Terror Operations

Case Studies in Terrorism

US Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRADOC G2
TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) - Threats
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Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terror

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• Adds one case study on the “Beslan: Hostage Crisis and Mass Murder” as chapter 6.
• Adds bibliographical references to support Chapter 6.
• Adds source notes to support images in Chapter 6.
Preface

*Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism* is a supplemental handbook that presents several terrorist incidents in a case study methodology. This handbook supports a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC G2 capstone reference guide on terrorism, TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1, *A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. Both the capstone guide and supplemental handbook are prepared under the direction of the TRADOC G2, TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity-Threats. Understanding terrorism spans foreign and domestic threats of nation-states, rogue states with international or transnational agent demonstrations, and extremist cells with members or loosely affiliated actors with specific strategies, tactics, and targets. A central aspect of this handbook comprises foreign and domestic threats against the United States of America in a contemporary operational environment (COE).

**Purpose.** This informational handbook supports institutional training, professional military education, and operational missions for U.S. military forces in the War on Terrorism (WOT). This document provides an introduction to the nature of terrorism and recognition of terrorist threats to U.S. military forces. A common situational awareness by U.S. military forces considers three principal venues for armed forces: forces that are deployed, forces that are in-transit to or from an operational mission, and forces that are primarily installation or institution support. Compiled from open source materials, this handbook promotes a “Threats” perspective and enemy situational awareness of U.S. strategies and operations in combating terrorism. Neither a counterterrorism directive nor antiterrorism manual, this handbook complements but does not replace Army training and intelligence products on terrorism.

**Intended Audience.** This handbook exists primarily for U.S. military forces; however, other applicable groups include interdepartmental, interagency, intergovernmental, civilian contractor, nongovernmental, private volunteer, and humanitarian relief organizations, and the general citizenry.

**Handbook Use.** Study of contemporary terrorist motivations and behavior, terrorist goals and objectives, and knowledge of terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) improve training and readiness of U.S. military forces. This handbook will be updated as necessary to enhance a current and relevant resource. A selected bibliography presents citations for detailed study of specific terrorism topics. Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

**Proponent Statement.** Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the proponent for this publication. Periodic updates will accommodate emergent user requirements on terrorism. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to Director, U.S. Army TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)-Threats, ATTN: ATIN-T, Threats Terrorism Team, Bldg 53, 700 Scott Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-1323.

This handbook is available at [https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil](https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil), and requires an Army Knowledge Online (AKO) login for access.
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Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism

Introduction

...War has been waged on us [USA] by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict has begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing.

George W. Bush
The President of the United States of America
September 14, 2001

This supplemental handbook presents a sampling of foreign and domestic terrorist incidents against the United States of America. Using an abridged case study methodology, analysis approaches each case from a “Threats” adversary viewpoint. Assessment provides observations on terrorist effectiveness in a contemporary operational environment.

The Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) has several common threads or constants for defining the environment. The U.S. will not experience a peer competitor until 2020 or beyond. Armed forces will continue to be used as a tool to pursue national interests. The U.S. may direct military action within the context of an alliance, a coalition, or even as unilateral action, with or without United Nations sanctions. Actions will be waged in a larger environment of diplomatic, informational, economic, and military operations. Modernization of capabilities by potential or known adversaries could negate U.S. overmatch for select periods of time or specific capabilities. Similarly, advanced technologies will be readily available on a world market for nation-states and non-state actors. Non-state actors can cause significant impacts on a military operation, as combatants and non-combatants. Of course, these factors and their effects will vary depending on a particular situation; however, a constant that must also be addressed is the issue of variables. To recognize the conditions, circumstances, and influences that effect employment of terrorist acts, analysis includes constants [factors] of the Operational Environment (OE), as well as critical variables that define a specific operational situation.¹

To understand the complex interactions of the Operational Environment, a framework of “systems” assists in assessing and gaining situational awareness. Joint doctrine uses systems of Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) to shape and conduct missions. PMESII, with other variables such as physical environment and time, affect circumstances and influence operations throughout the domains of air, land, sea, and space. This broader perspective, combined with mission, enemy and belligerents, friendly forces and partners, cultural sensitivities and resolve, are critical to mission success. Defining physical environmental conditions include terrain or urban settings (super-surface, surface and

subsurface features), weather, topography, and hydrology. The variable of time influences action such as planning, multi-echelon decision cycles, tempo of operations, and projected pacing of popular support for operations. Whether a real world threat or an opposing force created to simulate relevant conditions for training readiness, PMESII and other variables such as physical environment and time (PMESII+PT) describe the OE.

Interaction among these elements may range from peaceful humanitarian assistance to high-intensity combat operations. Alliances and coalitions are the expectation in most operations, but U.S. unilateral action is always a consideration. Military operations interrelate with other elements of national power – diplomatic, economic, social-cultural, and informational – for both the U.S. and an adversary. Advanced technologies are available to almost anyone, yet sophistication of weapon systems, in itself, may be a liability. Intelligence and operational tools must overlap and integrate complex sensor-surveillance systems and the value of human intelligence “eyes on the ground” collection and analysis. Engagement among actors in the COE can span formal nation-state representatives to the impact of individual combatants and noncombatants. Acts of terrorism are part of this reality.

Using open source material, this case study series provides an appreciation of how much information is readily available to friend and foe in understanding the tactics, techniques, and procedures of a terrorist operation. Combined with situational awareness, U.S. military forces can better deter, dissuade, or deny terrorists in the ability to achieve terrorist acts and aims. Simultaneously, U.S. military forces maintain the ability to better defend and protect the United States, its people, and interests in the Homeland and abroad throughout a full spectrum of operations and contingencies.

The U.S. is conducting a War on Terrorism (WOT). This national strategy is offensive, direct, and continuous. U.S. action will initially disrupt, over time degrade, and ultimately destroy terrorist organizations of global reach. Targets of U.S. operations will include terrorist leaders; their command, control, and communications; material support; and their finances. The war on terrorism will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy over an extended period of time.

**Case Study Purpose**

Know your enemy. This can be a two-edged sword of situational awareness and understanding. Through discerning threats and capabilities with documented terrorist

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incidents, U.S. military leaders will develop better situational awareness of forces and vectors of terrorism.

**Case Study Elements**

Case study method is a process of shared responsibility and disciplined exploration. In this terrorism handbook, case study organization comprises three main elements of (1) a case study abstract; (2) a main body comprising an introduction, learning objectives, situational overview, focus areas, case study discussion questions, and a brief case assessment; and (3) a bibliography of selected open-source references per terrorist incident. The references are a prompt to seek additional resources through multi-media research and study.

Case study is an effective adult learning method that “…provides an opportunity to gain confidence in one’s own judgment, but also a degree of humility as well. It also provides a most invaluable opportunity to learn how far one can go by rigorous logical analyses of one of the other dimensions of the problem and the extent to which judgment comes into play when many factors which have no common denominator must be weighed.”

This process guides, but does not dictate, a learning outcome. Using the case method, every iteration “…provides opportunity for new intellectual adventure, for risk taking, for new learning. One may have taught [studied] the case before, but last year’s notes have limited current value. With a new group of students [leaders], the unfolding dynamic of a unique section, and different time circumstances, familiar material is revitalized.”

Interaction among individuals can involve different techniques to compare and contrast analysis and synthesis of case study material. After an initial reading of the case study, options include focusing each student on one specific aspect of the incident and requiring an appraisal, creating two-person groups to identify key issues for the larger group study, using small groups to be advocates on a particular aspect of motivation, behavior, or outcome in an incident, or direct a simple free-writing exercise to suggest student topics for further investigation.

Closure of a case study is based on a premise that most case studies do not have an endpoint answer or a salient solution. The norm should be a confirmation of what new understanding and awareness exists from case study, what actions may be appropriate in the immediate future, and what additional questions have been identified as a continuum of investigation and refinement.

**Abstract.** A brief statement summarizes the case study and its significant observations on foreign or domestic terrorism.

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5 Ibid., 42.
7 Ibid., 230.
Introduction. A preface presents the principal contents and purpose of the case study. Providing background information, the introduction provides context to the incident and enhances an appreciation of the sequence of events and act of terrorism.

Case Methodology

The case study presents, analyzes, and assesses salient aspects of a terrorism incident. This method evolves from an overarching study of selected terrorism characteristics, specified learning objectives, case questions which focus analysis, and a summarized assessment of the analysis for discussion. Research data comes from unclassified sources and is available from common open-source portals.

Learning Objectives. The group of intended outcomes from the case study enables focused study, discussion, and analysis of a specific terrorist incident.

Case Questions. Issues, stated as open-ended questions, propose primary study topics. These queries explore relationships of terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), and how terrorist capabilities were implemented to achieve a terrorist objective.

Assessment. Cogent statements summarize deliberate analyses of causal factors or linked relationships in a specified act of terrorism, and present informed conclusions to optimize planning and actions against terrorism capabilities.

Case Studies Index

- Tokyo Chemical Sarin Attack, Tokyo, Japan (1995)
- Murrah Federal Building, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, USA (1995)
- Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (1996)

The Contemporary Operational Environment

The War on Terrorism (WOT) is an operational environment of today and for the foreseeable future. The Operational Environment (OE) as defined by the Department of Defense is: “A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander.”

DOD definition and further defines a mission setting for the current or near-term future circumstances – a Contemporary Operational Environment.9

The Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) encompasses a full range of terrorism threat. Originated to address known and potential conditions and adversaries that U.S. forces might confront in a post-Cold War world, the COE is a conceptual construct to recognize several norms and critical variables for military decisionmaking, planning, and operating. As a superpower, the U.S. must still consider the normal influences of movements and regional powers around the world and the capabilities of their armed forces, paramilitary forces, or clandestine groups.

The U.S. National Defense Strategy identifies four types of challenging threats. Traditional challenges exist by states that employ recognized military capabilities and forces in the more conventional forms of military competition and conflict. Irregular challenges are the more unconventional ways and means to counter the traditional advantages of much stronger opponents. Catastrophic challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and possible use of WMD or methods that produce WMD-like effects (WMD). Disruptive challenges may be the use of breakthrough technologies to limit or negate the operational advantage of an opponent.10

The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) addresses the WOT nature of the threat, and states priorities and responsibilities within the U.S. Armed Forces. As noted by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy “…produces a clearer understanding of the enemies we face and the conditions under which we fight…” The nature of this environment is a war against extremists that advocate the use of violence to gain control over others, and in doing so, threaten our [U.S.] way of life. Success will rely heavily on close cooperation and integration of all instruments of national power and the combined efforts of the international community. The overall goal of this war is to preserve and promote the way of life of free and open societies based on rule of law, defeat terrorist extremism as a threat to that way of life, and create a global environment inhospitable to terrorist extremists.11

The United States will target eight major terrorist vulnerabilities. This targeting is against terrorists, their enablers, and their organizations and networks, including state and non-state supporters. The contemporary operational environment can be assessed

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11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, J5 War on Terrorism, Strategic Planning Division, Briefing (U) The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT), Version 18 April 2005.
as “…the most dangerous times of our lifetime…not so much because we know precisely what somebody’s going to do, when and where, or how they’re going to do it; but that we know their intent and we know what the possibilities are and we know what our vulnerabilities are…So terrorism is part of the tactic. In other ways it’s [terrorism] an ‘ism’, much like communism and the others, only so much as it’s embodied in whatever movements and for whatever reasons.”

The intent is to maintain the initiative and dictate the tempo, timing, and direction of military operations.

As an example, denying resources to terrorists and terrorist networks is critical to countering the ideological support of terrorism. These efforts remove any legitimacy to terrorism and eliminate state and private support for terrorism; make it politically unsustainable for any country to support or condone terrorism; and support models for moderation in the Muslim regions of the world. Techniques in coordinating such actions may include a methodology of identifying or “mapping” key components that affect resources such as technology, key figures, and locations. Identifying the major connections among these components can spotlight weak assailable links of the networking and where targeting and action plans may be most effective. Measuring results and adapting operations enable a process for improved Joint leader education, readiness training, and WOT operations.

Red Teaming

As a time-proven concept used in U.S. government and commercial enterprises, “red teeming” deepens the understanding of options that are available to counter adaptive adversaries. This methodology both complements and informs intelligence collection and analysis, and enhances predictive estimates of adversary capabilities and intentions. Analyses of friendly forces; partners, allies, or neutral forces in an operational environment; and adversary capabilities and limitations are elements of a comprehensive decision support process. Aggressive “red teams,” embedded in friendly force organizations, challenge emerging operational concepts, evolving contingency plans, as well as operational orders in order to discover weaknesses before real adversaries do. The perspective of an adversary may be that of a confirmed threat, or a contingency of threat capabilities used to present conditions, circumstances, and influences for training and readiness. Focusing effects to achieve friendly force commander mission and intent uses red teeming to combat terrorism threats in a systematic, proactive command and staff decisionmaking process.

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13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, J5 War on Terrorism, Strategic Planning Division, Briefing (U) Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism, Version 19Jan05, 5 April 2005.
In 2003, a Defense Science Board task force validated two primary reasons for expanding the role of red teaming in the DOD: (1) To deepen understanding of the adversaries the U.S. now faces in the war on terrorism and in particular their capabilities and potential responses to U.S. initiatives, and (2) To guard against complacency. Red teaming can stress concepts, plans, and systems to identify vulnerabilities and capabilities before direct confrontation with a real world adversary.

To best apply red teaming programs, red team members must be able to understand the thinking and motivations of adversaries with different cultural and social backgrounds, to assess and analyze acting as independent and adaptive adversaries, and to interact and recommend in constructive and creative ways with the supported friendly forces leader and military decisionmaker.14 The world today is complex, as is armed conflict. A significant difference today, different from previous recent wars, is the reality of a protracted conflict of uncertain duration15 – a war on terrorism. To “detect, deter, and destroy terrorist organizations at every turn,” another evolving component of any U.S. action plan is to act against threats before they are fully formed. The ability to “red team” terrorist capabilities and limitations can be a powerful tool to understand risks and identify friendly forces options.

The overarching aim of this handbook is to create situational awareness and understanding of current terrorism capabilities and limitations, and complement the deliberate processes of military risk management, force protection, and mission orders conduct and leader decision-making. U.S. Armed Forces are at war – a War on Terrorism. In this long-term war of uncertain duration, the United States of America will continue to defend its values, liberties, and culture; its economic prosperity; and its security, along with allies and international partners.

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Chapter 1: Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack

The March 20, 1995 chemical nerve agent attack with sarin on the population of Tokyo provides several significant and peculiar insights of terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The rush-hour attack was nearly simultaneous in execution on five subway trains that were converging to the center of Tokyo. This deliberate act of terrorism, conducted by a cult, intended to cause thousands of casualties with a chemical nerve agent.

Figure 1-1. Above. Tokyo Subway Metropolitan Network Map
(Source: map http://www.bento.com/subtop.html)

Figure 1-2. Above, Left. Triage Near Subway
(Source: http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/humantoll/htimages/mad2.jpg)

Figure 1-3. Above, Right. Shoko Asahara – Aum Shinrikyo Leader
(Source: http://www.mpa.gr/gr/other/terrorism/images/aum-shinrikyo-LEADER.jpg)
This case study presents an unclassified summary of the terrorist cult history and motivations leading up to and including the Tokyo subway attacks; planning and preparation; tactics and techniques of the multiple point-area assault; the immediate aftermath of the incident. Several vignettes highlight cult member terrorists, victims, and governmental responses to the attack.

Timing and method are tools of terrorist choosing and further complicate risk management and force protection of a target selected by terrorists. In the case of the Aum Shinrikyo cult,16 this subway attack with sarin was one act in a long series of criminal acts that spanned several years and involved at least one previous attack with sarin.

A primary underlying aim of terrorism is a demoralizing psychological effect on the target population and its leaders, often with explicit media coverage of mass casualty or mass destruction effects, to erode resolve and enhance terrorist objectives.

A former U.S. Secretary of Defense stated the issue of chemical weapon use by terrorists and a trend toward increased levels of violence and mayhem in this way:

“Also looming is the chance that these terror weapons will find their way into the hands of individuals and independent groups – fanatical terrorists and religious zealots beyond our borders, brooding loners and self-proclaimed apocalyptic prophets at home. This is not hyperbole. It is reality.”17

Honorable William Cohen
U.S. Secretary of Defense
1999

Introduction

The 1995 terrorist attack using sarin nerve agent signaled a new level of terrorism using weapons of mass destruction or effect.18 A chronology table of Aum Shinrikyo activities prior to this incident displays an escalating degree of violence and crime. Activities immediately after the sarin subway attack also display selective acts of terrorism as national,

18 National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1. The NMS uses the term “WMD” to describe a broad range of adversary capabilities that poses potentially devastating impacts. WMD include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical “weapons.” These type weapons may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects. For example, negative psychological effects on people may be more severe than the numbers of lethal destruction or the degree of economic damage.
regional, and local authorities sought to apprehend Aum Shinrikyo cult members as suspected criminals of the sarin attack. A timeline table shows the nearly simultaneous conduct of the sarin attacks at various points of the Tokyo subway, and notes the initial civil and military actions to the incident.

Analysis confirms a dedicated plan and preparation for WMD experimentation and use, combined with a cultish dedication to a leader with an Armeggeddon-like expectation of the contemporary period. Previous use of chemical attacks by the cult bolstered their confidence in using a chemical agent, and aided the planning and execution process of the Tokyo subway attack, as well as the evasion of the five attack teams from the five separate attack sites. Studying this terrorist group and attack incident has other interesting aspects not necessarily observed in other well-known terrorist incidents. The specific terrorists in this attack were highly educated individuals. Several members of the cult were recruited from, and infiltrated into, activities in civil government, law enforcement, commercial industry, postgraduate academia, and the national military forces.

**Learning Objectives**

Learning objectives focus on analyzing case study information in order to synthesize and evaluate insights from this attack, discern patterns of terrorist method and means, and determine likely trends in future terrorist activities. Comparing and contrasting conditions, circumstances, and asymmetric options available to the terrorist can enhance judgment to recognize vulnerabilities, identify threats, and minimize the ability of terrorism to impact on accomplishing a friendly force mission.

The objectives for this case study are:

- Describe intelligence indicators that might have been analyzed to create a more effective tactical estimate of terrorist intention and capability in the March 20, 1995 sarin attack.

- Understand the motivation of Aum Shinrikyo cultists of choosing the population of the Tokyo subway system as a terrorist target of high value.

- Recognize aspects of force protection measures that could apply in a similar U.S. situation.

- Explain terrorist organizational structure and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used for the Tokyo subway system attack.

- Deduce a trend for terrorist acts with the objective of an increased combination for mass casualties and mass destruction.

**Case Study Overview— Tokyo Chemical Sarin Attack (1995)**

In mid-March 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult collected intelligence of a pending raid on their compound by government agencies. On very short notice, the Aum Shinrikyo
cult leader decided to conduct a sarin attack on a densely populated urban environment to distract government authorities and possibly avert the raid on cult facilities.

On March 20, 1995, five two-person teams entered the Tokyo subway system during the morning rush hour of people going to work. The selection of entry points and destinations were part of an elaborate action plan to attack the city population with the chemical nerve agent sarin along a significant portion of the subway system. The subway trains route converged on Kasumigaseki Station in the center of the capital's government district. This district includes many national and international activities such as the U.S. Embassy. The attacks occurred at or about 8:00 a.m. when traffic was busiest on a normal workday. The attack teams used one member as a vehicle driver while the other individual placed a sealed package, camouflaged with newspaper, on overhead storage racks or on the subway car floor. Using a sharpened tip of an umbrella, the individual punctured the package that allowed sarin liquid to ooze into the car and gradually vaporize.

Nerve agent effects were observed immediately in various degrees of severity. Some people smelled a strong solvent-like odor. Sarin in its pure state is colorless and

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19 Commentary No. 60, The Threat of Chemical/Biological Terrorism, August 1995, 1; available from http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/com60e.htm; Internet; accessed 7 January 2005.
odorless. The sarin used in the attack was only about 30 percent pure which caused the noticeable odor. Initial symptoms included eye irritation, difficulty in breathing, coughing, choking, and vomiting. Some people suffered with convulsions. Some people lost consciousness. Depending on the degree of sarin released in the confined space of a subway car or train station platform, concern of passengers and subway workers quickly degraded to panic and hysteria in some cases. Scenes included groups of people collapsing in heaps. One platform had over 30 people collapse after being overcome by the sarin vapor. A strange smell was strong enough to be noticed at ticket counters one floor above one of the train platforms.20

In reaction to the attack, emergency responses were overwhelmed as the cause of symptoms was unclear and reports were conflicting. Similarities to a “toxic gas” incident in Matsumoto in 1994 soon alerted medical teams and police of the strong possibility of a sarin attack. Nonetheless, citizens, subway workers, and emergency response personnel that assisted in the first reactions to the incident were contaminated, and in some cases, also became victims. Evacuation and reception of victims to local hospitals caused further contamination to several medical workers and hospital staff.

The attack caused 12 deaths and contaminated or adversely affected between 3500 and 5500 people. About 1000 people were mildly or moderately suffering sarin effects, with about 500 people requiring hospitalization. Nonetheless, the psychological trauma or perceived physical effects caused several thousand additional people to seek medical treatment. This further complicated an already overwhelmed emergency response system. The initial hours of response were further confused by reports of a gas explosion as the causal factor.21

The original intention of the Aum Shinrikyo was much more devastating in concept. As evidenced in raids conducted by the Japanese government on Aum Shinrikyo facilities after the subway attack, the cult used sarin that was a much less potent and diluted product. Had the sarin been fully potent, had the complete number of sarin packages been punctured and agent released, and had a number of other contributing factors been available to the Aum Shinrikyo cult, casualties would have been much more severe. Aum Shinrikyo had an expectation that thousands of people might die from the sarin attack and additional thousands of people would suffer from nerve agent effects or the psychological trauma of a massive chemical weapon attack.

Background

The Aum Shinrikyo was founded in 1987 by Chizuo Matsumoto, a middle-aged former yoga teacher. In 1984, he formed a company called the Aum Shinsen-no kai which was a yoga school and publishing house. He changed his name to Shoko Asahara or “Bright Light,” and in 1987, changed the name of his yoga group to the Aum Shinrikyo, a Sanskrit derivative literally meaning “Supreme Truth.”

In August 1989, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government granted the Aum Shinrikyo official religious corporation status. This law provided the group various privileges including massive tax breaks and de facto immunity from official oversight and prosecution. Under the Japanese Religious Corporation Law, after a group is recognized as a religious organization, authorities are not permitted to investigate its "religious activities or doctrine". This is broadly interpreted to cover almost all activities of the religious group including actions that raise revenue or contributions for corporate activities. Although the police could investigate a religious group for criminal acts, in practice, this would be difficult if not impossible to do because of the law and the government's reluctance to investigate religions.

With its status as a legally recognized religion, the Aum's activities and character dramatically changed. From a small handful of members in 1984, Aum Shinrikyo claimed membership of about 10,000 members in 1992 and about 50,000 members worldwide by 1995. Similarly, expansion occurred from a one-office operation in Japan in 1984 to over 30 branch offices in over six countries. Net worth grew from less than 430 million yen (approximately $4.3 million) when recognized in 1989 to more than 100 billion yen ($1 billion) by the time of the Tokyo incident in 1995.

The cult of Aum Shinrikyo became more aggressive and dangerous. With its dramatic growth, evidence increased of complaints from parents and family members that some Aum recruits were kidnapped and physically assaulted by the cult. A number of anti-Aum groups were started in this period by families of cult members. The people that formed these groups complained that they also became victims of assaults and harassment.

In February 1990, Asahara decided to become a political power in Japan and announced to his members that the Aum Shinrikyo would campaign for representative positions in the Japanese Diet [Congress] election. Asahara and 24 other members of his inner circle campaigned for these governmental positions under the banner of the Aum's own party - the Shinrito. Asahara received only 1700 votes out of approximately 500,000 votes. All of the Aum Shinrikyo candidates lost the election with very disappointing voting results.

The 1990 election defeat appears to be a major decision point for Asahara and the direction he would lead Aum Shinrikyo to demonstrate in subsequent years. Aum Shinrikyo rejected normal interaction with the larger Japanese society. Announcements of Armageddon\textsuperscript{22} and paranoia were recurring with a steady increase in violence and confrontation with the government.\textsuperscript{23}

The Aum Shinrikyo beliefs merged a combination of several philosophies, religions, or mystic traditions. With the basis of Buddhism as an initial framework of belief, the cult distorted this religion with concepts of a god of destruction, and mystic predictions similar to Nostradamus.\textsuperscript{24} Asahara shifted ideas of spiritual liberation through peaceful contemplation and discipline to a vision of vaguely explained levels of enlightenment, surviving the

\textsuperscript{22} Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English, 74. Armageddon, defined as, biblical reference to place where the last, decisive battle between forces of good and evil is to be fought before Judgement Day.

\textsuperscript{23} A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo. 31 October 1995, 1-3.

\textsuperscript{24} Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English, 927. Nostradamus, defined as, a French astrologer, Michel de Notredame (1503-1566), known for predictions that have been interpreted in many forms as certain events occurred through the centuries and into the present era.
destruction of the world, and earning salvation after the pending apocalypse\textsuperscript{25} only through the Aum beliefs.\textsuperscript{26} Ashara stated that salvation was possible only through his teaching as “the Spirit of Truth, His Holiness the Master the Shoko Asahara” or the “Supreme Master.” He often announced bizarre predictions such as:

“From now until the year 2000, a series of violent phenomena filled with fear that are too difficult to describe will occur. Japan will turn into wasteland as a result of a nuclear weapons attack. This will occur from 1996 through January 1998. An alliance centering on the United States will attack Japan. In large cities in Japan, only one-tenth of the population will be able to survive. Nine out of ten people will die.”\textsuperscript{27}

Shoko Asahara
Aum Shinrikyo
1993

Asahara had been predicting the apocalypse for some time. Japanese government officials reported that Asahara published a 1989 treatise on Armageddon and described a worldwide calamity based upon a war between Japan and the United States which would start sometime in 1997. By the early 1990s, Asahara published numerous predictions and claims of a pending world war by 1997 and a catastrophic reduction in the world population. In 1994, Asahara presented a public sermon from the Aum Shinrikyo headquarters in Tokyo that claimed the Aum Shinrikyo were victims of “poison gas attacks” by Japanese and U.S. military aircraft. Alleging attacks since 1988, he stated, “the use of poison gases such as sarin were clearly indicated. The hour of my death has been foretold. The gas phenomenon has already happened. Perhaps the nuclear bomb will come next.”\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 64. Apocalypse, defined as, Judeo-Christian writings (c. 200 B.C. – c. A.D. 300) depicting symbolically the ultimate destruction of evil and triumph of good.


\textsuperscript{27} A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo. 31 October 1995, 3-4; available from http://www.fas.org.irp/congress/1995_rpt/aum/part03.htm; Internet; accessed 7 January 2005.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 4.
Table 1-1. “Aum Shinrikyo and Selected Events 1984-1995” provides a chronology of key activities in the expansion and influence of the Aum Shinrikyo cult leading to the March 1995 sarin attack, as well as events immediately after the attack.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Note:</td>
<td>Selected events were not a collated analysis prior to the March 20, 1995 sarin attack on Tokyo subway passengers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Asahara forms Aum Shinsen-no kai Company for book publishing and yoga training center. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Company changes name to “Aum Shinrikyo.” [Sen, Part 8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Parents and family members of Aum Shinrikyo recruits complain to law enforcement officers that Aum Shinrikyo was kidnapping and physically assaulting recruits and family members. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1989</td>
<td>Mr. Sakamoto, a lawyer representing anti-Aum Shinrikyo groups, kidnapped and murdered along with his wife and one-year old son.  [After the 1995 Tokyo attack, Aum members confess to crime and families’ remains are found.] [Sen, Part V, p.1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1989</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo recognized as religious corporation by Tokyo Metropolitan Government. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1990</td>
<td>Asahara and some Aum Shinrikyo members run for governmental offices in Lower House [Congress]; none elected to office. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1992</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo “medical mission” sent to Zaire to obtain sample of Ebola virus. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca.29 1993</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo begins research into and production of chemical agents. [Sen, Part V, p.1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1993</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo purchases 500,000-acre sheep ranch in Western Australia. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 ca., that is *circra*: about; approximately.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1993</td>
<td>Local residents (approximately 100 people) complain to officials in Koto Ward of Tokyo about noxious fumes emitting from building believed to be affiliated with Aum Shinrikyo. [After the 1995 Tokyo sarin attack, Aum members tell Japanese officials that Aum Shinrikyo dispersed anthrax bacilli at their Tokyo headquarters during this 1993 period.] [Sen, Part V, p.1]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1993</td>
<td>Asahara and 26 members visit ranch in Australia. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1993</td>
<td>Two Aum Shinrikyo members plead guilty to charge of carrying dangerous chemicals on an airplane in Perth, Australia. [Sen, Part V, p.1]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1994</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo members visit Australia to investigate possibility of extracting uranium. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1994</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo purchase a MI-17 helicopter from Russia. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1994</td>
<td>231 people in seven towns in western Japan (Nara prefecture) suffer rash and eye irritations from unknown source. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 1994</td>
<td>Sarin chemical agent attack in Matsumoto kills seven people and injures over 200 people. [Sen, Part V, p.2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1994</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo sell sheep ranch in Australia at a financial loss. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1994</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo begins manufacturing AK-74 rifles. [Sen, Part V, p.2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 1994</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo members break into Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department building in order to steal driver license data. [Sen, Part V, p.2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1994</td>
<td>Residents complain repeatedly of peculiar odors from the Aum Shinrikyo’s Kamikuishiki [north of Tokyo] complex. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1994</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo members break into Hiroshima Factory of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in order to steal technical documents on weapons such as tanks and artillery. [Sen, Part V, p.2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1994</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo’s “Home Affairs Ministry” head Tomomitsu Niimi sprays Tadahiro Hamaguchi with VX nerve agent; man dies ten days later. [Sen, Part V, p.2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1995</td>
<td>Niimi attacks Hiruki Nagaoka, leader of the Association of the Victims of Aum Shinrikyo, with VX nerve gas; Nagaoka survives. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1995</td>
<td>A village office administrator kidnapped and killed by drug injection; his body is burned in microwave incinerator and remains discarded. [Sen, Part V, p.2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 1995</td>
<td>An Aum Shinrikyo follower pharmacist, Otaro Ochida, is hanged in Aum Shinrikyo facility; his body is burned in microwave incinerator and remains discarded. [Sen, Part V, p.2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. Mar 1995</td>
<td>Aum Shinrikyo members assist in firebombing attack of Aum Shinrikyo headquarters in effort to inspire public sympathy for the cult just before the Tokyo sarin attack. [Sen, Part V, p.2]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 5, 1995</td>
<td>Eleven people hospitalized from strange fumes in the Keihin Kyuko train line in Yokohama. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 15, 1995</td>
<td>Three attaché cases containing liquid, fans, vents, and batteries are discovered in Kasun-dgaseki subway station in Tokyo. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mar 20, 1995</strong></td>
<td>Twelve people die and up to 5500 people injured from sarin agent release in five subway trains of Tokyo subway system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 30, 1995</td>
<td>Director of National Police Agency is shot. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 4, 1995</td>
<td>Odors noticed from suspected Aum Shinrikyo location in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 11, 1995</td>
<td>Twenty people complain of sore throats and foul odor on Keihin line in Yokohama. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 19, 1995</td>
<td>500 people hospitalized due to fumes in the Yokohama railway system. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 21, 1995</td>
<td>27 people overcome by fumes in a store near the Yokohama rail station. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 23, 1995</td>
<td>Hideo Murai, Aum Shinrikyo member in charge of the “Science and Technology Ministry” stabbed to death in front of Aum Shinrikyo headquarters.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 5, 1995</td>
<td>Two bags of “poison gas” found in the men’s restroom in the Shinjuku subway station in Tokyo. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 16, 1995</td>
<td>Parcel bomb explodes at office of Tokyo’s Governor; one aide is wounded. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 4, 1995</td>
<td>Poison gas found in women’s restroom on the Hibiya line, Kayaba-Cho subway station and in men’s restroom of Shinjuku station in Tokyo. [Sen, Part 8]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** During weeks and months following the March 20, 1995 sarin attack, several of the Aum Shinrikyo leadership [including Asahara, were arrested. Hearings, trials, and convictions are not included in this table.**

**Sources:**


Ibid., [table code Sen, Part 8].

**Planning and Preparation: Matsumoto – Sarin in the Air**

Almost one year before the 1995 Tokyo sarin attack, the industrial and tourist city of Matsumoto, Japan experienced a sarin chemical attack in one of its residential neighborhoods. Sometime during the early evening hours of June 27, 1994, Aum
Shinrikyo cult members used a converted truck to disperse sarin toward a group of houses, apartment buildings, and dormitory. About 11:00 p.m., the local police and fire department started to receive calls for assistance from frightened residents. Residents, disoriented and ill when firefighters or policemen arrived, were transported to the hospital. Casualties mounted as the police used loudspeakers to warn local citizens what they thought was a toxic gas leak. Emergency response and medical treatment and evacuation continued throughout the night. However, by the early morning hours, six people had died, and another person would die that same day. Over 500 hundred people were transported to hospital facilities with about 50 people admitted for medical care. Over 250 people received outpatient treatment.

