The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

The USG’s Interagency Tool for Conflict Assessment
Report Documentation Page

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What is the ICAF?

- The interagency conflict assessment tool of the USG
- Systematic and collaborative assessment
- An integral part of whole of government interagency planning
- Deeper understanding of the conflict dynamics
What are the ICAF Outcomes?

1. Crucial and shared understandings of the conflict
2. A prioritized lists of conflict drivers and mitigating factors
3. An better understanding of what other offices/departments/agencies are undertaking
4. A report which details the ICAF’s findings and conclusions
The Conflict and Resilience Equation

- **The Conflict Equation:**
  
  ![Diagram](image1)
  
  Core Grievances + Key Actors + Windows of Vulnerability = Drivers of Conflict

- **The Resilience Equation**
  
  ![Diagram](image2)
  
  Social & Institutional Resilience + Key Actors + Windows of Opportunity = Mitigating Factors
• Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF)
  – Created by USAID’s CMM
  – Facilitated in more than 55 countries
  – Used to assess conflict for development assistance

• Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework (TCAPF)
  – Created by USAID’s OMA for DOD
  – Provides a programmatic and tactical level assessment and planning approach

• These tools have been revised to be compatible with the ICAF
Who Can Facilitate an ICAF?

- DOS/S/CRS
- USAID/DCHA/CMM
- Trained USG officials, in coordination with S/CRS and USAID/CMM
What is the ICAF Process?

• A workshop where practitioners and policymakers bring their diverse viewpoints together to reach a common understanding of a conflict

• Formats for this facilitation include:
  o DC Based Table Top
  o Country Team Table Top
  o Full In-Country ICAF

• Focuses include:
  o Regional conflicts
  o Specific country dynamics
  o A particular issue within a country
When is an ICAF Conducted?

• At the request of:
  – US Ambassador
  – USAID Mission Director
  – DOS Regional Bureau or Special Envoy
  – Geographic Combatant Command

• When responding to any conflict-related crisis or situation, time and resources permitting
## Past ICAF Applications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>DC-Based Workshop</th>
<th>Field-Based Workshop</th>
<th>Field-Based Intensive</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td></td>
<td>Influenced MSP (conducted 2/09; reiterated 10/09)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Informed Embassy Strategy, influenced 1207 Proposal (3/09)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo (DROC)</td>
<td>Influenced CAS (6/08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Identified gaps in knowledge (Conducted at NDU, 12/09)</td>
<td>Focused on Northern Border Region, informed 1207 Proposal (1/10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Included Sr. Pol. Officer &amp; Dep. USAID Mission Director, UN, State/USAID/DOD/ AFRICOM Desk Officers (1/10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on integrating 61 AFRICOM mentors &amp; understanding latent conflicts (3/10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Informed Lew/Holbrook/ Petraeus policy retreat (7/09)</td>
<td>Influenced 1207 Proposal (4/09)</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Proto-type DC-based workshop for 17 interagency reps (12/07)</td>
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<td>Informed Embassy Strategy, influenced 1207 Proposal (1/08)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>ICAF Pilot/ Influenced DOD/ State/ USAID strategy (5/08)</td>
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<td>Timor Leste</td>
<td>Intended to influence 1207 proposal (3/08)</td>
<td>Tentatively scheduled to inform 1207 proposal (4/10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Focus on refining DC workshop (2/10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on increasing interagency participation (3/10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Influenced USAID strategy development (9/09)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Planned for early 2010; will inform Embassy planning</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Framework

Context

Societal Patterns

Identity Groups

Institutional Performance

Key Actors’ Motivations and Means

Core Grievances

Social and Institutional Resilience

Drivers of Conflict

Mitigating Factors

Moments for Increasing Conflict

Moments for Decreasing Conflict

Windows of Vulnerability

Windows of Opportunity
1. Conditions that we treat as givens because they are difficult or impossible for humans to alter within our planning horizon.
   - Poverty/low quality of life
   - Bad neighborhood
   - Recent history of conflict
   - Low level of economic growth/recession
   - Heterogeneity (2 or 3 equally sized groups)
   - Youth bulge

2. Context does not cause conflict.
Core Grievances and Social and Institutional Resilience

Context

Societal Patterns

Identity Groups

Institutional Performance

Core Grievances
Social and Institutional Resilience
Identity at the core

1. People that identify with one another
2. Often ascribed by others:
   • Religion
   • Ethnicity
   • Language
3. Conflict rises when group feels in jeopardy:
   • Identity
   • Security
   • Recognition
Institutional performance

1. Institutions are both formal and informal
2. Institutions mediate impact of contextual factors
3. Institutional performance has two aspects:
   • Outcomes
   • Perceptions
4. Performance outcomes may be measured objectively, but what matters is subjective perceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy by identity groups
Societal Patterns

