THE LEADERLESS SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION: UNSTOPPABLE POWER OR LAST-DITCH EFFORT?

by

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December 2010

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Since September 11, 2001, the United States and its partners around the world have significantly damaged al Qaeda’s organizational structure, transforming what was once a robust terrorist network into one that is disaggregated and much less effective. Despite losing a considerable portion of its leadership in the war on terror, al Qaeda remains supportive of insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and they continue to perpetuate the Salafi-Jihadi ideology throughout the Middle East and beyond. As we continue to pursue a strategy aimed to further dismantle al Qaeda’s leadership we must consider what happens if we succeed? What should we expect to happen to the central organization if we kill or capture top-tier al Qaeda leadership such as Ayman al-Zawahiri or Osama bin Laden? Will the organization continue to be a threat without a recognizable leader? This research seeks to examine under what conditions a social movement organization will be effective without a leader. Advisors and scholars alike have dichotomous opinions regarding the potential effectiveness of leaderless social movement organizations. Social movement theorists have yet to examine leaderless organizations through the lens of their models. By examining leaderless social movement organizations in terms of the political process model we will gain a better understanding of why leaderless structures may be more effective for some organizations and less effective for others. This research will expand the existing body of social movement literature and provide a theory for predicting the potential effectiveness of leaderless social movement organizations.
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ABSTRACT

Since September 11, 2001, the United States and its partners around the world have significantly damaged al Qaeda’s organizational structure, transforming what was once a robust terrorist network into one that is disaggregated and much less effective. Despite losing a considerable portion of its leadership in the war on terror, al Qaeda remains supportive of insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it continues to perpetuate the Salafi-Jihadi ideology throughout the Middle East and beyond. As we continue to pursue a strategy aimed to further dismantle al Qaeda’s leadership, we must consider, what happens if we succeed? What should we expect to happen to the central organization if we kill or capture top-tier al Qaeda leadership such as Ayman al-Zawahiri or Osama bin Laden? Will the organization continue to be a threat without a recognizable leader? This research seeks to examine under what conditions a social movement organization will be effective without a leader. Advisors and scholars alike have dichotomous opinions regarding the potential effectiveness of leaderless social movement organizations. Social movement theorists have yet to examine leaderless organizations through the lens of their models. By examining leaderless social movement organizations in terms of the political process model, we will gain a better understanding of why leaderless structures may be more effective for some organizations and less effective for others. This research will expand the existing body of social movement literature and provide a theory for predicting the potential effectiveness of leaderless social movement organizations.
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<td>Animal Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASLTAH</td>
<td>Subversive Alliance for the Liberation of the Earth, Animals and Humans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Darul Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>Earth Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLA</td>
<td>Frente de Liberación Animal</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLA-CVN</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HLS</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISVG</td>
<td>Institute for the Study of Violent Groups</td>
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<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
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<td>Life Sciences Research Incorporated</td>
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<td>NAALPO</td>
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<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
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<td>PBB</td>
<td>Partai Bulan Bintang</td>
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<td>PCRM</td>
<td>Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine</td>
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<td>PETA</td>
<td>People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<td>SHAC</td>
<td>Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty</td>
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<td>SIMI</td>
<td>Student Islamic Movement of India</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Social Movement Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRATFOR</td>
<td>Strategic Forecasting Incorporated</td>
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We would like to thank our advisor, Professor Doowan Lee, and our second reader, Professor Michael Freeman, for all of their help and inspiration in writing this thesis. It would not have been possible without their guidance and direction. We would also like to thank our families, especially our wives, Heather and Stephanie, for their patience and understanding during the long hours of writing.
I. INTRODUCTION

But al Qaeda became powerful because bin Laden never took a traditional leadership role.¹

In many ways, Leaderless Resistance is a last-ditch effort to keep a struggle alive in the face of an overwhelming opposition.²

The leaderless jihad should be allowed to expire on its own.³

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the conditions under which leaderless social movement organizations are more or less effective. The term “leaderless” is a misnomer; all organizations have a leader to one degree or another. However, the degree to which the leader plays a role in everyday operations of the organization may vary. Leaders typically provide inspiration and/or operational direction for social movement organizations.⁴ Inspiration is provided through a combination of charisma and ideology, or a body of doctrine that guides the organization.⁵ The inspirational leader also frames the ideology to the culture by linking the organization’s identity, grievances, and proposed solutions to cultural norms. Operational direction includes the planning and coordination of ways and means to achieve tactical and strategic objectives.⁶ Sometimes the inspirational leader is also the operational leader; sometimes they are two different people. This paper refers to “leaderless” social movement organizations as those in which

⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Ibid.
the leader or leaders exercise a low degree of operational direction. This paper will introduce a theory that explains the potential effectiveness of leaderless social movement organizations and discusses methods for countering them.

B. BACKGROUND

In 2006, the publication of the bestselling book The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations challenged businesses to rethink their leadership strategies and organizational structures. Leaderless organizational structure was nothing new, but due to its overwhelming popularity, the book likely influenced many in and out of government who were concerned with combating terrorism. The U.S. had been fairly successful decapitating the leadership of terrorist groups during the first five years of the war on terror, in essence transforming them into leaderless organizations. Could the leaderless concepts articulated by authors Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom apply to terrorist organizations? If so, then the U.S. decapitation strategy could have the deleterious effect of spawning an “unstoppable power.”

Opinions regarding the effectiveness of leaderless social movement organizations are dichotomous. Some argue that leaderless social movement organizations are the next great threat—that they are more effective than organizations that have a clear leader.7 Others argue that they are less effective, that social movement organizations that adopt leaderless strategies do so as a “last ditch effort”8 to keep the organization alive.9 None explain the conditions under which leaderless social movement organizations are more or less effective. None have analyzed leaderless social movement organizations in terms of social movement theory.

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C. RESEARCH QUESTION

Under what conditions is a leaderless social movement organization likely to be more or less effective? This paper will attempt to provide an answer in terms of social movement theory. Examining this question through the lens of social movement theory’s political process model will provide a more nuanced understanding of why one leaderless social movement organization may be more or less effective than another.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on leaderless social movement organizations is best grouped into three broad categories. Counterterrorism advisors have written books and articles on the future terrorist threat and publicly debated their differences, and their implications are rather narrow.10 Scholars, on the other hand, have written about the utility of “leaderless resistance” as an organization strategy and attempted to relate the old term to today’s threat, but they have not done so in terms of social movement theory, which is well tested and most useful for analyzing social movements and their organizations.11 Finally, social movement theorists have written about organizational structure but have not gone so far


as to analyze “leaderless” social movement organizations. There is a clear gap in the literature that fails to explain the threat posed by leaderless social movement organizations in terms of models provided by social movement theory.

Within the last year, U.S. counterterrorism advisors have debated the current status of al Qaeda and the future threat it may pose. William Lind of the Free Congress Foundation claims that al Qaeda has adopted the leaderless model and David Kilcullen asserts that “today’s insurgents often employ diffuse, cell-based structures and ‘leaderless resistance.’” These advisors write of leaderless organizations as if they pose new and greater challenges, but they do so entrenched within an organization employing a decapitation strategy that is only effective so long as it is targeting organizations that have a leader. Simply because a terrorist organization adopts a leaderless strategy and becomes more difficult to target does not make it a more potent threat.

Two prominent advisors to the U.S. administration, Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, have publicly disagreed about the future threat of al Qaeda. In his book Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, Marc Sageman argues that the terrorist threat we face today looks very different than the one we faced on September 11, 2001. According to Sageman:

The present threat has evolved from a structured group of al Qaeda masterminds, controlling vast resources issuing commands, to a multitude of informal local groups trying to emulate their predecessors by


13 Lind, “On War #241.”

conceiving and executing operations from the bottom up. These...form a scattered global network, a leaderless jihad.\textsuperscript{15}

He concludes that “without direction (al Qaeda) cannot coalesce into a political organization able to govern a country. It can be a terrorist network and nothing more.”\textsuperscript{16} Bruce Hoffman disagrees, and has written that that the al Qaeda organization remains very much intact, and that it has relocated and reconstituted new leadership within existing structures.\textsuperscript{17} The disagreement between these advisors highlights two things: 1) confusion abounds at the highest levels over the actual status of the enemy in the war on terror, and 2) that scholars have not sufficiently analyzed leaderless organizations on a continuous scale of varying levels of effectiveness.

In fact, other leaderless social movement organizations do exist and they have achieved varying degrees of effectiveness. Sageman refers to al Qaeda as a social movement and al Qaeda Central as a social movement organization,\textsuperscript{18} but al Qaeda Central is but one organization within the broader Salafi-Jihad social movement that he describes in his 2004 book, \textit{Understanding Terror Networks}.\textsuperscript{19} Sageman says nothing about the leaderless social movement organizations that have been effective. While Sageman is essentially correct in his assessment that al Qaeda Central is a leaderless organization in decline and that they cannot govern effectively, the implications he draws narrowly fit the al Qaeda terrorist network. By limiting his analysis to this single network Sageman limits his potential policy implications. Furthermore, Sageman is unable to distinguish the variables that explain the effectiveness of leaderless social movement organizations. Counterterrorism experts are not alone in their insufficient explanations.

Scholars have written sparsely about “leaderless resistance,” its history and application in the radical environmental and white separatist movements. “Leaderless

\begin{footnotes}
\item Sageman, \textit{Leaderless Jihad}, vii.
\item Ibid., 144.
\item See Sciolino and Schmitt, “The Nation - A Not Very Private Feud Over Terrorism.”
\item Sageman, \textit{Leaderless Jihad}, 200.
\end{footnotes}
Resistance” is an organizational strategy first articulated in 1953 by Colonel Ulius Amoss, an officer in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II. Amoss was frustrated that the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies were using outdated methods to build resistance against communism in Eastern Europe. Anti-communist resistance cells in Europe were being infiltrated by Soviet intelligence agencies, and Amoss advocated for what he called “leaderless resistance” throughout Eastern Europe in order to subvert Soviet occupation. Amoss suggested:

We do not need ‘leaders’; we need leading ideas. These ideas would produce leaders. The masses would produce them and the ideas would be their inspiration. Therefore, we must create these ideas and convey them to the restless peoples concerned with them.

Many scholars and advisors, including Sageman, have erroneously attributed the concept of leaderless resistance to Louis Beam, a Texas Ku Klux Klan leader, and Aryan Nation activist. In his 1983 essay entitled “Leaderless Resistance,” Beam highlighted the disadvantages of a pyramidal organization structure, namely the ease by which law enforcement could execute a discriminate repression and decapitation strategy to dismantle the organization. His solution for overcoming these disadvantages was the concept of leaderless resistance, in which he advocated for “phantom cells” to cooperate with each other, absent communication and central direction. Leaderless organizations rely on influential members to perpetuate an ideology and frame it to the culture, but they do not require a leader to strategize, plan, and coordinate attacks. Beam stressed that in a leaderless organization it was incumbent upon the individual to “acquire the necessary skills and information as to what is to be done.”

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21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
inspirational leadership over the operational, but he was unable to successfully propagate the strategy within the white separatist movement.

In his analysis of Beam’s essay, Jeremy Pressman highlights two assumptions inherent within the leaderless resistance strategy: 1) multiple people hold common views and are willing to act on them in a violent manner 2) the strategy depends on a demonstration effect to mobilize others to act. These assumptions allude to the structural and ideological factors inherent in social movement theory. Mobilizing structures and strategic framing are two key variables that facilitate growth in social movement organizations. Mobilization under a leaderless resistance strategy results when “idealists truly committed to the cause” act on their own volition or “take their cue from others who precede them.” Inspirational leaders frame the movement’s identity, problem, and solution through a variety of means in order to persuade individuals to act, “keep people informed of events” and allow “for a planned response that will take many variations.” The actions that members or potential members read about and see on television and/or the internet motivate them to act. While these scholars have examined leaderless social movement organizations that have been effective, they have not analyzed them explicitly in terms social movement theory, which is most useful for analyzing the cycle of contentious politics or the origin, mobilization, and spread of social movements.

Finally, social movement theorists have written extensively about networks and their impact on organizational effectiveness, as well as the significance of framing an


30 Ibid.

31 David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (Aug., 1986): 464; According to Snow et al., “the term ‘frame’ is borrowed from Goffman (1974:21) to denote ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large. By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective. So conceptualized, it follows that frame alignment is a necessary condition for movement participation, whatever its nature or intensity.”
organization’s ideology and goals, but they have not gone so far as to analyze leaderless organizations.32 Social movement theory provides an excellent scientific framework for analyzing all social movement organizations. By not examining leaderless social movement organizations in particular, theorists have not demonstrated the unique characteristics of specific variables that explain how leaderless social movement organizations mobilize individuals to act collectively. Absent analysis in terms of social movement theory, potential policy implications remain unfounded. This paper analyzes leaderless social movement organizations in terms of social movement theory in order to justify wide-ranging future policy implications of potential threats.

E. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

We test our hypotheses through the lens of social movement theory’s political process model. The political process model combines four variables into a causal framework that explains the emergence and development of social movements.33 Collective action begins with grievances, and the extent to which a movement mobilizes depends on the political opportunity structures available for individuals to express their grievances, mobilizing structures within which individuals may organize to act collectively, and strategic frames that link movement ideology to the culture and motivate collectivities to act on behalf of the movement.34

All social movements arise out of a set of grievances. The strategies available for movements to express their grievances and bring about change depend in part on the socio political characteristics of the environment in which they exist. Political opportunities available to social movements may vary from open, democratic forms of government, with institutions available for people to assemble and voice their grievances, to closed, or authoritarian systems of government in which opposition to government is considered a crime. These opportunities often determine the tactics that an organization

33 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.
34 Ibid.
uses to bring about change, and also the tactics that the government may use to repress them. Social movement organizations structure themselves to take advantage of existing networks and mobilize the population.

Existing social networks provide established structures within which a new organization may recruit and mobilize members. Mobilizing structures may include professional associations, student and recreational organizations, or even government institutions. Movement leaders and members take advantage of the contacts they make through these existing networks to spread their message, recruit, and activate the population.

Social movement organizations strategically frame their ideology to achieve a high degree of resonance with cultural norms. They solicit empathy from the population when framing the problem. Prognostic frames, or the solution and tactics, follow directly from the diagnosis and are heralded as the only way to achieve movement goals. They maintain these frames by continually adapting them to cultural norms. They motivate individuals to act through a variety of techniques, to include appeals to religious fundamentals, morality, fear, Manichaeism, and millenarianism.

All of these variables can help to explain how social movement organizations mobilize individuals to act collectively, but they are not sufficient for explaining organization effectiveness. In this paper, we examine specific aspects of political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and strategic framing, within organizations that have varying degrees of operational leadership, to explain the conditions under which “leaderless” social movement organization are more or less effective.

1. Effectiveness

In his 1975 book The Strategy of Social Protest, William A. Gamson assesses the effectiveness of social movement organizations. Given countless variables that could affect social movement organizations, this is not an easy task, which explains why few


have attempted to assess social movement organization effectiveness since. Building upon Gamson’s work, however, Rachel Einwohner developed seven indicators that helped her assess the effectiveness of two local-level animal rights campaigns of the mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{37} One might think that goal achievement explains an organization’s effectiveness, but goal achievement is not a sufficient indicator of success in and of itself; organizations may be highly effective in changing structural institutions or society’s attitudes without ever achieving their stated goals. In this paper, effectiveness is assessed between two actors: the leaderless social movement organization and its target, which may be the state, private corporations, or society. This paper uses Einwohner’s seven indicators to assess six social movement organizations.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure1.png}
\caption{Social Movement Organization Effectiveness}
\end{figure}

The seven indicators depicted in Figure 1 should be considered on a spectrum of varying degrees of effectiveness. 1) Has the organization taken action against the target? We are particularly concerned with violent action against the target. Leaderless organizations abandon a hierarchical structure that produces operational direction for a reason; their actions are nearly always illegal and violent. 2) Has the target acknowledged the social movement organization as valid and relevant? Has the target verbally indicated that the social movement organization is legitimate and is worthy of a response? 3) Has the target consulted with the social movement organization? Has the target invited the social movement organization to negotiate a solution to remedy grievances? 4) Has the target made a concessional claim or promise to act in accordance

with the social movement organization demands? 5) Has the target changed its behavior in the direction desired by the organization? 6) Has the target complied exactly with the demands of the organization? 7) Has the social movement organization achieved its desired outcome or realized its overall goal? We assess these effectiveness indicators on social movement organizations within a variety of environments.

2. State Capacity

Social movement organizations pursue their goals within varying degrees of state capacity. The environment in which a social movement organization operates is going to have some effect on the ability of that organization to achieve its goals. In essence, the environment determines the political opportunity structures available to the social movement organization. Political opportunity structures are a necessary but not a sufficient variable for social movements to achieve collective action. Vince Boudreau provides a useful framework for examining the political opportunity structures available within a state. Boudreau’s research is focused on answering why precarious states use disproportionate power to quell a movement. According to Boudreau, the reaction of the state depends on both the capacity of the state and the capacity of the organization. Our study of leaderless social movement organization effectiveness is concerned with more than precarious regimes, and less concerned with the proportionality of state responses, therefore what is most useful for us is Boudreau’s typology of state capacity.

Boudreau expresses state capacity in terms of breadth and depth. Breadth refers to how broadly diffused state authorities are across time and space, or the degree to which the government is present and has established its authority within the confines of the state. The state may be narrow, or present in only “enclaves of society,” or it may be broad and have penetrated both urban and rural areas. Depth, on the other hand,

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40 Ibid.
describes the extent to which a state controls society.\textsuperscript{41} For example, states may be shallow, or “barely able to collect taxes,” or deep and able to “regulate intimate family relationships.”\textsuperscript{42} The state’s capacity in breadth and depth partly determines the organization’s ability to mobilize individuals to act collectively.\textsuperscript{43} Table 1 organizes Boudreau’s concept of state capacity in terms of breadth and depth.

Table 1. Boudreau’s Typology of State Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Capacity</th>
<th>Breadth – ability to exercise power simultaneously across territory</th>
<th>Depth – ability to exercise power simultaneously across many aspects of life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Broad – broadly diffused across time &amp; space</td>
<td>Shallow – little control over society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Narrow – narrowly concentrated across time &amp; space</td>
<td>Deep – extensive control over society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples</td>
<td>-Broad geographic power base</td>
<td>-Barely able to collect taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Penetrated &amp; established authority in rural areas</td>
<td>-Unable to regulate life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Government authority present in all areas</td>
<td>-Few laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Easily able to collect taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Regulate many aspects of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Many laws</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We use several quantitative indicators to help classify states into one of the four possible combinations of breadth and depth. The number of police per capita and the police density per square kilometer give us an indication of the breadth of the state. Police per capita and police density data is derived primarily from World Bank surveys taken during the time period that corresponds to our specific case studies. For this time period we compute a median score among all countries that provided this data to the World Bank, and we use the median to define the break point between the shallow and

\textsuperscript{41} Boudreau, “Precarious Regimes,” 37.