Japanese authorities conducted a special investigation of the attack, or “accident” as the incident was initially called, and within a week confirmed that sarin had been identified by gas chromatography-mass spectrometry (GC-MS) results. At the time, no evidence identified a link to incriminate the Aum Shinrikyo cult. Nonetheless, the incident signaled the escalation of a known threat and demonstrated the danger of a chemical attack using sarin.

The Aum Shinrikyo terrorist team improvised a dissemination system within a truck to vent sarin vapor during an approximate 20-minute period. A light breeze allowed the sarin to drift through open windows or doorways to spread over an area about 800 by 750 meters. Most of the sarin effects occurred within an area of about 400 by 300 meters.

Of note, emergency response workers were affected by the sarin too. Of the over 50 rescue workers operating at the attack site, 18 workers experienced negative effects. One rescue worker was admitted to the hospital. Although other workers did not seek medical assistance at the time, they displayed mild symptoms that included eye pain, darkness of vision, nausea, vomiting, headache, mucous discharge from the nose, narrowing field of vision, sore throat, fatigue, or shortness of breath. Physical examinations conducted three weeks after the attack on rescue workers identified no remaining abnormal symptoms.

During subsequent investigations of the Matsumoto incident and the operations of the Aum Shinrikyo cult, law enforcement authorities determined the reason for the attack. The cult wanted to slow or stop a civil lawsuit over real estate. The three judges sitting on the legal panel resided in a dormitory of this neighborhood. Not wanting to risk a legal decision against the cult, the Aum Shinrikyo decided to stop the judges from making any decision by attacking them, and others in the area, with a vapor of sarin nerve agent.

34 Ibid., 1.
35 Nakajima, T; S Sato; H Morita; and N Yanagisawa, Operational & Environmental Medicine Online, “Sarin Poisoning of a Rescue Team in the Matsumoto Sarin Incident in Japan,” (vol 54, 1997), 1; available from http://oem.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/abstract/54/10/697; Internet; accessed 9 February 2005.
The Decision to Attack Tokyo

Hindsight demonstrates clearly the significant intent and capability of the Aum Shinrikyo to produce and use chemical agents against people they believed to be threats to their cult. The notoriety of the Matsumoto incident was just one in a series of chemical agent incidents. Some reports indicate Aum Shinrikyo first attempted to buy sarin as early as 1988 from an alleged weapons smuggler or later from contacts in the former Soviet Union. Eventually, the Aum Shinrikyo leadership decided to develop their own capability for producing sarin. Scientists recruited into the Aum Shinrikyo developed and produced small amounts of sarin in late 1993 and into 1994. A facility called Satyan 7 [or Satian Building No.7] was built with Aum funds to mass produce sarin. Several million dollars, scientists, and skilled workers created a high-quality facility with computer-controlled reactors and industrial packaging equipment to automatically package specified amounts of sarin and seal the bags. However, based on a chemical agent production accident in 1994, the facility was not used in any mass production. Scientists continued to experiment with precursor chemicals to manufacture small amounts of sarin measured in grams or kilograms. Notwithstanding, the Aum Shinrikyo sustained an aim to have a capability for producing tons of sarin.

Japanese law enforcement organizations continued investigations on several incidents and gathered information that indicated the Aum Shinrikyo might be involved in incidents involving chemical attacks. However, the Japanese Constitution and laws protecting recognized religious organizations prevented Japanese authorities from certain levels of detailed inquiry or direct action against the Aum Shinrikyo. Reports and allegations continued to indicate Aum Shinrikyo involvement in several criminal actions, and newspaper editorials suggested an Aum Shinrikyo link to the Matsumoto incident.

Eventually, Japanese police linked the Aum Shinrikyo to crime scene evidence involving a kidnapping and murder. Based on this information, police used this linkage to obtain a search warrant to enter the Kamikuishiki compound of the Aum Shinrikyo. In planning the raid, police were aware of suspicious reports about facilities on the compound and possible chemical agent manufacturing. When policemen coordinated with the Japanese Self Defense Force (JDSF) [military forces] for contingencies in chemical protective measures, members of Aum Shinrikyo inside the JSDF alerted the Aum Shinrikyo leadership of the planned raid on the cult compound.

Shoko Asahara, as the leader of the Aum Shinrikyo, decided to take an immediate preemptive action by conducting a major chemical nerve agent sarin attack. The intention was to distract police and prevent the raid on the Kamikuishiki compound.

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36 A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo. 31 October 1995, 11. Reports link Aum Shinrikyo with chemical nerve agent VX attacks in December 1994 and January 1995. In one incident the victim died, and in the other incident the victim was in a coma for several weeks but survived.
38 Ibid., 9 and 10.
Tokyo – Recipe for Disaster

The five terrorists selected to conduct the actual attacks rehearsed at the Aum Shinrikyo’s Kamikuishiki compound near Mt. Fugi. In the early morning hours of March 20, 1995, they used umbrellas with a sharpened tip to practice piercing plastic bags filled with water. Preliminary contingency training for such an event may have spanned several days or weeks, but the decision to attack, final checks, and rehearsals were conducted within hours of the attack. After the final rehearsal period and coordination at the compound, they were issued hypodermic needles filled with an antidote for nerve agent symptoms if they experienced sarin effects from the attack.\(^{39}\)

The Sarin Attack

Five two-person teams conducted a nearly simultaneous attack on thousands of passengers of the Tokyo subway system. One attacker and one automobile driver comprised each of the five teams. Four of the subway rider-attackers carried two sarin packages and one subway rider-attacker carried three packages. Each of the packages held about 20 ounces of sarin nerve

Fortunately, the sarin was only about 30 percent pure in its concentration. This dilution of the sarin was a significant factor in limiting the number of casualties in attacks about to occur in the Tokyo subway system.

The morning rush of downtown Tokyo had already started with thousands of people using the public subway system to reach their places of business and appointments. The five teams departed from Aum Shinrikyo facilities and drove to designated subway stations selected for their respective entry to the several subway lines.

Masato Yokoyama and Kiyotaka Tonozaki were assigned the objective of attacking the Marunouchi Line. On the way to the subway station, Yokoyama bought a newspaper and wrapped the sarin packages to disguise the weapon. Wearing a wig and fake glasses, Yokoyama boarded the Shinjuku subway at 07:39 a.m. as the train headed southeast along a route to Ikebukuro. He poked his sarin packages as the subway approached the Yotsuya Station. His poking released sarin from only one of the two packages. Yokoyama departed the subway car and went immediately to a rest room and washed his umbrella tip with water. He met Tonozaki in the waiting automobile and departed the area.

By 08:30 a.m., this subway train reached the end of the line at Ikebukuro and started a return trip along the line. At the Ikebukuro Station, the train passengers were evacuated and a search of the train did not identify anything suspicious. As the train resumed the subway route, passengers were feeling unpleasant and reported a strange object in one of the cars.

Meanwhile on the Hibiya Line, Yasuo Hayashi and Shigeo Sugimoto were about to start their attack from the Ueno Station. As Sugimoto drove the automobile to the subway station, Hayashi wrapped the sarin packages, three packages in this case, in newspaper. Hayashi boarded the subway at 07:43 a.m. and once the train was underway, dropped the packages on the floor. He punctured the packages with his umbrella tip at the Akihabara Station, and departed the subway train to meet the waiting Sugimoto and automobile. They returned to the local Aum Shinrikyo headquarters. As the sarin started to evaporate or came in contact with people, a series of subway stations experienced casualties as the subway train continued its route. Sarin effects were most significant along a route of five stations. This was the most disastrous of the five attacks with eight deaths and 275 people with serious injuries.

Kenichi Hirose and Koichi Kitamura also attacked the Marunouchi Line. Hirose wrapped the sarin packages in a sports tabloid, and boarded the subway about 07:45 a.m. His apprehension and mounting tension caused him to depart a subway car and stand on the subway platform for a brief moment. He reboarded a train car and as the subway approached the Ochanomizu Station, he dropped the sarin package on the subway car floor and poked the package with his umbrella tip. He departed the subway and linked up with Kitamura.

Before entering the automobile, Hirose rinsed the umbrella tip with bottled water and tossed the item in the trunk of the car. Even with these simplistic decontamination precautions, Hirose started to show symptoms of nerve agent poisoning. He injected himself with an

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41 Murakami, Haruki, Underground, 104-106.
42 Ibid., 144-145.
antidote, and subsequently required additional emergency care at the local Aum Shinrikyo headquarters. The attack at this subway line caused one passenger death and 358 serious injuries.43

The Chyoda Line was the attack objective of Ikuo Hayashi and Tomomitsu Niimi. Enroute to the station, the team purchased newspapers to wrap and camouflage the sarin packages. Hiyashi boarded the southwest bound subway about 07:48 a.m. Wearing a surgical mask often worn by citizens to reduce the spread of colds during this season, he looked around the subway car as he prepared to release the sarin. Dropping the packages by his foot, he poked the packages several times with the umbrella. Although only one of the two sarin packages was punctured, casualties at this site eventually totaled two deaths and 231 people with serious injuries. Hayashi departed the train at the Shin-ochanomizu Station and met Niimi in a waiting automobile. Both terrorists returned to the local Aum Shinrikyo headquarters.44

The fifth attack started at the Ebisu Station of the Hibiya Line when Toru Toyoda punctured his two sarin packages with an umbrella tip. He had been driven from the local Aum Shinrikyo headquarters to the Naka-meguro Station by Katsuya Takahashi. Toyoda departed the subway station at 07:59 a.m., sat down in a subway car, and dropped his sarin packages on the floor. Leaving the train immediately after puncturing the packages, he met the automobile and returned to the Aum Shinrikyo headquarters. During this trip, Toyoda displayed symptoms of sarin poisoning, but did not experience any permanent effects. This attack resulted in one death and 532 seriously injured people.45

Table 1-2. “Timeline of Sarin Attack in Tokyo Subway (1995)” presents the nearly simultaneous attacks along five subway lines trains on three major subway lines of the network within a 20-minute period, as well as the mass confusion and anxiety as the emergency incident of unknown origin defined into an attack with a chemical agent. Emergency response technicians, transportation system workers, and law enforcement officials were quickly overwhelmed as casualties surpassed any normal triage capability at the attack sites or the several local hospitals.

Lack of timely communication or protocols for combined emergency response to verify a chemical agent attack; effective command and control of civil and government organizations in the response effort; quarantine of effected areas, equipment, and people; and slow public announcement of the sarin threat further complicated the response and allowed additional people to be contaminated.

43 Ibid., 59-61.
44 Ibid., 9, 60.
Table 1-2. Timeline of Sarin Attack in Tokyo Subway (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology</th>
<th>March 20, 1995 Selected Events Sequence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07:39-07:59</td>
<td>Five Aum Shinrikyo members each enter a separate subway train in Tokyo subway system with sarin packets. [ZH, 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07:39</td>
<td>Yokoyama boards Shinjuka train, and punctures one packet at Yottsuya Station. [WE, 4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07:43</td>
<td>Hayashi Yasuo boards southwest bound train at Ueno Station, and punctures packets at Akihabara Station. [WE, 5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 07:45</td>
<td>Hirose boards westbound Marunouchi train, and punctures packets at Ochanomizu Station. [WE, 4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07:48</td>
<td>Hayashi Ikuo boards southwest bound Chiyoda train, and punctures packet at Shin-ochanomizu Station. [WE, 3]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07:59</td>
<td>Toyoda boards northeast bound Hibiya train, and punctures packets at Ebisu Station. [WE, 4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 08:00</td>
<td>Five near simultaneous attacks release sarin in subway train cars. [CM, 12]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 08:00</td>
<td>Passenger at Kodenmacho Station kicks packet from train unto the platform. Packet leaks to form puddle. [ZH, 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 08:00</td>
<td>Five subway trains converge on Kasumigaseki Station near the center of Tokyo’s government offices. [CM, 8]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:09</td>
<td>First emergency call arrives at Tokyo Metropolitan Fire Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:09-09:10</td>
<td>Numerous emergency calls arrive at Tokyo Metropolitan Fire Department from fifteen different subway stations. [CM, 17]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:10</td>
<td>Passenger on southwest bound train presses emergency stop button. Several train passengers collapse unto the platform when the train arrives at the Tsukiji Station. [ZH, 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 08:10</td>
<td>Train staff make progressive announcements to train passengers, “sick passenger…explosion occurred at Tsukiji…Tsukiji next stop…Evacuate, Evacuate, Evacuate.” [CM, 12]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:16</td>
<td>St. Luke’s Hospital notified of a subway incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:17</td>
<td>First report of “fumes.” [ZH, 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:20</td>
<td>First report to Tokyo emergency switchboard with “foul odor” at Kamiyacho Station. [CM, 26]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 08:26       | “Bad smell” noticed by several passengers at Nakano-sakaue Station of

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46 ca., that is *circa*: about; approximately.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08:28</td>
<td>First victims arrive on foot at St. Luke’s Hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:30</td>
<td>Train is evacuated and searched at the Ikebukuro Station. No packets are discovered and train resumes schedule. [ZH, 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:32-09:27</td>
<td>Train at Ikebukuro Station departs on return route, complete route and returns to Ikebukuro Station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:33</td>
<td>Fire Department emergency squad receives call of six passengers collapsing at Nakano Sakaue station. [CM, 26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:35</td>
<td>Hibiya line stops all service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:38</td>
<td>Train reaches Ogikubo Station terminal point on Marunouchi line, boards additional passengers, and starts route in opposite direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 08:45-09:15</td>
<td>During this period, train staff removes packets at Hongo-san-chome Station and mops train car floor. [ZH, 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 08:40</td>
<td>First ambulances with casualties arrive at St. Luke’s Hospital. [ZH, 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:44</td>
<td>National Police Agency (NPA) convinced of major incident in subway system and significant response required. [CM, 13]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:50</td>
<td>Emergency medical sites are established on outside subway stations. [ZH, 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 09:00</td>
<td>Police start to block access to subways that are not already closed by subway staff. [CM, 26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 09:00</td>
<td>Tokyo Metropolitan Fire Department establishes emergency response operations headquarters at affected subway stations. [CM, 17]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:27</td>
<td>Train on Marunouchi line removed from service. [ZH, 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:40-09:40</td>
<td>St. Luke’s Hospital receives surge of 150 patients from sarin attack. [CM, 30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>before 11:00</td>
<td>Police have confirmation that sarin is source of attack, but hospitals and Tokyo Metropolitan Fire Department not officially notified of sarin agent. [CM, 22]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 11:00</td>
<td>Police announce at a press conference that sarin is source of subway attacks. [CM, 23]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 16:50-21:20</td>
<td>Self Defense Force teams decontaminate train cars with bleach and water solution. [CM, 28]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First 24 Hours After the Attack</strong></td>
<td>Ten people die from sarin attack. Nine people died at the incident sites, and one person died just after arrival at a hospital. [PK, 2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Several Weeks After the Attack</strong></td>
<td>Two more people die from complications of brain damage suffered from the sarin attack. [KP, 2]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Supplemental Vignettes -The Immediate Aftermath

Communications at several levels of civil and government organizations were not effective for public safety and services in a crisis response. Numerous examples arose of civilian, transit authority, and first-responder awareness of a critical problem but displayed a slowness in reporting or coordinating action. Passengers in the trains were the first to observe other passengers with symptoms of illness, or felt sick themselves. The subway train cars had a direct intercommunication system from each car to the train conductor, however, passengers were either not aware of the system or were not willing to be the first to declare a serious problem.

Once the train control center was notified of a critical issue without knowing the full extent of the problem, trains were allowed to continue on their scheduled routes. Three trains continued their operation for a period of time before being pulled from active service. This continuation of service contaminated people and facilities along the train line. Additionally, other station managers and trains were not alerted along the same lines. As more trains and their passengers were attacked, a sluggish alert protocol delayed immediate reactions and effective emergency response. Subway cleaning crews were not aware of the threat when dispatched to clean platform or train car areas which caused some crew personnel to become casualties to the sarin. Due to insufficient training on how to decontaminate an area for this type of agent, some train yard areas were further contaminated.47

In contrast to what was contaminated, many factors have been identified that minimized sarin effects in the subway attack, with the dilution of the sarin as a frequently stated reason. The relatively rapid response of emergency treatment and decontamination teams, and an exceptionally powerful air exchange system in the subway stations assisted in reducing the number of casualties.48

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By evening, fifteen subway stations had been affected by the sarin. Of the three train lines (Marunouchi, Hibiya, and Chiyoda) contaminated with sarin, all service was suspended on the Hibiya line the day of the attack. Nonetheless, regular service resumed the following day. On the Marunouchi and Chiyoda lines, regular service resumed by late afternoon on the same day as the attack, except for the Kasumigaseki Station. This station resumed service on the following day.49

The Terrorists

The court trials and legal proceeding have taken, in some cases, several years to come to a legal decision on criminal charges. The information in Table 1-3, “Current Legal Status – Tokyo Sarin Terrorists,” presents the court sentences against the Aum Shinrikyo leader, as well as the sentences against members of the five two-person teams that actually conducted the chemical nerve agent sarin attacks on people in the Tokyo subway system on March 20, 1995. As the judge was reading the court verdict to the cult leader, Asahara smiled, laughed, and later yawned but showed no real emotion to his death sentence.50

Documents seized by Japanese police from Aum facilities after the March 1995 Tokyo attack indicate that the apocalypse date predicted by the Aum Shinrikyo cult may have been moved from 1997 to an earlier date of November 1995. Aum Shinrikyo articles in early 1995 contained anti-Japanese and anti-U.S. editorials that included one article questioning assassination of the U.S. President and other assassinations of Japanese officials. The cult claimed that the Japanese government and U.S. military had attacked their compound with “poison gas.” An October 1995 U.S. Senate paper noted an unconfirmed report that the cult may have planned to send sarin packages to locations in the United States.51

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Court Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shoko Asahara</td>
<td>(Aum Shinrikyo Leader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masato Yokoyama</td>
<td>(Sarin Attacker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiyotaka Tonozaki</td>
<td>(Accomplice-Driver)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toru Toyoda</td>
<td>(Sarin Attacker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsuya Takahashi</td>
<td>(Accomplice-Driver)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenichi Hirose</td>
<td>(Sarin Attacker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koichi Kitamura</td>
<td>(Accomplice-Driver)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikuo Hayashi</td>
<td>(Sarin Attacker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomomitsu Niimi</td>
<td>(Accomplice-Driver)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yasuo Hayashi</td>
<td>(Sarin Attacker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shigeo Sugimoto</td>
<td>(Accomplice-Driver)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: At time of handbook publication, some appeal actions continue on behalf of convicted terrorists.

51 A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo. 31 October 1995, 4-6.
In determining the motivation of terrorist groups willing to use WMD such as sarin, at least six characteristics to consider are: charismatic leadership; no external constituency; apocalyptic vision; presentation as a loner or splinter group; sense of paranoia or grandiosity; and preemptive aggression. Comparing these characteristics to the Aum Shinrikyo, the cult displayed these types of actions and behavior. The Aum Shinrikyo combined intent with capability to conduct attacks using WMD.52

Table 1-1. “Aum Shinrikyo and Selected Events 1984-1995,” notes several incidents after the Tokyo sarin attack that included cyanide chemical devices in public facilities, a mail bomb to a Japanese official, and the murder of an Aum Shinrikyo associate in front of an Aum Shinrikyo office. Cult reaction, even after the police raids following the March 20, 1995 subway attack, indicated a number of dedicated cult members using terror as a tactic. Other actions may have involved copy-cat type criminal acts. Three months after the Tokyo subway sarin attack, a commercial airline flight, ANA Flight 857 heading from Tokyo to Hakodate was hijacked using fake sarin containers and explosives.53

Law enforcement scrutiny and legal actions on Aum Shinrikyo escalated dramatically after the Tokyo attack. Media coverage and political debate continued to highlight events in this cult, even after the cult changed its name in to “Aleph” in January 2000. Public domain websites maintain chronologies of events and issues.54

The Victims

The number of injured citizens in the Tokyo subway sarin attack totaled about 3800 people with about 1000 persons requiring hospitalization. Using data from one of the several hospitals that treated casualties in the sarin attack, injuries although serious for many people, could have been a much more catastrophic incident. Of 641 victims at that hospital, five were in a critical state. Two of these patients died while three patients fully recovered. Major symptoms were severe convulsions and cardiac arrest.

Figure 1-7. Triage at Tokyo Subway Exit

Many patients with moderate symptoms were primarily eye problems and headaches. 106 people were hospitalized overnight for observation and treatment. Contraction of the pupil of the eye was a most common symptom, while other signs included pain in the eyes, blurred vision, and visual darkness. Shortness of breath, nausea, vomiting, muscle weakness, and coughing were other symptoms. Many of the people with mild attack symptoms complained primarily of eye problems. These were treated and released after six hours of observation at the hospital.

Demographics of this hospital’s patient population represented a mix of about 40 percent female and 60 percent male with ages ranging 13 years to 60 years old. Four women were pregnant. Based on follow-up surveys to patients one month after the attack, about 60 percent suffered from some post-incident symptom and remained at about the same levels after three and six months.55 A separate medical study of rescue team members and police officers exposed to sarin in the Tokyo subway emergency response was conducted about three years after the attack. Although the medical report states that further study of possible other contributing factors was required, the study observed a chronic decline of memory function in the group (rescue team members and police officers) when compared with a control group.56

Case Discussion Questions

Intelligence and Threat Warning?

- What activities preceding the March 1995 sarin attack might have indicated the intent of the Aum Shinrikyo cult to use WMD against a civilian population?

- Did Aum Shinrikyo announcements state or indicate a security risk to U.S. national interests?

- How were subway cleaning crews and first-responder emergency treatment personnel warned and protected initially from sarin contamination?

Security Measures in Effect?

- How did Japanese national laws relating to religious groups restrict investigative procedures by law enforcement organizations?

- What centralized command and control procedures existed among Japanese civil government-military organizations for emergency response to a catastrophic incident?

55 Ohbu, Sadayoshi; Akira Yamashina; Nobukatsu Takasu; Tatsuo Yamaguchi; Tetsuo Murai; Kanzoh Nakano; Yuki Matsui; Ryuzo Mikami; Kenji Sakurai; and Shigeaki Hinohara, Sarin Poisoning on Tokyo Subway, 1 to 4; available from http://www.sma.org/smj/97jun3.htm; Internet; accessed 22 December 2004.

56 Nishiwaki, Yuji; Kazuhiko Maekawa; Yasutaka Ogawa; Nozomu Asukai; Masayasu Minami; Kazuyuki Omae; and the Sarin Health Effects Study Group, Effects of Sarin on the Nervous System in Rescue Team Staff members and Police Officers 3 Years after the Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, 1-7; available from http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/2001/109p1169-1173nishiwiki/nishiwaki-full.html; Internet; accessed 25 January 2005.
Terrorist Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures?

- What precedents in domestic terrorism, using chemical agents, had occurred in Japan that could have focused government awareness and counter actions?

- What type of rehearsals did the teams conduct for the attack?

- What was the terrorist rationale for using small packets to deliver the sarin?

- How could terrorists have increased mass casualty effects as even more devastating?

- How did the terrorist group structure itself, communicate, and operate during the phases of final planning, rehearsals, and execution of the sarin attack?

Assessment

A U.S. Congressional Research Service study on the terrorist threat and weapons of mass destruction spotlighted several interesting aspects of the Aum Shinrikyo and its Tokyo sarin attack. In a developmental period of several years in the early 1990s, the cult experimented and attempted to acquire various forms of WMD. Recruiting for expertise included Aum Shinrikyo activities at universities with particular emphasis on physics, engineering, and computer departments.\(^57\) A worldwide cult membership reported in the tens of thousands, an asset inventory net worth in the range of $1 billion, and connections with diverse civilian, academic, and international business interests provided research facilities, equipment, and scientific expertise for an ominous capability. Although initiatives to acquire biological weapons appear to have failed, the Matsumoto and Tokyo attacks demonstrated a clear purpose of causing mass casualties with a cult-manufactured chemical nerve agent.

After the Tokyo attack, assessment by the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation had very little information on the Aum Shinrikyo. One immediate concern noted by US officials in Tokyo was the fact that Aum Shinrikyo had an office several blocks from Times Square in downtown New York City. No illegal activities were uncovered when searching these premises with a warrant. Nonetheless, information appears to note a significant failure to identify this emergent threat to the USA until well after the Tokyo sarin attack.\(^58\)

In Japan, contemporary laws and legal system of Japan provided special protections to recognized religious groups and placed significant constraints on law enforcement surveillance and investigation, even when incidents and allegations indicated a very suspicious manner of cult operations.

At the time of the Tokyo attack, the Matsumoto attack was still officially labeled as an “accident.” Suspicion of linking Aum Shinrikyo and sarin use at Matsumoto was increasing


by late 1994, and a newspaper story in early 1995 suggested Aum Shinrikyo involvement. Nonetheless, law enforcement investigation was constrained.

The Matsumoto incident alerted emergency responders, police, and physicians that another sarin attack was possible or even likely to occur. Timely information sharing and interdependence would be key in any future incident. At least one physician who had treated patients in Matsumoto called hospitals in Tokyo on March 20, 1995 to alert them to the fact that the symptoms he was seeing on television matched those he had observed in the Matsumoto sarin exposure. He assisted hospital medical staff near the subway sites to a correct diagnosis of sarin attack. Similarly, a hospital involved in the Matsumoto incident faxed information about sarin treatment to the hospitals in Tokyo. As the news reports provided live coverage of the Tokyo victims, a Japanese manufacturer of a critical medicine for treatment took the initiative to send a supply of the item to Tokyo without waiting for a government request.

The use of a chemical weapon in a terror attack complicates the issues of public safety and emergency response. Issues and actions can quickly compound when chemical agent use is suspected. Special care medical facilities must be established, protection of first responder personnel must be adequate and timely; secondary contamination of people, equipment, and facilities must be limited; and anxiety can erupt into chaos once a chemical agent is confirmed. During the Tokyo sarin attack, over 5000 people arrived at hospitals, but only about 20 percent of those people displayed symptoms of sarin poisoning.

For the Tokyo attack, Japanese Self Defense Forces were the only organization with decontamination expertise. Yet, the role of this military force was primarily limited by protocol to the decontamination of the trains after

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59 Ibid., 14.
incident recovery operations were complete. Within two hours of the subway attack, several Japanese military experts arrived at Tokyo hospitals to advise and assist on patient treatment.

A recent Central Intelligence Agency report states that terrorist attacks in the future would likely be “small-scale, incorporating improvised delivery means, or easily produced or obtained chemicals, toxins, or radiological substances.” Small-scale chemical weapons can be a weapon-of-choice by terrorists given the sure knowledge of the anxiety and other psychological stress the attack threat or use can produce. Health concerns by the general population include the awareness that attack can occur without warning; knowledge that a deliberate terrorist decision, rather than a natural disaster, can cause the attack; incomplete or unfamiliar information of actual health threats can increase anxiety, as can the potential long-term effects of a chemical weapon on current or future generations.

Some senior U.S. Defense Department leaders believe that WMD attack against civilian populations or military forces and infrastructure is a consideration of “when” rather than a possibility of “if” terrorists will use chemical or other means of WMD.

“…they [terrorists] inevitably will get their hands on them [weapons of mass destruction] and they will not hesitate to use them.”

Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
U.S. Secretary of Defense
2002

A separate study by the Office of the Secretary of Defense assessed the potential for a chemical attack to cause significant delays in the deployment of military forces and to negatively impact on mission success. Findings indicate that significant delays in force projection could occur and mission conduct could be impaired.

Whether the terrorist target is a civilian or military population and infrastructure, this case study provides insight to the multi-dimensional requirements to combat terrorism that include international and national policy and law enforcement issues, intelligence constraints and restrictions in a democratic society, use of military forces in consequence management support of a catastrophic chemical incident, intergovernmental emergency response preparation and readiness, and public awareness of the terrorist and WMD threat.

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Note: What is sarin? See the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) fact sheet “Chemical Agent Fact Sheet – Sarin” appended to this case study. This one-page display provides a definition of sarin and overview of delivery means, production, historical use, function, effects, medical treatment, and other “quick facts.”

**Chemical Agent Fact Sheet—Sarin**

**Sarin** is a colorless, odorless, tasteless, human-made chemical warfare agent. It was originally developed in Germany in the 1930’s as a pesticide. Sarin is a nerve agent—it disrupts the functioning of the nervous system. Nerve agents are the most toxic and rapidly acting of all known chemical warfare agents. Sarin is highly toxic in both its liquid and vapor states.

**Delivery:** Following release into the air, people can be exposed to sarin through contact with skin or eyes. Sarin can also be inhaled as a gas. Sarin mixes easily with water, and since it is odorless, people would not be aware of sarin in drinking water. Furthermore, sarin in water can be absorbed through the skin.

**Production:** Sarin is made by mixing several commercially available chemicals in the right amounts and in the right sequence. It is debatable how easy it is for the layperson to synthesize sarin. It is somewhat complicated and dangerous to produce.

**Historic Use:** Iraq used sarin in the 1980-1988 war with Iran. The Japanese religious sect, Aum Shinriko, released sarin in Matsumoto in 1994 and the Tokyo subway in 1995. In May 2004, the presence of sarin was detected in the debris of a bomb that exploded in Iraq.

(Source: CDC, U.S. Army, WHO)

*National Library of Medicine*

For further information contact STEPHANIE LORANGER, Ph.D., Biology Issues Director, SLORANGER@fas.org, 202-454-4686
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Chapter 2: Murrah Federal Building Bombing

The truck bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on April 19, 1995, signaled a horrific escalation of domestic terrorism conducted in the United States homeland.

“This is the place, after all, where terrorists don’t venture. The Heartland. Wednesday [April 19] changed everything.”

*The Daily Oklahoman*

April 20, 1995

This act of domestic terrorism highlights the importance of accurate and timely intelligence on potential terrorist activities and capabilities, while preserving the individual rights and liberties of our democracy. The shock of this devastating attack was much more than physical damage. The psychological impact, both near-term and long-term, propelled each United States citizen into a stark recognition that domestic terrorism truly exists within the nation’s borders. This example of terrorism in a contemporary operational environment illustrates an emergent terrorist trend of mass casualty or mass destruction effects as a terrorist objective.

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This incident was, ultimately, the wanton act of one person. This case study presents an unclassified summary of a calculated strategy and tactics for a specific terrorist act based on U.S. findings in the criminal prosecution of Timothy McVeigh and his co-conspirator.

A primary underlying aim of terrorism is a demoralizing psychological effect on a target population and leaders to erode resolve and enhance other terrorist objectives. This was clearly McVeigh’s goal when he selected a government target in the “heart of America.”

**Introduction**

The U.S. Department of Justice provided a concise summary on physical effects and casualties of the bombing. The blast at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building killed 167 men, women, and children and injured 853 others. A volunteer nurse became the 168th fatality when she was struck by falling debris during the emergency response. The explosion devastated downtown Oklahoma City. The blast reduced the north face of the Murrah Building to rubble, and caused extensive damage to each of the nine floors as they collapsed into the center. When the dust cleared, one-third of the building lay in ruins. The force of the blast damaged 324 surrounding buildings, overturned automobiles, started fires, shattered windows, and blew out doors in a 50-block area. News reports indicated that the blast was felt 55 miles from the site and registered 6.0 on the Richter scale.

Nineteen children died and thirty children were orphaned in the Murrah Building’s collapse. More than 400 individuals were left homeless in the area. When the bomb detonated, about 600 Federal and contract employees and about 250 visitors were in the building. Additionally, 7000 people lost their workplace. Approximately 16,000 people were in the downtown area in Oklahoma City at the time of the explosion. Beyond the physical devastation and death or injury to initial victims, the terrorist attack caused significant psychological and emotional impacts on a much larger population.\(^{71}\)

**Learning Objectives**

Learning objectives focus on analyzing case study information in order to synthesize and evaluate the insight of reflective experiences, discern patterns of terrorist method and means, and determine likely trends in future terrorist activities. Comparing and contrasting conditions, circumstances, and options available to the terrorist will enhance the ability to recognize vulnerabilities and identify threats.

The objectives for this case study are:

- Describe intelligence indicators that would have alerted law enforcement to the threat.

- Understand the motivation of Timothy McVeigh for choosing the Murrah Building as a terrorist target of high value, as well as his selection of a symbolic date for the attack.


\(^{71}\) Turman, Department of Justice, *Responding to Terrorism Victims*, 1.
• Recognize the domestic terrorist threat to U.S. forces and citizenry in the United States homeland.

• Explain the terrorist organizational structure and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used for the Murrah Building bombing.

• Deduce a trend for terrorist acts with the objective of an increased combination for mass casualties and mass destruction.

“Terrorism has now exploded into middle America.”

Louis J. Freeh
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Case Study Overview - Murrah Federal Building (1995)

At 9:02 the morning of April 19, 1995 a catastrophic explosion ripped the air in downtown Oklahoma City. A truck bomb instantaneously demolished the entire front of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. Tons of crashing concrete and metal disrupted governmental functions and destroyed scores of lives. These innocent Americans included clerks, secretaries, law enforcement officers, credit union employees, citizens applying for Social Security, and children.

The Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building was used by various agencies of the United States, including the Agriculture Department, Department of the Army, Defense Department, Federal Highway Administration, General Accounting Office, General Services Administration, Social Security Administration, Housing and Urban Development, Drug Enforcement Administration, Labor Department, Marine Corps, Small Business Administration, Transportation Department, United States Secret Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Veterans Administration.

