Counterinsurgency Overview

Presented to:
MORS Irregular Warfare Workshop

19 April 2010

USA/USMC COIN Center
U.S. Army Stability Operations Proponent
U.S. Army Security Force Assistance Proponent
COL Daniel S. Roper, Director
**Report Documentation Page**

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<td>Army Combined Arms Center, COIN Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 66027</td>
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<th>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</th>
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<tr>
<td>Irregular Warfare III - Improving Analytical Support to the Warfighter: Campaign Assessments, Operational Analysis, and Data Management 19-22 April 2010, Lockheed Martin, Orlando, Florida</td>
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*Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)*

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
Agenda

• COIN Center Overview
• Understanding the Environment
• Human Terrain
• Assessments & Metrics
Mission Statement: USA/USMC COIN Center provides oversight of ground force COIN integration in order to improve US ground forces’ capability to operate in a full spectrum/COIN environment.

- **Integrate COIN initiatives**
- **Research best practices**
- **Improve Doctrine**
- **Improve Education**
- **Advise leaders and organizations**
- **Conduct Outreach to other military & civilian entities**

**Lines of Effort**

Assist Army/USMC in implementation/application of the body of thought in FM 3-24
Global COIN Center Partners

Media
• BBC
• National Public Radio
• McClatchy
• Chicago Tribune
• Congressional Quarterly
• Inside the Army
• AUSA Magazine

COIN Centers for Excellence
• COIN and Stability Operations Center
• COIN Training Center—Afghanistan

Liaison Officer Integration
• Japan
• Australia
• Netherlands
• New Zealand
• France
• United Kingdom
• Italy
• Germany

UK: Land Stability and COIN Centre
Netherlands: Doctrine
France: Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre
NATO: Joint Force Training Centre
Afghanistan: COIN Consultations

U.S. Military Centers
• USA/USMC COIN Center
• USJFCOM Joint Irregular Warfare Center
• SOCOM J10
• USMC Irregular Warfare Center
• USAF Irregular Warfare Center
• USCENTCOM Interagency Task Force
• Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

U.S. Government
• US Department of State
• U.S. Agency for International Development
• Department of Justice
• National Security Council

Think Tanks
• RAND
• U.S. Institute of Peace
• Center for New American Security
• Small Wars Journal

Academia
• Harvard
• US Military Academy
• Johns Hopkins
• Princeton
• Stanford
• Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute
• University of Kansas

Land Force Doctrine and Training System
Staff College
Special Operations Forces School
UK Land Warfare Centre
# COIN Center, Stability Operations, Security Force Assistance

**Proponent - Engagements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeframe</th>
<th>Event</th>
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| **2009**  | • Operational Mentor Liaison Team Training, Poland  
            • Multinational Engagements: *(UK, Italy, NATO Def College, France, Germany, Russia)*  
            • COIN Leaders Workshop: *Pakistan/Afghan border*  
            • Thailand Subject Matter Expert Exchange  
            • Pakistan COIN Conference  
            • Afghanistan coordination visits |
| **2010**  | • COIN Leaders Workshop: *Afghanistan Azimuth Check*  
            • Thailand *COIN Subject Matter Expert Exchange*  
            • Arizona State University *Foreign Policy Conference*  
            • COIN Collaboration: *(Canada, Turkey, Pakistan)*  
            • Afghanistan Training Command *COIN Consultation*  
            • Defense Summit Asia Conference |
Understanding the Environment
“This is a different kind of fight. Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population. Gaining their support will require a better understanding of the people’s choices and needs. [We must] change the operational culture to connect with the people. ISAF [must] focus on protecting the Afghan people, understanding their environment, and building relationships with them.”
Understanding the Operational Environment

Not ... *what to think*

Or even . . . *how to think*

In COIN & Irregular Warfare, focus on ...

*how to think about:*

- environment in which you operate &
- how to influence both environment & actors in it.
A Multiple-Problem Set

Economic Instability
Terrorism
Counterterrorism
Insurgency
COIN
Criminality
Rule of Law
Societal Instability
Justice
Employment
Legitimacy
External Actors

We must understand in detail the situation, however complex, and be able to explain it to others.

GEN McChrystal, 13 June 2009
“It is an irony of political warfare—and a political fact to be considered and understood—that the rules are not the same for both sides.”