\textsuperscript{42} Boudreau, “Precarious Regimes and Matchup Problems in the Explanation of Repressive Policy,” 37.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
broad state. For depth, we use tax effectiveness and law enforcement scores derived from World Bank surveys. The median for the scores reported for all states during the specific time period defines a break point between shallow and deep states. In addition to the quantitative method described here, we also make a qualitative assessment considering the context of the data and historical facts, and in some cases we refer to our experiences living within the subject state.

According to Boudreau, states generally seek a balance of breadth and depth. On the surface it would appear that the most challenging environment for social movement organizations would be one that is both broad and deep. It is important to note that just because a state is narrow and shallow does not mean that it does not pose challenges for the social movement organization. These states typically are building their capacity to extend the breadth and depth of their control and in doing so may pose significant problems for challengers. For example, states that can easily collect taxes in enclaves of society might seek to increase their tax revenues by expanding their authority in previously ungoverned areas. Social challengers “require more crucial, more particular, and more specific responses” to shallow states within poorly consolidated areas. In all cases the state must decide who they can fight, who they can coopt, and who they can ignore.

Weak states must make a calculated decision on when to respond to social movement organizations. They must consider the capacity of the organization, in terms of breadth and depth, and how formidable that organization is relative to state power. According to Quintan Wiktorowicz, “the most serious challenge to a system of control based upon predictability and visibility is group work that does not conform to the logic of the system and instead remains outside state surveillance.”

45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 37.
on social movements in Jordan indicates that states try to channel collective action so they are visible within the breadth and depth of the state.

How does the environment affect the organization’s ability to achieve our effectiveness indicators? It is important to remember that antagonists for revolutionary movements may be different than antagonists for reform movements. Antagonists for revolutionary movements are always state authorities. Antagonists for reform movements may or may not be state authorities. Reform movement organizations may target the state, corporations, or even private individuals. State authorities, nevertheless, are responsible for maintaining control regardless of the type of social movement organization operating within its borders.

The state’s capacity in breadth mostly affects the first two effectiveness indicators (contact and relevance). A state that is broad will make it difficult for the social movement organization to take action against its antagonist. The presence of state authorities throughout the state’s territory does not eliminate opportunities for the organization to commit violent acts but it does have a deterrent effect and may make it increasingly more difficult for the organization to execute their attacks. Additionally, a broad state may acknowledge the social movement organization as valid and relevant. If an organization has taken action against its antagonists amidst state authorities then it may be considered formidable. The converse of both indicators is true as well.

The state’s depth, on the other hand, affects the organizations ability to achieve all seven indicators. The degree to which the state controls society not only determines the likelihood that a challenger will act collectively and be determined valid and relevant, but whether or not the state will coerce, channel, or concede to the social movement organization. States that wish to increase their depth may be more likely to channel or concede to organizational demands depending on the type of government they employ. For example, pluralistic democracies that grant wide-ranging freedoms to their citizens may honestly wish to represent the people. As India sought its independence from the British in the mid-1940s it tried to establish a form of government that addressed the grievances and concerns of those within the Hindu-Nationalist Movement. In fact, the state’s desire to address these concerns was so strong that it led to the formation of
Pakistan. On the other hand, tyrannical regimes may be less willing to negotiate and more willing to repress the citizenry. The Chinese government’s response to the student movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989 is a good example. Then there is the type of government we see more and more in third world countries, the authoritarian democratic government. The leaders of these states routinely empower institutions only as much as is required to placate certain tribes or ethnicities. As a result, institutions are weak and unable to address grievances from social movement organizations, and the state leader is the only individual with the power to address grievances. These state leaders would also be less likely to negotiate with social movement organizations, unless they reasoned it was necessary to maintain their grip on power.

Boudreau’s framework of state capacity helps us to determine the political opportunity structures available within a state and classify various states according to their capacity but political opportunity structures are only one variable that determines a social movement organization’s ability to mobilize. We gain a better understanding of the impact that mobilizing structures and strategic framing have on organization effectiveness by closely examining the social movement organization’s leadership.

3. Leadership

In each case study we look at the overall structure of the organization, the organization’s connectivity to existing networks, and it’s inspirational and operational leadership. These four indicators help us make a qualitative assessment about the degree of leadership within the organization. They also expose the impact that mobilizing structures and strategic framing have on the effectiveness of each organization.

Both inspirational and operational leaders use their organization’s structure and connectivity to existing networks for the greater goal of mobilizing individuals, but they have different sub-goals. The inspirational leader seeks to frame the organization’s ideology to the culture, while the operational leader plans and coordinates a strategy for direct action that is consistent with the ideology.
Figure 2 depicts our concept of varying degrees of operational leadership. Again, the inspirational and operational leader may or may not be the same person; in this paper we are concerned with the quantity of both types of leadership that exist within the organization. There typically exists a high degree of inspirational leadership in both centralized and decentralized organizations; however, the degree to which the ideology or frames resonate with the population varies among organizations. Centralized or hierarchical organizations typically have a high degree of operational leadership as well. Decentralized or cellular type organizations, on the other hand, tend to rely on organization members to plan, coordinate, and even strategize for the organization. These we suggest have a low degree of operational direction.

4. Theory

This paper hypothesizes that the effectiveness of leaderless social movement organizations depends on the structural characteristics of the organization and the capacity of the state in which the organization operates. The political process model provides a framework of multiple variables that can be used to explain the progression of social movement development. Social movements may consist of one or a variety of social movement organizations that seek common goals to change social behavior. The underlying premise of the political process model is that social change through social movement is “above all else a political rather than a psychological phenomenon.” Movement mobilization, and thus organization mobilization, is dependent on the political opportunity structures available for individuals to express their grievances, mobilizing structures within which individuals may organize to act collectively, and strategic frames which link ideology to the culture and motivate collectivities to act on behalf of the movement. See McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*, 56.

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structures are a function of state capacity. More opportunities exist in states that have little capacity to control the population than in states that exercise a high degree of control over the population. Some combinations of state capacity and organizational structure are more effective than others. Centralized organizational structures have a high degree of operational leadership while decentralized structures have a low degree of operational leadership. Social movement organizations operating in states that exercise a low degree of control over the population will be most effective if they are more centralized. Centralized social movement organizations in permissive environments can take advantage of their hierarchical structure to mobilize individuals to act collectively. On the other hand, those organizations operating in states that exercise a high degree of control can be most effective if they are decentralized. Social movement organizations that are decentralized remain resilient through very strong frames; frame resonance enhances a decentralized organization’s effectiveness in highly capable states. Furthermore, social movement organizations that operate in states that are developing, or increasing their capacity, require a combination of variables to become effective. They must be relatively centralized, highly connected to existing networks, and maintain a high degree of frame resonance in order to be effective. Figure 3 organizes these hypotheses into a typological theory explaining the conditions under which leaderless social movement organizations may be more or less effective.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leaderless Social Movement Organization Effectiveness</th>
<th>State Capacity - Breadth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Narrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Capacity - Depth</td>
<td>Shallow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><img src="image.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Leaderless Social Movement Organization Effectiveness

Each cell in Figure 3 corresponds to a combination of breadth and depth and represents distinct political opportunities available to a social movement organization operating within that type of state. In each type of state, effectiveness is a function of the degree to which the organization is centralized. In the narrow and shallow state, social movement organization effectiveness increases as the degree of centralization within the organization increases. Political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and strategic framing all contribute equally to the organization’s ability to mobilize. In the broad and shallow state, social movement organization effectiveness also increases as the degree of centralization within the organization increases. However, connectivity to existing networks and frame resonance are especially important in maintaining a centralized organizational structure capable of mobilizing individuals in these environments. In the broad and deep state, social movement organization effectiveness increases as the degree of centralization within the organization decreases. Social movement organizations in this environment require a high degree of frame resonance to mobilize individuals. The narrow and deep cell is blank because we do not examine...
cases in this environment. Our research indicates that there are very few states with a narrow/deep capacity. Typically developing states increase their presence and then increase their control over the population. Although there may be a few cases, it is highly unusual for a state to exercise a high degree of control over the population without first establishing its authoritative presence throughout society.50

F. METHODOLOGY

This thesis demonstrates how an organization’s effectiveness varies according to the organization’s structure in a variety of environments. This paper uses a combination of within-case methods and comparative methods to test the theory presented.51 Case study analysis provides empirical observations and degrees of variance across the theory’s variables.

This paper examines six cases to test the theory. The Environmental Movement and the Salafi-Jihad movement consist of organizations whose leadership exhibit varying degrees of operational direction. We have chosen three organizations from each movement for study. These organizations operate around the world and within a variety of state capacities.52 They are all illegal and organizations that use violent means to accomplish goals ranging from reform to revolutionary.

Given both movements’ historical operations in a variety of environments, we compare two cases in three of the four environments of state capacity. We expect to observe varying degrees of actual and relative effectiveness between each organization in each of the three categories of state capacity. Ideally, observations of differing degrees of

50 Chile (~2002) is perhaps the best example of a narrow/deep state. Chile had 193 police per 100,000 people (median 288) and a police density of 0.04 (median 0.31) in 2002, which qualifies it as narrow. Chile had a law enforcement score of 75 (median 60) and tax effectiveness score of 100 (median 88) between 2004–2009 qualifying it as deep. The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal,” accessed November 15, 2010, https://www.agidata.org.

51 According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett the combination of these methods with typological theory “reduces the risks of mistaken inferences.” Alexander George & Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 254.

effectiveness will infer that the differences are attributed to the variation in our independent variables, or the degree of state capacity and degree of centralization within the social movement organization. Should we determine that potential exogenous variables are the source of variation then we will first look to determine if they truly are exogenous. What first appear to be exogenous variables may be elements of our intervening variables, or frame resonance and connectivity to existing networks.

Process-tracing is used in all cases to strengthen inferences from observations in the most similar case comparison. Process tracing helps us determine if explanations from the most similar case comparison are causal or spurious. Furthermore, it helps us confirm the causal chain, or how the “independent variable(s) lead to the outcome of the dependent variable”\textsuperscript{53} depicted in the theory, and highlights causal variables that are absent in the theory. A combination of within-case comparison and process tracing helps us demonstrate the conditions under which leaderless social movement organizations may be more or less effective.

II. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES–BROAD AND DEEP

A. EARTH LIBERATION FRONT–UNITED STATES

In this section we examine a cell within the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) to determine the degree of operational leadership within the organization and the impact that leadership has on ELF effectiveness in the U.S. First we provide an overview of the ELF and the cell known as the Family and describe its direct action campaign in the U.S. Next we examine the political opportunities available to the ELF given the U.S. government’s capacity. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the impact of leadership on organizational effectiveness. Through the lens of the political process model our analysis demonstrates that the ELF has a low degree of operational leadership and a low degree of effectiveness.

1. Overview

The ELF was founded in 1992, in Brighton, United Kingdom (UK) by activist members of the EarthFirst! organization. EarthFirst! was dedicated to saving the environment through protest, but over time, more radical members of the organization came to believe that direct action against government agencies and corporations would more effectively advance their agenda. In 1996, the North American ELF was established, and its first direct action was an arson attack on a U.S. Forest Service truck in Oregon. As Leader and Probst point out, “the decoupling of (the) ELF from Earth First! enabled the two organizations to focus on their respective constituencies,” civilly disobedient protesters on the one hand, and violent activists on the other.

The ELF is an illegal but conspicuous organization. Members primarily use arson, sabotage, and vandalism against the tools they claim that government agencies and corporations use to destroy the environment. In 2004, the FBI declared the ELF and

54 Leader and Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,” 38.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
Animal Liberation Front (ALF) to be the top U.S. domestic terrorist threat based on its belief that between 1996 and 2002 the organizations were responsible for some 600 criminal acts totaling $43 million in damages. While there is no way to know exactly how many incidents the ELF is responsible for, the yearly number of attacks claimed by the ELF continues to increase. Attacks overseas, in particular, have increased markedly in recent years. In total, the ELF has claimed responsibility for over 220 attacks around the world, while boasting that it has never harmed a life.

The ELF’s most notable attacks have occurred in the U.S. In 1998, ELF activists burned several buildings at a ski resort in Vail, Colorado, causing over $24 million in damages. In 2003, activists burned down a 206-unit condominium complex in San Diego that was nearing completion, causing $50 million in damages. In March 2008, the ELF claimed responsibility for setting fire to five mansions on “the street of dreams” in Echo Lake, Washington. It succeeded in completely destroying three of the homes, which, ironically, were eco-friendly.

Between 1995 and 2001, the “destructive level of environmental terrorism (in the United States) soared.” During this period the Family engaged in twenty-one designated acts of terrorism, which was approximately one-third of all attacks committed in the name of the ELF in the U.S. during the same time period. On January 20, 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the indictment of eleven Family

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59 Ibid.


members as a result of a FBI investigation known as “Operation Backfire.” According to the U.S. government, the Family conspired “to influence the conduct of government, business and private citizens by means of violence, sabotage, widespread destruction, and intimidation.” In all but one of its attacks the Family used sophisticated incendiary devices to commit arson, and it “took elaborate steps to avoid discovery.” Anywhere from one to eight Family members participated in each attack, but typical attacks consisted of three to five members. The Family spent a relatively short time planning its direct actions, and most of the attacks were planned and committed within a relatively short distance from member homes.

2. Political Opportunity Structures

Despite the high degree of breadth and depth of the U.S. government, political opportunities exist in the U.S. for environmental activists to engage in violent direct action against private corporations and government agencies. As one of the most socially and technologically advanced countries in the world, the U.S. is hypothesized by many in the environmental movement to cause the greatest damage to the environment. A robust logging industry, plant and animal research facilities, sport utility vehicle (SUV) dealerships and vacation resorts are believed to harm the environment in one form or another.

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64 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Smith et al., “Geospatial Analysis of Terrorist Activities: The Identification of Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Behavior of International and Environmental Terrorists,” 68.
another and provide ample targets for the ELF. However, these are not the only targets available to ELF activists in the U.S. Electrical towers, apartment buildings, and even individual homes have been attacked as well.

\[ a. \text{ Breadth} \]

The capacity of the U.S. government is best categorized as broad. In 2002, the U.S. had 941,139 total police officers or 327 police per 100,000 people.\(^6^9\) The police per capita figure of 327 is well above the median (288) for countries that reported this data to the World Bank in 2002.\(^7^0\) U.S. police maintain a persistent and visible presence throughout the entire population; however, the U.S. has some large areas that are sparsely populated.

The U.S. had a density of 0.1 police per square kilometer in 2002.\(^7^1\) All of the Family’s attacks were conducted in the U.S. Pacific Northwest (Washington, Oregon, California, Wyoming, and Colorado) between 1995 and 2001, parts of which are in the least densely populated region in the contiguous U.S. Despite the fact that police density in the U.S. is well below the median of 0.31, we categorize the U.S. as broad because the per capita figure is above the median and our experience living in various locations within the U.S. tells us that the police are never very far away.\(^7^2\) Furthermore, first responders quickly reacted to nearly all emergency calls related to the Family’s twenty attacks, even in sparsely populated areas.

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\(^7^0\) The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.” The median was generated from all countries that reported data to the World Bank in 2002.


\(^7^2\) The police density median was computed from 48 countries that reported police statistics on NationMaster.com.
b. Depth

The capacity of the U.S. government is also categorized as deep. The most recent law enforcement score for the U.S., assessed within the last five years, is 73, which is above the median of 60.\textsuperscript{73} Tax effectiveness indicates not only the degree to which the state may control the fiscal behavior of the population, but also behavior in general because so much of our lives depend on our fiscal capacity. The U.S. score for tax effectiveness is 87.5, which is also the median.\textsuperscript{74}

Qualitative assessments also point to a high degree of depth for the U.S. government. The U.S. government regularly demonstrates its capacity to regulate the population, promulgate new law, and enforce current law. For example, U.S. law defined what was meant by “federal crime of terrorism” on November 1, 2000, and the modifications made to the law ultimately enhanced each of the Family members’ sentences.\textsuperscript{75} Additionally, multiple cases that occurred after September 11, 2001, provided precedence for future domestic terrorism prosecution and sentencing. The flexibility of the U.S. legal system helped the U.S. government investigate and prosecute members of the Family between 2004 and 2006.

Perhaps the two most significant impacts of U.S. capacity, in depth particularly, was the FBI’s ability to infiltrate the Family and effectively apply the law in order to prosecute members of the cell. The results of these prosecution may have had a deterrent effect on ELF actions in the U.S.; attacks in the U.S. declined following the prosecution while attacks overseas increased. Nevertheless, the ELF organizational structure was specifically designed to remain resilient in the most restrictive environment, and ELF attacks did not cease entirely. A more detailed examination of the ELF’s mobilizing structures is necessary in order to determine the organization’s effectiveness and the conditions under which it may be effective in the broad and deep environment.

\textsuperscript{73} The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.” A total of 84 countries were assessed for law enforcement effectiveness by the World Bank between 2004 and 2009. Most countries had only one assessment in those six years. We computed the median from the latest assessment available for each country.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75} U.S. Government Sentencing Memorandum, 51–59.
3. Leadership

Leaders are responsible for mobilizing individuals to act collectively and in accordance with organizational guidelines. The ELF, like all social movement organizations, mobilizes individuals through its structure, connectivity to local networks, and framing of its ideology; however unlike a majority of social movement organizations the ELF mobilizes individuals without a clear inspirational or operational leader. Mobilizing structures are a significant factor in the origin of social movements\(^\text{76}\), and according to Doug McAdam “structural stability, not disorder, facilitates movement emergence.”\(^\text{77}\) The ELF is an organization that is structurally stable despite the fact that it does not have a clearly identifiable leader. In this section we first examine the ELF’s structure and connectivity to existing networks, and then we examine the degrees of inspirational and operational leadership.

\(\text{a. Organizational Structure}\)

The ELF organization is best characterized as having a decentralized cellular structure. The ELF press office acts as a public relations center for cells, such as the Family, but spokespeople from the press office claim no ties to individual activists nor have they been linked by law enforcement authorities to direct actions in the past. The press office exists to hold press conferences and publish communiqués after attacks, and presumably to maintain the ELF website. Following the attacks, communiqués claiming responsibility are sent to the ELF and/or ALF press office for public dissemination.

The ELF has no membership list. If one believes in the ELF’s ideology, and acts in accordance with ELF guidelines then he or she is an ELF member.\(^\text{78}\) It is up to the individual to determine whether or not he or she will become a member; individuals become members in their own minds. ELF cells, however, exercise strict

\(^{76}\) McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements,” 282.

\(^{77}\) Ibid., 283.

control over who is admitted into the cell because cell leadership is most vulnerable to state repression. The Family took extraordinary measures to conceal their identities, create alibis, and communicate from a distance with other cell members.