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The primary preparation for this criminal act began on or about September 13, 1994 and culminated on April 19, 1995 in the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.75

A chronology of terrorist activities displays an obsessive hate for the U.S. government, and a deliberate methodology for planning, preparing, and executing this terrorist attack.

**Background**

Surveying the lifestyle of Timothy McVeigh in the years prior to the bombing, he experienced mixed success at a series of minor jobs. He worked at a fast food restaurant in the fall of 1986 until the spring of 1987. Then he switched jobs and went to work as an armored car driver for a commercial security company in Buffalo, New York from the spring of 1987 to the spring of 1988.

McVeigh joined the U.S. Army in May, 1988 and remained in the Army until late 1991. He was a successful gunner on a mechanized infantry vehicle during the Gulf War and was decorated with several Army awards for actions in combat and commendable service.76 Yet, McVeigh's dislike for the Federal government was revealing itself in this same period. Some of his discussions with acquaintances related to reading a book and the exploits of a group of well-armed men and women who called themselves "patriots" that sought to overthrow the Federal government by use of force and violence. In one book, a group makes a fertilizer bomb in the back of a truck and detonates it in front of a Federal building in downtown Washington, D.C. during business hours that kills hundreds of people.77

As a guard for a commercial security company, he distributed white supremacist pamphlets and a book to co-workers on how to avoid paying taxes, and commented that it would be easy to steal firearms from a military base.78 From March 1992 to early 1993, McVeigh worked at another commercial security service. He visited his friends Mike and Lori Fortier who lived in Arizona. McVeigh worked at a hardware store in Arizona, and also worked as a security guard. Eventually, he started buying and selling books, as well as survivalist items at numerous gun shows throughout the United States.

McVeigh was fixated on personal rights and individual freedom. He studied history, the U.S. Constitution, and the amendments to the Constitution. He carried them on his person, he carried them in his car, and he carried them in his briefcase. He stacked them in his house, and he displayed them on tables at gun shows.


He also wrote letters to newspapers with his viewpoint on personal rights and freedoms. He voted as a U.S. citizen. His politics were openly expressed and known to everyone that spent time with him.\(^{79}\) In touring gun shows throughout the United States, he eventually visited forty of fifty states. As he sold books and survival items at gun shows, he often met people with similar concern about Constitutional rights and the perceived Federal government’s zeal in gun control.\(^{80}\)

McVeigh viewed the Federal raid at Ruby Ridge in 1992 as another incident of government attack on individual freedoms. Incidents between U.S. citizens and Federal agents such as at Ruby Ridge [1992] and Waco [1993] greatly concerned McVeigh. Citizens could have distinctly different beliefs and commitment to how individual rights\(^{81}\) and obedience to and enforcement of law\(^{82}\) are expressed in the United States. According to McVeigh’s defense attorney at his trial after the Murrah Building bombing, McVeigh was angry about Ruby Ridge. He believed that the ATF had entrapped Randy Weaver into committing a crime so that they could then pressure Weaver into being an informant for the ATF [Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] in a community in northern Idaho. McVeigh believed that the Federal government had acted very unjustly in the incident that resulted in the death of a Federal agent, the killing of Randy Weaver’s wife, and the killing of a ten-year-old boy as he was running towards the Weaver’s house. A court jury acquitting Randy Weaver of murder in the Ruby Ridge incident further convinced McVeigh of the correctness of his belief.

McVeigh also strongly opposed to the Brady Bill and gun control, so he wrote angry letters and talked about freedom and citizen’s constitutional rights. In McVeigh’s mind, the Brady Bill was just the first step to effectively repeal the U.S. Constitution’s Second Amendment by taking away from people their right to own guns and to protect themselves against abuses of the Federal government.\(^{83}\)

In addition to his concerns on the Ruby Ridge incident and the Brady Bill, McVeigh became obsessed with the outcome of the Waco, Texas incident between a religious group known as the Branch Davidians and Federal agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. An attempt to serve a search warrant for illegal weapons resulted in a gunfire exchange that resulted in several deaths and a group of Branch Davidians barricading themselves inside their ranch compound. He traveled to the Waco site and distributed anti-governmental literature. On April 19th, 1993, the United States experienced another tragedy when the siege of the Branch Davidian compound resulted in several deaths and destruction of the compound. McVeigh believed that the Federal government executed 76 people at Waco, including 30 women and 25 children. He believed that the Federal law enforcement at Waco deployed in a military fashion against American citizens and children living as a religious group in a


\(^{80}\) Michel and Herbeck, *American Terrorist*, 121.


compound, who had committed no crime. McVeigh visited Waco during the siege and went back after the compound’s fire and final events of the siege.

As time passed, he became more outraged at the government. McVeigh told people that the U.S. Federal Government had intentionally murdered people at Waco, and described the incident as the government's declaration of war against the American people. He wrote letters declaring that the government had drawn "first blood" at Waco, and predicted there would be a violent revolution against the American government.

McVeigh's anger and hatred of the government kept growing, and in late summer 1994, he told friends that he was done distributing antigovernment propaganda and talking about the coming revolution. He said it was time to take action, and the action he wanted to take was something dramatic, something that would shake up America [United States]. McVeigh expected and hoped that his action would be the “first shot” in a violent, bloody revolution in this country.

**Planning and Preparation: Oklahoma City Target**

The action he selected was a bombing, and the building he selected was the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. McVeigh had two reasons for bombing that particular building. First, he thought that the ATF agents, whom he blamed for the Waco tragedy, had their offices in that building. Second, McVeigh described the Murrah Federal Building as “an easy target.”

McVeigh selected the Murrah Building from a list of sites he developed as potential targets. He wanted his attack to target Federal law enforcement agencies and their employees. He recognized that many innocent people would be injured or killed. Primary targets included the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Drug Enforcement Administration. Besides the Oklahoma City site, McVeigh considered locations in Arkansas, Arizona, Missouri, and Texas. Another possible site may have included Washington, D.C. McVeigh considered targeting specific Federal individuals or their family members, but decided that a bombing would cause more notoriety.

The Murrah Building was conveniently located just south of Kansas where McVeigh resided. Its close proximity to an interstate highway (Interstate 35) assured easy access to and egress from the bombing target. The building design allowed for easy delivery or pickup of packages and people due to indented curbing in front of the building, which allowed vehicles to park directly in front of the building. You could drive a truck directly up to the front of the building. McVeigh assessed the damage that would occur based on the extensive amount of

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86 Ibid., 8.
glass windows in the Murrah Building and considered the probable collateral damage to surrounding structures. He recognized that the open parking lot space across the street from the building may dissipate some concussion from the explosion, but would allow good photograph coverage of a stark, horrifying image. Killing a large number of Federal employees was part of his plan to ensure major media attention.89

McVeigh conducted detailed personal reconnaissance of his target and routes of approach and routes of escape.90 McVeigh memorized his sequence of actions for this bombing, rehearsed his route, and prepared mentally for contingencies such as flat tires or meeting with police.91

McVeigh practiced bomb construction and observed bomb effects on a small scale by using a plastic jug and detonating the explosive-packed device at a desert location near a friend’s home.92 The bomb concept McVeigh was planning consisted of more than 5000 pounds of ammonium nitrate fertilizer mixed with about 1200 pounds of liquid nitromethane, 350 pounds of Tovex explosive, and the miscellaneous weight of sixteen 55-gallon drums, for a combined weight of about 7000 pounds.93 The truck bomb was relatively inexpensive to construct. A truck rental would be about $250. Fertilizer would cost about $500. The nitromethane cost about $3000. A used car for his escape vehicle would cost about $250. His estimate was a bomb project costing approximately $5000.94

McVeigh and Nichols obtained 4,000 pounds – two tons – of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. They bought it at a farm supply store in central Kansas where Nichols was living at the time and where McVeigh visited him. This was in the fall of 1994, at least six months before the bombing; giving an indication of the deliberate planning that went into process and premeditation.95 To get some of the other chemicals they needed for the bomb, McVeigh and Nichols used a commercial phone book and simply called dozens of companies and individuals in search of ingredients.96

McVeigh and Nichols got the detonators for the bomb by stealing them. Near Marion, Kansas, they broke into several storage lockers for explosives at a rock quarry, and stole hundreds of blasting caps and sausage-shaped explosives known as Tovex.97 They rented storage lockers in the central Kansas area near Nichols home and in Arizona to store supplies and stolen items, using phony names to preclude easy tracing of their real identities.98

During this period when McVeigh and Nichols were acquiring the components for the bomb, McVeigh periodically drove to Arizona and visited two of his friends, Michael and Lori Fortier. He had met Michael in the Army. They had shared similar antigovernment ideas,

89 Michel and Herbeck, American Terrorist, 168 and 169.
90 Ibid., 230.
91 Ibid., 214 and 215.
92 Ibid., 165.
93 Ibid., 164.
94 Ibid., 176 and 207.
96 Ibid., 10.
97 Ibid., 13.
98 Ibid., 14.
and McVeigh had come to trust Michael and Michael's wife, Lori. In the fall of 1994, he confided his plan to both of them. Sitting in their living room in Kingman, Arizona, McVeigh drew a diagram of the bomb that he intended to build. He outlined the box of the truck and drew circles for the barrels inside the truck. He described how the barrels of fertilizer and fuel oil would be positioned in the truck to cause maximum damage. McVeigh demonstrated his design to Lori Fortier by taking soup cans from her cupboard and placing them on the floor. The layout displayed the shape of the bomb inside the box of the truck that he described as a shape charge. He explained that by putting the barrels of explosives in a particular shape, he would increase the blast effects in a particular direction.  

In addition to what McVeigh told Fortier about his bombing plans, he took Fortier to Oklahoma City and showed him the building months before the bombing. McVeigh told Fortier during the trip that Nichols would help McVeigh mix the bomb and would help McVeigh get away after the bombing. When McVeigh and Fortier were in downtown Oklahoma City, they drove around the Murrah Building. McVeigh showed Fortier the alley where he planned on parking his car. He explained to Fortier that he would park there because he wanted to have a tall building between himself and the blast.

McVeigh also told Fortier about how he and Nichols planned to raise money to finance their illegal activities. They were going to do it by robbing a man who was a gun dealer that McVeigh knew from Arkansas. McVeigh had previously observed the man’s home in a remote area of Arkansas. Since the man knew McVeigh, Nichols was going to do the actual robbery. The stolen weapons and property were eventually sold to finance the bombing plot.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 22, 1994</td>
<td>McVEIGH rented a storage unit in the name of “Shawn Rivers” Herington, Kansas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 30, 1994</td>
<td>McVEIGH and NICHOLS purchased forty fifty-pound bags of ammonium nitrate in McPherson, Kansas under name of “Mike Havens.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late September 1994</td>
<td>McVEIGH made telephone calls in an attempt to obtain detonation cord and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

99 Ibid., 15.
100 Ibid., 32.
101 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1, 1994</td>
<td>Racing fuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 3, 1994</td>
<td>McVEIGH and NICHOLS stole explosives from a storage locker (commonly referred to as a magazine) in Marion, Kansas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 4, 1994</td>
<td>McVEIGH and NICHOLS transported the stolen explosives to Kingman, Arizona.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16, 1994</td>
<td>McVEIGH rented a storage unit in Kingman, Arizona for the stolen explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 17, 1994</td>
<td>NICHOLS registered at a motel in Salina, Kansas under the name “Terry Havens.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About October 18, 1994</td>
<td>McVEIGH and NICHOLS purchased forty fifty-pound bags of ammonium nitrate in McPherson, Kansas under the name “Mike Havens.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 19, 1994</td>
<td>McVEIGH and NICHOLS planned a robbery of a firearms dealer in Arkansas as a means to obtain moneys to help finance their planned act of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 5, 1994</td>
<td>McVEIGH planned and NICHOLS robbed, at gunpoint, a firearms dealer in Arkansas of firearms, ammunition, coins, United States currency, precious metals and other property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 7, 1994</td>
<td>NICHOLS rented storage unit No. 37 in Council Grove, KS in the name “Ted Parker” and concealed property stolen in the Arkansas robbery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 16, 1994</td>
<td>NICHOLS rented a storage unit in Las Vegas, Nevada and stored items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 21, 1994</td>
<td>NICHOLS prepared a letter to McVEIGH, to be delivered only in the event of NICHOLS’ death, in which he advised McVEIGH, among other matters, that storage unit No. 37 in Council Grove, Kansas had been rented in the name “Parker” and instructed McVEIGH to clear out the contents or extend the lease on No. 37 by February 1, 1995. NICHOLS further instructed McVEIGH to &quot;liquidate&quot; storage unit No. 40.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16, 1994</td>
<td>McVEIGH, while en route to Kansas to take possession of firearms stolen in the Arkansas robbery, drove with Michael FORTIER to the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building and identified the building as the target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1995</td>
<td>McVEIGH, NICHOLS, and FORTIER obtained currency from sale of firearms stolen in the Arkansas robbery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 9, 1995</td>
<td>NICHOLS paid for the continued use of storage unit No. 40 at Council Grove, Kansas in the name of “Joe Kyle.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>McVEIGH obtained a driver's license in the name of “Robert Kling” bearing a date of birth of April 19, 1972.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 14, 1995</td>
<td>McVEIGH purchased a 1977 Mercury Marquis in Junction City, KS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 14, 1995</td>
<td>McVEIGH called the NICHOLS residence in Herington, Kansas from Junction City, KS.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
April 14, 1995, McVEIGH called a business in Junction City using the name “Bob Kling” to inquire about renting a truck capable of carrying 5,000 pounds of cargo.

April 14, 1995 McVEIGH rented a room at a motel in Junction City, KS.

April 15, 1995 McVEIGH placed a deposit for a rental truck in the name "Robert Kling."

April 17, 1995 McVEIGH took possession of a 20-foot rental truck in Junction City, KS.

April 18, 1995 McVEIGH and NICHOLS, at Geary Lake State Park in Kansas, constructed an explosive truck bomb with barrels filled with a mixture of ammonium nitrate, fuel and other explosives placed in the cargo compartment of the rental truck.

April 19, 1995 McVEIGH caused the truck bomb to explode by lighting fuses connected to the explosive device in the truck.

April 19, 1995 McVEIGH parked the truck bomb directly outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, during regular business and day-care hours.

April 19, 1995 9:02 Truck bomb detonates next to Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building.

McVeigh learned some of his bomb making knowledge from pamphlets or books easily available on the open market. He learned how to mix different explosive ingredients, how to set up the bomb; and details such as how to drill a hole between the cargo box and the cab of the truck so that he could light the fuse from where he would be sitting as he drove the truck bomb. 103

By the end of October 1994, McVeigh had most of the ingredients he needed to build the bomb. He was determined to take action when he thought it would have maximum impact. The anniversary of the tragedy at Waco would provide that kind of maximum impact. He thought that others in the U.S. were as angered at Waco as he was and that he could achieve tremendous impact – shake up the nation – by delaying his violent terrorist action until the April 19th anniversary of the Waco incident. 104

“Something big is about to happen.” 105

Timothy McVeigh
Letter to McVeigh’s sister

McVeigh had been regularly corresponding with his sister, Jennifer. In the fall of 1994, he visited her and created a file in her computer. He marked the file “ATF read,” as though he wanted the ATF to discover this file and read it after his dramatic action. One chilling

103 Ibid., 25.
104 Ibid., 15.
105 Ibid., 16.
declaration stated, “All you tyrannical [profanity] will swing in the wind one day for your treasonous actions against the Constitution and the United States.” The file entry concluded with these words: “Die, you spineless cowardice [profanity].”

On occasion, McVeigh used pre-paid debit cards or public pay telephones to avoid the possibility of calls being traced to him. For instance, on April 14th McVeigh called Terry Nichols, who was living at that time in nearby Herington, Kansas. McVeigh also called a company to reserve a rental truck. Both calls were made on a debit card in an attempt to preclude any trace of who actually called.

Later that day, McVeigh registered with his own name at a small motel in Junction City, Kansas. He resided at the motel through that weekend up until April 18th, Tuesday, the day before the bombing.  

To hide his true identity, McVeigh used a phony driver's license to rent a truck. He had obtained a blank driver's license form through an advertisement in a commercial magazine that sells fake identification kits. He selected the name Robert Kling. As McVeigh noted to Lori Fortier, he liked that name because it reminded him of the “Klingon” warrior characters on a popular television show “Star Trek.”

Located about four miles from the motel, McVeigh arrived at a truck rental agency. The truck rental company attendant remembered a young man with a military demeanor who introduced himself as Robert Kling. Instead of simply making a cash deposit to reserve the truck in the name Kling, this man [McVeigh] wanted to pay for the truck in full. Kling [McVeigh] counted out several hundred dollars in cash and gave it to the attendant. After some administering of forms, Kling [McVeigh] departed the truck rental company, saying he would return to pick up the truck.

As a sidenote, April 23d is McVeigh's real birthday. However, the birthday he gave Kling on the fake driver’s license used to “prove” his identify was a special day -- April 19th -- the anniversary of the Davidian incident at Waco, and the date that McVeigh selected for the bombing in Oklahoma City. McVeigh wanted to avenge the deaths that occurred at Waco. He also knew that April 19th in 1775 is considered by some people as the beginning of the American Revolution and in his own mind, would be symbolic of defiance against what he believed to be an oppressive government.

On the morning of April 18, 1995, an individual at the Geary State Fishing Lake, approximately six miles south of Junction City, Kansas, observed a yellow truck parked next to a pickup truck for several hours. The individual described the pickup truck in some detail and recalled there was something white, possibly a camper shell, on the back of the pickup.

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106 Ibid., 19.
107 Ibid., 17.
108 Ibid., 19-21.
109 Ibid., 24.
truck.\textsuperscript{111} Little did the observing individual know that two men (McVeigh and Nichols) were constructing a massive truck bomb that would devastate the Murrah Building the next day in Oklahoma City.

The Attack with a High Yield Explosive

Sleeping in the rental truck that night at a gravel lot near a roadside motel in northern Oklahoma, McVeigh awoke early the morning of April 19\textsuperscript{th}, 1995. As he entered downtown Oklahoma City, he placed earplugs in his ears and continued driving. He stopped briefly to light one of two fuses connected to the bomb. Shortly afterwards, he halted the truck for a stoplight and lit the second fuse. The Murrah Building and surrounding area, brimming with people, were about to become a macabre scene of devastation.

McVeigh positioned the truck at the delivery access point in front of the Murrah Building, got out of the truck and locked the vehicle. He walked casually on a route along sidewalks that he had previously reconnoitered. He wanted to be behind a building when the bomb detonated. As the roar of the explosion shattered the morning air, McVeigh was lifted a full inch off the ground by the blast and recalled his cheeks being buffeted by the concussion. He didn’t look back. Within seconds, McVeigh was in his car and heading north out of the city.\textsuperscript{112}

Supplemental Vignettes: The Immediate Aftermath

After the bomb exploded, McVeigh calmly, at least outwardly, departed the bombing scene. McVeigh said he felt satisfaction of a mission accomplished. McVeigh had previously driven his car to Oklahoma City on Easter Sunday and prepositioned it near the Murrah Building as a means to depart the area after the bombing.\textsuperscript{113} Within seconds of the detonation, McVeigh was driving his car north out of the city.\textsuperscript{114}

About an hour after the bombing, an alert Highway Patrol trooper driving on Interstate 35 stopped a Mercury Marquis automobile because there was no car license plate on the back of the vehicle. He asked the driver (McVeigh) for his driver's license, and noticed a bulge under his clothing. McVeigh told the police officer that he had a loaded pistol and cooperated with the police officer as he was arrested. Yet, certain actions are puzzling about McVeigh. His post-trial reflections recount his thoughts when approached by the state trooper as McVeigh waited in his car by the side of the highway. McVeigh could have easily surprised and harmed the state trooper with a loaded pistol he was carrying on his person, but he chose not to do anything aggressive. At the time, the police officer made no connection with the bombing in Oklahoma City and McVeigh. He put McVeigh under arrest and drove to the county seat.\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{112} Michel and Herbeck, \textit{American Terrorist}, 220, 229-232.
\textsuperscript{114} Michel and Herbeck, \textit{American Terrorist}, 232, 237.
\textsuperscript{115} U.S. District Court, District of Colorado. Criminal Action No. 96-CR-68. Opening Statement by the Defense, 42.
On April 21, 1995, investigators learned that at approximately 10:20 a.m. on April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh had been arrested in Oklahoma on traffic and weapon offenses, and was incarcerated on those charges in Perry, Oklahoma. McVeigh's arrest occurred approximately 60-70 miles north of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, approximately one hour and 20 minutes after the April 19, 1995 bomb explosion.

Inside McVeigh's car, law enforcement agents later found a large sealed envelope. It contained writings, magazines, and photocopies from magazines and from newspapers that indicate McVeigh's motivation, and premeditation. Other documents that McVeigh had with him on this day of the bombing describe the value of killing innocent people for a cause. One excerpt—as highlighted by McVeigh—“The real value of our attacks today lies in the psychological impact, not in the immediate casualties.” Another slip of paper that he had in that envelope in his car read, in part, “When the government fears the people, there is liberty.” And hand-printed beneath those printed words, in McVeigh's handwriting, are the words, “Maybe now there will be liberty.”

Fortier

Fortier was culpable in the bombing. Although he did not join the conspiracy and he didn't participate in the bombing, he did have knowledge of McVeigh's plans. He neither reported it to anyone who could have stopped it, nor made any effort to prevent the criminal acts. Additionally, Fortier participated with McVeigh in transporting guns stolen from a gun dealer in Arkansas.

Mr. Fortier agreed to enter a plea bargain, was found guilty by a jury trial, and sentenced to 12 years in prison and fined $200,000.

Nichols

On April 21, 1995, at approximately 3:00 p.m., after hearing his name on the radio in connection with the Oklahoma City bombing, Terry Nichols voluntarily surrendered to the Department of Public Safety in Herington, Kansas. Herington authorities took no action and awaited the arrival of the FBI. Thereafter, a Special Agent of the FBI arrived and advised Nichols of his Miranda rights, which Nichols agreed to waive.

Although Nichols did not participate in the actual bombing, he was instrumental in assisting McVeigh in planning and preparing for the bombing. He helped rent storage lockers, purchase ammonium nitrate fertilizer and place McVeigh's get-away car in Oklahoma City.

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118 Ibid., 34.
Federal Court, Nichols was convicted of conspiracy, and found guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the death of eight Federal officers. 121

After being found guilty in a Federal jury trial, Nichols was sentenced to life in prison without release for his role as the chief collaborator in the Oklahoma City bombing. In August 2004, Nichols was found guilty of murder on Oklahoma state charges. The District Judge ordered Nichols to serve life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Nichols was spared the death penalty when the jury became deadlocked. 122

McVeigh

McVeigh was convicted on all 11 counts of his Federal Indictment, including conspiracy to bomb the building and responsibility for the deaths of eight Federal law enforcement officers killed inside. 123 Timothy McVeigh was executed at a Federal prison in Terre Haute, Indiana on June 11, 2001.

Case Discussion Questions

Intelligence and Threat Warning?

What suspicious activities preceding the bombing attack might have indicated the tactical targeting of the Murrah building in an operational level U.S. intelligence estimate?

Why did McVeigh select the Murrah Federal Building for his terrorist attack?

Planning, Preparation, and Conduct?

How did the terrorist cell obtain the major components of the improvised explosive device – the bomb?

How did the terrorist and support cell structure itself, communicate, and operate during the phases of planning and execution of the Murrah Building bombing attack?

How did the terrorist rehearse for the Murrah Building bombing?

What does the proximity of distance of the Murrah Building to the point of bomb detonation indicate for force protection measures?

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Physical Site Vulnerabilities and Risk Assessment?

What specific effects did the truck bomb detonation have on the structural integrity of the Murrah Building?

Given the same type of truck bomb and the scenario of a multi-level downtown office building, how could terrorists have increased mass casualty effects and devastation?

Assessment

As the bombing in Oklahoma City makes clear, Americans – domestic terrorists - with dastardly aims and intentions such as McVeigh must be considered in any threats profile of the U.S. Homeland. Noted by the Director of the FBI, “We cannot protect our country, our way of life, our government and the democratic processes that ensure our freedoms and liberties if we fail to take seriously the threat of terrorism from all sources – foreign and domestic.\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{quote}
“Terrorism is best prevented by acquiring, through legal and constitutional means, intelligence information relating to groups and individuals whose violent intentions threaten the public or our nation’s interests.”\textsuperscript{125}
\end{quote}

Louis J. Freeh
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

McVeigh was a U.S. citizen with personal beliefs that festered into a growing mistrust and eventual hatred of the U.S. government.\textsuperscript{126}

Awaiting execution, McVeigh remarked, “I like the phrase ‘shot heard ’round the world,’ and I don’t think there’s any doubt the Oklahoma blast was heard around the world.”\textsuperscript{127}

A comprehensive FBI investigation determined that there was no larger conspiracy than McVeigh and Nichols in the Murrah Building bombing. Over 43,000 leads and over 7,000 people were eliminated from consideration in this official scrutiny. No involvement of a foreign government or militia organization materialized, even though numerous allegations arose in conspiracy theories.\textsuperscript{128}

\textsuperscript{124} Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Opening Statement Before the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 3 May 1995, 2.
\textsuperscript{125} Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Congress, House of Representatives; Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime; Opening Statement Before the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 104th Congress, 3 May 1995, 3; available from http://www.lectlaw.com/files/cur13.htm; Internet; accessed 5 March 2004.
\textsuperscript{126} Michel and Herbeck, \textit{American Terrorist}, 108.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 382.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 366.
In a May 1995 statement by the Director of the FBI, Mr. Louis Freeh stated, “I do not want my remarks to be interpreted as advocating investigative activity against groups exercising their legitimate constitutional rights or targeting people who disagree with our government. The FBI is entirely comfortable with the Constitution, due process rights, Congressional oversight, legal process, and the American jury system. They each protect the American people and the FBI…The FBI cannot and should not, however, tolerate and ignore any individuals or groups which advocate violence – which would kill innocent Americans, which would kill “America’s Kids.” They are not just enemies of the United States, they are enemies of mankind.”

129 Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Opening Statement Before the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 3 May 1995, 4.
Chapter 3: Khobar Towers VBIED Bombing

The terrorist attack on Khobar Towers in 1996 highlights the importance of accurate and timely intelligence on terrorist activities and capabilities, the structure of a terrorist organization in action, and an emergent trend of mass casualty or mass destruction effects as a terrorist objective. This case study presents an unclassified summary of U.S. findings of intelligence shortfalls, force protection vulnerabilities, host nation operational sensitivities, and the calculated strategy and tactic of a specific terrorist act. In this case, a state sponsor assisted a surrogate group in order to influence U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Figure 3-1. Above, Bomb Crater from VBIED
(Source: U.S. House National Security Committee, Staff Report, The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident (1996).)

Figure 3-2. Right, The Front View of Building 131 at Khobar Towers After the Blast
(Source: U.S. House National Security Committee, Staff Report, The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident (1996).)
Introduction

The terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996 exposed more than the physical vulnerability of Americans serving abroad. The attack exposed shortcomings of the U.S. intelligence apparatus that left Americans unprepared for the specific threat that confronted them. U.S. military organizations encountered significant internal problems of continuity and cohesion with the host nation while deployed for their mission. Risk increased for U.S. military members deployed on contingency operations where political and cultural sensitivities of the host country were significant factors. A chronology of terrorist group activities in this case demonstrates a dedicated motivation and deliberate planning and execution cycle that applied phases of reconnaissance and surveillance, specific target selection and refined surveillance, staging and rehearsal, attack, and escape.

“Terrorism is a tool of states, a vehicle of expression for organizations and even a way of life for individuals. We can expect the terrorists to continue to seek out vulnerabilities and attack. Terrorists normally prey on the weak, but even militaries have vulnerabilities and present targets with high publicity value.”

Honorable William J. Perry
Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense, 1996

Learning Objectives

Learning objectives focus on analyzing case study information in order to synthesize and evaluate the insight of reflective experiences, discern patterns of terrorist method and means, and determine likely trends in future terrorist activities. Comparing and contrasting conditions, circumstances, and asymmetric options available to the terrorist will enhance judgment to recognize vulnerabilities, identify threats, and minimize the ability of terrorism to impact on accomplishing a friendly force mission.

The objectives for this case study are:

- Describe intelligence indicators that might have created a more effective tactical estimate of terrorist intention and capability in the Khobar Towers bombing.
- Understand the motivation of Saudi Hizballah and their state sponsor (Iran) associated support groups for choosing Khobar Towers as a terrorist target of high value.

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• Recognize force protection vulnerabilities at Khobar Towers that terrorists optimized in the bombing attack.

• Explain the terrorist organizational structure and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used for the Khobar Towers bombing.

• Deduce a trend for terrorist acts with the objective of an increased combination for mass casualties and mass destruction.

Case Study Overview – Khobar Towers Bombing (1996)

Shortly before 10:00 p.m. on the evening of June 25, 1996, a driver and one passenger drove a Datsun automobile into a public parking lot adjoining Khobar Towers building 131. This car acted as a scout vehicle and parked in a far corner of the lot. Soon after, a white four-door Chevrolet Caprice entered the parking lot and was staged for later use as escape transportation. The terrorists in the Datsun signaled that all was clear by blinking its lights. With that signal, a fuel truck converted into a truck bomb with an estimated 3,000-5,000 pounds of explosives approached the lot. The truck driver and his passenger entered the lot and backed the truck bomb against a perimeter fence in front of Khobar Towers building 131. After parking the truck, the truck driver and passenger quickly entered the back seat of the white Caprice. The Caprice, followed by the Datsun from the corner of the lot, sped away from the parking lot. Within minutes, the truck bomb exploded and devastated the north side of building 131, which was occupied by U.S. military members. The explosion killed nineteen U.S. military members and wounded 372 other Americans.132 Many Saudi civilians and other third country citizens were injured in the attack.

The force of the explosion was so great that the effects heavily damaged or destroyed six high rise apartment buildings and shattered windows in virtually every other structure in the compound, leaving a crater in the ground 85 feet wide and 35 feet deep. The blast concussion was felt 20 miles away in the Persian Gulf state of Bahrain. At the time, this incident was the worst terrorist attack against Americans in more than a decade.133

Background

From the 1980s and leading up to the Khobar Towers bombing, Hizballah, or “Party of God,” was the name used by a number of related Shia Islamic terrorist organizations operating in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Bahrain. These Hizballah organizations were inspired, supported, and directed by elements of the Iranian government. Saudi Hizballah, also known as Hizballah Al-Hijaz, was a terrorist organization operating primarily in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The group promoted, among other things, the use of violence against nationals and property of the United States located in Saudi Arabia. Because Saudi Hizballah was an

outlaw organization in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its members frequently met and trained in Lebanon, Syria, or Iran.\textsuperscript{134}

In the 1990s, Saudi Arabia witnessed growing dissatisfaction by large segments of its population as social, economic, and political issues approached crisis proportion within the kingdom. Not surprisingly, religion provided a powerful influence in each of these other areas. The Saudi population was growing at a rapid pace, expectations and quality of life experienced in previous years was no longer feasible for many Saudi citizens due to changing economic conditions, and many Saudis considered the Saudi royal family an apostate regime due to the close relationship with the United States.\textsuperscript{135}

U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia had been a contentious issue with many Saudis. Many Saudi citizens, and other people of the region with an Islamic fundamentalist viewpoint, were particularly critical of this non-Muslim presence in a country that is home to two holiest places in the Islamic religion, Mecca and Medina. This concern was part of a larger cultural struggle in Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{136}

**Planning and Preparation**

Saudi Hizballah began surveillance of Americans in Saudi Arabia in about 1993. Surveillance and reports continued to flow among Saudi Hizballah and officials in Iran. Potential targets included the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh and locales where Americans lived and worked. By 1994, Hizballah surveillance focused on eastern Saudi Arabia included Khobar Towers. In the months following, the terrorists recognized Khobar Towers as a lucrative target. The concentration of U.S. and coalition forces equated to between 2000 and 3000 people. In mid-1995, terrorists began regular surveillance of Khobar Towers. Pre-attack surveillance was conducted with one vehicle. The vehicle was observed and reported ten times over 40 separate occasions of surveillance.

\textsuperscript{134} U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. Grand Jury *Indictment* of 46 counts against named and unspecified terrorists charged in the Khobar Towers bombing attack of 25 June 1996, 2; available from [http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/khobar.pdf](http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/khobar.pdf); Internet; accessed 10 February 2004.

\textsuperscript{135} Joshua Teitelbaum and David Long, “Islamic Politics in Saudi Arabia,” *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch*: Special Policy Forum Report Number 259, 9 July 1997, 1 to 3; available at [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch1997/259.htm](http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch1997/259.htm); Internet; accessed 19 February 2004. While Saudi Arabia attempted to balance modernization with its role as a protector of the holy places of Islam in the nation, U.S. military forces were an obvious secular presence in Saudi Arabia that offended many Saudi citizens. Aims of Islam and modernization were at odds. Disenchanted youth, ever increasing in size within the population, often vented their frustration with alliance or membership in radical, violent organizations. Young men recruited for the Saudi Hizballah would often be transported to Hizballah controlled areas in Lebanon for military training, weapons and explosives training, and indoctrination. Subsequent training and liaison occurred among terrorist members of the Saudi Hizballah and Lebanese and Iranian Hizballah organizations. Elements of the Iranian government sponsored forms of military training and other close association with terrorists.


