more on developing political leaders
after wresting the security from the insurgents, and Trinquier’s efforts seemed to fall short in the political sphere. However, at the tactical level, both men succeeded in their efforts to defeat an insurgency.

What type of insurgency were the French forces fighting (See Table 7 at the end of Chapter 4)? The French fought two different types of insurgency in Vietnam and Algeria. Of the three authors mentioned here, only one, Roger Trinquier, commanded units in Indochina. The war in Indochina was an asymmetrical one in which a materially and financially weaker government fought a stronger one, but the weaker government, the Vietminh, had strong governmental and military organization.34 In the end, this political and military organization led to the defeat of the French.

Not all the anti-French factions were united in Vietnam. There were communists and nationalists, but they both fought their common enemy, the French, and once this war ended, they fought each other.35 The French tried to exploit these divisions during the war, but their dreams of maintaining their empire, alienated some potential nationalist allies. These exploitation attempts were nothing more than counter-guerrilla operations that eventually alienated large swaths of the population from the eventual victors. Once France left Indochina, these former allies had to make their way to South Vietnam or die fighting.36 Thus, this insurgency was an ideological one: nationalism versus imperialism.

In Algeria, the French once again fought an asymmetrical war against a weaker enemy. However, in this instance, the enemy did not have as complete an organization as that of the Vietminh.37 However, thoughts of independence motivated the insurgents in Algeria as well. However, this motivation was not universal. This allowed the French to use the methods of COIN described earlier. Since France was in close proximity to
Algeria and a lot of Algerians had served in the French armed forces, had been to France, or had family currently working in France, a feeling of citizenship resonated for many Algerians. Also, Algeria had been a province of France since the late nineteenth century. Finally, the insurgents had not proved themselves to be capable of governance. So as long as the French could prove resolute and show signs of victory, parts of the population proved loyal. Once the French government showed signs of wavering, the Muslim population decided to side with the insurgents to avoid retribution in a future without France. In 1961, the French decided to leave Algeria because of a lack of political will to keep Algeria in the Republic. Thus, this too was an ideological insurgency based on independence from colonialism.

What was the American COIN theorized and practiced by A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN? The author took a detachment command with its own combat outpost and battle space in July 2006. This command had an economy of force mission to free a company headquarters and two platoons for route security operations. Its primary mission had it partnering with two companies of the Iraqi Army (IA) to conduct security and training missions on the east side of the Euphrates River in Hit, Iraq in support of the battalion’s main effort in Hit proper. Since the author did not go to the COIN Academy at Taji, he had to make do with his prior knowledge of COIN. This knowledge and the experience gained with this detachment provided him with his COIN theory and practice when he took over A/1-36 IN at the end of September 2006.

After returning from the first deployment to Iraq in July 2004, the author read Bernard Fall’s *Street Without Joy* and *Last Reflections On A War*. From these two books, he took away RW=GW+PA and the concept of mobile war as practiced with futility by
the French in Vietnam. The idea of using firepower and maneuver against a less mobile and armed foe made sense when used in the context of the equation mentioned above. He also had David Hackworth’s “Out G the G” concept. Hackworth’s concept when married to the mobile warfare concept held some promise for the GW part of the equation because Hackworth described a similar mobile warfare concept in Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts. One last piece of information that the author had came in the form of guidance published in November 2005 by the National Security Council. This guidance came as 1-36 IN finished its combat training center and gunnery rotations. Up to that point in the war and even after, civilians, journalists, and even soldiers complained about a lack of a clearly defined endstate. These complaints made him curious about the contents of the guidance. The author clearly remembered three specific points from the guidance that he carried with him to Iraq in 2006. These points were:

Clear areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters and denying them safe-haven. Hold areas freed from enemy control by ensuring that they remain under the control of a peaceful Iraq government with an adequate Iraqi security force presence. Build Iraq Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.44

The author thought that if he followed the guidance published by the President he could not go wrong. These items are what formed the author’s theories on COIN in 2006. As for his COIN practice, that developed as he learned to fight a real life enemy who actively tried to kill the members of his command.

The COIN practice developed by A/1-36 IN in the fall of 2006 came from the theories of Bernard Fall, the experiences of David Hackworth, the National Security Council’s guidance for victory in Iraq, and the company commander’s own experiences in COIN learned as a detachment commander in the “quiet area of operations” during the
summer of 2006. This COIN practice revolved around several key elements. First, since
the company’s primary mission was training the IA, it had to develop a method to train
the IA while working with its Military Transition Team (MiTT) partners. Second, it had
to develop TTPs for fighting the insurgents. Finally and most importantly, it had to
develop its intelligence gathering TTPs. Unfortunately, the company had little power at
its disposal to work the political aspects of COIN in 2006. It did not have access to the
Commander's Emergency Response Program funds, and the battalion commander
handled the Key Leader Engagements (KLEs) with the city leaders of Hit. With this in
mind, we will now discuss the specifics of A/1-36 IN’s COIN practice in the fall and
winter of 2006 and 2007.

The company commander developed a system with his MiTT counterparts during
the summer as the Able Detachment commander responsible for training the IA. The
MiTT trained and re-trained the IA in basic soldier skills. The company’s soldiers
patrolled with the IA to reinforce the training provided by the MiTT in a real time
environment. The leadership had a similar plan for the IA commander. The MiTT officer
and company commander coached, taught, and mentored the IA commander, and they
did it in a way that mirrored the soldiers training: the commander provided the missions
for the IA commander to plan, and the MiTT officer helped him to plan, rehearse, and
refine his plan. After planning, the IA commander coordinated with the American
company commander for assets if necessary. At this time, the A/1-36 IN commander
made his suggestions for the IA plan if he saw something that gave him concerns. The
common operating procedure called for combined operations. The IA provided gun
trucks and a squad to platoon sized element of soldiers; the company provided Bradley
Fighting Vehicles or gun trucks and a like number of soldiers. The vehicles provided the outer cordon, the US soldiers provided the inner-cordon, and the IA provided the breaching element. The MiTT officer and the senior leader present from the detachment or company followed the breaching element to ensure the IA treated the occupants of the house with respect and conducted the search of the area properly. These procedures describe the framework the author took with him to his new company command in the fall of 2006. At the time, the author thought of these tactical TTPs as the GW, and the training of the IA as a portion of the PA (See Table 5 at the end of Chapter 4 to see the relationship between the tactical TTPs, training the IA, and KLEs in Bernard Fall’s RW equation).

As the author assumed company command, the battalion moved the IA company that had trained with Able Detachment to A/1-6 IN to partner; Able Detachment assumed the mission to partner with the newly arriving Iraqi Police (IP); and the battalion commander gave A/1-36 IN the responsibility of training the other IA company in the battalion. As mentioned earlier, A/1-36 IN had no other means at its disposal to address the political aspects of COIN. This partnering with the IA represented the sole means at the company’s disposal to influence the political fight. By partnering with the IA, it had the ability to conduct clear, hold, and build operations to the maximum effect. Most of its operations had an IA face to them. This helped to build Government of Iraq (GOI) credibility while developing IA capability. Partnering with the IA was similar to what Trinquier and Galula preached (See Table 6 at the end of Chapter 4). They believed getting the populace to actively support the government by creating local security forces separated the populace from the insurgents. Although the company worked with the IA
and not a local militia, the Iraqi presence provided A/1-36 IN’s actions with credibility which led in part to the population’s support (See Table 5 to see the relationship between training the IA and the PA in Fall’s equation).

