The LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV Transition in Northern Afghanistan

Contract Services Phase-in and Phase-out on a Grand Scale

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The U.S. military has successfully completed hundreds of Relief-in-Place and Transfers of Authority between military units during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom since 2002. The RIP/TOA process between military units has been observed, refined, and executed to the point where it is now a common and routine event. An uncommon and considerably larger-in-scale TOA was successfully completed in three key regions in Afghanistan: Regional Command-East, Regional Command-North, and Regional Command-Capital. This TOA was conducted between the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) III performing contractor (PC) and incumbent, KBR; and the LOGCAP IV incoming performing contractor (IPC), Fluor Intercontinental Incorporated. LOGCAP is a U.S. Army initiative to plan in peacetime for the use of civilian contractors in wartime and other contingencies. Army
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Materiel Command serves as the program manager for LOGCAP operations.

The transition of logistic contract support included 59 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) with a combined supported population of over 70,000 military service members, coalition forces, and Department of Defense civilians and contractors, all geographically dispersed over an area slightly smaller than California. The transition involved over 12,000 combined prime contractor and subcontractor employees of KBR and Fluor, and it was completed in less than nine months. The task was complicated by the concurrent theater combat and force surge requirements. The Defense Contract Management Agency, the contract administrator for contingency contract administration services for LOGCAP, and DCMA’s Team LOGCAP partners successfully planned and executed—arguably—the largest contractor battlefield RIP/TOA in military history.

**Planning and Development Begin**

To appreciate the significance of this TOA, one must first understand the considerable impact LOGCAP has on operations in northern and central Afghanistan. In the northern half of Afghanistan, LOGCAP provides operations and maintenance to over 1,500 non-tactical vehicles, 1,800 generators, 7,500 facilities, and over 40 dining facilities providing over 4 million meals per month. Additionally, LOGCAP provides, on a monthly basis, over 42 million gallons of water and 19 million gallons of fuel, and processes over 150,000 bags of laundry. Afghanistan’s austere infrastructure and hostile environment complicate this already challenging mission. The monumental task of planning and executing the contractor RIP/TOA—contractually referred to as phase-in and phase-out of services under the continuity of services clause—fell to DCMA-Northern Afghanistan (DCMA-NA), the organization responsible for LOGCAP contract administration in Regional Command-East, Regional Command-North, and Regional Command-Capital.

Planning development for the transition began in early 2009. Neither the LOGCAP III nor the LOGCAP IV contracts provided detailed contract direction on the phase-in and phase-out of services between PC and IPC. Agency-level strategic guidance promoted in-theater centralized planning and decentralized execution, encouraging significant teaming and cooperation among the various stakeholders involved in the transition. Considerable human and financial resource challenges and risks had to be mitigated and overcome with well-crafted plans of action. During mission analysis, DCMA-NA recognized a need for additional human resources. In response, DCMA HQ authorized three additional quality assurance representatives and three property specialists to the DCMA-NA team. DCMA-NA also committed seven additional members from its base human resource authorization towards the transition mission, while continuing to execute contract administration and oversight of LOGCAP and theater-wide contract administration of Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan contracts. The additional resources included the assignment of a field-grade officer with program management and contracting experience as the overall transition lead; three company-grade officers with quality assurance and program management experience serving as FOB transition leads; and a company-grade officer as transition operations officer to coordinate transition events and activities, assemble and analyze reports and data, and orchestrate meetings and coordination with the PC and IPC. Two additional DCMA employees supported the

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transition of Bagram Airfield, the largest joint military base in Afghanistan and the region’s strategic hub.

**Three-Stage Process**

The initial plan for transition incorporated three phases: (1) preparation; (2) reception, staging, onward movement and integration, and rehearsal; and (3) transition and validation. The three phases were marked by two decision points, each of which had several task requirements to be met before proceeding to the next phase (as illustrated in the figure on the previous page).

The preparation readiness review validated the readiness of the IPC and PC through the substantiated completion of required preparation tasks to move into the reception, staging, onward movement and integration, and rehearsal phase. The transition readiness review was a decision briefing for the approval or disapproval for DCMA-NA to proceed with the FOB transition. The review ensured that the incoming contractor had appropriate resources, processes, procedures, supplies, and equipment to meet LOGCAP IV requirements. Transition readiness review approval led to the TOA of the performing contractor with the incoming contractor. T-Day, the day when the incoming contractor formally assumes responsibility for all LOGCAP contract requirements on the FOB, marks the start of the validation phase. Shortly following T-Day, the DCMA transition team began service acceptance inspections using the same DCMA service examination checklist used by quality assurance representatives and contracting officer representative (CORS) during full performance of the contractor.