By early 1996, the terrorists were identifying locations to hide explosives. Explosives were eventually hidden in the area surrounding Khobar for use in the bombing attack. Of note, an attempt to smuggle explosives for this attack into Saudi Arabia was discovered and foiled on March 28, 1996 as a terrorist attempted to cross the Saudi Arabian border in a car. Saudi authorities confiscated 38 kilograms of plastic explosives hidden in the car and arrested the driver. Subsequently, Saudi investigators arrested several other terrorists. Nonetheless, Saudi Hizballah replaced these terrorists in the cell by May 1996 to replace or cover for an original group member for this attack. Additional large amounts of explosives were covertly collected and hidden in the vicinity of Khobar.

In early June over a two-week period, the terrorists used plastic explosives to convert a tanker truck into a bomb – a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). Key members of the Saudi Hizballah and the attack cell met in Syria in mid-June 1996 to confirm tactical plans for the bombing. Early in the evening of June 25, 1996, the six members of the attack cell reviewed final preparations for the attack. Several hours later, Khobar Towers would become a terrorist incident of major proportion against U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{138}

The Attack with a VBIED

On June 25, 1996, at approximately 10:00 p.m. Dhahran local time, a fuel truck laden with an improvised explosive device approached the northwest end of the Khobar Towers compound from the north and turned east onto 31st Street just outside the perimeter fence separating the compound from a public parking lot. The truck bomb had an estimated explosive power equivalent of 20,000 pounds of TNT.\textsuperscript{139} The truck, and a car that it was following, continued to travel along the perimeter fence toward the northeast corner of the compound.

Figure 3-3. Bomb Crater at Khobar Towers

\textit{Note:} Note the proportion of crater to individuals along rim.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid. 12 and 13.
A U.S. military security guard, present at an observation site on the roof of Building 131, spotted the suspicious car and fuel truck as they continued to travel along the perimeter fence toward the eventual attack site. When the vehicles reached Building 131, they turned left, pointed away from the building, and stopped. The fuel truck backed up into the hedges along the perimeter fence, about 80 feet from, and directly in front of Building 131. When two men emerged from the truck, quickly entered the car, and sped away, the U.S. military security guard radioed the situation to the security desk and began, along with the other two guards on the roof, to evacuate the building.

Emergency evacuation procedures began for Building 131 as the three security personnel ran door to door, starting from the top floor and working their way down, knocking loudly on each door and yelling for the residents to evacuate. Three to four minutes after the truck had backed up against the perimeter fence, the bomb exploded, demolishing the entire front facade of the eight-story building.

Timely action on the part of the guards, who had only been able to work their way down several floors of the building, saved the lives of many residents of Building 131. Many residents evacuating the building were located in the building stairwells at the moment of the explosion. Given the injury and death caused by glass and other flying objects caused by the blast, the stairwells were probably the safest place to be at the time of bomb detonation.

However, the force of the blast destroyed building 131 and severely damaged five adjacent buildings. Most of the buildings in the U.S. occupied sector of the Khobar Towers complex suffered some degree of damage. Nineteen U.S. military members were killed with several hundred other people injured. Hundreds of Saudi and third country nationals living in the complex and immediate vicinity were also wounded. The bomb blast shattered windows throughout the compound and created a crater 85 feet wide and 35 feet deep. The blast was felt as far away as Bahrain, 20 miles to the southeast.

U.S. intelligence experts concluded that Americans were the targets of the terrorists. Although injury and death were extensive, an even greater number of casualties might have occurred had the driver positioned the truck differently against the fence and if at least one row of concrete barriers [“Jersey” barriers of the kind used in construction and on U.S. highways] had not been present to absorb or deflect part of the blast away from the lower level of building 131.

Senior leaders of the U.S. military unit, after consultation with engineers and investigators at the scene, concluded that this force protection measure helped to prevent the collapse of the lower floors of the building. Had the lower floors collapsed, the attack would have likely caused collapse of the entire building with a significantly larger number of casualties and fatalities.140

According to the terrorist plan, attack leaders immediately departed the Khobar Towers area and Saudi Arabia using false passports. Two terrorists remained in Saudi Arabia in their hometown. No Khobar Towers terrorists were captured immediately following the VBIED attack.

Figure 3-4. Below, **Photograph of Khobar Towers After the Bombing**  
(Source: Report to the President and Congress on Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad (1996).)

![Photograph of Khobar Towers After the Bombing](Source: Report to the President and Congress on Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad (1996).)

Figure 3-5. Above, **Diagram Sketch of Khobar Towers and Bombing Site**  
(Source: Report to the President and Congress on the Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad (1996).)
Supplemental Vignettes: The Immediate Aftermath

Intelligence and Threat Warning

The U.S. Consul General in Dhahran at the time of the bombing stated, “No one really thought anything was going to happen in Dhahran. …[I] never had a piece of paper or anyone else outlining any particular threat.” In general, the U.S. presence allowed themselves to assume what the likely threats were, even in an absence of solid intelligence. A type of “tunnel vision” emerged that precluded an awareness of terrorist attack plans that were significantly greater than anything estimated.

The specific information U.S. officials in the region did have on terrorist capability consisted of evidence concerning the size of the 1995 car bomb terrorist attack in Riyadh that was equivalent to about 250 pounds of TNT, and numerous small pipe bombing incidents in nearby Bahrain. Senior U.S. officers in Saudi Arabia generally concluded that the upper limit of a terrorist bomb was no higher than what had been used in the 1995 car bombing. Likewise, the Saudis did not see terrorists using anything larger than the 1995 car bombing.

Other professional assessments did not estimate the damage potential of a bombing with the effects of the 1996 attack on Khobar Towers. The Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh related that a representative of his office had visited Khobar Towers prior to the bombing and was satisfied that the existing stand-off distance was adequate even though it was 20 feet less than the desired 100 foot State Department standard for fixed facilities. The RSO indicated that they would not have questioned an 80-foot stand-off distance even if the known threat had included a 1,000-pound bomb.

The Chief of the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) in Riyadh indicated that they considered the threat to be a bomb the size of the one that exploded at Riyadh in 1995, “maybe 500 pounds but -- we never went above 1,000 pounds.” Additionally, the U.S. Consul General in Dhahran stated, “the thought of a 20,000 or even 5,000 pound bomb driving up was pretty inconceivable.”

U.S. intelligence did not predict the precise attack on Khobar Towers. Commanders did have warning that the terrorist threat to U.S. military members and facilities was increasing. DOD elements in the theater had the authority, but were not exploiting all potential sources of information. Suspicious activities should have received more scrutiny. Human intelligence (HUMINT), had it been available, is probably the only source of information that could have provided the tactical details of a terrorist attack. In fact, a DOD report following the attack stated that the U.S. intelligence community must have the requisite authorities and invest more time, people, and funds into developing HUMINT against the terrorist threat.

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142 Ibid. 50.
Security Measures in Effect

Although the U.S. intelligence community was providing coverage of terrorist and terrorist related activities, the intelligence support lacked in at least one key area. Intelligence did not provide timely tactical warning of the impending terrorist attack and the specific kind of attack on Khobar Towers. Yet, vulnerability analysis using general intelligence of threats resulted in improvements to physical security and force protection measures at Khobar Towers prior to the June 25, 1996 bombing. These actions did save lives and reduced injuries.144

Much of the force protection concentrated on precluding penetration of the complex perimeter by a car, truck, or suicide bomb. The commander responsible for the Khobar Towers complex was very proactive and aggressive in implementing improved security measures. Many complementing security measures were enacted such as an increased threat condition awareness, physical barriers and serpentine driving control patterns at checkpoints, restricted off-base travel, inspection procedures for parcels and commercial deliveries, and procedures for unannounced or suspicious visitors.145 In the months preceding the Khobar Towers bomb attack, over 130 new security measures were implemented.146

The DOD task force report on the Khobar Towers bombing states a strong belief that “…to assure an acceptable level of security for U.S. forces worldwide, commanders must aggressively pursue an integrated systems approach to force protection that combines awareness and training, physical security measures, advanced technology systems, and specific protection measures tailored to each location. A comprehensive approach of common guidance, standards, and procedures will correct inconsistent force protection practices observed in the theater.”147

Following the Khobar Towers terrorist attack, the U.S. Secretary of Defense directed a critical re-evaluation of U.S. force posture in the region, and empowered military commanders to examine mission tasks with force protection as an even more important consideration in its worldwide mission planning and operations.

Physical Site Vulnerabilities and Risk Assessment

Ten suspicious incidents, including four of possible surveillance, were reported by U.S. members in April, May, and June 1996. Many of the incidents were during the period of the Hajj. The Hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, is a central duty and one of the five pillars of Islam. However, U.S. military forces were concerned that this surge of thousands of worshippers

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from around the world could be a likely period for extremist acts against U.S. presence in the vicinity of Islam’s holy places in Saudi Arabia. The suspicious incidents in the vicinity of Khobar Towers were investigated by the U.S. military, Saudi military, and Saudi local police. Nothing in the investigations indicated an attack on Khobar Towers was imminent.

These incidents included one possible threat indicator – the suspected ramming of a “Jersey” barrier on the east perimeter of the Khobar Towers complex. Reported to Saudi authorities, they permitted U.S. military forces to secure the barriers by staking them into the ground. There were four incidents of possible surveillance, which were reported to local Saudi authorities for further investigation. These occurred on April 1, 4, 17 and 25, 1996, and all involved reports by U.S. military members of Middle Eastern men driving by the Khobar Towers compound, or parked and observing the compound. Of the five incidents, two were inconclusive and three were completely discounted.

These incidents were discussed with the Saudis, who did not view them as threatening. They attributed the incidents of possible surveillance to natural curiosity on the part of Saudi citizens about the activities of Americans inside the complex perimeter. A parking lot existed just outside the northern perimeter of Khobar Towers. Saudis used this lot as part of a community recreational area and to visit a nearby mosque. During the month-long period of the Hajj, it was normal for many people to congregate in this area during evenings. Most of the reported incidents took place during this time, and this may have caused the Saudi police to dismiss them as non-threatening. The Saudis said they had undercover security personnel in the area and they were not concerned.148

**Host Nation Relationship**

Saudi Arabia, as the host nation, retained sovereignty both inside and outside the complex at Khobar Towers. Saudi Arabian authorities permitted U.S. military forces latitude in security measures within the installation, but any permanent change to facilities required Saudi approval. Security internal to the complex was a shared responsibility by U.S. forces, coalition forces, and Saudi Arabian military police. Security outside the fence was a Saudi responsibility.149 This tenuous sharing of force protection and limited ability to optimize security measures between the host nation, U.S. military forces, and the U.S. State Department caused significant challenges in the risk management of the Khobar Towers complex.

A January 1996 vulnerability assessment conducted by U.S. military forces identified the north perimeter fence area and the adjacent public parking lot as a significant weak point for three reasons: (1) the size and relative remoteness of the parking lot, (2) the visual obstruction that limits the ability of U.S. forces to identify an oncoming threat, and (3) access to the parking lot was uncontrolled and open to anyone. Recommendations included cutting back the vegetation, installing bollards (half buried steel pipes) connected by chain or cable along the

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easement on the Saudi side of the fence or along the sidewalk on the U.S. side of the fence, reinforcing the existing concrete barrier line with one-inch steel cable, and parking heavy vehicles along the fence to limit high speed penetration of the installation. The vulnerability assessment noted the increased cooperation between U.S. and local Saudi police, and noted that Saudi military members would coordinate with local civilian authorities to increase the uniformed police presence outside the northwest and northeast fence lines.

An earlier 1995 vulnerability assessment addressed security measures to be taken around the perimeter fence, including the proper placement of concrete “Jersey” barriers, and removing or repositioning objects near the vegetation on the north perimeter to increase visibility. Comments noted successful efforts by the U.S. security police to establish liaison with the various local military and civilian police agencies and an increased willingness for cooperation between the U.S. military forces and local police. The Saudi government, recognizing the need for U.S. military forces in the region since the Gulf War (1990-1991), encouraged a very urban presence of U.S. military forces. The Saudi royal family attempted to lessen the irritation of many Saudi to a “foreign presence” so near the holy places of Islam while simultaneously allowing the staging of U.S. military and coalition forces in their country. This tacit Saudi government aim exhibited itself in a methodical yet lethargic process for bolstering physical security measures suggested by U.S. military forces. In another practical limitation in an urban setting, expanding Khobar Towers security perimeters, emplacing more barriers, and clearing vegetation and foliage for better visibility along perimeters was counter to Saudi goals of minimizing Saudi citizen contact with U.S. forces. Expanding security distances in the area of the eventual attack site at Khobar Towers would have infringed on Saudi citizen access to a parking lot and park area near a local mosque.

**Terrorist Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures**

The terrorists organized in a cellular structure for their command and control. The Saudi Hizballah recruited from primarily young men of the Sh’ite faith. Cell members participating in this terrorist bombing came primarily from the same region in eastern Saudi Arabia, and in many cases, came from the same hometown. Loyalties such as a common religious earnestness, family and social relationships, and general dissatisfaction with Saudi government policies created a strong bond among members of this small group within the Saudi Hizballah. All cell members sequenced through deliberate phases of recruitment, indoctrination, and military-like training by the Saudi Hizballah.

Leaders, cadre, and supporters of this cell were focused on this particular mission and target. As a norm, interaction occurred usually between two to three cell members, but could involve up to six cell members with personal contact and oral exchanges. At times, written reports provided assessments and requirements. Occasionally, meetings and liaison occurred with the leader of the “military wing” of Saudi Hizballah or other Hizballah supporters. When three members of the cell were compromised and arrested by Saudi authorities during the preparation phase for the attack, replacement cell members were quickly assigned from the same hometown area. This change in cell members disrupted, but did not dismantle the attack plan. Compartmeting knowledge within the cell had benefited the terrorists as they proceeded with coordination meetings, received final guidance from Hizballah leaders,

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150 Ibid., 49 and 50.
and set a timeline in motion to conduct the attack with a massive truck bomb at Khobar Towers.\(^{151}\)

As noted earlier in the case study, planning and preparation included extensive surveillance. Pre-attack surveillance used one vehicle, which was observed and reported ten times of 40 separate uses as a surveillance means.\(^{152}\) Reports and meetings with senior leaders of Saudi Hizballah supported planning in detail such as verifying the accuracy of a map of Khobar or the rehearsal of transporting explosives from Lebanon to Saudi Arabia.\(^{153}\)

The DOD Task Force chartered to assess the Khobar Towers bombing estimated the bomb contained the equivalent of from 3,000 to 8,000 pounds of TNT, “most likely about 5,000 pounds.” The Secretary of Defense commissioned a special study by the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA). The DSWA report estimated the bomb was much larger with a likely yield of 20,000 to 30,000 pounds of TNT-equivalent.\(^{154}\)

DSWA compared physical attributes of the Khobar Towers crater and blast with physical attributes of craters formed by vehicle bomb tests conducted under terrain conditions similar to those at Dhahran. DSWA determined that the “…‘best’ estimate for the Dhahran yield would be 11.5 tons or 23,000 pounds of TNT-equivalent explosive.” DSWA compared the 5,000-pound TNT-equivalent yield estimate against the physical information known about the Khobar Towers crater and the crater information generated by the vehicle bomb tests. DSWA found that the 5,000-pound value implausible because it “implies a cratering efficiency greater than that produced by any known conventional explosive.” DSWA's analysis of glass breakage from the Khobar Towers bombing resulted in an even larger estimated TNT-equivalent yield of 31,000 pounds. This figure was derived by plotting the actual number of windows broken at Khobar Towers on a computer-generated graph that depicts the number of glass patio doors that would be broken by the blast pressures generated by various TNT-equivalent yields.

A peer review by a panel of outside experts concluded the “DSWA analysis credibly supports the conclusion that the explosive power of the bomb was in the 20,000 pounds of TNT equivalent class and probably larger.” The DSWA also noted that Building 133, located some 400 feet from the blast, sustained major structural damage. The weight of the evidence supports the DSWA estimate as to the size of the explosive.\(^{155}\)

Terrorists recognize the media value of physical effects on a target but seek the psychological impact value of attack that often overshadows the act itself. The inability of enemies to

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challenge U.S. and allied military power directly will likely lead to their asymmetric use of force to deter U.S. initiatives, attack forward deployed forces, and attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and its coalition partners. Terrorist attacks are intended to weaken U.S. resolve to maintain a force presence in threatened regions and to influence U.S. public and congressional opinion. Asymmetric use of force could include employment of weapons of mass destruction. The target will be U.S. citizens. Creation of casualties, whether from attacks like the one on Khobar Towers or more discrete attacks designed to establish a pattern of insecurity and helplessness, allows an enemy to demonstrate U.S. vulnerabilities at overseas locations and achieve political aims through indirect means.\footnote{U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Assessment of the Khobar Towers Bombing (30 August 1996) by General (USA Retired) Wayne A. Downing, 5; available from http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/downing/unclf913.html; Internet; accessed 9 February 2004.}

The Immediate Aftermath

International media attention spotlighted the terrorist attack on U.S. military forces in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Terrorists achieved objectives of notoriety with a worldwide audience and significant psychological trauma of mass casualties and horrific property damage. U.S. military forces suffered terrible injuries and loss of life; similar injuries and damage occurred to the surrounding Saudi community. U.S. military forces lost prestige when a compound considered relatively safe was easily attacked and devastated with a large bomb. The royal family of Saudi Arabia lost prestige because of its inability to prevent such a terrorist attack that affected Saudi citizens, civilians and government workers from other countries, and the U.S. military presence as their invited temporary guests. Regional and world attention weakened Saudi royal family prestige, from an Islamic perspective, due to the presence of a non-Muslim military force in its country of holy places for the Islamic faith.

Case Discussion Questions

Intelligence and Threat Warning?

What suspicious activities preceding the bombing attack might have indicated the tactical targeting of the Khobar Towers complex in an operational level U.S. intelligence estimate?

Security Measures in Effect?

How did Saudi and U.S. force protection measures encourage the terrorists to select the Khobar Towers complex for attack?

What does the proximity of distance of the Khobar Towers building 131 to the perimeter of the residential complex suggest in force protection vulnerabilities?

Physical Site Vulnerabilities and Risk Assessment?

Why did terrorists detonate the VBIED at the specific point of the Khobar Towers complex?
Given the same bomb (VBIED) and scenario of Khobar Towers, how could terrorists have increased mass casualty effects?

Host Nation Relationship?

How could the U.S. military unit chain of command and local Saudi security forces have cooperated more effectively in collective security of the Khobar Towers complex?

What impact did the urban location of Khobar Towers and a Saudi government aim of minimizing Saudi citizen contact and visibility with U.S. military forces have in hampering progressive physical security measures?

Terrorist Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures?

Why did the terrorist group choose the Khobar Towers as a principal target in Saudi Arabia?

How did the terrorist group structure itself, communicate, and operate during the phases of planning and execution of the Khobar Towers bombing attack?

Assessment

Intelligence gaps left the U.S. military organization and its leaders at the Khobar Towers complex largely unaware of the magnitude of the threat they faced. Intelligence support fell short in at least three ways. First, available intelligence was devoid of specific knowledge of terrorist and dissident activity inside Saudi Arabia. As a result, assessments were incomplete. Second, intelligence analysis did not examine vulnerabilities in the context of capabilities greater than those already demonstrated in the 1995 bombing in Riyadh. Formal threat assessments appear to have remained reactive to events. Third, intelligence assessments did not acknowledge their own limitations. They did not communicate a level of uncertainty that should have been appropriate considering the lack of specific knowledge available and the difficulty of understanding the complex environments of Saudi society. Based on such intelligence assessments, U.S. commanders in the theater of operations and in the region of Riyadh likely had a false sense of appreciating the level of threat they faced and the requisite level of security required to protect U.S. forces.

Problems stemming from such intelligence failures were further complicated by the organizational and operational shortcomings of the U.S. military mission characterized and conducted as a temporary mission. The provisional U.S. organization lacked continuity, cohesion, and adequate personnel resources. In particular, short-tour rotations — where 10 percent of the command was new to the theater every week — created an unacceptable level of unit instability. This constant turnover of people in duty positions placed a significant knowledge and coordination burden on officers and enlisted members of the command. The high turnover rate hampered any practical ability for U.S. military leaders to build a relationship of trust with their Saudi host.

Deference to Saudi cultural sensibilities, religious concerns, and domestic political concerns discouraged U.S. commanders in the field from aggressively pursuing more expansive security measures. While important, consideration of host country cultural sensitivities or
domestic politics should not have allowed any compromise to protection of U.S. forces, particularly in regions where a growing threat of terrorism focused against Americans.

The combination of situational factors resulted in terrorists being able to identify target site vulnerabilities, conceive a plan to attack a point of weakness, conduct methodical preparation, react to disruption of terrorist group membership, and effectively attack the designated target to achieve their objectives against the Saudi government and U.S. military forces.
Chapter 4: USS Cole Bombing

The maritime attack on the USS Cole by two individuals in a small boat, loaded with explosives, demonstrated an effective means of terrorism against U.S. military forces. When the suicide terrorist attack occurred, the bomb explosion next to the ship caused 17 crewmember deaths, wounded 39 other crewmembers, and seriously damaged the ship. Two terrorists were also killed in the explosion.

The “boat bombing” of the USS Cole introduced a new tactic of terrorism attack against a U.S. warfighting ship in a contemporary operational maritime setting. This case study presents an unclassified summary of U.S. observations and findings of U.S. intelligence shortfalls, U.S. force protection vulnerabilities, U.S. and host nation operational sensitivities, and the calculated strategy and tactic of a specific terrorist act.

Figure 4-1. Above, USS Cole After the Attack  
(Source: http://www.chinfo.navy.mil)

Figure 4-2. Left, USS Cole (DDG 67)  
(Source: http://federalvoice.dscc.dla.mil)

Terrorists have the luxury of searching for a single vulnerability. Timing and method are tools of terrorist choosing and further complicate risk management and force protection of a target selected by terrorists. A primary underlying aim of terrorism is a demoralizing psychological effect on the target population and its leaders, often with explicit media coverage of mass casualty or mass destruction effects, to erode resolve and enhance terrorist objectives.
Introduction

The 12 October 2000 attack on USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, took advantage of a seam in the fabric of U.S. efforts to protect naval forces during an “in-transit” phase of deployment. The USS Cole\(^{157}\) (DDG 67) is an Aegis missile equipped, Arleigh Burke class, destroyer. As a result of the attack, attention focused on implementing ways to improve U.S. policies and practices for deterring, disrupting, and mitigating terrorist attack on U.S. maritime forces in transit.

U.S. military forces support engagement elements of both the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. This means continuous transit of U.S. ships, aircraft and military units. U.S. military forces operate on land, in the air, and on the seas in a world environment characterized by unconventional and transnational threats. Sovereign waterways, the high seas, or even a temporary berthing site are all possible locations for maritime terrorism.\(^{158}\) Assessing a chronology of terrorist group activities verifies a dedicated motivation and deliberate planning and execution cycle that applied phases of reconnaissance and surveillance, specific target selection, staging and rehearsal, preparation, attack; and although this was a deliberate suicide attack, escape plans for terrorist support elements following the bombing.

Learning Objectives

Learning objectives focus on analyzing case study information in order to synthesize and evaluate the insight of reflective experiences, discern patterns of terrorist method and means, and determine likely trends in future terrorist activities. Comparing and contrasting conditions, circumstances, and asymmetric options available to the terrorist will enhance judgment to recognize vulnerabilities, identify threats, and minimize the ability of terrorism to impact on accomplishing a friendly force mission.

The objectives for this case study are:

- Describe intelligence indicators that might have created a more effective tactical estimate of terrorist intention and capability in the USS Cole bombing.

- Understand the motivation of Yemeni extremists and their associated support groups for choosing the USS Cole as a terrorist target of high value.

- Recognize U.S. vulnerabilities to force protection measures at the USS Cole refueling site that terrorists optimized in the bombing attack.

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• Explain the terrorist organizational structure and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used for the USS Cole bombing.

• Deduce a trend for terrorist acts with the objective of an increased combination for mass casualties and mass destruction.

**Case Study Overview - USS Cole (2000)**

U.S. military presence in the Mideast region demonstrates regional engagement while U.S. air, sea, and land forces deter aggression by anyone who would threaten U.S. critical national interests. In 2000, USS Cole was proceeding to join a carrier battle group in the Gulf region that formed a key part of an immediate ready force. This began with the ship’s deployment from Norfolk on August 8th. The trans-Atlantic Ocean crossing lasted until August 20th when the ship and crew started conducting operations in the Mediterranean Sea. These operations, along with several port visits, lasted from August 20th until October 9th. Then, USS Cole transited the Suez Canal in order to conduct maritime operations in the northern Arabian Gulf in support of enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Yemen plays a key part in the ability for U.S. and coalition maritime forces to operate in the region. Yemen controls the eastern side of the Bab al Mandeb choke point at the southern end of the Red Sea, and is geo-strategically positioned approximately 1400 miles south of Suez and 1400 miles southwest of the Strait of Hormuz.¹⁵⁹

Given the pending 3300-mile movement from the Suez Canal to the Northern Arabian Gulf, USS Cole required refueling. According to U.S. Navy policy, an oiler [fuel ship] does not accompany a single ship during transits, so the decision was made that USS Cole would conduct a brief stop for fuel (BSF) in Aden, Yemen.

The operational requirement to refuel necessitated the development of: (1) a force protection plan for the refueling operation at Aden, (2) a logistics request for husbanding services at the port, and, (3) a request for the necessary diplomatic clearances. USS Cole met these requirements and continued the route down the Red Sea entering the port of Aden on October 12th. She moored to the starboard side of a refueling platform at 8:49 a.m. (local Yemen time).¹⁶⁰


¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 7.
Figure 4-3. **Bomb Site and Aden Harbor**
(Source: [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_cities/aden.jpg](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_cities/aden.jpg) and)

Figure 4-4. **Aerial View of Port at Aden**
Background

The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of operations is a large, dangerous, and complex region, consisting of 25 countries, with over half a billion people from a variety of ethnic and religious backgrounds. The region is historically unstable, yet remains vital to U.S. national interests. It contains vast energy resources, key air and sea lines of communication, and critical maritime choke points. Economic and political disruptions can have profound global consequences. Sources of instability within the region include hegemony, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missiles. Conflict is a norm in this region. Between USCENTCOM forming in 1983 as a U.S. military command and the USS Cole bombing in 2000, USCENTCOM responded to crises on 23 occasions.\(^{161}\)

U.S. Navy ships began making brief stops for fuel at Aden in January 1999. The decision to go into Aden for refueling was based on operational as well as geo-strategic factors and included an assessment of the terrorist and conventional threats in the region. The Horn of Africa was in great turmoil in 1998, as exemplified by continuing instability in Somalia, the U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, an ongoing war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and an internal war in Sudan. In December 1998, combat strikes were conducted against Iraq for non-compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions. As of December 1998, 14 of the 20 countries in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) were characterized as “High Threat” countries.

Djibouti, which had been the U.S. Navy refueling stop in the Southern Red Sea for over a decade, began to deteriorate as a useful port because of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war. This war caused increased force protection concerns for our ships, as well as congestion in the port resulting in operational delays.

Aden, Yemen was seen as a viable alternative for refueling operations. Although the terrorism threat is endemic in this region. While the intelligence community and USCENTCOM regularly monitored the threat situation of the region and locales, no specific threat information or warning for Yemen or Aden indicated a pending terrorist attack on a U.S. warship, however, since the U.S. Navy began refueling operations in Aden in January 1999, U.S. Navy ships had conducted 27 brief stops for fuel, two port visits, and one logistics visit without incident. Nonetheless, Yemen was acknowledged as a high threat environment.\(^{162}\)

Planning and Preparation – Maritime Bombing

A U.S. Federal Indictment issued in May 2003, describes a primary timeline of terrorist planning and preparation in 1999 and 2000 for the October 2000 terrorist attack. A U.S. Federal grand jury indicted two Yemeni nationals for plotting the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in the harbor of Aden, Yemen. The Indictment alleges that Usama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa authorizing the killing of Americans motivated the defendants to conduct the terrorist attack on the USS Cole. Although Usama bin Laden may not be linked to the specific direction of the USS Cole attack, several links exist among al Qaeda operatives and the terrorists in this attack.

\(^{161}\) Ibid., 4.
\(^{162}\) Ibid., 6 and 7.
This Indictment charges Jamal Ahmed Mohammed Ali al-Badawi and Fahd al-Quso with various terrorism offenses, including murder of U.S. nationals and murder of U.S. military personnel. Badawi was also charged with attempting, with co-conspirators, to attack the U.S. destroyer USS The Sullivans in January 2000, while it was refueling in the port of Aden. The defendants, both alleged to be longtime al Qaeda associates, remain at large overseas. They had been in custody in Yemen until they escaped from prison in early 2003.

The table in this case study displays a timeline and series of actions leading to the terrorist attack on the USS Cole. Although not known by U.S. authorities at the time of the USS Cole attack, terrorists had attempted to attack USS The Sullivans on January 3, 2000, while the ship was berthed for servicing in Aden Harbor. Terrorists loaded a boat with explosives and launched the boat from the beach. However, the attack was aborted when the boat sank under the weight of the explosives. The May 2003 Federal Indictment alleges that the terrorists salvaged the explosives, refit the boat, and began plotting another attack.

Badawi was a key al Qaeda operative in Aden recruited by terrorists closely associated with Usama bin Laden. Badawi assisted in procuring safehouses in Aden for terrorists, obtained the attack boat, and provided the trailer and truck used to tow the boat to Aden harbor. Quso facilitated the plot to attack USS Cole and prepared to film the attack from an apartment on the hills overlooking Aden Harbor. Among several unindicted co-conspirators, one is Tafiq Muhammad Saleh Bin Roshayd Bin Attash, also known as Khallad, and Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda Al-Nasheri, who are alleged to be veteran students and teachers in the al Qaeda terrorist camps in Afghanistan. Saif al Adel, a member of al Qaeda’s military committee, who allegedly participated in the planning of these attacks, is also indicted in the East Africa embassy bombing case. Badawi, at the direction of Khallad and Nasheri, went to Saudi Arabia, purchased a boat large enough to carry explosives, and a trailer and truck to tow the boat, and secured a safehouse in Aden to hide the boat until the attack.

Raed Hijazi was the man in charge of terrorist training for the USS Cole attack. According to U.S. sources, Raed Hijazi is a former Boston [USA] taxi driver and an American citizen of Palestinian origin. Jordanian security officials link him as a close associate of Mohammed Abu Zubayda, a member of Bin Laden's inner circle. Hijazi was arrested in Syria at the end of 2000 and later transferred to Jordan where he had been sentenced to death in his absence for involvement in Bin Laden's alleged millennium plot, which included targets in Jordan and the U.S. Some evidence exists that the suicide attack in Aden Harbor was originally planned as part of the al Qaeda millennium plot.163

According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Khalid al-Midhar, a hijacker aboard the plane that crashed into the Pentagon on September 11 had earlier been observed on a surveillance video in Malaysia meeting an unnamed man who is suspected of involvement in the USS Cole attack. According to Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, who was Yemen's prime minister at the time of the attack, “Khalid al-Midhar was one of the Cole perpetrators, involved in preparations...He was in Yemen at the time and stayed after the Cole bombing for

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a while, then he left.”\(^{164}\) Association of al Qaeda operatives to members of this terrorist act in Aden Harbor appears conclusive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spring 1999</td>
<td>NASHERI(^{166}) enlists BADAWI(^{167}) with a letter from KHALLAD(^{168}) to assist in a terrorist operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1999</td>
<td>BADAWI locates a residence in Aden that provides privacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1999</td>
<td>NASHERI leases property in Aden for six-month period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1999</td>
<td>NASHERI directs BADAWI to procure a boat and a truck to tow the boat to Aden Harbor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1999</td>
<td>NASHERI and other individuals secure a boat on the property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 January 2000</td>
<td>NASHERI and other individuals transport an explosives-laden boat from the property to the Aden Harbor beachfront.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 January 2000</td>
<td>NASHERI and other individuals return to the beachfront and salvage the sunken boat and explosives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2000</td>
<td>QUSO(^{169}) and NIBRASS(^{170}) travel to Bangkok, Thailand. QUSO is directed to shave and wear western-style clothing so he doesn’t attract attention on trip. They deliver approximately $36,000 to KHALLAD in Bangkok, Thailand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 2000</td>
<td>NASHERI informs BADAWI of aborted attempt to bomb USS <em>The Sullivans</em>, and discusses ongoing plot to attack U.S. naval ship and comply with Usama Bin Laden edict to drive American forces from the Arabian Peninsula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 2000</td>
<td>HASAN(^{171}) leases a lodging to act as a safehouse in Aden.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{164}\) Ibid.


