Social Networks: Rational Learning and Information Aggregation

by

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### Abstract

This thesis studies the learning problem of a set of agents connected via a general social network. We address the question of how dispersed information spreads in social networks and whether the information is efficiently aggregated in large societies. The models developed in this thesis allow us to study the learning behavior of rational agents embedded in complex networks. We analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic game where each agent sequentially receives a signal about an underlying state of the world, observes the past actions of a stochastically-generated neighborhood of individuals, and chooses one of two possible actions. The stochastic process generating the neighborhoods defines the network topology (social network). We characterize equilibria for arbitrary stochastic and deterministic social networks and characterize the conditions under which there will be asymptotic learning that is the conditions under which, as the social network becomes large, the decisions of the individuals converge (in probability) to the right action. We show that when private beliefs are unbounded (meaning that the implied likelihood ratios are unbounded), there will be asymptotic learning as long as there is some minimal amount of expansion in observations. This result therefore establishes that, with unbounded private beliefs there will be asymptotic learning in almost all reasonable social networks. Furthermore we provide bounds on the speed of learning for some common network topologies. We also analyze when learning occurs when the private beliefs are bounded. We show that asymptotic learning does not occur in many classes of network topologies, but surprisingly, it happens in a family of stochastic networks that has infinitely many agents observing the actions of neighbors that are not suitably persuasive. Finally, we characterize equilibria in a generalized environment with heterogeneity of preferences and show that, contrary to a naive intuition, greater diversity (heterogeneity) facilitates asymptotic learning when agents observe the full history of past actions. In contrast, we show that heterogeneity of preferences hinders information aggregation when each agent observes only the action of a single neighbor.
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We analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic game where each agent sequentially receives a signal about an underlying state of the world, observes the past actions of a stochastically-generated neighborhood of individuals, and chooses one of two possible actions. The stochastic process generating the neighborhoods defines the network topology (social network).

We characterize equilibria for arbitrary stochastic and deterministic social networks and characterize the conditions under which there will be asymptotic learning—that is, the conditions under which, as the social network becomes large, the decisions of the individuals converge (in probability) to the right action. We show that when private beliefs are unbounded (meaning that the implied likelihood ratios are unbounded), there will be asymptotic learning as long as there is some minimal amount of expansion in observations. This result therefore establishes that, with unbounded private beliefs, there will be asymptotic learning in almost all reasonable social networks. Furthermore, we provide bounds on the speed of learning for some common network topologies. We also analyze when learning occurs when the private beliefs are bounded. We show that asymptotic learning does not occur in many classes of network topologies, but, surprisingly, it happens in a family of stochastic networks that has infinitely many agents observing the actions of neighbors that are not sufficiently persuasive.

Finally, we characterize equilibria in a generalized environment with heterogeneity of preferences and show that, contrary to a naive intuition, greater diversity (heterogeneity)
facilitates asymptotic learning when agents observe the full history of past actions. In contrast, we show that heterogeneity of preferences hinders information aggregation when each agent observes only the action of a single neighbor.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Aggregation of Information in Social Networks

How is dispersed and decentralized information held by a large number of individuals aggregated? Imagine a situation in which each of a large number of individuals has a noisy signal about an underlying state of the world. This state of the world might concern, among other things, earning opportunities in a certain occupation, the quality of a new product, the suitability of a particular political candidate for office or payoff-relevant actions taken by the government. If signals are unbiased, the combination—*aggregation*—of the information of the individuals will be sufficient for the society to “learn” the true underlying state. The above question can be formulated as the investigation of what types of behaviors and communication structures will lead to this type of information aggregation.

This thesis investigates the learning behavior of rational agents who are embedded in a social network. We aim to understand under what conditions do rational individuals learning from each others’ actions are able to correctly identify an underlying state. The analysis of the spread of information in social networks has a diverse set of applications, and some of the most interesting questions relate to how businesses can leverage social
networks in order to improve their operations. For example, when should a firm rely on viral (word-of-mouth) marketing to spread the news that its products are of high quality? Should the publicity campaign used to convince consumers to see a good film be fundamentally different than the one deployed for a worse movie? How do traditional ads compare in effectiveness to the novel “social ads”, which simply show you information about your friends’ purchases? Are there particular individuals that should be targeted in order to maximize one’s influence on a social network?

Condorcet’s Jury Theorem provides a natural benchmark for information aggregation, where sincere (truthful) reporting of their information by each individual is sufficient for aggregation of information by a law of large numbers argument (Condorcet, 1788). Against this background, a number of papers, most notably Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992) and Smith and Sorensen (2000), show how this type of aggregation might fail in the context of the (perfect) Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic game: when individuals act sequentially, after observing the actions of all previous individuals (agents), many reasonable situations will lead to the wrong conclusion with positive probability.

An important modeling assumption in these papers is that each individual observes all past actions. In practice, individuals are situated in complex social networks, which provide their main source of information. For example, Granovetter (1973), Montgomery (1991), Munshi (2003) and Iaonnides and Loury (2004) document the importance of information obtained from the social network of an individual for employment outcomes. Besley and Case (1994), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), Munshi (2004), and Udry and Conley (2001) show the importance of the information obtained from social networks for technology adoption. Jackson (2006, 2007) provides excellent surveys of the work on the importance of social networks in many diverse situations. In this thesis, we address how the structure of social networks, which determines the information that individuals receive, affects equilibrium information aggregation.
We start with the canonical sequential learning problem, except that instead of full observation of past actions, we allow for a general *social network* connecting individuals. More specifically, a large number of agents sequentially choose between two actions. An underlying state determines the payoffs of these two actions. Each agent receives a signal on which of these two actions yields a higher payoff. Preferences of all agents are aligned in the sense that, given the underlying state of the world, they all prefer the same action. The game is characterized by two features: (i) the *signal structure*, which determines how informative the signals received by the individuals are; (ii) the *social network structure*, which determines the observations of each individual in the game. We model the social network structure as a stochastic process that determines each individual’s *neighborhood*. Each individual only observes the (past) actions of agents in his neighborhood. Motivated by the social network interpretation, throughout it is assumed that each individual knows the identity of the agents in his neighborhood (e.g., he can distinguish whether the action observed is by a friend or neighbor or by some outside party). Nevertheless, the realized neighborhood of each individual as well as his private signal are private information.

We also refer to the stochastic process generating neighborhoods as the *network topology* of this social network. For some of our results, it will be useful to distinguish between deterministic and stochastic network topologies. With deterministic network topologies, there is no uncertainty concerning the neighborhood of each individual and these neighborhoods are common knowledge. With stochastic network topologies, there is uncertainty about these neighborhoods.

The environment most commonly studied in the previous literature is the *full observation network topology*, which is the special case where all past actions are observed. Another deterministic special case is the network topology where each individual observes the actions of the most recent $M \geq 1$ individuals. Other relevant social networks include stochastic topologies in which each individual observes a random subset of past
actions, as well as those in which, with a high probability, each individual observes the actions of some “influential” group of agents, who may be thought of as “leaders” or the media.

We provide a systematic characterization of the conditions under which there will be equilibrium information aggregation in social networks. We say that there is *information aggregation* or equivalently *asymptotic learning*, when, in the limit as the size of the social network becomes arbitrarily large, individual actions converge (in probability) to the action that yields the higher payoff. We say that asymptotic learning fails if, as the social network becomes large, the correct action is not chosen (or more formally, the lim inf of the probability that the right action is chosen is strictly less than 1).

Two concepts turn out to be crucial in the study of information aggregation in social networks. The first is whether the *likelihood ratio* implied by individual signals is always bounded away from 0 and infinity. Smith and Sorensen (2000) refer to beliefs that satisfy this property as *bounded (private) beliefs*. With bounded beliefs, there is a maximum amount of information in any individual signal. In contrast, when there exist signals with arbitrarily high and low likelihood ratios, *(private) beliefs are unbounded.* Whether bounded or unbounded beliefs provide a better approximation to reality is partly an interpretational and partly an empirical question. Smith and Sorensen’s main result is that when each individual observes all past actions and private beliefs are unbounded, information will be aggregated and the correct action will be chosen asymptotically. In contrast, the results in Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992) and Smith and Sorensen (2000) indicate that with bounded beliefs, there will not be asymptotic learning (or information aggregation). Instead, as emphasized by Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992), there will be “herding” or “informational cascades,” where individuals copy past actions and/or completely ignore their own signals.

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1The likelihood ratio is the ratio of the probabilities or the densities of a signal in one state relative to the other. The bounded likelihood ratio condition was first introduced by Cover (1969).
The second key concept is that of a network topology with expanding observations. To describe this concept, let us first introduce another notion: a finite group of agents is *excessively influential* if there exists an infinite number of agents who, with probability uniformly bounded away from 0, observe only the actions of a subset of this group. For example, a group is excessively influential if it is the source of all information (except individual signals) for an infinitely large component of the social network. If there exists an excessively influential group of individuals, then the social network has nonexpanding observations, and conversely, if there exists no excessively influential group, the network has expanding observations. This definition implies that most reasonable social networks have expanding observations, and in particular, a minimum amount of “arrival of new information” in the social network is sufficient for the expanding observations property.\(^2\) For example, the environment studied in most of the previous work in this area, where all past actions are observed, has expanding observations. Similarly, a social network in which each individual observes one uniformly drawn individual from those who have taken decisions in the past or a network in which each individual observes his immediate neighbor all feature expanding observations. Note also that a social network with expanding observations need not be connected. For example, the network in which even-numbered [odd-numbered] individuals only observe the past actions of even-numbered [odd-numbered] individuals has expanding observations, but is not connected. A simple, but typical, example of a network with nonexpanding observations is the one in which all future individuals only observe the actions of the first \(K < \infty\) agents.

\(^2\)Here, “arrival of new information” refers to the property that the probability of each individual observing the action of some individual from the recent past converges to one as the social network becomes arbitrarily large.
1.2 Contributions

In this section, we introduce the main results of the thesis. Theorem 1 shows that there is no asymptotic learning in networks with nonexpanding observations. This result is not surprising, since information aggregation is not possible when the set of observations on which (an infinite subset of) individuals can build their decisions remains limited forever.

Our most substantive result, Theorem 2, shows that when (private) beliefs are unbounded and the network topology is expanding, there will be asymptotic learning. This is a very strong result (particularly if we consider unbounded beliefs to be a better approximation to reality than bounded beliefs), since almost all reasonable social networks have the expanding observations property. This theorem, for example, implies that when some individuals, such as “informational leaders,” are overrepresented in the neighborhoods of future agents (and are thus “influential,” though not excessively so), learning may slow down, but asymptotic learning will still obtain as long as private beliefs are unbounded.

The idea of the proof of Theorem 2 is as follows. We first establish a strong improvement principle under unbounded beliefs, whereby in a network where each individual has a single agent in his neighborhood, he can receive a strictly higher payoff than this agent and this improvement remains bounded away from zero as long as asymptotic learning has not been achieved. We then show that the same insight applies when individuals stochastically observe one or multiple agents (in particular, with multiple agents, the improvement is no less than the case in which the individual observes a single agent from the past). Finally, the property that the network topology has expanding observations is sufficient for these improvements to accumulate to asymptotic learning.

In Theorems 3 and 4, we present results on the speed of convergence for some common network topologies, assuming the private beliefs are unbounded. We derive conditions on the private belief distribution that guarantee that the error rate decays polynomially fast. In contrast, when each agent observes the action of a single, uniformly selected neighbor,
the error rate decays subpolynomially. We show that the previously derived conditions on the private belief distribution guarantee logarithmic decay of the probability of error in the case of uniform sampling.

Theorem 5 presents a partial converse to Theorem 2. It shows that for the most common deterministic and stochastic networks, bounded private beliefs are incompatible with asymptotic learning. It therefore generalizes existing results on asymptotic learning, for example, those in Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992), and Smith and Sorensen (2000) to general networks.

One of our more surprising results is Theorem 6, which establishes that asymptotic learning is possible with bounded private beliefs for certain stochastic network topologies. In these cases, there is sufficient arrival of new information (incorporated into the “social belief”) because some agents make decisions on the basis of limited observations. As a consequence, even bounded private beliefs may aggregate and lead to asymptotic learning. This finding is particularly important, since it shows how moving away from simple network structures has major implications for equilibrium learning dynamics.

Our last set of results address the question of heterogeneity of preferences. In most of the thesis, we assume that all agents have the same utility function and they differ only in their knowledge of the state of the world. However, in most real-life situations, idiosyncratic preferences serve as a confounding factor in learning. For example, when an individual buys a piece of equipment, she will typically take into account factors such as their belief about the product quality as well as their particular needs. When learning from the actions of peers, an agent has to distinguish between perceived quality (belief about the state) and the effect of individual preferences. Therefore, the naïve intuition is that learning is harder in the presence of heterogeneous preferences. In Theorem 7, we show that this is indeed the case when each agent can only observe the actions of one neighbor. However, when agents observe the full history of actions, diverse preferences have the opposite effect. Theorem 8 shows that asymptotic learning can occur in the
full observation topology even under bounded beliefs, if the preferences are sufficiently diverse.

1.3 Related Literature

The literature on social learning is vast. Roughly speaking, the literature can be separated according to two criteria: whether learning is Bayesian or myopic, and whether individuals learn from communication of exact signals or from the payoffs of others, or simply from observing others’ actions. Typically, Bayesian models focus on learning from past actions, while most, but not all, myopic learning models focus on learning from communication.

Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992) started the literature on learning in situations in which individuals are Bayesian and observe past actions. Smith and Sorensen (2000) provide the most comprehensive and complete analysis of this environment. Their results and the importance of the concepts of bounded and unbounded beliefs, which they introduced, have already been discussed in the introduction and will play an important role in our analysis in the thesis. Other important contributions in this area include, among others, Welch (1992), Lee (1993), Chamley and Gale (1994), and Vives (1997). An excellent general discussion is contained in Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998). These papers typically focus on the special case of full observation network topology in terms of our general model.

The two papers most closely related to ours are Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) and Smith and Sorensen (1998). Both of these papers study social learning with sampling of past actions. In Banerjee and Fudenberg, there is a continuum of agents and the focus is on proportional sampling (whereby individuals observe a “representative” sample of the overall population). They establish that asymptotic learning is achieved under mild assumptions as long as the sample size is no smaller than two. The existence of a
continuum of agents is important for this result since it ensures that the fraction of individuals with different posteriors evolves deterministically. Smith and Sorensen, on the other hand, consider a related model with a countable number of agents. In their model, as in ours, the evolution of beliefs is stochastic. Smith and Sorensen provide conditions under which asymptotic learning takes place.

A crucial difference between Banerjee and Fudenberg and Smith and Sorensen, on the one hand, and our work, on the other, is the information structure. These papers assume that “samples are unordered” in the sense that individuals do not know the identity of the agents they have observed. In contrast, as mentioned above, our setup is motivated by a social network and assumes that individuals have stochastic neighborhoods, but know the identity of the agents in their realized neighborhood. We view this as a better approximation to learning in social networks. In addition to its descriptive realism, this assumption leads to a sharper characterization of the conditions under which asymptotic learning occurs. For example, in Smith and Sorensen’s environment, asymptotic learning fails whenever an individual is “oversampled,” in the sense of being overrepresented in the samples of future agents. In contrast, in our environment, asymptotic learning occurs when the network topology features expanding observations (and private beliefs are unbounded). Expanding observations is a much weaker requirement than “non-oversampling.” For example, when each individual observes agent 1 and a randomly chosen agent from his predecessors, the network topology satisfies expanding observations, but there is oversampling.\footnote{This also implies that, in the terminology of Bala and Goyal, a “royal family” precludes learning in Smith and Sorensen’s model, but not in ours, see below.}

Other recent work on social learning includes Celen and Kariv (2004) who study Bayesian learning when each individual observes his immediate predecessor, Gale and Kariv (2003) who generalize the payoff equalization result of Bala and Goyal (1998) in connected social networks (discussed below) to Bayesian learning, and Callander and Horner (2006), who show that it may be optimal to follow the actions of agents that
deviate from past average behavior.

The second branch of the literature focuses on non-Bayesian learning, typically with agents using some reasonable rules of thumb. This literature considers both learning from past actions and from payoffs (or directly from beliefs). Early papers in this literature include Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995), which show how rule-of-thumb learning can converge to the true underlying state in some simple environments. The papers most closely related to our work in this genre are Bala and Goyal (1998, 2001), DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (2003) and Golub and Jackson (2007). These papers study non-Bayesian learning over an arbitrary, connected social network, in a context where agents act repeatedly but myopically. Bala and Goyal (1998) establish the important and intuitive payoff equalization result that, asymptotically, each individual must receive a payoff equal to that of an arbitrary individual in his “social network,” since otherwise he could copy the behavior of this other individual. This principle can be traced back, in the engineering literature, to the results on asymptotic agreement by Borkar and Varaiya (1982) and Tsitsikis and Athans (1984). A similar, but strengthened, “imitation” intuition plays an important role in our proof of asymptotic learning with unbounded beliefs and expanding observations.

DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel and Golub and Jackson also study similar environments and derive consensus-type results, whereby individuals in the connected components of the social network will converge to similar beliefs. They provide characterization results on which individuals in the social network will be influential and investigate the likelihood that the consensus opinion will coincide with the true underlying state. Golub and Jackson, in particular, show that social networks where some individuals are “influential” in the sense of being connected to a large number of people make learning more difficult or impossible. A similar result is also established in Bala and Goyal, where they show that the presence of a royal family, i.e., a small set of individuals observed by everyone, precludes learning. This both complements and contrasts with our results.
In our environment, an excessively influential group of individuals prevents learning, but influential agents in Golub and Jackson’s sense or Bala and Goyal’s royal family are not excessively influential and still allow asymptotic learning. This is because with Bayesian updating over a social network, individuals recognize who the oversampled individuals or the royal family are and accordingly adjust the weight they give to their action/information.

The literature on the information aggregation role of elections is also related, since it revisits the original context of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. This literature includes, among others, the papers by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996, 1997), McLennan (1998), Myerson (1998, 2000), and Young (1988). Most of these papers investigate whether dispersed information will be accurately aggregated in large elections. Although the focus on information aggregation is common, the set of issues and the methods of analysis are very different, particularly since, in these models, there are no sequential decisions.

Finally, there is also a literature in engineering, which studies related problems, especially motivated by aggregation of information collected by decentralized sensors. The typical objective in this literature is to maximize the probability that a given agent, called the fusion center, estimates correctly the state of the world. The agents use decision rules chosen by a social planner, rather than equilibrium decision rules. Cover (1969) shows that the fusion center asymptotically estimate the state in the case of unbounded likelihood ratios and each agent observing only the action of their immediate predecessor. The work by Papastavrou and Athans (1990) contains a result that is equivalent to the characterization of asymptotic learning in this same network topology. Tay, Tsitsiklis and Win (2008) analyze the problem of information aggregation for sequences of trees in the limit as the number of leaves (agents that only know their private signals) goes to infinity.
1.4 Organization

The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the model, the solution concept and the decomposition lemma that describes the agents’ decisions in terms of their social and private beliefs. Chapter 3 introduces the concept of expanding observations and shows that it is a necessary condition for asymptotic learning and a sufficient condition on the network in the case where private beliefs are unbounded. Chapter 4 contains upper and lower bounds on the speed of learning. Chapter 5 presents the results on learning under the assumption of bounded private beliefs. Chapter 6 extends the model to include diverse preferences and Chapter 7 concludes the work.
Chapter 2

The Model

2.1 Formulation

A countably infinite number of agents (individuals), indexed by $n \in \mathbb{N}$, sequentially make a single decision each. The payoff of agent $n$ depends on an underlying state of the world $\theta$ and his decision. To simplify the notation and the exposition, we assume that both the underlying state and decisions are binary. In particular, the decision of agent $n$ is denoted by $x_n \in \{0, 1\}$ and the underlying state is $\theta \in \{0, 1\}$. The payoff of agent $n$ is

$$u_n(x_n, \theta) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x_n = \theta \\
0 & \text{if } x_n \neq \theta.
\end{cases}$$

Again to simplify notation, we assume that both values of the underlying state are equally likely, so that $\mathbb{P}(\theta = 0) = \mathbb{P}(\theta = 1) = 1/2$.

The state $\theta$ is unknown. Each agent $n \in \mathbb{N}$ forms beliefs about this state from a private signal $s_n \in S$ (where $S$ is a metric space or simply a Euclidean space) and from his observation of the actions of other agents. Conditional on the state of the world $\theta$, the signals are independently generated according to a probability measure $\mathbb{F}_\theta$. We refer to the pair of measures $(\mathbb{F}_0, \mathbb{F}_1)$ as the signal structure of the model. We assume that $\mathbb{F}_0$...
and $F_1$ are absolutely continuous with respect to each other, which immediately implies that no signal is fully revealing about the underlying state. We also assume that $F_0$ and $F_1$ are not identical, so that some signals are informative. These two assumptions on the signal structure are maintained throughout the paper and will not be stated in the theorems explicitly.

In contrast to much of the literature on social learning, we assume that agents do not necessarily observe all previous actions. Instead, they observe the actions of other agents according to the structure of the social network. To introduce the notion of a social network, let us first define a neighborhood. Each agent $n$ observes the decisions of the agents in his (stochastically-generated) neighborhood, denoted by $B(n)$.$^1$ Since agents can only observe actions taken previously, $B(n) \subseteq \{1, 2, ..., n - 1\}$. Each neighborhood $B(n)$ is generated according to an arbitrary probability distribution $Q_n$ over the set of all subsets of $\{1, 2, ..., n - 1\}$. We impose no special assumptions on the sequence of distributions $\{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ except that the draws from each $Q_n$ are independent from each other for all $n$ and from the realizations of private signals. The sequence of probability distributions $\{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is the network topology of the social network formed by the agents. The network topology is common knowledge, whereas the realized neighborhood $B(n)$ and the private signal $s_n$ are the private information of agent $n$. We say that $\{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a deterministic network topology if the probability distribution $Q_n$ is a degenerate (Dirac) distribution for all $n$. Otherwise, that is, if $\{Q_n\}$ for some $n$ is nondegenerate, $\{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a stochastic network topology.

A social network consists of a network topology $\{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ and a signal structure $(F_0, F_1)$.

**Example 1** Here are some examples of network topologies.

1. If $\{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ assigns probability 1 to neighborhood $\{1, 2, ..., n - 1\}$ for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$,
then the network topology is identical to the canonical one studied in the previous
literature where each agent observes all previous actions (e.g., Banerjee (1992),
Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Smith and Sorensen (2000)).

2. If \( \{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) assigns probability \( 1/(n - 1) \) to each one of the subsets of size 1 of
\( \{1, 2, ..., n - 1\} \) for each \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), then we have a network topology of random sampling
of one agent from the past.

3. If \( \{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) assigns probability 1 to neighborhood \( \{n - 1\} \) for each \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), then
we have a network topology where each individual only observes his immediate
neighbor (also considered in a different context in the engineering literature by
Papastavrou and Athans (1990)).

4. If \( \{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) assigns probability 1 to neighborhoods that are subsets of \( \{1, 2, ..., K\} \)
for each \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) for some \( K \in \mathbb{N} \). In this case, all agents observe the actions of at
most \( K \) agents.

5. Figure 2.1 depicts an arbitrary stochastic topology until agent 7. The thickness of
the lines represents the probability with which a particular agent will observe the
action of the corresponding preceding agent.

Given the description above, it is evident that the information set \( I_n \) of agent \( n \) is
given by her signal \( s_n \), her neighborhood \( B(n) \), and all decisions of agents in \( B(n) \), that
is,

\[
I_n = \{s_n, B(n), x_k \text{ for all } k \in B(n)\}. \tag{2.1}
\]

The set of all possible information sets of agent \( n \) is denoted by \( \mathcal{I}_n \). A strategy for
individual \( n \) is a mapping \( \sigma_n : \mathcal{I}_n \to \{0, 1\} \) that selects a decision for each possible
information set. A strategy profile is a sequence of strategies \( \sigma = \{\sigma_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \). We use the
standard notation \( \sigma_{-n} = \{\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_{n-1}, \sigma_{n+1}, \ldots\} \) to denote the strategies of all agents
other than \( n \) and also \( (\sigma_n, \sigma_{-n}) \) for any \( n \) to denote the strategy profile \( \sigma \). Given a
strategy profile $\sigma$, the sequence of decisions $\{x_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a stochastic process and we denote the measure generated by this stochastic process by $\mathbb{P}_\sigma$.

**Definition 1** A strategy profile $\sigma^*$ is a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game of social learning if for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\sigma^*_n$ maximizes the expected payoff of agent $n$ given the strategies of other agents $\sigma^*_{-n}$.

In the rest of the thesis, we focus on pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, and simply refer to this as “equilibrium” (without the pure-strategy and the Perfect Bayesian qualifiers).

Given a strategy profile $\sigma$, the expected payoff of agent $n$ from action $x_n = \sigma_n(I_n)$ is simply $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid I_n)$. Therefore, for any equilibrium $\sigma^*$, we have

$$\sigma^*_n(I_n) \in \arg\max_{y \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{P}[(y, \sigma^*_{-n})(y = \theta \mid I_n)].$$  \hfill (2.2)
It is worthwhile to highlight that the decision rule above is indeed the result of a strategic equilibrium. At first glance, the behavior described by Eq. (2.2) does not appear to be truly game-theoretical as agents are not strategic about the information they reveal through their actions. However, agents are in fact strategic with respect to the actions they observe: when selecting their actions, they take into consideration that all other agents are utility-maximizers, and all other agents realize that every one is a utility-maximizer and so on.

We denote the set of equilibria (pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria) of the game by $\Sigma^*$. It is clear that $\Sigma^*$ is nonempty. Given the sequence of strategies $\{\sigma^*_1, \ldots, \sigma^*_{n-1}\}$, the maximization problem in (2.2) has a solution for each agent $n$ and each $I_n \in \mathcal{I}_n$. Proceeding inductively, and choosing either one of the actions in case of indifference determines an equilibrium. We note the existence of equilibrium here.

**Proposition 1** There exists a pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.

Our main focus is whether equilibrium behavior will lead to information aggregation. This is captured by the notion of asymptotic learning, which is introduced next.

**Definition 2** Given a signal structure $(\mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{F}_1)$ and a network topology $\{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$, we say that asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium $\sigma$ if $x_n$ converges to $\theta$ in probability (according to measure $\mathbb{P}_\sigma$), that is,

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = 1.$$ 

Notice that asymptotic learning requires that the probability of taking the correct action converges to 1. Therefore, asymptotic learning will fail when, as the network becomes large, the limit inferior of the probability of all individuals taking the correct action is strictly less than 1.

Our goal in Chapters 3 and 5 is to characterize conditions on social networks—on signal structures and network topologies—that ensure asymptotic learning.
2.2 Equilibrium Strategies

In this section, we provide a characterization of equilibrium strategies. We show that equilibrium decision rules of individuals can be decomposed into two parts, one that only depends on an individual’s private signal, and the other that is a function of the observations of past actions. We also show why a full characterization of individual decisions is nontrivial and motivate an alternative proof technique, relying on developing bounds on improvements in the probability of the correct decisions, that will be used in the rest of our analysis.