The ELF’s organizational structure is dependent upon both direct and indirect ties. Movement meetings, print publications, and the internet are mechanisms that are commonly used to link individuals to the ELF ideology and spur collective action.79 A benign environmentalist who desires to have a greater impact on saving the environment may come across the ELF website while searching the internet where he or she can find all the information needed to take direct action. It is conceivable that the internet can provide the “salient” or strong tie that McAdam references as so important to individual involvement in a social movement;80 however, the internet, still in its infancy during the Family’s years does not appear to be pivotal to ELF recruitment. Only one Family member became involved with the Family through an Internet tie.81 In the case of the Family, social relationships that developed through face-to-face meetings such as EarthFirst! rendezvous, Family “Book Club” meetings, and various protest events became the salient ties by which members became committed to direct action for the ELF.

b. Connectivity to Existing Networks

The ELF’s organizational structure needs to be considered in the context of the larger environmental movement in which it exists. The environmental movement has steadily gained traction throughout the world since the 1960s. Hundreds of

79 Leader and Probst, The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism, 340.
81 Suzanne Savoie became involved with Daniel McGowan via the Internet, and they both eventually became Family members. See U.S. Government Sentencing Memorandum, 124.
82 “Book Club” meetings brought together Family members to discuss such things as “lock picking, reconnaissance of targets, computer security, encrypted messaging, and manufacture of mechanical and electrical timing devices used to initiate incendiary devices…While at each of the meetings, the attendees were expected to explain how they arrived, what countermeasures they used to avoid detection, and what alibi and alias they were using as cover for the meeting.” Family members who attended the Book Club meetings communicated via draft e-mail messages in a shared e-mail account. Five known meetings were held in four different states between 1995 and 2001. See U.S. Government Sentencing Memorandum, 4–5.
organizations have sprung up in the U.S. alone. Most organizations within the environmental movement are peaceful and were formed to raise public consciousness and lobby politicians. Public consciousness of environmental issues has become more of a norm within the culture, and politicians increasingly pass environmentally friendly legislation to address the public’s environmental grievances. Nevertheless, this growing network of organizations provides a large pool of possible recruits for the ELF, and forums to discuss direct action.

c. Inspirational Leadership

In his book *Eco-Terrorism*, Don Liddick describes the inspirational leaders in the environmental and animal rights movements. He notes that:

> While there may be no official leaders in leaderless resistance movements, in the realm of animal rights and environmental radicalism there are nevertheless authors, public figures, and press officers who provide inspiration and ideological support; Ingrid Newkirk, Peter Singer, Steven Best, Edward Abbey, Paul Watson, Craig Rosebraugh, Leslie James Pickering, and Dave Foreman are just a few relevant examples. Movement icons are especially important and provide inspiration; Barry Horne, for example, engaged in several lengthy hunger strikes and died while incarcerated for animal liberation crimes, and Julia “Butterfly” Hill holds the record for the longest tree sit (about two years).  

These inspirational leaders within the movement frame the ideology to appeal to movement sympathizers and reinforce activist commitment. They maintain the frames through websites, communiqués, and literature.

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Table 2. The ELF Strategic Frames  

| Identity Frames | As a nation and **global community**, we have witnessed the rapid decimation of our planet...for our families, our communities, for future generations, for all the species of life on the planet, and for ourselves... all of us depend on the earth for our survival. |
| Diagnostic Frames (Enemy) | From global warming, including the melting of the polar ice caps and polar bears threatened with extinction, to the air judged as unsafe to breathe in hundreds of U.S. cities, to the water supply polluted with chemicals and pharmaceuticals, to our food supply contaminated with genetic modification and genetically engineered ingredients, it is now common knowledge that environmental destruction is threatening life on earth. When it becomes clear that the **U.S. government** will not take the necessary measures to reverse this reality, and at the same time continues to allow **corporations** to get away with destructive practices, direct action must be taken. |
| Prognostic Frames (Goals/Solution) | - **To educate the public** on the atrocities committed against the environment and all of the species that cohabit in it  
- **To inflict maximum economic damage** to those who profit from the destruction of the natural environment  
- **To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal - human or non-human**  
Form your own Earth Liberation Front cell and do **what needs to be done** to protect life on the planet!  
If not you who? If not now when?  
**Laws have to be broken** to advocate for and to change the unjust and unhealthy practices. **It is logical** and a matter of international historic record. |
| Maintenance Frames | When politicians and governments refuse to prioritize the health of people, other species and the planet over the quest for financial gain, it is up to us to act. There is simply no excuse not to act. No longer may we allow the excuse of ignorance to prevent us from taking action. No longer may we rely on our own laziness, fear, insecurities, or inconveniences as an excuse not to act. |
| Motivational Frames | Every second we spend thinking of excuses as to why we don’t take direct action, another glacier melts, another inch of the sea rises, another forest is clear-cut, another animal is skinned for a fur coat, another animal is tortured in a laboratory, another community is polluted, another factory churns out SUVs, another factory farm slaughters thousands of animals, another worker is exploited, another person becomes ill, and the planet is one step closer to no longer being able to sustain life. |

The narrative on the ELF’s website clearly indicates a high degree of internal resonance between frames (see Table 2).  

Leader and Probst describe the operating philosophy of the ELF as one in which the actions are the ends it pursues; goals are oriented toward actions, not political change. The ELF “depends on the commitment of individual members to a common ideology and set of goals.” In his analysis of the ELF, Paul Joosse writes that:

Leaderless resistance allows the ELF to avoid ideological cleavages by eliminating all ideology extraneous to the very specific cause of halting the degradation of nature. In effect, the ELF’s use of leaderless resistance creates an ‘overlapping consensus’ among those with vastly different ideological orientations, mobilizing a mass of adherents that would have

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84 ELF Press Office website.  
86 Leader and Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,” 40.  
87 Ibid.
never been able to find unanimity of purpose in an organization characterized by a traditional, hierarchical, authority structure.88

The bridge between the broader environmental movement ideology and the ELF’s ideology is not too far; in fact the main difference is the prognostic frames. What are unique about the ELF’s strategic frames are its prognostic frames, or its goals and its methods for achieving those goals. The ELF’s goals are to “educate,” “inflict economic damage,” and “avoid harming any life.” These goals, digested in context of the broader environmental movement and compared to other environmental movement organizations seem relatively moderate. Therefore recruiting members from the broader movement does not require a significant recruiting effort on the part of leadership.

It is not apparent if the frames on the website have changed over the years, but their simplicity and resonance indicate they have likely not needed to be modified much, if at all. Achievable, simple, and timeless goals resonate and require a low degree of maintenance over time. The methods for achieving these goals, however, require a high level of commitment from ELF members. EarthFirst! cofounder Dave Foreman justified criminal action in defense of the environment using the following metaphor:

If you come home and find a bunch of Hell’s Angels raping your wife, your old mother, and eleven-year-old daughter, you don’t sit down and talk balance with them or suggest compromise. You get your twelve gauge shotgun and blow them to hell…there are people out there trying to save their mother [Mother Earth] from rape.89

According to Foreman and other environmental and animal rights authors, the government and corporations are the real terrorists. Liddick’s research indicates that “movement literature (books, online journals, zines, etc.) frequently condemns its condemners as a rationale for engaging in direct action.”90 According to former ELF spokesman Craig Rosebraugh “the threat to the life of the planet is so severe that political

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89 Liddick, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements, 82.
90 Ibid., 92.
violence must be understood as a viable option.”

Clearly the Family saw violence as a viable option. Brent Smith and Kelly Damphousse have examined spatial and temporal patterns of the Family. Their research indicates that “frequently these incidents involved local environmental activists who became ‘revolutionized’ after hearing speeches by nationally known radical environmentalists. In the days and weeks following those speeches, local activists planned and committed attacks on local targets.”

Between 1997 and 2001, Craig Rosebraugh and Leslie James Pickering were spokespersons for the ELF. Rosebraugh became a spokesperson after he was “contacted in 1997 by the ALF who was taking responsibility for a mink release thirty miles from Portland,” where he lived. Rosebraugh had previously sympathized with the ALF/ELF cause, and had published articles in “movement magazines and newspapers nationwide” declaring his support. For these reasons he became a trusted figure that activists could rely upon to “forward communiqués to the news media and the public.”

According to the U.S. Government Sentencing Memorandum in the Family case, Rosebraugh ended his tenure as ELF spokesperson in 2001 after he modified one of the Family’s communiqués without permission from its members. According to Rosebraugh, he had become disillusioned with attempts to effect change through what he called “single-issue pursuits” and he began to advocate for a more fundamental political and social change through revolution.

Liddick notes that “by 2002 Pickering’s rhetoric had become increasingly violent, framing ELF actions as part of a larger revolutionary struggle.” For Pickering

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92 Smith et al., “Geospatial Analysis of Terrorist Activities: The Identification of Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Behavior of International and Environmental Terrorists,” 47.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
97 Vaughan, “Burning Rage of a Dying Planet: The ELF Interview.”
the ELF objectives were not to influence government policy but rather to “build a radical or even revolutionary resistance movement to the existing power structure.”

Pickering notes that while he was spokesman “the ELF were clearly growing and building much public support. This is because they were taking frequent spectacular actions and consistently evading capture. They were very successful at gaining media attention and causing extensive economic damage to their chosen targets.”

Pickering attributes the decline in growth since he left his office as spokesperson to the ELF’s change in strategy. The ELF was most successful when it caused multi-million dollar damage to large corporations or government buildings that were clearly separated from the public. Its decline ensued when it began to target SUV dealerships and apartment complexes.

According to Pickering, “the media and government worked to exploit this situation.”

In summary, inspiration for violent direct action comes from a collection of writings and speeches produced by multiple influential authors and speakers from above ground organizations within the anarchist, environmental and animal rights movement. Books such as Dave Foreman’s Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching and Edward Abbey’s The Monkeywrench Gang provide both inspiration and operational tactics and techniques. Within the cell known as the Family, cell leader William Rodgers provided an additional level of inspiration and operational direction to members of the cell. EarthFirst! rendezvous and Book Club meetings provided forums for individuals to discuss the “tactics of property destruction.”

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100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., 103.
102 Ibid., 103.
103 Ibid., 67, 102–103; Rosebraugh and Pickering “went on to form Arissa, an organization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the U.S. government.”
d. **Operational Leadership**

There is little evidence to suggest that any individual above the cellular level has provided operational direction for the ELF. Individuals in the Family cell acted alone or in smaller sub-cells of three to five individuals as advocated in the writings of movement authors. William Rodgers was the operational leader for the Family. He coordinated and planned several of the Family’s attacks and participated in six arsons. According to the U.S. government “Rodgers was the principal proponent of and the leader at the Vail Ski Resort and the University of Washington Horticulture Center arsons.” He had written two “how to” manuals “on how to perform malicious destruction and arson.” Rodgers was one of the individuals responsible for initiating the Book Club meetings, in which members “engaged in training classes to learn sabotage techniques, encryption software, and security measures to minimize infiltration by law enforcement.” Yet according to Smith and others, the Family was surprisingly spontaneous as “three-fourths of (antecedent) activities occurred within the three-day period immediately prior to, and including, the day of the incident.” The length of planning between “lone wolf” direct action and cellular organization structures such as the Family did not vary substantially. In their comparison with other environmental and international terror groups, Smith and others conclude that the Family was more spontaneous than other groups studied.

The only evidence that suggests there was coordination between cell members and a prominent organizational level figure involves the relationship of some Family members with Rodney Coronado. Rodney Coronado was at one time the publisher of the EarthFirst! Journal, and he has been arrested multiple times for terror

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108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.
acts committed in the names of the ALF and the ELF. Family member Jonathan Paul lived with Coronado while Coronado was engaging in direct action for the ALF, and Chelsea Dawn Gerlach took part in the reconnaissance of potential genetic engineering targets at the University of Arizona under the guidance of Coronado.\footnote{U.S. Government Sentencing Memorandum, 91.} In January 2003, Coronado demonstrated how to build a firebomb out of household materials for a crowd of college students at American University in Washington, D.C.\footnote{Center for Consumer Freedom: ActivistCash.com, “Rodney Coronado,” accessed September 20, 2010, http://activistcash.com/biography.cfm/b/3255-rodney-coronado.} On February 22, 2006, Coronado was arrested for demonstrating how to make an incendiary device during a speech in San Diego on the same day that a housing complex in nearby University City was torched by the ELF.\footnote{Onell R. Soto. “Feds arrest environment radical over S.D. speech,” The San Diego Union Tribune: SignOnSanDiego.com, February 23, 2006, accessed September 14, 2010, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/20060223-9999-1m23rod.html.} Coronado claimed to be in Tucson the morning the fire was set.\footnote{Ibid.}

Coronado is also a well known link between ALF and PETA. PETA president Ingrid Newkirck reportedly gave Coronado “over $70,000 in ‘grants’ from (PETA’s) tax-exempt coffers” while the FBI was investigating him for several arsons he conducted under ALF “Operation Bite Back.”\footnote{Center for Consumer Freedom: ActivistCash.com, “Rodney Coronado.”} Liddick suggests “it may be fair to say that the border between PETA and ALF is amorphous.”\footnote{Liddick, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements, 52.} Likewise, the ELF may be the underground organization of EarthFirst!, but it is not clear that EarthFirst! leaders provide operational direction to ELF cells.

Despite that the FBI considers Coronado to be a national leader of the ELF,\footnote{Liddick, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements, 52.} operational leadership appears to reside with the members themselves at the cellular level. The number of ELF attacks in the U.S. steadily declined between 2006 and the end of 2008, or the time that Coronado was arrested and released from prison; however, this timeframe also corresponds to the indictment of the 11 Family members,
their trial, and sentencing. The extent to which each event impacted organization effectiveness remains unknown. There is not enough open source information to declare Rodney Coronado as the national leader of the ELF, but based on his connections to some of the Family members we can say that he furthered some member’s operational knowledge to some degree. Figure 4 shows that the degree of operational leadership within the ELF is low.

![Figure 4. ELF Leadership Relationship](image)

### 4. Effectiveness

Despite that the Family committed twenty-one attacks and inflicted $43 million in damages over a six-year period it was not very effective. The Family was able to make contact with its adversaries in a broad and deep environment. Members employed elaborate measures to conceal their preparation and activity from law enforcement. They used codes and strict computer security procedures while communicating. They built incendiary devices in sterile tents, wore gloves during attacks, and burned their clothes or soaked them in acid after attacks. Through these measures they were able to conduct prolonged action against their target set. These procedures were enforced by all Family members.

The extent of the damages caused by the Family led the FBI to deem the ELF relevant in 2004 when it referred to the ALF and ELF as the top domestic terror threat. Of course, that relevancy acted as a double edged sword on the ELF as the FBI increased

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its resources in the Pacific Northwest to investigate the cell. Through their investigation U.S. authorities were able to coerce Family member Jacob Ferguson to turn against the

Figure 5. ELF Effectiveness

other members. The Family never progressed past relevancy, and was unable to gain concessions or convince its adversaries to change. Many of the targets destroyed by the ELF were covered by insurance and quickly rebuilt or replaced. Figure 5 illustrates the ELF’s effectiveness.

However, when we revisit the stated goals of the organization it appears that the ELF has been quite effective. The Family “educated,” “inflicted maximum economic damage,” and avoided harming any animal or human life. Like we will see in the Salafi-Jihad movement, the true goals of the violent activists within the environmental movement are loftier than those indicated in its frames. ELF members who make the commitment to violent action also favor a rollback of civilization, which is so far-reaching that it may appear unattainable to outsiders. Many in the Family considered their actions effective because they were successful at making contact and gaining relevancy for a prolonged period; in essence the ELF’s goals had become about existence and action.\(^{119}\) ELF members understand they will probably not see results overnight or

\(^{119}\) Our analysis is consistent with that of Leader and Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,” 40.
even in their lifetime, and this is precisely why we will continue to see direct action from extremists within the environmental, animal rights, and anti-globalization movements for the foreseeable future.

B. GAMAAT ISLAMIYAH–EGYPT

In this section we examine Gamaat Islamiyah (GI) to determine the degree of operational leadership within the organization and the impact that leadership had on GI effectiveness in Egypt. We will focus our study on the period when GI was most active, from 1992 to 1997 when violence between GI and the Egyptian government was at its peak. First we provide an overview of GI by describing its origins and the direct actions it conducted during the aforementioned period. Next, we examine the political opportunities available to the GI given the Egyptian government’s capacity. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the impact of leadership on organizational effectiveness. Through the lens of the political process model our analysis demonstrates that the GI has a low degree of operational leadership and a low degree of effectiveness.

1. Overview

Gamaat Islamiyah traces its roots back to the summer of 1973, just prior to the October war between Egypt, Syria, and Israel. During that summer, student circles organized camps where Islamic militants indoctrinated students into “pure Islamic life.” These groups eventually evolved into student associations, which won a majority in the Egyptian Student’s Union in 1977. Following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981, many of these militants were arrested and jailed. While in jail, a dispute developed between the jailed leaders and two separate organizations were formed. The first was named Tanzim Al-Jihad and was led by Lieutenant Abboud al-Zomor, one of the main conspirators in Sadat’s assassination, and

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Ayman al-Zawahiri who is now recognized as a top al Qaeda leader.\(^{121}\) The second group reused the name Gamaat Islamiya and was responsible for much of the violence that erupted in Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s.

Until 1992, the violence committed by GI members was mainly focused on the Coptic Christian minority. The main goal during this time was to expand recruitment by turning the Coptics into scapegoats for economically depressed youth. During the late 1980s violence continued to escalate, culminating in the assassination of the former President of Parliament, Rifaat al-Mahgoub in 1990.\(^{122}\) Nineteen ninety two marked the beginning of GI’s most violent period with the assassination of Farag Foda on June 8. Foda was a secularist intellectual who was an outspoken opponent of sharia law and vocal proponent of normalizing relations with Israel.\(^{123}\) The summer of 1992 also marked the first time that tourists were targeted when a cruise boat on the Nile and a train were attacked. In October 1992, an Englishwoman was killed, and several Germans were injured in December.\(^{124}\) In 1993, sporadic violence spread to Cairo, where several tourists were killed, culminating in the massacre at Luxor on November 17, 1997, that resulted in the death of 60 people.\(^{125}\)

During this time GI also made a concerted attempt at controlling territory, occupying the district of Embaba in Cairo, and effectively replacing the government there. GI organized all activities, from sporting events to schools and even changed the streets names in the district to Islamic names. This process occurred over several years but became most successful after the release of militant leaders from jail in 1985. GI control of Embaba lasted until December 1992 when the Egyptian government launched a massive offensive to retake the district after Sheik Gaber, GI’s self-proclaimed military

\(^{121}\) Kepel, *Jihad*, 282.

\(^{122}\) Kepel, *Jihad*, 284.

\(^{123}\) Ibid., 287.

\(^{124}\) Ibid., 288.