1. Interactions between Identity Groups and Institutions produce persistent societal patterns:
   - Exclusion
   - Elitism
   - Rent-seeking/corruption
   - Capacity deficits
   - Disillusionment

2. And also:
   - Accommodation
   - Tolerance
Outputs: 

- **Core Grievances**: Identity groups’ deep sense of frustration and injustice emerging out of persistent social patterns such as elitism, exclusion, chronic capacity deficits (systemic stagnation), strategic resources (oil, diamonds, timber), ungoverned space, transitional moment: unmet expectations, corruption/rent-seeking

- **Social and Institutional Resilience**: Identity Groups’ willingness to engage in social patterns such as community organizing, intergroup trust development, facilitated dialogue, peace-building, traditional/alternative dispute resolution
Drivers and Mitigating Factors

Core Grievances
Social and Institutional Resilience

Drivers of Conflict
Mitigating Factors

Key Actors’ Motivations and Means

Context

Societal Patterns

Institutional Performance

Identity Groups

Institutional Performance

Identity Groups

Societal Patterns

Context
Key Actors

- Key Actors mobilize groups around Core Grievances and Resiliencies

- Key Actors
  - Are both organizations and individuals
  - Are related to identified grievances

- Motivations
  - What motivates them to engage with grievances or resiliencies

- Means
  - Basis of authority
  - Organizational capacities
  - Financing
  - Operational space
Outputs

- Prioritized Drivers and Mitigating Factors of the Conflict
  - These are the understandings that will allow one to set planning goals and objectives that are informed by USG interests
Windows of Uncertainty

Identity Groups

Societal Patterns

Institutional Performance

Context

Key Actors’ Motivations and Means

Core Grievances

Social and Institutional Resilience

Drivers of Conflict

Mitigating Factors

Moments for Increasing Conflict

Moments for Decreasing Conflict

Windows of Vulnerability

Windows of Opportunity
Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunities

- Moments in time that may crystallize grievances or resiliencies
  - Elections
  - Passage of legislation
  - Assassinations/targeted political violence
  - Ruling in a court case
  - Economic shock
  - Holidays
Outputs

- Allows the team to recognize the moments for increasing and decreasing conflict
- Also provides a way to hypothesis status quo trajectory and the future based upon the environment, key dynamics and anticipated events
- Describes potential points of entry
ICAF Outputs

Task One: Diagnosis

- Step 1: Core Grievances
- Step 2: Drivers of Conflict
- Step 3: Moments for Increasing Conflict
- Step 3: Mitigating Factors
- Step 3: Moments for Decreasing Conflict

Task Two: Pre-Planning

- Step 1: Response Gaps
- Step 1: Entry Points
Identify current efforts to **address drivers** and **strengthen mitigating factors**:
- By USG agencies
- By other international actors

Identify remaining critical gaps

Conduct risk analysis in addressing gaps
- Cost/benefits
- Opportunities and entry points

Identify key actors/windows that may serve as entry points
Key Dynamics Obtained by Mapping the System

1. Cambodia – Key Dynamics:
   - Social
   - Institutional
   - Political

2. Pakistan – Unintentional self-reinforcing behaviors
Aggregation of power

Elite “buy in”

Rent-seeking opportunities

Culturally-rooted system based on a Patron--Client Relationship

Activities of CPP and HS

Aggregation of power

Systemic Vulnerabilities
--Dependence on ever-increasing rents
--Reliance on a strong “system” manager
--Weak ability to respond to crises
--Patronage-weakened institutions

Key Economic Dynamic

Economic growth

External support (donors, investors)

Key Institutional/Political Dynamic

Global Economy

Cambodia

"Elite" Patron-Client System

Sensitive but Unclassified

Selective predatory impact on communities

Economic growth

External support (donors, investors)
US believes Pakistan stability is in the US Interest

GOP lacks civilian capacity for greater development activities

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GOP seeks continued funding from US

GOP & PAK Mil believe parity with India is in Pakistan’s interest

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US sees PAK Mil as its “lever” in Pakistan

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GOP lacks civilian capacity for greater development activities

Pashtuns believe PAK Mil is antagonistic to their interests & is Punjab-centric

US believes ungoverned Spaces in Pakistan will be used by terrorists threatening the US

US continues to provide disproportionate funding for PAK Mil

Pashtuns reluctant to assist PAK Mil in tribal regions

US attempts to build civilian capacity in Pakistan

GOP & PAK Mil fight Taliban in FATA & NW Frontier Prov.

US wants light US branding in Pakistan

GOP acquiesces in requests requests of PAK Mil sees military as opportunity for additional funding from US

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Questions?