\(^{166}\) Abdul Rahim Mohamed Hussein Abda Al-Nasheri, aka NASHERI. S12 98 Cr. 1023

\(^{167}\) Jamal Ahemd Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi, aka BADAWI. S12 98 Cr. 1023

\(^{168}\) Tafiq Muhammed Saleh Bin Roshayd Bin Attash, aka KHALLAD. S12 98 Cr. 1023

\(^{169}\) Fahd Al-Quso, aka QUSO. S12 98 Cr. 1023

\(^{170}\) Ibrahim Al-Thawar, aka NIBRASS. S12 98 Cr. 1023
| Summer 2000 | HASAN leases an apartment to act as an observation post perched on the hills overlooking Aden harbor. |
| Summer 2000 | KHALLAD and NASHERI meet with Usama Bin Laden and other individuals in Afghanistan. NASHERI tests explosives while in Afghanistan. |
| Summer-Fall 2000 | NASHERI and other individuals refit the boat that had sunk in January 2000, and test the explosives that had sunk in the boat. |
| September 2000 | BADAWI trains QUSO to film the planned attack on a U.S. ship in Aden Harbor from an area apartment and vantage point. |
| Sept - Oct 2000 | BADAWI provides QUSO with a pager, and informs QUSO that he’ll receive a predetermined code that would indicate the imminent attack on a U.S. ship. QUSO would depart to the area apartment and vantage point. |
| October 12, 2000 | NIBRASS, HASAN, and other individuals tow the explosives-laden boat with a truck to the Aden Harbor beachfront. |
| October 12, 2000 | QUSO departs his residence to go to the vantage point. |
| October 12, 2000 | NIBRASS and HASAN board the explosives-laden boat and launch the boat-bomb in the direction of the USS Cole. |
| October 12 11:18 a.m. | NIBRASS and HASAN offer friendly gestures to observing crew members of the USS Cole, and steer the boat alongside USS Cole. **Boat-bomb detonates next to USS Cole.** 173 17 U.S. sailors killed; 39 U.S. sailors wounded. The terrorists NIBRASS and HASAN killed in suicide attack. The blast leaves a 40-foot diameter hole in ship’s side with the ship in jeopardy of sinking. |

**The Attack**

As the USS *Cole* entered Aden harbor, the ship did not dock at the quayside. Refueling took place at a water-borne platform known as a dolphin. This fuel transfer point is a commercially run Yemeni operation and lies about 600 meters offshore. The U.S. Navy contracted for such refueling operations.

After verifying the refueling alignment, refueling operations commenced at 10:31 a.m. At 11:18, two suicide attackers detonated their explosives-laden boat against the side of the USS *Cole*. 173 The small boat was probably loaded with between 400 to 700 pounds of explosives, and the blast blew a 40-foot hole in the port side, amidships, of the USS *Cole*. U.S. analysis of explosive residues found at the blast site indicates that the terrorist bombers used C-4.

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171 Hassan Awadh Al-Khami, aka HASAN. S12 98 Cr. 1023
172 Franks, 7.
173 Ibid.
Supplemental Vignettes: The Immediate Aftermath

Shortly after the boat suicide attack, three groups claimed responsibility for the Aden attack – the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan previously unknown in Yemen, the Army of Mohammed, and the Islamic Deterrence Forces (IDF). The Army of Mohammed also claimed responsibility for bombing the British embassy in Sana’a the following day. The Islamic Army has previously claimed responsibility for several incidents in Yemen which turned out not to have been terrorist acts. The IDF’s statement said the attack was in “defence [defense] of the honour [honor] and dignity of the Islamic nation and to avenge the blood of the oppressed Muslim nation in Palestine with the blessing of the American regime for that enemy … This operation will not be the last, as such attacks will continue against our enemy, and the enemy of our Arab and Muslim nation: America and its artificial Zionist entity in Palestine.”

In stark contrast to terrorist announcements, many governments and allied military forces provided immediate responsive support during the aftermath of the USS Cole bombing. The Government of Yemen provided initial medical support and security forces to protect U.S. Government officials arriving in the area. France and Djibouti helped with initial medical evacuation and treatment. Royal Navy ships HMS Marlborough and HMS Cumberland provided damage control and other assistance. Expedited overflight clearances were approved, as well as the use of air bases from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar.

Intelligence Threat and Warning

The threat situation was monitored regularly in Yemen and throughout the U.S. military area of responsibility (AOR). The U.S. intelligence community and USCENTCOM considered this area a High Threat environment. A number of threat assessments had been conducted in the port and throughout the area. However, leading up to the attack on USS Cole on October 12th, no specific threat information for Yemen or for the port of Aden was reported that would cause a change to the assessment.

The DOD USS Cole Commission Report (9 January 2001) states that intelligence priorities and resources have shifted from a Cold War focus to new and emerging threats only at the margins. Contemporary events indicate that intelligence resources need to be reprioritized for collection and analysis, including human intelligence and signal intelligence, against terrorism. Intelligence production must be refocused and tailored to safeguard transiting units in order to mitigate the terrorist threat. Furthermore, a requirement exists for an increase in counterintelligence (CI) resources dedicated to combating terrorism and development of clearer CI assessment standards.

The investigation by the DOD Commission identifies that the commanding officer of the USS Cole did not have the specific intelligence, focused training, appropriate equipment or on-scene security support to effectively prevent or deter such a determined, pre-planned assault.

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175 Franks, 3.
176 Ibid., 6.
177 DoD USS Cole Commission Report, 1.
on his ship.\textsuperscript{178} In-transit units require intelligence support tailored to the terrorist threat in their immediate area of operations. This support must be dedicated from a higher echelon with focused analysis and tailored production.\textsuperscript{179} Independent transiting units must be better trained and resourced to submit appropriate requests for information to force intelligence organizations. This will allow these intelligence activities to be responsive to the transiter’s anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) requirements.

Security Measures in Effect

Military sources and several news agencies reviewed the actions conducted, as well as actions not conducted, by the ship and crew as the USS \emph{Cole} entered the harbor. Clearly, the terrorists were able to observe patterns that previous ships displayed during their visits to Aden Harbor. For example, terrorists could easily see if U.S. forces attempted to control the movement of small boats near a warship in the harbor, as well as what crewmember presence and actions were visible on deck.\textsuperscript{180}

The USS \emph{Cole} had a crew trained in force protection and was conducting a force protection plan for the particular circumstance of a refueling operation in Aden Harbor when the terrorists attacked. Not all Threat Condition measures were being implemented during the refueling task. While refueling was ongoing, a small boat appeared about 09:20 a.m. to remove garbage from the USS \emph{Cole}. This boat and two men were turned away without conducting trash removal. However, a short time later, garbage removal was authorized and three garbage barges were expected. Two were tied up on the port side of the ship. Then, a small boat about 35 feet in length was observed coming quickly out from the city but slowed as it neared the USS \emph{Cole}. The boat and two men showed no hostile intent, and were even waving to the crew and smiling. Some crew assumed this was a third garbage boat. This small boat continued to move toward the USS \emph{Cole} from the 11 o’clock position relative to the ship’s bow, pulled alongside the port side, amidships, of the USS \emph{Cole}. The two-man boat crew detonated the explosives as a suicide attack.\textsuperscript{181}

From post-attack analysis recommendations, U.S. military forces must create an integrated system of training that produces a unit that is clearly and visibly ready, alert and capable. To achieve this level of AT/FP proficiency, this type of training must be elevated to the same priority as primary mission training.\textsuperscript{182} DOD and Service guidance on the content of anti-terrorism/force protection Level III commander-type training must be more definitive if senior field grade officer (O-5 and O-6) levels are to execute their AT/FP responsibilities.\textsuperscript{183} Demonstrating visible force protection by transiting units can more effectively deter terrorist attacks.\textsuperscript{184} In any case, all missions should include an


\textsuperscript{179} \textit{DoD USS Cole Commission Report}, 7.

\textsuperscript{180} “Attack on the USS \emph{Cole},” Yemen Gateway [database on-line]; available from \url{http://www.al-bab.com/yeman/cole1.htm}.

\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Case Study: USS Cole (DDG 67)}, U.S. Navy Center for Antiterrorism and Navy Security Forces, Antiterrorism Officer (ATO) Course, 2005. 1 and 9.

\textsuperscript{182} \textit{DoD USS Cole Commission Report}, 2

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 6.
antiterrorism mission statement. Using a defense in depth concept for force protection with assessments, warnings, and threat zones can minimize vulnerabilities. Clearly understood friendly forces rules of engagement (ROE) and posted orders provide standards and guidance for conducting deliberate, and as required, instantaneous decisions and actions. Doctrine, with officers and crews trained and ready in tactics, techniques, and procedures, can enhance force protection postures.

**Host Nation Relationship**

While classifying the diplomatic clearance and logistics requirement process may improve the operational security of transiting units, it is not practical due to the commercial nature of the process. Local providers of goods, services, and transportation must be employed to support these type operations. Consequently, they must be evaluated in ways that enhance the AT/FP posture of the in-transit unit. According to Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, refueling arrangements had been made 10 to 12 days earlier through the U.S. Embassy in Yemen - a standard procedure. Implementing proactive AT/FP measures must mitigate the real and potential effect of public knowledge of visits by U.S. military forces.

“As I have previously stated in testimony before this [Senate and House Armed Services] committee, ‘Our men, women, DOD civilians, and Diplomats in the region are under constant observation, and, in some cases, being stalked, everyday, 24-hours-a-day, because the terrorist threat in this region is very real.’”

General Tommy Franks
Commander
U.S. Central Command

The U.S. criminal investigation into the attack was led by the U.S. FBI, which immediately deployed nearly 200 agents and technicians to begin the arduous work of putting together the pieces of the puzzle and finding who was responsible. The FBI worked closely with officials from the Naval Criminal Investigation Service, NYPD [New York Police Department] officers from the New York Joint Terrorism Task Force, and Yemeni investigators. Yemen, while recognizing that it had to cooperate to some extent for the sake of its relations with the U.S., insisted on maintaining its independence and sovereignty in a case which had occurred within its national territory. Investigative disputes between Yemen and the U.S. resulted in a phone call from President Bill Clinton to President Salih. On November 6, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said: “We got good cooperation during the first

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185 Ibid., 8.
187 Franks, 7.
phase. ... We're in discussions with them [the Yemenis] on the modalities of how we will cooperate further in the future...”

Terrorist Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

Post-attack investigation revealed there may have been at least three previous terrorist attack attempts in Yemen. In the first attempt during November 1999, terrorists had planned to attack a convoy of U.S. military personnel heading to Yemen's National Center for the Removal of Land Mines. This was foiled when Yemeni security forces discovered explosives about a mile from the hotel where the Americans were staying. Suspects questioned in connection with the USS Cole bombing were said to have known details of the route taken by the Americans to and from the center. A second attempt allegedly targeted the Royal Hotel in Aden, where most of the 30 American servicemen were billeted. The third attempt was an intended attack on 3 January 2000 to bomb USS The Sullivans, a U.S. destroyer warship as it refueled in Aden.189

The U.S. Federal Indictment states that terrorists conducted their planning and preparations through many ruses and covert means. These included, but were not limited to, front [false] companies, false identity and travel documents, coded correspondence, and false information provided to authorities.190

The terrorists organized in a cellular structure for command and control. After recruitment, cell members received deliberate phases of indoctrination and training. Leaders, cadre, and supporters of this cell were focused on a particular mission and target of attacking a U.S. ship. When an unexpected sinking of the terrorist bomb-boat occurred and precluded the January 2000 attack, cell members regrouped and continued to prepare for a similar mission in Aden Harbor. The sequence of planning and preparation notes a very small cell that usually compartmented knowledge among two or three individuals, and insulated more senior terrorist leaders from the specific terrorist act against the USS Cole.

Operational Lessons Learned

As noted in the DOD USS Cole Commission Report, the links between national policies and resources, and individual transiting units are the geographic Unified CINCs or military commanders-in-chief [since retitled as Combatant Commander] and their [Service] Component Commanders. A significant lesson learned is to recognize that transiting units do not have time or resources to focus on a series of locations while in transit. This requires these units to rely on others to support their efforts to deter, disrupt and mitigate terrorist attacks. The Component Commander has the operational war-fighting mindset for the region and is capable of controlling the resources to fight the fight and tailor specific anti-terrorism/force protection measures to protect transiting units.191 U.S. military forces must get out of the purely defensive mode by proactively applying AT/FP techniques and assets to detect and deter terrorists. Second, an additional lesson learned is acknowledging that transfer

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190 Indictment S12 98 Cr. 1023, 6 and 7.
191 DoD USS Cole Commission Report, 2
of transiting units between and within theaters must be better coordinated. Third, a discrete operation risk management model should be adopted and utilized in AT/FP planning and execution.

**Case Discussion Questions**

**Intelligence and Threat Warning?**

What activities preceding the bombing attack might have indicated the tactical targeting of the USS *Cole* in an operational level U.S. intelligence estimate?

**Security Measures in Effect?**

How did U.S. force protection measures encourage the terrorists to select a U.S. Navy ship for attack?

What does the proximity of distance of the “boat bomb” detonation to the USS *Cole* suggest in force protection vulnerabilities?

Given the same bomb (IED) delivery means and scenario of the USS *Cole*, how could terrorists have increased mass casualty effects as even more devastating?

**Host Nation Relationship?**

How could the U.S. military unit chain of command and local Yemeni have cooperated more effectively in harbor security and post-attack investigations?

What rationale existed for choosing Aden harbor as a refueling site in the region?

**Terrorist Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures?**

In what other instances has al Qaeda created a vulnerability by employing innovative tactics?

Why did the terrorists use a small boat to attack the USS *Cole* in Aden harbor?

How did the terrorist group structure itself, communicate, and operate during the phases of planning and execution of the USS *Cole* bombing attack?

**Assessment**

International media attention spotlighted the successful terrorist maritime attack on U.S. military forces in Yemen. U.S. military forces suffered loss of life and serious wounds, and about $250 million in damage to a warship. Terrorists achieved objectives of notoriety with a worldwide audience and significant psychological trauma of a global audience through U.S. military casualties, a visibly damaged U.S. warship, and a significant escalation of maritime terrorism.

In January 2001, Usama bin Laden celebrated the bombing of USS *Cole* with a poem he recited at his son's wedding:
A destroyer: even the brave fear its might. 
It inspires horror in the harbour [harbor] and in the open sea. 
She sails into the waves 
Flanked by arrogance, haughtiness and false power. 
To her doom she moves quickly 
A dinghy awaits her, riding the waves. ¹⁹²

U.S. military forces lost prestige when a berth for refueling considered relatively safe, was the site of a devastating attack by suicide terrorists. The Yemeni Government lost national prestige due to its inability to prevent such a terrorist attack in one of its principal harbors and seaports. The attack strained the credibility of selected Yemeni government officials with regional neighbors and commercial business associates. From an Islamic extremist perspective, the attack denounced Yemeni cooperation with U.S. military forces near the holy places of the Islamic faith.

Despite a long investigation by U.S. and Yemeni authorities there is still no conclusive proof that bin Laden specifically ordered the attack on the USS Cole. However, Badawi, regarded as the most senior of the Cole suspects who have been arrested, told his investigators that he received telephone instructions for the bombing from Mohammed Omar al-Harazi in the United Arab Emirates. Badawi said he had originally met Harazi in Afghanistan during the war.¹⁹³ Badawi indicated that Al-Harazi’s tone and manner led him to believe that Al-Harazi was receiving orders and financing for the attack on the USS Cole from bin Laden.¹⁹⁴ A senior Yemen government official stated that Al-Harazi was the organizer for a foiled plot to blow up the U.S. embassy in India.¹⁹⁵

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¹⁹³ Ibid.
The initial damage repair estimate to the USS Cole (DDG 67), a modern Aegis missile equipped warship, was just under $250 million. In 2001 U.S. dollar value, this repair cost was equivalent to about one-fourth of the total construction and commissioning cost of the warship.\textsuperscript{196} Following 14 months of repairs, the guided missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) rejoined the U.S. Atlantic Fleet at sea in April 2002.

\begin{quote}
“We have not forgotten this nation’s commitment to bring to justice all those who plot murder and orchestrate terror – no matter how long they run or how far they flee.”\textsuperscript{197}
\end{quote}

Honorable John Ashcroft
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice

\textsuperscript{196} Perl and O’Rourke, 1.
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Chapter 5: London Bombings of 7 July 2005

The morning flurry of people traveling to work in central London started like many other summer days, but July 7, 2005 changed abruptly as the subway system stopped and conflicting reports signaled that something was horribly wrong. Rush-hour bomb attacks occurred almost simultaneously on three subway lines. Soon afterwards, a bomb detonated on a double-decker bus as it slowly traversed city traffic jammed by detours and temporary road blocks due to the evolving crises near several subway stations.

European nations and other regions of the world demonstrated a growing concern about domestic “home-grown” terrorism as facts emerged on the terrorists responsible for the London bombings. The terrorists conducting these attacks on the people of London were United Kingdom citizens. Terrorism, in the context of July 2005 London, spotlighted that such criminals may or may not be readily identified as a specific threat in a population. Now,
a clear and present enemy was living and operating with deadly effect among a general population in Western Europe.

This case study presents an unclassified summary of terrorist motivations leading up to and including the London subway and bus attacks; planning and preparation; tactics and techniques of the multiple point-area bombings; and the immediate aftermath of the incident. Several vignettes highlight terrorist characteristics, London emergency response and treatment of victims, and governmental responses to the attack.

A primary underlying aim of terrorism is a demoralizing psychological effect on the target population and its leaders, often with explicit media coverage of mass casualty or mass destruction effects, to erode resolve and enhance terrorist objectives.

However, acts of terrorism can also have an opposite effect of fortifying the resolve of a population. The immediate public outrage in London, the United Kingdom, and many nations of the world appears to illustrate such resolve in the July 2005 London bombings.

\textbf{This was not a terrorist attack against the mighty and the powerful. It was not aimed at Presidents or Prime Ministers. It was aimed at ordinary, working-class Londoners, black and white, Muslim and Christian, Hindu and Jew, young and old. It was an indiscriminate attempt to slaughter, irrespective of any considerations for age, for class, for religion, or whatever. That isn’t an ideology, it isn’t even a perverted faith – it is just an indiscriminate attempt at mass murder and we know what the objective is. They seek to divide Londoners. They seek to turn Londoners against each other...Londoners will not be divided by this attack.\footnote{Honorable Ken Livingstone, Mayor of London, July 7, 2005}}

\textbf{Introduction}

The July 2005 bombings in London marked a different type of terrorist attack in Western Europe. The intended purpose caused mass casualties and significant disruption to a major metropolitan city and its people, but the more extraordinary aspect was the nationality of the terrorists. British citizens had conducted mass murder on their own countrymen. Comments from the general population paralleled those of a member of London University’s War Studies Institute: “I certainly think this is a new dimension...These are people who grew up in Britain, that are now attacking their own community, and taking other Muslim people into their missions and killing them...a novelty we haven’t seen in this country so far.”\footnote{Matthew Chance, “Britain’s home-grown terrorists,” CNN.com WORLD; available from http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europa/07/14/homegrown.terror/; Internet; accessed 23 January 2006.}
Learning objectives are introductory and can be used for analysis and application of lessons learned on several levels of training, professional education, or operational perspective. Chronologies of events provide insight on events immediately before and after the bombings.\textsuperscript{200} The timelines of various reports display norms of confusing and conflicting information as news of an incident develops and facts are confirmed. Some data was irrefutable but meaningful only after the attacks. Train station and subway Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras recorded sequences of activity among the suicide bombers on July 7, 2005. Review of individual bomber actions near or in the subway system does not indicate any overt bizarre behavior. In hindsight, a notable exception on a city street might be the bomber as he fidgeted with his bag on the top deck of a double-decker bus just prior to the bomb detonation.

Criminal investigation and counterterrorism actions by UK government organizations centered their efforts quickly based on forensic evidence from the bomb sites. With hours of the attacks, one fact was certain: London experienced a multiple site, nearly simultaneous, mass casualty causing attack by suicide bombers along the subway lines of the London underground transportation network. And the terrorists were “home-grown.”\textsuperscript{201} What links, if any, existed with foreign extremists and terrorism?

\textit{Note:} This case study does not address the terrorist bombings in London on July 22, 2005. In an apparent multiple site suicide pact, four individuals attempted to explode bombs in bags or rucksacks. Target locations were three subway trains and one bus in central London. Fortunately, small explosions at each target site did not detonate the larger bomb package.\textsuperscript{202}

\textbf{Learning Objectives}

Learning objectives focus on analyzing case study information in order to synthesize and evaluate insights from this attack, discern patterns of terrorist method and means, and determine likely trends in future terrorist activities. Comparing and contrasting conditions, circumstances, and asymmetric options available to the terrorist can enhance judgment to recognize vulnerabilities, identify threats, and minimize the ability of terrorism to impact on accomplishing the mission of a targeted activity or organization.


\textsuperscript{201} Matthew Chance, “Britain’s home-grown terrorists,” \textit{CNN.com WORLD}, 23 January 2006.


5-3
The objectives for this case study are:

- Describe intelligence indicators that might have been analyzed to create a more effective tactical estimate of terrorist intention and capability in the July 2005 attacks.

- Understand the terrorist’s motivation of choosing the population of London and the London subway system as a terrorist target of high value.

- Recognize aspects of force protection or security measures that could apply in domestic terrorist threats to U.S. forces or citizenry in the United States homeland and abroad.

- Explain terrorist organizational structure and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used for the London subway system and transportation attacks.

- Deduce possible trends for terrorist acts with the objective of an increased combination for mass casualties and mass destruction.

Case Study – London Bombings of 7 July 2005

At about 08:50 within seconds of each other on July 7, 2005, suicide terrorists detonated bombs on three subway trains as the trains departed into tunnels of the London subway system. A short time later at 09:47, an explosion ripped open a double-decker bus in the snarled traffic of a busy London street. Within moments of the nearly simultaneous subway train explosions, scores of people were dead and dying. Injured passengers groped for escape. Others trapped in subway cars, waited for help. Eventually some passengers started to extract themselves and each other from wreckage or stalled train cars and walked along subway tunnels to stations they had recently departed. Less than one hour later, a flash of light and explosion transformed a busy city street into a scene of death and injury around the peeled wreckage of a city bus. Emergency response efforts were immediate with triage at the train stations, as well as evacuation and treatment of injured citizens to nearby hospitals. Similar actions occurred as the shock of the bombed bus on a city street shifted to concern and care for the people in and around the bomb site.

According to Prime Minister Tony Blair, “The timing of the Tube [subway] explosions was designed to be at the peak of the rush hour and thus to cause maximum death and injury.” However, more than death and destruction were at the root of this act of terrorism.

Background

For all the democratic freedoms guaranteed by law in the United Kingdom, London in particular is publicized also as a haven for dissidents, radicals, and the fermenting of

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terrorism. The term “Londonistan”²⁰⁴ has even been used in the media on occasion to indicate this delicate yet abrasive condition with extremism. Democratic freedom in the UK is a regular topic of dialog, as are policies for asylum from rogue regimes, national intelligence collection capabilities, and measures for antiterrorism and counterterrorism as part of the Global War on Terrorism. The benefits and protections of democratic institutions can also feed the ability to promote extremism.

Dramatic examples of extremism and hate can collide with issues of homeland security and democratic security of a nation at large. For instance, early days of a fledgling concept emanating from extremists in London would grow into the al-Qaeda organization. Connection to such groups can connect to terrorist incidents from the late 1990s to more recent attacks in the initial years of this century. Individuals with an incendiary message, protected with rights of freedom of speech in a democracy, can demonstrate a dramatic impact on extremism. For example, Abu Hamza al-Masri was granted UK asylum in the 1970s and gained British citizenship in the early 1980s. He volunteered to fight in Afghanistan in the 1990s, followed by a return to the UK with an extreme view of people he believed were enemies of Islam. His views and pronouncements from a mosque or other public places in the UK directed mass violence against non-Muslims. One speech cited in a British documentary film has al-Masri urging his followers to get an infidel “…and crush his head in your arms, so you can wring his throat. Forget wasting a bullet, cut them in half!”²⁰⁵

Abu Hamza al-Masri was convicted recently in the UK. He was sentenced to seven years in prison on six charges of soliciting murder, 21 months on three counts of incitement to racial hatred, three years for possessing “threatening, abusive or insulting recordings,” and three and a half years for having a document useful to terrorists.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁴ “Londonistan” is considered generally a derogatory term for the British capital of London. See an extract from Wikipedia, Londonistan; available from http://www.answers.com/topic/londonistan; Internet; accessed 15 March 2006.
Figure 5-4. Below, Left. Map of United Kingdom
(Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia05/united_kingdom.gif)
Figure 5-5. Below, Right. Greater London Map
(Source: http://streetfaults.tfl.gov.uk/images/map-london-boroughs.gif)
Figure 1-6. Above. Central London Surface Network Map
(Source: base map http://www.bbc.co.uk/london/congestion/images/bike_park.jpg)
Figure 5-7. London Underground-Subway Network Map
(Source: base map http://www.tfl.gov.uk/tfl/pdfdocs/colourmap.gif)

Figure 5-8. Four Bombings in Central London

Mohammad Khan goes west. Bombs near EDGWARE ROAD.

Lindsay Germaine goes south. Bombs near RUSSELL SQUARE.

Shahzad Tanweer goes east. Bombs near ALDGATE EAST.

Hasib Hussain "late" for Tube. Bomb explodes on city bus at TAVISTOCK SQUARE.
Another example of extremism is cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed who stated in 2004, "We don't make a distinction between civilians and non-civilians, innocents and non-innocents. Only between Muslims and unbelievers. And the life of an unbeliever has no value. It has no sanctity." Also in 2004, he declared during an interview with the Portuguese magazine Publica that attacks were “…inevitable. Because several [attacks] are being prepared by several groups….." One "very well organized" group in London calling itself al-Qaeda Europe "has a great appeal for young Muslims." And he further stated, "I know that they are ready to launch a big operation." Just after the July 7, 2005 suicide bombings, he declared, "What happened…confirmed that as long as the cause and the root problem is still there...we will see the same effect we saw on July 7.

Knowing today's enemy in the Global War on Terrorism is not as obvious as it may have been in earlier sensational periods of al-Qaeda attention. Clearly still a threat, the al-Qaeda organization has changed since its origin. Even though the “hunt” has killed or captured many of the original key al-Qaeda leaders and disrupted organizational apparatus, veteran terrorists and new recruits continue to communicate, train, plan, and prepare for future attacks.

Even before al-Qaeda, the United Kingdom was no stranger to terrorism. Combating domestic terrorism in prior decades realized the value of maintaining good relationships with local communities. People in the community were a critical information and intelligence source to identify and defeat terrorists. Selective monitoring of electronic communications provided significant awareness of plots too, and allowed government authorities to preempt or minimize terrorist actions. Specific to the July 2005 London bombings, community trust in law enforcement activities was a major supporting issue in the criminal investigations. Even though concern on racial profiling and anti-Muslim hate crimes increased after the bombings, Scotland Yard noted that the majority of ethnic and national Muslim groups in Britain showed support to help police find the London bombers and planners. Also, police officials accentuated the worth of using the “language of dialogue” with British religious and ethnic groups, especially Muslims, as a best policy for fighting domestic terrorism and foreign extremism.

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209 George W. Bush, “President Addresses American Legion, Discusses Global War on Terrorism,” 24 February 2006; available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/62075.htm; Internet; accessed 10 March 2006, 7. President Bush said, “We will stay on the offensive. We will continue to hunt down the terrorists, wherever they hide.”


Networks such as al-Qaeda state a recurring aim to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies. This reaches far beyond the combatant zones of Iraq and Afghanistan; this wedge attempts to split US allies and coalition partners over a worldwide program of combating terrorism and the resolve for collective security. Momentum and continuum are operational expectations for such terrorism. To accent this type of mindset for a perpetual condition of terrorism, Brian Michael Jenkins states, “There will be more Londons.” Continued successful terrorist acts are key to “…demonstrate capability,…hope to the terrorists’ perceived constituents, inspire others to take up arms, reveal vulnerabilities, attract recruits and financial contributions… end humiliation, restore honor, awaken the community…” The London attacks could be a “…likely model for future US attacks.”

The British Terrorists

Biographical sketches of the four suicide bombers provide perspective on citizens who decided to conduct terrorism on their own nation. Several issues remain open as criminal investigations continue to search for definitive answers. Other aspects look to terrorist support networking and how these four men were groomed and convinced to commit suicide and homicide. As noted in the UK government report on the bombings, the backgrounds of the four men appear largely unexceptional. The social life of community mosques, youth clubs, gyms, and religious bookshops may have been the opportunity for Khan to identify candidates for indoctrination and further commitment to an act of terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5-1. London 7 July 2005 Suicide Bombers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Sidique Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shehzad Tanweer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germaine Lindsay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasib Hussain</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Face recognition of four men at “The British Terrorists” available from http://images.google.com with name search. See also, “Suicide bombers’ ‘ordinary’ lives,” bbb.co.uk; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4678837.stm)

Mohammad Sidique Khan appears to be the “dominant figure with ‘operational command’ of the group.” Speculation notes he probably coordinated with contacts outside the UK such as visits to Pakistan and other networking efforts. He worked as a teaching assistant and respected mentor on special needs and learning skills at a primary school in Leeds until December 2004. “He was a nice bloke…” noted a father of one of the school’s young students. Khan was married; his wife was pregnant and they had an 18-month old daughter. Earlier, he operated a gym for local youth associated with a mosque, but is reported to have been expelled from one mosque due to his extreme views of Islam. In 2004, he established another youth program in his local community. Some reports called it a learning center or bookstore. Although the building was closed often, local reports state that men were seen regularly meeting at the building. Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain lived in nearby neighborhoods and all three knew each other.

Shehzad Tanweer seemed a normal young man at 22 years old. A sports science graduate from a Leeds university, he came from a successful family whose father owned a small local business. Tanweer was a handsome, lean person who may not have been a loner, but did not have many friends and was not interested in the relaxing social scene. An acquaintance in the local area said, Shehzad was very religious. “He used to go to the mosque a lot...he was a nice, quiet person.”

Tanweer had traveled to Pakistan once in 2003. As a friend of Mohammad Sidique Khan, they traveled together to Karachi, Pakistan on November 19, 2004. A week later, they traveled by train from Karachi to Lahore. While in Pakistan, Tanweer studied at one of the many religious centers-schools. Tanweer and Khan departed Pakistan together on February 8, 2005. Upon his return to the UK, he had grown a beard and prayed five times a day. Family members noted his concern over UK policies in Kashmir, Iraq, and Afghanistan; they knew that he idolized Osama bin Laden.

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Germaine Lindsay was a 19 year old husband and father who had converted to Islam when he was 15 years old. Born in Jamaica, he came to the UK when he was five months old. Lindsay lived his early years near Leeds in the small town of Huddersfield in West Yorkshire. School friends say he changed dramatically after his conversion. He studied Urdu, wanted to be known as Abdullah Shaheed Jamal, and displayed devout manners and actions.

He moved his family to Aylesbury in 2003. Lindsay may have met the other three terrorists while attending one of the clubs that Mohammad Sidique Khan established. Lindsay worked as a carpet fitter. A close friend stated that he traveled to a mosque in London; another local citizen reported that Lindsay traveled because the local mosques were too moderate for him. At the time of his suicide, he had a 15-month old child and his wife was pregnant.‡‡‡‡ His wife said, “He was a loving husband and father.”

Hasib Hussain, at 18 years old, was the youngest of the four suicide bombers. He experienced trouble at school and was withdrawn from some academic programs by school officials. Hussain went on a pilgrimage to Mecca with his father, and afterwards, is reported to have studied in Pakistan. Returning to Leeds, he grew a beard and wore traditional Muslim clothes.‡‡‡‡ He liked sports but was unemployed. Often, he traveled to Dewsbury to worship. (Mohammad Sidique Khan had a home in Dewsbury.) On July 7, 2005, Hussain told relatives that he was going to London to attend a religious lecture. Hussain had shaved his beard prior to the suicide attack.

Planning and Preparation

What caused four British citizens to bond into a suicide pact with a religious-extremist bent? Some reports catalog a growing issue of “...a disaffected younger generation drifting into radicalism under the blind eyes of immigrant parents, slowly giving up more of its energy to groups whose zeal and camaraderie offer it a sense of purpose.”‡‡‡‡ A person or persons committed to recruiting terrorists often survey common meeting places such as mosques, clubs, or universities, and identity possible candidates for grooming.

In this case, a common place for the four bombers was a gym associated with a mosque and a building described as a bookstore or learning center. Khan coordinated these meetings with the younger men. Gradually, a tighter hold developed on these individuals through propaganda, extremist viewpoints and preaching, and other bonding techniques as a select

‡‡‡‡ “Suicide bombers ‘ordinary’ lives,” bbc.co.uk; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4678837.stm; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006.
group. In one example, a normally enjoyable sport gained some notoriety when photographs proved that a waving Khan and smiling Tanweer had been together white-water rafting in North Wales in June 2005. Similarly, Mohammad Sidique Khan may have met Germaine Lindsay through paintballing sessions with a group of young Muslim men. Other forms that can weld affiliation include visits to locations for indoctrinating fundamental perspectives on religion, or training specific skills to conduct terrorist acts.

How did the terrorists make their bombs? A residence in Leeds was identified as the bomb factory in the criminal investigation following the bomb attacks. A terrorism expert noted that the residence “…was a clearly and carefully thought out and effective manufacturing facility…” Making this type of explosive is dangerous, yet, as noted in understatement by a senior US police official, “The recipe to make a bomb is unfortunately as available on the Internet as a recipe for meatloaf.” Other details included the use of commercial grade refrigerators at the Leeds residence to keep the explosive materials cool; beverage coolers were used to transport the explosives in two cars.

The explosive used in each suicide attack was TATP. Each of the bombs used about two to five kilograms, or 10 to 12 pounds, of explosive. Formal names are acetone peroxide or triacetone triperoxide, using the acronym TATP. The suicide bombers used material available easily at neighborhood stores; the basic ingredients are drain cleaner, bleach, and acetone. Significant risk exists in making and moving this concoction. TATP is very unstable and sensitive to heat or friction. Another open briefing to business leaders reported that HMDT, or hexamethylene triperoxide diamine may have been used; this is made from chemicals similar to TATP.