2.2.1 Characterization of Individual Decisions

Our first lemma shows that individual decisions can be characterized as a function of the sum of two posteriors. These posteriors play an important role in our analysis. We will refer to these posteriors as the individual’s private belief and the social belief.

**Lemma 1** Let $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ be an equilibrium of the game. Let $I_n \in \mathcal{I}_n$ be an information set of agent $n$. Then, the decision of agent $n$, $x_n = \sigma(I_n)$, satisfies

$$x_n = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid s_n) + \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid B(n), x_k, k \in B(n)) > 1, \\
0, & \text{if } \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid s_n) + \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid B(n), x_k, k \in B(n)) < 1,
\end{cases}$$

and $x_n \in \{0, 1\}$ otherwise.

**Proof.** We prove that if

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid s_n) + \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid B(n), x_k \text{ for all } k \in B(n)) > 1, \quad (2.3)$$

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then \( x_n = 1 \). The proofs of the other clause follows the same line of argument. We first show that Eq. (2.3) holds if and only if

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid I_n) > 1/2,
\]  

(2.4)

therefore implying that \( x_n = 1 \) by the equilibrium condition [cf. Eq. (2.2)]. By Bayes’ Rule, Eq. (2.4) is equivalent to

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid I_n) = \frac{d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(I_n \mid \theta = 1)\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1)}{\sum_{j=0}^1 d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(I_n \mid \theta = j)\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = j)} = \frac{d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(I_n \mid \theta = 1)}{\sum_{j=0}^1 d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(I_n \mid \theta = j)} > 1/2, \quad (2.5)
\]

where the second equality follows from the assumption that states 0 and 1 are equally likely. Hence, Eq. (2.4) holds if and only if

\[
d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(I_n \mid \theta = 1) > d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(I_n \mid \theta = 0). \quad (2.6)
\]

Conditional on state \( \theta \), the private signals and the observed decisions are independent, i.e.,

\[
d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(I_n \mid \theta = j) = d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_n \mid \theta = j)\mathbb{P}_\sigma(B(n), x_k, \; k \in B(n) \mid \theta = j).
\]

Combining the preceding two relations, it follows that Eq. (2.6) is equivalent to

\[
\frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(B(n), x_k, \; k \in B(n) \mid \theta = 1)}{\sum_{j=0}^1 \mathbb{P}_\sigma(B(n), x_k, \; k \in B(n) \mid \theta = j)} > \frac{d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_n \mid \theta = 0)}{\sum_{j=0}^1 d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_n \mid \theta = j)}.
\]

Since both states are equally likely, this can be rewritten as

\[
\frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(B(n), x_k, \; k \in B(n) \mid \theta = 1)P_\sigma(\theta = 1)}{\sum_{j=0}^1 \mathbb{P}_\sigma(B(n), x_k, \; k \in B(n) \mid \theta = j)P_\sigma(\theta = j)} > \frac{d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_n \mid \theta = 0)P_\sigma(\theta = 0)}{\sum_{j=0}^1 d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_n \mid \theta = j)P_\sigma(\theta = j)}.
\]
Applying Bayes’ Rule on both sides of Eq. (2.7), we see that the preceding relation is identical to

\[ \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid B(n), x_k, k \in B(n)) > \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 0 \mid s_n) = 1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid s_n), \]

completing the proof. ■

The lemma above establishes an additive decomposition in the equilibrium decision rule between the information obtained from the private signal of the individual and from the observations of others’ actions (in his neighborhood). The next definition formally distinguishes between the two components of an individual’s information.

**Definition 3** We refer to the probability \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid s_n) \) as the **private belief** of agent \( n \), and the probability

\[ \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid B(n), x_k \text{ for all } k \in B(n)), \]

as the **social belief** of agent \( n \).

Notice that the social belief depends on \( n \) since it is a function of the (realized) neighborhood of agent \( n \).

Lemma 1 and Definition 3 imply that the equilibrium decision rule for agent \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) is equivalent to choosing \( x_n = 1 \) when the sum of his private and social beliefs is greater than 1. Consequently, the properties of private and social beliefs will shape equilibrium learning behavior. In the next subsection, we provide a characterization for the dynamic behavior of private beliefs, which will be used in the analysis of the evolution of decision rules.
2.2.2 Private Beliefs

In this subsection, we study properties of private beliefs. Note that the private belief is a function of the private signal \( s \in S \) and is not a function of the strategy profile \( \sigma \) since it does not depend on the decisions of other agents. We represent probabilities that do not depend on the strategy profile by \( \mathbb{P} \). We use the notation \( p_n \) to represent the private belief of agent \( n \), i.e.,

\[
p_n = \mathbb{P}(\theta = 1 \mid s_n).
\]

The next lemma follows from a simple application of Bayes’ Rule.

**Lemma 2** For any \( n \) and any signal \( s_n \in S \), the private belief \( p_n \) of agent \( n \) is given by

\[
p_n = \left(1 + \frac{d\mathbb{F}_0}{d\mathbb{F}_1}(s_n)\right)^{-1}.
\]

(2.7)

In the lemma above, \( d\mathbb{F}_0/d\mathbb{F}_1 \) denotes the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the measures \( \mathbb{F}_0 \) and \( \mathbb{F}_1 \) (recall that these are absolutely continuous with respect to each other). If \( \mathbb{F}_0 \) and \( \mathbb{F}_1 \) have densities, then for each \( j \in \{0, 1\} \), \( d\mathbb{F}_j \) can be replaced by the density of \( \mathbb{F}_j \). If both measures have atoms at some \( s \in S \), then \( d\mathbb{F}_0/d\mathbb{F}_1(s) = \mathbb{F}_0(s)/\mathbb{F}_1(s) \).

We next define the support of a private belief. In our subsequent analysis, we will see that properties of the support of private beliefs play a key role in asymptotic learning behavior.

**Definition 4** The signal structure has **bounded private beliefs** if there exists some \( 0 < m, M < \infty \) such that the Radon-Nikodym derivative \( d\mathbb{F}_0/d\mathbb{F}_1 \) satisfies

\[
m < \frac{d\mathbb{F}_0}{d\mathbb{F}_1}(s) < M,
\]

for almost all \( s \in S \) under measure \((\mathbb{F}_0 + \mathbb{F}_1)/2\). The signal structure has **unbounded private beliefs** if the infimum of the support of \( d\mathbb{F}_0/d\mathbb{F}_1(s) \) is 0 and the supremum of the support of \( d\mathbb{F}_0/d\mathbb{F}_1(s) \) is \( \infty \) under measure \((\mathbb{F}_0 + \mathbb{F}_1)/2\).
Bounded private beliefs imply that there is a maximum amount of information that an individual can derive from his private signal. Conversely, unbounded private beliefs correspond to a situation where an agent can receive an arbitrarily strong signal about the underlying state. Smith and Sorensen (2000) show that, in the special case of full observation network topology, i.e., \( B(n) = \{1, \ldots, n - 1\} \) for every agent \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), there will be asymptotic learning if the private beliefs are unbounded and, conversely, there will not asymptotic learning if the private beliefs are bounded. In this thesis, we do not analyze the case where there are arbitrarily strong signals in favor of one state, but not in favor of the other. Such a scenario would occur, for example, if the support of \( \frac{d\mathbb{F}_0}{d\mathbb{F}_1}(s) \) is \((0, M)\) for some \( M < \infty\).

Since the \( p_n \) are identically distributed for all \( n \) (which follows by the assumption that the private signals \( s_n \) are identically distributed), in the following, we will use agent 1’s private belief \( p_1 \) to define the support and the conditional distributions of private beliefs.

**Definition 5** The **support of the private beliefs** is the interval \([\underline{\beta}, \overline{\beta}]\), where the end points of the interval are given by

\[
\underline{\beta} = \inf \{ r \in [0, 1] \mid P(p_1 \leq r) > 0 \}, \quad \text{and} \quad \overline{\beta} = \sup \{ r \in [0, 1] \mid P(p_1 \leq r) < 1 \}.
\]

Combining Lemma 2 with Definition 4, we see that beliefs are unbounded if and only if \( \underline{\beta} = 1 - \overline{\beta} = 0 \). When the private beliefs are bounded, there is a maximum informativeness to any signal. When they are unbounded, agents may receive arbitrarily strong signals favoring either state (this follows from the assumption that \((\mathbb{F}_0, \mathbb{F}_1)\) are absolutely continuous with respect to each other). When both \( \underline{\beta} > 0 \) and \( \overline{\beta} < 1 \), private beliefs are bounded.
We represent the conditional distribution of a private belief given the underlying state by $G_j$ for each $j \in \{0, 1\}$, i.e.,

$$G_j(r) = \mathbb{P}(p_1 \leq r \mid \theta = j).$$  \hfill (2.8)

We say that a pair of distributions $(G_0, G_1)$ are private belief distributions if there exist some signal space $S$ and conditional private signal distributions $(F_0, F_1)$ such that the conditional distributions of the private beliefs are given by $(G_0, G_1)$. The next lemma presents key relations for private belief distributions.

**Lemma 3** For any private belief distributions $(G_0, G_1)$, the following relations hold.

(a) For all $r \in (0, 1)$, we have

$$\frac{dG_0}{dG_1}(r) = \frac{1 - r}{r}.$$

(b) We have

$$G_0(r) \geq \left(\frac{1 - r}{r}\right)G_1(r) + \frac{r - z}{2}G_1(z) \text{ for all } 0 < z < r < 1,$$

$$1 - G_1(r) \geq (1 - G_0(r))\left(\frac{r}{1 - r}\right) + \frac{w - r}{2}(1 - G_1(w)) \text{ for all } 0 < r < w < 1.$$

(c) The ratio $G_0(r)/G_1(r)$ is nonincreasing in $r$ and $G_0(r)/G_1(r) > 1$ for all $r \in (\underline{\beta}, \overline{\beta})$.

**Proof.**

(a) By the definition of a private belief, we have for any $p_n \in (0, 1)$,

$$\mathbb{P}(\theta = 1|s_n) = \mathbb{P}(\theta = 1|p_n).$$
Using Bayes’ Rule, it follows that

\[ p_n = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1|p_n) = \frac{d\mathbb{P}(p_n|\theta = 1)\mathbb{P}(\theta = 1)}{\sum_{j=0}^{1} d\mathbb{P}(p_n|\theta = j)\mathbb{P}(\theta = j)} \]

\[ = \frac{d\mathbb{P}(p_n|\theta = 1)}{\sum_{j=0}^{1} d\mathbb{P}(p_n|\theta = j)} = \frac{dG_1(p_n)}{\sum_{j=0}^{1} dG_j(p_n)}. \]

Because of the assumption that no signal is completely informative, i.e., \( p_n \notin \{0, 1\} \), we can rewrite this equation as

\[ \frac{dG_0(p_n)}{dG_1(p_n)} = \frac{1 - p_n}{p_n}, \]

completing the proof.

(b) For any \( p \in (0, 1) \),

\[ G_0(p) = \int_{r=0}^{p} dG_0(r) = \int_{r=0}^{p} \frac{1-r}{r}dG_1(r) = \left(\frac{1-p}{p}\right)G_1(p) + \int_{r=0}^{p} \left(\frac{1}{r} - \frac{1}{p}\right) dG_1(r), \]

where the second equality follows from part (a) of this lemma. We can provide a lower bound on the last integral as

\[ \int_{r=0}^{p} \left(\frac{1}{r} - \frac{1}{p}\right) dG_1(r) \geq \int_{z=0}^{z} \left(\frac{1}{z} - \frac{2}{z+p}\right) dG_1(r) \geq \int_{r=0}^{z} \left(\frac{1}{z} - \frac{2}{z+p}\right) dG_1(r) \geq \frac{p-z}{2}G_1(z), \]

for any \( z \in (0, p) \). Equivalently, the second relation is obtained by

\[ 1 - G_1(p) = \int_{r=p}^{1} dG_1(r) = \int_{r=p}^{1} \frac{r}{1-r}dG_0(r) = (1 - G_0(p)) \left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right) + \int_{r=p}^{1} \left(\frac{r}{1-r} - \frac{p}{1-p}\right) dG_0(r), \]

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where the following bound is valid for any \( p < w < 1 \),

\[
\int_{r=p}^{1} \left( \frac{r}{1-r} - \frac{p}{1-p} \right) d\mathcal{G}_0(r) \geq \int_{r=w}^{1} \left( \frac{r}{1-r} - \frac{p}{1-p} \right) d\mathcal{G}_0(r) \\
\geq \int_{r=w}^{1} \left( \frac{w}{1-w} - \frac{p + w}{2 - p - w} \right) d\mathcal{G}_0(r) \geq \frac{w - p}{2} (1 - \mathcal{G}_0(w)).
\]

(c) From part (a), we have for any \( r \in (0, 1) \),

\[
\mathcal{G}_0(r) = \int_{x=0}^{r} d\mathcal{G}_0(x) = \int_{x=0}^{r} \left( \frac{1-x}{x} \right) d\mathcal{G}_1(x) \\
\geq \int_{x=0}^{r} \left( \frac{1-r}{r} \right) d\mathcal{G}_1(x) = \left( \frac{1-r}{r} \right) \mathcal{G}_1(r). \tag{2.9}
\]

Using part (a) again,

\[
d \left( \frac{\mathcal{G}_0(r)}{\mathcal{G}_1(r)} \right) = \frac{d\mathcal{G}_0(r)\mathcal{G}_1(r) - \mathcal{G}_0(r)d\mathcal{G}_1(r)}{(\mathcal{G}_1(r))^2} \\
= \frac{d\mathcal{G}_1(r)}{(\mathcal{G}_1(r))^2} \left[ \left( \frac{1-r}{r} \right) \mathcal{G}_1(r) - \mathcal{G}_0(r) \right].
\]

Since \( \mathcal{G}_1(r) > 0 \) for \( r > \beta \), \( d\mathcal{G}_1(r) \geq 0 \) and the term in brackets above is non-positive by Eq. (2.9), we have

\[
d \left( \frac{\mathcal{G}_0(r)}{\mathcal{G}_1(r)} \right) \leq 0,
\]

thus proving the ratio \( \mathcal{G}_0(r)/\mathcal{G}_1(r) \) is non-increasing.

We now show that

\[
\mathcal{G}_0(r) \geq \mathcal{G}_1(r) \text{ for all } r \in [0, 1]. \tag{2.10}
\]

From Eq. (2.9), we obtain that Eq. (2.10) is true for \( r \leq 1/2 \). For \( r > 1/2 \),

\[
1 - \mathcal{G}_0(r) = \int_{x=r}^{1} d\mathcal{G}_0(x) = \int_{x=r}^{1} \left( \frac{1-x}{x} \right) d\mathcal{G}_1(x) \leq \int_{x=r}^{1} d\mathcal{G}_1(x) = 1 - \mathcal{G}_1(r),
\]

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thus proving Eq. (2.10).

We proceed to prove the second part of the lemma. Suppose \( G_0(r)/G_1(r) = 1 \) for some \( r < \beta \). Suppose first \( r \in (1/2, \beta) \). Then,

\[
G_0(1) = G_0(r) + \int_{x=r}^{1} dG_0(x)
= G_1(r) + \int_{x=r}^{1} dG_0(x)
= G_1(r) + \int_{x=r}^{1} \left( \frac{1-x}{x} \right) dG_1(x)
\geq G_1(r) + \left( \frac{1-r}{r} \right) \int_{x=r}^{1} dG_1(x)
\geq G_1(r) + \left( \frac{1-r}{r} \right) [1 - G_1(r)],
\]

which yields a contradiction unless \( G_1(r) = 1 \). However, \( G_1(r) = 1 \) implies \( r \geq \beta \) – also a contradiction. Now, suppose \( r \in (\beta, 1/2] \). Since the ratio \( G_0(r)/G_1(r) \) is non-increasing, this implies that for all \( x \in (r, 1] \), \( G_0(x)/G_1(x) \leq 1 \). Combined with Eq. (2.10), this yields \( G_0(x)/G_1(x) = 1 \) for all \( x \in (r, 1] \), which yields a contradiction for \( x \in (1/2, \beta) \).

The lemma above establishes several important relationships that are used throughout the thesis. Part (a) establishes a basic relation for private belief distributions, which is used in some of the proofs below. The inequalities presented in part (b) of this lemma play an important role in quantifying how much information an individual obtains from his private signal. Part (c) will be used in our analysis of learning with bounded beliefs.

2.2.3 Social Beliefs

In this subsection, we illustrate the difficulties involved in determining equilibrium learning in general social networks. In particular, we show that social beliefs, as defined in Definition 3, may be nonmonotone, in the sense that additional observations of \( x_n = 1 \)
Figure 2-2: The figure illustrates a deterministic topology in which the social beliefs are nonmonotone.

in the neighborhood of an individual may reduce the social belief (i.e., the posterior derived from past observations that $x_n = 1$ is the correct action).

The following example establishes this point. Suppose the private signals are such that $G_0(r) = 2r - r^2$ and $G_1(r) = r^2$, which is a pair of private belief distributions $(G_0, G_1)$. Suppose the network topology is deterministic and for the first eight agents, it has the following structure: $B(1) = \emptyset, B(2) = \ldots = B(7) = \{1\}$ and $B(8) = \{1, \ldots, 7\}$ (see Figure 2-2).

For this social network, agent 1 has $3/4$ probability of making a correct decision in either state of the world. If agent 1 chooses the action that yields a higher payoff (i.e., the correct decision), then agents 2 to 7 each have $15/16$ probability of choosing the correct decision. However, if agent 1 fails to choose the correct decision, then agents 2 to 7 have a $7/16$ probability of choosing the correct decision. Now suppose agents 1 to 4 choose action $x_n = 0$, while agents 5 to 7 choose $x_n = 1$. The probability of this event
happening in each state of the world is:

\[
P(\sigma | x_1 = \ldots = x_4 = 0, x_5 = x_6 = x_7 = 1, \theta = 0) = \frac{3}{4} \left( \frac{15}{16} \right)^3 \left( \frac{1}{16} \right)^3 = \frac{10125}{2^{26}},
\]

\[
P(\sigma | x_1 = \ldots = x_4 = 0, x_5 = x_6 = x_7 = 1, \theta = 1) = \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{9}{16} \right)^3 \left( \frac{7}{16} \right)^3 = \frac{250047}{2^{26}}.
\]

Using Bayes’ Rule, the social belief of agent 8 is given by

\[
\left[ 1 + \frac{10125}{250047} \right]^{-1} \simeq 0.961.
\]

Now, consider a change in \(x_1\) from 0 to 1, while keeping all decisions as they are. Then,

\[
P(\sigma | x_1 = 1, x_2 = x_3 = x_4 = 0, x_5 = x_6 = x_7 = 1, \theta = 0) = \frac{1}{4} \left( \frac{7}{16} \right)^3 \left( \frac{9}{16} \right)^3 = \frac{250047}{2^{26}},
\]

\[
P(\sigma | x_1 = 1, x_2 = x_3 = x_4 = 0, x_5 = x_6 = x_7 = 1, \theta = 1) = \frac{3}{4} \left( \frac{1}{16} \right)^3 \left( \frac{15}{16} \right)^3 = \frac{10125}{2^{26}}.
\]

This leads to a social belief of agent 8 given by

\[
\left[ 1 + \frac{250047}{10125} \right]^{-1} \simeq 0.039.
\]

Therefore, this example has established that when \(x_1\) changes from 0 to 1, agent 8’s social belief declines from 0.961 to 0.039. That is, while the agent strongly believes the state is 1 when \(x_1 = 0\), he equally strongly believes the state is 0 when \(x_1 = 1\). This happens because when half of the agents in \(\{2, \ldots, 7\}\) choose action 0 and the other half choose action 1, agent \(n\) places a high probability to the event that \(x_1 \neq \theta\). This leads to a nonmonotonicity in social beliefs.

Since such nonmonotonicities cannot be ruled out in general, standard approaches to characterizing equilibrium behavior cannot be used. Instead, in the next section, we
use an alternative approach, which develops a lower bound to the probability that an individual will make the correct decision relative to agents in his neighborhood.
Chapter 3

The Case of Unbounded Private Beliefs

In this chapter, we present a property called expanding observations and show that it is a necessary condition for asymptotic learning. We also prove that this property provides a full characterization of asymptotic learning under the assumption of unbounded private beliefs.

3.1 Expanding Observations as a Necessary Condition for Learning

We introduce a property of the network topology that is a requirement for asymptotic learning. Intuitively, for asymptotic learning to occur, the information that each agent receives from other agents should not be confined to a bounded subset of agents. This property is established in the following definition. For this definition and throughout the thesis, if the set $B(n)$ is empty, we set $\max_{b \in B(n)} b = 0$.

Definition 6 The network topology has expanding observations if for all $K \in \mathbb{N}$,
we have
\[ \lim_{n \to \infty} Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) = 0. \]

If the network topology does not satisfy this property, then we say it has nonexpanding observations.

Recall that the neighborhood of agent \( n \) is a random variable \( B(n) \) (with values in the set of subsets of \( \{1, 2, \ldots, n-1\} \)) and distributed according to \( Q_n \). Therefore, \( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \) is a random variable that takes values in \( \{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\} \). The expanding observations condition can be restated as the sequence of random variables \( \{\max_{b \in B(n)} b\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) converging to infinity in probability. Similarly, it follows from the preceding definition that the network topology has nonexpanding observations if and only if there exists some \( K \in \mathbb{N} \) and some scalar \( \epsilon > 0 \) such that

\[ \limsup_{n \to \infty} Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) \geq \epsilon. \]

An alternative restatement of this definition might clarify its meaning. Let us refer to a finite set of individuals \( C \) as excessively influential if there exists a subsequence of agents who, with probability uniformly bounded away from zero, observe the actions of a subset of \( C \). Then, the network topology has nonexpanding observations if and only if there exists an excessively influential group of agents. Note also that if there is a minimum amount of arrival of new information in the network, so that the probability of an individual observing some other individual from the recent past goes to one as the network becomes large, then the network topology will feature expanding observations. This discussion therefore highlights that the requirement that a network topology has expanding observations is quite mild and most social networks satisfy this requirement.

When the topology has nonexpanding observations, there is a subsequence of agents that draws information from the first \( K \) decisions with positive probability (uniformly bounded away from 0). It is then intuitive that network topologies with nonexpanding
observations will preclude asymptotic learning. Our first theorem states this result.

**Theorem 1** Assume that the network topology \( \{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) has nonexpanding observations. Then, there exists no equilibrium \( \sigma \in \Sigma^* \) with asymptotic learning.

**Proof.** Suppose that the network has nonexpanding observations. This implies that there exists some \( K \in \mathbb{N}, \epsilon > 0 \), and a subsequence of agents \( \mathcal{N} \) such that for all \( n \in \mathcal{N} \),

\[
Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) \geq \epsilon. \tag{3.1}
\]

For any such agent \( n \in \mathcal{N} \), we have

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( x_n = \theta \bigg| \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) + \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( x_n = \theta \bigg| \max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq K \right) Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq K \right) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( x_n = \theta \bigg| \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) + Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq K \right) \leq 1 - \epsilon + \epsilon \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( x_n = \theta \bigg| \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right), \tag{3.2}
\]

where the second inequality follows from Eq. (3.1).

Given some equilibrium \( \sigma \in \Sigma^* \) and agent \( n \), we define \( z_n \) as the decision that maximizes the conditional probability of making a correct decision given the private signals and neighborhoods of the first \( K - 1 \) agents and agent \( n \), i.e.,

\[
z_n = \arg\max_{y \in \{0, 1\}} \mathbb{P}_{y, \sigma \sim \epsilon_n}(y = \theta \mid s_i, B(i), \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, K - 1, n). \tag{3.3}
\]

We denote a particular realization of private signal \( s_i \) by \( s_i \) and a realization of neighborhood \( B(i) \) by \( B(i) \) for all \( i \). Given the equilibrium \( \sigma \) and the realization \( s_1, \ldots, s_{K-1} \) and \( B(1), \ldots, B(K-1) \), all decisions \( x_1, \ldots, x_{K-1} \) are recursively defined [i.e., they are non-stochastic; see the definition of the information set in Eq. (2.1)]. Therefore, for any

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that satisfies $\max_{b \in \mathcal{B}(n)} b < K$, the decision $x_n$ is also defined. By the definition of $z_n$ [cf. Eq. (3.3)], this implies that

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid s_i = s_i, B(i) = \mathcal{B}(i), \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, K-1, n) \\
\leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(z_n = \theta \mid s_i = s_i, B(i) = \mathcal{B}(i), \text{ for } i = 1, \ldots, K-1, n).
$$

By integrating over all possible $s_1, \ldots, s_{K-1}, s_n, \mathcal{B}(1), \ldots, \mathcal{B}(K-1)$, this yields

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \mathcal{B}(n)) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(z_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \mathcal{B}(n)),
$$

for any $\mathcal{B}(n)$ that satisfies $\max_{b \in \mathcal{B}(n)} b < K$. By integrating over all $\mathcal{B}(n)$ that satisfy this condition, we obtain

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( x_n = \theta \mid \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( z_n = \theta \mid \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right). 
$$

Moreover, since the sequence of neighborhoods $\{B(i)\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$ is independent of $\theta$ and the sequence of private signals $\{s_i\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$, it follows from Eq. (3.3) that the decision $z_n$ is given by

$$
z_n = \arg \max_{y \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( y = \theta \mid s_1, \ldots, s_{K-1}, s_n \right). 
$$

Therefore, $z_n$ is also independent of the sequence of neighborhoods $\{B(i)\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$ and we have

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( z_n = \theta \mid \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( z_n = \theta \right).
$$

Since the private signals have the same distribution, it follows from Eq. (3.5) that for any $n, m \geq K$, the random variables $z_n$ and $z_m$ have identical probability distributions. Hence, for any $n \geq K$, Eq. (3.5) implies that

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma (z_n = \theta) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma (z_{K} = \theta).
$$
Combining the preceding two relations with Eq. (3.4), we have for any $n \geq K$, 

$$
P_\sigma \left( x_n = \theta \mid \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) \leq P_\sigma \left( z_n = \theta \mid \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) = P_\sigma \left( z_n = \theta \right) = P_\sigma \left( z_K = \theta \right).$$

Substituting this relation in Eq. (3.2), we obtain for any $n \in \mathcal{N}, n \geq K$,

$$
P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \leq 1 - \epsilon + \epsilon P_\sigma(z_K = \theta).$$

Therefore,

$$
\lim\inf_{n \to \infty} P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \leq 1 - \epsilon + \epsilon P_\sigma(z_K = \theta). \quad (3.6)
$$

We finally show that in view of the assumption that $\mathbb{F}_0$ and $\mathbb{F}_1$ are absolutely continuous with respect to each other [which implies $P_\sigma(x_1 = \theta) < 1$], we have $P_\sigma(z_K = \theta) < 1$ for any given $K$. If $P_\sigma(x_1 = \theta) < 1$ holds, then we have either $P_\sigma(x_1 = \theta \mid \theta = 1) < 1$ or $P_\sigma(x_1 = \theta \mid \theta = 0) < 1$. Assume without loss of generality that we have

$$
P_\sigma(x_1 = \theta \mid \theta = 1) < 1. \quad (3.7)
$$

Let $\overline{S}$ denote the set of all private signals such that if $s_1 \in \overline{S}$, then $x_1 = 0$ in equilibrium $\sigma$. Since the first agent’s decision is a function of $s_1$, then Eq. (3.7) is equivalent to

$$
P_\sigma(s_1 \in \overline{S} \mid \theta = 1) > 0.
$$

Since the private signals are conditionally independent given $\theta$, this implies that

$$
P_\sigma(s_i \in \overline{S} \text{ for all } i \leq K \mid \theta = 1) = P_\sigma(s_1 \in \overline{S} \mid \theta = 1)^K > 0. \quad (3.8)$$
We next show that if \( s_i \in \overline{S}_\sigma \) for all \( i \leq K \), then \( z_K = 0 \). Using Bayes’ Rule, we have

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 0 \mid s_i \in \overline{S}_\sigma \text{ for all } i \leq K) = \left[ 1 + \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_i \in \overline{S}_\sigma \text{ for all } i \leq K \mid \theta = 1)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_i \in \overline{S}_\sigma \text{ for all } i \leq K \mid \theta = 0)} \right]^{-1}
= \left[ 1 + \prod_{i=1}^{K} \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_i \in \overline{S}_\sigma \mid \theta = 1)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_i \in \overline{S}_\sigma \mid \theta = 0)} \right]^{-1}
= \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_1 \in \overline{S}_\sigma \mid \theta = 1)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_1 \in \overline{S}_\sigma \mid \theta = 0)} \right)^K \right]^{-1},
\]  

(3.9)

where the second equality follows from the conditional independence of the private signals and the third equality holds since private signals are identically distributed. Applying Bayes’ Rule on the second term in parentheses in Eq. (3.9), this implies that

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 0 \mid s_1 \in \overline{S}_\sigma) = \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 0 \mid s_1 \in \overline{S}_\sigma)} - 1 \right)^K \right]^{-1}
\]  

(3.10)

Since \( s_1 \in \overline{S}_\sigma \) induces \( x_1 = 0 \), we have \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 0 \mid s_1 \in \overline{S}_\sigma) \geq 1/2 \). Because the function on the right-hand-side of Eq. (3.10) is nondecreasing in \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 0 \mid s_1 \in \overline{S}_\sigma) \) for any value in \([1/2,1]\), we obtain

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 0 \mid s_1 \in \overline{S}_\sigma \text{ for all } i \leq K) \geq \frac{1}{2}.
\]

By the definition of \( z_K \), this implies that if \( s_i \in \overline{S}_\sigma \) for all \( i \leq K \), then \( z_K = 0 \) (we can let \( z_n \) be equal to 0 whenever both states are equally likely given the private signals). Combined with the fact that the event \( \{s_i \in \overline{S}_\sigma \text{ for all } i \leq K\} \) has positive conditional probability given \( \theta = 1 \) under measure \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma \) [cf. Eq. (3.8)], this implies that \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(z_K = \theta) < 1 \). Substituting this relation in Eq. (3.6), we have

\[
\liminf_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) < 1,
\]
thus showing that asymptotic learning does not occur.