\(^{125}\) Ibid., 277.
leader, declared to the international press that Emababa was an Islamic Republic. In all, there were approximately 1300 fatalities between 1990 and 1997 as a result of GI violence.

2. Political Opportunity Structures

Despite the high degree of breadth and depth of the Egyptian government, there was still an opportunity for GI to gain control of small pockets of territory to establish a base of support. In particular, the provinces of Asyut and Minia in Middle Egypt were particularly attractive to GI. Islam had never fully established itself in these areas and there was a considerable Coptic Christian population, which the organization could blame for the economic troubles of the Muslims in that area. The lack of government influence in these areas appears to be more of a choice rather than a lack of capability given the large police force that it maintains. In addition, the government has showed that it was capable of re-taking and maintaining control of territory at will.

a. Breadth

In terms of breadth, Egypt is categorized as broad. In 1990, Egypt had 122,000 national police and 300,000 paramilitary forces. With a population of 52.5 million in the mid 1990, police per capita strength is 803 per 100,000 people, well above the median of 288 police per 100,000 people. When a lapse in government presence does occur such as in Embaba, the government is able to quickly respond and regain presence. At Embaba, 14,000 troops occupied the district for six weeks, setting up police

126 Kepel, Jihad, 291.
130 “Library of Congress Country Studies,” http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query2r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+eg0006%29; The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal,” The median was generated from all countries that reported data to the World Bank in 2002.
stations and other government offices. In addition, Egypt had a density of 0.42 police per square kilometer in 1990. This statistic is above the median of 0.31 police per square kilometer as determined by the reported police strength of 48 countries. The fact that both police per capita as well as police per square kilometer are above average makes Egypt broad in capacity.

b. Depth

Despite the fact that Egypt’s law enforcement score was 60, which is below the median of 73, the capacity of Egypt can also be categorized as deep. The Egyptian government during the 1980s and 1990s was a highly authoritarian regime capable of controlling many aspects of life through coercive and repressive tactics. Arrests of individuals for Islamist activities rose from 3,600 in 1992 to 17,000 in 1993, demonstrating the ability of the government to infiltrate into Egyptian society. The Egyptian government’s success at repressing Islamic radicals caused many, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, to abandon operations in Egypt in favor of working for the greater global jihad movement. In addition, Egypt had the ability to effectively control the fiscal behavior of the population with a tax effectiveness score 88 which is also the median.

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131 Kepel, Jihad, 291.


133 The police density median was computed from 48 countries that reported police statistics on NationMaster.com.

134 The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.” A total of 84 countries were assessed for law enforcement effectiveness by the World Bank between 2004 and 2009. Most countries had only one assessment in those six years. We computed the median from the latest assessment available for each country.

135 Kassem, Egyptian Politics, 41.


137 The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.” A total of 89 countries were assessed for tax effectiveness by the World Bank between 2004 and 2009. Most countries had only one assessment in those six years. We computed the median from the latest assessment available for each country.
3. Leadership

The most prominent member of GI is Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman who serves as GI’s spiritual leader. Born in Egypt in 1938, Abdel Rahman was jailed for being the religious advisor to Sadat’s assassins. He was released in 1983 and briefly arrested again in 1989 after which he traveled to Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and finally the United States where he preached at the al-Salam mosque in Jersey City and the al-Badr mosque in Brooklyn.\(^{138}\) He was arrested in connection with the World Trade Center bombing that took place in February 1993 and is currently serving a life sentence in a Colorado prison.

\(^{a}\) Organizational Structure

GI does not have a clear organizational structure. Instead, the organization appears to be a collection of loosely affiliated cells. The cells are comprised mostly of disenfranchised urban youth with a cadre of radical Islamic intellectuals who oversee recruiting and inspirational leadership. Both the ELF and GI are similar in terms of organizational structure. Both share a cellular structure, with the ELF press office being the equivalent of the Islamic intellectuals who “speak” for the organization. In addition, ideology is spread in a similar fashion through face-to-face contact. GI sought to gain a base of support by infiltrating into neighborhoods where anger over social and economic conditions could be directed against Coptic Christians as well as the Egyptian government. Perhaps the biggest difference between the ELF and GI is the underlying ideology that each was trying to exploit. ELF ideology appealed to those already concerned about the same issues, namely the destruction of the environment. All that was needed was to inspire the individual to move from peaceful action to violence. Though religious, many of educated but poor Egyptians were upset at the government over economic and social issues, not spiritual ones. GI leaders sought to frame an existing problem that was largely unrelated to their agenda in a context that was in line with GI’s ideology.

\(^{138}\) Zuhur, *Egypt*, 68.
b. Connectivity to Existing Networks

GI had two main bases of support. The first were the former members of the Gamaat Islamiyah student associations that were formed in the 1970s. During that time, the number of students attending Egyptian universities doubled to half a million. However, economic troubles such as the fall of the price of oil in 1985 left many of these former students unemployed and disenfranchised with the government making them prime candidates for recruitment.

The second base of support was the Muslim Brotherhood, which was mostly comprised of the professional middle class in Egypt. Originally founded in 1928 on the Suez Canal, the Muslim Brotherhood sought an Islamist Egyptian state, but differed from GI in that it favored change through the existing political process instead of violence. The Muslim Brotherhood was successful in gaining representation in Parliament through the electoral process, and had also gained control of powerful private organizations such as trade unions. The Muslim Brotherhood operated a network of charitable activities throughout Egypt such as hospitals and schools, which GI used as bases for recruitment.

The large student population in the 1970s combined with the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood gave GI a relatively large pool from which to recruit. However, connectivity to these groups was relatively weak compared to the connectivity to the hundreds of peaceful environmental groups that the ELF enjoyed. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood was gaining success through the existing political process made their supporters less likely to withdraw their support in favor of a more violent agenda. Due to a lack of operational leadership, GI was unable to compensate for this weak connectivity to existing networks.

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139 Kepel, *Jihad*, 82.
140 Ibid., 284.
141 Ibid., 284.
c. **Inspirational Leadership**

Islamist sentiment in Egypt began to rise with Egypt’s defeat in the Six Day War in 1967 combined with the failure of the social and economic policies of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, which promised economic prosperity, but instead left many youth disenfranchised and unemployed. The anger over these events served as the base from which GI mobilized its members. As the spiritual leader of GI, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman not only blamed the Egyptian government, but also on the perceived economic success of the disproportionate number of Coptic Christians in the upper Nile region. Christians in the region were well educated and occupied many prominent positions.\(^{142}\) This was framed as contrary to Islamic teachings, which required Christians to be humble and submissive and also required them to pay a tax in exchange for protection. Instead, it should be Muslims who were prosperous, not Christians. Omar Abdel Rahman frequently issued fatwas authorizing attacks against Coptic Christians. Thus, the solution to poverty and social inequality was to replace the Egyptian government with an Islamic state through a combination of violent jihad and preaching in “the compelling of good and the driving out of evil.”\(^{143}\) Unlike other Salafi-Jihad movement organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the inspiration of GI members was more rooted in the promise of material redemption than in spiritual redemption. This framework resonated specifically amongst the poor; particularly those who attended college with the promise of financial success, but who found themselves back in their town unemployed and living off the charity of relatives.\(^{144}\) However, this framework had its limitations as evidenced by the case of Embaba, whose citizens had initially welcomed GI under the promise of improved living conditions, but who ended up turning against them as the imposition of Islamic law degraded into purely criminal activity.\(^{145}\) Table 3 summarizes the various strategic frames used by Sheik Gaber and GI in order to gain support.

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143 Ibid., 282.
144 Ibid., 284.
145 Ibid., 291.
Table 3. GI Strategic Frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Frames</th>
<th>Egyptian Muslims are living under the rule of an immoral government, which has promised prosperity but delivered poverty and social inequality.</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Diagnostic Frames (Enemy) | - The Egyptian government is responsible for the financial and moral decline of the state.  
- Coptic Christians have unfairly gained success at the expense of Muslims. Holy texts call on Muslims to “humble and humiliate” Christians.\textsuperscript{146} |
| Prognostic Frames (Goals/Solution) | - Replace the Egyptian government with an Islamic state.  
- Establish control of small pockets of territory and establish Islamic law.  
- De-legitimize the Egyptian government through attacks on secular leaders and tourists. |
| Maintenance Frames | Economic and social prosperity will only come with the establishment of an Islamic state. |
| Motivational Frames | If the Egyptian government is allowed to continue, then Egypt will continue to fall into moral decay and come under the influence of Zionism (Israel). |

In contrast to the ELF, the gap between social and economic woes and violent jihad was a broad one. As noted earlier, the main difference between the ELF and peaceful environmental movements was the prognostic frame, which included violence. For GI, the leadership needed to work much harder to bridge a much wider gap between frames. Just about the only aspect shared between GI and its target audience was the identity and part of the diagnostic frame that identified the Egyptian government as the problem. This disparity is evident in the fact that many of those that eventually joined GI were the university students in the 1970s that had gone to school with the encouragement of the secular Egyptian government. Had employment and economic prosperity followed, the legitimacy of the government would have been validated, thus eliminating the remaining common frames. This meant that recruiting required a significant effort on the part of leadership, and new frames had to be added, such as the perceived success of the Coptic Christians.

\textsuperscript{146} Kepel, \textit{Jihad}, 285
**d. Operational Leadership**

Very little is known about the operational leadership of GI with the exception of an electrician named Sheik Gaber Mohammed Ali who emerged from the seiged district of Embaba, claiming to be the military leader of GI. It is questionable that Sheik Gaber was actually the leader of GI, but there is no doubt that he ran Embaba, organizing vigilante squads and acting as judge and jury within the community. Whether or not Gaber was actually the military leader of GI, there is a clear distinction between inspirational and operational leadership (Figure 6). Omar Abdel Rahman was arrested in June 1993 in the United States, yet attacks still continued in Egypt, including the massacre at Luxor in 1997.

The operational structure of GI is similar to that of the ELF in that there is little evidence to suggest that there is an individual who provides operational direction, planning, or coordination to achieve tactical and strategic objectives. Actions are planned and executed at the individual or cellular level. With the exception of Gaber in the case of Embaba, no other individual has been identified that has provided operational direction.

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4. Effectiveness

On Einwohner’s scale of effectiveness, GI was not very successful, achieving a score of 2 (target acknowledgement of social movement organization as valid and relevant, see Figure 7). Internally, the inability to keep the actions of the disenfranchised urban youth from degrading into purely criminal activity significantly hindered effectiveness. Externally, many of the violent acts alienated the Egyptian population, causing even sympathizers such as the Muslim Brotherhood to distance themselves from GI. In addition, a massively brutal and repressive response by the Egyptian government was too much for GI to overcome.

The district of Embaba serves as an example of GI’s inability to maintain the religious and political focus of its recruits. Christian businesses were routinely looted and the people beaten. Many youth who were not more than common criminals used religious radicalization as a way of conducting criminal activities unabated. The result was that those that once sympathized with GI turned against them.\footnote{Kepel, \textit{Jihad}, 281.} GI attacks on tourists had an even greater effect on alienating the Egyptian population. The massacre
at Luxor resulted in a steep decline in tourism, which alienated those that depended on the tourist trade such as restaurant owners and market vendors regardless of their religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{149}

The brutal and repressive response by the Egyptian government also prevented GI from being very effective. The government responded to the occupation of Embaba by deploying 14,000 troops, occupying the neighborhood for six weeks and arresting hundreds of people.\textsuperscript{150} After Embaba, GI was unable to effectively mobilize the urban youth, as the Egyptian government embarked on a campaign of repression culminating in a call for a ceasefire by GI’s imprisoned leadership in July 1997.\textsuperscript{151}

While the repressive capacity of the Egyptian state certainly contributed to the failure of GI, the lack of operational leadership combined with a lack of internal and external resonance in its frames were also significant factors contributing to GI’s lack of success. Had GI been left to operate without government response, it would have still alienated the Egyptian population as evidenced by Embaba and the fallout from the attacks on tourists. While individual operations were aimed at achieving certain economic or social effects, the lack of operational leadership meant each event was not linked to the next in a greater strategic framework that severely inhibited effectiveness.

While both the ELF and GI were never able to progress past relevancy, the ELF is more successful when it comes to persistency. The goals of the ELF are much more broad and global when compared to the goals of GI, which were confined to the state of Egypt. ELF activists realize that they may not see results in their lifetime. In contrast, the more localized goals of GI made it easier to see the “writing on the wall” when the movement had failed. For GI, successes and failures were more quantifiable in the form of territory, membership, and public support than for ELF. Thus, GI leaders were able to determine when they had been defeated. For the ELF, whose goals are continued existence and action, the end will never be clear.

\textsuperscript{149} Kepel, \textit{Jihad}, 289.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 291.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 297.
III. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES–BROAD AND SHALLOW

A. LASHKAR-I-TAIBA–INDIA

In this section we examine Lashkar-I-Taiba (LeT) to determine the degree of operational leadership within the organization and the impact that leadership had on LeT effectiveness in India. While LeT was originally founded with the intent to drive India out of the region of Kashmir, it expanded operations into India beginning in the mid-1990s. We focus our study on this period when LeT operated in India, from 1994 to the present. First we provide an overview of LeT by describing its origins and the direct actions it conducted during the aforementioned period. Next we examine the political opportunities available to LeT given the Indian government’s capacity. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the impact of leadership on organizational effectiveness. Through the lens of the political process model our analysis demonstrates that the LeT has a moderate degree of operational leadership and a low degree of effectiveness.

1. Overview

LeT is a radical Islamic group operating in both India and Pakistan. The organization’s main goal is to free Kashmir from Indian control in order to establish an Islamic state. It has been debated whether or not LeT has expanded this goal to encompass all of India or to establish two independent Islamic states in northern and southern India. The organization established its headquarters in Muridke, Pakistan just outside the city of Lahore, capital of the Pakistani province of Punjab.

LeT is the military wing of Markaz-Dawa-ul-Irshad (MDI), an organization founded in 1987 to assist the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation. Both Pakistan’s intelligence service, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), as well as the U.S.


154 Ibid., 1.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked with MDI until the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the late 1980s. LeT was founded in 1990 and initially operated in eastern Afghanistan against the Soviet Union until it shifted focus to Kashmir under the direction of the ISI.\textsuperscript{155} It is believed that Pakistan continued to exert some control over LeT until Pakistani President Musharraf banned the organization in 2002. In October 2001, the U.S. officially designated LeT a terrorist organization.

In 1994, LeT began to carry out attacks in Kashmir and has since expanded operations into the rest of India. Its first attack took place in October 1994 when 50–60 members ambushed an Indian Army convoy, eventually executing five soldiers.\textsuperscript{156} Since then, LeT members have carried out numerous attacks in India including the massacres of Hindus in January 1996, January 1997, June 1997, April 1998, and August 1998.\textsuperscript{157} Other significant attacks include a raid on the Indian parliament in December 2001 and an attack on an Indian Army base in Kaluchak, which killed 36.\textsuperscript{158} LeT also carried out a series of bombings in Mumbai on July 11, 2006, which killed approximately 200 people as well as a second series of shooting and bombing attacks in Mumbai in November 2008.

2. Political Opportunity Structures

Despite being a modern, well-established democracy, India still suffers political problems, which opens up opportunities to radical groups such as LeT. The Indian law enforcement system has at times practiced selective justice, which has increased sympathy for radical Muslim groups in India. For example, India has pressed Pakistan relentlessly to extradite Dawood Ibrahim for his role in the Mumbai attacks in 1993. Yet Indian authorities have made little attempt to bring to justice those that instigated riots in the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002 in which scores of Muslims were killed.\textsuperscript{159} The

\textsuperscript{155} Cronin, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 56.
\textsuperscript{156} Clarke, “Lashkar-i-Taiba,” 9.
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid., 17.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 54.
relatively free level of speech afforded by the democratic government has also allowed Hindu nationalists to increasingly advocate an anti-Muslim agenda, making radical groups more attractive to Muslims living in India as a means of self-defense.\textsuperscript{160}

\textit{a. Breadth}

The capacity of the Indian government is best categorized as broad. In 2001, there were approximately 2 million police in India.\textsuperscript{161} In addition, a paramilitary force of approximately 1.3 million supplements state police forces.\textsuperscript{162} Given a population of roughly 1.1 billion, there are 300 police per 100,000 people, which is above the median of 288 per 100,000 as reported by the World Bank.\textsuperscript{163} With a land area of 2,973,193 square kilometers, there are 1.1 police per square kilometer, three times the median as reported by the World Bank.\textsuperscript{164}

\textit{b. Depth}

In terms of depth, India is categorized as shallow. The most recent law enforcement score for India assessed within the last five years is 58, which is slightly below the median of 60.\textsuperscript{165} India has the maximum tax effectiveness score of 100, with the median score being 87.5.\textsuperscript{166} Quantitatively, these figures indicate a capacity that is more deep than shallow. However, qualitative data indicates that state capacity is shallow due to several financial and political challenges.

\textsuperscript{160} Clarke, “Lashkar-i-Taiba,” 55.


\textsuperscript{162} “Indian Paramilitary Forces,” \url{http://www.indianetzone.com/5/indian_paramilitary_forces.htm}.

\textsuperscript{163} “India Population – Demographics,” \url{http://www.indexmundi.com/india/population.html}; The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal,” The median was generated from all countries that reported data to the World Bank in 2002.


\textsuperscript{165} The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.” A total of 84 countries were assessed for law enforcement effectiveness by the World Bank between 2004 and 2009. Most countries had only one assessment in those six years. We computed the median from the latest assessment available for each country.

\textsuperscript{166} The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.”
In fiscal years 2007–2008, India had what was considered a massive budget deficit, which amounted to six percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This deficit was attributed to inefficient government policies such as unproductive subsidies and tax incentives in addition to numerous tax loopholes.\footnote{Bertelsmann Stiftung, “BTI 2010 — India Country Report,” Shaping Change – Strategies of Development and Transformation, accessed September 6, 2010, http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/125.0.html?&L=1.} Corruption is widespread in public offices, which are frequently misused. Administrators have relatively wide discretion in implementing government policies with little transparency or fear of prosecution.\footnote{Stiftung, “BTI 2010 — India Country Report.”} Thus, while the Indian government may have the capability to exercise greater depth of control, in reality control is implemented shallowly.