Choosing target sites and conducting tactical surveillance is an operational norm for such a well planned attack. After the bombing attacks, review of security camera footage indicated an apparent reconnaissance mission in late June 2005.

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237 “TATP is suicide bombers’ weapon of choice,” TIMESONLINE; available from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/o,,22989-1695442,00.html; Internet; accessed 6 March 2006.
Were the suicide bombers radicalized by a foreign handler? Although posed as one of several considerations in criminal investigations, no conclusive unclassified information is available to support the claim of a specific foreign handler. Yet, after the bombings, London’s Metropolitan Police stated, “There is still quite clearly a possibility, almost a certainty…” that others were involved in the organizational effort for the four suicide attacks.\textsuperscript{240} Several people were questioned for possible links to the suicide bombers; criminal investigations continue.\textsuperscript{241} One report alleges that Khan may have met with extremist Islamist group members in Malaysia or the Philippines as early as 2001.\textsuperscript{242}

Notwithstanding, three of the four London bombers visited Pakistan in the year or two before the London bombings. Khan and Tanweer spent three months in Pakistan. Plane flights and airport security photographs confirm they flew into Karachi in November 2004 and also departed together in February 2005. Hussain flew to Pakistan in July 2004 and remained for a period of time before returning to the UK.\textsuperscript{243}

Whether domestic or foreign in scope, support activities existed for these four men to think, decide, and act without being compromised. Some of bombers were listed on law enforcement watch lists, but based on available information of their activities, they were deemed not significant for detailed surveillance. Investigative reporting indicated that the attacks may have been supported by al-Qaeda elements in Pakistan. One report states that numerous phone calls were made in May and June 2005 from public telephones in Pakistan to mobile telephones recovered at a location in Leeds where the rucksack bombs were made.\textsuperscript{244} Within hours of the bombings, the British Foreign Secretary noted that the attacks had the “…hallmarks of an al-Qaeda related attack.”\textsuperscript{245}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{PH2005092001610.jpg}
\caption{Possible Reconnaissance 28 June 2005 \hfill \textit{(Source: media.washingtonpost.com/.../PH2005092001610.jpg)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{243} “ATTACKS ON LONDON,” CTV.ca; available from http://www.ctv.ca/generic/WebSpecials/london_attacks/; Internet; accessed 26 January 2006.
What was the fiscal cost of the bomb making? Cost factor of the multiple point attacks was inexpensive and simple; one estimate is a cost of less than $5000.\(^{246}\) An official UK government estimate is an overall cost of no more than $14,000.\(^{247}\)

Other issues remain in question. Why did the suicide bombers retain identification cards and other personal papers on their person? This type of information and other forensic data collected at the bomb scenes were instrumental in tracing the identity of the four individuals. Why did the residence used to manufacture the explosives appear to provide materials and facilities for future use? Why were explosive devices found near Luton station in one of the rental cars used by the suicide pact?\(^{248}\)

**The Attacks**

Early on the morning of July 7, 2005, three of the terrorists (Hasib Hussain, Shehzad Tanweer, and Mohammad Sidique Khan) traveled together in a rental car from West Yorkshire to Luton station about 45 kilometers north of London. The terrorists paid for a seven day parking permit and also purchased round trip tickets to London.\(^{249}\) A fourth suicide bomber, Germaine Lindsay from Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, met them at the Luton station.\(^{250}\) Lindsay used a rental car also.\(^{251}\) On Luton station surveillance tapes viewed after the bombings, a fifth man near the four bombers was confirmed as a regular commuter and eliminated from investigation to the bombings.\(^{252}\)

At about 07:20, the four men entered the train station and boarded the train to King’s Cross station. Each of the men carried a rucksack that contained an explosive device. The closed circuit television cameras of the King’s Cross station show the four men about 08:20. Upon arrival at the King’s Cross station as a group,

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\(^{251}\) J.F.O. McAllister, “Hate Around the Corner,” *TIME Europe Magazine*; 17 July 2005; available from [http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901050725-1083866-1,00.html](http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901050725-1083866-1,00.html); Internet; accessed 6 March 2006.

the men dispersed as individuals and walked to their selected target subway trains.\textsuperscript{253} Khan took a train headed west; Tanweer took a train headed east; Lindsay took a train headed south. At 08:50, three explosions within seconds of each other, on three separate subway trains, shattered the London morning. The bombs were detonated by cell phones set to alarm at 08:50.\textsuperscript{254} Later investigation of the bomb sites, as well as the bomb factory in Leeds, provided no evidence of remote detonation or intention to construct remote detonators.\textsuperscript{255}

Hussain’s movements were different. Speculation suggests that he was going to take a train headed north, but this action did not occur. He was the bomber on Bus No. 30. Reports that Hussain could not board an intended subway because northbound subway services were suspended was contested by a London transportation spokesperson. All six subway lines running through King’s Cross were operating at 08:50.\textsuperscript{256} CCTV video shows Hussain going into shops and bumping into people as he walked in the area and into a pharmacy. He even went a fast-food restaurant.\textsuperscript{257} After failing to contact the other suicide bombers on their cellular phones [by this time, the other three bombers were dead], Hussain boarded a bus – Bus No. 30.\textsuperscript{258}

As the explosion causes were still being determined, Bus No. 30 was operating along its route of Marble Arch at 09:00 and arrived at Gloucester Place by 09:05. Subsequent bus stops on Marylebone Road at 09:10 were uneventful and by 09:30 the bus approached Euston Road and Gower Street. The King’s Cross station was closed by this time due to the bombing and caused rerouting of traffic by police. The bus driver said, “My bus had been diverted because there were thousands of people coming out of the tube [subway]. There were many people who were trying to get on the bus at

\textbf{Figure 5-15. Bus Wreckage in Tavistock Square}


once…” 259 Not familiar with the detour in traffic flow but attempting to deliver his passengers near their intended destinations, the bus driver navigated his way into Woburn Place and Tavistock Square. 260 One bus passenger remembered another passenger near the rear of the bus. “This chap started digging down into his bag and getting back up…he did it about a dozen times in two or three minutes and looked extremely agitated.” 261

Meanwhile, the bus driver was attempting to orient himself and had just called out to a police officer, asking where he was. The officer replied, “Tavistock Square, mate.” Just then, the bus exploded. The time was 09:47.

People in the immediate vicinity of Bus No. 30 bus saw the explosion and felt a blast wave; some were injured by parts of metal and glass shards; some were dumbfounded for moments. A peaceful yet busy London square had transformed suddenly to a site of death and injury. 262 As one man raced out of his apartment after hearing a “tremendous thud,” he recalled a scene that was “oddly quiet” yet had people crying in each other’s arms.” 263

Other people at locations near the subway bombings experienced similar disbelief, combined with anxiety. What was happening? A businessman was startled by a sound “like a great door slamming” as windows shook and the building seemed to shudder. He looked out his fifth-floor office building window and saw smoke pouring from air shafts of the Aldgate East subway station. 264

The Victims and Emergency Response

The four suicide bombings resulted in 56 deaths. Four of the deaths were the suicide bombers. Over 700 people were injured in the blasts. About 350 people required hospital treatment with over twenty people deemed serious or critical injuries.

Emergency response activities in London had planned and rehearsed for mass casualty incidents. As multiple reports clarified the extent of emergency, citizens and professionals rallied at the bomb scenes and medical organizations activated triage and supplemental treatment measures on site or in nearby hospitals. At the underground bomb sites, some people were easier to reach than other victims based on the closeness to subway stations and wreckage from the explosions. The Russell Square explosion was particularly difficult

264 Evan Thomas, Stryker McGuire…, “Terror at Rush Hour, On the Trail: A massive worldwide hunt begins to catch the London killers.”
because it was about 500 yards from the nearest exit. As a single 12-foot wide tunnel about 60 feet below the ground surface, blast had more effects on death, injury, and structural damage than in the other two tunnel blasts. Notwithstanding, the Aldgate and Edgware Road subway blasts had their own crises with death, dying, and passengers attempting to escape the wreckage and confusion of the explosion. The Aldgate subway explosion occurred about 100 yards from the station; the Edgware Road explosion happened seconds after departing the Edgware station.

Treatment of injuries included 350 people at the bomb scenes with over 200 people transported to Royal London Hospital. 100 of these injured people were kept overnight for care. Of 22 people in critical condition, one person subsequently died. As an example of response effort, the Walk-In Centre [clinic] on the grounds of London Hospital was alerted about 09:20 of a major incident. In a matter of minutes, clinic areas were prepared to receive emergency patients. About 10:00, a double-decker bus was the first arrival with injured citizens. Triage quickly sorted patients in a stream of casualties lasting over two hours. Other hospitals near the bombing sites received

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>Bomber</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liverpool Street/Aldgate East</td>
<td>Subway</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King’s Cross/Russell Square</td>
<td>Subway</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgware Road</td>
<td>Subway</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tavistock Square</td>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Location Unannounced</td>
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casualties, triaged, and stabilized patients too. Serious injuries included body penetrations and blunt wounds, traumatic amputations, perforated eardrums, burns, and smoke inhalation.\textsuperscript{268}

Numerous examples of individual courage witnessed subway employees, citizens, paramedics, and other first responders going into the tunnels to assist in extracting injured passengers. Concern for possible secondary explosions made some response efforts problematic. Many individuals were treated at the subway stations, ticket halls, or nearby waiting areas. Injured people treated as “walking wounded” were evacuated on London buses to local hospitals for further treatment. Ambulance carriers and air ambulances were used for rapid transportation. Nearby specialist hospitals attended to casualties at the scene.\textsuperscript{269}

Individual acts indicated the keen sense of response and care by Londoners. One doctor working at his office at Tavistock Square heard a tremendous explosion, as racing emergency vehicles and television images indicated a crisis already in progress. He recalled, “We can see white smoke and debris raining down in the square…I am in shirtsleeves and a pinstripe suit, with no pen and no paper, and I am technically an uninjured victim.” He and his colleagues conducted ad hoc triage in an office building and operated in effect, a casualty clearing station. They provided emergency care and moved injured people to hospitals in a clinical priority.\textsuperscript{270}

For emergency services in a terrorist incident such as the London bombings, a nearly simultaneous, multiple-point bombings accents several complications. Any multiple attack scenario will stress emergency response and recovery efforts. Communications between on-site and medical facilities may overload normal messaging means such as commercial telephone systems or mobile subscriber systems. Surface transportation routes and detours will congest and slow arrival at and departure from the incident sites.\textsuperscript{271} Detailed planning and regular comprehensive rehearsals can offset these factors in a crisis situation for emergency services.

Beyond the issue of physical injury repair and recovery, a professor of psychiatry at Kings College in London noted that treating psychological effects may be just as significant. “We must be careful to avoid shifting from the language of courage, resilience, and well-earned pride into the language of trauma and victimhood…The bombs made more than enough victims; it is important that we do not inadvertently create more.”\textsuperscript{272}

\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., 543-545.
\textsuperscript{271} Jim Ryan and Hugh Montgomery, “Terrorism and the Medical Response,” \textit{Perspective}, 543-545.
Aftermath of Suspicion and the Khan Video

Immediately following the suicide attacks of July 7, 2005, many theories posed how and why the bombers conducted their attacks. Some reports proposed a deliberate plan and intention of suicide and homicide. Other reports suggested that the four men may have been duped as unknowing suicide bombers. Forensic evidence quickly established the identity of the four men who died at the attack sites. Hypotheses continued as journalistic reporting and police announcements fed bits and pieces of information to the general public in the weeks following the attacks. Then, in September 2005, al-Jazeera aired a videotape attributed to al-Qaeda with the suicide statement of Mohammad Sidique Khan. Earlier in August 2005 and although no direct claim for the bombings was announced by al-Qaeda, al-Zawahiri threatened the UK with “...more destruction after the explosions of London.”273

“...I’m going to talk to you in a language that you understand.”274 The impact of Khan’s image and voice was startling – this man, in clothing and a video backdrop too familiar from many other al-Qaeda type videotapes, was very different. He spoke with a common English tone and rhythm; his words were not stilted with a “schooled English” or a foreign accent. He was home-grown! Mohammad Sidique Khan was a home-grown terrorist.

Al-Qaeda’s al-Zawahiri made an accompanying statement to the Khan videotape. Khan used phrases of blame such as “...You democratically elected governments continuously perpetrate atrocities against my people...” al-Zawahiri stated a connection with comments about, “...The lands and interest of the countries that took part in the aggression against Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan are targets for us.”275

Claims that Khan had affiliated and received some form of training for his terrorists seemed to be true. His trips to Pakistan in 2004-2005 appear a logical channel.276 Other questions remain. Were Khan and his suicide partners guided directly by some foreign handler or were the suicide bombers an autonomous cell? How was Khan recruited and developed to become a suicide bomber and cell leader of a multiple site suicide attack? A terrorism expert at the University of St Andrews in Scotland stated the point bluntly to the public. “Somebody obviously must have recruited Khan in the first place...He didn’t pop up just by accident.”277

On July 6, 2006, a videotape release of Shehzad Tanweer showed him dressed similar to Khan in the earlier Khan videotape and had the same website logo. Shehzad Tanweer says, “What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a string of attacks that will continue and

become stronger.”278 Issued as people prepared to observe the anniversary of London suicide bombings and loss of life one year previous in 2005, this Tanweer videotape and an accompanying video statement from Ayman al-Zawahri indicated further an al-Qaeda inspired motive for the July 7, 2005 bombings.

The Media Moment

The London bombings presented cellular telephone images and information in near real-time from victims and from people in the immediate vicinity of the attack sites. Although this forum for “citizen journalism” existed well before July 2005, most notably during the December 2004 tsunami, the quality of personal accounts and insight improved greatly in the hours and days following the London subway and bus bombings.

Web sites of broadcasting corporations or syndicated newspapers provided a means to submit eye-witness accounts by common citizens, while news reporters developed complementary news vignettes. Rather than drowning interested people in a tidal wave of miscellaneous information and opinion, the London incident proved that this type of journalism could be focused and edited in a concise and meaningful way.279

Camera phones presented near-immediate images to a general public that otherwise would not have been possible. When victims at the bomb sites, in particular the subway train cars and tunnels, sent video clips of the terrorist attacks to news channels or family members, they provided the first actual recordings of damage magnitude.280 This news gathering technology offers exceptional capabilities during future incident use by emergency responders, transportation coordinators, law enforcement, and other government authorities and services.

The Public Response

Condemnation of these terrorist acts was immediate. UN Secretary Kofi Annan stated that the bombings as “an attack on humanity itself.” The UN Security Council condemned the terrorism without reservation and urged nations to prosecute the terrorists for such “barbaric acts.” Many prominent religious leaders and organizations voiced similar disgust. Grand

Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Asheikh, declared that “…Killing and terrorizing innocent people and the destruction of property are not condoned by Islam.” The Muslim Community of Britain exemplified several groups by condemning the indiscriminate acts of terror.281

Queen Elizabeth and members of the royal family were very visible in visiting hospitals and staffs, victims of the attacks, emergency responders, and general citizenry in the hours and days following the terrorist attacks.282

In the context of the Global War on Terrorism, President Bush commented on the London bombings: “These attacks were barbaric, and they provide a clear window into the evil we face…The aim of the terrorists is to remake the Middle East in their own grim image of tyranny and oppression by toppling governments, by exporting terror, by forcing free nations to retreat and withdraw.” Bush stated the requirement for offensive action to deter or deny acts of this type of terror against the United States. “The best way to protect the homeland is to go on the offense, is to find these people in foreign lands and bring them to justice before they come here to hurt us.”283 Appeasement, a failed political option in a previous century, is not an option. “These kind of people who blow up subways and buses are not people you can negotiate with, or reason with, or appease.”284 Correspondingly, Bush acknowledged that, “We know that there is no such thing as perfect security, and that in a free and open society it is impossible to protect against every threat.”

Prime Minister Blair announced, “…I say to our Muslim community. People know full well that the overwhelming majority of Muslims stand four square with every other community in Britain. We were proud of your contribution to Britain before last Thursday [bombings]. We remain proud of it today. Fanaticism is not a state of religion but a state of mind. We will work with you to make the moderate and true voice of Islam heard as it should be.”285 Other salient comments reflected the terrorist acts in their basic definition: “There can be no way that anyone can say that there can be an ideology or faith that underpins this act [bombings], it is simply a criminal attempt at mass murder.”286

Case Discussion Questions

Intelligence and Threat Warning?

- What activities preceding the July 2005 attacks might have indicated the intent of the terrorists to attack a major city population and its infrastructure?

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284 Ibid.
• Did specific extremist activities in the United Kingdom indicate a security risk to UK or US national interests in the UK?

• Why did the terrorists select the London subway system as a target?

• Why did the terrorists select the London bus system as a target?

Security Measures in Effect?

• How did United Kingdom national laws relating to freedom of speech affect the forum of discussion and dissent concerning religious extremism?

• What centralized command and control procedures existed among UK civil government-military organizations for emergency response to a catastrophic incident?

• Were adequate security measures in place at the train-subway stations? What role do police have in force protection activities? What is the role of the law abiding citizen?

Terrorist Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures?

• What precedents in domestic terrorism in the United Kingdom could have focused government awareness and counter actions?

• How did the terrorists acquire and manufacture the improvised explosive devices?

• What type of rehearsals did the teams conduct for the attack?

• What was the terrorist rationale for using backpacks to deliver the bombs?

• How could terrorists have increased mass casualty effects as even more devastating?

• How did the terrorist cell structure itself, communicate, and operate during the phases of final planning, rehearsals, and execution of the attacks?

• What implications exist for the conduct of domestic terrorism by citizens or naturalized residents of Western nations?

Assessment

What motivation existed for the suicide bombing attacks of July 7, 2005? The Khan videotape cites his commitment to an extremist viewpoint in a religious duty. He attempted to state a moral basis for his actions. He aligned himself philosophically with and praised notorious al-Qaeda regional and transnational leaders.

A likely rationale for targeting London is the United Kingdom presence as the second largest Coalition Force in Iraq and a strong ally with the United States. Khan, in his suicide
videotape, calls himself a soldier at war and criticizes “…democratically elected governments…” Furthermore, Khan declares a plan for vengeance.

But why was this particular day in July selected for the attack? The G-8 Summit scheduled in Scotland during this period may have been a consideration, but the bombings did not display any significant disruption to its agenda or outcomes. Yet, the value of this terrorist action might be realized in context of a larger strategic, long-term, extremist outlook. To gain momentum in highlighting perceived wrongs and seek general acknowledgement of grievances, there must be action. The lack of a credible claim of responsibility immediately following the attacks suggests that Khan may have operated in a loosely confederated or semi-independent manner.

Nonetheless, public business and transportation experienced temporary disruption. Some official announcements recommended that Londoners consider not going to work for a period of time; some theaters or other gatherings closed temporarily for business. People reported suspicious incidents that perked apprehension of other bombing attacks. Although these observations turned out to be false alarms, these reports averaged about ten temporary closures of stations or lines per day for a week. The London bombings echo an expectation of confusion and unintentional errors in initial information announcements, congested mobile telephone services, disrupted traffic patterns, and security cordons, as well as general anxiety in normal everyday actions.

The Mayor of London used the media to make an immediate statement to the terrorists: “In the days that follow, look at our airports, look at our seaports and look at our railway stations and even after your cowardly attack, you will see that people…will arrive in London to become Londoners and to fulfill their dreams and achieve their potential. They choose to come to London…because they come to be free, they come to live the life they choose, they come to be able to be themselves. They flee you because you tell the how they should live. They don’t want that and nothing you do, however many of us you kill, will stop that flight to our city where freedom is strong and where people can live in harmony with one another.”

Concerning the daily lives of Londoners, the Prime Minister noted “…just four days later, London’s buses, trains, and as much of its underground [subway] as possible, are back on normal schedules; its businesses, shops and schools are open; its millions of people are coming to work with a steely determination…” In fact, although the London Underground [subway] was closed in the hours following the bombings, much of the city service was operating by the next day. Those lines damaged by the explosions remained inoperative until repairs and initial crime scene investigation were completed. Similarly, most bus lines were

289 Ibid.
operating normally by the next day with the exception of selected central London areas. For a period, surface trains operated with adjusted access ability into London.\textsuperscript{291}

Attacking central London may have been a symbolic gesture against an economic district of a major European city. The disruption of transportation was a practical temporary impact on the population and commerce, but impact on the overall economy and markets was marginal if not minimal.\textsuperscript{292} Shortly after the 7 July London suicide attacks, one assessment from a subject matter expert consortium in Washington, D.C. posed several issues for consideration as analysis of the terrorist acts continued. Tactics and techniques may be adapting from previous sensational attacks. The bombers were “home-grown,” that is, citizens of the UK. Yet, attention should focus also on “…the importance of networks aiding trans-boundary movement and implicitly aiding recruitment by appeals to non-territorial forms of identity…” Other comments suggest that a new generation of terrorist, with little personal experience in war-torn regions of the world, may be evolving from Salafi-Jihadist movement support, and be less likely linked to a formal al-Qaeda organization.\textsuperscript{293} One claim of responsibility, from a group declaring affiliation with al-Qaeda, described a “burning cross” which may have been the expectation of explosions at cardinal points along the subway system.\textsuperscript{294}

**Implications for the United States**

What terrorist concerns loom in the future for the United States? The Federal Bureau of Investigation knows that transnational networks such as al-Qaeda remain committed to attacking the United States. Relatively simple, low-technology type weapons are the most likely means available to cause mass casualties and economic disorder. The US transportation system is a key terrorist target.\textsuperscript{295}

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5-18.png}
\caption{New York City Mass Transit System and Daily Living (Source: http://images.google.com...www.alertnet.org/thefacts/imagesrepository/RTR)}
\end{figure}


Why attack public transportation systems in the United States? Terrorists attack targets with an expectation of success; notoriety feeds on anxiety, fear, and mass casualties. Soft targets such as tourist sites, resorts, restaurants, hotels, residential compounds, synagogues, city streets, buses, trains, and subways are vulnerable. Other aspects favor an attack: public transportation centers offer easy access and escape, if escape is a planning factor. Contained environments increase the effects of explosives and the likelihood of panic and mayhem after an attack. Transportation systems normally concentrate people; these concentrations increase the probability of mass casualties and effects.

The greatest concerns in preventing a catastrophic terrorist incident are (1) the threat of covert operatives, whether a sleeper-type cell or a recently recruited operative, inside the US with an intention to assist or conduct a terrorist attack; (2) the clear intention of al-Qaeda to obtain and use a weapon of mass destruction against the US; and (3), the potential for al-Qaeda to leverage other extremist persons or groups to assist or conduct attacks on the United States.

US domestic terrorists and other international terrorist groups pose a threat too. Political and social agendas include white supremacy, black separatism, animal rights, environmental protection, anarchism, anti-abortion, right-wing Patriot movement themes, and ethnic homeland or religious ideology themes. In a recent instance, the FBI uncovered an alleged terrorism plot by Americans to target synagogues and military recruiting centers around the Los Angeles area. The London bombings indicate that a person can take an extreme concept, and recruit targeted individuals into a small group of committed terrorists. He can gather and provide the means for making and delivering devastating weapon effects, and attack while attempting to mask mass murder with a radical ideology and justification.

The danger in the United States remains real. The largest mass transit systems in the US support New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, and Washington, D.C. When Khalid Sheik Muhammed, a chief subordinate to Osama bin laden, was captured, he stated during his interrogation that al-Qaeda planned to attack the Washington, D.C. metro [subway] system.

Risk assessment and management is a colossal task for any of the transportation systems. For example, New York City has more than 7 million daily commuters using its network of buses, trains, and subways. Consider just the tunnel network of the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The transportation network includes 14 tunnels that link four of the city’s five boroughs under three bodies of water – the East River, the Harlem River, and Newtown

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297 WMD: weapon of mass destruction or effects. WMD uses major categories of chemical, nuclear, biological, radiological, and high yield explosives (CBRNE).
299 Ibid., 6-7.
Creek. In 1997, law enforcement uncovered and prevented an Islamic terrorist bomb attack on the New York City subway system. Another terrorist attempt to bomb the New York City subway system was prevented in 2004 before the Republican National Convention.

Immediately after the 7 July 2005 London bombings, the US elevated the Homeland Security Advisory System risk of attack level from Code YELLOW to Code ORANGE for the mass transit portion of the US transportation sector. Although no specific intelligence suggested a similar attack against the US transportation system, the belief that terrorism was a driving element of the London bombings, the possibility that al-Qaeda may be involved, and a typical al-Qaeda tactic of conducting nearly simultaneous attacks convinced Federal authorities that a high risk announcement was appropriate.

The United States security is not just a Federal responsibility. National strategy seeks to maximize security but acknowledges Americans’ rights, freedoms, prosperity, mobility, and individual privacy. Security is a network of systems spanning government and the private sector. Partnership includes federal, State, and local leadership; law enforcement at all levels; emergency responders such as incident management, firefighters, and medical technicians and doctors; international liaison; and of course, the general public.

Another collective way to assist in countering the distorted promotion of terrorism is to use descriptive terms in a deliberate manner. Intent follows a definition of terms. Labeling and describing the London bombers for what they are – mass murderers – denies the rhetoric of extremism and refutes any legitimacy of suicide or murder. Militant reinterpretation of religious dogma is at its best a misguided passion; at its worst, a criminal travesty.

Similar clarity accents the strategy that the United States uses to protect its people. Four key points shape this doctrine. First, the United States is proactive and remains on the offensive with the intention of defeating terrorists abroad in order to preclude terrorist attack in the Homeland. Second, the United States makes no distinction between the terrorist and the...
countries that harbor them. Both are an enemy of the US. Third, the United States will confront threats before they fully materialize. Fourth, the United States advances the security of the Homeland by advancing the cause of freedom across the world. This advance of freedom is vital to US security and depends on the advance of liberty in other nations.\(^{310}\)

We remain a nation at war... We will take this fight to the enemy without wavering, and we will prevail ... they're [terrorists are] trying to break our will with stunning acts of violence. The terrorists do not understand America. They’re not going to shake our will. We will stay in the hunt, we will never give in, and we will prevail.\(^{311}\)

George W. Bush  
The President  
United States of America

Future Trends?

This case study discussed terrorist method, means, and rationale in the London bombings of July 7, 2005. The apparent localized planning and conducting of these four attacks suggest several trends in future acts of terrorism. First, suicide bombing and the tactic of nearly simultaneous, multiple site attacks will continue to occur and remain a significant threat. Combined with motivational extremism by terrorists, these suicide-homicide attacks will be very difficult to combat and counter, especially with the flexible organizational structure of loose confederations or semi-independent terrorist cells. Second, terrorist’s intent on gaining shocking psychological effects with mass casualties and mass media coverage will attack soft-type targets such as transportation networks and the corresponding high density of people usually located in these confined areas. Third, weapon effects beyond the destructive power of conventional explosives will be magnified as terrorists seek, acquire, weaponize, and use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear capabilities. Fourth, attacking vulnerabilities that cause calamity and catastrophic economic consequences for the US will remain a primary aim of al-Qaeda. Expanding transnational associations with localized terrorist cells amplify this capability. Finally, future terrorist attacks will not be analyzed as only discrete events, but will be examined as episodes in a long war that will be measured not in days and months, but in years and decades – a Global War on Terrorism.

\(^{311}\) Ibid., 2.
Chapter 6: Beslan: Hostage Crisis and Mass Murder

The morning of September 1, 2004 started as a community day of celebration in Beslan, an industrial-agricultural town in the Russian Republic of North Ossetia/Alania. Children and parents were preparing for the first day of the school season in the Caucasus, a day known as “First September” or the “Day of Knowledge.” Opening ceremonies for school would include first-year students giving flowers to those students beginning their final year of school, followed by a procession at the school. Parents and relatives were ready to attend the ceremonies of opening day to share their pride in observing sons, daughters, nephews, and nieces at this educational milestone.

But happiness turned to confusion, and spiraled abruptly to horror as a vehicles drove to the school courtyard. A group of about 30 individuals in camouflage and civilian clothing, their faces covered with masks, jumped from vehicles or nearby areas and started barking orders. Some of the parents thought the display must be security forces practicing a counter-terrorism drill. Yet, immediate anxiety rippled through the crowd. Some people wanted to believe the first popping noises were balloons as part of the celebration. But something was terribly wrong. Weapons were being fired into the air and ground; people were being pushed and shoved; some people were shooting at each other.
Assault rifle gunfire shocked everyone to the reality that they were in the midst of a terrorist incident and being herded into the school.

This premeditated hostage crisis spanning almost three days would result in the mass murder of over 300 men, women, and children. Several hundred other citizens were wounded or psychologically traumatized by the ordeal. Some actions by Russian authorities contributed to the loss of life and trauma in this incident. A group of terrorists used these criminal acts to gain international attention and seek political concessions from the Russian Federation concerning Chechnya. The terrorists wanted to also embarrass Russian authorities with the apparent inability of Russia to protect its citizens from terrorism. Recognizing terrorism as a criminal act, terrorism and terrorist will be the terms normally used throughout the case study.

This case study presents an unclassified summary of terrorist motivations and actions of an attack on a city middle school. Phases assess planning and preparation, tactics and techniques, and immediate aftermath of the hostage crisis and intentional murders. Other vignettes highlight local emergency response and medical treatment of victims, media manipulation and restrictions, dysfunctional negotiation opportunities, Russian governmental security lapses and command and control gaps, and conduct of Russian military and security forces. (See Table 6-4, Chronology of Beslan: Hostage Crisis and Mass Murder.)

As a caveat, descriptions of events at Beslan remain clouded in controversy. Even after official commission studies, investigative reporting and eye witness or hostage interviews by numerous organizations, sequences of action and what actually occurred are often marred by suspicion or proof of intentional false statements, or the perception of what a particular person may recall of a traumatic situation. At best, this case study can provide generalized timelines, numbers, and a common account of the terrorism at Beslan.

**Introduction**

*Hostage taking has a special place in the terrorism arsenal…they conduct large-scale terrorist actions involving hostage taking.*

Colonel Sergey A. Kulikov

A primary underlying aim of terrorism is a demoralizing psychological effect on a target population and its leaders, often with explicit media coverage of mass casualty effects to erode public resolve and enhance terrorist objectives.

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312 Sergey Kulikov, translated by Robert Love, “Insurgent Groups in Chechnya,” *Military Review* 83 (November-December 2003): 24, 28. Sergey A. Kulikov was a special forces battalion commander in the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) during the Second Chechen War, and was a liaison officer between the Russian Ministry of Defense Armed Forces and Russia’s MVD during the First Chechen War. His father, General Anatolly Kulikov, was at one time the commander of all Russian forces in Chechnya.
Beslan and the war in Chechnya are inseparable events in perspective. Whether domestic or international in scope, terrorism was and remains part of a strategy that sometimes erupts as part of an operational campaign or specific tactic. Russian President Yeltsin commented on terrorism and Chechnya in 1999:

> **Our country is waging a difficult battle against international terrorism, which has blatantly thrown down the gauntlet before us. This is a fight for the life of the people of Russia, many of whom we lost in Moscow and Dagestan, in Volgodonsk and Buynaksk. This is a fight for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. It is also part of the international community’s effort against international terrorism. I am sure that those in the West who for some reason have still not understood this will be convinced that we are in the right. International terrorism has no borders. It now has the whole world in its sights.**

President Boris Yeltsin  
December 1999

In subsequent years, statements by other senior Russian officials emphasized the main threats to Russia’s security as religious extremism, separatism, and international terrorism. Russia’s campaign for international action against terrorism spanned national, regional and global cooperation. Shortly after the terrorist attack on the USA on September 11, 2001, Russian President Putin stated: “Terrorism and religious extremism of various denominations today pose the main threat to peace.”

Acts of terrorism can have an effect of demoralizing a population; however, terrorism can also fortify the resolve of a population. The immediate public outrage in Beslan, in the Russian Federation, and among many nations of the world illustrates the impact from such a hostage crisis and mass murder. Tactical success or failure at such an incident can have a corresponding offset for both governmental authorities and terrorists. The notoriety that such a devastating tactical event can have on either government policy or terrorist intent can significantly improve or diminish its value on operational or strategic goals. Russian authorities displayed several significant flaws in incident response, negotiations, and tactical conduct.

In the Beslan incident, issues of questionable confidence or outright unbelief by local citizens in governmental announcements and procedures, and terrorist perceptions of expected operational conduct by government forces based on previous

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314 Ibid., 4.  
315 Ibid., 10.
counter-terrorist scenarios, further complicated an already critical situation. How would the Russian government respond to this crisis? Did the terrorists achieve their stated or intended objectives? Would the terrorists negotiate?

A statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin shortly after the crisis addressed issues of sympathy as well as analysis of operational security deficiencies at Beslan, and measures for improved future security, crisis management, and law enforcement. In a declaration concerning terrorism, Putin stated:

> ...The terrorists believe that they are stronger than we are. That they will be able to intimidate us with their brutality, paralyze our will, and demoralize our society...We are not dealing merely with separate acts of intimidation and isolated terrorist sorties. We are dealing with direct intervention against Russia by international terrorism, with an all-out, brutal and full scale war that, over and over again, keeps taking the lives of our companions. All the world experience shows that such wars, unfortunately, do not end quickly...We must create a much more effective security system and demand that our law enforcement agencies take actions commensurate with the level and magnitude of the new threats that have emerged...  