This theorem states the intuitive result that with nonexpanding observations, asymptotic learning will fail. This result is not surprising, since asymptotic learning requires the aggregation of the information of different individuals. But a network topology with nonexpanding observations does not allow such aggregation. Intuitively, nonexpanding observations, or equivalently the existence of an excessively influential group of agents, imply that infinitely many individuals will observe finitely many actions with positive probability and this will not enable them to aggregate the dispersed information collectively held by the entire social network.

3.2 Expanding Observations as a Sufficient Condition for Learning

The main question is then whether, once we exclude network topologies with nonexpanding observations, what other conditions need to be imposed to ensure asymptotic learning. The following theorem shows that for general network topologies, unbounded private beliefs and expanding observations are sufficient to guarantee asymptotic learning in all equilibria.

**Theorem 2** Assume that the signal structure \((F_0, F_1)\) has unbounded private beliefs and the network topology \(\{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\) has expanding observations. Then, asymptotic learning occurs in every equilibrium \(\sigma \in \Sigma^*\).

The proof of this theorem is provided in Section 3.3. However, many of its implications can be discussed before presenting a detailed proof.

Theorem 2 implies that unbounded private beliefs are sufficient for asymptotic learning for most (but not all) network topologies. In particular, the condition that the
network topology has expanding observations is fairly mild and only requires a minimum amount of arrival of recent information to the network. Social networks in which each individual observes all past actions, those in which each observes just his neighbor, and those in which each individual observes \( M \geq 1 \) agents independently and uniformly drawn from his predecessors are all examples of network topologies with expanding observations. Theorem 2 therefore implies that unbounded private beliefs are sufficient to guarantee asymptotic learning in social networks with these properties and many others.

Nevertheless, there are interesting network topologies where asymptotic learning does not occur even with unbounded private signals. The following corollary to Theorems 1 and 2 shows that for an interesting class of stochastic network topologies, there is a critical topology at which there is a phase transition—that is, for all network topologies with greater expansion of observations than this critical topology, there will be asymptotic learning and for all topologies with less expansion, asymptotic learning will fail. The proof of this corollary is also provided in Section 3.3.

**Corollary 1** Assume that the signal structure \((\mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{F}_1)\) has unbounded private beliefs. Assume also that the network topology is given by \( \{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) such that

\[
Q_n(m \in B(n)) = \frac{A}{(n-1)^C} \quad \text{for all } n \text{ and all } m < n,
\]

where, given \( n \), the draws for \( m, m' < n \) are independent and \( A \) and \( C \) are positive constants. If \( C < 1 \) then asymptotic learning occurs in all equilibria. If \( C \geq 1 \), then asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium.

Given the class of network topologies in this corollary, \( C < 1 \) implies that as the network becomes large, there will be sufficient expansion of observations. In contrast, for \( C \geq 1 \), stochastic process \( Q_n \) does not place enough probability on observing recent actions and the network topology is nonexpanding. Consequently, Theorem 1 applies and there is no asymptotic learning.
To highlight the implications of Theorems 1 and 2 for deterministic network topologies, let us introduce the following definition.

**Definition 7** Assume that the network topology is deterministic. Then, we say a finite sequence of agents \( \pi \) is an **information path** of agent \( n \) if for each \( i \), \( \pi_i \in B(\pi_{i+1}) \) and the last element of \( \pi \) is \( n \). Let \( \bar{\pi}(n) \) be an information path of agent \( n \) that has maximal length. Then, we let \( L(n) \) denote the number of elements in \( \bar{\pi}(n) \) and call it agent \( n \)'s **information depth**.

Intuitively, the concepts of information path and information depth capture the intuitive notion of how long the “trail” of the information in the neighborhood of an individual is. For example, if each individual observes only his immediate neighbor (i.e., \( B(n) = \{n - 1\} \) with probability one), each will have a small neighborhood, but the information depth of a high-indexed individual will be high (or the “trail” will be long), because the immediate neighbor’s action will contain information about the signals of all previous individuals. The next corollary shows that with deterministic network topologies, asymptotic learning will occur if only if the information depth (or the trail of the information) increases without bound as the network becomes larger.

**Corollary 2** Assume that the signal structure \((\mathbb{F}_0, \mathbb{F}_1)\) has unbounded private beliefs. Assume that the network topology is deterministic. Then, asymptotic learning occurs for all equilibria if the sequence of information depths \( \{L(n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) goes to infinity. If the sequence \( \{L(n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) does not go to infinity, then asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium.

The notion of information depth extends to stochastic network topologies. In fact, expanding observations is equivalent to \( L(n) \) going to infinity in probability. That is, expanding observations occurs if, and only if, for every \( \epsilon > 0 \) and every \( K \in \mathbb{N} \), there exists some \( N \in \mathbb{N} \) such that for all \( n \geq N \), \( Q(L(n) < K) \leq \epsilon \).

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3.3 Learning under Unbounded Private Beliefs

This section presents a proof of our main result, Theorem 2. The proof follows by combining several lemmas and propositions provided in this section. In the next subsection, we show that the expected utility of an individual is no less than the expected utility of any agent in his realized neighborhood. Though useful, this is a relatively weak result and is not sufficient to establish that asymptotic learning will take place in equilibrium. Subsection 3.3.2 provides the key result for the proof of Theorem 2. It focuses on the case in which each individual observes the action of a single agent and private beliefs are unbounded. Under these conditions, it establishes (a special case of) the strong improvement principle, which shows that the increase in expected utility is bounded away from zero (as long as social beliefs have not converged to the true state). Subsection 3.3.3 generalizes the strong improvement principle to the case in which each individual has a stochastically-generated neighborhood, potentially consisting of multiple (or no) agents. Subsection 3.3.4 then presents the proof of Theorem 2, which follows by combining these results with the fact that the network topology has expanding observations, so that the sequence of improvements will ultimately lead to asymptotic learning. Finally, subsection 3.3.5 provides proofs of Corollaries 1 and 2, which were presented in Section 3.2.

3.3.1 Information Monotonicity

As a first step, we show that the ex ante probability of an agent making the correct decision (and thus his expected payoff) is no less than the probability of any of the agents in his realized neighborhood making the correct decision.

Proposition 2 (Information Monotonicity) Let $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ be an equilibrium. For any
agent \( n \) and neighborhood \( \mathcal{B} \), we have

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \mathcal{B}) \geq \max_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_b = \theta).
\]

**Proof.** Let \( h : \{(n, B(n)) : n \in N, B(n) \subseteq \{1, 2, \ldots, n-1\}\} \rightarrow N \) be an arbitrary function that maps an agent and a neighborhood of the agent into an element of the neighborhood, i.e., \( h(n, B(n)) \in B(n) \). In view of the characterization of the equilibrium decision \( x_n \) [cf. Eq. (2.2)], it follows that for any private signal \( s_n \), neighborhood \( B(n) \subseteq \{1, 2, \ldots, n-1\} \), and decisions \( x_k, k \in B(n) \), we have

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid s_n, B(n), x_k, k \in B(n)) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{h(n,B(n))} = \theta \mid s_n, B(n), x_k, k \in B(n)).
\]

By integrating over all possible private signals and decisions of agents in the neighborhood, we obtain that for any \( n \) and any \( B(n) = \mathcal{B} \),

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \mathcal{B}) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{h(n,B(n))} = \theta \mid B(n) = \mathcal{B}) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{h(n,\mathcal{B})} = \theta),
\]

where the equality follows by the assumption that each neighborhood is generated independently from all other neighborhoods. By taking the maximum over all functions \( h \), we obtain

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \mathcal{B}) \geq \max_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_b = \theta),
\]

showing the desired relation. \( \blacksquare \)

Information monotonicity is similar to the *(expected) welfare improvement principle* in Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) and in Smith and Sorensen (1998), and the *imitation principle* in Gale and Kariv (2003) and is very intuitive. However, it is not sufficiently strong to establish asymptotic learning. To ensure that, as the network becomes large, decisions converge (in probability) to the correct action, we need *strict* improvements. This will be established in the next two subsections.

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3.3.2 Observing a Single Agent

In this subsection, we focus on a specific network topology where each agent observes the decision of a single agent. For this case, we provide an explicit characterization of the equilibrium, and under the assumption that private beliefs are unbounded, we establish a preliminary version of the strong improvement principle, which provides a lower bound on the increase in the ex ante probability that an individual will make a correct decision over his neighbor’s probability (recall that for now there is a single agent in each individual’s neighborhood, thus each individual has a single “neighbor”). This result will be generalized to arbitrary networks in the next subsection.

For each \( n \) and strategy profile \( \sigma \), let us define \( Y^\sigma_n \) and \( N^\sigma_n \) as the probabilities of agent \( n \) making the correct decision conditional on state \( \theta \). More formally, these are defined as

\[
Y^\sigma_n = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = 1 \mid \theta = 1), \quad N^\sigma_n = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = 0 \mid \theta = 0).
\] (3.11)

The unconditional probability of a correct decision is then

\[
\frac{1}{2}(Y^\sigma_n + N^\sigma_n) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta).
\] (3.12)

We also define the thresholds \( L^\sigma_n \) and \( U^\sigma_n \) in terms of these probabilities:

\[
L^\sigma_n = \frac{1 - N^\sigma_n}{1 - N^\sigma_n + Y^\sigma_n}, \quad U^\sigma_n = \frac{N^\sigma_n}{N^\sigma_n + 1 - Y^\sigma_n}.
\] (3.13)

The next proposition shows that the equilibrium decisions are fully characterized in terms of these thresholds.

**Proposition 3** Let \( B(n) = \{b\} \) for some agent \( n \). Let \( \sigma \in \Sigma^* \) be an equilibrium, and let
Figure 3-1: The equilibrium decision rule when observing a single agent, illustrated on the private belief space.

Let $\sigma$ be given by Eq. (3.13). Then, agent $n$’s decision $x_n$ in equilibrium $\sigma$ satisfies

$$
x_n = \begin{cases} 
0, & \text{if } p_n < L_b^\sigma \\
x_b, & \text{if } p_n \in (L_b^\sigma, U_b^\sigma) \\
1, & \text{if } p_n > U_b^\sigma.
\end{cases}
$$

The proof is omitted since it is an immediate application of Lemma 1 [use Bayes’ Rule to determine $P_\sigma(\theta = 1|x = j)$ for each $j \in \{0, 1\}$].

Note that the sequence $\{(U_n, L_n)\}$ only depends on $\{(Y_n, N_n)\}$, and is thus deterministic. This reflects the fact that each individual recognizes the amount of information that will be contained in the action of the previous agent, which determines his own decision thresholds. Individual actions are still stochastic since they are determined by whether the individual’s private belief is below $L_b$, above $U_b$, or in between (see Figure 3-1).

Using the structure of the equilibrium decision rule, the next lemma provides an
expression for the probability of agent \( n \) making the correct decision conditional on his observing agent \( b < n \), in terms of the private belief distributions and the thresholds \( L_\sigma^b \) and \( U_\sigma^b \).

**Lemma 4** Let \( B(n) = \{b\} \) for some agent \( n \). Let \( \sigma \in \Sigma^* \) be an equilibrium, and let \( L_\sigma^b \) and \( U_\sigma^b \) be given by Eq. (3.13). Then,

\[
\Pr(\sigma|x_n = \theta | B(n) = \{b\}) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ G_0(L_\sigma^b) + (G_0(U_\sigma^b) - G_0(L_\sigma^b)) N_\sigma^b + (1 - G_1(U_\sigma^b)) + (G_1(U_\sigma^b) - G_1(L_\sigma^b)) Y_\sigma^b \right].
\]

**Proof.** By definition, agent \( n \) receives the same expected utility from all his possible equilibrium choices. We can thus compute the expected utility by supposing that the agent will choose \( x_n = 0 \) when indifferent. Then, the expected utility of agent \( n \) (the probability of the correct decision) can be written as

\[
\Pr(\sigma|x_n = \theta | B(n) = \{b\}) = \Pr(\sigma|p_n \leq L_\sigma^b | \theta = 0) \Pr(\theta = 0) + \Pr(\sigma|p_n \in (L_\sigma^b, U_\sigma^b], x_b = 0 | \theta = 0) \Pr(\theta = 0)
+ \Pr(\sigma|p_n > U_\sigma^b | \theta = 1) \Pr(\theta = 1) + \Pr(\sigma|p_n \in (L_\sigma^b, U_\sigma^b], x_b = 1 | \theta = 1) \Pr(\theta = 1).
\]

The result then follows using the fact that \( p_n \) and \( x_b \) are conditionally independent given \( \theta \) and the notation for the private belief distributions [cf. Eq. (2.8)].

Using the previous lemma, we next strengthen Proposition 2 and provide a lower bound on the amount of improvement in the ex ante probability of making the correct decision between an agent and his neighbor.

**Lemma 5** Let \( B(n) = \{b\} \) for some agent \( n \). Let \( \sigma \in \Sigma^* \) be an equilibrium, and let \( L_\sigma^b \)
and $U_b^\sigma$ be given by Eq. (3.13). Then,

$$
P_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \{b\}) \geq P_\sigma(x_b = \theta) + \frac{(1 - N_b^\sigma)L_b^\sigma}{8} G_1 \left( \frac{L_b^\sigma}{2} \right) + \frac{(1 - Y_b^\sigma)(1 - U_b^\sigma)}{8} \left[ 1 - G_0 \left( \frac{1 + U_b^\sigma}{2} \right) \right].$$

**Proof.** In Lemma 3(b), let $r = L_b^\sigma$, $z = L_b^\sigma/2$, so that we obtain

$$
(1 - N_b^\sigma)G_0(L_b^\sigma) \geq Y_b^\sigma G_1(L_b^\sigma) + \frac{(1 - N_b^\sigma)L_b^\sigma}{4} G_1 \left( \frac{L_b^\sigma}{2} \right).
$$

Next, again using Lemma 3(b) and letting $r = U_b^\sigma$ and $w = (1 + U_b^\sigma)/2$, we have

$$
(1 - Y_b^\sigma)[1 - G_1(U_b^\sigma)] \geq N_b^\sigma[1 - G_0(U_b^\sigma)] + \frac{(1 - Y_b^\sigma)(1 - U_b^\sigma)}{4} \left[ 1 - G_0 \left( \frac{1 + U_b^\sigma}{2} \right) \right].
$$

Combining the preceding two relations with Lemma 4 and using the fact that $Y_b^\sigma + N_b^\sigma = 2 P_\sigma(x_b = \theta)$ [cf. Eq. (3.12)], the desired result follows. ■

The next lemma establishes that the lower bound on the amount of improvement in the ex ante probability is uniformly bounded away from zero for unbounded private beliefs and when $P_\sigma(x_b = \theta) < 1$, i.e., when asymptotic learning is not achieved.

**Lemma 6** Let $B(n) = \{b\}$ for some $n$. Let $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ be an equilibrium, and denote $\alpha = P_\sigma(x_b = \theta)$. Then,

$$
P_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \{b\}) \geq \alpha + \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{8} \min \left\{ G_1 \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{2} \right), 1 - G_0 \left( \frac{1 + \alpha}{2} \right) \right\}.
$$

**Proof.** We consider two cases separately.

*Case 1: $N_b^\sigma \leq \alpha$. From the definition of $L_b^\sigma$ and the fact that $Y_b^\sigma = 2\alpha - N_b^\sigma$ [cf. Eq.
Since $\sigma$ is an equilibrium, we have $\alpha \geq 1/2$, and thus the right hand-side of the preceding inequality is a nonincreasing function of $N_0^\sigma$. Since $N_0^\sigma \leq \alpha$, this relation therefore implies that $L_0^\sigma \geq 1 - \alpha$. Combining the relations $1 - N_0^\sigma \geq 1 - \alpha$ and $L_0^\sigma \geq 1 - \alpha$, we obtain
\[ \frac{(1 - N_0^\sigma) L_0^\sigma}{8} \geq \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{8} G_1 \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{2} \right). \tag{3.14} \]

Case 2: $N_0^\sigma \geq \alpha$. Since $Y_0^\sigma + N_0^\sigma = 2\alpha$, this implies that $Y_0^\sigma \leq \alpha$. Using the definition of $U_0^\sigma$ and a similar argument as the one above, we obtain
\[ \frac{(1 - Y_0^\sigma)(1 - U_0^\sigma)}{8} \left[ 1 - G_0 \left( \frac{1 + U_0^\sigma}{2} \right) \right] \geq \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{8} \left[ 1 - G_0 \left( \frac{1 + \alpha}{2} \right) \right]. \tag{3.15} \]

Combining Eqs. (3.14) and (3.15), we obtain
\[ \frac{(1 - N_0^\sigma)L_0^\sigma}{8} G_1 \left( \frac{L_0^\sigma}{2} \right) + \frac{(1 - Y_0^\sigma)(1 - U_0^\sigma)}{8} \left[ 1 - G_0 \left( \frac{1 + U_0^\sigma}{2} \right) \right] \geq \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{8} \min \left\{ G_1 \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{2} \right), 1 - G_0 \left( \frac{1 + \alpha}{2} \right) \right\}, \]
where we also used the fact that each term on the left hand-side of the preceding inequality is nonnegative. Substituting this into Lemma 5, the desired result follows.

The preceding lemma characterizes the improvements in the probability of making the correct decision between an agent and his neighbor. To study the limiting behavior of these improvements, we introduce the function $\Xi : [1/2, 1] \to [1/2, 1]$ defined by
\[ \Xi(\alpha) = \alpha + \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{8} \min \left\{ G_1 \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{2} \right), 1 - G_0 \left( \frac{1 + \alpha}{2} \right) \right\}. \tag{3.16} \]
Lemma 6 establishes that for $n$, which has $B(n) = \{b\}$, we have

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta | B(n) = \{b\}) \geq \mathbb{Z}(\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_b = \theta)),$$

(3.17)
i.e., the function $\mathbb{Z}$ acts as an improvement function for the evolution of the probability of making the correct decision. The function $\mathbb{Z}(\cdot)$ has several important properties, which are formally stated in the next lemma.

**Lemma 7** The function $\mathbb{Z} : [1/2, 1] \rightarrow [1/2, 1]$ given in (3.16) satisfy the following properties:

(a) The function $\mathbb{Z}$ has no upwards jumps. That is, for any $\alpha \in [1/2, 1]$,

$$\mathbb{Z}(\alpha) = \lim_{r \uparrow \alpha} \mathbb{Z}(r) \geq \lim_{r \downarrow \alpha} \mathbb{Z}(r).$$

(b) For any $\alpha \in [1/2, 1]$, $\mathbb{Z}(\alpha) \geq \alpha$.

(c) If the private beliefs are unbounded, then for any $\alpha \in [1/2, 1)$, $\mathbb{Z}(\alpha) > \alpha$.

**Proof.** Since $G_0$ and $G_1$ are cumulative distribution functions, they cannot have downwards jumps, i.e., for each $j \in \{0, 1\}$, $\lim_{r \uparrow \alpha} G_j(r) \leq \lim_{r \downarrow \alpha} G_j(r)$ for any $\alpha \in [1/2, 1]$, establishing Part (a). Part (b) follows from the fact that cumulative distribution functions take values in $[0, 1]$. For Part (c), suppose that for some $\alpha \in [1/2, 1)$, $Z(\alpha) = \alpha$. This implies that

$$\min \left\{ G_1 \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{2} \right), 1 - G_0 \left( \frac{1 + \alpha}{2} \right) \right\} = 0.$$  

(3.18)

However, from the assumption on the private beliefs, we have that for all $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ and any $j \in \{0, 1\}$, $G_j(\alpha) \in (0, 1)$, contradicting Eq. (3.18). ■

The properties of the $\mathbb{Z}$ function will be used in the analysis of asymptotic learning in general networks in subsection 3.3.3. The analysis of asymptotic learning requires the relevant improvement function to be both continuous and monotone. However,
\( \overline{Z} \) does not necessarily satisfy these properties. We next construct a related function \( Z : [1/2, 1] \to [1/2, 1] \) that satisfies these properties and can be used as the improvement function in the asymptotic analysis. Let \( Z \) be defined as:

\[
Z(\alpha) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \alpha + \sup_{r \in [1/2, \alpha]} Z(r) \right). \tag{3.19}
\]

This function shares the same “improvement” properties as \( \overline{Z} \), but is also nondecreasing and continuous. The properties of the function \( Z(\cdot) \) stated in the following lemma.

**Lemma 8** The function \( Z : [1/2, 1] \to [1/2, 1] \) given in (3.19) satisfy the following properties:

(a) For any \( \alpha \in [1/2, 1] \), \( Z(\alpha) \geq \alpha \).

(b) If the private beliefs are unbounded, then for any \( \alpha \in [1/2, 1) \), \( Z(\alpha) > \alpha \).

(c) The function \( Z \) is increasing and continuous.

**Proof.** Parts (a) and (b) follow immediately from Lemma 7, parts (b) and (c) respectively. The function \( \sup_{r \in [1/2, \alpha]} Z(r) \) is nondecreasing and the function \( \alpha \) is increasing, therefore the average of these two functions, which is \( Z \), is an increasing function, establishing the first part of part (c).

We finally show that \( Z \) is a continuous function. We first show \( Z(\alpha) \) is continuous for all \( \alpha \in [1/2, 1) \). To obtain a contradiction, assume that \( Z \) is discontinuous at some \( \alpha^* \in [1/2, 1) \). This implies that \( \sup_{r \in [1/2, \alpha]} Z(r) \) is discontinuous at \( \alpha^* \). Since \( \sup_{r \in [1/2, \alpha]} Z(r) \) is a nondecreasing function, we have

\[
\lim_{\begin{subarray}{c} \alpha \to \alpha^* \\ \alpha < \alpha^* \end{subarray}} \sup_{r \in [1/2, \alpha]} Z(r) > \sup_{r \in [1/2, \alpha^*]} Z(r).
\]
from which it follows that there exists some $\epsilon > 0$ such that for any $\delta > 0$

$$\sup_{r \in [1/2, \alpha^* + \delta]} \overline{Z}(r) > \overline{Z}(\alpha) + \epsilon \quad \text{for all } \alpha \in [1/2, \alpha^*).$$

This contradicts the fact that the function $\overline{Z}$ does not have an upward jump [cf. Lemma 7 (a)], and establishes the continuity of $Z(\alpha)$ for all $\alpha \in [1/2, 1)$. The continuity of the function $Z(\alpha)$ at $\alpha = 1$ follows from part (a). \[\blacksquare\]

The next proposition shows that the function $Z$ is also a (strong) improvement function for the evolution of the probability of making the correct decision.

**Proposition 4** (Strong Improvement Principle) Let $B(n) = \{b\}$ for some $n$. Let $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ be an equilibrium. Then, we have

$$P_{\sigma}(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \{b\}) \geq Z(P_{\sigma}(x_b = \theta)). \quad (3.20)$$

**Proof.** Let $\alpha$ denote $P_{\sigma}(x_b = \theta)$. If $Z(\alpha) = \alpha$, then the result follows immediately from Proposition 2. Suppose next that $Z(\alpha) > \alpha$. This implies that $Z(\alpha) < \sup_{r \in [1/2, \alpha]} \overline{Z}(r)$. Therefore, there exists some $\overline{\alpha} \in [1/2, \alpha]$ such that

$$\overline{Z}(\overline{\alpha}) > Z(\alpha). \quad (3.21)$$

We next show that $P_{\sigma}(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = b) \geq \overline{Z}(\overline{\alpha})$. Agent $n$ can always (privately) make the information from his observation of $x_b$ coarser (i.e., not observe $x_b$ according to some probability). Let the observation thus generated by agent $n$ be denoted by $\tilde{x}_b$, and suppose that it is given by

$$\tilde{x}_b = \begin{cases} 
  x_b, & \text{with probability } (2\overline{\alpha} - 1)/(2\alpha - 1) \\
  0, & \text{with probability } (\alpha - \overline{\alpha})/(2\alpha - 1) \\
  1, & \text{with probability } (\alpha - \overline{\alpha})/(2\alpha - 1),
\end{cases}$$

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where the realizations of $\tilde{x}_b$ are independent from agent $n$’s information set. Next observe that $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\tilde{x}_b = \theta) = \overline{\alpha}$. Then, Lemma 6 implies that $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta | B(n) = b) \geq \overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\overline{\alpha})$. Since $\overline{\mathcal{Z}}(\overline{\alpha}) > \mathcal{Z}(\alpha)$ [cf. Eq. (3.21)], the desired result follows.