The DCMA service examination checklist measures contractor performance against contract performance requirements. This initial examination serves as a quality inspection baseline for subsequent DCMA and CORS audits and has two goals: to ensure the incoming contractor understands the performance standards; and to continue validation and refinement of the contractor’s quality management system. The validation phase concluded with the FOB out-briefs, which not only summarized transition activities over the previous few weeks, but also served as a formal introduction or kickoff meeting between the new contractor’s FOB management team, FOB leadership, CORS, and base operating support integrator (BOS-I, commonly known as FOB mayor). The FOB mayor is responsible for FOB operations and maintenance as well as FOB infrastructure and facility planning and management. Including the FOB leadership and mayor assured buy-in and fostered confidence in the transition process by demonstrating to them DCMA, Fluor, and KBR commitment to customer engagement.

DCMA-NA masterfully orchestrated this complex mission by directing the activities of four transition operations teams and two DoD contractors. DCMA-NA simultaneously used four independently operating transition teams consisting of a team lead, an Air Force captain, a DCMA quality assurance representative, and a DCMA property specialist. DCMA transition team operations included the following: engaging unit leadership at the FOBs to ensure the unit fully understood the transition process; monitoring property inventory performed by the two contractors; monitoring the technical assessment of facilities; evaluating the readiness of the IPC to perform required LOGCAP IV services; conducting daily in-process reviews (hot wash) with FOB stakeholders; and preparing briefings and assessments.

Transitions, or TOAs, between the performing contractor and incoming contractor were executed by FOB, meaning all service operations transitioned from the PC to the IPC at a specific date and time for that specific FOB. Bagram Airfield was the exception. Because of the sheer size of Bagram Airfield at the time of transition (a supported population of over 25,000), it was determined that transitioning by service group (for example, black and gray water removal, vehicle maintenance, and so on) was a more rational approach. A unique challenge occurred during the transition, when the IPC and the PC became dependent on each other for support and services. Since the entire region and associated services were not transitioned on one overarching specific date, it was inevitable that at some point, the two contractors would have to support each other. For example, on Bagram Airfield, black and gray water removal transitioned to the incoming contractor while vehicle maintenance had yet to transition; therefore, the incoming contractor depended on the performing contractor for vehicle mainte-
nance on the black and gray water removal trucks. A similar challenge occurred for individual FOBs. Although all services on the FOB transitioned to the IPC on a certain date and at a certain time, many of the FOBs—specifically the smaller population FOBs—encountered contractor interdependence because of hub and spoke support requirements. Decentralized execution allowed the IPC and PC, through DCMA-NA transition operations, to coordinate a change in transition order where the performing contractor maintained control over the hub FOB until the spoke FOBs transitioned to the incoming contractor. This reduced the risk of supply chain distribution problems that could possibly disrupt operations at the smaller FOBs. Once all spoke FOBs were under the IPC’s control, the hub FOB could transition.

There were several important adjustments that contributed significantly to the success of the transition mission in northern Afghanistan. First and foremost was the decision to commit additional human resources and to appropriately devote those resources to the transition mission. However, the most critical event was the DCMA-NA commander’s decision to convene an operational pause two months into the transition mission. The DCMA-NA transition team, IPC, and PC used the operational pause to hold a series of meetings with the various stakeholders to deal with and discuss observations, insights, and lessons noted during transition operations; and to address Army Materiel Command’s directive to accelerate transition completion by two months. The transition operational pause culminated in a synchronization conference.

Emerging from the synchronization conference was a refined, more robust process with increased system fidelity, ultimately reducing transition timelines with no OEF mission impact and minimal impact to the continuation of FOB services.