President Vladimir Putin  
September 4, 2004

**Learning Objectives**

Learning objectives focus on analyzing case study information in order to synthesize and evaluate insights from this attack, discern patterns of terrorist method and means, and determine likely trends in contemporary terrorist activities. Comparing and contrasting conditions, circumstances, and asymmetric options available to the government authorities and the terrorists can enhance judgment to recognize vulnerabilities, identify threats, and minimize the ability of terrorism to affect a targeted activity or organization.

Terrorism is a reality of the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) and will remain a significant threat for the foreseeable future. Terrorists may target susceptible

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people, symbols, capabilities, and infrastructure to enhance terrorist objectives and diminish the resolve of an adversary. Attacks may occur while U.S. military forces are in U.S. homeland, in transit to and from missions, and during operational deployments around the world. Other organizations or citizenry are potential terrorism targets. The objectives for this case study are:

- Describe intelligence indicators that might have been analyzed to create a more effective tactical estimate of terrorist intention and capability in the Beslan hostage crisis and murder of civilian men, women, and children.
- Understand the terrorist’s motivation of choosing the population of Beslan and a community school celebration as a terrorist target of high value.
- Recognize aspects of force protection or security measures that could apply in domestic terrorist threats to U.S. forces or citizenry in the United States homeland and abroad.
- Explain terrorist organizational structure and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used for the Beslan attacks.
- Deduce possible trends for terrorist acts with the objective of mass casualties and international media attention.

**Case Study – Beslan: Hostage Crisis and Mass Murder (2004)**

**Background**

The Caucasus lies located between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. This region has experienced ethnic-religious rivalries for centuries. Characteristics continue to highlight the importance of local politics, economics, and motivations of separatism, independence, and regional power. More recently, this regional land bridge between southeast Europe and western Asia illustrates the aftermath of oppressive Soviet policy in the mid-twentieth century. Stalin ordered mass deportations of ethnic populations such as the Checheno-Ingush for alleged collaboration with the Nazi regime during World War II. Russian authorities incorporated much of the region into the Russian Republic of North Ossetia. By the late 1950s, the Checheno-Ingush people were allowed to resettle in their former homeland, but found some geographic areas and former properties were retained by North Ossetia. An additional friction is a predominantly Christian population in North Ossetia with much of the surrounding region home to Muslim populations.

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Figure 6-3. Above, Left Russian Caucasus and Area of Interest (box added)

Figure 6-4. Above, Right North Ossetia and Beslan (outline added)
Figure 6-5. *Above, Left.* Beslan Map (Out of Date) (box added)

Figure 6-6. *Above, Right.* Beslan Overhead Image (outline added)
As the Soviet Union disintegrated, simmering issues of the Ingush people to reclaim former land and property in North Ossetia boiled to the surface. By 1992, a short conflict between the Ingush and North Ossetians caused an estimated several hundred to several thousand deaths before Russian forces stopped the fighting. Thousands of people were displaced due to the short war. Chechnya, a neighboring region, had declared its independence from Russia in late 1991. Russia struggled to maintain sovereignty in Chechnya and eventually moved military forces into Chechnya in December 1994. Two years of war offered mixed outcomes. Russia had lost the information war of public opinion to Chechen fighters. However, Russian authorities learned from this failure and promoted a compelling image of regional criminal activity, political extremism, and terrorism as counter to Russian security. Issues such as regional kidnapping, hostage taking, slavery, slave trading, and oil theft were publicized as were numerous raids and bombings being conducted by criminals, extremists, and terrorists. Russian public opinion appeared to shift dramatically in favor of an “iron hand” after a Chechen separatist, Shamil Basayev, conducted a series of attacks in nearby Dagetsan, and a series of bombs attributed to Chechen terrorists exploded in apartment complexes in Moscow and other Russian cities.

Russia considered the Dagestan attacks part of a larger separatist aim to destabilize republics adjacent to Chechnya such as Dagetsan and Ingushetia, as well as the entire Caucasus area. Basayev’s August 1999 raid into Dagestan by a Chechnya-based and self-proclaimed Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB) was one of the contributing factors igniting the Second Chechen War in 1999. Russia deployed more military forces to Chechnya. By mid 2000, Russia established direct rule of Chechnya. Eventually defeated in conventional large scale operations in urban and mountainous areas by Russian forces, separatists and other insurgent groups concentrated on small scale raids, bombings, and terrorism. By early 2003, Russia provided a large degree of autonomy to Chechnya with Russia still clearly in control of the republic.

Mass hostage-taking was recognized as being a particularly effective tactic for gaining media attention. The 2002 civilian hostage crisis in a Moscow theater kept the Chechen separatist movement and discussion of Islamic extremism in the spotlight. The terrorists claimed the approval of Shamil Basayev, one of the more notorious of Chechen terrorists. The mass casualty outcome of the Moscow theater crisis, criticism of Russian public opinion...
security counter-measures, and flawed Russian tactical conduct added grist to an already expanding terrorist information operations mill. Yet, closer inspection between terrorist political goals and extremist religious sanction could identify significant differences in pragmatic politics, moderate Islamic views, and radical separatist actions.

Shamil Basayev found himself hailed as a “freedom fighter” or defamed as a criminal and “bandit.” Terms mean different things to different people. In the region, the term boeviki can be translated as “fighter” or “separatist fighter,” or can be defined as “terrorist militant” as often expressed by Russian officials. Support of Basayev’s extreme actions from Chechen leaders and nationalists shuttled among recognition as military ally, an outlaw, or as a distant political associate.

Terrorist operations in 2003 and 2004 displayed increased activity and marked tactics to gain international attention of ethnic, political, and Islamic extremist disputes. A suicide bomber attempted to assassinate the Ingushetia President in April 2004. In May 2004, the Russian-backed President of Chechnya was assassinated in Grozny, Chechnya by a bomb placed under the seats in a stadium. Political tension and brokering for power destabilized the region once again. Attacks and incidents in Ingushetia and Dagestan continued. In June 2004, well-armed and organized militants from Chechnya attacked Nazran the capitol of Ingushetia, and specifically sought and killed local law enforcement officers, occupied government buildings, searched for government officials, and ambushed reinforcing law enforcement convoys. Shamil Basayev was in the news once again.

Connection among Chechen criminal activity, insurgency, and terrorism is well known in the Caucasus region and very difficult to stop or deter. Kinship and a culture of violence in the region fans criminal acts such as protection rackets, kidnapping, counterfeiting, forgery, and illegal oil trade. The same bonds of kinship and fear of reprisal minimize any real success of regional law enforcement or Russian security forces penetrating these groups that often blur the distinction among criminal, insurgent, and terrorist.

Would another spectacular act of terrorism break the resolve of the Russian Federation and the will of the Russian people as a whole? Could another localized Caucasus event demonstrate the inability of Russia to protect its republics? Should a civilian hostage crisis be conducted on a heretofore unprecedented scale of terror?

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The Terrorists – A Huge Cauldron is Simmering

To understand part of the regional terrorist threat that assaulted Beslan, two cultural traditions of adat and teip are fundamental to individual and group outlook on actions. Adat is a traditional concept of retribution or revenge. Teip is the tradition of clan or tribe and the allegiance required to an extended family and its ancestral lands. Such concepts compel groups with a sense of separatism or independence from external influences, and expect guidance from group elders, as well as protection of their culture by their young men.

Former Ingush President Ruslan Aushev once compared the region as “…a huge cauldron is simmering there, in which there is Chechnya, and Dagestan, and Ingushetia, and Karardino-Balkaria, and Georgia, and each will be seeking its own interests.” In addition to ethnic rivalries, radical forms of Islam are appealing to some in the region and may offer a personal meaning or supposed acceptance in a much larger religious context.

Well before 2000, the Russian Federation was facing the specter of increasing terrorism and categorized three main types of terrorism: social terrorism with the aim of political and economic change, nationalist and ethno-separatist terrorism, and religious terrorism. By 2000, the threats of religious extremism and separatism were combining with international terrorism as Russia’s main threats. Russia announced similar statements after the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. Russia experienced an increasing degree of Islamic radicalism in a number of terrorism incidents, and if not a primary incentive in specific terrorist group goals, was at least contributing to regional instability and extremism.

Profile of a Terrorist

Shamil Basayev, who claimed overall terrorist responsibility for the Beslan attack, supported terror for aims including separatist, political, and religious reasons. His personal history is interwoven in the turmoil of Russia after the demise of the Soviet Union and the rising expectations of Caucasus regional republics in the new Russian Federation. Basayev was involved in regional insurgent activities and ethnic fighting as early as 1991. He gained notoriety during a 1991 hijacking of an airplane that placed a temporary media spotlight on Chechnya, and later, he acted as a key insurgent leader in the fighting in and around Grozny during the First Chechen War. After his wife, two of his children, and several other family

Figure 6-7. Basayev

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331 Mark Smith, “Russian Perspectives on Terrorism,” 2, 4, 10.
members were killed in a 1995 Russian bombing raid on his home village, Basayev led an insurgent group that resulted in a mass hostage crisis in the city of Budyonnovsk in the Stavropol Krai republic, northwest of Chechnya. His successful negotiation with the Russian Prime Minister for safe passage of the insurgent group to Chechnya created an image of ethnic hero.332

By 1997, Basayev was promoting a concept to journalists of Chechnya as a moderate Islamic state within the Russian Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but by 1999, appeared to be aligning with radical Islamic groups seeking to establish an independent Islamic state. Throughout this period, he was involved with senior political leaders in Chechnya, but his political intrigues such as personally leading an insurgent raid into neighboring Dagestan fractured any accommodation with more moderate Chechen leaders. One website notes an alleged interview with Basayev concerning the Dagestan raid: “We did not invade Dagestan. Rather, we went there in order to help our Muslim brothers in Dagestan ... Dagestan is our nation and it belongs to both the Chechens and Dagestanis...” 333 During the Second Chechen War starting in 1999, Basayev continued to be a charismatic leader in the fighting, was severely wounded, and had part of one leg amputated.334 Yet, he continued to plan and conduct terrorist acts in subsequent years as part of a campaign to intimidate and embarrass Russian authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Death</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moscow Apartments Bombing</td>
<td>&gt; 260</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>Sep 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Security Based Attack</td>
<td>&gt; 50</td>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>Jul 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis</td>
<td>&gt; 150</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>Oct 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Military Hospital Suicide Bombing</td>
<td>&gt; 50</td>
<td>North Ossetia</td>
<td>Aug 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Metro Train Bombing</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>Feb 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination Attempt of Ingush President</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ingushetia</td>
<td>Apr 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination of Chechen President</td>
<td>≥ 5</td>
<td>Chechnya</td>
<td>May 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raid on Capitol City of Nazran</td>
<td>&gt; 90</td>
<td>Ingushetia</td>
<td>Jun 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Airplane Suicide Bombings</td>
<td>≥ 85</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Aug 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow Metro Train Bombing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>Aug 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beslan School Hostage-Mass Murder</td>
<td>&gt; 330</td>
<td>North Ossetia</td>
<td>Sep 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whether directly approved by Basayev or related to a larger regional insurgency, sensational acts of terror were increasing in number, spreading anxiety among a larger Russian population, and challenging Russian ability to contain and stop these criminal activities and murders. Apartment bombings in Moscow caused over 200 deaths, a theater hostage crisis resulted in over 150 deaths, a suicide bombing of a military hospital caused over 50 deaths, a bombing assassinated the Chechen President, raids in Ingushetia killed over 90 people, suicide bombings of two airplanes killed almost 90 people, and a bombing of a metro station killed 10 people. Beslan would be one more tragic event in this ongoing series of terrorist acts, and far surpass an already appalling tally of terrorism.

The leader of the terrorist group at Beslan, nicknamed “Colonel,” was Chechen Ruslan Tagirovich Khuchbarov. Wanted by Russian authorities for murder, he had operated in a number of Chechen separatist-insurgent groups and was a principle actor in several regional terrorist incidents prior to Beslan. Videotape recorded by the terrorists inside the school show him as a man of medium build. Wearing a skull cap over a shaved head or closely cropped haircut, his face is framed by a mustache and large beard flowing from ear to ear. The tour that he gives a negotiator presents images of other terrorists in various attire of military equipment and weapons, and views the tangled bodies of adults they had murdered on the first day and dumped out of a second floor window into the school yard.

No one profile fits the terrorists at Beslan. A survey of their terrorist backgrounds present a mixed history of criminal activity, inter-family feuds and demands for revenge, fighting in the separatist struggle of Chechnya, and in some cases, proclaimed religious extremism. A common aspect was having family members who had been killed or kidnapped or tortured by Russians in Chechnya or Ingushetia. Hostage interviews after the crisis testify to levels of treatment by terrorists from sheer brutality to individual acts of benign kindness. Other hostage interviews indicate that some of the terrorists were expecting to survive the hostage-taking and were not on a suicidal mission. Suicide, seemingly accepted by female terrorists wearing suicide belt-vests, was argued among several of the terrorists and appears to have been less than an unconditional commitment by all of the terrorists.

337 “New Video Of Beslan School Terror, CBS News 48 Hours, January 21, 2005, available from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/20/48hours/main668127.shtml; Internet; accessed 6 February 2007. This site also links to a video clip recorded by the terrorists inside the school, and includes scenes as Khuchbarov discusses the hostage situation with Ruslan Aushev, displays dead hostages, and the release of several mothers with infants.
338 Adam Dolnik, “Negotiating the Beslan Hostage Crisis,” (University of Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP)), n.d., 31, 36-37, 39.
The only Beslan terrorist captured by Russian authorities and surviving after the attack, Nur-Pashi Kulayev, stated that the Beslan attack was intended to create an expansion of fighting across the Caucasus region, and to incite religious and ethnic hatred based on a compulsion for revenge. Causing confrontation and strife between Christian and Muslim faiths within regional populations was a specific objective.

In an interview after the Beslan murders, Basayev stated his intention had been to present conditions that offered no means for a “bloodless resolution” to the hostage crisis. The videotape shows him sitting in front of a banner with Arabic inscriptions. With characteristic flair, he promoted his aim for Chechen independence and the requirement for complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya. His comment that he was shocked at the carnage of Beslan is quite surprising, when in the same interview, he clearly labeled Russian civilians as targets in his war. Basayev stated, “We are planning more Beslan-type operations in the future because we are forced to do so.”

Planning and Preparation

Terrorist attacks in the months prior to September 2004 displayed a clear increase in activity throughout the region of North Ossetia and neighboring Ingushetia and against the Russian government at large by Chechen separatists. A female suicide bombing at a bus stop in Ossetia in June 2003, a July 2003 double suicide bombing by female terrorists at a Moscow rock concert, and a September 2003 suicide truck bomb at a Russian Federal building bore the signature of Chechen terrorists and displayed a growing boldness in their operations. However, a significant spike in organization and planning occurred for the June 2004 attack on the Ingushetia capitol of Nazran and several towns and villages along a main highway in the republic. The raids were conducted by an estimated 200 to 300 attackers. Concerns that Chechen-linked warfighting was coming across neighboring borders was accented with concerns that many of the attackers may have been local Ingush, as well as Chechen. About 100 people were killed in one night of fighting. Over 120 people were wounded. Many of the terrorists wore police uniforms during their attacks. An acting interior minister and his deputy, other government officials, Federal Security Service investigators, prosecutors, and local policemen were targeted, and in many cases and killed by the terrorists.

The Nazran, Ingushetia incident provided some important intelligence indicators. This raid was the largest raid in the region of this sort in years and occurred in a neighboring republic to Chechnya and North Ossetia. What were terrorists planning? Besides “…intimidating the Ingush people, intimidating the Ingush leadership, and destabilizing the situation in Russia’s south, in particular in the Caucasus region…,” as noted by President Putin, what were the multiple raids achieving? At a minimum, the raids demonstrated terrorist ability to infiltrate and transit Ingushetia, and conduct attacks. Border control appeared to be ineffective. Combined with porous borders and allegations of corruption involving bribery at border control points, security measures seemed to be inadequate. Security forces and key urban areas appeared unable to protect themselves.

Given the pinpoint targeting of government and law enforcement officials in Nazran, terrorists had a dedicated surveillance plan of people and buildings in place; local support to separatist terrorists had to be in place within the population too. Surely, other possible targets were being considered by terrorists in the region. Reconnaissance must be confirming preliminary options and the likelihood of success against specified locations.

Did any indicators exist for the citizens of Beslan of unusual activities? After the September tragedy, citizens of Beslan remember odd occurrences near the Beslan School, that in hindsight, appear to be events in active surveillance and reconnaissance of the Beslan school and surrounding city blocks. Two Beslan citizens affirmed that one of the terrorists identified in the crisis aftermath had been seen in the Beslan marketplace one week prior to the attack. Other citizens recall several unknown men sitting on boxes in the school courtyard one week before the attack. Another report states that one citizen recalled about four vehicles parked near the school with bearded men observing the area.

During hostage interviews after the Beslan incident, one observant parent noticed that lengths of wire used in constructing the bomb connections in the gymnasium were precut to size and that the basketball hoops had been part of bomb distribution plan. Hostages stated that terrorists directed floor boards to be removed from certain areas in the school. Some stories evolved that weapons or explosives may have been cached by terrorists or sympathizers during previous construction work in the school. Flooring had definitely been removed in some areas of the school but evidence of pre-positioned materiel was inconclusive. A local deputy police chief noted, “They [the terrorists] were so well

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344 Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Russia: Ingushetia Mourns Its Dead Amid Renewed Concerns For Regional Stability.”
346 Adam Dolnik, “Negotiating the Beslan Hostage Crisis,” (University of Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention (CTCP)), n.d., 51.
trained…” He was surprised how quickly they positioned themselves throughout the school building and was sure they were very familiar with the interior of the school. “It wasn’t the first time they were here.” One hostage recalled seeing a terrorist leader pull a map drawing of the school from his pocket as he was questioning her and looking for a piece of paper to write a note.

Why Beslan? Of the four schools in Beslan, School No. 1 was the largest. In a 2005 interview well after the Beslan attack, Shamil Basayev said that large renowned Russian cities like Moscow or St Petersburg were considered for attacks but that operational and financial limitations caused a more regional target selection. Nonetheless, achieving a tactical success in a nearby Russian republic of North Ossetia would still create a crisis incident for Russian authorities and spotlight separatist aims for Chechnya.

The Attack

In the early morning hours of September 1, the group of terrorists conducted final attack preparations in the woods near the border between North Ossetia and Ingushetia. This area had also been the training camp for the assault, seizure, and barricade operations near and within the school. They departed around 7:00 a.m. in several [reports vary from one to three] vehicles. Reports note that the group was observed on an access road by a police officer at an isolated outpost. The police officer was held by the terrorists but apparently escaped or was released once in Beslan. His attempt to provide timely warning to local authorities is questionable. The terrorists drove discretely in Beslan and arrived at the school yard shortly after 9:00 a.m.

The terrorists were well prepared and heavily armed. Some wore camouflage uniforms while others wore civilian clothes and athletic attire. Many wore ammunition vests and harnesses with various pouches and military equipment such as hand grenades and first aid kits. Several men carried assault rifles; some of the terrorists had 40mm grenade launchers mounted under the rifle barrels. Other weapons or individual equipment included food and water, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and protective masks to counter debilitating gas or chemicals. Sentry dogs were also used as part of terrorist warning systems.

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351 Ibid., 52.
352 Ibid., 27.
355 Adam Dolnik, “Negotiating the Beslan Hostage Crisis,” 27.
Figure 6-9. Beslan School 1-3 September Selective Events (Above, Top)

Figure 6-10. Day 1: Seizure and Murder (Above, Bottom)
7. Bomb explodes in gym; another explosion occurs within seconds.
8. Terrorists shoot emergency services men recovering remains.
9. Hostages flee gym; terrorists shoot at hostages; security and cordon forces shoot at terrorists.
10. Terrorists move hostages to the cafeteria wing.
11. Terrorists continue fighting.

12. Security forces assault; free some hostages who move to safety.
14. Main fighting actions occur near cafeteria and hallways-rooms; many explosions.
15. Most security force casualties occur in this wing of school; terrorists are killed-captured.

Figure 6-11. Day 2 and 3: Malice to Mayhem (Above, Top)

Figure 6-12. Day 3: Final Frenzy (Above, Bottom)
“First September” or the “Day of Knowledge” ceremonies were in progress at Middle School No.1 when at least one vehicle drove into the school grounds. About 30 masked individuals in camouflage or civilian clothes ran toward the ongoing ceremony and started to surround the crowd of parents, teachers, relatives, and school children. Many parents had brought their infants to the ceremony because a pre-school nursery was closed unexpectedly due to a maintenance problem. Instant anxiety turned to fear as several camouflaged men fired their weapons, and shouted phrases such as “Allah Akbar!” or “This is a seizure!” Firing rifles into the air and into the ground, the terrorists started herding the entire group of civilians toward the school building.

Some of the school group attempted to run away; some were able to scatter and escape from the tightening cordon of armed men. Obviously out-gunned, one parent who was carrying a pistol fired at the terrorists in the opening moments of the assault, but was shot and killed as terrorists continued to herd men, women, and children into the school. Other terrorists quickly offloaded equipment and explosives from the utility truck, and two smaller vehicles they had arrived in, and started to distribute weapons, ammunition, and explosives throughout the school building complex. One report states that five local police officers and one terrorist were killed in early exchanges of gunfire. At least two terrorists were wounded during the initial seizure of civilians. Another report says that at least two people were killed and eleven wounded in these first hectic minutes. Sporadic gunfire continued during the initial hours.

Terrorist actions were immediate in isolating and neutralizing hostage ability to attempt resistance, escape, or contact with anyone outside of the school. Terrorists made a thorough search of the school and gathered people who had hidden in first and second floor rooms. Most hostages were taken to the gymnasium and told to sit on the floor; many had their hands raised behind their head. One hostage remembers that men who attempted to resist were killed immediately; other wounded hostages were led out of the gym and killed in the hallway.

Adult males were separated in most instances from the women and children. Some men were used to break windows. Although many hostages thought this breakage was due to the stifling condition in the gym, others suspected that terrorists did this as a precaution against the use of debilitating gas as used by Russian security forces during the Moscow theater hostage crisis. A group of about twenty male hostages was used to block probable

361 “Chechen Terrorists Seize School in North Ossetia,” The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 56 no. 35 (September 29, 2004): 5.
entrances to the school with furniture and other items. Once these tasks were accomplished, the group was taken to a second floor room and murdered with gunfire.

All mobile or cellular telephones were confiscated from the hostages. Terrorists threatened to kill anyone found with a phone as well as several people around any person found with a phone.362 Other threats stressed mass punishment for individual disobedience. “If any of you resist us, we will kill children and leave the one who resists alive!”363 The terrorists demanded that only Russian be spoken by the hostages. After allowing one adult to speak to the hostages in the gymnasium in an attempt to quiet everyone, he was shot and killed in front of everybody. He had spoken in Ossetian. His body was dragged into a hallway leaving a large red trail smeared on the floor.

Meanwhile, several terrorists were methodically setting improvised bombs throughout the school building. Backpacks and other equipment brought into the school held the material for a large number of improvised bombs; some were small plastic bottle looking devices; some rectangular devices were the size of a small briefcase.364 In the gymnasium, bombs were connected together along the floor in a “daisy-chain” type arrangement. Other explosives were attached by wires to the basketball hoops in the gymnasium and hung suspended over the hostages. A terrorist was positioned in open view standing on an alleged pressure plate that would explode the bombs if his body

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364 Ibid., 5.
pressure was released off of the small platform. Unknown to Russian authorities at the time, over 120 improvised explosives were being positioned throughout the school.365

Measures to fortify and barricade the school were immediate with well rehearsed plans. Teams had specific tasks to accomplish. Some terrorists focused on preparing defenses for an assault from local police and militia; some started assembling bombs and tripwires; a small number of terrorist-guards contained the hostages. Snipers were positioned at key locations in the school building complex.366 Other terrorists occupied classrooms, library, administrative areas, and cafeteria.

Thought had been given to exploiting the media. The terrorists recorded their actions in the gymnasium and hallways of the school on videotape and provided it for media distribution. Sensationalism was important. Graphic scenes on the terrorist videotape showed a bomb being assembled on the gym floor, next to the blood path that had been caused when a hostage’s dead body was dragged away. At least several hundred people were packed into the gym; another panning of the gym shows a young boy sitting with his hands behind his head, fear in his eyes, and a terrorist standing nearby holding an assault rifle. The terrorists also maintained contact with sources outside of the hostage site via their own mobile telephones. The terrorists were aware of much of the international media coverage of their incident.367

Local police and other security forces gradually cordoned the school area about 10:30 a.m. Establishing a perimeter to isolate the school was disorganized. Law enforcement leaders lacked effective control of an exclusion zone from terrorist gunfire.368 Only about one hundred meters separated a porous perimeter from the school area. One photographer was able to position in a nearby building with a security force team and maintained a clear view of the school complex.369 Civilians were allowed to meander on the streets and among houses and apartments, and in some cases walked within easy shouting distance to the school. Some terrorists were yelling taunts from the school windows. Sporadic gunfire directed at the school caused an ultimatum by the terrorists. Hostages were placed in window sills, in some cases, to stop the firing from the surrounding streets and buildings.

Initial attempts to contact the terrorists by telephone and initiate a foundation for negotiations were not received well by the terrorists. Terrorists wanted direct contact with very senior Russian officials. About an hour later, terrorists had one female hostage deliver a hand-written note to the cordon. Terrorists demanded to see President Dzhosokhov from North Ossetia, President Ziazikov of Ingushetia, Aslambek

365 Adam Dolnik, “Negotiating the Beslan Hostage Crisis,” 12.
366 Ibid., 6.
Aslakanov as a senior advisor to Russian President Putin, and a Dr. Leonid Roshal who had assisted in some negotiations during the 2002 Moscow theater terrorist hostage-taking incident. They also stated several threats: for every terrorist killed, 50 hostages would be killed; for every terrorist wounded, 20 hostages would be killed; and if five terrorists were killed, they would “…blow everything up.” The terrorists also threatened to shoot ten hostages if the lights [electrical power] were turned off or the communication links were disconnected. A telephone number was posted in the note.  

Telephone contact with the terrorists was not progressing toward any accommodation. Both terrorists and Russian officials wondered what would be the next significant move in negotiation. Gun fire had stopped from the cordon. The school was clearly well defended by the terrorists. The two female terrorists rigged as a suicide bombers were near a hallway. Another terrorist stood nearby with hostages. About 3:00 p.m., an explosion ripped apart one of the female suicide bombers. Her belt-vest bomb had detonated without any obvious warning. The other female terrorist wearing a suicide belt-vest died from the blast too, and blast effects and shrapnel peppered another terrorist guard and some hostages. At least two hostages died from the explosion.

After caring for one of the wounded terrorists, a terrorist leader directed the wounded hostages be brought upstairs in order to receive medical attention. He lied. The hostages were led into a room and killed in a burst of rifle fire. Some hostages say that the female terrorists disagreed with targeting a school and children and had argued among the terrorists. Yet, reports that the female terrorists were killed purposely by the terrorist leader with a command detonation of the belt-vest bomb seems improbable based on other terrorists who were killed or severely wounded in the bomb blast.

In the late afternoon, the terrorists sent a female hostage with another note to the cordon. The note provided a corrected phone number to the note delivered earlier in the day by the same hostage. Ruslan Aushev was requested to come to Beslan. He was a former President of Ingushetia and well respected in the Caucasus region.

Lights remained on in the school all night. Dr. Roshal attempted to negotiate with the terrorists via telephone for several hours during the evening, but to no success. From the police perimeter outside of the school yard, single gunshots were heard periodically throughout the night from within the school. Described as warning shots by the terrorists, the occasional crack of a gunshot startled civilians maintaining a vigil along the area cordon. The terrorists had organized for duty shifts and had a rest plan among the group members. Periodically, the terrorists listened to news from commercial radio broadcasts.

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372 Ibid., 14.
Around midnight, Roshal was talking again with the terrorists via telephone in an attempt to negotiate some allowance for water and food for the hostages, or an exchange of children hostages for adults. These talks ended abruptly after midnight when terrorists stopped talking on the phone.375

Day Two

Daylight did not indicate recognition of any workable options for negotiation. Russian announcements on the previous day that only 120 hostages had been seized infuriated the terrorists. Even a revision by Russian authorities to over 300 hostages was grossly less than the over 1000 hostages that the terrorists, local citizens, and Russian authorities knew were in the school. Attempts at negotiation stalled.

By noon, the terrorists declared more restrictions based on the Russian media announcements that were downplaying the significance of the hostage-taking and the immediate crisis that was underway. Terrorists denied food and water to the hostages, and severely restricted any physical movements in the rooms or previous allowances to use bathroom facilities.376 Hostages had not been given food since the start of the hostage crisis. Now, hostages were getting desperate in their dehydration. Some hostages even resorted to drinking urine.

Conditions remained tense. During the mid-afternoon, at least two rocket propelled grenades (RPG) were fired by terrorists at the surrounding perimeter; one RPG set a car on fire. Some reports that state that the terrorists were on drugs such as heroin appears overstated. However, some terrorists probably did have stimulants to stave off fatigue.

Then, some hostages recall that the terrorists had heard something from their leader that visibly pleased them. Some form of negotiation was about to take place. At mid-afternoon, one man was allowed entry to the school by the terrorists. Ruslan Aushev, a former President of Ingushetia, surveyed the status of hostages, saw the corpses that had been dumped into the school yard on the previous day, and discussed possible options with the terrorist leader.

A positive sign of progress was in motion. Aushev and the terrorists had arranged an accommodation on selective release of some hostages. Several women with nursing infants would be allowed to exit the school. About 5:00 p.m., a van was allowed into the

restricted area next to the school and returned with additional hostages. 26 people were released by the terrorists. Approval to remove bodies from the school yard would wait until the following day.

The terrorists handed Ruslan Aushev a hand-written note dated August 30 supposedly from Shamil Baseyev. Demands still focused on the removal of Russian forces from Chechnya. English translations of the note may differ slightly; however, the basic text of the note follows:

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Vladimir Putin, you were not the one to start the war, but you could be the one to end it, that is if you find the courage and resolve to act like de Gaulle. We are offering you peace on a mutually beneficial basis in line with the principle “independence for security.” We can guarantee that if you withdraw the [Russian] troops and recognize Chechen independence, then: we will not strike any political, military or economic deals with anyone against Russia; we will not have any foreign military bases even temporary ones; we will not support or finance groups fighting the Russian Federation; we will join the Commonwealth of Independent States; we will stay in the ruble zone; we could sign the Collective Security Treaty, although we would prefer the status of a neutral state; we can guarantee that all of Russia’s Muslims will refrain from armed methods of struggle against the Russian Federation, at least for 10-15 years, on condition that freedom of religion is respected…The Chechen nation is involved in the national liberation struggle for its Freedom and Independence and for its preservation. It is not fighting to humiliate Russia or destroy it. As a free nation, we are interested in a strong neighbor. We are offering peace and the choice is yours.
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Figure 6-14. Beslan Terrorist Note of Demands to President Putin

Day Three

The third day of the hostage crisis was tense in the streets and buildings around the school. What might occur next increased the general anxiety. What were the authorities

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378 Mark Smith, “Russian Perspectives on Terrorism,” 19; and Wikipedia, “Beslan School Hostage Crisis-Demands.”
coordinating? Would there be another release of hostages? There had already been so much killing – corpses were visible in a jumbled pile below a second floor window at the school. What would the Russian security forces do?

Time and events seemed in Limbo – a clock on the wall ticked away the seconds, minute by minute, as both the Russian authorities and the terrorists were peering to see what action would occur next.

“The school will not be stormed.” North Ossetian President Aleksandr Dzasokov announced to relatives and friends of hostages around 11:00 a.m. He told the crowd near the school that his greatest hope was that the terrorists would get tired, demand buses, and hostages would be released. He said, “We are willing to give the terrorists free passage to any destination, to any border…”

Demands had been stated to the Russian authorities several times since the beginning of the hostage-taking. Primary demands by the terrorists for Russia to remove Russian forces from Chechnya and for President Putin to resign had gone unanswered. Notes had been delivered by a hostage to the Russian authorities on two separate occasions.

The terrorists were getting very agitated and anxious by the start of the third day. Telephone conversations were leading nowhere. Russian offers to exchange adults for children, or coordinating for safe passage of the terrorists appeared to have failed. The terrorists knew that a Russian response to hostage-taking was usually an armed response. The terrorists also knew that in past terrorist confrontations, Russians had typically conducted an armed assault on about the third day of an incident.

Conditions inside the school were past critical for many of the hostages. They had been without food since the beginning of the crisis, and without water since the previous day when the terrorists denied water as an additional restriction. Physically, hostages were very weak. Any sleep was a strange notion of drowsy fits coupled with sudden alerts of what was happening to them. Emotionally, they were desperate.

Shortly before 1:00 p.m., terrorists in the gymnasium moved some of the improvised bombs along the floor closer to one of the walls. Other bombs remained as originally set among and above the group of hostages.

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380 Mark Smith, “Russian Perspectives on Terrorism,” 63.
381 Adam Dolnik, “Negotiating the Beslan Hostage Crisis,” 11.
Moments to Mayhem

An agreement was arranged to allow emergency services to remove corpses from the school yard that had been pushed out of second floor windows on the first day. Meanwhile, most of the children were very dehydrated, physically exhausted, and propped listless around the gymnasium. Adult hostages fared no better. The terrorists acted nervous and agitated. Shouts led to them beating some people. Terrorists argued with each other.