3. Leadership

Hafiz Saeed, a professor of Islamic studies at a Pakistan university, is the founder of MDI and the leader of LeT. In the 1980s, Saeed traveled to Afghanistan to join the mujahidin in the struggle against the Soviet Union where he met Osama bin Laden and was inspired by the jihadi movement. Upon his return to Pakistan, Saeed founded MDI on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan. Saeed believed that the problem facing Muslims was their enslavement by the West. Thus, jihad was a means of “establishing the rule of Islam.”\footnote{Mariam Abou Zahab, “I Shall Be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise: The Pakistani Martyrs of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure),” in Practice of War: Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence, eds. Aparna Rao, Michael Bollig and Monika Bock (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 135.} After LeT was banned in Pakistan in 2002, LeT’s main base of operations was transferred from Pakistan to Kashmir, and Saeed stepped down as leader.\footnote{Ibid., 149.} In his place, an obscure figure named Abdul Wahid took over as leader. Since he took over, Wahid has never been seen in public or issued any statements.\footnote{Umer Farooq, “The Two Faces of Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Asharq Alawsat, June 12, 2008, accessed September 6, 2010, http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=3&id=14953.}
a. **Organizational Structure**

LeT follows a hierarchical military style structure with a chief commander, provisional commander, district commander, and battalion commander (see Figure 8). The organization is divided into districts and operates training camps throughout Pakistan and Kashmir. LeT also has a separate policymaking body headed by an amir and a naib amir (deputy), which also has a hierarchical structure and is responsible for the formulation of strategy.\(^{172}\)

![Figure 8. LeT Organizational Structure](image)

b. Connectivity to Existing Networks

Until 2002, LeT enjoyed the support of Pakistan, in particular, the ISI, which saw LeT as a useful tool to wage a proxy war with India. The ISI was allegedly the primary supporter of LeT both for finance and training. LeT was permitted to operate unhindered from its headquarters in Muridke, Pakistan, and militants have been trained in ISI-run camps in Afghanistan. In addition, it was reported that Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed, who was the Director General of the ISI at the time, attended a LeT meeting in April 2001. The outcome of the meeting was a resolution that called upon India-based operatives to destroy Hindu temples and place the flag of Islam on top of the ruins. As a result of pressure from the western nations, Pakistan has in recent years withdrawn support for LeT.

LeT has maintained a relationship with several radical Islamist groups including Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden reportedly contributed ten million Pakistani rupees towards the construction of a mosque at the headquarters of MDI including a guesthouse where he personally stayed while visiting. It has also been alleged that bin Laden attended annual MDI meetings. In March 2002, Abu Zubaydah, a top Al Qaeda leader, was captured at a LeT safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. In addition, LeT has dispatched operatives to conflict areas around the world such as Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq in an attempt to forge ties with other extremist groups.

LeT has also forged ties with radical groups within India such as the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which assisted in carrying out various attacks such as the bombings in Mumbai in July 2006. Several SIMI members have been arrested for assisting in LeT operations. Majid Mohammed Shafi was accused of smuggling explosives and Pakistani militants across the Indian border into Bangladesh.

174 Clarke, “Lashkar-i-Taiba,” 43.
175 Ibid., 44.
176 Ibid., 1–2.
177 Cronin, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 57.
Sajid Margun Ansari, who ran a mobile phone repair shop, was arrested for providing electronic timer circuitry.\(^{179}\) Such arrests demonstrate that LeT has managed to co-opt native Indians to help in their cause.

c. Inspirational Leadership

Kashmiri nationalists who sought independence from India in order to establish a secular, democratic state originally carried out the struggle for the independence of Kashmir. However, since the early 1990s, an increasing number of Islamist groups, such as LeT, have intervened in the conflict. For these groups, the struggle for Kashmir is framed as not just a war between Kashmiri Muslims and India, but also a global struggle between Muslims and Hindus, who are in league with other “enemies of Islam,” namely Jews and Christians.\(^{180}\) Many members are self-motivated to join the organization. Militants join as either a means to gain social status or due to anger over perceived injustices committed by the Indian government. Pakistanis in particular are exposed to propaganda at an early age on the Indian occupation of Kashmir. Indian soldiers are shown beating Kashmiris on television where stories of numerous brutalities are circulated.\(^{181}\) The struggle against India appears to resonate with only a small segment of the Pakistani population. Studies have shown that most LeT recruits belong to the lower middle class and come from villages in the Punjab region\(^{182}\). Many come from families that were traumatized by the violent partition of India and Pakistan and seek to defend the honor of their families.\(^{183}\) In addition, many members come from lower castes that are seeking to gain prestige for their families by fighting.\(^{184}\) This sense of individual and family empowerment is the main motivation for many LeT militants. There are also financial incentives for socially frustrated and poor


\(^{180}\) Zahab, “I Shall Be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise,” 133.

\(^{181}\) Ibid., 140–141.

\(^{182}\) Ibid., 139.

\(^{183}\) Ibid., 140.

\(^{184}\) Ibid., 140–141.
young men, as LeT militants receive a monthly salary and the prestige of military glory. Once accepted into training, militants receive intensive military and religious training aimed at altering their identities - they grow their hair long and stop shaving. In addition, they adopt Islamic pseudonyms in place of their real names. Once members are recruited and trained, LeT relies more upon military skill than ideology to motivate its members. Attacks are carefully planned and carried out with extreme precision. This is evident in the fact that LeT members have never carried out a suicide bombing. In addition, the preferred method of attack, which is the fedayeen attack (small groups of three to five men), always carries a small chance of survival for the militants. Table 4 summarizes the various strategic frames used by LeT leadership.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Frames</th>
<th>As Muslims, we must fight to free Kashmir from the control of India, which has conspired with other enemies of Islam from the West to ultimately destroy Pakistan.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Diagnostic Frames (Enemy) | - India has engaged in brutal and repressive tactics to control Kashmir.  
- India is a Hindu nation dedicated to the destruction of Islam. |
| Prognostic Frames (Goals/Solution) | - “The jihad in Kashmir would soon spread to entire India. Our Mujahideen would create three Pakistan in India.”  
- “We feel that Kashmir should be liberated at the earliest. Thereafter, Indian Muslims should be aroused to rise in revolt against the Indian Union so that India gets disintegrated.” |
| Maintenance Frames | If India is not confronted, then it will eventually destroy Pakistan and then other Muslim nations will fall. |
| Motivational Frames | Those that fight and die for the liberation of Kashmir will earn honor and prestige for themselves and their families. |

Table 4. LeT Strategic Frames

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185 Ibid., 140.
186 Zahab, “I Shall Be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise,” 142.
188 Zahab, “I Shall Be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise,” 139.
189 Ibid., 7.
d. Operational Leadership

Operational leadership appears to be relatively decentralized. However, Hafiz Saeed has provided some measure of operational direction. He reportedly decided how many militants to send into Kashmir based upon the number of deaths that occurred and the capacity of the organization inside Kashmir to absorb new fighters. In addition, Saeed made several statements in 1996 and 1997, which outlined the operational goals of the organization:

The jihad in Kashmir would soon spread to entire India. Our Mujahideen would create three Pakistans in India. We feel that Kashmir should be liberated at the earliest. Thereafter, Indian Muslims should be aroused to rise in revolt against the Indian Union so that India gets disintegrated.

Despite the fact that Saeed provided some operational leadership, LeT’s day-to-day operations were more decentralized. In a December 28, 2000, interview with a Los Angeles Times reporter, a LeT militant named Abu Samara claimed that he operated out of a self-sustaining MDI base in Pakistan that provided spiritual and military training. Figure 9 illustrates the moderately decentralized structure of LeT. The slight overlap between inspirational and operational leadership can be attributed to the fact that LeT was based outside of India and could operate relatively freely in both Pakistan and Pakistan held Kashmir. However, operations inside India required a more decentralized operational structure due to the extremely broad capacity of the Indian government. Avoiding detection required a significant effort on the part of LeT militants, who used fake travel documents and untraceable phones to avoid being caught.

190 Clarke, “Lashkar-i-Taiba,” 143.
4. Effectiveness

On Einwohner’s scale of effectiveness, LeT was not very successful, achieving a score of 2 (target acknowledgement of social movement organization as valid and relevant, see Figure 10). While LeT has managed to carry out numerous deadly attacks inside India, the Indian government does not appear to be persuaded in any way to make concessions with regard to Kashmir, either through troop reduction or troop withdrawal.\footnote{Clarke, “Lashkar-i-Taiba,” 45.} Attempts at escalating tensions between India and Pakistan have also failed, causing a split between members who align themselves with the Pakistani government and members who feel that efforts to liberate Kashmir from India should intensify. Most notably, a top LeT leader, Maulana Zafar Iqbal, has gone on to form his own militant group called Khairun Naas (People’s Welfare).\footnote{Ibid., 4.} Despite several daring and highly publicized attacks inside India, LeT has so far failed to garner widespread support from Indian Muslims.
Figure 10. LeT Effectiveness
B. ANIMAL LIBERATION FRONT–MEXICO

In this section we examine the Frente de Liberación Animal (FLA), or Animal Liberation Front (ALF) in Mexico, to determine the degree of operational leadership within the organization and the impact leadership has on ALF effectiveness. First we provide an overview of the ALF and describe the direct actions conducted by the ALF in Mexico. Next we examine the political opportunities available to the ALF given the Mexican government’s capacity. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the impact of leadership on ALF’s effectiveness. Through the lens of the political process model our analysis demonstrates that the ALF has very little, if any, operational leadership in Mexico and a very low degree of effectiveness.

1. Overview

The ALF was founded in 1976 in Great Britain by Ronnie Lee and approximately thirty other individuals. According to Liddick, Lee had long been involved in animal rights activism in Great Britain, and he “learned to mimic the Irish Republican Army (IRA), adopting the organizational structure of decentralized, small, autonomous cells.” The ALF matured in Great Britain over the next ten years, effectively damaging British businesses and research facilities through its direct actions. In 1989, after 14 attempted bombings by animal rights activists, “Scotland Yard [classified the] ALF as a terrorist organization in the same category as the IRA and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).”

The North American ALF is very similar to the original organization formed in Great Britain and to the ELF discussed in the previous chapter. The ALF’s website has a wealth of information including its philosophy and tactics, links to similar organizations in the animal rights movement, and graphic videos of animal abuse. The ALF’s mission statement is “to effectively allocate resources (time and money) to end the ‘property’

197 Liddick, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements, 40.
198 Ibid, 40.
199 Ibid, 41.
status of nonhuman animals.” 200 Its objective is “to abolish institutionalized animal exploitation because it assumes that animals are property.” 201 The ALF particularly opposes vivisection or surgical experimentation on live animals. The mission of the ALF is not confined to any particular region but instead can be applied by peoples in all areas of the globe where animals are being “exploited;” in fact attacks have been conducted in the name of the ALF around the world.

Recently, the ALF has claimed responsibility for a rash of attacks in Mexico. According to the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG), the ALF has committed over 120 direct actions in Mexico between the beginning of 2008 and the end of 2009, but a Strategic Forecasting Incorporated (STRATFOR) report issued in September 2009 indicates the number may be even higher. 202 Scott Stewart of STRATFOR notes that there were approximately 200 direct action attacks in Mexico between January and September of 2009 alone. Approximately 157 of those attacks were arson or incendiary devices, which by way of comparison is more arson attacks than were conducted by American environmental and animal rights organizations in the U.S. since 2001. 203

The ALF’s direct action in Mexico has consisted of vandalism, arson, and even bombings via improvised explosive devices (IED). 204 The use of IEDs among environmental and animal rights organizations is unique. IEDs may create unwanted collateral damage. After all one of the objectives of the ALF, like the ELF is to “take all necessary precautions against hurting any animal, human or non-human.” 205 September 2009 targets included Banamex bank branches, Telmex phone booths, vehicles, offices, and cables, and Novartis, a customer of Huntingdon Life Sciences that conducts

201 Ibid.
204 Stewart, “Mexico: Emergence of an Unexpected Threat.”
205 Liddick, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements, 42.
experimentation on animals.\textsuperscript{206} Novartis has also been accused by activists as having spread “genetically modified seed throughout Mexico’s corn-growing belt … contaminating native species of maize.”\textsuperscript{207} Other targets in recent years have included fast food “restaurants (including McDonald’s and Kentucky Fried Chicken), meat shops, pet shops, fur and leather stores, luxury vehicles, and construction equipment.”\textsuperscript{208} Most attacks have been conducted by cells in the populous areas in and around Mexico City and Guadalajara.\textsuperscript{209}

A variety of organizations, groups, and/or cells have claimed responsibility for attacks in Mexico. The Subversive Alliance for the Liberation of the Earth, Animals and Humans (ASLTAH) claimed responsibility for several September 2009 IED attacks.\textsuperscript{210} FLA Mexico (FLAM) and FLA-Commando Verde Negro (CVN) have also claimed responsibility for attacks in Mexico through communiqués in which they greet their “brothers” in the ALF and ELF. These groups all operate in accordance with ALF guidelines and are likely cells within the ALF in Mexico. Perhaps cell identification and use of IEDs are indications that the ALF has very little operational leadership in Mexico, but before we discuss leadership we examine the opportunities available in Mexico.

2. Political Opportunity Structures

As we shall see in this section, political opportunities for animal rights activists to engage in violent direct action are plentiful in Mexico. Over the past four years the Mexican government has been preoccupied with its war on drugs.\textsuperscript{211} The government’s focus on the drug trade and trafficking has expanded the opportunity for anarchist, environmental, and animal rights activists to increase their direct action activities in Mexico, but there have been no significant arrests or prosecutions of animal rights

\textsuperscript{206} Stewart, “Mexico: Emergence of an Unexpected Threat,” 2.
\textsuperscript{207} Ross, “Wave of Anarchist Bombings Strike Mexico.”
\textsuperscript{208} Stewart, “Mexico: Emergence of an Unexpected Threat,” 2–3.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid, 1.
activists in Mexico despite the significant number of attacks. Limited information available on the ALF in Mexico speaks to the government’s lack of capacity to control the population.

a. **Breadth**

Mexico’s capacity is best categorized as broad. In 2002, Mexico had 495,821 total police officers or 492 police per 100,000 people. The police per capita figure of 492 is well above the median (288) for countries that reported this data to the World Bank in 2002. Mexican police maintain a persistent and visible presence throughout the entire population; however, Mexico, like the U.S., has some large areas that are sparsely populated.

Mexico had a density of 0.25 police per square kilometer in 2002. Most of ALF’s attacks have occurred in urban centers within Mexico. Despite the fact that police density in Mexico is slightly below the median of 0.31, we categorized Mexico as broad because the military has increased its presence and bolstered local police forces to intensify its prosecution of the drug war.

b. **Depth**

Mexico is also categorized as shallow. The most recent law enforcement score for Mexico, assessed within the last five years, is 56.25, which is below the median

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212 NationMaster.com, “Crime statistics – Police per Capita.”

213 The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.” The median was generated from all countries that reported data to the World Bank in 2002.


215 The police density median was computed from 48 countries that reported police statistics to NationMaster.com.

Mexico’s score for tax effectiveness is 62.5, which is below the median of 88. Qualitative assessments also point to a low degree of depth for the Mexican government. The Mexican government regularly demonstrates its inability to regulate the population and enforce current law. Local law enforcement is corrupt. Over the past two years President Felipe Calderon’s government has attempted to “purge [the] ranks” of local police forces and remove corrupt officers, but it appears to be an ongoing process that may take even more time. A more detailed examination of the ALF’s mobilizing structures is necessary in order to determine the effectiveness of the ALF and the conditions under which it may be effective in the broad and shallow environment.

3. Leadership

Like all social movement organizations, the ALF mobilizes individuals through its structure, connectivity to existing networks, and framing of its ideology. The ALF’s organizational structure and strategic frames are very similar to those of the ELF, but there are subtle differences that may explain differences in effectiveness between the two organizations. The ALF’s connectivity to existing networks in Mexico is superior to that of the ELF in the U.S.

a. Organizational Structure

The ALF’s organizational structure is markedly different from that of LeT. Though both organizations use illegal methods to pursue their objectives they sit at different ends of the structural spectrum. While LeT is hierarchical with a military style structure, the ALF is decentralized and cellular. According to the ALF’s website “activists work anonymously, either in small groups or individually, and do not have a

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217 The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.” A total of 84 countries were assessed for law enforcement effectiveness by the World Bank between 2004 and 2009. Most countries had only one assessment in those six years. We computed the median from the latest assessment available for each country.

218 Ibid.

219 Reuters, “Mexico fires thousands of police to combat corruption.”; Hawley and Solache, “Mexico focuses on police corruption.”; Luhnow, “Mexico Cracks Down on Local Police Corruption.”
centralized organization or coordination.”220 The ALF makes it clear that it has elected
to operate within a decentralized structure because “ALF actions may be against the
law.”221 The North American Animal Liberation Press Office (NAALPO) explains that
“cells are non-hierarchical in their structure, which allows for only those people involved
directly in the action to control their own destiny.”222 Like the ELF, the ALF has no
membership list. “Any group of people who are vegetarians or vegans and who carry out
actions according to ALF guidelines have the right to regard themselves as part of the
ALF.”223 There is no reason to believe that the ALF in Mexico operates under a different
organizational structure than the one described by the NAALPO.

b. Connectivity to Existing Networks

The ALF has a high degree of connectivity to other environmental and
animal rights organizations. Although it has not grown to the same extent as the
environmental movement in terms of numbers of organizations, the animal rights
movement has made significant strides raising public consciousness of animal rights
issues and “moved further into the mainstream.”224 For example, a 2008 ballot measure
in California aimed at improving the treatment of egg-laying chickens passed
overwhelmingly with 63% of the vote.225 Also in 2008, Spain’s parliament “passed a
resolution calling for legal rights to be extended to nonhuman primates.”226 Legal, above
ground organizations, such as the Humane Society and PETA, have been working for the
past four decades to change the public consciousness with regard to animal rights, and
from the increase in animal rights legislation they have been somewhat successful.