The COIN TTPs that the company developed in the fall of 2006 went through three evolutions. First, it conducted cordons and search of the entire company area of operations (AO) three to four nights a week. This process took us four weeks and lasted into November. At first, the unit had success in these operations because they caught the local insurgents off guard. The company captured an AQI cell that had a ledger with aliases, activities such as mortar man, sniper, Improvised Explosive Device maker or emplacer, and names of dead insurgents with dollar amounts paid to families. Also, in the first cordon and search to involve both IP and IA, the operation captured the newly appointed AQI emir in Hit (at least that was the intelligence the IP gave us). However, after six weeks, the insurgents smartened to our tactics. They started to spend the nights outside of the city. An illustration of this occurred when the company captured a battalion target during a raid who took the raid element to an accomplice’s house after tactical questioning. When the group conducted a raid on the accomplice’s house, the suspected insurgents were absent, and after talking with the women in the house, the patrol learned why. The men had been involved in a fight earlier that day with A/1-6 IN, another company attached to the battalion; they felt coalition forces would show up that night and disappeared to avoid capture. That clearly illustrates the effect of the cordon and search tactic (See Tables 5, 6, and 8 at the end of Chapter 4 to see how these tactics relate to GW, clearing of insurgents, and the change in enemy TTPs respectively).
After reading the intelligence summary provided by the Battalion S2 (Intelligence Officer), the company commander identified some known insurgent meeting places with possible meeting times. The company leadership developed a tactic to randomly raid these locations during these meeting times. The company leadership referred to these operations as “snatch and grab” operations. The patrol would detain all personal located in the meeting area. They brought them back to the company Combat Outpost (COP). At this time, the company had a Marine Tactical Human Intelligence Team staying with it at the COP. According to orders and the law, the company leadership could not interrogate such detainees, but the Tactical Human Intelligence Team could tactically question them for a few hours before either sending them to battalion or releasing them. Although this tactic did not result in any captures, the company did receive intelligence that it scared one insurgent who was near one of the raids. He thought the raiders were after him. This tactic put the insurgents in a sense of panic because the company targeted their meeting places. The insurgents started to worry about the company’s actions more as time passed (See Tables 5 and 6 at the end of Chapter 4 to see how these raid tactics relate to Fall’s GW and Galula’s and Trinquier’s clearing of insurgents respectively).

The company commander used this time to spread fear of the company’s snipers. As the Tactical Human Intelligence Team released the detainees, the commander told the released men to spread the word that snipers were in the city and they were good. The company had some recent successes that gave this speech some credence. For four weeks in October and November, a Marine Recon platoon worked with the company. The company commander did not have any real control over this platoon, but he had to provide their quick reaction force. This gave the commander a little influence over their
operations. However, the platoon leader, who was a captain as well, got along well enough with the company leadership to coordinate his efforts. These coordinated efforts led to the two most successful operations up to that time. The Intelligence Summary identified another insurgent meeting place. The commander shared this information with the Recon platoon leader. The Recon platoon leader agreed to place a team in a position to watch the site. On 21 October 2006, the team killed six insurgents as they prepared to attack the market. About two weeks later, another Recon team made contact near a tier one Improvised Explosive Device site. They killed eight insurgents. After this Recon platoon left the company, the commander decided to use his squads to replicate the Recon platoon’s ambush activities (See Tables 5 and 6 at the end of Chapter 4 to see how these tactics relate to GW and clearing of insurgents).

These squads operated in mutually supporting positions supported by a static position or by one or more squads also in position. These were kinetic operations, but by moving into a house with Iraqi civilians, the soldiers gave a face to the American Soldier. They proved to be great ambassadors who did not abuse their position. Many Iraqis shared meals with these soldiers and provided them with information. This tactic started to spread fear and doubt in the minds of the insurgents. The company leadership knew this because the soldiers learned that insurgents told the residents of Hit to brick up their windows to prevent their use by American snipers. Also, insurgent activity changed. The sites used for mortar attacks all changed. They started to get further away in order to prevent exposure. The company also received intelligence towards the end of the deployment that the insurgents were having a hard time getting some of their Yemeni recruits to enter the city because of all the snipers.
Intelligence or rather the lack of it, without a doubt, makes COIN one of the hardest endeavors in realm of warfare. As stated earlier, the author did not participate in a mission rehearsal exercise or the COIN Academy as a company commander. He started to learn analysis with an event tracking wheel as the Able Detachment commander. With this wheel, he learned to pattern the insurgents who attacked the COP with indirect fire. By tracking the 18 or so attacks, he learned that the enemy attacked between the hours of 1100 and 2000 and at least one attack would occur in a five day period. This information allowed the detachment leadership to change force protection measures as necessary. Another lesson learned on the other side of the river was census operations. The platoon attached to the detachment conducted combined operations with the IA doing census operations for the houses in our area. The platoon used the method described earlier for cordons and search. This allowed the patrol to search the house and identify who lived there. When doing census operations, good organization is imperative. It is also important to not ask for too much information. These patrols take a long time and the longer they take the more inefficient they become. Soldiers start to become complacent after four hours. Say what you may about discipline; after six months in zone, people get tired. The repeated stressors of combat exhaust the mental, emotional, and spiritual resilience of soldiers. For this reason, patrols should not last more than four hours, and this example shows how resource intensive COIN operations become. The resource in question here is manpower. Surge operations do happen, but they should not become the norm. Also, at times, the lack of organization caused the detachment to redo houses because names and pictures from the census did not match. Since the detachment’s AO had little activity
compared to that of the companies in Hit, tracking indirect fire and census operations provided the author with his initial training on COIN intelligence.

When the author took command of A/1-36 IN, the fire support officer, the company commander, first sergeant, and third platoon leader received wounds that took them out of action.47 Usually, it would have been the fire support officers job to manage the intelligence operations, with input from the commander, for the company. However, the author had to do this due to the fire support officers evacuation. The company had some old files to look through for back ground information and the executive officer and platoon leaders gave an area assessment. The commander referenced these sources repeatedly for the remainder of the tour. As mentioned earlier, the Intelligence Summary provided by the Battalion S-2 provided a lot of information. At first, the Intelligence Summary provided all the company’s intelligence; however, this intelligence was not complete because it gave local names for locations which the company did not have. That led to patrols tasked with asking questions about the local name for places. As the patrols received this information, the information provided in the Intelligence Summary started making sense. By unlocking this puzzle, the ability to target the enemy vastly improved. Patrols conducted several successful ambushes because the company identified enemy meeting places by knowing the local name for them. As the company conducted more and more cordons and search and ambushes, its soldiers began to interact more with the population which led to more and better intelligence (See Tables 6 and 8 at the end of Chapter 4 to relate them to identifying and clearing of insurgents and to see how these operations caused an increase in actionable intelligence, which led to changes in the enemy’s TTPs and his effectiveness).
The soldiers found that the people wanted to talk. The population gave the patrols a lot of information. One of the bits of information provided told the company leadership that the insurgents told the locals to use the market in the morning. Attacks would occur after that time, and since the insurgents provided warning, civilians could not blame them for collateral damage. Since the company did its cordons and search at night, it assisted in providing the locals with a sense of security for talking. Which houses were searched? And who talked? It could have been anyone in the houses searched, and with a curfew in place, it took an added effort for the insurgent to identify which houses were searched and who possibly talked. During these night time operations, soldiers asked questions about known insurgents. Of the insurgents on the battalion target list in the company AO, the patrols found all their residences, learned more about them, and even captured a few. After operating with a lack of information for the first several weeks of command, the company started to have a sense of the environment which aided its efforts in COIN (See Tables 6 and 8 at the end of Chapter 4 to relate them to indentifying and clearing of insurgents and to see an increase in actionable intelligence respectively).