Robert Taber, War of the Flea, 1965
Information as a “Lens” in COIN

Achieving a degree of coherency in word, actions, images & outcome

What is our compelling narrative?

Info

Coherent Effects

Physical

Psychological

Regional Actors

HN Security

Nat’l Military

Police

Insurgents

Active Supporters

Sympathizers

Splinter Groups

Coalition Forces

U.S.

Non-U.S.

HN Government

National

Local

Interagency

Media

Essential Svcs (SWEAT-MS)

Civ-Mil Ops

Governance

Combat Ops

Economic

Other Influences

Competitors
Key Mission Areas

• Succeed in *counterinsurgency and stability operations*
  
  • retain the capability to conduct large-scale *counterinsurgency and stability operations* in a wide range of environments
  
  • increase *counterinsurgency and stability operations* competency and capacity in general purpose forces
  
• Build the *security capacity of partner states*
  
  • *strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance*
COMISAF Directive

“Counterinsurgency is an order. It is not a technique we recommend. This is how we are operating this campaign. It is how we will win. It is not open to people’s personal philosophy.”

16 March 2010
COIN, IW, SO, & SFA

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Increasing Violence

Stable Peace

Unstable Peace

Insurgency

General War

OPERATIONAL THEMES

Peacetime Military Engagement

Limited Intervention

Peace Operations

Irregular Warfare

Major Combat Operations

Security Force Assistance

Stability Operations
USG COIN Guide

“Whether the United States should engage in any particular counterinsurgency is a matter of political choice, but that it will engage in such conflicts during the decades to come is a near certainty. This Guide...will serve best if treated not as a rigidly defined set of recipes, but rather, as a stimulus to disciplined, but creative thought.”

**Essential Doctrine**

- **FM 3-07.1: Security Force Assistance**
  - Level: Operational/Tactical
  - Scope: Army SFA
  - Published: May 2009

- **FM 3-07: Stability Operations**
  - Level: Operational
  - Scope: Army
  - Published: Oct 2008

- **FM 3-24/3-24.2**
  - FM 3-24: COIN
    - Level: Operational
    - Scope: Joint
    - Published: Oct 2009
  - FM 3-24.2: Tactics in COIN
    - Level: Tactical
    - Scope: Army Bde and below
    - Published: Apr 2009

- **JP 3-24: COIN**
  - Level: Operational
  - Scope: Joint
  - Published: Oct 2009

- **Irregular Warfare JOC**
  - Scope: IW Joint Operating Concept
  - Signed: Sep 2007

- **Irregular Warfare JOC**
  - Scope: IW Joint Operating Concept
  - Signed: Sep 2007

- **USA/USMC COIN Center**
  - Web-sites and Links

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**COIN.ARMY.MIL**
“Today insurgency is mutating, thus forcing an intense reevaluation of U.S. strategy and operational concepts.”

Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century”
A “Comprehensive Approach”
“Success” in Counterinsurgency

“A victory is not [just] the destruction in a given area of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization. It is that, plus the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population.”

David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 1964
Human Terrain
Human Terrain

The element of the operational environment encompassing the cultural, sociological, political, and economic factors of the local population.

“You cannot operate in this environment without a detailed understanding of all the PMESII variables, particularly the political and informational.”

GEN Ray Odierno, September 2009
Relevant Context in the Operational Environment

Operational Variables
- Political
- Military
- Economic
- Social
- Infrastructure
- Information
- Physical terrain
- Time

Civil Considerations
- Areas
- Structures
- Capabilities
- Organizations
- People
- Events

Integrate to paint detailed picture of local perceptions & dynamics
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Military/Security</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Information</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District/Provincial boundary</td>
<td>IED sites, military/insurgent bases</td>
<td>Bazaars, farms, repair shops, bazaars</td>
<td>Picnic areas, bazaars, meeting sites</td>
<td>Irrigation networks, medical services</td>
<td>Radio, gathering points, graffiti, posters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Structures | Shura halls, Court House | Police HQ’s, military bases | Bazaars, banks, industrial plants | Mosques, Wedding halls | Roads, bridges, electrical lines, dams | Cell, radio and TV towers, print shops |

| Capabilities | Dispute resolution, judges, local leadership | Military/Police Enemy recruiting potential? | Access to banks, development, black market | Traditional structures, means of justice | Ability to: build/maintain roads, dams, irrigation | Literacy rate, phone service |