3.3.3 Learning from Multiple Agents

In this subsection, we generalize the results of the previous subsection to an arbitrary network topology. We first present a stronger version of the information monotonicity relation (cf. Proposition 2), where the amount of improvement is given by the improvement function $\mathcal{Z}$ defined in Eq. (3.20). Even though a full characterization of equilibrium decisions in general network topologies is a nontractable problem (recall the discussion in subsection 2.2.3), it is possible to establish an analogue of Proposition 4, that is, a generalized strong improvement principle, which provides a lower bound on the amount of increase in the probabilities of making the correct decision. The idea of the proof is to show that improvements can be no less than the case in which each individual’s neighborhood consisted of a single agent.

**Proposition 5** (Generalized Strong Improvement Principle) For any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, any set $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n-1\}$ and any equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$, we have

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \mathcal{B}) \geq \mathcal{Z}\left(\max_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_b = \theta)\right).
$$

**Proof.** Given an equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ and agent $n$, let $h_\sigma$ be a function that maps any subset of $\{1, \ldots, n-1\}$ to an element of $\{1, \ldots, n-1\}$ such that for any $\mathcal{B} \subset \{1, \ldots, n-1\}$, we have

$$
h_\sigma(\mathcal{B}) \in \arg\max_{b \in \mathcal{B}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_b = \theta). \quad (3.22)
$$
We define \( w_n \) as the decision that maximizes the conditional probability of making the correct decision given the private signal \( s_n \) and the decision of the agent \( h_\sigma(B(n)) \), i.e.,

\[
w_n \in \operatorname{argmax}_{y \in \{0, 1\}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( y = \theta \mid s_n, x_{h_\sigma(B(n))} \right).
\]

The equilibrium decision \( x_n \) of agent \( n \) satisfies

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid s_n, B(n), x_k, k \in B(n)) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(w_n = \theta \mid s_n, B(n), x_k, k \in B(n)),
\]

[cf. the characterization of the equilibrium decision rule in Eq. (2.2)]. Integrating over all possible private signals and decisions of neighbors, we obtain for any \( \mathfrak{B} \subset \{1, \ldots, n-1\} \),

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \mathfrak{B}) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(w_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \mathfrak{B}).
\]  \hspace{1cm} (3.23)

Because \( w_n \) is an optimal choice given a single observation, Eq. (3.20) holds and yields

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(w_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \mathfrak{B}) \geq Z \left( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{h_\sigma(\mathfrak{B})} = \theta) \right).
\]  \hspace{1cm} (3.24)

Combining Eqs. (3.22), (3.23) and (3.24) we obtain the desired result. \( \blacksquare \)

This proposition is a key result, since it shows that, under unbounded private beliefs, there are improvements in payoffs (probabilities of making correct decisions) that are bounded away from zero. We will next use this generalized strong improvement principle to prove Theorem 2. The proof involves showing that under the expanding observations and the unbounded private beliefs assumptions, the amount of improvement in the probabilities of making the correct decision given by \( Z \) accumulates until asymptotic learning is reached.
3.3.4 Proof of Theorem 2

The proof consists of two parts. In the first part of the proof, we construct two sequences \( \{\alpha_k\} \) and \( \{\phi_k\} \) such that for all \( k \geq 0 \), there holds

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq \phi_k \text{ for all } n \geq \alpha_k.
\]  

(3.25)

The second part of the proof shows that \( \phi_k \) converges to 1, thus establishing the result.

Given some integer \( K > 0 \) and scalar \( \epsilon > 0 \), let \( N(K, \epsilon) > 0 \) be an integer such that for all \( n \geq N(K, \epsilon) \),

\[
Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b < K \right) < \epsilon,
\]

(such an integer exists in view of the fact that, by hypothesis, the network topology features expanding observations). We let \( \alpha_1 = 1 \) and \( \phi_1 = 1/2 \) and define the sequences \( \{\alpha_k\} \) and \( \phi_k \) recursively by

\[
\alpha_{k+1} = N \left( \alpha_k, \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 - \frac{\phi_k}{Z(\phi_k)} \right] \right), \quad \phi_{k+1} = \frac{\phi_k + Z(\phi_k)}{2}.
\]

Using the fact that the range of the function \( Z \) is \([1/2, 1]\), it can be seen that \( \phi_k \in [1/2, 1] \) for all \( k \), therefore the preceding sequences are well-defined.

We use induction on the index \( k \) to prove relation (3.25). Since \( \sigma \) is an equilibrium, we have

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq \frac{1}{2} \quad \text{for all } n \geq 1,
\]

which together with \( \alpha_1 = 1 \) and \( \phi_1 = 1/2 \) shows relation (3.25) for \( k = 1 \). Assume that the relation (3.25) holds for an arbitrary \( k \), i.e.,

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_j = \theta) \geq \phi_k \text{ for all } j \geq \alpha_k.
\]

(3.26)

Consider some agent \( n \) with \( n \geq \alpha_{k+1} \). By integrating the relation from Lemma 5 over
all possible neighborhoods \(B(n)\), we obtain

\[
P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq \mathbb{E}_{B(n)} \left[ Z \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} P_\sigma(x_b = \theta) \right) \right],
\]

where \(\mathbb{E}_{B(n)}\) denotes the expectation with respect to the neighborhood \(B(n)\) (i.e., the weighted sum over all possible neighborhoods \(B(n)\)). We can rewrite the preceding as

\[
P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq \mathbb{E}_{B(n)} \left[ Z \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} P_\sigma(x_b = \theta) \right) \mid \max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq \alpha_k \right] Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq \alpha_k \right) + \mathbb{E}_{B(n)} \left[ Z \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} P_\sigma(x_b = \theta) \right) \mid \max_{b \in B(n)} b < \alpha_k \right] Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b < \alpha_k \right).
\]

Since the terms on the right hand-side of the preceding relation are nonnegative, this implies that

\[
P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq \mathbb{E}_{B(n)} \left[ Z \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} P_\sigma(x_b = \theta) \right) \mid \max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq \alpha_k \right] Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq \alpha_k \right).
\]

Since \(\max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq \alpha_k\), Eq. (3.26) implies that

\[
\max_{b \in B(n)} P_\sigma(x_b = \theta) \geq \phi_k.
\]

Since the function \(Z\) is nondecreasing [cf. Lemma 8(c)], combining the preceding two relations, we obtain

\[
P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq \mathbb{E}_{B(n)} \left[ Z \left( \phi_k \right) \mid \max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq \alpha_k \right] Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq \alpha_k \right) = Z(\phi_k) Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq \alpha_k \right),
\]

where the equality follows since the sequence \(\{\phi_k\}\) is deterministic. Using the definition
of $\alpha_k$, this implies that

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq Z(\phi_k) \frac{1}{2} \left[ 1 + \frac{\phi_k}{Z(\phi_k)} \right] = \phi_{k+1},$$

thus completing the induction.

We finally prove that $\phi_k \to 1$ as $k \to \infty$. Since $Z(\alpha) \geq \alpha$ for all $\alpha \in [1/2, 1]$ [cf. Lemma 8(a)], it follows from the definition of $\phi_k$ that $\{\phi_k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a nondecreasing sequence. It is also bounded and therefore it converges to some $\phi^*$. Taking the limit in the definition of $\phi_k$, we obtain

$$2\phi^* = 2 \lim_{k \to \infty} \phi_k = \lim_{k \to \infty} \left[ \phi_k + Z(\phi_k) \right] = \phi^* + Z(\phi^*),$$

where the third equality follows since $Z$ is a continuous function [cf. Lemma 8(c)]. This shows that $\phi^* = Z(\phi^*)$, i.e., $\phi^*$ is a fixed point of $Z$. Since the private beliefs are unbounded, the unique fixed point of $Z$ is 1, showing that $\phi_k \to 1$ as $k \to \infty$ and completing the proof. ■

3.3.5 Proofs of Corollaries 1 and 2

Proof of Corollary 1. We first show that if $C \geq 1$, then the network topology has nonexpanding observations. To show this, we set $K = 1$ in Definition 6 and show that the probability of infinitely many agents having empty neighborhoods is uniformly bounded away from 0. We first consider the case $C > 1$. Then, the probability that the neighborhood of agent $n + 1$ is the empty set is given by

$$\mathbb{Q}_{n+1}(B(n + 1) = \emptyset) = \left( 1 - \frac{A}{nC} \right)^n,$$
which converges to 1 as \( n \) goes to infinity. If \( C = 1 \), then
\[
\lim_{{n \to \infty}} Q_{n+1}(B(n+1) = \emptyset) = \lim_{{n \to \infty}} \left(1 - \frac{A}{n}\right)^n = e^{-A}.
\]

Therefore, for infinitely many agents, \( Q_{n+1}(B(n+1) = \emptyset) \geq e^{-A}/2 \). The preceding show that the network topology has nonexpanding observations for \( C \geq 1 \), hence the result follows from Theorem 1.

We next assume that \( C < 1 \). For any \( K \) and all \( n \geq K \), we have
\[
Q_{n+1} \left( \max_{{b \in B(n+1)}} b \leq K \right) = \left(1 - \frac{A}{n^C}\right)^{n-K},
\]
which converges to 0 as \( n \) goes to infinity. Hence the network topology is expanding in observations and the result follows from Theorem 2. ■

**Proof of Corollary 2.** We show that \( \{L(n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) goes to infinity if and only if the deterministic sequence \( \{\max_{{b \in B(n)}} b\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) goes to infinity. Suppose first \( \{L(n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) diverges to infinity. Then, for every \( K \) there exists \( N \) such that for all \( n \geq N \), \( L(n) \geq K \). Note that
\[
L(n) \leq 1 + \max_{{b \in B(n)}} b
\]
because the longest information path must be a subset of the sequence
\[
(1, 2, \ldots, \max_{{b \in B(n)}} b, n).
\]
So, for \( n \geq N \), if \( L(n) \geq K \), then \( \max_{{b \in B(n)}} b > K \), thus proving the first part of the lemma. Suppose next that \( \{\max_{{b \in B(n)}} b\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) goes to infinity as \( n \) goes to infinity. We show by induction that for each \( d \in \mathbb{N} \), there exists some integer \( C_d \) such that \( L(n) \geq d \) for all \( n \geq C_d \). Since \( L(n) \geq 1 \) for all \( n \), then \( C_1 = 1 \). Assume such \( C_d \) exists for some \( d \). Then, we show that such a \( C_{d+1} \) also exists. Since \( \{\max_{{b \in B(n)}} b\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \) goes to infinity,
there exists some \( N_d \) such that for all \( n \geq N_d \),

\[
\max_{b \in B(n)} b \geq C_d.
\]

Now, for any \( n \geq N_d \), there exists a path with size \( d \) up to some \( k \geq C_d \) and then another observation from \( k \) to \( n \), therefore \( L(n) \geq d + 1 \). Hence, \( C_{d+1} = N_d \). ■
Chapter 4

The Rate of Learning

4.1 Decay of the Error Probabilities

The key metric of this thesis, asymptotic learning, measures how informed the action of agent $n$ of the social network is in the limit as $n$ goes to infinity. This metric determines whether agents learn from the actions of peers in very large societies. However, in any application of this model, a social network would be described by a finite graph. To understand how well asymptotic learning serves as a good approximation for finite-sized networks, we need to analyze the speed of learning. The rate at which learning happens is therefore of considerable interest since convergence to approximately correct beliefs and actions might require an arbitrarily large network.

Another important consideration that leads us to study of the rate of learning is the problem of comparing the impact of different network topologies on the learning process. In Chapter 3, we determine that a minimal amount of communication (expanding observations) is sufficient to produce asymptotic learning. Therefore, analyzing the speed of learning is important for understanding how network topology affects learning in social networks.

We explore in this chapter the rate of decay of the probability of error under Bayesian
learning in the case of unbounded private beliefs. We investigate the rate of convergence of individual beliefs and actions to the correct beliefs and actions in a simplified version of our general model. In particular, instead of general network topologies, we focus on situations in which individuals observe only one past action. We distinguish two cases. In the first, which we refer to as immediate neighbor sampling, each individual observes the most recent action, i.e., \( B(n) = \{n - 1\} \) for each \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). In the second, which we refer to as random sampling, each individual observes any one of the past actions with equal probability. That is, for each \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) and each \( b \in \{1, \ldots, n - 1\} \), \( B(n) = \{b\} \) with probability \( 1/(n - 1) \).

We develop a method of estimating an upper bound on the error probability in both cases, based on approximating this bound with an ordinary differential equation. Our results are as follows:

- With random sampling, the probability of the incorrect action converges to zero faster than a logarithmic rate [in the sense that this probability is no greater than \( (\log(n))^{-1/(K+1)} \) where \( n \) is the number of individuals in the network and \( K \) is a constant].

- With immediate neighbor sampling, the probability of the incorrect action converges to zero faster than a polynomial rate [in the sense that this probability is no greater than \( n^{-1/(K+1)} \)].

- We show by means of an example that the bounds are tight. That is, we construct a signal structure where the probability of error decays at a logarithmic rate with random sampling and at a polynomial rate with immediate neighbor sampling.

The immediate neighbor sampling enables faster aggregation of information, because each individual is sampled only once. In contrast, with random sampling, each individual is sampled \emph{infinitely often}. Thus, with a random sampling, there is slower rate of arrival of new information into the system. While real-world social networks are much more
complex than the two stylized topologies we study, our results already suggest some general insights. In particular, they suggest that social networks in which the same individuals are the (main or only) source of the information of many others will lead to slower learning than networks in which the opinions and information of new members are incorporated into the “social belief” more rapidly.

The most closely related paper is Tay, Tsitsiklis and Win (2007), who study the problem of information aggregation over sensor networks. They consider decision rules that minimize the error probability of the final agent of a finite sequence (different model from the perfect Bayesian equilibrium characterized here) and provide lower and upper bounds on the rate of convergence of posteriors generated by decentralized agents. The formal model is similar to our model of social learning with immediate neighbor sampling, though our bounds on the rate of convergence are not present in Tay, Tsitsiklis and Win. Their lower bounds apply to our model of immediate neighbor sampling. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, our results on the speed of learning in the random sampling case are also not present in the previous literature.

4.2 Upper Bounds on the Error Probability

In this section, we prove the upper bounds on the error probability in social networks. We first introduce an important property of the private belief distributions that will impact the rate of convergence results.

**Definition 8** The private belief distributions have **polynomial shape** if there exist some constant $C' > 0$ and $K > 0$ such that

\[
G_1(\alpha) \geq C'\alpha^K \quad \text{and} \quad G_0(1 - \alpha) \leq 1 - C'\alpha^K \quad (4.1)
\]

for all $\alpha \in [0, 1/2]$. If Eq. (4.1) holds only for $\alpha \in [0, \epsilon]$ for some $\epsilon > 0$, then the private
belief distributions have polynomial tails.

This condition guarantees that strong signals in favor of both states of the world occur fairly frequently. It eliminates, for example, unbounded private beliefs generated by two Gaussian distributions $F_0$ and $F_1$ with different mean values. In such cases, there are very strong signals in favor of both states of the world (hence, unbounded private beliefs), but they occur very infrequently because normally distributed random variables rarely deviate several standard deviations away from the mean. If the probability of a very informative signal is small, then learning will be slower since a large number of agents will need to arrive before a well-informed agent acts.

For simplicity, the results in this paper assume polynomial shape, but they extend immediately to private belief distributions with polynomial tails. Note that polynomial shape implies there exist some constants $C > 0$ and $K > 0$ such that

$$\min \left\{ G_1 \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{2} \right), 1 - G_0 \left( \frac{1 + \alpha}{2} \right) \right\} \geq C(1 - \alpha)^K$$

for all $\alpha \in [1/2, 1]$.

We assume in this section that $G_0$ and $G_1$ are continuous distributions in order to guarantee that there is almost surely unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This assumption could be relaxed at the expense of more notation.

We now restate Lemma 6 from Chapter 3 that establishes a lower bound on the amount of improvement in the ex ante probability of making the correct decision between an agent and his neighbor. This bound will be key in the subsequent convergence rate analysis.

Lemma 6 Let $B(n) = \{ b \}$ for some $n$ and denote $\alpha = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_b = \theta)$. In equilibrium,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta|B(n) = \{ b \}) \geq \alpha + \frac{1}{8}(1 - \alpha)^2 \min \left\{ G_1 \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{2} \right), 1 - G_0 \left( \frac{1 + \alpha}{2} \right) \right\}.$$
When the private beliefs have polynomial shape, we obtain from Lemma 6 and Eq. (4.2) that for some $C > 0$ and $K > 0$,

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta | B(n) = \{b\}) \geq \alpha + \frac{C}{8} (1 - \alpha)^{K+2},
$$

(4.3)

where $\alpha = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_b = \theta)$. Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (4.3) is increasing in $\alpha$ over $[1/2, 1]$ if

$$
C < \frac{2^{K+1}}{K + 2}.
$$

(4.4)

Note that if Eq. (4.3) holds for some $C > 0$, then it also holds for any $C' \in (0, C)$. So, we can assume without loss of generality that Eq. (4.4) holds and, therefore, the right-hand side of Eq. (4.3) is increasing in $\alpha$.

We now state and prove the bound on the speed of learning for the immediate neighbor sampling network topology.

**Theorem 3** Suppose agents sample immediate neighbors and the private beliefs have polynomial shape, then

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n \neq \theta) = O\left(n^{\frac{1}{K+1}}\right).
$$

**Proof.** To prove this bound, we construct a pair of functions $\phi$ and $\tilde{\phi}$, where $\phi$ can be represented by a difference equation and $\tilde{\phi}$ by a differential equation and show that for all $t \in \mathbb{N}$, $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_t = \theta) \geq \phi(t) \geq \tilde{\phi}(t)$.

When the conditions of the proposition hold, we have from Eq. (4.3) that for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) + \frac{C}{8} (1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta))^{K+2}.
$$

(4.5)

We construct a sequence $\{\phi(n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ where $\phi(1) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_1 = \theta)$ and, recursively, for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$
\phi(n + 1) = \phi(n) + \frac{C}{8} (1 - \phi(n))^{K+2}.
$$
and proceed to show by induction that for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq \phi(n). \tag{4.6}
\]

The relation holds for \( n = 1 \) by construction. Suppose the relation holds for some \( n \). Then,

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) + \frac{C}{8} (1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta))^{K+2}
\geq \phi(n) + \frac{C}{8} (1 - \phi(n))^{K+2}
= \phi(n+1),
\]

where the second inequality holds because we assumed that the right-hand side of Eq. (4.3) is increasing in \( \alpha \). Therefore, Eq. (4.6) holds for all \( n \).

Let us now define \( \phi(t) \) on non-integer values of \( t \) by linear interpolation of the integer values. That is, for any \( t \in [1, \infty) \),

\[
\phi(t) = \phi(\lfloor t \rfloor) + \frac{C}{8} (t - \lfloor t \rfloor) (1 - \phi(\lfloor t \rfloor))^{K+2}.
\]

Finding such a \( \phi \) is equivalent to solving the following differential equation (where derivatives are defined only at non-integer times):

\[
\frac{d\phi(t)}{dt} = \frac{C}{8} (1 - \phi(\lfloor t \rfloor))^{K+2}.
\tag{4.7}
\]

Let us now construct yet another continuous time function \( \tilde{\phi}(t) \) to bound \( \phi(t) \). Let \( \tilde{\phi}(1) = \phi(1) \) and

\[
\frac{d\tilde{\phi}(t)}{dt} = \frac{C}{8} \left( 1 - \tilde{\phi}(t) \right)^{K+2}. \tag{4.7}
\]
Note that both $\phi$ and $\tilde{\phi}$ are increasing functions. We now show that
\begin{equation}
\tilde{\phi}(t) \leq \phi(t) \text{ for all } t \in [1, \infty).
\end{equation}

Let $t^*$ be some value such that $\tilde{\phi}(t^*) = \phi(t^*)$. Then, for any $\epsilon \in [0, 1 - (t^* - \lfloor t^* \rfloor)]$,
\begin{align*}
\phi(t^* + \epsilon) & = \phi(t^*) + \epsilon \frac{C}{8} (1 - \phi(\lfloor t^* \rfloor))^{K+2} \\
& \geq \phi(t^*) + \epsilon \frac{C}{8} (1 - \phi(t^*))^{K+2} \\
& = \tilde{\phi}(t^*) + \epsilon \frac{C}{8} (1 - \tilde{\phi}(t^*))^{K+2} \\
& \geq \tilde{\phi}(t^*) + \int_{t^*}^{t^* + \epsilon} \frac{C}{8} (1 - \tilde{\phi}(t))^{K+2} dt \\
& = \tilde{\phi}(t^* + \epsilon),
\end{align*}
where the first equality comes from $\phi$’s piecewise linearity, the following inequality from the monotonicity of $\phi$, the second equality from $\tilde{\phi}(t^*) = \phi(t^*)$ and the second inequality from the monotonicity of $\tilde{\phi}$. Therefore, for any $t^*$ such that $\tilde{\phi}(t^*) = \phi(t^*)$, we have that for all $\epsilon \in [0, 1 - (t^* - \lfloor t^* \rfloor)]$, $\tilde{\phi}(t^* + \epsilon) \leq \phi(t^* + \epsilon)$. Hence, $\tilde{\phi}$ does not cross above $\phi$ at any point and, since both functions are continuous, it implies Eq. (4.8) holds.

Combining Eqs. (4.6) and (4.8) we obtain that for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$,
\begin{equation*}
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq \phi(n) \geq \tilde{\phi}(n).
\end{equation*}
See Figure 4-1 for a graphical representation of this bound. We can solve the ODE of Eq. (4.7) exactly and calculate $\tilde{\phi}(n)$ for every $n$. The solution is as follows: there exists some other constant $\overline{C}$ (which is determined by the boundary value $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_1 = \theta) = \tilde{\phi}(1)$) such that for each $n$,
\begin{equation*}
\tilde{\phi}(n) = 1 - \left( \frac{1}{8(K + 1)C(n + \overline{C})} \right)^{\frac{1}{K+1}}.
\end{equation*}
Figure 4-1: Bound used to prove Theorems 3 and 4. The values of $P_\sigma(x_n = \theta)$ are lower bounded by the difference equation $\phi$, which in turn are lower bounded by the differential equation $\tilde{\phi}$.

Therefore,

$$P_\sigma(x_n \neq \theta) \leq \left( \frac{1}{8(K+1)C(n+C)} \right)^{\frac{1}{\pi+1}}$$

and the desired result follows. ■

**Theorem 4** Suppose that agents use random sampling and the private beliefs have polynomial shape, then

$$P_\sigma(x_n \neq \theta) = O \left( (\log n)^{-\frac{1}{\pi+1}} \right).$$

**Proof.** To prove this result, we again construct a pair of functions $\phi$ and $\tilde{\phi}$ and show that for all $t \in \mathbb{N}$, $P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq \phi(t) \geq \tilde{\phi}(t)$.

Under a random sampling topology, we have for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$P_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{b=1}^{n} P_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta | B(n+1) = \{b\})$$

$$= \frac{1}{n} \left[ P_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta | B(n+1) = \{n\}) + (n-1)P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \right],$$
because conditional on observing the same \( b < n \), agents \( n \) and \( n + 1 \) have identical probabilities of making an optimal decision. From Eq. (4.3), we obtain that

\[
P_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta) \geq P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) + \frac{C}{8n} \left(1 - P_\sigma(x_n = \theta)\right)^{K+2}.
\]

(4.9)

Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (4.9) is increasing in \( P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \) for any \( n \geq 1 \) because we assumed the right-hand side of Eq. (4.3) is increasing in \( \alpha \).

Let’s recursively construct a sequence \( \phi(n) \) with \( \phi(1) = P_\sigma(x_1 = \theta) \) and, for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[
\phi(n+1) = \phi(n) + \frac{C}{8n} \left(1 - \phi(n)\right)^{K+2}.
\]

Now, we show by induction that

\[
P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq \phi(n).
\]

(4.10)

The relation holds for \( n = 1 \) by construction. Suppose the relation holds for some \( n \). Then,

\[
P_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta) \geq P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) + \frac{C}{8n} \left(1 - P_\sigma(x_n = \theta)\right)^{K+2}
\]

\[
\geq \phi(n) + \frac{C}{8n} \left(1 - \phi(n)\right)^{K+2}
\]

\[
= \phi(n+1).
\]

where the second inequality holds because the right-hand side of Eq. (4.9) is increasing in \( P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \). Therefore, Eq. (4.10) holds for all \( n \).