The tactics and techniques mentioned above cannot win an insurgency alone. They represent the GW portion of Fall’s equation; however, these tactics did buy time for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to become competent. The task force found the IA capable of team sized operations under American control in February 2006, and left them capable of independent company sized operations by December 2006.48 During the fall of 2006, the newly recruited and trained IP began returning from Jordan. After returning from training, the IP systematically moved from their base 20 kilometers southeast of Hit, north up the east side of the Euphrates to the COP across from Hit, and finally into Hit
itself in January 2007. Once the police entered the city, the insurgents attacked the newly built police station with 40 insurgents. A platoon from A/1-36 IN repulsed the attack with no ISF or American casualties and at least 10 insurgent dead. This action began the end of the insurgency in Hit which the next unit saw through to the end. As for the Clear, Hold, Build guidance from the National Security Council, the company made progress in all three areas. It cleared parts of the city of insurgents; held the area and hampered the enemy’s freedom of movement; and helped to build the ISF in Hit (See Tables 5 and 6 at the end of Chapter 4 to see how the TTPs used by A/1-36 IN during the time the author served as its commander relate to Bernard Fall’s equation of RW=GW+PA and the common practices of Galula and Trinquier).

The author’s COIN theories continued to develop in the 14 months after redeploying in February 2007 to redeployment in April 2008. In the interim, he read David Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, reflected on his experiences in Hit by writing After Action Review notes, and continued to learn as much as possible about COIN. While reading Galula’s book, he saw Galula’s eight step model and reflected on how the model related to his experience in Hit. After doing this and seeing how it related, Galula’s model became a new tool for COIN practice. Partnering with the IA also changed how the author saw working with local national security forces. He learned that empathy, cultural awareness and understanding, and patience are required to be successful in prosecuting a successful COIN plan. Since he took command four months into the 2008 deployment, he again did not attend the COIN Academy at Taji; however, these new theories, past experiences, and old Ideas about RW=GW+PA, Clear, Hold,
Build, and “Out G the G” made up his COIN theories for the 2008 deployment to Salman Pak.

The COIN practiced in 2008 by A/2-6 IN definitely became more refined. In this 2008 deployment, several new experiences arose which had to be understood and exploited. The company had a fusion cell to assist with intelligence analysis. The company had several villages with tribal leaders which meant more KLEs than the last deployment. Since the company had both Sunni and Shia in its AO, it had to deal with sectarian disputes. The Sons of Iraq (SOI) had sprung from the Awakening Movement out of Al Anbar that members of 1-36 IN had heard rumors of in 2006 but never saw. Finally, the IA had improved drastically. With this improvement, came a well deserved sense of pride which at times bordered on arrogance. Since the author had reflected on failure as well as success, he had many ways in which to improve and refine his past performance. These improvements and refinements defined his company’s COIN practice in 2008.

Company Intelligence Support Team is the new term for the company intelligence section A/2-6 IN had in 2008 known as a fusion cell. During 2007, when an order from brigade directed the battalions to designate soldiers for fusion cell training without changing unit manning levels, the author advised his battalion commander to oppose it. Manpower in COIN counts; company commanders never have enough soldiers to accomplish their tasks. However, he lost the argument, but the fusion cells in the battalion came from the fire support sections. In 2008, not a lot of fire missions occurred so the fire supporters needed a job. After taking command and knowing the importance of intelligence operations, the author trained his fusion cell to incorporate lessons learned
from the 2006-2007 deployment. It took two months of coaching and mentoring to get them to understand what he wanted and how he wanted it. The main thing the author got them to understand was that intelligence at the company level is like a mosaic. The patrols gather bits of information and submit them to the fusion cell. It is the job of the fusion cell with the assistance of the commander to put these pieces of information together. By gaining new pieces of information, a picture of the COIN environment starts to appear.\textsuperscript{53} He also had them realize that organization leads to success. The company had to know what information it had, the information’s relevance, and where to find it.\textsuperscript{54} If the company could not do that, all its efforts were wasted (See Table 6 at the end of Chapter 4 to compare to the common practices of Galula and Trinquier: identifying insurgents).

First, the initial zone reconnaissance conducted did not provide information on the local names for areas in the company zone. To fill this intelligence gap, the company commander tasked the platoons to ask the locals for this information. The platoon leaders made sure to ask as many people as the patrol encountered in the zone to cross check the information. Next, the fusion cell organized the data passed to us from the previous unit on the members of the SOI and any new members added recently. Since the SOI all carried identity cards showing employment with the SOI, the fusion cell had the beginnings of a census for the company zone.\textsuperscript{55} The company had begun census operations prior to the author taking command in August, and continued it until the end of November 2008. Insurgent activity had been minor since the battalion’s arrival in zone at the end of April 2008. However, it picked up in July and maintained a relatively steady level until mid October. Once the insurgents increased their activity, it was easy for the
fusion cell to identify locations and insurgents. Gathering data from higher intelligence, census data, and patrol debriefs, the fusion cell created link diagrams tracking human relationships and maps with local names. These tools helped to stop trouble before it even began because these tools provided the company with information that the locals saw as omnipotence. The company leadership had a good idea who participated in insurgent activity before, and by repeatedly visiting them on patrols, ensured the locals knew they had an eye on them.

The biggest adjustment the author had to make concerned KLEs. In 2006, he did KLEs with a key Sheik from the Albu Nimr Tribe; however, the author just represented the battalion commander and had no decision authority. This experience introduced him to the formalities and techniques of KLEs. In 2008, he had over a dozen village leaders representing two main tribes, the Battawi and Shimmari, with which he conducted KLEs. In this second scenario, he had command authority to make decisions that met the brigade and battalion commander’s intent. The main situations that he dealt with during KLEs concerned SOI and public works contracts, area security, tribal relations with the IA, and sectarian relations between tribes. Through KLEs, he learned that much could be accomplished by drinking chai, listening, and when necessary, speaking (See Table 5 at the end of Chapter 4 which shows KLEs as PA).