The initial transition plan was working but had some recognized shortcomings, including an incorrect assumption that all services were of equal importance and that the PC and IPC had 12 months to complete the transition. The current plan was unlikely to meet the Army Materiel Command-directed timeline and mission directives. Emerging from the synchronization conference was a refined, more robust process with increased system fidelity, ultimately reducing transition timelines with no Operation Enduring Freedom mission impact and minimal impact to the continuation of FOB services. A new four-step approach was adopted. It enhanced coordination and planning between DCMA, Fluor, and KBR and gave the FOB transition teams the authority to make proactive and continuous process improvements. Dedicated teams from Fluor and KBR were assigned to each step of the four-step approach.

**Step 1**
Activities during Step 1 are similar to those conducted during the pre-deployment site survey, setting and establishing the conditions for success. The incoming contractor conducts an FOB site assessment and conducts in-process planning on the resources required to transition and operate the FOB. The incoming contractor’s presence at the FOB at this time is not permanent and is used to gain more detailed information to effectively implement movement of the transition activities toward full performance. During this phase, the DCMA transition team validates service requirements from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV coordinating with the LOGCAP support officer, FOB leadership, FOB mayor, and the FOB’s supporting administrative contracting officer and quality assurance representatives.

**Step 2**
The incoming contractor begins a sustained presence at the FOB during this step, a phase similar to the activities of torch-and-advance parties. Early establishment of communications is critical at this time to set the conditions for subsequent service establishment, particularly in property/materials management and service order functions, for the IPC automated information system. DCMA completes its validation of services and contractor property accountability lists. The mayor identifies applicable CORs for services. As part of continuous process improvement the incoming contractor, performing contractor, and DCMA transition teams identified the need to start the asset inventory (property, facilities, materials, tools, etc.) during this step for FOBs with significantly large inventories and to supply support activity operations. These FOBs were usually designated as logistical hubs, supporting neighboring FOBs. The asset inventory is normally the critical path to meeting the scheduled transition day. This phase culminates at the preparation readiness review where the IPC and PC update DCMA on the finalized plan for transitioning LOGCAP service and operation requirements between the PC and the IPC.

**Step 3**
This step involves unit tasks similar to those performed when a unit completes theater arrival activities before assuming mission responsibility from the departing unit. Asset inven-
tory is started during this step, unless previously begun in Step 2. The essential service threshold prioritizes work during Step 3 and defines the minimum, or threshold, service requirements that must be reached before the incoming contractor assumes responsibility for LOGCAP operations of the FOB. Essential services are those services designated by contract as critical to life support on base—water, food, power generation, etc. The incoming contractor’s readiness or capability is measured through capability assessment/TOA checklists developed by DCMA quality assurance representatives and based on the LOGCAP quality assurance and surveillance plan and the IPC’s quality control plan, and are briefed at the technical readiness review. This phase culminates on T-Day or TOA.

**Step 4**

T-Day marks the beginning of Step 4 and is very similar to the initial plan’s validation phase, starting with DCMA’s service acceptance inspections. The contractor’s Phase 3 team departs and moves to the next FOB and hands off performance to the FOB contractor support staff. The contractor’s Step 4 team focus is on training and integrating employees, refining automated information system inputs, and validating quality assurance processes. The DCMA transition team conducts a close-out brief with the mayor and FOB leadership giving a summary of the service acceptance inspection findings. Using the DCMA transition team’s findings from TOA checklists, the transition team’s observations, and the contractor’s internal quality performance assessments, Phase 4 completes the transition effort and advances into contractor full performance.

**Ingredients for Transition Success**

Early in-theater centralized planning and decentralized execution encouraged significant teaming and cooperation among the various stakeholders involved in the LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV transition. The four-step process improved alignment and prioritization of transition tasks. Fluor’s, KBR’s, and DCMA’s assignment of dedicated teams for transition activities proved critical in developing increased teaming between the contractors and contract administrator. This teaming approach also supported continuous process improvement of transition activities, where observations, insights, and lessons could immediately be applied in a decentralized manner. Developing and adjusting the transition approach to closely follow the proven RIP/TOA process and assigning the appropriate resources to that process led to transition success and ensured uninterrupted logistic support for U.S. and coalition forces in northern Afghanistan.

Lucius was previously deputy commander, DCMA-Northern Afghanistan overseeing the LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV transition activities. Riley is commander of DCMA AIMO-Birmingham and was the commander of DCMA Northern Afghanistan at the time of the LOGCAP III to IV transition. The authors welcome comments and questions and can be contacted at tommie.lucius@us.army.mil and mike.riley@dcma.mil.