Let us now define \( \phi(t) \) on non-integer values of \( t \) by linear interpolation of the integer values. That is, for any \( t \in [1, \infty) \),

\[
\phi(t) = \phi([t]) + \frac{C}{8[t]} (t - [t]) \left(1 - \phi([t])\right)^{K+2}.
\]

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Finding such a $\phi$ is equivalent to solving the following differential equation (where derivatives are defined only at non-integer times):

$$\frac{d\phi(t)}{dt} = \frac{C}{8[t]} \left(1 - \phi([t])\right)^{K+2}.$$ 

Let us now construct yet another continuous time function $\tilde{\phi}(t)$ to bound $\phi(t)$. Let $\tilde{\phi}(1) = \phi(1)$ and

$$\frac{d\tilde{\phi}(t)}{dt} = \frac{C}{8t} \left(1 - \tilde{\phi}(t)\right)^{K+2}. \quad (4.11)$$

Note that both $\phi$ and $\tilde{\phi}$ are increasing functions. We now show that

$$\tilde{\phi}(t) \leq \phi(t) \text{ for all } t \in [1, \infty). \quad (4.12)$$

Let $t^*$ be some value such that $\tilde{\phi}(t^*) = \phi(t^*)$. Then, for any $\epsilon \in [0, 1 - (t^* - [t^*])]$,

$$\begin{align*}
\phi(t^* + \epsilon) &= \phi(t^*) + \epsilon \frac{C}{8[t^*]} \left(1 - \phi([t^*])\right)^{K+2} \\
&\geq \phi(t^*) + \epsilon \frac{C}{8t^*} \left(1 - \phi(t^*)\right)^{K+2} \\
&= \tilde{\phi}(t^*) + \epsilon \frac{C}{8t^*} \left(1 - \tilde{\phi}(t^*)\right)^{K+2} \\
&\geq \tilde{\phi}(t^*) + \int_{t^*}^{t^*+\epsilon} \frac{C}{8t} \left(1 - \tilde{\phi}(t)\right)^{K+2} dt \\
&= \tilde{\phi}(t^* + \epsilon),
\end{align*}$$

where the first equality comes from $\phi$'s piecewise linearity, the following inequality from the monotonicity of $\phi$, the second equality from $\tilde{\phi}(t^*) = \phi(t^*)$ and the second inequality from the monotonicity of $\tilde{\phi}$. Therefore, for any $t^*$ such that $\tilde{\phi}(t^*) = \phi(t^*)$, we have that for all $\epsilon \in [0, 1 - (t^* - [t^*])]$, $\tilde{\phi}(t^* + \epsilon) \leq \phi(t^* + \epsilon)$. Hence, $\tilde{\phi}$ does not cross above $\phi$ at any point and, since both functions are continuous, it implies Eq. (4.12) holds.
Combining Eqs. (4.10) and (4.12) we obtain that for any \( n \in \mathbb{N} \),

\[
P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq \phi(n) \geq \tilde{\phi}(n).
\]

Again, we can solve the ODE of Eq. (4.11) exactly and calculate \( \tilde{\phi}(n) \) for every \( n \). The solution is that there exists some other constant \( C \) (which is determined by the boundary value \( P_\sigma(x_1 = \theta) = \tilde{\phi}(1) \)) such that for each \( n \),

\[
\tilde{\phi}(n) = 1 - \left( \frac{1}{8(K+1)C(\log n + C)} \right)^{\frac{1}{K+1}}.
\]

Therefore,

\[
P_\sigma(x_n \neq \theta) \leq \left( \frac{1}{8(K+1)C(\log n + C)} \right)^{\frac{1}{K+1}}
\]

and the desired result follows. ■

4.3 Tightness of the Bounds

This section presents an example of a signal structure that demonstrates a signal structure for which learning with immediate neighbor sampling occurs at a polynomial rate and learning with a random sampling network topology occurs at a logarithmic rate, thus establishing the tightness of Theorems 3 and 4.

Example 2 For each \( n \), let the signal \( s_n \in [0,1] \) be generated by the following signal structure:

\[
F_0(s_n) = 2s_n - s_n^2 \quad \text{and} \quad F_1(s_n) = s_n^2.
\]

Note that \( F_0 \) and \( F_1 \) above are not probability measures, but cumulative distribution functions. In this example, the signals are identical to the private beliefs, i.e., \( p_n(s_n) = \ldots \)
Therefore, the state-conditional distributions of private signals [cf. Eq. (2.8)] are
\[ G_0(r) = 2r - r^2 \quad \text{and} \quad G_1(r) = r^2. \] (4.13)

Therefore, this signal structure has polynomial shape. We now show that under this particular signal structure, for any \( n \),
\[ \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta | B(n + 1) = \{n\}) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) + (1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta))^2. \] (4.14)

From Lemma 4, we obtain a recursion on \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \) that is defined in terms of \( Y_n^\sigma, N_n^\sigma, U_n^\sigma, \) and \( L_n^\sigma \) [cf. Eqs. (3.11) and (3.13)]. Since the signal structure is symmetric, the state-conditional probabilities must be identical, i.e.,
\[ \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta | \theta = 0) = N_n^\sigma = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta | \theta = 1) = Y_n^\sigma, \]
and furthermore, the decision thresholds satisfy
\[ \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = U_n^\sigma = 1 - L_n^\sigma. \]

To simplify the notation, denote \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = z \). The recursion of Lemma 4 can thus be written as
\[ \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta | B(n + 1) = \{n\}) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ G_0(1 - z) + (G_1(z) - G_0(1 - z))z + (1 - G_1(z)) + (G_1(z) - G_1(1 - z))z \right], \]
which reduces to
\[ \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta | B(n + 1) = \{n\}) = z + (1 - z)^2, \]
once we replace \( G_0 \) and \( G_1 \) according to Eq. (4.13), thus proving Eq. (4.14). Using an ODE bound similar to the proof method of Theorems 3 and 4, we obtain that the probability \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \) can be approximated by \( w(t) \) in the immediate neighbor sampling case \( B(n) = \{n - 1\} \) and
\[
\frac{dw(t)}{dt} = (1 - w(t))^2.
\]
Solving this ODE yields that for some constant \( C \),
\[
w(t) = 1 - \frac{1}{t + C}.
\]
Thus, \( 1 - w(t) = \Theta(t^{-1}) \), which implies that
\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n \neq \theta) = \Theta(n^{-1}).
\]
For the random sampling case, the ODE that bounds the probability of optimal decision is
\[
\frac{dw(t)}{dt} = \frac{(1 - w(t))^2}{t}.
\]
Solving this ODE we obtain that for some constant \( C \),
\[
w(t) = 1 - \frac{1}{\log(t) + C}
\]
and thus obtain
\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n \neq \theta) = \Theta((\log n)^{-1}).
\]
Therefore, we conclude that learning is significantly slower with random sampling than with immediate neighbor sampling, at least for signal structures with polynomial shape.
Chapter 5

The Case of Bounded Private Beliefs

In this chapter, we show that for several families of network topologies, asymptotic learning does not occur under bounded private beliefs. We also show that, surprisingly, learning occurs in a class of stochastically-generated social networks where infinitely many agents observe the actions of a set of neighbors that is not sufficiently persuasive.

5.1 No Learning under Bounded Private Beliefs

In the full observation network topology, bounded beliefs imply lack of asymptotic learning. One might thus expect a converse to Theorem 2, whereby asymptotic learning fails whenever signals are bounded. Under general network topologies, learning dynamics turn out to be more interesting and richer. The next theorem provides a partial converse to Theorem 2 and shows that for a wide range of deterministic and stochastic network topologies, bounded beliefs imply no asymptotic learning.

**Theorem 5** Assume that the signal structure \((\mathcal{F}_0, \mathcal{F}_1)\) has bounded private beliefs. If the network topology \(\{Q_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}\) satisfies one of the following conditions,

(a) \(B(n) = \{1, \ldots, n-1\}\) for all \(n\),
(b) \(|B(n)| \leq 1\) for all \(n\), or

(c) there exists some constant \(M\) such that \(|B(n)| \leq M\) for all \(n\) and

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \max_{b \in B(n)} b = \infty \quad \text{with probability } 1,
\]

then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium \(\sigma \in \Sigma\).

This theorem implies that in most common deterministic and stochastic network topologies, bounded private beliefs imply lack of asymptotic learning. The three parts of Theorem 5 are discussed and proved separately as propositions. Although Part (a) of this theorem is already proved by Smith and Sorensen (2000), we provide an alternative proof that highlights the importance of the concepts emphasized here.

The next proposition states the result corresponding to part (a) of Theorem 5.

**Proposition 6** Assume that the signal structure \((\mathbb{F}_0, \mathbb{F}_1)\) has bounded private beliefs and \(B(n) = \{1, \ldots, n - 1\}\) for all \(n\). Then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium.

**Proof.** The proof consists of two steps. We first show that the lower and upper supports of the social belief \(q_n = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_1, \ldots, x_{n-1})\) are bounded away from 0 and 1. We next show that this implies that \(x_n\) does not converge to \(\theta\) in probability.

Let \(x^{n-1} = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n-1})\) denote the sequence of decisions up to and including \(n - 1\). Let \(\varphi_{\sigma,x^{n-1}}(q_n, x_n)\) represent the social belief \(q_{n+1}\) given the social belief \(q_n\) and the decision \(x_n\), for a given strategy \(\sigma\) and decisions \(x^{n-1}\). We use Bayes’ Rule to determine the dynamics of the social belief. For any \(x^{n-1}\) compatible with \(q_n\), and \(x_n = \bar{x}\) with
\[ \bar{x} \in \{0, 1\}, \] we have

\[
\varphi_{\sigma,x^{n-1}}(q_n, \bar{x}) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x_n = \bar{x}, q_n, x^{n-1}) = \left[ 1 + \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \bar{x}, q_n, x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \bar{x}, q_n, x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \right]^{-1}
\]

\[
= \left[ 1 + \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(q_n, x^{n-1} \mid \theta = 0) \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \bar{x} \mid q_n, x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(q_n, x^{n-1} \mid \theta = 1) \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \bar{x} \mid q_n, x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \right]^{-1}
\]

\[
= \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q_n} - 1 \right) \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \bar{x} \mid q_n, x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \bar{x} \mid q_n, x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \right]^{-1}.
\] (5.1)

Let \( \alpha_{\sigma,x^{n-1}} \) denote the probability that agent \( n \) chooses \( x = 0 \) in equilibrium \( \sigma \) when he observes history \( x^{n-1} \) and is indifferent between the two actions. Let

\[
\mathbb{G}_j^- (r) = \lim_{s \to r} \mathbb{G}_j (s),
\]

for any \( r \in [0, 1] \) and any \( j \in \{0, 1\} \). Then, for any \( j \in \{0, 1\} \),

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = 0 \mid q_n, x^{n-1}, \theta = j) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(p_n < 1 - q_n \mid q_n, \theta = j)
\]

\[
+ \alpha_{\sigma,x^{n-1}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(p_n = 1 - q_n \mid q_n, \theta = j)
\]

\[
= \mathbb{G}_j^- (1 - q_n) + \alpha_{\sigma,x^{n-1}} \left[ \mathbb{G}_j (1 - q_n) - \mathbb{G}_j^- (1 - q_n) \right].
\]

From Lemma 3(a), \( d\mathbb{G}_0 / d\mathbb{G}_1 (r) = (1 - r) / r \) for all \( r \in [0, 1] \). Therefore,

\[
\frac{1 - r}{r} \leq \frac{\mathbb{G}_0 (r)}{\mathbb{G}_1 (r)}, \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\mathbb{G}_0^- (r)}{\mathbb{G}_1^- (r)} \leq \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta}.
\]

Hence, for any \( \alpha_{\sigma,x^{n-1}} \),

\[
\frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = 0 \mid q_n, x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = 0 \mid q_n, x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} = \frac{\mathbb{G}_0^- (1 - q_n) + \alpha_{\sigma,x^{n-1}} \left[ \mathbb{G}_0 (1 - q_n) - \mathbb{G}_0^- (1 - q_n) \right]}{\mathbb{G}_1^- (1 - q_n) + \alpha_{\sigma,x^{n-1}} \left[ \mathbb{G}_1 (1 - q_n) - \mathbb{G}_0^- (1 - q_n) \right]}
\]

\[
\in \left[ \frac{q_n}{1 - q_n}, \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \right].
\]
Combining this with Eq. (5.1), we obtain

\[
\varphi_{\sigma,x^{n-1}}(q_n, 0) \in \left[ \left( 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q_n} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{1}{\beta} \right) \right)^{-1}, \left( 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q_n} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{q_n}{1-q_n} \right) \right)^{-1} \right] \\
= \left[ \frac{\beta q_n}{1 - \beta - q_n + 2\beta q_n}, \frac{1}{2} \right]
\]

Note that \( \frac{\beta q_n}{1 - \beta - q_n + 2\beta q_n} \) is an increasing function of \( q_n \) and if \( q_n \in [1 - \bar{\beta}, 1 - \underline{\beta}] \), then this function is minimized at \( 1 - \bar{\beta} \). This implies that

\[
\varphi_{\sigma,x^{n-1}}(q_n, 0) \in \left[ \frac{\beta(1 - \bar{\beta})}{-\bar{\beta} + \bar{\beta} + 2\beta(1 - \bar{\beta})}, \frac{1}{2} \right] = \left[ \frac{\Delta}{2} \right],
\]

where \( \Delta \) is a constant strictly greater than 0. An analogous argument for \( x_n = 1 \) establishes that there exists some \( \bar{\Delta} < 1 \) such that if \( q_n \in [1 - \bar{\beta}, 1 - \underline{\beta}] \), then

\[
\varphi_{\sigma,x^{n-1}}(q_n, 1) \in \left[ \frac{1}{2}, \bar{\Delta} \right].
\]

We next show that \( q_n \in [\Delta, \bar{\Delta}] \) for all \( n \). Suppose this is not true. Let \( N \) be the first agent such that

\[
q_N \in [0, \Delta) \cup (\bar{\Delta}, 1]
\]

in some equilibrium and some realized history. Then, \( q_{N-1} \in [0, 1 - \bar{\beta}) \cup (1 - \beta, 1] \) because otherwise, the dynamics of \( q_n \) implies a violation of Eq. (5.2) for any \( x_{N-1} \). But note that if \( q_{N-1} < 1 - \bar{\beta} \), then by Lemma 1 agent \( N - 1 \) chooses action \( x_{N-1} = 0 \) and, thus by Eq. (5.1),

\[
q_N = \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q_{N-1}} - 1 \right) \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{N-1} = 0 \mid q_{N-1}, x^{N-2}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{N-1} = 0 \mid q_{N-1}, x^{N-2}, \theta = 1)} \right]^{-1} \\
= \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q_{N-1}} - 1 \right) \frac{1}{1} \right]^{-1} \\
= \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1}{q_{N-1}}}.
\]
By the same argument, if \( q_{N-1} > 1 - \beta \), we have that \( q_N = q_{N-1} \). Therefore, \( q_N = q_{N-1} \), which contradicts the fact that \( N \) is the first agent that satisfies Eq. (5.2).

We next show that \( q_n \in [\Delta, \overline{\Delta}] \) for all \( n \) implies that \( x_n \) does not converge in probability to \( \theta \). Let \( y_k \) denote a realization of \( x_k \). Then, for any \( n \) and any sequence of \( y_k \)'s, we have
\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1, x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \leq n) \leq \overline{\Delta}\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \leq n),
\]
\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 0, x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \leq n) \leq (1 - \Delta)\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \leq n).
\]
By summing the preceding relations over all \( y_k \) for \( k < n \), we obtain
\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1, x_n = 1) \leq \overline{\Delta}\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = 1) \text{ and } \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 0, x_n = 0) \leq (1 - \Delta)\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = 0).
\]
Therefore, for any \( n \), we have
\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \leq \overline{\Delta}\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = 1) + (1 - \Delta)\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = 0) \leq \max\{\overline{\Delta}, 1 - \Delta\} < 1,
\]
which completes the proof. \( \square \)

Briefly, this result follows by showing that under bounded private beliefs there exist \( 0 < \underline{\Delta} < \overline{\Delta} < 1 \) such that the social belief of each agent belongs to the interval \([\Delta, \overline{\Delta}]\). This establishes that either individuals always make use of their own signals in taking their actions, leading to a positive probability of a mistake, or individuals follow a potentially incorrect social belief.

The next proposition shows that asymptotic learning fails when each individual observes the action of at most one agent from the past.

**Proposition 7** Assume that the signal structure \((\mathbb{F}_0, \mathbb{F}_1)\) has bounded private beliefs and \(|B(n)| \leq 1 \) for all \( n \). Then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium.

**Proof.** The first step is the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Let $B(n) = \{b\}$ for some $n$. We define

$$f(\underline{}; \bar{}; \bar{}) = \max \left\{ 1 - \frac{\underline{\beta}}{2(1 - \bar{}; \beta)}; \frac{3}{2} - \frac{1}{2\bar{}; \beta} \right\},$$

(5.3)

where $\bar{}$ and $\underline{}$ are the lower and upper supports of the private beliefs (cf. Definition 5). Let $\sigma$ be an equilibrium. Assume that $P_\sigma(x_b = \theta) \leq f(\underline{}; \bar{}; \bar{})$. Then, we have

$$P_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \{b\}) \leq f(\underline{}; \bar{}; \bar{}).$$

Proof. We first assume that $P_\sigma(x_b = \theta) = f(\underline{}; \bar{}; \bar{})$ and show that this implies

$$U_\sigma \geq \beta, \quad \text{and} \quad L_\sigma \leq \beta,$$

(5.4)

where $U_\sigma$ and $L_\sigma$ are defined in Eq. (3.13). We can rewrite $U_\sigma$ as

$$U_\sigma = \frac{N_\sigma}{1 - 2P_\sigma(x_b = \theta) + 2N_\sigma} = \frac{N_\sigma}{1 - 2f(\underline{}; \bar{}; \bar{}) + 2N_\sigma}.$$

This is a decreasing function of $N_\sigma$ and, therefore,

$$U_\sigma \geq \frac{1}{1 - 2f(\underline{}; \bar{}; \bar{}) + 2}.$$

Using $f(\underline{}; \bar{}; \bar{}) \geq \frac{3}{2} - \frac{1}{2\bar{}; \beta}$, the preceding relation implies $U_\sigma \geq \beta$. An analogous argument shows that $L_\sigma \leq \beta$.

Since the support of the private beliefs is $[\underline{}; \bar{}; \bar{}; ]$, using Lemma 3 and Eq. (5.4), there exists an equilibrium $\sigma' = (\sigma'_n, \sigma_{-n})$ such that $x_n = x_b$ with probability one (with respect to measure $P_{\sigma'}$). Since this gives an expected payoff $P_{\sigma'}(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = b) = P_{\sigma}(x_b = \theta)$, it follows that, $P_{\sigma}(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = b) = P_{\sigma}(x_b = \theta)$. This establishes the claim that

if $P_{\sigma}(x_b = \theta) = f(\underline{}; \bar{}; \bar{})$, then

$$P_{\sigma}(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \{b\}) = f(\underline{}; \bar{}; \bar{}).$$

(5.5)
We next assume that $P_{\sigma}(x_b = \theta) < f(\beta, \bar{\beta})$. To arrive at a contradiction, suppose that
\begin{equation}
P_{\sigma}(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \{b\}) > f(\beta, \bar{\beta}). \tag{5.6}
\end{equation}
Now consider a hypothetical situation where agent $n$ observes a private signal generated with conditional probabilities $(F_0, F_1)$ and a coarser version of the observation $x_b$, i.e., the random variable $\tilde{x}_b$ distributed according to
\begin{align*}
P(\tilde{x}_b = 1 \mid \theta = 1) &= 1 - Y^\sigma_b \left[ \frac{1 - f(\beta, \bar{\beta})}{P_{\sigma}(x_b = \theta)} \right] \quad \text{and} \quad P(\tilde{x}_b = 0 \mid \theta = 0) = 1 - N^\sigma_b \left[ \frac{1 - f(\beta, \bar{\beta})}{P_{\sigma}(x_b = \theta)} \right].
\end{align*}
It follows from the preceding conditional probabilities that $P(\tilde{x}_b = \theta) = f(\beta, \bar{\beta})$. We assume that agent $n$ uses the equilibrium strategy $\sigma_n$. Using a similar argument as in the proof of Eq. (5.5), this implies that
\begin{equation}
P(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \{b\}) = f(\beta, \bar{\beta}). \tag{5.7}
\end{equation}
Let $z$ be a binary random variable with values $\{0, 1\}$ and is generated independent of $\theta$ with probabilities
\begin{align*}
P(z = 1) &= 1 - \frac{2Y^\sigma_b}{P_{\sigma}(x_b = \theta)} \quad \text{and} \quad P(z = 0) = 1 - \frac{2N^\sigma_b}{P_{\sigma}(x_b = \theta)}.
\end{align*}
This implies that $P(z = j \mid \theta = j) = P(z = j)$ for $j \in \{0, 1\}$. Using $\tilde{x}_b$ with probability $\frac{1}{1 + f(\beta, \bar{\beta})} \left[ 2 + \frac{(Y^\sigma_b - 1)P_{\sigma}(x_b = \theta)}{Y^\sigma_b} \right]$ and $z$ otherwise generates the original observation (random variable) $x_b$. Therefore, from Eq. (5.6), $P(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \{b\}) > f(\beta, \bar{\beta})$, which contradicts Eq. (5.7), and completes the proof. \hfill \blacksquare

Let $f$ be defined in Eq. (5.3). We show by induction that
\begin{equation}
P_{\sigma}(x_n = \theta) \leq f(\beta, \bar{\beta}) \quad \text{for all } n. \tag{5.8}
\end{equation}
Suppose that for all agents up to \( n - 1 \) the preceding inequality holds. Since \(|B(n)| \leq 1\), we have

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \emptyset)\mathbb{Q}_n(B(n) = \emptyset) + \sum_{b=1}^{n-1} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = b)\mathbb{Q}_n(B(n) = \{b\}) \\
\leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \emptyset)\mathbb{Q}_n(B(n) = \emptyset) + \sum_{b=1}^{n-1} f(\hat{\beta}, \bar{\beta})\mathbb{Q}_n(B(n) = \{b\}),
\]

where the inequality follows from the induction hypothesis and Lemma 9. Note that having \( B(n) = \emptyset \) is equivalent to observing a decision \( b \) such that \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_b = \theta) = 1/2 \). Since \( 1/2 \leq f(\hat{\beta}, \bar{\beta}) \), Lemma 9 implies that \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid B(n) = \emptyset) \leq f(\hat{\beta}, \bar{\beta}) \). Combined with Eq. (5.9), this completes the induction.

Since the private beliefs are bounded, i.e., \( \hat{\beta} > 0 \) and \( \bar{\beta} < 1 \), we have \( f(\hat{\beta}, \bar{\beta}) < 1 \) [cf. Eq. (5.3)]. Combined with Eq. (5.8), this establishes that \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) < 1 \), showing that asymptotic learning does not occur at any equilibrium \( \sigma \).

The proof of the result above follows by establishing an upper bound on the amount of improvement in the ex ante probability of the correct action, hence providing a converse to the Strong Improvement Principle (cf. Propositions 4 and 5). Under bounded private beliefs, this upper bound is uniformly bounded away from 1, establishing no learning.

Finally, the following proposition establishes Part (c) of Theorem 5.

Proposition 8 Assume that the signal structure \((\mathbb{F}_0, \mathbb{F}_1)\) has bounded private beliefs. Assume that there exists some constant \( M \) such that \(|B(n)| \leq M\) for all \( n \) and

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \max_{b \in B(n)} b = \infty \quad \text{with probability 1.}
\]

Then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium.

Proof. We start with the following lemma, which will be used subsequently in the proof.
Lemma 10 Assume that asymptotic learning occurs in some equilibrium $\sigma$, i.e., we have $\lim_{n \to \infty} P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = 1$. For some constant $K$, let $D$ be the set of all subsets of $\{1, ..., K\}$. Then,

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \min_{D \in D} P_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in D) = 1.$$ 

Proof. First note that since the event $x_k = 1$ for all $k \leq K$ is the intersection of events $x_k = 1$ for each $k \leq K$,

$$\min_{D \in D} P_\sigma(x_k = 1, \ k \in D) = P_\sigma(x_k = 1, \ k \leq K).$$

Let $\Delta = P_\sigma(x_k = 1, \ k \leq K)$. Fix some $\tilde{D} \in D$. Then,

$$P_\sigma(x_k = 1, \ k \in \tilde{D}) \geq \Delta > 0,$$

where the second inequality follows from the fact that there is a positive probability of the first $K$ agents choosing $x_n = 1$. Let $A = \{0, 1\}^{\lvert \tilde{D} \rvert}$, i.e., $A$ is the set of all possible actions for the set of agents $\tilde{D}$. Then,

$$P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = \sum_{a_k \in A} P_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid x_k = a_k, \ k \in \tilde{D})P_\sigma(x_k = a_k, \ k \in \tilde{D}).$$

Since $P_\sigma(x_n = \theta)$ converges to 1 and all elements in the sequence $P_\sigma(x_k = 1, \ k \in \tilde{D})$ are greater than or equal to $\Delta > 0$, it follows that the sequence $P_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in \tilde{D})$ also converges to 1. Hence, for each $\epsilon > 0$, there exists some $N_\epsilon(\tilde{D})$ such that for all $n \geq N_\epsilon(\tilde{D})$,

$$P_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in \tilde{D}) \geq 1 - \epsilon.$$

Therefore, for any $\epsilon > 0$,

$$\min_{D \in D} P_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in D) \geq 1 - \epsilon \quad \text{for all} \quad n \geq \max_{D \in D} N_\epsilon(D),$$

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thus completing the proof. ■

**Proof of Proposition 8.** To arrive at a contradiction, we assume that in some equilibrium \( \sigma \in \Sigma^* \), \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = 1 \). The key part of the proof is to show that this implies

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in B(n)) = 1.
\] (5.10)

To prove this claim, we show that for any \( \epsilon > 0 \), there exists some \( \tilde{K}(\epsilon) \) such that for any neighborhood \( \mathfrak{B} \) with \( |\mathfrak{B}| \leq M \) and \( \max_{b \in \mathfrak{B}} b \geq \tilde{K}(\epsilon) \) we have

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in \mathfrak{B}) \geq 1 - \epsilon.
\] (5.11)

In view of the assumption that \( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \) converges to infinity with probability 1, this implies the desired claim (5.10).

For a fixed \( \epsilon > 0 \), we define \( \tilde{K}(\epsilon) \) as follows: We recursively construct \( M \) thresholds \( K_0 < \ldots < K_{M-1} \) and let \( \tilde{K}(\epsilon) = K_{M-1} \). We consider an arbitrary neighborhood \( \mathfrak{B} \) with \( |\mathfrak{B}| \leq M \) and \( \max_{b \in \mathfrak{B}} b \geq \tilde{K}(\epsilon) \), and for each \( d \in \{0, \ldots, M-1\} \), define the sets

\[
\mathfrak{B}_d = \{b \in \mathfrak{B} : b \geq K_d\} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathfrak{C}_d = \{b \in \mathfrak{B} : b < K_{d-1}\},
\]

where \( \mathfrak{C}_0 = \emptyset \). With this construction, it follows that there exists at least one \( d \in \{0, \ldots, M-1\} \) such that \( \mathfrak{B} = \mathfrak{B}_d \cup \mathfrak{C}_d \), in which case we say \( \mathfrak{B} \) is of type \( d \). We show below that for any \( \mathfrak{B} \) of type \( d \), we have

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in \mathfrak{B}_d \cup \mathfrak{C}_d) \geq 1 - \epsilon,
\] (5.12)

which implies the relation in (5.11).
We first define $K_0$ and show that for any $\mathcal{B}$ of type 0, relation (5.12) holds. Since $\lim_{n \to \infty} \Pr(\sigma(x_n = \theta) = 1$ by assumption, there exists some $N_0$ such that for all $n \geq N_0$,

$$\Pr(\sigma(x_n = \theta) \geq 1 - \frac{\epsilon}{2M}.$$ 

Let $K_0 = N_0$. Let $\mathcal{B}$ be a neighborhood of type 0, implying that $\mathcal{B} = \mathcal{B}_0$ and all elements $b \in \mathcal{B}_0$ satisfy $b \geq K_0$. By using a union bound, the preceding inequality implies

$$\Pr(\sigma(x_k = \theta, k \in \mathcal{B}_0) \geq 1 - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{B}_0} \Pr(\sigma(x_k \neq \theta)) \geq 1 - \frac{\epsilon}{2}.$$ 

Hence, we have

$$\Pr(\sigma(x_k = \theta, k \in \mathcal{B}_0 | \theta = 1) \frac{1}{2} + \Pr(\sigma(x_k = \theta, k \in \mathcal{B}_0 | \theta = 0) \frac{1}{2} \geq 1 - \frac{\epsilon}{2},$$

and for any $j \in \{0, 1\}$,

$$\Pr(\sigma(x_k = \theta, k \in \mathcal{B}_0 | \theta = j) \geq 1 - \epsilon. \quad (5.13)$$

Therefore, for any such $\mathcal{B}_0$,

$$\Pr(\sigma(\theta = 1 | x_k = 1, k \in \mathcal{B}_0) = \left[1 + \frac{\Pr(\sigma(x_k = 1, k \in \mathcal{B}_0 | \theta = 0)\Pr(\sigma(\theta = 0))}{\Pr(\sigma(x_k = 1, k \in \mathcal{B}_0 | \theta = 1)\Pr(\sigma(\theta = 1))}\right]^{-1}$$

$$\geq \left[1 + \frac{\epsilon}{1 - \epsilon}\right]^{-1} = 1 - \epsilon,$$

showing that relation (5.12) holds for any $\mathcal{B}$ of type 0.