| Organizations | GOV & NGO organizations | Coalition & Host Nation Forces | Banks, landholders, economic NGO’s | Tribes, clans, families | Gov Ministries, Construction companies | News organizations, mosques |

| People       | Governors, councils, elders, Judges | Coalition/ host nation military/police leaders | Bankers, landholders, merchants, criminals | Religious/civic leaders, elders, families | Builders, contractors, development councils | Civic/religious leaders, family heads |

| Events       | Elections, meetings, speeches, trials | Kinetic events, military/police operations | Drought, harvest, business opening | Weddings, deaths/births/funerals, bazaar days | Road/bridge/school construction, well digging | Festivals, project openings |
“You must understand your operational environment. All of us must learn the ASCOPE methodology to refine our awareness of the operational environment. This gives us an understanding of civil considerations from the point of view of the population, insurgent, and counterinsurgent.”
Information Management

PROBLEM: “Little [relevant information] from the ground level in Afghanistan reaches a central repository where customers who need information can access or search for it. Instead, vital information piles up in obscure SharePoint sites, inaccessible hard drives, and other digital junkyards.”

MG Michael Flynn, p. 17.

REQUIREMENT: An integrated capabilities-driven technical approach that can meet the need for normalized, time-sensitive, population-centric (PMESII-PT, ASCOPE, indicators) information.

CHECKMATE Command Post Executive Summary, 2010
Civil Information Management

PROBLEM: The lack of a standardized assessment process that allows civil and military personnel to determine and target the grievances/root causes of instability and conflict in Area of Operations (AO).

What Information?
- Demographics
- Economics
- Social constructs
- Culture
- Political processes
- Political leaders
- Civil-military relationships
- Infrastructure nodes
- Non-state actors in the AO
- Civil defense
- Public safety and health capabilities
- Environment
- Events

PMESII-PT
- Political
- Military
- Environment
- Social
- Infrastructure
- Information Systems
- Physical Environment
- Time

ASCOPE
- Areas
- Structures
- Capabilities
- Organizations
- People
- Events

DIME
- Diplomatic
- Information
- Military
- Economic

SWEAT-MUS
- Sewage
- Water
- Electricity
- Academics
- Trash
- Medical
- Unemployment
- Security

TCAPF – Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework
Reason for change in population?
What is the most important problem facing the village?
Who do you believe can solve your problems?
What should be done first to help your village?
Assessments & Metrics
“When you get a new job to do, spend most of your time discovering exactly what your new mission is. Then break it down into workable units.”

GEN Matthew Ridgway
Frame the Problem

• What is the force trying to accomplish (ends)?
• What conditions, when established, constitute the desired end state (ends)?
• How will the force achieve the end state (ways)?
• What sequence of actions is most likely to attain these conditions (ways)?
• What resources are required, and how can they be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?
• What risks are associated with that sequence of actions, and how can they be mitigated (risk)?
U S OBJECTIVE IN AFGHANISTAN

President Obama, United States Military Academy, 1 December 2009

“Our overarching goal...: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.”

HOW DO WE MEASURE THAT?
MOE – Not a New Issue

December 1966

AY 05-06
Measure of Effectiveness

“A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.”

(Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Operations.)

“At best, measures of combat efficiency are measures of how quickly or cheaply forces perform military missions. They do not gauge whether mission success will achieve political purposes.”

Robert S. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War
History Repeating Itself?

“...requirements exist for methods or analytical models that are suitable or adequate for gaining greater understanding of insurgency / counterinsurgency-type situations, for measuring progress; for detecting and assessing causal relationships; and for evaluating alternative allocations of effort, tactics, and strategies.”

Lawrence J. Dondero, Head, Military Gaming Dept “Measurement of Pacification Progress in Vietnam (U)” Research Analysis Corporation (RAC), *September 1968*
MOE in a Complex Environment

It is important to preface any attempt to establish analytic criteria, and measures of effectiveness, for a conflict like the Afghan War with some important caveats:

• There is a natural desire to find bottom line metrics and judgments, but the task is to manage complexity and not to oversimplify.
• Any metrics or analysis which focus narrowly on formal command structures, or national boundaries, are inherently wrong.
• It is far easier to quantify what is easily measured than to quantify what is relevant.
• Metrics often imply a false precision, particularly since they are rarely shown as full ranges or rounded to reflect uncertainty.
• Numbers that are unsupported by narrative are a remarkably poor method of communication.