A/2-6 IN managed two contracts with the local tribal leaders in its AO. The first and largest contract pertained to the SOI. The company originally managed 14 SOI contracts, but when the Georgians had to suddenly leave theatre, we picked up an additional three SOI contracts on our far eastern boundary. The company paid the contract holder for a specified number of SOI members. When the pay agent paid the
SOI, he paid the tribal leader designated to run the SOI. The company never had a problem with this system. The company leadership found that the SOI leader had more people working than designated, and he paid them less per person, but this system allowed more people to work and distributed the wealth to more tribal members. No doubt there was a small amount of graft on the leader’s part, but the SOI did their job and no major disruptions occurred (See Tables 5 and 6 at the end of Chapter 4 which shows the SOI checkpoints as GW, the management of the SOI as PA, and the SOI as local security forces).

The other main contract the company managed dealt with a public works program. This public works program had two contracts with the two most influential tribes in the AO. Basically, with this program the workers conducted the basics of civil government. They cleaned trash from the villages and roads running through the AO, and they also cleared vegetation from the routes as well. This helped to prevent roadside Improvised Explosive Devices.

These two types of contracts helped with security for several reasons. First, the local population became actively involved in providing its own security through the SOI. This action denied sanctuary to AQI making them a more visible target. Secondly, the contracts provided fiscal relief to an impoverished area. This took away a recruiting tool from AQI who used to pay locals to place Improvised Explosive Devices, conduct small arms fire attacks on ISF or coalition forces, or provide logistical support. Third, it allowed the Iraqis to have daily contact with American forces. The lead company interpreter told the author that the Iraqi impression of Americans before the surge was one of Americans clad in sunglasses shouting “Stop Motherf@#$er!” or “Put your hands
up Motherf@#$er!” For someone who has been in this situation, it is an understandable sentiment; however, by having more interaction with the locals, they see that American Soldiers are human and relations improve. Improved relations do not mean the locals love American Soldiers, but the locals do like Americans better than the man who is cutting off heads (See Tables 5, 6, and 8 at the end of Chapter 4 which shows the ISF as part of the PA, local security forces, and how their use by American forces helped to decrease the number and effectiveness of attacks)!

These contracts gave the company leverage when dealing with the tribal leaders. If the tribal leaders did not want to abide by the rules, the company cut off the funds. Could this have made for a difficult situation? Yes it could, but since the IA wanted to arrest a lot of the SOI members, American influence with the IA combined with the SOI contract money gave the company a very strong negotiating tool.

As mentioned before, the IA leadership had improved drastically. The company commander felt comfortable with his partnered IA commander conducting operations in the AO. With this in mind, during the weekly security meetings (KLEs) with the IA and SOI leadership, he let the IA battalion commander run the show. When the SOI asked him a question, he directed the SOI to ask the IA commander. The company commander’s main talking point was that American forces were not going to be in Iraq forever, and the SOI and IA needed to learn to work together. This gave the IA commander credibility in the eyes of the SOI leaders. The company commander could do this because he and the IA commander had a quick 15-25 minute meeting before hand to discuss what they wanted to achieve during the weekly security meeting. If the IA commander wanted to say something that could possibly jeopardize relations, the author
would let him know how this could possibly affect the situation. No situations arose in which the IA commander and the author did not agree by the time they met with the SOI. The first IA battalion left after the author’s first four months in command, but he and the second IA battalion commander were able to conduct things in a similar manner (See Table 5 at the end of Chapter 4 which shows KLEs between the SOI, IA, and US as PA).  

The author met with the local tribal leaders at least once a week at the security meeting, but he would also meet with two or three separately during the week. His platoon leaders had almost daily contact with them. Once they cemented these working relationships, they were able to identify reasons for past grievances and possible solutions to rectify them. The biggest problem concerning sectarianism came along the company’s eastern boundary between two branches of the same tribe. The Shimmari tribe in our AO had three branches. Two of these branches adhered to the Shia sect and the other to the Sunni sect. When AQI operated in the AO, it exploited this divide and caused a cousin against cousin war. With AQI neutralized in the area, the tribe now had to try and put that cousin war behind it. It took six months of negations with the IA and the two branches along our eastern boundary to get to the beginnings of a compromise. The IA agreed to put a COP in the area, the company did its best to clear the area of old Improvised Explosive Devices and get the displaced persons jobs in the IP, and the SOI leader in the area promised to provide security. This deal, although not perfect and some issues did arise later, started a return of displaced persons to the area which helped to start an end to that feud. One other example had a local dispute over a woman being exploited by AQI to drive the Battawi to fight one of Shia branches of the Shimmari on the western side of
our AO. Once the company learned of this past event, the company leadership started to work on a peaceful settlement. It took close to four months, but by the end of the company’s tour, both sides wanted A/2-6 IN to mediate the conflict. The company ran out of time, but passed the information to the IA and its replacement unit (See Tables 5 and 6 at the end of Chapter 4 which shows KLEs as PA, and bases amongst the population which allowed for this daily contact with local leaders).

The advent of the Awakening movement that led to the SOI won the war. Yes, American soldiers played a big part in winning the war, but without the people of Iraq joining the cause, failure was all but inevitable. Casualties would have continued to mount with no visible sign of progress. The high casualties coupled with a lack of progress, would have eventually led to the exhaustion of the American public’s will to continue the war effort. This is precisely what occurred to the French government that precipitated France’s general withdrawal from Algeria.

The SOI helped the company to succeed for many reasons. The SOI maintained a constant presence in zone which hampered the insurgents’ freedom of movement. Many insurgents switched sides because AQI became overbearing. Critics complain that Americans paid SOI members, with blood on their hands, to support the nascent Iraqi government. While that is true, it also ended escalating violence. The SOI member who quit shooting at Coalition Forces and started shooting at AQI resulted in one less person for Coalition Forces to kill and probably more since that individual’s family and tribe usually supported him. Also, since Americans paid them, Americans controlled them. This gave American leadership leverage with the GOI and ISF since the SOI had close to 100,000 armed members. Those members forced the GOI to acknowledge their existence.
and grievances. Even when the GOI and IA began paying the SOI in October 2008, A/2-6 IN had rosters of the SOI members in its AO.\(^{62}\) The fusion cell did its best to ensure the fidelity of the transfer of these SOI rosters to the GOI to ensure the members continued to receive pay. Of the close to 830 SOI members in the company AO, close to 805 continued to receive pay, and the fusion cell worked to get the other 25 on the GOI SOI roster. The tribal leaders saw this, and these efforts helped to win the support of the population in the company zone (See Tables 5 and 6 at the end of Chapter 4 which shows SOI management as PA and local security forces).

The IA in 2008 had vastly improved. The author felt a tremendous amount of pride in these forces. Although the brigade that partnered with 2-6 IN was not the same one that worked with 1-36 IN in 2006, it still amazed him to see the difference 14 months had made. These forces could accomplish all assigned tactical tasks. Their major weakness came from a poor logistic capability. The army had not created the logistic systems necessary to arm, equip, and repair its combat systems. Administration also proved a weak point. Many soldiers received pay several months late; however, absent without leaves did not decimate the formations as much as it had in 2006.