We proceed recursively, i.e., given $K_{d-1}$ we define $K_d$ and show that relation (5.12) holds for any neighborhood $\mathcal{B}$ of type $d$. Lemma 10 implies that

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \min_{D \subseteq \{1, \ldots, K_{d-1} - 1\}} \Pr(\sigma(x_n = \theta | x_k = 1, k \in D) = 1.$$
Therefore, for any $\delta > 0$, there exists some $K_d$ such that for all $n \geq K_d$,

$$\min_{D \subseteq \{1, \ldots, K_{d-1}\}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in D) \geq 1 - \delta \epsilon.$$ 

From the equation above and definition of $C_d$ it follows that for any $C_d$,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in C_d) \geq 1 - \delta \epsilon.$$ 

By a union bound,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_k = \theta, \ k \in B_d \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in C_d) \geq 1 - \sum_{k \in B_d} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_k \neq \theta \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in C_d) \geq 1 - (M - d) \delta \epsilon.$$ 

Repeating the argument from Eq. (5.13), for any $j \in \{0, 1\}$,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_k = \theta, \ k \in B_d \mid \theta = j, x_k = 1, \ k \in C_d) \geq 1 - \frac{(M - d) \delta \epsilon}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = j \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in C_d)}.$$ 

Hence, for any such $B_d$,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in B_d \cup C_d) \geq 1 - \frac{(M - d) \delta \epsilon}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in B_d \cup C_d)}.$$ 

Choosing

$$\delta = \left(\frac{1}{M - d}\right) \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in C_d) \min_{D \subseteq \{1, \ldots, K_{d-1}\}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in D),$$
we obtain that for any neighborhood $\mathcal{B}$ of type $d$

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in \mathcal{B}_d \cup \mathcal{C}_d) \geq 1 - \epsilon.$$ 

This proves that Eq. (5.12) holds for any neighborhood $\mathcal{B}$ of type $d$, and completing the proof of Eq. (5.11) and therefore of Eq. (5.10).

Since the private beliefs are bounded, we have $\beta > 0$. By Eq. (5.10), there exists some $\overline{N}$ such that

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in B(n)) \geq 1 - \frac{\beta}{2} \quad \text{for all } n \geq \overline{N}.$$ 

Suppose the first $\overline{N}$ agents choose 1, i.e., $x_k = 1$ for all $k \leq \overline{N}$, which is an event with positive probability for any state of the world $\theta$. We now prove inductively that this event implies that $x_n = 1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Suppose it holds for some $n \geq \overline{N}$. Then, by Eq. (5.11),

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid s_{n+1}) + \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x_k = 1, \ k \in B(n + 1)) \geq \frac{\beta}{2} + 1 - \frac{\beta}{2} > 1.$$ 

By Lemma 1, this implies that $x_{n+1} = 1$. Hence, we conclude there is a positive probability $x_n = 1$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ in any state of the world, contradicting $\lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = 1$, and completing the proof. ■

The following corollary illustrates an implication of Theorem 5. It shows that, when private beliefs are bounded, there will be no asymptotic learning (in any equilibrium) in stochastic networks with random sampling.

**Corollary 3** Assume that the signal structure $(\mathbb{F}_0, \mathbb{F}_1)$ has bounded private beliefs. Assume that each agent $n$ samples $M$ agents uniformly and independently among $\{1, \ldots, n - 1\}$, for some $M \geq 1$. Then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$. 

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Proof. For $M = 1$, the result follows from Theorem 5 part (b). For $M \geq 2$, we show that, under the assumption on the network topology, $\max_{b \in B(n)} b$ goes to infinity with probability one. To arrive at a contradiction, suppose this is not true. Then, there exists some $K \in \mathbb{N}$ and scalar $\epsilon > 0$ such that

$$Q \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \leq K \text{ for infinitely many } n \right) \geq \epsilon.$$

By the Borel-Cantelli Lemma (see, e.g., Breiman, Lemma 3.14, p. 41), this implies that

$$\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \leq K \right) = \infty.$$

Since the samples are all uniformly drawn and independent, for all $n \geq 2$,

$$Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \leq K \right) = \left( \frac{\min\{K, n-1\}}{n-1} \right)^M.$$

Therefore,

$$\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} Q_n \left( \max_{b \in B(n)} b \leq K \right) = 1 + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \left( \frac{\min\{K, n-1\}}{n} \right)^M \leq 1 + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \left( \frac{K}{n} \right)^M < \infty,$$

where the last inequality holds since $M \geq 2$. Hence, we obtain a contradiction. The result follows by using Theorem 5 part (c). ■

5.2 Learning under Bounded Private Beliefs

We next show that with general stochastic topologies asymptotic learning is possible even under bounded private beliefs. Let us first define the notion of a nonpersuasive neighborhood.

**Definition 9** A finite set $B \subset \mathbb{N}$ is a nonpersuasive neighborhood in equilibrium.
\[ \sigma \in \Sigma^* \text{ if} \]
\[ \Pr_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \in B) \in \left(1 - \beta, 1 - \beta \right) \]

for any set of values \( y_k \in \{0, 1\} \) for each \( k \). We denote the set of all nonpersuasive neighborhoods by \( \mathcal{U}_\sigma \).

A neighborhood \( B \) is nonpersuasive in equilibrium \( \sigma \in \Sigma^* \) if for any set of decisions that agent \( n \) observes, his behavior still depends on her private signal. A nonpersuasive neighborhood is defined with respect to a particular equilibrium. However, it is straightforward to see that \( B = \emptyset \), i.e., the empty neighborhood, is nonpersuasive in any equilibrium. The following two propositions present two classes of nonpersuasive neighborhoods.

**Proposition 9** Let \((G_0, G_1)\) be private belief distributions. Assume that the first \( K \) agents have empty neighborhoods, i.e., \( B(n) = \emptyset \) for all \( n \leq K \), and \( K \) satisfies

\[ K < \min \left\{ \frac{\log \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \right)}{\log \left( \frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)} \right)}, \frac{\log \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \right)}{\log \left( \frac{1 - G_0(1/2)}{1 - G_1(1/2)} \right)} \right\}. \tag{5.14} \]

Then any subset \( B \subseteq \{1, 2, \ldots, K\} \) is a nonpersuasive neighborhood.

**Proof.** For simplicity, we assume in this proof that all agents break ties in favor of action 0. Relaxing this assumption does not change the result but requires more notation. Using Bayes’ Rule and the assumption of equal priors on the state \( \theta \), we have that the social belief given by observing neighborhood \( B \), with actions \( x_k = y_k \) for each \( k \in B \) in equilibrium \( \sigma \) is given by

\[ \Pr_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \in B) = \left(1 + \frac{\Pr_\sigma(x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \in B|\theta = 0)}{\Pr_\sigma(x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \in B|\theta = 1)} \right)^{-1}. \tag{5.15} \]
Since the neighborhoods of the agents in $B$ are all empty, their actions are independent conditional on the state $\theta$. Hence,

$$P_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \in B) = \left(1 + \frac{\prod_{k \in B} P_\sigma(x_k = y_k|\theta = 0)}{\prod_{k \in B} P_\sigma(x_k = y_k|\theta = 1)}\right)^{-1}.$$ 

Given the assumption that all agents break ties in favor of action 0, we can obtain that for each agent $n$ with an empty neighborhood, and each $j \in \{0, 1\}$,

$$P_\sigma(x_1 = 0|\theta = j) = G_j(1/2) \quad \text{and} \quad P_\sigma(x_1 = 1|\theta = j) = 1 - G_j(1/2).$$ 

Therefore, the social belief of Eq. (5.15) can be rewritten as

$$P_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \in B) = \left(1 + \frac{(1 - G_0(1/2))\sum_{k \in B} y_k G_0(1/2)|B| - \sum_{k \in B} y_k}{(1 - G_1(1/2))\sum_{k \in B} y_k G_1(1/2)|B| - \sum_{k \in B} y_k}\right)^{-1}. \quad (5.16)$$

From Lemma 3(c), we have that

$$\frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)} > 1 > \frac{1 - G_0(1/2)}{1 - G_1(1/2)},$$

which combined with Eq. (5.16) implies

$$\min_{B \subseteq \{1, ..., K\}, \{y_k\}_{k \leq K} \in \{0, 1\}^K} P_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \in B) = P_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k = 0 \text{ for all } k \in \{1, ..., K\}) = \left(1 + \frac{G_0(1/2)^K}{G_1(1/2)^K}\right)^{-1} \quad \text{and}$$

$$\max_{B \subseteq \{1, ..., K\}, \{y_k\}_{k \leq K} \in \{0, 1\}^K} P_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \in B) = P_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k = 1 \text{ for all } k \in \{1, ..., K\}) = \left(1 + \frac{(1 - G_0(1/2))^K}{(1 - G_1(1/2))^K}\right)^{-1}.$$

Therefore, any such neighborhood $B \subseteq \{1, ..., K\}$ is nonpersuasive if it satisfies the conditions

$$\left(1 + \frac{G_0(1/2)^K}{G_1(1/2)^K}\right)^{-1} > 1 - \overline{\beta} \quad \text{and} \quad \left(1 + \frac{(1 - G_0(1/2))^K}{(1 - G_1(1/2))^K}\right)^{-1} < 1 - \beta,$$ \quad (5.17)
which together yield Eq. (5.14). □

To understand the inequality in Eq. (5.14) it is easier to consider the rearranged, but equivalent, the pair of inequalities in Eq. (5.17). The factor of $(1 - (G_0(1/2)/G_1(1/2))^K)^{-1}$ represents the probability that the state $\theta$ is equal to 1 conditional on $K$ agents independently selecting action 0. For such a neighborhood of $K$ agents acting independently to be nonpersuasive, there must exist a signal strong enough in favor of state 1 such that an agent would select action 1 after observing $K$ independent agents choosing 0. From Lemma 1, we know this is possible if $(1 - (G_0(1/2)/G_1(1/2))^K)^{-1} + \bar{\beta} > 1$. Repeat the same argument for action 0 to obtain the second inequality in Eq. (5.17).

**Proposition 10** Let $(G_0, G_1)$ be private belief distributions. Assume that the first $K$ agents observe the full history of past actions, i.e., $B(n) = \{1, ..., n-1\}$ for all $n \leq K$, and $K$ satisfies

$$K < \min \left\{ \log \left( \frac{\bar{\beta}}{1-\bar{\beta}} \right), \log \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \right) \right\}. \tag{5.18}$$

Assume also that the private belief distributions $(G_0, G_1)$ satisfy the following monotonicity conditions: the functions

$$\left( \frac{1}{q} - 1 \right) \frac{G_0(1-q)}{G_1(1-q)} \quad \text{and} \quad \left( \frac{1}{q} - 1 \right) \frac{1-G_0(1-q)}{1-G_1(1-q)} \tag{5.19}$$

are both nonincreasing in $q$. Then any subset $B \subseteq \{1, 2, ..., K\}$ is a nonpersuasive neighborhood.

**Proof.** As in the previous proposition, we assume in this proof for simplicity, and without loss of generality, that all agents break ties in favor of action 0. We start by showing inductively that all networks of the form $\{1, ..., n\}$ for any $n \leq K$ are nonpersuasive. In particular, we first show that for all $n \leq K$, and any set of values
$y_k \in \{0, 1\}$ for each $k \leq n$,

$$
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \leq n) \geq \left(1 + \left(\frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)}\right)^n\right)^{-1}.
$$

(5.20)

The upper bound on $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \leq n)$ is symmetric and we do not prove it to avoid repetition.

Note that Eq. (5.20) is trivially true for $n = 0$, i.e., $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1) = 1/2$. Assume that Eq. (5.20) is true for $n - 1$ as an inductive hypothesis. We now show it is true for $n$.

Let the social belief given the neighborhood $\{1, ..., n\}$ and decisions $y^n = (y_1, ..., y_n)$ be given by $q^*(y^n) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \leq n)$. Then, using Bayes’ Rule, we obtain that

$$
\frac{1}{q^*(y^n)} - 1 = \left(\frac{1}{q^*(y^{n-1})} - 1\right) \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = y_n|\theta = 0, x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \leq n - 1) \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = y_n|\theta = 1, x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \leq n - 1).
$$

Since agent $n$ observes the full history of past actions and breaks ties in favor of action $0$, we have

$$
\frac{1}{q^*(y^n)} - 1 = \begin{cases} 
\left(\frac{1}{q^*(y^{n-1})} - 1\right) \frac{1-G_0(1-q^*(y^{n-1}))}{1-G_1(1-q^*(y^{n-1}))}, & \text{if } y_n = 1; \\
\left(\frac{1}{q^*(y^{n-1})} - 1\right) \frac{G_0(1-q^*(y^{n-1}))}{G_1(1-q^*(y^{n-1}))}, & \text{if } y_n = 0.
\end{cases}
$$

If $y_n = 1$, then $q^*(y^n) \geq q^*(y^{n-1})$ because

$$
\frac{1 - G_0(1-r)}{1 - G_1(1-r)} \leq 1 \text{ for any } r \geq \beta,
$$

by Lemma 3(c). Using the inductive hypothesis,

$$
q^*(y^n) \geq q^*(y^{n-1}) \geq \left(1 + \left(\frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)}\right)^{n-1}\right)^{-1} \geq \left(1 + \left(\frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)}\right)^n\right)^{-1},
$$

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thus proving Eq. (5.20) for \( y_n = 1 \). If \( y_n = 0 \), then we need to consider two separate cases. Suppose first \( q^*(y^{n-1}) < 1/2 \). Then, by Lemma 3(c), we have that

\[
\frac{\mathcal{G}_0(1 - q^*(y^{n-1}))}{\mathcal{G}_1(1 - q^*(y^{n-1}))} \leq \frac{\mathcal{G}_0(1/2)}{\mathcal{G}_1(1/2)}.
\]

Combining the relation above with the inductive hypothesis, we obtain

\[
\left(\frac{1}{q^*(y^{n-1})} - 1\right) \frac{\mathcal{G}_0(1 - q^*(y^{n-1}))}{\mathcal{G}_1(1 - q^*(y^{n-1}))} \leq \left(\frac{1}{q^*(y^{n-1})} - 1\right) \frac{\mathcal{G}_0(1/2)}{\mathcal{G}_1(1/2)} \leq \left(\frac{\mathcal{G}_0(1/2)}{\mathcal{G}_1(1/2)}\right)^n,
\]

thus proving that Eq. (5.20) holds in this case as well. Finally, consider the case where \( q^*(y^{n-1}) \geq 1/2 \). Here, we use the monotonicity assumption from Eq. (5.19) to show that

\[
\frac{1}{q^*(y^n)} - 1 = \left(\frac{1}{q^*(y^{n-1})} - 1\right) \frac{\mathcal{G}_0(1 - q^*(y^{n-1}))}{\mathcal{G}_1(1 - q^*(y^{n-1}))} \leq \left(\frac{1}{1/2} - 1\right) \frac{\mathcal{G}_0(1/2)}{\mathcal{G}_1(1/2)} \leq \left(\frac{\mathcal{G}_0(1/2)}{\mathcal{G}_1(1/2)}\right)^n,
\]

thus completing the proof of Eq. (5.20). We thus conclude that any neighborhood \( \{1, ..., n\} \) is unpersuasive if \( n \leq K \) and \( K \) satisfies

\[
\left(1 + \left(\frac{\mathcal{G}_0(1/2)}{\mathcal{G}_1(1/2)}\right)^K\right)^{-1} > 1 - \overline{\beta},
\]

as well as the symmetric (upper bound)

\[
\left(1 + \left(\frac{1 - \mathcal{G}_0(1/2)}{1 - \mathcal{G}_1(1/2)}\right)^K\right)^{-1} < 1 - \beta.
\]

Both conditions on \( K \) combined yield the condition of Eq. (5.18).

We have proved that the set \( \{1, ..., K\} \) is nonpersuasive given the conditions of the proposition. We now show that any subset of \( B \subseteq \{1, ..., K\} \) is also nonpersuasive. To prove this result, we bound by the worst possible event in terms of the actions of agents
not $B$ with respect to the social belief, i.e.,

\[
P_\sigma(\theta = 1 | x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \in B)
= \sum_{z^n \in \{0, 1\}^{\{1, \ldots, K\} \setminus B}} P_\sigma(x_k = z_k \text{ for } k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \setminus B | x_k = y_k \text{ for all } k \in B)
\geq \min_{z^n \in \{0, 1\}^{\{1, \ldots, K\} \setminus B}} P_\sigma(\theta = 1 | x_k = y_k \text{ for } k \in B, x_k = z_k \text{ for } k \in \{1, \ldots, K\} \setminus B).
\]

Use a symmetric bound to show the maximum value of the social belief. The proof is, therefore, complete since we have previously proven that for the neighborhood $\{1, \ldots, K\}$ is unpersuasive. ■

The monotonicity condition of Eq. (5.19) guarantees the following: let $0 \leq q' \leq q'' \leq 1$; then $P_\sigma(\theta = 1 | q_n = q', x_n = 0) \leq P_\sigma(\theta = 1 | q_n = q'', x_n = 0)$ and $P_\sigma(\theta = 1 | q_n = q', x_n = 1) \leq P_\sigma(\theta = 1 | q_n = q'', x_n = 1)$. That is, an agent $n$ with a given social belief $q_n = q'$ selecting action 0 (or action 1) represents a stronger signal in favor of state $\theta = 0$ than an agent with social belief $q_n = q'' \geq q'$ choosing action 0 (or, respectively, action 1).

Our main theorem for learning with bounded beliefs, which we state next, provides a class of stochastic social networks where asymptotic learning takes place even under bounded private beliefs.

**Theorem 6** Let $(\mathbb{F}_0, \mathbb{F}_1)$ be an arbitrary signal structure. Let $M$ be a positive integer and let $C_1, \ldots, C_M$ be sets such that $C_i \in \mathcal{U}_\sigma$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, M$ for some equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$. For each $i = 1, \ldots, M$, let $\{r_i(n)\}$ be a sequence of non-negative numbers such that

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n) = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n) = \infty,
\]

(5.21)

with $\sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n) \leq 1$ for all $n$ and $r_i(n) = 0$ for all $n \leq \max_{b \in C_i} b$. Assume the network
The topology satisfies

\[ B(n) = \begin{cases} 
    C_i, & \text{with probability } r_i(n) \text{ for each } i \text{ from } 1 \text{ to } M, \\
    \{1, 2, \ldots, n-1\}, & \text{with probability } 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n). 
\end{cases} \]

Then, asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium \( \sigma \).

Clearly, this theorem could have been stated with \( C_i = \emptyset \) for all \( i = 1, \ldots, m \), which would correspond to agent \( n \) making a decision without observing anybody else’s action with some probability \( r(n) = \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n) \leq 1 \).

This is a rather surprising result, particularly in view of existing results in the literature, which generate herds and information cascades (and no learning) with bounded beliefs. This theorem indicates that learning dynamics become significantly richer when we consider general social networks. In particular, certain stochastic network topologies enable a significant amount of new information to arrive into the network, because some agents make decisions with limited information (nonpersuasive neighborhoods). As a result, the relevant information can be aggregated in equilibrium, leading to individuals’ decisions eventually converging to the right action (in probability).

**Proof of Theorem 6.** To simplify the exposition of the proof, we assume that the corresponding private belief distributions \( (\mathcal{G}_0, \mathcal{G}_1) \) are continuous, which implies that the equilibrium is unique.

For each \( n \), let \( x^n = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \) represent the sequence of decisions up to and including \( x_n \). Let \( q^*(x^n) \) denote the “social belief” when \( x^n \) is observed under equilibrium \( \sigma \), i.e.,

\[ q^*(x^n) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x^n). \]

The social belief \( q^*(x^n) \) is a martingale and, by the martingale convergence theorem, converges with probability 1 to some random variable \( \hat{q} \). Conditional on \( \theta = 1 \), the
likelihood ratio

\[
\frac{1 - q^*(x^n)}{q^*(x^n)} = \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 0 \mid x^n)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 \mid x^n)}
\]

is also a martingale [see Doob, 1953, Eq. (7.12)]. Therefore, conditional on \( \theta = 1 \), the ratio \((1 - q^*(x^n))/q^*(x^n)\) converges with probability 1 to some random variable \((1 - \hat{q}_1)/\hat{q}_1\).

In particular, we have

\[
\mathbb{E}_\sigma \left[ \frac{1 - \hat{q}_1}{\hat{q}_1} \right] < \infty,
\]

[see Breiman, Theorem 5.14], and therefore \( \hat{q}_1 > 0 \) with probability 1. Similarly, \( q^*(x^n)/(1 - q^*(x^n)) \) is a martingale conditional on \( \theta = 0 \) and converges with probability 1 to some random variable \( \hat{q}_0/(1 - \hat{q}_0) \), where \( \hat{q}_0 < 1 \) with probability 1. Therefore,

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\hat{q} > 0 \mid \theta = 1) = 1 \text{ and } \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\hat{q} < 1 \mid \theta = 0) = 1. \tag{5.22}
\]

The key part of the proof is to show that the support of \( \hat{q} \) is contained in the set \( \{0, 1\} \).

This fact combined with Eq. (5.22) guarantees that \( \hat{q} = \theta \) (i.e., the agents that observe the entire history eventually know what the state of the world \( \theta \) is).

To show that the support of \( \hat{q} \) is contained in \( \{0, 1\} \), we study the evolution dynamics of \( q^*(x^n) \). Suppose \( x_{n+1} = 0 \). Using Bayes’ Rule twice, we have

\[
q^* ((x^n, 0)) = \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0, x^n \mid \theta = 1)}{\sum_{j=0}^{1} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0, x^n \mid \theta = j)} = \left[ 1 + \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0, x^n \mid \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0, x^n \mid \theta = 1)} \right]^{-1}
\]

\[
= \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q^*(x^n)} - 1 \right) \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0 \mid \theta = 0, x^n)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0 \mid \theta = 1, x^n)} \right]^{-1}.
\]

To simplify notation, let

\[
\hat{f}_n(x^n) = \frac{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0 \mid \theta = 0, x^n)}{\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0 \mid \theta = 1, x^n)}, \tag{5.23}
\]

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so that

\[ q^*((x^n, 0)) = \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q^*(x^n)} - 1 \right) f_n(x^n) \right]^{-1}. \tag{5.24} \]

We next show that if \( q^*(x^n) \geq 1/2 \) for some \( n \), we have

\[ f_n(x^n) \geq 1 + \delta \quad \text{for some } \delta > 0, \tag{5.25} \]

which will allow us to establish a bound on the difference between \( q^*(x^n) \) and \( q^*((x^n, 0)) \).

By conditioning on the neighborhood \( B(n + 1) \), we have for any \( j \in \{0, 1\} \),

\[
P_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0 \mid \theta = j, x^n) = \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n + 1)p_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0 \mid \theta = j, x^n, B(n + 1) = C_i) \\
+ \left( 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n + 1) \right) p_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0 \mid \theta = j, x^n, B(n + 1) = \{1, \ldots, n\}).
\]

For each \( i = 1, \ldots, M \), we define

\[ q_i(x^n) = p_\sigma(\theta = 1|x_k, k \in C_i). \]

Using the assumption that \( G_0 \) and \( G_1 \) are continuous, Lemma 1 implies that

\[
P_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0 \mid \theta = j, x^n, B(n + 1) = C_i) \\
= p_\sigma(p_{n+1} \leq 1 - q_i(x^n) \mid \theta = j, x^n, B(n + 1) = C_i) = G_j(1 - q_i(x^n)).
\]

Therefore,

\[
P_\sigma(x_{n+1} = 0 \mid \theta = j, x^n) = \\
\sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n + 1)G_j(1 - q_i(x^n)) + \left( 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n + 1) \right) G_j(1 - q^*(x^n)).
\]

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Combining Eqs. (5.26), (5.27) and (5.28), we see that for all \( n \)
which implies the existence of some \( c \). Furthermore, since \( C \) is a nonpersuasive
neighborhood, we have

\[
q_i(x^n) \in (1 - \beta, 1 - \beta) \quad \text{for all } x^n,
\]

which implies the existence of some \( c_i' \) with \( \inf_{x^n} q_i(x^n) = c_i' > 1 - \beta \), where the strict
inequality follows since the infimum is over a finite set. Lemma 3(c) then implies that

\[
G_0(1 - q_i(x^n)) \geq \left( \frac{G_0(1 - c_i')}{G_1(1 - c_i')} \right) G_1(1 - q_i(x^n)). \tag{5.28}
\]

Combining Eqs. (5.26), (5.27) and (5.28), we see that for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) with \( q^*(x^n) \geq 1/2 \),

\[
f_n(x^n) \geq \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{M} \omega_i(n + 1) G_0(1 - q_i(x^n)) + \left( 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{M} \omega_i(n + 1) \right) G_0(1 - q^*(x^n))}{\sum_{i=1}^{M} \omega_i(n + 1) G_1(1 - q_i(x^n)) + \left( 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{M} \omega_i(n + 1) \right) G_1(1 - q^*(x^n))}.
\]

Hence, Eq. (5.23) can be rewritten as

\[
f_n(x^n) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n + 1) G_0(1 - q_i(x^n)) + \left( 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n + 1) \right) G_0(1 - q^*(x^n))}{\sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n + 1) G_1(1 - q_i(x^n)) + \left( 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n + 1) \right) G_1(1 - q^*(x^n))}.
\]
Notice the right-hand side of the equation above is merely a weighted average. Therefore, if $n \in \mathcal{N}$ and $q^*(x^n) \geq 1/2$, then

$$f_n(x^n) \geq \min \left\{ \frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)}, \min_{i \in \{1, \ldots, M\}} \frac{G_0(1 - c'_i)}{G_1(1 - c'_i)} \right\} = 1 + \delta,$$

for some $\delta > 0$ using Lemma 3(c), proving Eq. (5.25).