221 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2003682,00.html.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
According to the FBI “significant overlap in personnel and support networks exist among ALF and related groups.”\textsuperscript{227} PETA has been particularly supportive of the ALF in the U.S. PETA’s director Ingrid Newkirk provided operational and financial support to ALF activist Rodney Coronado, who was convicted “for the 1992 arson of a Michigan State University research laboratory.”\textsuperscript{228} In Mexico, however, the ALF may be more connected to organizations outside the animal rights movement. A strong anarchist movement in Mexico underpins environmental and animal rights activism. Violence appears to breed violence as activists from all three movements incite each other to step up their direct action. The ALF, ELF, and anarchists in Mexico have all attacked similar targets with similar tactics and at similar times.\textsuperscript{229} A majority of the prosecutions of ALF attacks have been students, or young people, who have expressed anarchist views, views that are common among members of ALF and ELF wherever they act.\textsuperscript{230} It is likely that the same individuals act under the mantle of all three movements in Mexico. With respect to connectivity, the ALF in Mexico appears to be very similar to LeT in India; both organizations have a high degree of connectivity to diverse movements.

c. Inspirational Leadership

There are no clearly identifiable inspirational leaders of the ALF in Mexico. The inspiration that appears to fuel ALF members in North America comes from historical and current literature, North American press officers, and activism itself. In 1975, Peter Singer wrote \textit{Animal Liberation}, which “laid out the philosophical groundwork for regarding animals as deserving of greater respect and legal

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{227} Liddick, \textit{Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements}, 42–44; PETA released some of the ALF’s early communiqués conducted under operation Bite Back led by Rodney Coronado.
\item \textsuperscript{229} Stewart, “Mexico: Emergence of an Unexpected Threat.”
\item \textsuperscript{230} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
protection.”231 Singer wrote that the benefits of eating animals and using them in biomedical research are minimal compared with the suffering of animals.”232 Animal Liberation is referred to as the bible of the animal rights movement, and many contemporary inspirational leaders utilize Singers fundamental concepts in framing the ideology to cultural norms.233

North American ALF press officers provide a degree of inspirational leadership for the organization. Rick Bogle, Jason Miller, Nicoal Sheen, Jerry Vlasak, and Gary Yourofsky are all highly educated individuals that serve as official press officers, but none are from Mexico nor do they have overt links to Mexican activists. Advisors and speakers (and self-proclaimed activists) include Peter Young, Erin Skinner, and Steven Best. Best, an associate professor of philosophy and humanities at the University of Texas, El Paso, is perhaps one of the most influential writers and spokespeople for animal rights in North America. He has written numerous books on environmental and animal liberation radicalism.234

Incarcerated activists, past and present, also provide a degree of inspiration for members. Barry Horne was an imprisoned animal rights activist in Great Britain, who staged a series of hunger strikes between 1997 and 1998.235 His hunger strikes gained international attention from movement sympathizers around the world, and he died in prison in 2001 of liver failure.236 Consider the following excerpt from a communiqué disseminated after an animal liberation operation in Mexico on November 5, 2009:

231 Cohen, “Can Animal Rights Go Too Far?”
232 Liddick, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements, 25.
233 Liddick, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements, 25.
234 Steven Best, “Biography,” Dr. Steven Best personal website, accessed September 17, 2010, http://www.drstevebest.org/bio.htm. Best proudly notes that he and his students in his Philosophy of Law class “led a successful initiative at the [El Paso] City Council to pass a resolution declaring the PATRIOT Act to be unconstitutional.”
236 Ibid.
Once again, united in a cell of the Frente de Liberación Animal – Comando Verde Negro (FLA – CVN), we have taken to the streets to realize the dream of so many lukewarm veg(etari)ans who chant, shout, sing and whine for Animal Liberation at concerts, in front of a computer, looking at photographs of tortured and dying animals, at peaceful demonstrations, among other events and places far removed from the breeders, laboratories, the dog pounds, the ‘pet’ stores, the farms, etc. where the animals are truly hoping that you will shake your fear, your defeatist attitude and that you will decide once and for all to begin to realize your dream, your yearning, your desire for Animal Liberation… Tonight, the 5th of November, a day to commemorate and remember, not the death but the life of a person of great worth in the fight against anthropocentrism (sic)-- Barry Horne-- we decided to strike against speciesism once again…This action is also dedicated to the person who was arrested in Guadalajara last month; other cells have also expressed solidarity with Ramses Villareal, arrested on charges of terrorism but who kept silent and was released. Now we, the FLA - CVN make this dedication, hoping that this comrade has been well and has strength to move forward after his arrest.237

Jerry Vlasak, spokesman for the North American ALF, said his organization receives anonymous news statements from the Mexican group but does not know who its members are because they operate secretly.”238

Anonymous authors in magazines such as Bite Back, Arkangel, and No Compromise extend the philosophical arguments made by Singer and expand on the frames outlined in Table 5. 239 Rabia y Acción, or Anger and Action magazine, is one such publication produced in Mexico and written in Spanish. Rabia y Acción is a publication for “anarcho-vegans for radical action” and its content mirrors that of English publications previously mentioned. The June 2010 edition of Rabia y Acción includes editorials, contact information for and letters from prisoners, summaries of recent attacks, instructions for assembling incendiary devices, and even an interview with Ronnie Lee, the founder of the ALF in Great Britain. These magazines report past actions and focus on operational tactics and techniques for future direct action.

237 Bite Back, “Diary of Direct Actions.”


239 Liddick, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movement, 42.
Table 5. The ALF Strategic Frames

| Identity Frames | ALF activists are compassionate people who put their own freedom on the line for animals who cannot fight for it themselves. ALF activists are today’s Boston Tea Party and Underground Railroad. Referring to ALF activists as terrorists trivializes real terrorism and clouds the true nature of the ALF. ALF member pattern themselves after the freedom fighters in Nazi Germany who liberated war prisoners and Holocaust victims and destroyed equipment that Nazis used to torture and kill their victims. Other comparisons include anti-apartheid movement and struggle by Palestinians against Israeli oppressors. The animal liberation movement has important similarities with some of the great freedom fighters of the past two centuries and is akin to contemporary peace and justice movements in its quest to end bloodshed and violence toward life and to win justice for other species. |
| Diagnostic Frames (Enemy) | Industries that profit from animal exploitation. Businesses that inflict immense suffering on non-human animals. |
| Prognostic Frames (Goals/Solution) | Short term aim – save as many animals as possible and directly disrupt the practice of animal abuse. Long term aim – end all animal suffering by forcing animal abuse companies out of business. |
- To liberate animals from places of abuse, i.e. laboratories, factory farms, fur farms, etc. and place them in good homes where they may live out their natural lives, free from suffering. |
- To inflict economic damage to those who profit from the misery and exploitation of animals. |
- To reveal the horror and atrocities committed against animals behind locked doors, by performing non-violent direct actions and liberations. |
- To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal - human and non-human. |
- To analyze the ramifications of any proposed action and never apply generalizations (e.g. all ‘blank’ are evil) when specific information is available. |
The rights of an animal trump utilitarian appeals to human benefit. May also use intimidation to prevent further animal abuse and murder. |
| Maintenance Frames | The animal liberation movement will end when animal exploitation ends. |
| Motivational Frames | If not you, who? If not now, when? Support the animal liberation front. When the law is wrong, the right thing to do is break it. This is often how moral progress is made in history, from defiance of American slavery and Hitler’s anti-Semitism to sit-ins and “whites only” lunch counters in Alabama. Animals are freed, not stolen…and when one destroys the inanimate property of animal exploiters, one is merely leveling what was wrongfully used to violate the rights of living beings. |

The ALF’s strategic frames in Table 5 reveal a medium degree of internal resonance. The ALF’s frames intend to instill a “liberator” identity among members; philosophical narratives are laced with comparisons between ALF activists and history’s freedom fighters. The problem, according to the ALF, is animal suffering, and organizations that contribute to animal suffering are the ALF’s targets. The ALF’s goals and guidelines are simple and enduring. What is most notable, however, is the inconsistency between prognostic frames and actions, weak maintenance frames, and limited motivational frames.

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The NAALPO website explains that “because the ALF operates anonymously, there is no way (emphasis added) to aid actions before they happen.”241 Instead, one can help “by donating to legal defense funds of those who have been arrested...writing to prisoners, and speaking out in support of direct action at every opportunity.”242 This sympathetic support that the ALF seeks is important but it cannot directly help the ALF realize its goals. The ALF website claims the ALF is a “non-violent campaign,” but in fact the ALF’s actions are violent. The ALF exists to conduct violent direct action; violent direct action is what separates the ALF from organizations such as the Humane Society and PETA. Whereas environmental activists claim the planet will not survive if we do not act now, the ALF can provide no similar reason why animal suffering must be prevented immediately. For the most part, the websites motivational frames simply tug at the heartstrings of the population and aim to justify civil disobedience.

LeT’s strategic frames are stronger internally than those of the ALF, but they are also very different. LeT’s frames appeal to the population’s sense of honor while the ALF’s frames appeal to the population’s sense of compassion. LeT frames its struggle as one for human survival while the ALF frames its struggle as one for animal survival. Both organizations frame their identity as liberators, but while LeT is concerned about liberating people, the ALF aims to liberate animals. The subject (human or animal) that each organization defends suggests that LeT’s frames have a higher degree of external resonance; after all, people are the target of ALF frames.

Perhaps the most telling belief expressed by ALF inspirational leaders is that the animal liberation movement is similar to history’s relatively successful insurgent movements. The NAALPO website states:


242 Ibid.
Whatever animal exploitation industries and governments take against the animal liberation movement, they will no more stop it than U.S. soldiers were able to quell North Vietnamese armies or the resistance movement spreading throughout Iraq, or the Israelis can stop the Palestinians in their efforts to achieve their goals.”

This statement highlights the contradiction between the ALF’s strategic frames and its structure. The “resistance movements” that the press office refers to in this statement were centralized hierarchical organizations. These insurgent organizations had high degrees of operational leadership, while the ALF does not.

d. Operational Leadership

There is no evidence that points to any individual as an operational leader of the ALF in Mexico. Evidence obtained through arrests has been insufficient for law enforcement authorities wishing to gain fidelity on organizational leadership. Evidence gained thus far has only aided in the prosecution of a limited number of direct action cases. It is likely that the ALF cells in Mexico are similar to those of the ELF in the U.S., but direct action in Mexico appears to be coordinated to some degree. It may appear this way because activists inspire each other through their direct actions. Given the close connections between various movements in Mexico and the young ages of the activists, the organization may very well be coordinated from university campuses. Figure 11 depicts the relationship between inspirational and operational leadership of the ALF in Mexico. The ALF has a much lower degree of operational leadership in Mexico than LeT has in India.

![Figure 11. ALF Mexico Leadership Relationship](image)

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4. Effectiveness

The ALF has achieved a very low degree of effectiveness in Mexico; the organization has only succeeded in attacking its adversaries (see Figure 12). Despite the recent surge in attacks, the ALF’s adversaries and the government show no signs that they consider the ALF relevant. Clearly, the priority of the Mexican government is to defeat the drug cartels that have caused the most significant violence.

LeT has achieved a slightly higher degree of effectiveness than the ALF in the broad and shallow environment. LeT has a more hierarchical structure, relatively equal connectivity, stronger strategic frames, and a higher degree of operational direction from leaders within the organization than the ALF does. The higher degree of operational direction within LeT is reflective of its centralized command structure, but still the organization is only slightly more effective than the ALF. Relevance is ultimately determined by the social movement organization’s antagonist. LeT directly challenges the authority of the Indian government; it presents a significant threat to those with power in India. Furthermore, those in power can easily recognize LeT because LeT looks like the Indian government with its hierarchical and centralized structure.
IV. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES–NARROW AND SHALLOW

A. STOP HUNTINGDON ANIMAL CRUELTY–CANADA

In this section, we examine Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) to determine the degree of operational leadership within the organization and the impact it has on SHAC effectiveness in Canada. First we provide an overview of SHAC and its direct actions in Canada. Next we examine the political opportunity structures available to SHAC in Canada given the Canadian government’s capacity. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the impact of leadership on organizational effectiveness. Our analysis demonstrates that SHAC has a very low degree of operational leadership and is largely ineffective in Canada.

1. Overview

SHAC was founded in Great Britain in 1999 by Greg Avery and Heather James.244 Avery and James were inspired to start the organization after seeing a PETA video, aired on British television, documenting the abuse of lab animals inside Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), “one of the largest contract animal-testing laboratories in the world.”245 SHAC targets HLS, companies that do business with HLS, and employees of both. SHAC has also targeted shareholders of HLS stock. Targeting people makes SHAC unique among the radical animal rights groups.

SHAC primarily uses intimidation as a means to achieve its objectives. Operatives investigate their targets and distribute personal and financial information on those targets, “information that could only by known by a true stalker.”246 Operatives have been known to post “the home addresses and phone numbers of HLS employees” and associates employees on its website.247 SHAC has threatened female HLS

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244 Liddick, *Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements*, 45.
245 Ibid.
employees with sexual assault, followed them home from work, and sent e-mails to families asking “Do you know where your children are?”

Members have targeted individual homes with protests, graffiti, vandalism, and kinetics; SHAC firebombs and letter bombs have injured several. SHAC has also demonstrated its capacity to disrupt the communications networks of its targets. In July 2002, “over 2 million e-mails were sent through” a HLS associate’s computer system, compromising the server and damaging the company’s operations. SHAC is also known to continuously place telephone calls to targeted companies in order to disable voice communications.

SHAC has been most active in Europe and the U.S. with the support of underground animal rights groups such as the ALF and the ELF. The ALF has engaged in direct action against HLS and its associates throughout the world, but its actions have been limited in Canada. Between 2005 and 2010 the ALF executed 33 attacks in Canada but only six of those targeted HLS or its associates. Most of the ALF’s attacks in Canada targeted furriers or aimed to liberate animals, such as minks, from captivity. The limited number of ALF attacks against HLS associates in Canada consisted of vandalism or graffiti on employee’s private vehicles and homes. SHAC activists in Canada typically conduct protests, small-scale sabotage, vandalism and graffiti in the Montreal and Vancouver areas.

SHAC’s direct actions in Canada do not compare in violence or effectiveness to attacks against HLS in the U.S. and Europe. For example, one attack in the U.K. targeted a Cannacord executive over the company’s relationship with Phytopharm, an associate of HLS. In May 2005 the ALF claimed that it had placed an incendiary device underneath the executive’s car in the garage at his private residence in London while he and his family slept inside. The car caught fire and the executive and his family

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249 Ibid.
251 Cannacord is a Vancouver Canada-based brokerage.
252 Liddick, *Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements*, 47.
subsequently went into hiding. In June 2005 Cannacord dropped Phytopharm as its client. This type of attack is more representative of SHAC’s direct actions in the U.S. and U.K., but it remains to be seen in Canada.

In November and December 2006 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) raided the homes of and arrested three “organizers of the Montreal chapter” of SHAC, and they also arrested eighteen protesters at SHAC demonstrations during a one month span.253 “Material related to the [SHAC] campaign was confiscated by law enforcement, including close to five thousand dollars in donations.”254 Names of the “organizers” were not released.

2. Political Opportunity Structures

a. Breadth

Canada is best categorized as narrow. In 2002, Canada had 58,422 total police officers or 186 police per 100,000 people.255 The police per capita figure of 186 is well below the median (288) for countries that reported this data to the World Bank in 2002.256 Canadian police maintain a persistent and visible presence in urban centers; however, Canada has some large areas that are sparsely populated. Canada had a density of 0.01 police per square kilometer in 2002.257 This figure is well below the median of 0.31.258

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254 Ibid.


256 The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.” The median was generated from all countries that reported data to the World Bank in 2002.


258 The police density median was computed from 48 countries that reported police statistics to NationMaster.com.
b. Depth

Canada’s capacity is also categorized as shallow. The most recent law enforcement score for Canada, assessed within the last five years, is 58, which is slightly below the median of 60.\footnote{The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.” A total of 84 countries were assessed for law enforcement effectiveness by the World Bank between 2004 and 2009. Most countries had only one assessment in those six years. We computed the median from the latest assessment available for each country.} Canada’s tax effectiveness score is 75, which is well below the median of 88.\footnote{Ibid.} The narrow and shallow capacity of the Canadian government suggests that Canada presents an ideal opportunity for militant activism, but the high degree of leadership that characterizes other regional SHAC chapters appears to absent in Canada.

3. Leadership

SHAC is generally more organized than other violent organizations within the environmental and animal rights movements. For the most part SHAC has visible leadership that inspires and directs campaigns to stop the exploitation of animals. Leaders have suffered the consequences of their structure and reaped the benefits; they have been targeted by the state and served time in prison, but they have also mobilized individuals to act against HLS. In some countries SHAC’s leadership has effectively used its structure and connectivity to mobilize individuals to target HLS and its associates, but in other countries, like Canada, leadership has been less effective.

a. Organizational Structure

SHAC is a legal, conspicuous, and hierarchical organization headquartered in the U.K with offices or chapters in various countries throughout the world. Each SHAC chapter has a president who also acts as chief spokesperson for the organization. Some chapters have campaign coordinators. Police in the most active countries, such as the U.K., “suspect there are only about 20 to 25 SHAC activists willing to risk imprisonment for their cause.” SHAC’s U.K. website is the only one that is currently operational; chapter websites in the U.S. and Canada have been taken off-line. The main
website (www.shac.net) provides chapter contact information for prospective members around the world. A 2004 federal indictment of SHAC-USA leaders sheds some interesting light on a typical chapter structure. SHAC-USA is a “not-for-profit corporation incorporated under the laws of the state of Delaware, with its principal place of business located in New Jersey.” Pamelyn Ferdin took over as president of SHAC-USA for Kevin Jonas, who was one of six SHAC activists convicted of multiple federal felonies including conspiring to incite others to break the law in March 2006. The six conspirators are referred to as the “SHAC-7.” As an above ground organization SHAC has access to significantly more resources than illegal organizations such as the ALF and ELF.

b. Connectivity to Existing Networks

According to the Center for Consumer Freedom, SHAC has ties to several legal and illegal organizations. One legal organization with which SHAC is connected is the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM). The PCRM was founded in 1985 as a nonprofit organization that, according to its website, “promotes preventative medicine, conducts clinical research, and encourages higher standards for ethics and effectiveness in research.” Newsweek magazine noted, however, that “less than 5 percent of PCRM’s members are physicians.” The Center for Consumer Freedom provides substantial evidence to support their claim that the PCRM is a “fanatical animal rights group.” The PCRM openly supports SHAC and “even co-signed a letter with SHAC-USA’s [former president] Kevin Jonas…urging customers to boycott Huntingdon

261 Jonas is a former ALF spokesman. See Liddick, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements, 49.


263 Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine, http://www.pcrm.org/.

Life Sciences.” In *Eco-Terrorism*, Liddick exposes the clear ties that PCRM has to PETA. The PCRM and PETA provide money and a pool of animal rights sympathizers for SHAC to recruit.

According to the federal indictment of the SHAC-7, SHAC enlists the support of illegal organizations, such as the ALF and ELF, to conduct direct actions against HLS. “At the national ‘Animal Rights 2001’ convention, SHAC underscored this relationship by sharing a table with the criminal ALF and its sister group, the ELF.” Current SHAC-USA president Pamelyn Ferdin’s husband is Jerry Vlasak, a North American ALF spokesperson and longtime animal rights activist. ALF’s diary of direct actions and the communiqués documented on the Bite Back magazine website lists HLS as the target of many ALF attacks. Another indication of SHAC’s connectivity to illegal social movement organizations can be found in their newsletter. Many of the “SHAC” prisoners listed in the SHAC Newsletters are from the ELF cell the “Family” discussed earlier.

c. Inspirational Leadership

Charismatic movement spokespeople use a growing body of literature on animal rights issues and attractive websites to inspire SHAC members. A British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) report notes that police wiretaps of Greg Avery (founder and director of SHAC in the U.K.) and two others in the U.K. revealed that they meet “every three months to discuss their campaign with regular updates from colleagues in the U.S. and Europe.” This report suggests that inspiration for campaigns in Europe


and the U.S. is managed by Avery and others in the U.K. SHAC newsletters are produced in the U.K. and made available to all SHAC chapters through the website. Avery uses these professionally produced media to disseminate current and relevant frames and mobilize animal rights sympathizers around the world to act in defense of animals. Chapter presidents likely provide an additional degree of inspirational leadership for campaigns in their regions. According to an anonymous contribution on the ALF website, Richard Leblanc is a spokesperson for SHAC Canada, but there is no evidence to indicate the degree of Leblanc’s influence within the Canadian organization. Inspirational leadership in Canada is likely very limited, yet this void is probably filled by the abundance of inspiration from outside sources previously discussed.