The leadership had also improved. The two battalion commanders partnered with the author led from the front. He never saw the battalion commander in 2006. These leaders showed they cared for their soldiers. The author inspected their mess hall, supply storage areas, tactical operations center, and arms room. All made an impression on him. The battalions had several company COPs throughout the AO. The IA commanders also provided these locations with what they needed.
The author partnered with the battalion commander. His platoon leaders partnered with the company commanders and platoon leaders. We met with them daily. The author coached his officers and soldiers to show the IA respect. The main teaching point focused on silent professionalism. They did not need to brag. They were in Iraq, and the IA did not patrol in America. That knowledge should temper outward signs of arrogance. The IA respected American soldiers as evidenced by their appearance. IA soldiers look like American soldiers. That is more by choice than regulation. The author explained that by showing the IA respect the soldiers in the company could win back respect. To illustrate the point, the author told his soldiers to allow the IA the right of way along the main road in the company AO. This was a quick and easy way to show respect. It also insured no children were harmed when the IA and the soldiers of Alpha Company raced each other to win position to pass one another in oncoming traffic. By giving this respect to the IA, it showed them that they had become a real military force, and that allowed them to feel pride in their organization (See Tables 5 and 6 at the end of Chapter 4 which shows IA development as PA and bases amongst the population respectively).

The techniques and tactics of 2008 differed from the TTPs of 2006. The fusion cell made life easy by developing link diagrams and localized maps that developed the human and geographic terrain. With this knowledge, conducting KLEs with tribal leaders became less arduous because key leaders had background information that assisted in understanding of the environment.\footnote{63} The company used these KLEs instead of force to shape the environment. The SOI made the environment safer for the people of Iraq, the ISF, and coalition forces. Since the environment was less dangerous, the relationship with the IA moved from development to mentoring. For the author, 2006 represented the GW
portion of Fall’s equation, and 2008 represented the PA portion (See Tables 5 and 6 at the end of Chapter 4). A company commander can never totally affect the PA portion, but A/2-6 IN did as much as possible at the company level in 2008.

What type of insurgency were A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN fighting (See Table 7 at the end of Chapter 4)? The insurgency A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN faced differed from each other in some respects. In Hit during 2006 and early 2007, A/1-36 IN fought AQI, Sunni nationalists, and criminal elements. The three fought together against a common enemy, the US. AQI had an Islamist ideology seeking to unite the Middle East under a caliphate that followed Sharia law. The AQI’s harsh enforcement of Sharia law alienated their Sunni nationalist allies, and breaks in the alliance started to surface in the late summer of 2006. The Sunni nationalists fought against an occupier. The nationalists fought the invader because of frustration over the lack of progress in rebuilding after the conventional war, national pride, fear of Shia retribution, and a sense of vengeance for a family member or friend killed by coalition forces. These emotions are natural and understandable; however, with the right use of carrots and sticks, this side could be brought over to the coalition side. The criminal element had roots that predated Saddam Hussein. Smuggling is a pastime in Al Anbar. American forces were just another organization trying to cut profits causing smugglers to fight back. Also, as with all urban areas, there were psychotic criminals who like to kill for the fun of it. The hard part of this insurgency was trying to decide what type of enemy you faced. AQI definitely fought an ideological insurgency, and arguably, the others did as well.

In Salman Pak during the 2008 to 2009 deployment, the insurgency was even more complex than in 2006 to 2007. There were AQI remnants, but JAM also had a
presence in the area as did the other elements mentioned earlier.\textsuperscript{67} However, by this time, the nationalists had come over to the side of the Coalition as the SOI.\textsuperscript{68} The awkward part about this arrangement was that the SOI had come over to our side, but the GOI had not recognized this. This led to confrontations between the GOI and SOI. Elements of the ISF, especially the National Police, had sectarian agendas and acted in a rogue manner that violated the rule of law.\textsuperscript{69} This insurgency was also an ideological one based on religion, national sovereignty, and political posturing.

Not all of the tactics used by the two companies, A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN, produced lasting effects. In some cases, the tactics simply failed. A/1-36 IN revised the tactics it used during its tour in Hit, Iraq three times for a reason. The tactical evolution undergone by A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN demonstrate the futility of a strictly military approach to COIN. Following a brief discussion of tactics used, this thesis will discuss the criticisms of French COIN theory levied by Gentile, Arquilla, and Luttwak.

The cordon and search technique quit producing results as the enemy changed his TTPs to counter the tactics employed by A/1-36 IN. On one level, the technique worked because the company met and talked with the local population, but on another, it failed because the insurgents moved to new locations for which the company had no intelligence.

The snatch and grab technique came to an end because it produced no palpable results. Moreover, the technique led to an ambush on one of the platoons that inflicted a casualty on the unit that required an urgent surgical evacuation. That soldier never returned to the unit.
A/1-36 IN used the ambush technique with mixed results. Ambush proved successful at times, but at others, it did not. The commander analyzed data garnered from patrols, and in order to gain contact with the enemy for a decisive action, took a calculated risk by conducting squad sized zone ambushes in known areas of insurgent activity. During one of the engagements with the enemy, the company lost two soldiers to wounds resulting from an enemy’s grenade attack.

In a subsequent tour in Iraq, a platoon leader from A/2-6 IN was killed in an ambush in which the attacker posed as a member of the SOI. The company commander had one of the least restrictive policies toward the IA/SOI. The company did not force individuals in these elements to clear their weapons while working with its members. Some might argue that this policy led to the death of the platoon leader; however, the company always pulled security, but the split second of positive association proved fatal in this case. Complete safety is impossible in war. Commanders attempt to mitigate risk, but safety must be balanced with mission accomplishment. The calculated risk was necessary to build trust with the IA/SOI. Calculated risk entails outcomes that are both positive and negative.

Turning to the subject of criticism of current Army doctrine and French COIN theory on which it is based, the author of this thesis will address the main arguments of the three authors identified in Chapter 2 who disagree with the theories espoused in this chapter. The authors, Gentile, Arquilla, and Luttwak, have all argued against the tactics of Galula espoused in this chapter. The author wants to show that the critics’ ideas do not necessarily conflict with the ones mentioned here, and could possibly be used in conjunction with them.
The main point of contention raised by Colonel Gentile is that the US Army’s current doctrine is too closely aligned with the French theory because it preaches population centric versus enemy centric warfare. Experience shows that population centric warfare does not mean that major combat will not occur. While seeking security during the clearing phase of operations, major combat has a very high probability of occurring. For example, a forty-man insurgent element attacked a platoon of A/1-36 IN in order to destroy the IP station jointly protected by the platoon and the IP. The company’s experience shows that, during the clearing phase of a COIN operation, a major focus of the effort should be on enemy centric warfare. As Fall preaches, however, combat operations should always occur with the political process in mind. The companies’ experiences in Iraq, discussed above, indicate that military action alone is insufficient to curtail the insurgency. Similarly, as Trinquier witnessed against the Viet Minh, once the insurgents reach a level of physical parity, they will look for the climactic conventional fight. The counterinsurgent must have the ability to conduct both population and enemy centric war.