Combining Eq. (5.25) with Eq. (5.24) yields

$$q^* ((x^n, 0)) \leq \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q^*(x^n)} - 1 \right) (1 + \delta) \right]^{-1} \quad \text{for all } n \in \mathcal{N}, \ q^*(x^n) \geq 1/2. \ (5.29)$$

Suppose now $n \in \mathcal{N}$ and $q^*(x^n) \in [1/2, 1 - \epsilon]$ for some $\epsilon > 0$. We show that there exists some constant $K(\delta, \epsilon) > 0$ such that

$$q^*(x^n) - q^* ((x^n, 0)) \geq K(\delta, \epsilon). \ (5.30)$$

Define $g : [1/2, 1 - \epsilon] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ as

$$g(q) = q - \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q} - 1 \right) (1 + \delta) \right]^{-1}.$$

It can be seen that $g(q)$ is a concave function over $q \in [1/2, 1 - \epsilon]$. Let $K(\delta, \epsilon)$ be

$$K(\delta, \epsilon) = \inf_{q \in [1/2, 1 - \epsilon]} g(q) = \min\{g(1/2), g(1 - \epsilon)\} = \min \left\{ \frac{\delta}{2(2 + \delta)}, \frac{\epsilon \delta (1 - \epsilon)}{1 + \epsilon \delta} \right\} > 0.$$

From Eq. (5.29), it follows that

$$q^*(x^n) - q^* ((x^n, 0)) \geq q^*(x^n) - \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q^*(x^n)} - 1 \right) (1 + \delta) \right]^{-1} \geq g(q^*(x^n)) \geq K(\delta, \epsilon),$$

thus proving Eq. (5.30).
Recall that $q^*(x^n)$ converges to $\hat{q}$ with probability 1. We show that for any $\epsilon > 0$, the support of $\hat{q}$ does not contain $(1/2, 1 - \epsilon)$. Assume, to arrive at a contradiction, that it does. Consider a sample path that converges to a value in the interval $(1/2, 1 - \epsilon)$. For this sample path, there exists some $N$ such that for all $n \geq N$, $q^*(x^n) \in [1/2, 1 - \epsilon]$. By the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, there are infinitely many agents $n$ within $\mathcal{N}$ that observe a neighborhood $C_i$ for some $i$ because the neighborhoods are independent and $\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n) = \infty$. Since these are nonpersuasive neighborhoods, an infinite subset will choose action 0. Therefore, for infinitely many $n$ that satisfy $n \geq N$ and $n \in \mathcal{N}$, by Eq. (5.30),

$$q^*(x^{n+1}) \leq q^*(x^n) - K(\delta, \epsilon).$$

But this implies the sequence $q^*(x^n)$ is not Cauchy and, therefore, contradicts the fact that $q^*(x^n)$ is a convergent sequence. Hence, we conclude that the support of $\hat{q}$ does not contain $(1/2, 1 - \epsilon)$. Since this argument holds for any $\epsilon > 0$, the support of $\hat{q}$ cannot contain $(1/2, 1)$. A similar argument leads to the conclusion that the support of $\hat{q}$ does not include $(0, 1/2]$. Therefore, the support of $\hat{q}$ is a subset of the set $\{0, 1\}$. By Eq. (5.22), this implies that $\hat{q} = \theta$ with probability 1.

We finally show that $\hat{q} = \theta$ with probability 1 implies the convergence of actions $x_n$ to $\theta$ in probability. Suppose first $\theta = 1$. Then, $q^*(x^n)$ converges to 1 with probability 1. Therefore, $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(p_{n+1} + q^*(x^n) \geq 1 \mid \theta = 1)$ converges to 1. Therefore, for any $n$,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid \theta = 1) \geq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid \theta = 1, B(n) = \{1, ..., n - 1\}) \mathbb{Q}(B(n) = \{1, ..., n - 1\})$$

$$= \mathbb{P}_\sigma(p_{n+1} + q^*(x^n) \geq 1 \mid \theta = 1) \left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n)\right).$$

Since $\sum_{i=1}^{M} r_i(n)$ converges to 0, the preceding relation implies that $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid \theta = 1)$ converges to 1. By the same argument, $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta \mid \theta = 0)$ also converges to 1, thus
proving asymptotic learning occurs in equilibrium $\sigma$.$\blacksquare$

It is important to emphasize the difference between this result and that in Sgroi (2002), which shows that a social planner can ensure some degree of information aggregation by forcing a subsequence of agents to make decisions without observing past actions. With the same reasoning, one might conjecture that asymptotic learning may occur if a particular subsequence of agents, such as that indexed by prime numbers, has empty neighborhoods. However, there will not be asymptotic learning in this deterministic topology since $\liminf_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) < 1$. For the result that there is asymptotic learning (i.e., $\liminf_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = 1$) in Theorem 6, the feature that the network topology is stochastic is essential.
Chapter 6

Heterogeneity of Preferences

6.1 The Role of Preferences

In the model of social learning introduced in Chapter 2 and analyzed in Chapters 3-5, all agents have the same preferences. This assumption allowed us to focus on information dynamics in a context where actions were selected based on beliefs about the state of the world. However, in most real-life learning problems, different individuals also have different preferences over possible states of the world. For example, when a consumer decides on a new product to purchase, his choice is not merely a function of whether the product will yield long-term value, but it also rests on whether this product fits this consumer’s particular needs. The element of personal preferences arises in contexts as varied as choosing an operating system for your computer, where a given operating system is best suited for a particular type of user, or selecting a retirement fund, where different risk-reward profiles are recommended based on a person’s age and wealth, or picking a political party, where different individuals would prefer different tax rates.

Once we incorporate the element of diverse preferences into our social learning model, each individual agent faces a more complex task when trying to estimate the state from the actions of her peers. Suppose you observe a person entering a Japanese restaurant
rather than the similarly priced Italian alternative next door. When learning from his action, you have to consider whether the person selected that option because he believes the Japanese restaurant serves meals of higher quality or because he enjoys eating sushi more than eating pasta. If the former explanation is true, then his action is informative and you should consider following him into the Japanese parlor, but if the latter reason is correct, then his action is completely uninformative and you should completely disregard his action. Therefore, a given action is less informative about the state of the world in a context of private preferences and it would be natural that rational agents would perform worse (learn less) than they would in an environment without private preferences.

The intuition above is confirmed in Smith and Sorensen (2000) where diverse types generically lead agents to an equilibrium called confounded learning. That is, the history of actions eventually becomes uninformative about the state because agents cannot determine whether the actions are a product of the signals (and therefore correlated to the state of the world) or a consequence of the diverse preferences. Therefore, diverse preferences are an obstacle to social learning in this model.

However, a key assumption in Smith and Sorensen’s model is that preferences are not “monotonic in the state”. For example, suppose an agent $n$ of type $A$ would select action $x_n = \theta$ if she knew the state $\theta$, but a different agent $m$ of type $B$ would choose action $x_n = 1 - \theta$ if she knew the state. That is, if we increase the likelihood that state is equal to 1 rather than 0, some agents will react by changing their actions from 0 to 1, while others will do exactly the opposite and change their actions from 1 to 0. This phenomenon reduces an agent’s power to make inferences on the state based on the actions of others.

In this chapter we consider preferences that are monotonic on the state. Monotonic preferences satisfy the following property: for a given belief about the state of the world different agents might select different actions, but if we increase the probability that the state is 1, then all agents either maintain their current actions or change to action
1. Preferences are monotonic in many scenarios where agents have to learn from their peers. For example, given a belief about the quality of a given product, some individuals would choose to buy it, while others would not. However, if the belief about the product quality decreases, no one will become more likely to buy it than they previously were. The selection of a financial product is also a good example. Different people have distinct risk-reward preferences, but everyone prefers higher returns to lower returns.

We study the problem of learning under diverse preferences with two different models for the social network topology. In Section 6.3, we assume agents observe only the action of their immediate neighbors. In this case, the naïve intuition that diverse preferences hinder learning is indeed verified. We first show that no learning occurs under bounded private beliefs. This result is based on the intuitive notion that learning from a single agent is less informative if her preferences are unknown. We then show by means of an example that asymptotic learning might fail even under unbounded beliefs given diverse preferences.

In Section 6.4, we assume agents observe the entire history of past actions. Under this topology, we show that diverse preferences improve learning. The wider the support of preferences, the higher will be the probability that an agent \( n \) will choose the best action, for large \( n \).\(^1\) In particular, if preferences are very diverse, learning occurs for any signal structure. The rationale behind this result is the following: heterogeneous preferences reduces the ability of the first few agents to learn from the actions of others; the immediate consequence is that these agents need to give greater consideration to their own private signals; for an agent that comes later into the game (large \( n \)), the history will contain more information about the signals and, therefore, yield more learning.

\(^1\)Note that this is a set-valued result, please see Section 6.4 for the precise statement.
6.2 Formulation

The model studied in this chapter is an extension of the one introduced in Chapter 2. A countably infinite number of agents, indexed by \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), sequentially make a single decision (take an action). Each agent \( n \) has a type \( t_n \in \mathbb{R} \) and makes a decision \( x_n \in \{0, 1\} \). The payoff of agent \( n \) depends on her type, her decision and some underlying state of the world \( \theta \). Similarly to the model in Chapter 2, we assume that both values of the underlying state are equally likely, so that \( \mathbb{P}(\theta = 0) = \mathbb{P}(\theta = 1) = 1/2 \). For each \( n \), the payoff of agent \( n \) is

\[
    u(t_n, x_n, \theta) = \begin{cases} 
        (1 - \theta) + t_n, & \text{if } x_n = 0, \\
        \theta + (1 - t_n), & \text{if } x_n = 1.
    \end{cases}
\]

Note that this utility function has two components: the first one depends on whether \( x_n = \theta \) and the second one depends on \( t_n \) and whether \( x_n = 1 \). This means agents need to balance between two objectives, they all want to choose their actions \( x_n \) equal to the state \( \theta \), but they also have a preference for choosing one particular action. The type \( t_n \) indicates how agent \( n \) makes this trade-off: if the type \( t_n = 1/2 \), agent \( n \) is neutral between actions 0 and 1 and, therefore, makes her choice solely based on which action is more likely to realize \( x_n = \theta \); the higher her value of \( t_n \), the more she prefers decision 0. If the value of \( t_n \) is greater than or equal to 1, then agent \( n \)'s preference for action 0 always overrides her preference for \( x_n = \theta \) and, therefore she will certainly choose that action. In this case, we say agent \( n \) is committed to action 0. Similarly, if \( t_n \leq 0 \), then agent \( n \) is committed to action 1. For simplicity, we assume all agents are non-committed, i.e., \( t_n \in (0, 1) \) for all \( n \). Our results can easily be extended to include committed agents if we modify slightly the definition of asymptotic learning by considering only the convergence of actions of the non-committed agents.

The types \( \{t_n\} \) are independently generated according to probability measure \( \mathbb{H} \).
For each \( n \), the type \( t_n \) is private information of agent \( n \). The measure \( H \) is common knowledge. We assume that \( H \) has full support in some range \( [\underline{\gamma}, \overline{\gamma}] \), where \( 0 \leq \underline{\gamma} \leq 1/2 \leq \overline{\gamma} \leq 1 \). The support of the distribution \( H, [\underline{\gamma}, \overline{\gamma}] \), is a measure of the diversity of preferences. If both \( \underline{\gamma} \) and \( \overline{\gamma} \) are close to \( 1/2 \), then all agents are close to indifferent between the two possible actions prior to receiving information about the state \( \theta \). If, on the other hand, \( \underline{\gamma} \) is close to 0 and \( \overline{\gamma} \) is close 1, then there are agents with strong prior preference for one of the two choices in the action set.

**Definition 10** The preferences are said to be **unbounded** if \( \underline{\gamma} = 0 \) and \( \overline{\gamma} = 1 \). The preferences are said to be **bounded** if \( \underline{\gamma} > 0 \) and \( \overline{\gamma} < 1 \).

The concept of unbounded preferences should not be confused with the notion of unbounded private beliefs. Unbounded preferences indicates that there are agents arbitrarily more likely to take each one of the possible actions before they know any information about the state. Unbounded private beliefs means that there are arbitrarily strong signals in favor of both actions. If agent \( n \) knew that agent \( b \) chose action 0 because of a very strong signal, she would be inclined to follow suit since it indicates the state is likely to be \( \theta = 0 \). However, if agent \( n \) knew that agent \( b \) selected action 0 because of a strong personal preference, agent \( n \) should disregard decision \( b \)'s action as it is uninformative about the state. In our model, both types and signals are private, so agents make Bayesian estimates of the likelihood of each scenario and make decisions based on their estimates.

Apart from the private types and the modified utility functions, the model analyzed in this chapter is the same as the one described in Chapter 2. Each agent \( n \) obtains a signal \( s_n \in S \) generated from one of two probability measures, \( F_0 \) or \( F_1 \), conditional on the state \( \theta \). An agent \( n \) also observes the actions of agents in a neighborhood \( B(n) \). The information set \( I_n \) of agent \( n \) is composed of his type \( t_n \), signal \( s_n \), neighborhood \( B(n) \) and all decisions of agents \( x_k \) for \( k \in B(n) \). We analyze the pure-strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibria and denote the set of equilibria by $\Sigma^*$.

The following lemma establishes the equilibrium decision rule used by the agents.

**Lemma 11** Let $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ be an equilibrium of the game. Let $I_n \in \mathcal{I}_n$ be an information set of agent $n$. Then, the decision of agent $n$, $x_n = \sigma(I_n)$, satisfies

$$x_n = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 | s_n, B(n), x_k \text{ for all } k \in B(n)) > t_n, \\ 0, & \text{if } \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 | s_n, B(n), x_k \text{ for all } k \in B(n)) < t_n, \end{cases}$$

and $x_n \in \{0, 1\}$ otherwise.

**Proof.** Agent $n$ maximizes her expected utility given her information set and the equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ and, thus, selects action 1 if $\mathbb{E}_\sigma[(1-\theta) + t_n | I_n] > \mathbb{E}_\sigma[\theta + (1-t_n) | I_n]$, where $\mathbb{E}_\sigma$ represents the expected value in a given equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$. The agent $n$ knows her type $t_n$ and, therefore, the previous condition is equivalent to $\mathbb{E}_\sigma[\theta | I_n] > t_n$.

Since $\theta$ is an indicator function and $t_n$ is independent of $\theta$, we have that $\mathbb{E}_\sigma[\theta | I_n] = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 | s_n, B(n), x_k \text{ for all } k \in B(n))$, proving the clause for $x_n = 1$. The proof for the case $x_n = 0$ is identical with the inequalities reversed. ■

Agent $n$’s posterior belief $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 | s_n, B(n), x_k \text{ for all } k \in B(n))$ can be decomposed in two parts, the private belief $p_n = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 | s_n)$ and the social belief $q_n = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(\theta = 1 | B(n), x_k \text{ for all } k \in B(n))$. The following lemma shows the equilibrium decision rule in terms of the type, private and social beliefs.

**Lemma 12** Let $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ be an equilibrium of the game. Let $I_n \in \mathcal{I}_n$ be an information set of agent $n$. Then, the decision of agent $n$, $x_n = \sigma(I_n)$, satisfies

$$x_n = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } p_n > \frac{t_n(1-q_n)}{t_n(1-2q_n) + q_n}, \\ 0, & \text{if } p_n < \frac{t_n(1-q_n)}{t_n(1-2q_n) + q_n}, \end{cases}$$

and $x_n \in \{0, 1\}$ otherwise.
To avoid repetition, we refer the reader to the proof of Lemma 1, which is very similar. The only difference in the two results is that while in Lemma 1 the threshold on agent $n$’s posterior belief is $1/2$, here it is $t_n$.

In the next two sections, we study respectively the role of preferences under the immediate neighbor network topology, i.e., $B(n) = \{n-1\}$ and under the full information topology, i.e., $B(n) = \{1, \ldots, n-1\}$.

6.3 Observing a Single Agent

In this section, we show that diverse preferences hinder learning under the immediate neighbor network topology, i.e., $B(n) = \{n-1\}$.

We first show that if the private beliefs are bounded, agents do not learn the state irrespective of the distribution of private preferences $\mathbb{H}$.

**Theorem 7** Suppose the private beliefs are bounded and the network topology satisfies $B(n) = \{n-1\}$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then, asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$.

**Proof.** The first step of the proof is to show that agent $n$’s ex ante probability of choosing the best action is maximized with type $t_n = 1/2$. We first condition $\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta)$ on $s_{n+1}$ and $x_n$,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta) = \sum_{\pi=0}^{1} \int_{\pi \in S} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta | s_{n+1} = \pi, x_n = \pi) d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_{n+1} = \pi, x_n = \pi), \quad (6.1)$$

and observe that for any $\pi \in \{0,1\}$ and any $\pi \in S$,

$$\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta | s_{n+1} = \pi, x_n = \pi) \leq \max_{y \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(y = \theta | s_{n+1} = \pi, x_n = \pi) \quad (6.2)$$

since $x_{n+1}$ is a function solely of $x_n$, $s_{n+1}$ and $t_{n+1}$ ($t_{n+1}$ being independent from
\( \theta, x_n \) and \( s_{n+1} \). Note that if \( t_{n+1} = 1/2 \), the agent solves exactly this maximization problem, i.e.,

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta | s_{n+1} = \bar{s}, x_n = \bar{x}, t_{n+1} = 1/2) = \max_{y \in \{0,1\}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(y = \theta | s_{n+1} = \bar{s}, x_n = \bar{x}). \quad (6.3)
\]

Combining Eqs. (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) we obtain

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta) \leq \sum_{\bar{x}=0}^{1} \int_{\bar{s} \in \mathcal{S}} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta | s_{n+1} = \bar{s}, x_n = \bar{x}, t_{n+1} = 1/2) d\mathbb{P}_\sigma(s_{n+1} = \bar{s}, x_n = \bar{x}),
\]

which integrates out to

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta) \leq \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta | t_{n+1} = 1/2). \quad (6.4)
\]

The integration is valid since \( x_n \) and \( s_{n+1} \) are independent of \( t_{n+1} \). We have thus shown that having type \( t_{n+1} = 1/2 \) maximizes agent \( n+1 \)'s probability of choosing the optimal action given the state.

We now invoke Lemma 9 from the Appendix to complete the result. The lemma was proved in the context of a single utility function for all agents and, thus, we need to add the condition \( t_{n+1} = 1/2 \) to adapt it to the model with heterogeneous preferences. From Lemma 9 we obtain that if \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \leq f(\beta, \bar{\beta}) \), then,

\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta | t_{n+1} = 1/2) \leq f(\beta, \bar{\beta}), \quad (6.5)
\]

where the function \( f \) is defined as

\[
f(\beta, \bar{\beta}) = \max \left\{ 1 - \frac{\beta}{2(1 - \beta)}, \frac{3}{2} - \frac{1}{2\beta} \right\}.
\]
Combining Eqs. (6.4) and (6.5), we obtain that if $P(\sigma(x_n = \theta) \leq f(\beta, \overline{\beta})$, then

$$P(\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta) \leq P(\sigma(x_{n+1} = \theta \mid t_{n+1} = 1/2) \leq f(\overline{\beta}, \overline{\beta}).$$

We can apply this result inductively to obtain that $P(\sigma(x_n = \theta) \leq f(\beta, \overline{\beta})$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ – note: the base case is a random variable $x_0$ that is equally likely to be 0 or 1 and is independent of $\theta$. The proof is thus complete, since $f(\overline{\beta}, \overline{\beta}) < 1$ when the private beliefs are bounded. ■

In the theorem above, we proved that no distribution of preferences $\mathbb{H}$ will lead to learning when the private beliefs are bounded in the immediate neighbors topology. We next address the question of whether diverse preferences can stop asymptotic learning when both private beliefs and preferences are unbounded. We show by means of an example that learning might not occur with unbounded preferences and private beliefs.

**Example 3** For each $n$, assume the type $t_n$ is generated from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. Furthermore, let the signal $s_n \in [0, 1]$ be generated by the following signal structure:

$$F_0(s_n) = 2s_n - s_n^2 \text{ and } F_1(s_n) = s_n^2.$$

In this example, the signals are identical to the private beliefs, i.e., $p_n(s_n) = s_n$. Therefore, the state-conditional distributions of private signals [cf. Eq. (2.8)] are

$$G_0(r) = 2r - r^2 \text{ and } G_1(r) = r^2. \quad (6.6)$$

Using the decision rule stated in Lemma 12, the probability of agent $n$ making the
The correct decision is given by
\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x=0}^{1} \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( p_n \leq \frac{t_n(1-q_n)}{t_n(1-2q_n) + q_n} \bigg| x_{n-1} = \bar{x}, \theta = 0 \right) \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n-1} = \bar{x}|\theta = 0) \\
+ \frac{1}{2} \sum_{x=0}^{1} \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( p_n > \frac{t_n(1-q_n)}{t_n(1-2q_n) + q_n} \bigg| x_{n-1} = \bar{x}, \theta = 1 \right) \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n-1} = \bar{x}|\theta = 1).
\]

Because of the symmetry of the signal structure (as well as continuity of private belief distributions which guarantee a unique equilibrium), we have that
\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = \sum_{x=0}^{1} \mathbb{P}_\sigma \left( p_n > \frac{t_n(1-q_n)}{t_n(1-2q_n) + q_n} \bigg| x_{n-1} = \bar{x}, \theta = 1 \right) \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n-1} = \bar{x}|\theta = 1).
\]

Based on symmetry, we also obtain that \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n-1} = 1|\theta = 1) = 1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n-1} = 0|\theta = 1) = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n-1} = \theta) \) and that \( q_n = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n-1} = \theta) \) when \( x_{n-1} = 1 \) and \( q_n = 1 - \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n-1} = \theta) \) when \( x_{n-1} = 0 \). By conditioning on \( t_n \) and substituting the private belief distribution, we obtain that
\[
\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = \int_{t=0}^{1} \frac{(\alpha - 1)^2 t(3\alpha t - 2\alpha - t)}{(2\alpha t - \alpha - t)^2} dH(t),
\]
where \( \alpha = \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n-1} = \theta) \). Solving this integral we obtain that \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = r(\mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_{n-1} = \theta)) \), where the mapping \( r \) is defined below
\[
r(\alpha) = \frac{12\alpha^3 - 18\alpha^2 + 8\alpha - 1 - 4\alpha^2(1-\alpha)^2 \ln \left( \frac{1}{\alpha} - 1 \right)}{(2\alpha - 1)^3}.
\]

The mapping \( r \) is plotted in Figure 6.1. The function \( r \) has two fixed points at 0.7196 and 1, and lies below the identity line in \((0.7196, 1)\). The implication of this curve is that an agent \( n \) observing the action of an agent \( n-1 \) has a lower probability of choosing the optimal action given the state than his neighbor if \( \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \in (0.7196, 1) \). Therefore, the fixed point at 0.7196 is stable, but the one at 1 is not. The implication is that the improvement principle, which was at the heart of the Theorem 2, does not hold in this case.
Figure 6-1: This graph shows the lack of improvement principle in a model with heterogeneous preferences.

Asymptotic learning does not occur and \( \lim_{n \to \infty} P_{\sigma}(x_n = \theta) = 0.7196 \) for this particular signal structure.

6.4 Observing the Full History

In Section 6.3, we showed that diverse preferences have a negative effect on learning in a network where agents observe only the action of their immediate neighbors. Here, we show that heterogeneous preferences facilitate learning when agents can observe all past actions.

To simplify the proofs, we assume that \( H, G_0 \) and \( G_1 \) have densities. This assumption guarantees unique equilibrium.

Lemma 13 Assume that \( B(n) = \{1, ..., n - 1\} \) for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). Then, the social belief \( q_n \)
converges with probability 1.

Proof. The social belief $q_n$ is a non-negative martingale adapted to the filtration generated by the sequence of decisions $(x_1, \ldots, x_{n-1})$ and, by the martingale convergence theorem, converges with probability 1. ■

We denote the limit of $\{q_n\}$ by the random variable $\hat{q}$. We now show several lemmas on the support of the limiting social belief $\hat{q}$.

The intuition behind the results to follow (Lemmas 14 and 15) is captured in Figure 6.2. In the network topology where agents observe the entire history of past actions, the dynamics of the social belief sequence $\{q_n\}$ can be described by a pair of curves that map the social belief of an agent $n$, $q_n$, to the social belief of agent $n + 1$, $q_{n+1}$. The lower curve maps the value of $q_n$ into $q_{n+1}$ if $x_n = 0$, while the upper curve maps the value of $q_n$ into $q_{n+1}$ if $x_n = 1$. That is, the pair of curves incorporate the action $x_n$ into the social belief $q_n$ to form the next agent’s social belief $q_{n+1}$.

Lemma 13 establishes that the sequence $\{q_n\}$ converges with probability 1 to some random variable $\hat{q}$. Therefore, for almost all realizations, the sequence $\{q_n\}$ must be a converging sequence. However, the sequence $\{q_n\}$ can only converge to a point where at least one of the mappings, the $x_n = 0$ or the $x_n = 1$, is equal to the identity (represented by the dashed line in Figure 6.2). A convergent sequence of real numbers is Cauchy, so the sequence $|q_{n+1} - q_n|$ must go to 0. If the sequence $\{q_n\}$ were to converge to a point where neither mapping is equal to the identity, it would contradict the convergence of $|q_{n+1} - q_n|$ to 0.

Lemmas 14 and 15 show that the support of $\hat{q}$ is contained in the union of the two highlighted regions on the horizontal axis of Figure 6.2. Lemma 14, in particular, uses the reasoning outlined above to prove that the support of $\hat{q}$ does not contain any intermediary points between the two highlighted intervals. An important consequence of this lemma is that agents, in the limit as $n$ grows to infinity, ignore their private beliefs and types. The sequence of social beliefs $\{q_n\}$ converges, with probability 1, to a region
Figure 6-2: The dynamics of the social beliefs are captured by two mappings from $q_n$ to $q_{n+1}$, one for the case where $x_n = 0$ and the other one for the case where $x_n = 1$. Lemmas 14 and 15 show that the highlighted regions on the horizontal axis contain the support of $\hat{q}$.

where it overwhelms any agent’s private information.

**Lemma 14** Assume that $B(n) = \{1, \ldots, n-1\}$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then, the limiting social belief $\hat{q}$ satisfies

$$\hat{q} \notin \left[1 + \left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\right) \left(\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}\right)\right]^{-1}, \left[1 + \left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\right) \left(\frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma}\right)\right]^{-1}$$

with probability 1.