Table 6. SHAC’s Strategic Frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Frames</th>
<th>SHAC is made up of compassionate people from all walks of life and people of all ages from children to pensioners. All of us are outraged at the existence of HLS and all of us are doing as much as we can to make sure that this evil company is closed down for good. Two million members of the public have signed a petition to have HLS closed, thousands have protested. The campaign involves thousands of caring people all across the world. Like you they are disgusted by HLS and their evil activities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diagnostic Frames (Enemy)</td>
<td>HLS is the largest contract testing laboratory in Europe. They have about 70,000 animals on site…destined to suffer and die in cruel, useless experiments. HLS will test anything for anybody. They carry out experiments which involve poisoning animals with household products, pesticides, drugs, herbicides, food colorings and additives, sweeteners, and genetically modified organisms. Every three minutes an animal dies inside Huntingdon totaling 500 innocent lives every day. They have been infiltrated and exposed at least seven separate times for disgusting animal cruelty…horrific evidence of animal abuse…including punching beagle puppies in the face.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prognostic Frames (Goals/Solution)</td>
<td>Close down HLS through three tier approach. Campaign against: - customers who provide HLS with an income and profits - suppliers who provide HLS with vital tools to carry out research - financial links such as shareholders, market makers and bargaining facilities. The SHAC campaign is all about action. Action is everything. Words and tears mean nothing to the animals trapped in their cages inside HLS waiting to die. …Demonstrations, writing letters, making phone calls, sending emails or faxes, telling others about the campaign, distributing leaflets, fundraising, putting up posters and stickers. Action is whatever you can do to shut down that hell-hole that is HLS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Frames</td>
<td>The government has failed to close HLS so it is up to each and every one of us to close them down. The animals deserve nothing less than our utmost commitment to take action every day to close down the lab that holds them captive and slowly kills them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivational Frames</td>
<td>SHAC has called on a mass boycott of HLS and is calling on all companies that do business with HLS to turn their backs on animal cruelty. If you are happy to pay for, or profit from the cruelty HLS inflicts on innocent animals then you are just as much responsible as the vivisectors themselves. We all have an important role to play, so please join us and help close down HLS!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHAC’s strategic frames outlined in Table 6 are consistent with its organizational structure and nature as a legal above ground organization. SHAC claims its “campaign is all about action,” which it benignly defines as “demonstrations, writing

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letters, making phone calls, sending e-mails or faxes, telling other people about the campaign, distributing leaflets, fundraising, [and] putting up poster and stickers.”

The website is careful to note that it “does not encourage repetitive, rude or threatening phone calls and e-mails” and asks that members “make their point politely.” SHAC’s actions are quite different though.

SHAC’s frames have a high degree of internal resonance, but they are inconsistent with direct actions carried out by SHAC. A 2002 Boston Globe editorial declared “If SHAC activists seek to illuminate the condition of laboratory animals, they have failed. Their own tactics reveal a disturbing willingness to inflict suffering.”

The ALF’s website notes that “while SHAC Inc. is an aboveground legal protest movement, the ‘SHAC movement’ sometimes resorts to illegal tactics such as property destruction to exert added pressure on HLS and its clients.”

SHAC has focused their frames on soliciting legal support from animal rights sympathizers, but it relies on hard core activists in the ALF to carry out its violent and illegal direct action. This inconsistency indicates that SHAC is a typical front organization for an illegal group and may explain why SHAC has not been able to mobilize a significant number of people outside of the existing underground animal rights organizations. The most committed members of SHAC are in all likelihood also members of the ALF. The fact that the president of SHAC-USA (a “former” ALF member) was convicted for his direct actions demonstrates that he was not able to mobilize others to act against HLS. Both sympathizers and hard core activists can find information of value to them in SHAC’s newsletter and on its website.

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274 Ibid.


d. Operational Leadership

SHAC appears to provide the operational leadership for the ALF through these media. In his opening remarks to the jury in the SHAC-7 case, U.S. Attorney Charles B. McKenna referred to the defendants as “the commanders” who “got their foot soldiers to go out and to their dirty work.”277 Greg Avery provides broad operational direction for the greater SHAC organization by determining the targets that will be the focus of SHAC letter writing campaigns and direct action attacks. The targets, or companies and their contact information are posted weekly on the SHAC website and in the SHAC newsletter.278 Recent targets include HLS customers Novartis, AstaZeneca, and Bristol-Myers Squibb, financiers Progress Funding and Sub Anchor, and suppliers Phenomonex and FedEx.279 Even detailed information on individuals has been posted in these sources in the past. The website and newsletter are focused on operations in the Europe and the U.K., however, they do list target information in other regions. These media do not describe the violent methods to be used against these targets; violent methods can be found at any number of other animal rights websites.

Figure 13. SHAC Leadership Relationship in Canada

SHAC’s modus operandi suggests that some degree of coordination is required to effectively conduct a multi-pronged campaign against HLS, its associates, and

277 Hall, “Disaggregating the Scare from the Greens,” 706.
individuals through legal and illegal means, but there is no evidence of this coordination in Canada. Gabriel Villeneuve launched the Canadian arm of SHAC in 2003. Villeneuve was arrested on at least two occasions in 2008, and he was likely one of the three “organizers” arrested in Montreal in 2006. Villeneuve claims he has been arrested over 70 times. He is “legally forbidden to be in contact with his comrades at SHAC Canada,” and in 2008 he noted that he would start up “another animal rights organization in the near future.” Villeneuve likely coordinates protests, but there is no evidence to indicate that he provides operational direction for direct action to SHAC activists in Canada. Figure 13 depicts the low degree of operational direction within SHAC Canada.

4. Effectiveness

SHAC has achieved a medium degree of effectiveness in the U.K. and the U.S. but in Canada it has been largely ineffective (see Figure 14). Operating in the U.S. and U.K. SHAC has made contact with its enemies, been deemed relevant by authorities, and coerced concessional change from HLS and its associates around the world. On a global scale, SHAC has been quite effective in damaging HLS. SHAC pressure in the U.K. caused HLS to relocate to the U.S. in 2001. HLS was dropped from the New York Stock Exchange because its share price had fallen significantly, but it has since made a return as Life Sciences Research Incorporated (LSRI) in 2009. There is little financial data available on the company but it continues to trade on the exchange.

HLS chief executive, Brian Cass, notes that the company has done well despite the ten-year campaign waged against them. Cass asserts that the company has “doubled in size” since 2001 and is “solidly profitable.” But the company still has difficulty

281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
284 Alderson, “Huntingdon Life Sciences to move back to UK after crackdown on animal rights militants.”
getting loans, and when it does, it is forced to pay unusually high interest rates.\textsuperscript{285} According to John Lewis, deputy assistant director of the FBI, “about one hundred companies had stopped doing business with HLS as a result of SHAC intimidation, including Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Charles Schwab, and Deloitte & Touche.” Bank of America and Goldman Sachs stopped doing business with HLS as well.\textsuperscript{286} SHAC’s website provides a link to a long list of additional companies that have ceased doing business with HLS as a result of its campaign. These companies “were at one time associated with HLS either as shareholders, stockholders, market makers, suppliers or clients” and all have “made clear and unequivocal statements to SHAC stating that will never deal with Huntingdon ever again.”\textsuperscript{287}

Figure 14. SHAC Effectiveness

According to Villeneuve, “Montreal is the North American capital for vivisection when it comes to pharmaceutical products. There are over 50 companies affiliated with

\textsuperscript{285} Alderson, “Huntingdon Life Sciences to move back to UK after crackdown on animal rights militants.”

\textsuperscript{286} Hall, “Disaggregating the Scare from the Greens,” 691.

HLS located [in Montreal].”288 Despite the apparent abundance of targets, SHAC and ALF actions against HLS in Canada have been very limited. The low degree of ALF activism in Canada suggests that there may simply be a limited number of hard core activists there, but it is more likely that Villeneuve has not been very effective at mobilizing them.

SHAC’s decentralized organizational structure best explains its lack of effectiveness in Canada. SHAC has not taken advantage of the opportunities afforded by Canada, a narrow and shallow state, to use a hierarchical organizational structure to mobilize underground activists. SHAC Canada does not have a website, and there is little publication of targets in Canada on SHAC’s international website. Direct action in Canada is best characterized as small scale and sporadic, therefore it has not gained the attention of potential recruits or the media. Given the number of times he has been arrested, Villeneuve likely devotes much of his efforts to evading authorities. Perhaps if he were to focus his efforts on building a legal above ground organization, like those that exist in other less permissive environments, he may begin to see some success. Unlike chapters in other countries SHAC Canada does not have a clear operational leader to coordinate direct action with underground organizations. SHAC chapters in the U.K. and the U.S. have high degrees of operational leadership and ALF activism, and they have been more successful.

B. JEMAHAH ISLAMIYAH–INDONESIA

In this section, we examine Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to determine the degree of operational leadership within the organization and the impact that leadership had on JI effectiveness in Indonesia. We will focus our study on the period when JI was most active, from 2000 to 2005 when violence between JI and the Indonesian government was at its peak. First we provide an overview of JI by describing its origins and the direct actions it conducted during the aforementioned period. Next, we examine the political opportunities available to the JI given the Indonesian government’s capacity. The remainder of the chapter focuses on the impact of leadership on organizational

288 Barry, “Critter Crazy: Animal rights activist fights cruelty, often from behind bars.”
effectiveness. Through the lens of the political process model our analysis demonstrates that the JI has a moderate degree of operational leadership and a moderate degree of effectiveness.

1. Overview

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was founded in January 1993 at Camp Saddah, a mujahidin training camp in Afghanistan set up by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a close affiliate of Osama Bin Laden. JI traces its roots back to the Darul Islam (DI), an Islamic organization founded in the 1940s dedicated to the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. While JI shares this vision of an Islamic state of Indonesia, its ultimate goal is to establish a pan-regional caliphate in Southeast Asia. In October 2002, the United States designated JI a foreign terrorist organization. The United Nations (U.N.) subsequently placed JI on the proscribed entities list, which requires all U.N. members to freeze assets, deny funding, and restrict travel to JI members. JI has been active in several regional conflicts but became active in terrorist attacks in 2000, culminating in the second Bali bombing on October 1, 2005.

Prior to 2000, the violence committed by JI was restricted to communal fighting aimed at fueling anti-Christian sentiment. However, in 2000, JI began to carry out more significant terrorist attacks. The first occurred in August 2000 with the attempted assassination of the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia followed by attacks on 38 churches throughout Indonesia on December 24, 2000. The church attacks, known as the Christmas Eve bombings, left 19 people dead and 120 injured. In August 2001, the Atrium Mall in East Jakarta was bombed. This attack was aimed at a Christian group that was meeting in a rented room of the second floor of the mall. As violent as these attacks were, they were only precursors to JI’s most violent and lethal phase from 2002–2005.

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290 Ibid., 91.
JI began its most active phase with multiple bomb attacks on October 12, 2002, on the island of Bali. In all, three bombs were detonated: the first was a small bomb placed inside a bar, the second was placed in a van outside a nightclub, and the third was placed on a street curb near the U.S. consulate. In all, 202 people were killed and over 500 wounded in the attacks. On August 5, 2003, JI operatives carried out another major attack in front of the J.W. Marriott hotel in downtown Jakarta resulting in 12 fatalities. On September 20, 2004, a minivan filled with explosives was detonated outside the Australian embassy, killing 9 people. The final major attack by JI occurred on October 1, 2005, when three suicide bombers attacked three different establishments on Bali, killing 23 people. In contrast to the attacks prior to 2002, these attacks were very sophisticated, calling for a high level of coordination and technical expertise and represents the peak of JI activity.

2. Political Opportunity Structures

Jemaah Islamiyah became most active at a time when the Indonesian government was extremely vulnerable. The democratic government had only been in place since 1998 and was still struggling to fix all the problems left by the previous Suharto regime. Corruption was rampant, and several ethnic groups seized the opportunity to mount a bid for independence. The island of East Timor voted for independence in August 1999 and a bloody struggle ensued resulting in more than 7,000 East Timorese killed. The conflict continued until 2002 when East Timor gained its independence. The region of Aceh also made a bid for independence around the same time. An agreement signed in August 2005 granted partial autonomy to the region, but only after a bloody conflict, which claimed an estimated 15,000 lives. This instability opened up an opportunity for radical groups such as JI to operate relatively free of government interference.

293 Ibid., 13.
a. Breadth

In terms of breadth, Indonesia is categorized as narrow. In 2004, Indonesia had 285,000 police or 120 police per 100,000 people.\textsuperscript{294} The police per capita figure is well below the median of 288 per 100,000 people as reported by the World Bank in 2002.\textsuperscript{295} Indonesia had 0.15 police per square kilometer, less than half of the median of 0.31 police per square mile as reported by the World Bank.\textsuperscript{296} Geographically, Indonesia is a highly fragmented state, encompassing 17,508 islands of which approximately 6000 are inhabited.\textsuperscript{297} The Indonesian government has struggled to control ethnic and religious violence on several islands, including the island of Aceh, which had sought independence. On August 15, 2005, the Indonesian government reached a peace agreement with Aceh, giving it considerable autonomy but not full independence.\textsuperscript{298}

b. Depth

In terms of depth, Indonesia is characterized as shallow. The democratic government was only weakly consolidated in 2002, having only been in place since 1998 after the fall of the authoritarian military regime of President Suharto. Corruption was rampant, with Indonesia ranking as the seventh most corrupt nation in 2002 in a Transparency International study.\textsuperscript{299} Efforts to decentralize the government were poorly


\textsuperscript{295} CIA World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal,” The median was generated from all countries that reported data to the World Bank in 2002.


\textsuperscript{298} Amy L. Freedman, Political Change and Consolidation: Democracy’s Rocky Road in Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 94.

managed and only exacerbated the problem, resulting in a “chaotic free-for-all.” Under the Suharto regime, corruption was an entrenched part of political life. It was expected that government entities such as the military would partially fund their operations through corruption. This allowed Suharto to severely underfund the national budget. As a result, the tax collection system in place once the democratic government took over was only minimally effective. This instability is reflected in the fact that Indonesia went through three presidents in the first six years of democracy.

3. Leadership

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was a founding member of JI and provided the inspirational leadership. Ba’asyir was originally a member of DI who, along with Abdullah Sungkar, established a boarding school called Pesantren al-Mukmin in the Indonesian town of Solo in 1972. The goal of this school was to establish a community of members committed to Sharia law and the establishment of an Islamic state and would serve as the basis for the establishment of JI. Sungkar initially held the title of amir until his death in 1999 when Ba’asyir assumed the title.

a. Organizational Structure

The organizational structure of JI is a hierarchical military style structure that is controlled by a governing council called the Markaz under the direction of the amir. The governing council is supported by consultative council called the Shura, which is further broken down into functional components (i.e., operations, finance,
recruiting) that assist the Markaz in the formulation of policy. JI is divided into regional commands called mantiqis, which cover the following areas:

Mantiqi 1: Singapore, Malaysia (excluding Sabah) and southern Thailand
Mantiqi 2: Indonesia (excluding Sulawesi and Kalimantan)
Mantiqi 3: Sabah, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and the southern Philippines
Mantiqi 4: Australia and Papua

Mantiqis are roughly equivalent in military terms to a brigade, which is further broken down into wakalah (battalions), khatibah (companies), qirdas (platoons), and fiah (squads). Figure 15 depicts the organizational structure of JI.

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306 Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, 57.
Although both SHAC and JI share a hierarchical structure, there are several key differences. The first difference is that SHAC is a global organization, whereas JI is regional. This makes physical communication and coordination as well as the sharing of resources easier for JI. In addition, JI is a much larger organization, with a membership of around 2,000 activists and 5,000 sympathizers at its peak in contrast to the estimated 20 to 25 SHAC activists willing to take action in each country.307 The structure of JI is also more rigid and military-like, whereas SHAC resembles more of an international club, with chapters in each country. This makes JI leadership and decision-making more centralized in comparison to SHAC.

307 Chalk et al., _The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia_, 93.
b. Connectivity to Existing Structures

In keeping with its goal of establishing a pan-regional caliphate in Southeast Asia, JI has ties to other radical Islamist groups in the region such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. Until approximately the mid-2000s, when the Philippine government shut it down, JI and MILF operated a training camp together called Camp Abu Bakar.308

JI has also maintained ties with al Qaeda since the early 1990s. The relationship began when a JI member, Abdullah Sungkar, met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan some time around 1993–1994. Since then, JI has benefitted from its relationship with al Qaeda through use of training facilities as well as financial support.309 During the early years of the organization, many JI operatives trained in al Qaeda run training camps in Afghanistan.310 Another JI member, named Hambali, is the only Southeast Asian member of the central council of al Qaeda.311

Unlike SHAC, JI does not use ties to other organizations as a means of recruitment. Instead JI uses these ties as a means of operational support, preferring to recruit from the Indonesian population, particularly those that have attended JI sponsored pesantren (boarding school). SHAC has also co-opted affiliate groups such as ALF to conduct violent action against its primary target the HLS. JI attacks were conducted exclusively by its own members.

c. Inspirational Leadership

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was a founding member of JI and provided the inspirational leadership. His own statements appear to confirm this fact: “I make many knives and I sell many knives, but I’m not responsible for what happens to them.”312

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308 Jackson et al., *Aptitude for Destruction*, 78.
309 Ibid., 64.
310 Ibid., 77.
311 Rabasa et al., *Beyond Al-Qaeda*, 148.
312 Jackson et al., *Aptitude for Destruction*, 62.
Many JI operatives were students of the pesantren that he established with Abdullah Sungkar, which taught a very conservative version of Islamism. JI’s basic ideology was that man was responsible for managing and enforcing God’s laws on earth. Islam not only encompassed spirituality, but all other aspects of life as well including politics and society. Muslims had lost their way in the face of secular ideologies, and must now seek to reunify religion and politics through the establishment of an Islamic state and ultimately a pan-regional caliphate in Southeast Asia.313

The creation of a pan-regional caliphate would occur in several stages. First, it would occur through the establishment of small Islamic communities, or Jemaah Islamiyah from which the organization derives its name.314 The second stage was the establishment of an Islamic state targeting the Indonesian government. Finally, other states in the region would be targeted including Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore.315

Ba’asyir employed several methods to mobilize and recruit members. As a predominantly Muslim country, efforts were made to exploit feelings of guilt for not living up to JI’s interpretation of “true Islam.”316 This message resonated with even moderate Muslims in Indonesia and had the effect of mitigating the public’s distrust of JI’s radical agenda.317 Internally, the promise of divine rewards and redemption resonated strongly with members, many of whom joined the organization for purely religious reasons, either as a “no fuss” path to heaven or out of an unselfish desire to help the “Muslim Nation.”318 Ba’asyir would also exploit the personal loyalty that develops between students and teachers in Southeast Asia as a means of mobilization in addition to ties of kinship and friendship.319 Members were taught to obey leadership through Amar

314 Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction, 59.
315 Gunaratna, “The Ideology of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah,” 73.
316 Ibid., 74.
317 Ibid., 74.
318 Ibid., 72.
319 Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction, 61.
ma’ruf, nahi munkar (the code commanding good and forbidding evil). When members did not obey leadership, they were told that they had committed a sin against God. This concept was reinforced through the selective use of Islamic scripture that appeared to support these beliefs.\textsuperscript{320} Internal review mechanisms called hisbah were used, which were designed to control fluctuations in the commitment of members.\textsuperscript{321} Table 7 summarizes the strategic frames used by JI.