John Arquilla argues for smaller units fighting against networks to solve the US Army’s current problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. The A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN experience shows that Arquilla’s prescription is what occurred and that this is entirely consistent with Galula’s experiences and recommendations. Galula found that his smaller units, dispersed in multiple villages, did not face as high a risk as larger transient formations, because his soldiers knew the local inhabitants and gained their trust which led to more intelligence. By identifying the insurgent networks, it became possible to target and neutralize them. Technological means cannot do this alone. Soldiers on the
ground were necessary to garner human intelligence only available from human interaction. Once soldiers from A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN began talking to the locals, information began to accumulate which helped with targeting. The true area of debate, where there is no disagreement between Arquilla and the author, comes from the higher echelon’s desire to minimize American casualties. This caution is commonly referred to as risk aversion. Smaller units will not have the ability to fight on their own while risk aversion permeates upper levels of command.

Lastly, Edward Luttwak believes that COIN is costly and that airpower could accomplish the same endstate at a vastly cheaper rate. The A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN experience in Iraq demonstrates, however, that airpower can only augment the ground forces in accomplishing the endstate. Airpower cannot accomplish COIN on its own. Airpower can be cheaper as witnessed by the drone program in Afghanistan, but airpower cannot always hit the right target or produce the desired effects. For instance, in 2006, a 500 pound bomb passed through a roof in Hit, Iraq. No explosion occurred and the desired results were not achieved. When AQI attacked the newly built IP station in January 2007, an attack helicopter, sent to provide air support, had a main weapons system malfunction and did not provide the desired effects. In both cases, ground forces were necessary to fulfill the mission’s goals. Airpower can augment but never completely replace soldiers on the ground.

Using the tables described in Chapter 3, I will now show the trends that they depict. Table 5, Bernard Fall’s Theory of RW = GW + PA, showed how the two companies led by the author used GW plus PA methods to counter the RW practiced by the insurgents. The unfortunate part of the A/1-36 IN example is the over reliance on GW;
however, this can be explained by level of the insurgency Galula would have described in the author’s AO. Since the counterinsurgents had to clear the area of insurgents, a heavy reliance on GW became necessary until a higher level of security occurred. The beginnings of PA emerge with of the formation and development of the IP and the continued development of the IA. In the A/2-6 IN example, the equation shows more balance, and the author would argue that the PA side of the equation has more weight. In this example, the previous unit already conducted the clearance of insurgents.

Table 6, Common Practices of Galula and Trinquier, provide four commonalities between the two men: identify the insurgents, clear the insurgents, create bases amongst the population, and create local population security forces. In the examples provided by the author’s experience, his units did all four as well. The major differences being that A/2-6 did not have to clear the insurgents from the area since the prior unit did that. The SOI A/2-6 worked with provided a local security that more closely resembles what Galula and Trinquier had in mind; however, having indigenous security forces at higher levels also works as long as the national government has legitimacy in the eyes of the population.

Table 7, Characteristics of Insurgency Faced, show that all participants studied for this thesis faced adversaries that fought for ideological reasons, received external support, had an active sanctuary, and used asymmetrical tactics when their opponent had greater physical strength. Only in the Vietnam example, when the Viet Minh gained local parity, did the counterinsurgent face a symmetrical opponent. The table also shows that the opponents the author faced were not a homogeneous lot. The author’s companies faced many opponents with differing objectives.
Table 8, Metrics Used to Identify Effectiveness, shows that the change in enemy activity depends on the intelligence at the disposal of the counterinsurgent. A change in the number of attacks could occur at any time since the enemy may be low on munitions, avoiding counterinsurgent activity, or watching and learning counterinsurgent TTPs. The same can be said for effectiveness of attacks and a change in enemy TTPs. However, an increase in actionable intelligence drives the success of operations and can have a direct impact on all the other metrics. In all the examples provided, actionable intelligence led to a sustained increase in the other metrics. No other metric had the same impact.

Table 5. Bernard Fall’s Theory of RW=GW+PA Complete

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Companies</th>
<th>GW</th>
<th>PA</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/1-36 IN</td>
<td>-Clearance Operations</td>
<td>-Training IA/IP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Intelligence Gathering</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Raids</td>
<td>-KLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Ambushes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/2-6 IN</td>
<td>-Intelligence Gathering</td>
<td>-SOI management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Census Operations</td>
<td>-Partnership with IA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Raids</td>
<td>-Public Works/Micro Grants</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-SOI Checkpoints</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Weekly Security Meeting Between US, IA, and SOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-KLEs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Created by author using data from Bernard Fall, Last Reflections on a War (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole, 2000), 210.*
Table 6. Common practices of Galula and Trinquier Complete

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common practices of Galula and Trinquier</th>
<th>Authors Companies and relevance of their actions in comparison with tasks at left</th>
<th>A/1-36 IN</th>
<th>A/2-6 IN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identifying Insurgents</td>
<td>Census/Intelligence Helped ID insurgents in AO</td>
<td>Census/ SOI Rosters/ Intelligence ID human terrain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing Insurgents</td>
<td>Cordon and Search/Ambush/Raid Operations</td>
<td>Most Cleared by prior unit; SOI and active COIN ops kept insurgents from returning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bases Amongst the Population</td>
<td>Company/Platoon bases in Hit, Iraq</td>
<td>BN/Company bases in Salman Pak, Iraq</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Population Security Forces</td>
<td>IA/IP</td>
<td>IA/IP/ SOI</td>
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Table 7. Characteristics of Insurgency Faced Complete

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of Insurgency Faced</th>
<th>Galula</th>
<th>Trinquier</th>
<th>Fall</th>
<th>A/1-36 IN</th>
<th>A/2-6 IN</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>FLN/Viet Minh</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>AQI/Iraqi Nationalists/ Criminal Elements</td>
<td>AQI/JAM/Iraqi Nationlists/ Criminal Elements</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>Communist/ Nationalist</td>
<td>Communist/ Nationalist</td>
<td>Sectarian/ Nationalist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Arab/ Communist</td>
<td>Arab/ Communist</td>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>Muslim Extremist/ Iran</td>
<td>Muslim Extremist/ Iran</td>
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<tr>
<td>External Supporters</td>
<td>Morocco/Tunisia</td>
<td>Morocco/Tunisia/Laos/ China</td>
<td>Laos/ Cambodia/ China</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Syria/Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Sanctuary</td>
<td>Asymmetrical</td>
<td>Asymmetrical/Symmetrical</td>
<td>Asymmetrical/Symmetrical</td>
<td>Asymmetrical</td>
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*Source: Created by author.*
Table 8. Metrics Used to Identify Effectiveness Complete

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<th>Counterinsurgents</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Number of Attacks</td>
<td>Insurgents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>told to stay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>out of Galula’s AO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness of Attacks</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>decreases because attackers are outsiders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Enemy TTPs</td>
<td>Insurgents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conduct simple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>attacks due to high attrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in Actionable Intelligence</td>
<td>Tips come from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>locals leading to detentions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2 Ibid., 375.
5 Ibid., 53.
6 Ibid., 54.
7 Ibid., 55.
8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., 56.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.


17 Ibid., 99.

18 Ibid., 100.

19 Ibid., 122.

20 Ibid., 123.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 220.

24 Trinquier, 54.

25 Ibid., 31.

26 Ibid., 24.

27 Ibid., 15.

28 Ibid., 45.

29 Ibid., 38.

30 Ibid., 20.

31 Ibid., 28.
32 Ibid., 61.


34 Fall, *Street Without Joy*, 27.

35 Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, 145.