*Andrew Cordesman, Analyzing the Afghan-Pakistan War, Draft 28 July 09
MOE in Afghanistan

FY 2010 Defense Authorization Act

The committee requires the President to assess U.S. progress in four areas for Afghanistan, including: assisting the Afghan people with building a functional government; spreading the rule of law and reducing corruption; reducing the ability of anti-government elements to carry out attacks in and from Afghanistan; and improving the economy. The administration is directed to develop goals and timelines to achieve the aims listed, in addition to measures of effectiveness for accurate assessments in each area.
Measure of Effectiveness

“The measure of effectiveness will not be the number of enemy killed, it will be the number of Afghans shielded from violence.”

GEN Stanley McChrystal

“Because political objectives are just that—political—they are often ambiguous, contradictory; it is one of the greatest sources of frustration for soldiers. . . .”

Dr. Eliot Cohen
Concerns

• What are the relevant indicators of success?
• How will those indicators be measured?
• How will information regarding those indicators be forwarded?
• How can the information be used by units on the ground?
• What are the conditions that have to be established for the desired end state?

"Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted."

Einstein
To Determine Progress...

- Must maintain a common set of core metrics
- Must maintain a consistent methodology
- Cannot simply measure, must also interpret
- Must determine categories for metrics
  - Population
  - Host nation government
  - Security forces
  - Enemy
  - Development

Kilcullen, “Measuring Progress in Afghanistan,” Dec 09
Attributes of Good Metrics

**GENERAL**

1. Operationally defined
2. Efficient, feasible, parsimonious
3. Variable
4. Created within spatial and temporal domains
5. Consider classification level and whether data exists at the required level

**SPECIFIC**

1. Transparent
2. Repeatable
3. Shared
4. Layered
5. Reasonably easy to do
6. Defendable
7. Rigorous
8. Good enough
9. Linked
10. Generalizable
11. Systematic
12. Reliability
Framework for COIN
Approach to Counterinsurgency
1. Separate insurgents from Population
2. Connect Population to Government
3. Transform Environment to be inhospitable to Insurgents

Framework for Counterinsurgency: “War Amongst the People”

COIN Principles
- Legitimacy
- Unity of Effort
- Political is Primary
- Understand the Environment
- Intelligence
- Isolate Insurgents
- Security under Rule of Law
- Long term Commitment

Motivations
- Fear
- Greed
- Honor

Insurgency Dynamics
- Leadership
- Ideology
- Objective
- Environment
- External Support
- Phases
- Organization

Prerequisites
- Lack of Government Control
- Vulnerable Population
- Leadership for Direction

Insurgents

Insurgency Dynamics

External (Non)State Actor

Coalition

Military

HN Security Forces

HN Gov.

PRTs

Partner Unit TT/OMLT

People

Physical

Psychological

Physical

Psychological

Physical

Psychological

External (Non)State Actor

Resources Sanction

Political Moral

Political

Military

Civ

In the diagram, the COIN Principles are shown on the left, while the Motivations and Insurgency Dynamics are depicted on the right. The Prerequisites for successful counterinsurgency are illustrated in the center, with the Insurgents and the external (Non)State Actor connected through various interactions and influences.
### Successful COIN Practices- Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clear Hold Build</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>By/With/Through HN</th>
<th>Security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Build and develop cleared areas</td>
<td>Focus on population</td>
<td>Political and military cooperation</td>
<td>Deny sanctuary to insurgents</td>
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<tr>
<td>“...use projects and work programs to bring communities together.”</td>
<td>“We need to embrace the Afghan people.”</td>
<td>“Partner with ANSF at all echelons.”</td>
<td>“...separate insurgents from the center of gravity, the people.”</td>
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*COMISAF Guidance, Aug 09*
Security Force Assistance Activities
FM 3-07.1

**Plan and resource** Host Nation security force operations.

**Generate** Host Nation capacity.

**Partner** with HN security forces. Embed advisors to support capacity building.

**Transition** to Host Nation legitimate authority.

**Sustain** Host Nation security forces. Develop and support relevant programs.

“Building [partner] capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
Foreign Affairs
The warfighting functions are integrated and synchronized in the MDMP to generate combat power. Variances during execution disrupt this synchronization. During execution, commanders and staff also assess the underlying framework of the plan itself. This involves reexamining the original design concept and determining if it is still relevant to the situation.