The main difference between JI and SHAC’s method of inspirational leadership lies in the legality of each organization. As a legal above ground organization, SHAC is free to mount overt campaigns through newsletters and websites in an effort to mobilize the masses. However, this inhibits its ability to communicate the violent side of its agenda. In contrast, JI is an illegal underground organization, which did not seek mass mobilization, instead seeking to establish small religious communities. Thus, JI was able to communicate its ideology in its entirety to a select group of people who were isolated in the pesantren from competing ideologies. Combined with the robust structure that was put in place to maintain these ideologies, JI was much more successful at inspiring its members to violent action.

\textsuperscript{320} Gunaratna, “The Ideology of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah,” 73.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 74.
Table 7. JI Strategic Frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Frames</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslims have lost their way since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, which was the last true “Muslim Nation”. Modern secular ideologies have resulted in moral decay. The Muslim Nation must be restored in order to restore morality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diagnostic Frames (Enemy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The freedom to practice Sharia has been inhibited throughout our history by English, Japanese, and Dutch rule in Southeast Asia. Islam has lost its prominence as a result of being de-politicized by the Suharto regime and the follow-on democratic government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prognostic Frames (Goals/Solution)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The first step to establishing a pan-regional caliphate in Southeast Asia is the creation of small Islamic communities or Jemaah Islamiyah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Second, a Daulah (Islamic State) in Indonesia must be established through jihad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The final step is the establishment of the pan-regional caliphate.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maintenance Frames</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace can only be achieved if Islam is practiced in its totality, which encompasses all aspects of life: spiritual, physical, and social.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivational Frames</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- God legitimizes actions against the Indonesian government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- By fighting in the name of Islam, one can do no wrong. Divine retribution for those that do not comply, divine rewards for those that do comply.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Operational Leadership

While it has been established that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir provided inspirational leadership to JI, his operational role is less clear. It is believed that Hambali, the head of Mantiqi 1 and mastermind behind the first Bali bombings, was responsible for the planning and field operations of JI. However, it now appears that the distinction between inspirational and operational leadership was less distinct. After his capture in May 2002, Omar al-Faruq, the confessed mastermind behind the Christmas Eve bombings in 2000, revealed that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir played an active role in planning attacks by authorizing the use of JI personnel and resources. According to al-Faruq, Ba’asyir even went so far as to send aides to meet with al-Qaeda in order to

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323 Ibid., 72.
324 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, 49.
325 Gunaratna, “The Ideology of Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah,” 73.
326 Ibid., 73.
327 Ibid., 70.
328 Ibid., 72.
329 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, 101.
procure weapons and explosives for specific attacks. Figure 16 depicts the relatively centralized leadership structure of JI. This higher degree of centralization can be attributed to the narrow and shallow capacity of the Indonesian government. During the reign of President Suharto, both Sungkar and Ba’asyir operated Pesantren al-Mukmin quietly and peacefully until they were drawn out into the open by an elaborate sting operation set up by Suharto’s intelligence czar in 1978. Both were subsequently arrested and released several years later, although plans to arrest Sungkar and Ba’asyir again caused them to flee to Malaysia in 1985. Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned in 1998 after the collapse of the Suharto regime. The fragile new democratic government that took its place created an environment that allowed formerly restricted Islamic groups to operate freely, including JI. Thus, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were able to exercise more centralized control with little fear of repression.

The moderately centralized leadership of JI stands in contrast to the decentralized leadership of SHAC in Canada. Given the specificity of SHAC’s target (HLS people and property) the requirement for centralized leadership is less than what JI required. For JI, what constituted an effective target was less clear, and thus required more direction.

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331 Chalk et al., *The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia*, 88.
332 Ibid., 89.
333 Ibid., 89.
4. Effectiveness

On Einwohner’s scale of effectiveness, JI was marginally successful, achieving a score of 3 (social movement organization is invited to give input on an issue centrally related to its concerns, see Figure 17). While the majority of Muslim Indonesians are moderate and do not agree with JI’s agenda, Islamic political parties have enjoyed some success. Following elections in 1999, the Partai Bulan Bingtan (PBB) introduced two bills, which were influenced by Sharia law. The first bill was a revision of the criminal code and would have made acts such as adultery and homosexuality illegal. The second bill would have made proselytizing, conversion, and inter-faith marriage illegal. In addition, the bill made the commemoration of religious holidays a legal obligation.\(^{334}\) While these bills were not successful, Article 31 of the Indonesian constitution, which addresses the national education system, acknowledges “the necessity of religious values in the development of Indonesian civilization.”\(^{335}\)

![Figure 17. JI Effectiveness](image)

Islamist political parties have also gained increasing success in local elections by running on a platform of anti-corruption. Districts that elected Islamic party

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\(^{334}\) Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, 74.

representatives in the 1999 elections experienced a relative decline in corruption while districts that elected secular representatives experienced a relative increase. The result was that in the 2004 elections, citizens living in districts where corruption increased voted out their secular representatives and elected Islamic party representatives. Thus, the Indonesian government has not been entirely free of Islamic influence despite being a secular democracy.

The success of JI can be attributed to a moderate degree of centralized leadership combined with the strong internal and external resonance of JI’s strategic frames. Centralized leadership resulted in the creation of a strong support structure to maintain the group’s ideology among its members. Intense indoctrination in an isolated environment aimed at only a select group of individuals who were already seeking a religious education meant that JI’s strategic frames had a strong internal resonance. As the nation with the world’s largest Muslim population, JI’s Islamic message resonated strongly with many Indonesians outside the organization. This strong external resonance can still be seen today with the involvement of various Islamic political parties in the government. In contrast, GI leadership was significantly more decentralized and suffered from weak internal and external resonance. GI’s attempt to co-opt people that did not fully share GI’s strategic frames meant that more centralized leadership was required to mobilize support. Unfortunately for GI, it lacked the centralized leadership necessary to maintain the group’s ideology like JI had. The result is that JI enjoyed a greater degree of success when compared to GI.

The relative success of JI when compared to SHAC in Canada is a result of leadership and resonance. For SHAC, there is no indication that Gabriel Villeneuve has managed to set up any operational structure, instead relying on the individual decision to act. As a legal organization, SHAC in Canada was limited to public calls for non-violent action and lacked a covert structure that could disseminate the violent agenda that set it apart from peaceful animal rights groups. To do so would have required some degree of

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operational leadership that SHAC did not have. In many respects JI was the complete opposite, with a clear operational and inspirational structure that ensured a high degree of resonance amongst its members.
V. CONCLUSION

The intent of this thesis was to identify the conditions under which a leaderless social movement organization will be more or less effective. We made the distinction between operational and inspirational leadership and defined a “leaderless” social movement organization as one that has a low degree of operational leadership. In order to assess effectiveness, we utilized a scale based on seven indicators developed by Einwohner in her study of animal rights campaigns. This scale recognizes that effectiveness cannot be quantified merely by whether or not a social movement organization has achieved its stated goals, and allows us to assess effectiveness with higher fidelity.

In testing our hypotheses, we chose a wide variety of case studies, which encompassed organizations with varying degrees of leadership in a variety of environments. By studying a broad range of leaderless organizations, we have addressed a shortcoming in the work of scholars such as Marc Sageman, who have focused on specific organizations such as al Qaeda but failed to identify the underlying conditions that make leaderless social movement organizations effective. The conclusions that we draw can be applied more broadly and allow a more nuanced approach to addressing leaderless social movement organizations. Suggestions such as “leaderless jihad should be allowed to expire on their own”337 are incomplete, narrow, and only consider the structure of the organization without taking into account the effect of the environment in which they operate. From our case studies, it is clear that effectiveness is determined by many factors both internal and external to the organization. Understanding these factors will allow states to better address the threat of violent leaderless social movement organizations by tailoring responses to take advantage of their strengths and compensate for their weaknesses.

Social movement organizations structure their organization based on the capacity of the state in which they operate. As state capacity increases, the optimal degree of

337 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 146.
operational leadership decreases. This is a rational decision based on the costs associated with a high degree of operational leadership that a state with a high capacity can impose. Increased state capacity is associated with an increased ability to repress, allowing the state to “decapitate” a centralized organization with ease. Conversely, a social movement organization has less to fear from a state with a low capacity to repress, allowing for a more structured and centralized organization. This tendency is demonstrated in our case studies, where there is a trend towards more centralized operational control as state capacity decreases. On one end of the spectrum, we see a clear distinction between operational and inspirational leadership and a more decentralized structure for both ELF and GI operating in states that are broad and deep. On the other end of the spectrum, we see more of an overlap between operational and inspirational leadership or a more centralized structure for JI operating in a state that is narrow and shallow. This is not to say that a leaderless organization cannot operate in environments other than broad and deep, rather that conditions in a broad and deep environment prevent an organization from being effective with a centralized structure due to the repressive capabilities of the state.

Our case studies also indicate that the decision to become more leaderless is independent of the goals of the social movement organization. We reference Gamson’s distinction between reform and revolutionary movements and test cases that fit both types (see Table 8). There are organizations with relatively low degrees of operational leadership for both types of movements in each category of state capacity, and results of our analysis lead us to conclude that the degree of leadership is not dictated by the types of goals that organizations pursue, nor do the types of goals significantly impact organization effectiveness. According to Gamson, reform organizations are generally more successful than revolutionary organizations. Our case studies show that this conclusion does not hold true for organizations with low degrees of operational leadership. The degree of effectiveness is more dependent on the structure of the organization and how it fits with the environment in which it operates.
Table 8. Summary of Degrees of Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Narrow/Shallow</th>
<th>Broad/Shallow</th>
<th>Broad/Deep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reform</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHAC</strong></td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Operational</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>Direction</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ALF</strong></td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>Direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ELF</strong></td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>Direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revolutionary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>JI</strong></td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operational</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LeT</strong></td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
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<td>Operational</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Direction</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gi</strong></td>
<td>Inspiration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operational</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direction</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

We acknowledge the difficulty in defining effectiveness when it comes to social movement organizations. Defining a movement as effective only if it has achieved its goals is dichotomous and insufficient. Members of a movement may consider an organization effective if it simply continues to exist and to inspire action. In addition, any concession by the antagonist may be considered effective in moving the organization towards its ultimate goal. For example, JI can be considered effective in that Islamic inspired legislation was introduced into the secular Indonesian government, moving it one step closer to an Islamic state. In an attempt to quantify the varying degrees of effectiveness we use Einwohner’s seven indicators. However, in doing so, we do not imply that a low score on this scale means that the organization does not consider itself effective. Nevertheless, it is a useful tool for outsiders to evaluate social movement organizations.
Figure 18 shows the variables that enhance organization effectiveness along a spectrum of state capacity. The key factor to effectiveness for organizations with a low degree of operational leadership is frame resonance. As previously noted, states that are broad and deep preclude a high degree of operational leadership. In the absence of centralized leadership, which would keep an organization operationally focused on achieving the organization’s goals, leaderless organizations rely on strong frame resonance as the “glue” that keeps the decentralized organization together. As a result, frame resonance takes on an even more important role in keeping a decentralized organization together. However, strong frame resonance can only achieve so much. ELF exhibited a high degree of frame resonance compared to GI, which had relatively weak frame resonance. GI had to work much harder than the ELF to achieve the same degree of effectiveness. ELF’s lack of operational leadership was offset to some degree by the resonance of its message which inspired only the truly committed to action, whereas GI’s attempt to co-opt those not truly committed to the cause met with failure.

### Effectiveness Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>+ Structure</th>
<th>+ Resonance</th>
<th>+ Connectivity</th>
<th>- Structure</th>
<th>+ Resonance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Narrow/Shallow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Broad/Deep</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### State Capacity

Figure 18. Effectiveness Factors

The key factor to effectiveness for organizations with a high degree of operational leadership is the centralized structure itself. In narrow and shallow states increased centralization comes with little cost and more effectiveness. States that are narrow and shallow provide the most permissive environment in which to operate, yet SHAC was unable to move past contact, while JI, which exhibited the highest degree of operational leadership in our case studies, was able to achieve consultancy. The JI case study also
indicates that centralized organizations in a permissive environment can mobilize collective action with moderate frame resonance.

Determining how a state should proceed against a leaderless social movement is a multi-step process. The first step is to determine the degree of operational leadership that the organization has. All social movement organizations desire a high degree of inspirational leadership and high frame resonance to mobilize individuals, but they vary in the amount of operational direction they require. Discovering the actual structure of an organization can be difficult.

Inspirational leaders may be easier to identify, as they may be likely to make public statements as a way to frame the movement’s ideology and attract new members. Multiple inspirational leaders in organizations such as the ELF may indicate a more decentralized structure without having to determine the degree of operational leadership. However, organizations with a single inspirational leader such as JI require more in-depth intelligence collection by the state in order to determine the degree to which inspirational and operational leadership are centralized.

Determining operational leadership may be more challenging, as the agendas of violent social movement organizations means that operations must be carried out away from the visibility of the state. Thus, operational leaders are less likely to publicly declare how and when specific targets will be attacked for fear of being thwarted by the state. The secretive nature of exercising operational leadership in violent social movement organizations requires a more robust intelligence capability by the state. Otherwise it will be difficult to determine the actual degree of operational control.

The second step is to determine the capacity of the state. We used both quantitative and qualitative data to determine state capacity, including the ability to collect taxes, police per capita, and country studies conducted by private organizations such as the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Quantitative data on every nation has become increasingly available, making the evaluation of state capacity easier. However, qualitative considerations should not be completely discounted in order to provide a complete picture of state capacity that numbers alone cannot provide.
The strategy that we recommend to counter violent social movement organizations focuses on the “glue” that holds the movement together under different state capacities (see Table 9). States that are narrow and shallow allow for centralized leadership and a more hierarchical structure. Resonance plays a secondary role, as leadership can be more coordinated to keep the organization intact. Members do not necessarily need to be “true believers” because the leadership can tailor frames and operations in order to mobilize people with other grievances. Thus, narrow and shallow states should target the structure of the organization. Leaders, brokers, finances, and communications are all valid targets in such a strategy, as the removal of these institutions would have a major impact on the capacity of the organization to carry out further operations. In contrast, a decentralized organization would have multiple cells each with their own set of these institutions so that it could operate independently.

Table 9. Strategies to Limit Social Movement Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limiting Social Movement Organization Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resonance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other end of the spectrum, states that are broad and deep should focus on targeting the social movement organization’s frames. Since social movement organizations can only continue to survive in a broad and deep environment by
decentralizing, the resonance of strategic frames serves as the “glue” that keeps the organization together. Targeting the structure of a highly decentralized organization would have little effect, as each cell is designed to operate independently. Infiltration is an option, as it eventually brought down the “Family” cell within the ELF, but given security measures it is a highly risky and difficult technique to rely on. Thus, information and psychological operations become the tactics of choice with the goal of decreasing the external resonance of the movement’s message. Such tactics can be overt information campaigns consisting of black and/or white propaganda to counter the frames.338 The broad and deep state tends to rely on its repressive capabilities to demobilize social movement organizations, however, increased repression can fuel mobilization. The broad and deep state should instead develop competing frames to compromise the inspirational leader’s legitimacy, highlight the futility of the organization’s prognostic frames, and promote the possibility of change through nonviolent prognostic frames.339

For states with capacities that fall in between these two extremes, a strategy that targets both the structure and frames should be used. The organization should be evaluated to determine the resonance of frames and degree of operational leadership. If resonance is strong, then the state should weigh its strategy towards countering frames. If there is a high degree of operational leadership, then the state should weigh its strategy towards dismantling the structure. This is not to suggest that one strategy should be completely abandoned in favor of the other. Rather, the response should be tailored to focus more on the aspect that acts as the dominant “glue” that keeps the organization together.

Targeting structure or frames also plays to the strengths of each type of state capacity. Narrow and shallow states more than likely enjoy only marginal legitimacy,
making it difficult to formulate a compelling counter-frame. In addition, the state, because it is shallow, would be unable to infiltrate the organization to undermine it from the inside. However, it would probably have enough military capability to physically target the structure. Broad and deep states in general enjoy a higher degree of legitimacy, making it easier for them to formulate counter-frames that can effectively compete with those of the antagonist organization.

We have two recommendations for further study. Our case studies evaluate state capacity against violent social movement organizations over a relatively short period. State capacity is not static and can shift over time. Newly created states can start off as narrow and shallow but can progress towards broad and deep. Broad and deep states can lose legitimacy over time and move towards being narrow and shallow. However, the exact order in which this transformation occurs is unknown. How do states evolve/devolve along the scale of state capacity? Does becoming narrow precede becoming shallow? If a pattern can be found, then it would have implications for how states should shift their strategies over time. If a narrow and shallow state perceives itself as getting broader and deeper, then it can expect that the social movement organization will decentralize and thus shift its strategy to countering frames. If the state can anticipate that it will become broad before it becomes deep, then it knows that it will have the capability to overtly counter frames before it has the capability to carry out a covert counter-frame strategy through infiltration of the organization.

Our second recommendation is to test our hypothesis on non-violent social movement organizations. Leaderless social movements such as the Tea Party in the United States have been able to grow and gain political influence in a very short period of time. Are non-violent movements more successful than violent movements? Do non-violent movements exhibit the same degree of leadership under different state capacities? Non-violent social movements may be able to gain greater success than their violent counterparts because few people are willing to take the extra step towards violence. Perhaps it is violence that is the key factor that influences potential resonance. The strategies for countering non-violent social movements may be different as well. Kinetic operations aimed at eliminating the structure would no longer be an option. Therefore,
channeling or co-opting the organization may be most effective or an entirely different strategy may need to be developed. Research into these two areas would provide a complete picture of how leaderless social movements operate in different environments, providing a starting framework from which policy makers can address almost any specific social movement.
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LIST OF REFERENCES


Kaplan, J. “Leaderless Resistance.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 9, no. 3 (Fall, 1997): 80-95.


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