40 Ibid., 535.


43 Ibid.


45 Headquarters Department of the Army, Bronze Star Narrative for CPT Augustine Gonzales, Written by LTC Thomas Graves, Orders Number PO 307-036, Signed by LTG Peter Chiarelli, Baghdad, Iraq, 3 November 2006.

46 Ibid.


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49 Headquarters Department of the Army, Officer Evaluation Report for CPT Augustine Gonzales, 1 June 2007, 2.

50 Ibid.

52 Headquarters Department of the Army, Bronze Star Narrative for CPT Augustine Gonzales.


54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., 29.

56 Ibid., 30.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., 28.


60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.


63 Ibid., 26.

64 West, The Strongest Tribe, 9-10.

65 West, “Counterinsurgency Lessons From Iraq,” 3.


67 Ibid., 309.

68 Ibid., 365.

69 Ibid., 309.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Does French COIN theory as developed and practiced in Algeria and Vietnam have utility for the current American counterinsurgent? First and foremost, it is important for the modern counterinsurgent to realize that insurgencies are political wars waged to propagate an ideology. Each one has differences based on the history of the people and their geographic location. Military action alone can take the counterinsurgent only so far in this type of war. Political actions must be taken and are weighted more highly in a COIN war. Galula, Fall, and to an extent Trinquier all realized this and advised all counterinsurgents to understand this. The soldiers of A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN learned this in their every day dealings with Iraqi civilians. The soldiers’ actions had to be fair and measured to win the support of the Iraqi populace. They had to show that the system offered by the Coalition was better than that of the other side.

At the tactical level, intelligence is just as important today as it was fifty years ago. Technology can gather some types of intelligence, but the intelligence needed in COIN cannot all come from those sources. The best intelligence comes from the population. The only way to get this intelligence is to win the confidence of the population by living amongst them. Both Galula and Trinquier advised this, and A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN learned this. The more the soldiers of these two companies got to know the population, the more actionable intelligence the population provided. Census operations provide a wealth of knowledge on the population and allow the
counterinsurgent a means of controlling the population. Both Galula and Trinquier described this. The author learned it in 2006, but really realized its importance in 2008.

Creating and working with local security forces increases legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Galula and Trinquier describe how it is necessary to get the population to choose a side and actively participate in their defense. The author worked with the ISF in both 2006 and 2008. The security forces helped create a unified state in Iraq. In 2008, the SOI brought the rest of the population in A/2-6 IN’s areas of operation into active participation in COIN. They chose a side and actively participated in the struggle against common foes.

At the company level, empowering local leaders did not occur in 2006. Not many local leaders were found who wanted to participate in the struggle against the insurgency. In 2008, empowering local leaders occurred at the tribal and village level. These local leaders helped to gain control of the population that fell under their sway.

To answer the question posed above, yes, French COIN has relevance to today’s American counterinsurgent. However, French COIN has many similarities to other types of COIN. If a student of COIN looks at Thompson’s Clear, Hold, Build, and Won and compares it to the commonalities of Galula and Trinquier listed on Table 6 in Chapter 4, the student will notice similarities. Clear, Hold, Build, and Won sounds a lot like identify insurgents, clear insurgents, build bases amongst the population, and develop local security forces. French COIN alone does not hold the solution to conducting successful COIN operations, but it does provide a model and should not be disregarded. The author does acknowledge that RW=GW+PA does not address the entirety of the revolutionary spectrum, but Fall’s equation acknowledges that a political dimension has to be part of
the solution, and it needs to be weighted heavier than the military dimension. Knowing Galula’s, Trinquier’s, and Fall’s theories provides the modern American counterinsurgent with an understanding that can only help in resolving COIN situations.

**Recommendations**

As I mentioned above, I believe the current American counterinsurgent can learn from French COIN practice as practiced by David Galula and Roger Trinquier. The most important lesson that those two, as well as Bernard Fall espoused, however, was the importance of a political endstate and the political action required to achieve it to the overall success of COIN. Without a clearly defined political endstate that addresses the causes for the insurgency, victory is not possible for the counterinsurgent; therefore, military ways and means alone will not lead to a successful political end. The military aspect can at most set the conditions for success, but cannot defeat an insurgency by itself. The counterinsurgent must have a political strategy augmented by a military strategy to successfully counter the insurgency.

Based on the experiences of A/1-36 IN and A/2-6 IN, it is possible to militarily set the conditions for success; however, the counterinsurgent should first conduct several tasks. First, intelligence drives operations. The counterinsurgent must conduct an area reconnaissance to identify his geographical and human terrain. Part of this is identifying local names for areas and locations as well as identifying the capacity of the local infrastructure. It is also beginning a census to identify people in the area. By identifying and meeting with local leaders, counterinsurgent forces can gain some legitimacy in the eyes of the local population.
Next, one must gain and maintain security for the population. To do this is hard without intelligence, but the more legitimacy and intelligence obtained, the easier it becomes. Galula, Trinquier, and I all learned that once the enemy could no longer intimidate the population the insurgency lost effectiveness. To gain security, the counterinsurgent must live with the population because once the counterinsurgent leaves the area to return to base, the insurgent comes back and intimidates the population. This intimidation leads the population to conclude the government is weak and the insurgent is strong. This belief causes the population to believe the insurgent cannot lose the war, and they will eventually side with the insurgents. The population will never support the government in this situation since people tend to believe it is better to be intimidated and alive than a dead supporter of an ineffective government.

The term “Hearts and Minds” has become misunderstood. One does not win hearts and minds by handing out candy, money, or medical aid. The people will take these items, but doing those things alone does not win the support of the people. Insurgents use terrorism to take the support of the population. The terrorism used by insurgents defeats the idealism of the misunderstood concept of “Hearts and Minds.” Security wins hearts and minds. If the population is secure from the terrorism practiced by the insurgents, the population will be more inclined to support the counterinsurgent. Once security has been established, good governance, government sponsored projects, international aid, and candy will help the counterinsurgent win the permanent support of the population.

In COIN as in other types of warfare, the political endstate drives the military ways and means. Because the subverted government has to identify and counter the
causes for the insurgency to be successful, COIN takes time. Short cuts do not exist. As Edward Lansdale stated in his book, *In the Midst of Wars*, “It may be a slow process, small step by small step, but we should not deviate from the goal with excuses of expediency or to save the false pride of officialdom.”¹

The US has the potential to be successful not only in Afghanistan but wherever its military conducts COIN because as Americans they do not wish to occupy, govern, and exploit nations. Americans seek to help nations create institutions that have their “citizenry and the government so closely bound together that they are unsplittable. In other words, a country’s strength lies in having what Lincoln described at Gettysburg: a government ‘of the people, by the people, for the people.’”² As Table 7 depicts, most insurgencies have an element of nationalism associated with their cause. Since Americans seek to establish local governments in line with the quote above, the PA portion of Fall’s equation implicitly has more weight than the GW. That is the main difference between the French experiences in Indochina and Algeria and the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is something that works in the favor of the US and needs explanation to its local COIN partners and the world.

¹Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars*, 373.
²Ibid., 372.
ILLUSTRATIONS

Picture of Hit, Iraq
*Source:* Google Earth Imaging, (Picture from 29 November 2007): A/1-36 IN operated in the northwestern half of the city.