**Proof.** We only show that

$$\hat{q} \notin \left[\frac{1}{2}, \frac{\gamma(1-\beta)}{\gamma(1-2\beta) + \beta}\right]$$

(6.7)
since the proof for the other half of the interval is symmetrical. Let $\Omega$ represent the set of all possible sample paths of the equilibrium of this game. Let $\Omega' = \{ \omega \in \Omega : q_n(\omega) \text{ is a convergent sequence } \}$. The set $\Omega'$ has measure 1 because $q_n$ is a non-negative martingale. For any $\epsilon > 0$, let $\Omega'(\epsilon) = \{ \omega \in \Omega' : \hat{q}(\omega) \in \left[ \frac{1+3\gamma}{6}, \frac{\gamma(1-\beta)}{\gamma(1-2\beta)+2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} \right] \}$. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that the support of $\hat{q}$ does not satisfy Eq. (6.7). Then, there exists some $\epsilon > 0$ such that $P(\omega \in \Omega'(\epsilon)) > 0$.

For any sample path $\omega \in \Omega'(\epsilon)$, let $N(\omega)$ be such that $q_n(\omega) \in \left[ \frac{1+2\gamma}{4}, \frac{\gamma(1-\beta)}{\gamma(1-2\beta)+2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} \right]$ for all $n \geq N(\omega)$. Let $\mathcal{W}(\omega)$ be the set of all $n$ such that $x_n(\omega) = 0$. By the Borel-Cantelli Lemma, the set $\mathcal{W}(\omega)$ contains infinitely many elements except for a set of events of measure zero. Let $\Omega''(\epsilon) \subseteq \Omega'(\epsilon)$ be the subset of events where $\mathcal{W}(\omega)$ contains infinitely many elements. We now show that for any $\epsilon > 0$, the set $\Omega''(\epsilon)$ is empty, therefore producing a contradiction.

The bulk of the proof is to show that there exists some function $K$ such that for any $n \geq N(\omega)$ and $n \in \mathcal{W}(\omega)$,

$$q_n(\omega) - q_{n+1}(\omega) \geq K(\epsilon) > 0. \quad (6.8)$$

In words, it means that when the belief $q_n(\omega)$ is in $\left[ \frac{1+2\gamma}{4}, \frac{\gamma(1-\beta)}{\gamma(1-2\beta)+2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} \right]$, an action $x_n(\omega) = 0$ will 'reduce' the social belief by at least $K(\epsilon)$. Since there are infinitely many $n \in \mathcal{W} \cap \{ n \geq N(\omega) \}$, Eq. (6.8) implies that the sequence $q_n(\omega)$ is not Cauchy. This contradicts the fact that the sequence $q_n(\omega)$ converges, therefore implying that $\omega \notin \Omega''(\epsilon)$. This proves that $\Omega''(\epsilon) = \emptyset$.

We now prove Eq. (6.8). To prove it, we show that for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and any sample path $\omega$, if $x_n(\omega) = 0$ and $q_n(\omega) \in \left[ \frac{1+2\gamma}{4}, \frac{\gamma(1-\beta)}{\gamma(1-2\beta)+2} + \frac{\epsilon}{2} \right]$, then Eq. (6.8) holds. For the rest of the proof, we consider a fixed sample path $\omega$ and, to simplify notation, we suppress
the \((\omega)\) from \(q_n\) and \(x_n\). Let \(x^{n-1} = (x_1, \ldots, x_{n-1})\). Using Bayes’ Rule twice,

\[
q_{n+1} = \mathbb{P}(\theta = 1|x_n = 0, x^{n-1}) = \left[ 1 + \frac{\mathbb{P}(x^{n-1}|\theta = 0) \mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(x^{n-1}|\theta = 1) \mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \right]^{-1} \\
= \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q_n} - 1 \right) \frac{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \right]^{-1}. \quad (6.9)
\]

To obtain Eq. (6.8) from Eq. (6.9), we need to lower bound the ratio \(\frac{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)}\).

Using Lemma 12 and subsequently conditioning on \(t_n\), we obtain that for any \(j \in \{0, 1\}\),

\[
\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = j) = \int_{t=\gamma}^{\gamma} \mathbb{P} \left( p_n \leq \frac{t(1-q_n)}{t(1-2q_n) + q_n} \bigg| x^{n-1}, \theta = j \right) d\mathbb{H}(t).
\]

Since \(q_n\) is a deterministic function of \(x^{n-1}\), and \(t_n\) and \(p_n\) are independent (conditionally on \(\theta\)),

\[
\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = j) = \int_{t=\gamma}^{\gamma} \mathbb{P} \left( p_n \leq \frac{t(1-q_n)}{t(1-2q_n) + q_n} \bigg| q_n, \theta = j \right) d\mathbb{H}(t) \\
= \int_{t=\gamma}^{\gamma} G_j \left( \frac{t(1-q_n)}{t(1-2q_n) + q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t).
\]

Therefore, the ratio that we need to lower bound from Eq. (6.9) is

\[
\frac{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} = \frac{\int_{t=\gamma}^{\gamma} G_0 \left( \frac{t(1-q_n)}{t(1-2q_n) + q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}{\int_{t=\gamma}^{\gamma} G_1 \left( \frac{t(1-q_n)}{t(1-2q_n) + q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}.
\]

We now consider two cases. If \(q_n \geq \gamma\), we obtain that

\[
\frac{t(1-q_n)}{t(1-2q_n) + q_n} \leq \frac{1}{2} \text{ for all } t \in [\gamma, \gamma].
\]

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From Lemma 3(c), we know that the ratio $\frac{G_0(r)}{G_1(r)}$ is nonincreasing and thus, if $q_n \geq \gamma$,

$$\frac{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \geq \frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)}. \quad (6.10)$$

Now we consider the case where $q_n < \gamma$. We also have $q_n \geq \frac{1+2\gamma}{4} \geq \gamma$. We can thus break the numerator into two components,

$$\frac{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} = \frac{\int_{t=\gamma}^{q_n} G_0 \left( \frac{t}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t) + \int_{t=q_n}^{\gamma} G_1 \left( \frac{t}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}{\int_{t=\gamma}^{\gamma} G_1 \left( \frac{t}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}.$$

From Lemma 3(c), we know that the ratio $\frac{G_0(r)}{G_1(r)}$ is nonincreasing and strictly greater than 1 over the interval $(\beta, \beta)$. Notice that for any fixed $q_n$, the fraction $\frac{t}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n}$ is increasing in $t$ and, in particular, for $t = q_n$ the fraction attains the value $1/2$. Hence, we obtain that

$$\frac{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \geq \frac{\int_{t=\gamma}^{q_n} G_0 \left( \frac{t}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t) + \int_{t=q_n}^{\gamma} G_1 \left( \frac{t}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}{\int_{t=\gamma}^{\gamma} G_1 \left( \frac{t}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)} = 1 + \left( \frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)} - 1 \right) \frac{\int_{t=\gamma}^{q_n} G_1 \left( \frac{t}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}{\int_{t=\gamma}^{\gamma} G_1 \left( \frac{t}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}.$$

Note that the denominator of the previous equation can be at most 1. Therefore, we can relax this inequality and obtain

$$\frac{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \geq 1 + \left( \frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)} - 1 \right) \int_{t=\gamma}^{q_n} G_1 \left( \frac{t}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t).$$

We can further relax this inequality by only considering $t \geq \frac{q_n(2\gamma+1)}{3-2q_n-2\beta+4\gamma}$. This particular value is chosen to guarantee that $\frac{t}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n} \geq \frac{2\gamma+1}{4}$, which is useful because for any
\[ r \geq \frac{2\beta+1}{4}, \quad G_1(r) \geq G_1(\frac{2\beta+1}{4}) > 0. \]

\[
\frac{P(x_n = 0 | x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{P(x_n = 0 | x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \geq 1 + \left( \frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)} - 1 \right) \int_{\frac{q_n(2\beta+1)}{3-2q_n - 2\beta + 4\beta q_n}}^{q_n} G_1 \left( \frac{t(1-q_n)}{t(1-2q_n) + q_n} \right) dH(t) 
\]

\[
\geq 1 + \left( \frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)} - 1 \right) \int_{\frac{q_n(2\beta+1)}{3-2q_n - 2\beta + 4\beta q_n}}^{q_n} G_1 \left( \frac{2\beta + 1}{4} \right) dH(t) 
\]

\[
= 1 + \left( \frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)} - 1 \right) G_1 \left( \frac{2\beta + 1}{4} \right) [H(q_n) - H \left( \frac{q_n(2\beta + 1)}{3 - 2q_n - 2\beta + 4\beta q_n} \right)]. 
\]

To complete the bound, we just need to take a worst-case approach with respect to the value of \( q_n \), that is, construct a bound that works for any \( q_n \in \Delta = [\frac{1+2\gamma}{4}, \frac{\gamma(1-\beta)}{\gamma(1-2\beta)+\beta} + \frac{\epsilon}{2}] \),

\[
\frac{P(x_n = 0 | x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{P(x_n = 0 | x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \geq 1 + \left( \frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)} - 1 \right) G_1 \left( \frac{2\beta + 1}{4} \right) \inf_{q \in \Delta} \left[ H(q) - H \left( \frac{q(2\beta + 1)}{3 - 2q - 2\beta + 4\beta q} \right) \right]. 
\]

Note that the interval \([\epsilon/2, 1 - \epsilon/2]\) is compact and the function \( H \) is continuous. Therefore, the infimum attains its minimum,

\[
\frac{P(x_n = 0 | x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{P(x_n = 0 | x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \geq 1 + \left( \frac{G_0(1/2)}{G_1(1/2)} - 1 \right) G_1 \left( \frac{2\beta + 1}{4} \right) \min_{q \in \Delta} \left[ H(q) - H \left( \frac{q(2\beta + 1)}{3 - 2q - 2\beta + 4\beta q} \right) \right]. 
\]

Since \( H \) has full support (it’s strictly increasing),

\[
\min_{q \in \Delta} \left[ H(q) - H \left( \frac{q(2\beta + 1)}{3 - 2q - 2\beta + 4\beta q} \right) \right] > 0. 
\]

Combining this result for \( q_n < \beta \) and Eq. (6.10) for \( q \geq \beta \), we obtain that for any \( \epsilon > 0 \),
there exists some $K'(\epsilon) > 0$ such that

$$\frac{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(x_n = 0|x^{n-1}, \theta = 1)} \geq 1 + K'(\epsilon).$$

Plugging this result into Eq. (6.9), we obtain

$$q_{n+1} \leq \left[1 + \left(\frac{1}{q_n} - 1\right) (1 + K'(\epsilon))\right]^{-1}.$$

Hence,

$$q_n - q_{n+1} \geq q_n - \left[1 + \left(\frac{1}{q_n} - 1\right) (1 + K'(\epsilon))\right]^{-1}$$

$$= \frac{q_n K'(\epsilon) - q_n^2 K'(\epsilon)}{1 + K'(\epsilon) - q_n K'(\epsilon)} \geq \frac{q_n K'(\epsilon)}{1 - q_n K'(\epsilon)} \geq \frac{\epsilon K'(\epsilon)}{2 - \epsilon K'(\epsilon)} > 0.$$

Let $K(\epsilon) = \frac{\epsilon K'(\epsilon)}{2 - \epsilon K'(\epsilon)}$ to obtain Eq. (6.8), thus completing the proof. ■

The lemma above says that the limiting social belief $\hat{q}$ is sufficiently informative that it leads agents to disregard their private beliefs. The lemma below, on the other hand, is an upper bound on the informativeness of $\hat{q}$. It says that if both private beliefs and preferences are bounded, then $\hat{q}$ will not approach 0 or 1, that is, the social belief will not be completely informative about the state.

**Lemma 15** Assume that $B(n) = \{1, \ldots, n-1\}$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$. The limiting social belief $\hat{q}$ satisfies

$$\hat{q} \notin \left[0, \left[1 + \left(\frac{1 - \beta}{\beta}\right) \left(\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}\right) \left(\frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma}\right)\right]^{-1}\right]$$

$$\cup \left(\left[1 + \left(\frac{1 - \beta}{\beta}\right) \left(\frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}\right) \left(\frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma}\right)\right]^{-1}, 1\right]$$

with probability 1.
Proof. Let

\[ \hat{q} = \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \right) \left( \frac{1 - q}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1}. \]

If \( q_n < \hat{q} \) for some \( n \), then \( x_n = 0 \) with probability 1, and thus \( q_k = q_n \) for all \( k \geq n \), implying that \( \hat{q} = q_n \). If \( q_n \geq \hat{q} \),

\[
\mathbb{P}(\theta = 1|q_n, x_n = 0) = \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q_n} - 1 \right) \frac{\int \mathbb{G}_0 \left( \frac{t(1-q_n)}{t(1-2q_n)+q_n} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t) \right]^{-1}
\]

\[
\geq \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q_n} - 1 \right) \sup_{r \in (\beta, \gamma)} \frac{\mathbb{G}_0(r)}{\mathbb{G}_1(r)} \right]^{-1}
\]

\[
= \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{q_n} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \right) \right]^{-1},
\]

where the last equality follows from the Lemma 3(c). Hence, if \( q_n \geq \hat{q} \),

\[
\mathbb{P}(\theta = 1|q_n, x_n = 0) \geq \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{\hat{q}} - 1 \right) \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \right) \right]^{-1},
\]

thus proving the desired result. For the upper interval, a symmetric proof applies. \( \blacksquare \)

The bound is tight in the following sense: in the most basic model of Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) [cf. page 996], with \( \gamma = \bar{\gamma} = 1/2 \) and two symmetric signals (thus \( \beta = 1 - \bar{\beta} \)), in the equilibrium where indifferent agents follow their private signals, we obtain that \( \hat{q} \) satisfies

\[
\hat{q} \in \left\{ \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \right) \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \right) \left( \frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1}, \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \right) \left( \frac{\bar{\beta}}{1 - \bar{\beta}} \right) \left( \frac{1 - \bar{\gamma}}{\bar{\gamma}} \right) \right]^{-1} \right\}.
\]

This is true because the social belief follows a Markov Chain with 5 states in this example. The states represent the number of private signals in favor of state 1 minus the number of signals in favor of state 0, with the values -2 and +2 being absorbing states. In the same game, if we consider the equilibrium where agents follow their social beliefs when
indifferent, we obtain that all agents copy the action of agent 1 and \( \hat{q} \) satisfies

\[
\hat{q} \in \left\{ \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \left( \frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1}, \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \left( \frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1} \right\}.
\]

We now define a property of the signal structure and preference distribution that enables us to characterize exactly the random variable \( \hat{q} \).

**Definition 11** The social belief is **monotonic in the observations** if

\[
\left( \frac{1}{q} - 1 \right) \frac{\int G_0 \left( \frac{t(1-q)}{(1-2q)+q} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}{\int G_1 \left( \frac{t(1-q)}{(1-2q)+q} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)} \quad \text{and} \quad \left( \frac{1}{q} - 1 \right) \frac{\int G_0 \left( \frac{t(1-q)}{(1-2q)+q} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}{\int G_1 \left( \frac{t(1-q)}{(1-2q)+q} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}
\]

are non-increasing functions of \( q \).

**Lemma 16** Assume that \( B(n) = \{1,...,n - 1\} \) for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). If the social belief is monotonic in the observations, then the limiting social belief \( \hat{q} \) satisfies

\[
\hat{q} \notin \left[ 0, \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \left( \frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1} \right) \cup \left( \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \left( \frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1}, 1 \right]\right]
\]

with probability 1.

**Proof.** For

\[
\overline{q} = \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{1 - \beta} \left( \frac{1 - \gamma}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1}, \%
\]

we get that

\[
\frac{\int G_0 \left( \frac{t(1-q)}{(1-2q)+q} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}{\int G_1 \left( \frac{t(1-q)}{(1-2q)+q} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)} = 1.
\]
Therefore, by the monotonicity of social beliefs, if \( q \geq \overline{q} \), we have that
\[
1 + \left( \frac{1}{q} - 1 \right) \frac{\int G_0 \left( \frac{t(1-q)}{l(1-2q)+q} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}{\int G_1 \left( \frac{t(1-q)}{l(1-2q)+q} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)} \geq \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1}{\overline{q}} - 1 \right) \frac{\int G_0 \left( \frac{t(1-q)}{l(1-2q)+\overline{q}} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)}{\int G_1 \left( \frac{t(1-q)}{l(1-2q)+\overline{q}} \right) d\mathbb{H}(t)} \right]^{-1} = \overline{q}.
\]

Therefore, for \( q_n \geq \overline{q} \), we have that \( \mathbb{P}(\theta = 1 | q_n, x_n = 0) \geq \overline{q} \). Since \( \mathbb{P}(\theta = 1 | q_n, x_n = 1) \geq q_n \), we obtain that \( q_n \geq \overline{q} \) for all \( n \). A symmetric argument yields the upper interval. ■

To connect the results concerning the limiting social belief \( \hat{q} \) and the measure of learning used throughout the thesis, asymptotic learning, we need to define the following two quantities. Let
\[
g_L(\beta, \overline{\beta}, \gamma, \overline{\gamma}) = \frac{(-\gamma + \beta)\overline{\beta}(-1 + \gamma)}{-\gamma(\gamma - \beta) + \gamma\gamma + \beta\beta - \gamma\beta - \beta\gamma + \beta\gamma}\]
and let \( g_H(\beta, \overline{\beta}, \gamma, \overline{\gamma}) = \)
\[
\frac{(-\gamma(\gamma - \beta) + 2\gamma\beta\overline{\beta} - \gamma\beta + \beta - \beta\overline{\beta})(1 - \gamma - \beta + \beta\gamma)}{-\gamma(\gamma - \beta) + \gamma^2 \overline{\gamma} + 2\gamma\overline{\beta}\overline{\overline{\beta}}\overline{\gamma} - 2\gamma\overline{\beta}\overline{\overline{\gamma}}\gamma - \gamma\beta^2 \overline{\beta} + \beta\gamma^2 + \beta\gamma - 2\beta^2 \gamma \overline{\beta} + \beta^2 \gamma \overline{\beta}}.
\]

The following theorem shows that the quantity \( g_L(\beta, \overline{\beta}, \gamma, \overline{\gamma}) \) lower bounds the amount of learning, \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \), possible for a given support of the private beliefs and distribution of private preferences. It arises when the limiting social belief \( \hat{q} \) takes values as close as possible to 1/2. Conversely, when the limiting social belief \( \hat{q} \) takes values as close to 0 and 1 as possible, the social belief is at its most informative about the state \( \theta \) and \( \lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \) takes the highest value possible, \( g_H(\beta, \overline{\beta}, \gamma, \overline{\gamma}) \).

**Theorem 8** Assume that \( B(n) = \{1, ..., n - 1\} \) for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). Then, the limiting
probability of an optimal action conditional on the state is bounded by

\[ g_L(\beta, \bar{\beta}, \gamma, \bar{\gamma}) \leq \lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \leq g_H(\beta, \bar{\beta}, \gamma, \bar{\gamma}). \]

Furthermore, if social belief is monotonic in the observations then

\[ \lim_{n \to \infty} \mathbb{P}_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = g_L(\beta, \bar{\beta}, \gamma, \bar{\gamma}). \]

**Proof.** Combining the results of Lemmas 14 and 15, we obtain that the limiting social belief \( \hat{\sigma} \) satisfies

\[
\hat{\sigma} \notin \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} \right) \left( \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1}, \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \right) \left( \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1} \cup \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \right) \left( \frac{1-\tau}{\tau} \right) \right]^{-1}, \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} \right) \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \right) \left( \frac{1-\tau}{\tau} \right) \right]^{-1}.
\]

The limiting social belief is least informative when it takes values closest to 1/2, that is,

\[
\hat{\sigma} \in \left\{ \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \right) \left( \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1}, \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \right) \left( \frac{1-\tau}{\tau} \right) \right]^{-1} \right\}.
\] (6.11)

and most informative when it takes values closest to 0 and 1, that is,

\[
\hat{\sigma} \in \left\{ \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} \right) \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \right) \left( \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1}, \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} \right) \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \right) \left( \frac{1-\tau}{\tau} \right) \right]^{-1} \right\}.
\] (6.12)

If, for any given agent \( n \), her social belief \( q_n \) satisfies \( q_n \leq \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \right) \left( \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} \right) \right]^{-1} \), then she will disregard her private belief and select \( x_n = 0 \). Similarly, if \( q_n \geq \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \right) \left( \frac{1-\tau}{\tau} \right) \right]^{-1} \), agent \( n \) will select \( x_n = 1 \). Since the sequence social beliefs \( \{q_n\} \) converges with probability 1 to \( \hat{\sigma} \) and \( \hat{\sigma} \) satisfies Lemma 15, for almost every realization, the sequence of decisions \( \{x_n\} \) will converge with probability 1. In a realization where \( \hat{\sigma} < 1/2 \), the
sequence \( \{x_n\} \) will converge to 0 and, conversely, if \( \hat{q} > 1/2 \) in a given realization, the sequence \( \{x_n\} \) will converge for that realization to 1. Therefore,

\[
\lim_{n \to \infty} P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ P_\sigma(\hat{q} < 1/2 | \theta = 0) + P_\sigma(\hat{q} > 1/2 | \theta = 1) \right].
\]

If the support of \( \hat{q} \) contains only two points, such as in Eqs. (6.11) and (6.12), the following martingale equalities [see Breiman, Theorem 5.14] allow us to compute \( P_\sigma(\hat{q} < 1/2 | \theta = 0) \) and \( P_\sigma(\hat{q} > 1/2 | \theta = 1) \).

\[
E_\sigma \left[ \frac{1 - \hat{q}}{\hat{q}} \bigg| \theta = 1 \right] = E_\sigma \left[ \frac{\hat{q}}{1 - \hat{q}} \bigg| \theta = 0 \right] = 1,
\]

We thus obtain that if the support of \( \hat{q} \) is given by Eq. (6.11), then \( \lim_{n \to \infty} P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = g_L(\underline{\beta}, \overline{\beta}, \underline{\gamma}, \overline{\gamma}) \) and if the support of \( \hat{q} \) is given by Eq. (6.12), then \( \lim_{n \to \infty} P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) = g_H(\underline{\beta}, \overline{\beta}, \underline{\gamma}, \overline{\gamma}) \).

In Lemma 16, we show that social beliefs monotonic in the observations guarantee that the limiting social belief \( \hat{q} \) will support closest to 1/2 and, therefore, \( \hat{q} \) will attain its least informative values.

Both \( g_L(\beta, \overline{\beta}, \gamma, \overline{\gamma}) \) and \( g_H(\underline{\beta}, \overline{\beta}, \underline{\gamma}, \overline{\gamma}) \) are increasing in \( \overline{\gamma} \) and decreasing in \( \underline{\gamma} \). Therefore, the more diverse the preferences are, the higher will be both the lower and upper bounds on \( \lim_{n \to \infty} P_\sigma(x_n = \theta) \). The final corollary shows that in the case where preferences are most diverse (unbounded preferences), asymptotic learning occurs.

**Corollary 4** Assume that \( B(n) = \{1, \ldots, n-1\} \) for all \( n \in \mathbb{N} \). If either the private beliefs or the preferences are unbounded, then asymptotic learning will occur in equilibrium \( \sigma \in \Sigma^* \).

**Proof.** This result follows immediately from Theorem 8 since \( g_L(\underline{\beta}, \overline{\beta}, \gamma, \overline{\gamma}) = 1 \) if \( \underline{\beta} = 1 - \overline{\beta} = 0 \) or \( \underline{\gamma} = 1 - \overline{\gamma} = 0 \).
Chapter 7

Conclusion

In this thesis, we studied the problem of Bayesian (equilibrium) learning over a general social network. A large social learning literature, pioneered by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992) and Smith and Sorensen (2000), has studied equilibria of sequential-move games, where each individual observes all past actions. The focus has been on whether equilibria lead to aggregation of information (and thus to asymptotic learning).

In many relevant situations, individuals obtain their information not by observing all past actions, but from their “social network”. This raises the question of how the structures of social networks in which individuals are situated affects learning behavior. To address these questions, we formulated a sequential-move equilibrium learning model over a general social network.

In our model, each individual receives a signal about the underlying state of the world and observes the past actions of a stochastically-generated neighborhood of individuals. The stochastic process generating the neighborhoods defines the network topology. The signal structure determines the conditional distributions of the signals received by each individual as a function of the underlying state. The social network consists of the network topology and the signal structure. Each individual then chooses
one of two possible actions depending on his posterior beliefs given his signal and the 
realized neighborhood. We characterized pure-strategy (perfect Bayesian) equilibria for 
arbitrary stochastic and deterministic social networks, and characterized the conditions 
under which there is asymptotic learning. Asymptotic learning corresponds to individual 
decisions converging (in probability) to the right action as the social network becomes 
large.

Two concepts turn out to be crucial in determining whether there will be asymp-
totic learning. The first is common with the previous literature. Following Smith and 
Sorensen (2000), we say that private beliefs are bounded if the likelihood ratio implied 
by individual signals is bounded and there is a maximum amount of information that 
can be generated from these signals. Conversely, private beliefs are unbounded if the 
corresponding likelihood ratio is unbounded. The second important concept is that of 
expanding or nonexpanding observations. A network topology has nonexpanding ob-
servations if there exists infinitely many agents observing the actions of only a finite 
subset of (excessively influential) agents. Most network topologies feature expanding 
observations.

Nonexpanding observations do not allow asymptotic learning, since there exists in-
initely many agents who do not receive sufficiently many observations to be able to 
aggregate information.

One of our main theorems shows that expanding observations and unbounded pri-
ivate signals are sufficient to ensure asymptotic learning. Since expanding observations 
is a relatively mild restriction, to the extent that unbounded private beliefs constitute 
a good approximation to the informativeness of individual signals, this result implies 
that all equilibria feature asymptotic learning applies in a wide variety of settings. An-
other implication is that asymptotic learning is possible even when there are “influential 
agents” or “information leaders”, that is, individuals who are observed by many, most 
or even all agents (while others may be observed not at all or much less frequently). It is
only when individuals are excessively influential—loosely speaking when they act as the sole source of information for infinitely many agents—that asymptotic learning ceases to apply.

We also provide a partial converse to this result, showing that under the most common deterministic or stochastic network topologies, bounded beliefs imply no asymptotic learning. However, we show that asymptotic learning is possible even with bounded beliefs for a certain class of stochastic network topologies. These networks feature infinitely many agents observing the actions of a group of agents that are not sufficiently persuasive and, therefore, always use their private signals to make decisions.

Finally, we explore the role of the diversity of preferences on asymptotic learning. We show that, in a network topology where each agent observes only the actions of a single neighbor, heterogeneous preferences make the agents’ inference problem harder, and therefore, hinder observational learning. On the other hand, when agents observe the entire history of past actions, diverse preferences enhance the agents’ ability to learn the state.

We believe the framework developed here opens new ways to analyze how the structure of social networks affects learning dynamics and the process of information aggregation in large societies. A fascinating question that we do not address in this thesis is whether it is possible for a social planner to influence the learning process by modifying the network structure and what would be the optimal way to achieve it. Some other very interesting questions that can be studied by building on this framework are the following: equilibrium learning when the underlying state is changing dynamically; information dynamics when there is a mix of communication (of signals or beliefs) and observation of actions; the influence of a subset of a social network (for example, the media or interested parties) in influencing the views of the rest as a function of the network structure.
Bibliography