Picture of Salman Pak and surrounding area
*Source:* Google Earth Imaging, (Picture from 29 November 2007): A/2-6 IN operated in the area south of Salman Pak to the river and east to the Al Kut/Baghdad highway.
Map of Iraq

*Source:* United Nations, Map of Iraq (January, 2004): Hit is northwest of Ramadi and Salman Pak is southeast of Baghdad. Salman Pak is located just below the red word Baghdad.
GLOSSARY

Armies. Armed Forces created, raised, armed, equipped, and trained; a government is responsible for those aspects of an army’s formation.

Center of Gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.

Conventional Warfare. The hostile engagement between two armies (armed forces) on the field of battle.

Guerrilla Warfare. Small War; small war is war between two actors where there is a lack of military parity.

People or Population. The population of the country in which the insurgency is occurring.

Political Action. Political, ideological, and administrative system to control the population.

Revolutionary Warfare. The result of the application of guerrilla methods to the furtherance of an ideology or a political system.
APPENDIX A

Bronze Star Narrative for CPT Gonzales

NARRATIVE TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF
THE BRONZE STAR MEDAL

TO
CAPTAIN AUGUSTINE C. GONZALES

CPT Augustino Gonzales, United States Army, distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service to the United States as the Battalion Assistant Operations Officer for 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry and the Company Commander for A Company, 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry in Hit, Iraq, from 16 January 2006 to 15 January 2007 during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

CPT Gonzales deployed with the battalion from Friedberg, Germany to Camp Buehring, Kuwait. While in Kuwait, CPT Gonzales coordinated for the necessary resources and training of the entire battalion in preparation for the movement to Iraq. Upon completion of RSOI, he then coordinated the movement of the battalion to Hit, Iraq. He was one of the initial members of the task force to deploy to Hit and immediately established the command and control systems required for the fight. This involved integrating communications systems and battle tracking systems that were new to the battalion. Once in combat, CPT Gonzales served as the primary battle captain for the battalion, coordinating the actions of the battalion during numerous enemy contacts. He developed the systems necessary to maintain situational awareness on all activities in an area of operations the size of the state of Rhode Island. As the primary battle captain, he coordinated numerous medical evacuations of wounded Soldiers directly contributing to their safety. Due to CPT Gonzales’ maturity, he was assigned as the Detachment Commander for Able Detachment, TF 1-36 in Habbaniyah, Iraq. He formed the detachment using an infantry platoon as the nucleus and adding maintenance and medical assets. As the detachment commander, CPT Gonzales was primarily responsible for the development and training of an Iraqi Army task force formed from two companies. Within two months, CPT Gonzales created a formidable Iraqi Army force that could plan and conduct operations independently throughout Hit and Habbaniyah. He led this force on numerous raids throughout the city resulting in killing or capturing over 35 insurgents. On 27 September 2006, the commander of A Company, TF 1-36 was wounded. CPT Gonzales was immediately identified as the new company commander. Taking command while the company was conducting combat operations, CPT Gonzales began a series of clearing operations in conjunction with the Iraqi Army. His company cleared over 1000 structures within a four week period detaining numerous high value targets and other insurgents. CPT Gonzales led his company through numerous enemy contacts, to include improvised explosive devices, small arms, and rocket propelled grenades. While fighting throughout his assigned area of operations, he was able to defeat a significant IED threat that threatened the task force lines of communications. Additionally, he also marginalized the enemy mortar threat by denying the enemy access to traditional mortar points of origin locations. His aggressive operations were the key to reducing enemy contact throughout Hit. His company fought a difficult and determined enemy with distinction, resulting in numerous recommendations for awards for valor—a testament to his leadership. His actions are in keeping with the finest traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, the Ready First Combat Team, the Multi-National Corps—Iraq, and the United States Army.
APPENDIX B

Rater Comments for CPT/MAJ Gonzales

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART V - PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL EVALUATION (Rater)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. EVALUATE THE RATED OFFICER'S PERFORMANCE DURING THE RATING PERIOD AND HIGHER POTENTIAL FOR PROMOTION</td>
</tr>
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<td>X OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE, MUST PROMOTE</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. COMMENT ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE PERFORMANCE, REFER TO PART II, DA FORM 67-0 AND PART IV A, B, AND PART VA, DA FORM 67-0-1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT Gonzales is an officer who has completed all tasks assigned during this rating period. During the past three months, CPT Gonzales was primarily responsible for coordinating the training and development of two Iraqi army companies with assistance from members of a Military Transition Team and use of a mechanized infantry platoon. During this timeframe, the two Iraqi army companies were certified in the directed squad battle drills, platoon collective tasks, and company METL. These units rapidly developed and are fully trained to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Al Anbar. CPT Gonzales also coordinated security and maintained a quick reaction force able to respond throughout his area of operations that encompassed approximately 1000 square kilometers. CPT Gonzales is an intense officer who is fully committed to mission accomplishment and is fiercely competitive.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART V - PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL EVALUATION (PM/II)</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2. COMMENT ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THE PERFORMANCE, REFER TO PART II, DA FORM 67-0 AND PART IV A, B, AND PART VA, DA FORM 67-0-1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT Augustine Gonzales has performed well as an infantry company commander in combat. He assumed command under extremely adverse conditions replacing a company commander who had been wounded and medically evacuated to the United States. Additionally, the company first sergeant and company fire support officer were also medically evacuated at the same time. Despite the loss in senior leadership, Augie was able to build his own team and continue operations to defeat the insurgency in Hit, Iraq. His company constructed the first Iraqi Police Station in Hit and trained the Iraqi Police force that occupied the station. Within two weeks of construction, the station was attacked by a large insurgent force. CPT Gonzales' company fought tenaciously killing at least 10 insurgents and protecting the station with no loss of life. CPT Gonzales conducted a successful transfer of authority for his area of operations in Hit and redeployed his company efficiently with no loss of equipment or personnel.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PART V - PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL EVALUATION (PM/II)</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ Augie Gonzales performed exceptionally well as a rifle company commander during our COIN campaign in OIF. MAJ Gonzales' company team conducted COIN operations in the largest, most rural, and most complex zone of our area of operations in the southwest Madain Qada. MAJ Gonzales' interaction with the Sunni tribal population and leaders successfully defused much of the communal violence plaguing the area over the past several years. Leading the negotiations between rival clans, Augie was instrumental in furthering the reconciliation process and easing the problem of displaced persons. MAJ Gonzales worked closely with two successive Iraqi Army battalions assigned to his area to develop both their tactical capabilities and professionalism. The net result of his efforts was creating a security situation where Coalition Forces were in operational overwatch of Iraqi Security Forces maintaining security in what was once a potentially problematic region. Augie is a student of our profession and develops his subordinates to know how to think, vice what to think. Augie is a tough infantry leader that led his company from the front in combat. MAJ Gonzales is a compassionate leader that is fiercely loyal to his Soldiers and them to him. MAJ Gonzales will continue to excel in the most demanding infantry leadership positions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


**Periodicals**


**Government Documents**


**Other Sources**


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