Six rescue service workers dressed in red and blue striped coveralls slowly approached the school building with a van to remove the bodies.\(^{384}\) Time seemed to stop. A near visible tension saturated the air. Terrorist snipers were prepared for a ruse and assault by Russian forces; other terrorists were manning their assigned points in the building complex and checking the readiness of their weapons. The terrorists in the gymnasium looked at the chain of bombs in the gymnasium.

Suddenly, the gymnasium erupted in a large explosion. Windows shattered and window frames were blown from the walls. Bodies hurled against walls and each other. Many hostages near the detonation were killed outright from blast and shrapnel; many other hostages were wounded. Seconds later, a second explosion occurred in the gymnasium. Reports differ on whether the initial explosion was caused by security forces or the terrorists.\(^ {385}\) Everything went into slow motion. For many, physical numbness and emotional shock quickly gave way to natural adrenalin and the need to escape.

Two emergencies services members were shot and killed almost immediately by the terrorists as gunfire burst from the school shortly after the explosion.\(^ {386}\) In the gymnasium, an instinct for survival compelled many of the hostages to act. Hostages were stumbling through a hole in the wall created by the explosion, while others were jumping from the high window sills and tumbling to the ground. Other hostages were stunned or moaning from their wounds; some hostages were perfectly still.

A panicked scramble by hostages spread throughout the school yard as they attempted to find safety beyond the mixed cordon of security forces, police, and civilians. Terrorists were shooting at fleeing hostages; people along the cordon were shooting at terrorists. Soldiers, policemen, and armed civilians from the cordon assisted hostages as best they could to quickly seek cover and safety. Security forces entered the school at breaches they created in walls with explosives charges.


Injured hostages were placed in ambulances or any available transportation. Civilian cars were used to evacuate when casualties quickly overwhelmed existing ambulance capability. Vehicles blocked streets and cars had to be pushed off roadways to allow for evacuation to nearby medical treatment points and hospitals. Fire trucks, emergency vehicles, and civilian vehicles were intermixed in a frenzy.

Conditions were just as hectic inside the school as bullets smacked interior walls with many hostages still trapped with the terrorists. Gunfire from inside and outside the school shattered temporary moments of pause. Some hostages were able to be carried or led from the school as fighting continued in other areas of the building complex. Decisions by the terrorists inside the school building caused another serious development.

The terrorists were puzzled that no major assault had occurred in conjunction with the initial explosions. About 30 minutes after the initial explosions, movements around the school and increasing gunfire confirmed that security forces were pressing closer to the school building for an assault. An explosion near the gymnasium roof started a fire that eventually caused a portion of gym roof to collapse that killed many hostages died.

Prior to the roof collapse, one of the terrorist leaders gathered several other terrorists in the main hallway and directed hostages in the gym to follow them to the school cafeteria on the first floor. A large number of hostages were already on the cafeteria floor when they arrived. Other terrorists were firing their weapons from cafeteria windows. Metal bars across the windows may have been one reason that the terrorists chose to use this as their defensive position. No one could easily get in or out of the room. Women were ordered by the terrorists to place themselves and children in the window spaces to act as human shields for the terrorists.387 Mothers waved cloths and kerchiefs from between the

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window bars and screamed for the firing to stop. Gunfire continued from outside of the school as terrorists fired weapons from the cafeteria windows.

The magnitude of gunfire, rockets, grenades, and explosions were taking a toll on the terrorists as Russian security forces fought their way into and through the gymnasium area about 2:00 p.m. Individual vignettes illustrate the personal connections in a small community. One mother, reeling from shock in the gymnasium after the bomb explosions, found her daughter wounded and unconscious. Dragging her along the floor, soldiers started to jump into the gym through window openings. She recognized one of the soldiers as a neighbor and shouted to him. At first, he did not realize who she was but then recognized her and helped to carry the daughter to safety.388

Life and death fighting continued in close-quarters, room-by-room fights down the school hallways. In the cafeteria, security forces had entered through a breach at one of the windows. Just as rescue seemed to be imminent for one mother, terrorists and security forces came face-to-face inside the cafeteria. Neither the security force soldier nor the terrorist could miss their target as gunfire erupted at point-blank range. As the terrorist recoiled from bullets hitting him, he tossed a hand grenade. The explosion shook the room. Women and children were dead or wounded; at least one security forces soldier and one terrorist lay dead on the floor.389

Tanks were also used to fire their main guns into the school as Russian forces fought to kill or capture the terrorists, and rescue the hostages. Two tanks had been staged one block from the school. A tank was directed to move forward near the fence bordering the school.390 Security forces designated areas still occupied by terrorists and ordered a tank to fire several main gun (125 millimeter) rounds into the school.391 Russian forces breached school walls with small explosive charges to create entry points for some of their attacks and also for removing hostages from areas of the school. Russian helicopters could be heard overhead by the hostages.392 Explosions and gunfire echoed in classrooms and down the hallways of each floor.

The roof near the gymnasium was smoldering or on fire. The two initial explosions had damaged a portion of ceiling. Whether the explosions or use of Shmel flamethrowers by Russian forces to destroy a sniper location caused subsequent fires is contentious. Nonetheless, this flamethrower weapon is more accurately described as an incendiary rocket launcher. In addition to its incendiary purpose, each rocket has blast effects of a...

391 Adam Dolnik, “Negotiating the Beslan Hostage Crisis,” 59.
122mm artillery round. After the fighting, expended launchers were found by citizens on the rooftops of nearby buildings. Eventually, portions of the school roof collapsed.

Fighting continued in the school between pockets of terrorists and teams of Russian security forces. One mother hiding her child in a classroom, saw a Russian soldier looking at her from a doorway across a hall. As he darted into the hall, bullets slammed into him and he fell into the room next to the woman. He died. Other soldiers jumped into the room, paused to bandage wounds, and continued to attack down the hallway.

Figure 6-16. The Fighting Concludes and Aftermath

Some of the terrorists attempted to break out of the school cordon and evade Russian forces and local citizens. One report states that thirteen terrorists, including two women, did succeed in leaving the school and occupied a nearby building. This indicates at least four women in the group of terrorists at Beslan. The building was destroyed by tanks and Shmel rockets by mid-evening. Terrorists at this site died in the fighting.

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396 *Wikipedia,* “Beslan school hostage crisis-Course of the crisis-Day 3-aftermath.”
Gradually, Russian forces secured more areas of the school and pressed individual terrorists or small terrorist groupings into final acts of isolated fighting. By 3:00 p.m., three terrorists had barricaded themselves and several hostages in a school basement. All of these terrorists and hostages were killed in the final fighting.\textsuperscript{397}

A senior Federal Security Service official stated that the terrorists probably had a “support team” outside of the school in surrounding buildings as part of the terrorist’s tactical plan. He noted this type of reserve was common and “…when some of the terrorists managed to break out of the school, they had fire support from somewhere outside.” Another Russian special unit member said that once some of the terrorists had fought their way out of the school, they started to disperse in different directions.\textsuperscript{398}

Some terrorists attempted to escape from the carnage by blending into the local populace. One terrorist was beaten to death by the outraged fathers of hostages when he was identified trying to seek medical attention as a civilian. Another terrorist was lynched by a mob once he was cornered and apprehended.\textsuperscript{399} Some terrorists probably escaped. Reports indicate that at least two alleged terrorists claimed to be medical providers. Another episode recounted a just-released hostage finding her mother outside of the school. Still in shock, they saw a man sitting in a parked car and asked to be taken to their home. He was wearing a police uniform but did not have any shoulder straps. Just then, another man dressed in black and unshaven got into the car, as the driver started the vehicle. They ignored the home address stated by the woman, drove in the opposite direction, and angrily said, “I do not know the place.” Both women jumped from the car and felt certain that these men were participants to the terrorist attack of the school.\textsuperscript{400}

Accounts differ on when the school was actually secured and when all of the known terrorists were captured or killed. By early evening, almost all fighting ceased; yet, reports of some gunfire and final struggles continued into the wee hours of the next morning.\textsuperscript{401}

The Russian Federal Security Service initially reported that 20 terrorists had been killed and that some were not of regional ethnic groups. Some reports listed Arabs and one man described as black among the terrorists. Reports included three terrorists being detained.\textsuperscript{402} Later, these reports would change with more accurate information. Some public criticism stated that Russian authorities were attempting to create a tenuous link of the attack with al Qaeda associated international terrorism. Other reports

\textsuperscript{397} Wikipedia, “Beslan school hostage crisis-Course of the crisis-Day 3.”
\textsuperscript{398} “Beslan Hostage Crisis Ends in Disaster,” \textit{The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press} 56 no. 35 (October 6, 2004): 2, 4, 5.
\textsuperscript{399} Wikipedia, “Beslan school hostage crisis-Course of the crisis-Day 3-aftermath.”
\textsuperscript{401} “Beslan Hostage Crisis Ends in Disaster,” \textit{The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press} 56 no. 36 (October 6, 2004): 5.
\textsuperscript{402} Ibid., 3.
ranged terrorist ethnicity to include Chechen, Ingush, Kazakhs, Slavs, and North Ossetian men and women.

At least 32 terrorists conducted the Beslan hostage-taking and mass murder incident. One terrorist was captured, was tried and convicted, and is serving a life sentence in a Russian prison for his crimes. Evidence suggests that additional terrorists were involved in the operation beyond the killed or captured terrorists, and may have included a total group of between 50 to 70 terrorists.403

Civil Law Enforcement and First Responders

Local police and regional law enforcement agencies were unprepared for such a dramatic and violent action by terrorists. The school was guarded by one unarmed police officer without an immediate means of communication. Local traffic police, who may have normally been in the area, had been tasked to provide security at a different event.404 An improved intelligence and analysis capability by security forces may have discerned a higher risk at Beslan, and taken additional police security precautions around Beslan schools. Information about possible school attacks and separatists allegedly penetrating into the Beslan area was not acted upon, even though indications were evident.405

Figure 6-17. Recovery Efforts After the Fight

Once the terrorists had seized hostages and barricaded themselves inside the school, securing the site with an effective cordon might have precluded armed civilians or militia from further complicating containment of the school site. Some civilians were allowed to

403 Mark Smith, “Russian Perspectives on Terrorism,” 66.
404 Adam Dolnik, “ Negotiating the Beslan Hostage Crisis,” 52.
join the cordon with their own weapons. Many civilians were allowed to roam the neighboring streets, and nearby houses and apartments remained occupied by residents during the crisis. The general safety of local civilians near the school block area was in jeopardy throughout the incident.

The security concept of an inner cordon to contain the terrorists and outer cordon to block civilians from interfering with operations was poorly conducted. The mix of Federal forces and army elements, special counter-terrorism forces, Ossetian republic organizations, local police, untrained volunteers, undisciplined local civilians with weapons, and a general populace observing from streets and buildings was a disaster waiting to happen.

The urban setting made conditions all the more difficult. The cordon perimeter was only about two hundred meters or less from the school. The surrounding streets were lined with trees and line of sight positions had to be close to the school. The residential-commercial area ranged from small single story structures to multi-story apartment buildings.

Groups of armed civilians added to moments of no control after the gymnasium explosion. The panic of hostages attempting to escape, and the start of random shooting by both civilians shooting into the school and terrorists shooting at fleeing hostages and anyone else in the schoolyard was pandemonium. One report states that terrorists also threw hand grenades at the hostages.

Questions of how the terrorists arrived so easily in Beslan and how police response appeared so sluggish in the initial minutes of terror fermented several stories about police corruption and ineptitude. One hostage states that one of the terrorists boasted of buying their safe way past any potential security checkpoints. Another report notes one of the reasons police did not start arriving at the school until well over an hour after the terrorist seizure of the school was an inability to unlock a container and distribute weapons at the local police station.

Local firefighting departments were unprepared to respond to a hostage crisis. City firefighting teams were unable to reduce fire damage when confronted with gunfire and explosions. Rightful concern existed by firefighters on whether or not the school scene was secure from remnants of the terrorist group. Yet, whatever fire department staging and preparation occurred during the previous two days of crisis resulted in dismal

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407 Ibid., 5.
408 Adam Dolnik, “Negotiating the Beslan Hostage Crisis,” 13, 52.
performance. When firefighters were allowed to enter the school area on the third day, the first fire truck seen at the school arrived with an empty water tank. Another report states that fire trucks arriving at the school almost immediately used all of their available water source supply.

The large number of dead bodies overwhelmed the ad hoc means for mortuary affairs. As bodies were gradually extracted from the school building debris, a slow and grim process started in body identification. Temporary measures were often rows of bodies on the ground. Eventually, bodies were covered with available sheets or material.

![Figure 6-19. Firefighters at Beslan](image)

Identifying remains, cause of death, and release of remains to the next of kin was an arduous process. Many remains had been badly burned; officials and family members were unable to identify many of the corpses and would have to wait for detailed forensics. Even this later process was problematic for some as the cost for such analysis was placed on family members to verify remains that may be in question. Some remains required refrigeration until preliminary examinations could be completed. Burials started almost immediately for many families. The local cemetery was too small for such a large number of graves and had to expand to an adjacent plot of land.

**Incident Command and Coordination**

Clear command and control, that is, the coordinated leadership effort toward resolving the crisis was not conducted effectively by the Russian authorities on site at Beslan. Transfer of critical information; incorporating local expertise and knowledge of the area, facilities, and buildings; and integrated operations were not apparent between the local authorities, Republic representatives, military forces, and Federal security forces. Not having one chain of command on the scene at Beslan was problematic and dysfunctional. Operational contingency plans to counter a mass hostage situation such as Beslan did not appear to exist.

The first command center was established and managed directly by the President of North Ossetia/Alania, Alexandr Dzasokhov, in a nearby building. Hours later, a separate command center was activated by senior officials who had arrived from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Actually, two FSB staffs were formed during the crisis. A military general officer led a Federal Operational Staff, and a separate staff was...

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411 Adam Dolnik, “Negotiating the Beslan Hostage Crisis,” 60.
413 Peter Forster, “Beslan: Counter-terrorism Incident Command: Lessons Learned,” *Homeland Security Affairs*, 2 (October 2006); available from [http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=2.3.3](http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=2.3.3); Internet; accessed 30 January 2007, 4
attached to three deputy Federal Security Service chiefs. These three entities appeared to work independently and were, in some instances, counter-productive to each other’s efforts.414 Communications and information sharing appeared stovepiped, rather than inter-operational in cooperation.

In the months following the Beslan incident, Federal legislation in Russia assigned the main responsibility for counter-terrorism to the Federal Security Service (FSB). The Chief of the FSB or one of his subordinate leaders has the decision authority on conducting counter-terrorism activities and is responsible for their operational implementation.415

Other post-Beslan elements of improved organizational structure and effectiveness include standing operational staffs to deal with terrorism; consolidation of authority for certain law enforcement agencies, security services, and army forces in combating terrorism; expansion of manpower in divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and units of the Ministry of Defense; and information and tactical intelligence sharing.416 Yet, many areas of organizational effectiveness and reform remain to be proven.

Negotiations

Professional negotiators were not apparent in the unraveling crisis of hostages with a scene already confounded by murder of civilians during the initial hours in the school yard and school building. Some civilians had been shot and killed during the initial assault into the school. One adult male was murdered in front of people clustered in the gymnasium. Bodies of several dead adult males were dumped out of a second floor window by terrorists on the first day of the hostage crisis.

Negotiations, or the appearance of negotiations, were under the constant gaze of parents, friends, and relatives near the school. Signals of hope were tenuous. The eventual release of some women and children, was offset by periodic gunshots from within the building. Terrorists shot at people and vehicles along the perimeter established around the school by security forces, local police, and militia.

Previous major incidents involving hostages appeared to show a lack of Russian government patience in negotiating with terrorists. Security forces or military forces action seemed to be the favored tactical response rather than some level of accommodation.417

Time was a premium and a response would be necessary. Was consideration given to possible terrorist objectives other than a complete suicide mission?418 What opportunities

415 Ibid., 2.
existed for negotiations to possibly gain an initial concession? Did the ability exist for establishing some level of rapport or confidence building in the early phase of the hostage crisis? Did the murders by terrorists allow for negotiation and some action less than a security forces assault?

The Media Morass

Governmental public affairs and media relations officials did not provide accurate information in public announcements.\textsuperscript{419} Some official statements were intentionally misleading. Initial statements by officials on the low number of hostages were criticized immediately by local citizens. Criticism erupted as rage in some cases as family members and friends felt helpless in a spiraling crisis of terrorist demands and public affairs disinformation. Local citizens knew generally how many children and adults had been attending the school celebration and claimed that officials were purposely underestimating the magnitude of the hostage crisis.

The terrorists were angered as commercial radio reports of the hostage situation stated hostage numbers in the low hundreds, rather than the over 1000 people the terrorists had within the school building. The result was a further terrorizing of hostages inside the school and restriction of hostage food and water.

Details of the Beslan crisis were purposely muted by Russian officials. Russian television was noticeably absent from much of the international media coverage. Even though Rossiya TV had a live feed of Beslan images periodically to the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) and Cable News Network (CNN), Russian viewers often had to wait for updates only from news programs. When the hostage crisis deteriorated to the final chaos of explosions, shooting, and mass murder, Russia’s main television channels continued with the usual broadcasting programs. Other channels like the BBC, CNN, and Euronews started transmitting live pictures from the schoolyard area.

Nonetheless, some photographers and correspondents were able to enter the immediate area surrounding the school and witness the series of events and catastrophic ending. Photographers captured numerous scenes of tragedy and quickly distributed pictures to an international public ready to consume. One example of this grim fascination occurred just after the explosions in the gymnasium. One small girl was blown out of the gymnasium through a window space and unto the schoolyard. Wearing only underwear and shoes, she rose to her feet slowly but apparently unhurt. Dazed, she climbed back into the school through a window rather than turning to the safety of those people along the perimeter. Pathos.\textsuperscript{420}

Media restrictions existed at the local Beslan hospitals. Film crews that appeared at the hospital were searched and forced to surrender all of their film footage.\textsuperscript{421} Medical

\textsuperscript{419} Ibid.
workers had their mobile phones confiscated and were not allowed to leave the hospitals after completing their shifts.422

Use of tanks and incendiary rockets by security forces was a questionable level of force when hundreds of civilians were known to be in the school, even after the panic of a breakout attempt by some hostages following the explosion in the gymnasium. The decision to fire a tank’s large caliber main gun several times into the school and shoot flame rockets [“flamethrower” is the term used in most reports] from nearby buildings might have been minimized with a degree of security forces forethought. In perspective, the terrorists had been very heavily armed. A tally of weapons and munitions collected from within the school after the terrorists were killed or captured included: over 35 assault rifles, three machine guns, as well as grenade launchers, rocket launchers, hand grenades, pistols, ammunition, TNT, and other weapons and explosives. Over 120 improvised explosives had to be cleared from the school.423

Victims and Medical Treatment

Medical evacuation vehicles and medical facilities were unprepared to accept and treat the large number of injured hostages and members of the security forces.424 Attempts at triage were quickly overwhelmed. Ambulances were largely unavailable as wounded hostages escaped or were rescued from the school. Lack of cleared evacuation routes complicated timely medical evacuations. Private automobiles had to be pushed out of road ways in some situations to allow other private vehicles, commandeered to carry wounded and injured hostages, a route toward area hospitals or temporary treatment points.425

However, some medical contingency preparation was underway during the crisis. Over 1000 hospital beds in Beslan and the nearby city of Vladikavkaz were being prepared for the possibility of mass casualties426 Well over 400 civilians were hospitalized with over half of the patients being children. A majority of the injuries included gunshot wounds, shrapnel wounds, burns, and other physical trauma. One month after the

426 Adam Dolnik, “Negotiating the Beslan Hostage Crisis,” 63.
attack, 240 people were still being treated in regional hospitals with about half that number being children. 427

Meanwhile, the hospitals and temporary morgues were crowded with parents, relatives, and friends looking for family members and friends. Of the known dead, only about 180 had been identified two days after the incident while about 160 people were missing and unaccounted for by families. 428

Throughout the crisis, Russian authorities provided a large team of experts to Beslan for psychological counseling and treatment of adults and children. During the initial days of crisis, the relatives of hostages were the primary patient group. After the third day climax of fighting, priority of treatment shifted to patients as they were received in Beslan medical facilities. Follow-up interviews and counseling continued as patients expressed feelings such as fear or guilt. Morgues and funerals received on-site psychiatrist coverage too. 429 This medical response appears to be one of the few success stories of decisive, coordinated, and proper action by Russian authorities. Yet, some reports questioned the effectiveness of psychological treatment plans. 430 The issues of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) will exist for a considerable time based on Russian and other medical studies. 431

Physical casualties were a grim count of dead and injured. Of the over 370 deaths at Beslan during the three day period, 331 deaths were civilians with 317 of them having been hostages. Children deaths totaled 186 within this casualty number. Other deaths included five law enforcement officers, four emergency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6-2. Beslan Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deaths</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-Mil Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emer Responders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wounded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casualties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security-Mil Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emer Responders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Casualty TOTAL: | > 1128 |

responders, and at least ten security forces soldiers.432 Over 700 civilians were wounded, and over 50 security forces and military members were wounded.433 The number of terrorists noted as present at Beslan in most accounts is 32 terrorists. Russian official reports state that 31 terrorists were killed and one terrorist was captured. Many reports still contest that many terrorists evaded and escaped from the Beslan area.

Even the number of hostages seized by the terrorists differs depending on the source and how people were counted. One early report from a local Beslan administrator said that 1,347 people were hostages, while another official said that 1,156 hostages were seized by terrorists.434

Postscript

NOTE: In July 2006, Shamil Baseyev was killed in Ingushetia by Russian security forces. Reports state that a truck loaded with munitions exploded, killing the terrorist leader and several of his followers. Opinions differ if the explosion was accidental435 or was the culmination of a successful counter-terrorism operation by Russian forces.436 Notwithstanding, Baseyev’s death removed one of the more notorious figures from the regional strife of separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism.

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Case Discussion Questions

Intelligence and Threat Warning?

- What activities preceding the September 2004 attack might have indicated the intent of the terrorists to attack a major city population and its infrastructure?

- How did specific extremist activities in the region around North Ossetia indicate a security risk to Russian or Federation interests?

- Why did the terrorists select the Beslan middle school celebration as a target?

Security Measures in Effect?

- What centralized command and control procedures existed among civil government-military organizations for emergency response to a catastrophic incident?

- Were adequate security measures in place at the school? What role do police have in force protection activities?

- What perimeter separation distance would have been more effective in assisting crowd control and protection?

- What commodities or concessions may have been part of initial negotiation attempts with the terrorists? What authority should a negotiator have had in dealing with the terrorists?

- What is the role of the law abiding citizen? Why did military forces and law enforcement authorities allow civilians to be part of the security perimeter with weapons?

- How did the Russian security forces apply techniques of target containment and collateral damage? What limitations on use of lethal force existed during the crisis?

- How did the security forces and civilian police control the local civilian population during the assault into the school, the breakout attempt by several terrorists, and the immediate medical recovery operations?

Terrorist Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures?

- What precedents in domestic terrorism in the Russian Federation could have focused government awareness and counter actions?

- How did the terrorists transport and assemble the improvised explosive devices?
• What type of rehearsals did the teams conduct for the attack? What indicators of surveillance of the target site may have existed? What actions indicated that the terrorists had detailed knowledge of the building interior?

• How could terrorists have increased mass casualty effects as even more devastating?

• What facts may have indicated that the hostage crisis was not a guaranteed terrorist suicide mission? When were hostages murdered inside the school? Were there murders by terrorists on day 2 or day 3 before the explosion in the gymnasium?

• How did the terrorists attempt to communicate with Russian authorities? How did Russian authorities facilitate or damage negotiation trust?

• How did the terrorist cell structure itself, communicate, and operate during the phases of final planning, rehearsals, and execution of the attacks? How did terrorists attempt to escape and evade from the school building?

• What implications exist for the deterring or dissuading domestic terrorism by citizens or naturalized residents of Western nations?
### Table 6-3.
**Selected Observations from Beslan Hostage Crisis and Mass Murder**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Topics for Seminar Study and Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Incident Command and Control (C2)** | • Effectiveness of crisis command and control among Federal, Republic, and local authorities.  
• Effectiveness of Federal senior leaders at the crisis center in representing a national presence.  
• Effectiveness of intelligence sharing among echelons of Federal, Republic, and local authorities.  
• Effectiveness of information cooperation among echelons of Federal, Republic, and local authorities.  
• Rules of engagement (ROE) for use of and type of lethal force by security and military forces. |
| **Negotiation** | • Conduct of negotiation team to introduce and develop accommodation or compromise.  
• Role of senior Federal leaders in facilitating and responding to specific terrorist demands. |
| **Civil Law Enforcement** | • Physical security and rapid response conduct by local police during increased level of threat.  
• Medical evacuation route control and clearance and quick egress.  
• Cordon control around the incident site.  
• Crime scene protection for forensic investigation. |
| **Medical and Hospitalization** | • Employment of psychiatric response team during the crisis and after the crisis ended.  
• Conduct of hospitalization contingency plans in preparation for mass casualties. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical vehicle staging</td>
<td>Conduct of contingency plans for mortuary affairs during the crisis and after the crisis ended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortuary Affairs</td>
<td>Conduct of identifying and storing remains after the crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct of individual and mass interments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firefighting</td>
<td>Conduct of staging firefighting vehicles and equipment during the crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct of firefighting operations once allowed access to the crisis site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media-Public Relations</td>
<td>Accuracy and truthfulness of information provided by Federal crisis center authorities to media and local citizens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Restrictions on specified correspondents to preclude access to the crisis site.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness of Federal misinformation operations to public and corresponding antagonism of terrorists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness of Federal counterterrorism tactics and operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Readiness</td>
<td>Conduct of regular crisis response exercises at Federal level of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct of regular crisis response exercises at Republic level of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct of regular crisis response exercises at local level of government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordination among civil and military authorities in combating terrorism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Planning for the Future

Who will be the first responder in a similar crisis within the United States? Local response is the first response capability. In a hostage situation, local first responders will require key information immediately to assess aspects such as number of hostages, number of casualties, number of criminals, building and room configurations, electrical power sources, heating sources, and access and egress routes to the site. The murder-suicide trauma of Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado (1999) illustrated issues such as law enforcement and emergency services being unsure of several critical pieces of practical information-intelligence in the incident site, instances of near fratricide among responding law enforcement organizations, other initial command and control issues as multiple agencies reported to the crisis. Timely public information needs to be distributed accurately to the public.437

First Response is Local

Local law enforcement organizations must collaborate regularly with State and Federal organizations in information sharing and intelligence gathering of potential terrorist threats in a community. Correspondingly, trained and ready law enforcement teams, focused on terrorism, hostage taking, or similar crisis situations, must be readily available for authorities to employ. This awareness includes much more than a response capability with Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams.

Intelligence preparation and knowledge of the local environment is critical to law enforcement success. For example, the Los Angeles Police Department and its Counterterrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau analyzed observations from Beslan in 2004 and considered contingencies if a similar terrorist attack occurred in their city. The police used intelligence indicators of criminal or potentially criminal activity to concentrate surveillance and covert operations on a Chechen connection. As the investigation evolved, an international car theft ring appeared to have links to international terrorism. A Chechen businessman in the US affiliated with an apparent charity organization caused special concern when he displayed photographs of himself with Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev. Eventually, warrants and arrests stopped the car

theft ring in early 2006 with no publicity of terrorism. Yet, detecting and disrupting criminal support networks and money laundering capable of provisioning terrorism can be part of local, regional, Federal, and international law enforcement actions in the Global War on Terrorism.

Figure 6-22. First Responders to Crisis: Police-Emergency Services-FBI

Cultural Awareness is Critical

The culture in which a crisis occurs will have significant influence on the official reaction to a hostage crisis and potential murder scenario. Demonstrating the ability for physical force, as well as applying a larger range of psychological or specialized methods, can be a common expectation in a society that wants immediate results and success. Such actions can be conducted in a conventional manner, or used as an unconventional or


439 The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. 1385, prohibits the use of the Army or the Air Force for law enforcement purposes, except as otherwise authorized by the Constitution or statute. This prohibition applies to Navy and Marine Corps personnel as a matter of DOD policy. The primary prohibition of the Posse Comitatus Act is against direct involvement by active duty military personnel (to include Reservists on active duty and National Guard personnel in Federal service) in traditional law enforcement activities.
asymmetric advantage.\textsuperscript{440} The pressure from a public for authorities “to be seen doing something” must be complemented with legitimate means to gain the initiative in a crisis, attempt to reduce tensions, and resolve crisis with less than lethal force when possible. Not all cultures or nations may accept the same way of containing and solving a crisis. Yet, conditions may deteriorate where direct and forceful action must be employed to safeguard lives and property from wanton threats.

**Training is Readiness**

A 2005 conference organized with support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-Russia Council provided a forum for national preparedness and response experts to discuss lessons learned from recent terrorist attacks. Although statements were not necessarily official national policy or positions, the Russian team shared experiences and insights and identified major lessons and needs from terrorist attacks in Russia:\textsuperscript{441}

- Improve effective legislative and executive coordination.
- Synchronize existing national and international legislation.
- Invest training resources for emergency medical personnel, hostage negotiation teams, and special assault forces.
- Address non-military counter-terrorism strategies such as terrorist financing, narcotics trafficking, and better international intelligence sharing.
- Improve airline security.
- Enhance effective public information policy and minimize the psychological effects of terror on the general public.

The United States team at the (NATO)-Russia Council conference provided these major lessons and needs from the 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center terrorist bombings:

- Provide efficient information and intelligence sharing among military, law enforcement and emergency response personnel.
- Improve capabilities for military, law enforcement, and emergency response personnel to work in a dangerous environment.
- Standardize operations throughout all levels of government [local, State, Federal], especially communications between law enforcement agencies and emergency medical centers.
- Develop a coherent, credible public information policy.
- Conduct frequent emergency response exercises.


\textsuperscript{441} “Chairman’s Report: Lessons learned from recent terrorist attacks: Building national capabilities and institutions,” NATO-Russia Council, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 27 June-1 July 2005; available from http://www.nato.int/docu/conf/2005/050727/index.html; Internet; accessed 20 December 2006. The US Mission to NATO and George C. Marshal Centre with the support of the Slovenian Foreign Ministry organized this professional forum under NATO-Russia Council auspices.
Reduce Vulnerability to Terrorism

The capstone U.S. Federal document for all-hazards domestic incident management is the *National Response Plan* dated December 2004 and its *Notice of Change to the National Response Plan* that provides updates as of May 2006. This provides guidance for local, State, Federal, and tribal government coordination and approach to manmade and natural hazards, as well as terrorist incidents. Principles of the *NRP* can apply to planning and preparing for terrorism wherever terrorists may strike.

The *National Response Plan*, exercised regularly, is *part of a collective effort to prevent* terrorist attacks…reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recovery from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies as they occur. A publication series by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can assist to focus training and exercising. Combined with other aspects of antiterrorism and counterterrorism preparedness, the ability to plan, train, exercise, and improve readiness against terrorism is critical to this Federal, State, and local mandate. The *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)* reference manuals provide a common framework for assessing terrorism prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. The HSEEP is a threat- and performance- based exercise program.

Given domestic crisis incidents such as Beslan (2004) in Russia or Columbine (1999) in the USA, readiness must:

“…ensure that all response personnel and organizations – including the law enforcement, military, emergency response, healthcare, public works, and environmental communities – are properly equipped, trained, and exercised to respond to all terrorist threats and attacks…”

National Strategy for Homeland Security

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chronology</th>
<th>Selective Event Sequence</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summer 04</td>
<td>Terrorists alleged to have hidden explosives and materiel under flooring inside of the Beslan school during a facility renovation-construction project.</td>
<td>CDPSP. “Beslan Hostage Crisis Ends in Disaster,” The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 56 no. 36 (October 6, 2004).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Multiple reports are considered in stating approximate times for this series of events. (ca. circa)

**Legend.** Several references used in the “source” right-hand column are coded with letters for simplicity. References are:

- CDPSP. “Beslan Hostage Crisis Ends in Disaster,” The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 56 no. 36 (October 6, 2004).
### September 1, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07:00 (+)</td>
<td>A truck approaches an isolated security outpost in Ingushetia and near the North Ossetia border. A lone policeman is made a hostage by armed terrorists as the terrorists continue on their journey to Beslan in a three vehicle group.</td>
<td>DS, 3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:00</td>
<td>Beslan School No. 1 starts the opening ceremonies for the school year.</td>
<td>DS, 6; W, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:00-09:20</td>
<td>Terrorists seize Beslan School No. 1: Several people are killed as civilian, police, and terrorist exchange gunfire; Hostages are held in school.</td>
<td>CDPSP. 56-35, 1 MT, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:20</td>
<td>Terrorists are searching school building rooms and collecting hostages.</td>
<td>E, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:30</td>
<td>North Ossetia’s Republican Ministry for Emergencies announces school seizure.</td>
<td>HDJ, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:45 (+)</td>
<td>Terrorists start emplacing improvised bombs throughout the school and barricading building access points.</td>
<td>DS, 6 W, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:15</td>
<td>Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) anti-terrorist group is alerted to deploy from Moscow to Khankala, Chechnya.</td>
<td>HDJ, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:15 (+)</td>
<td>Four motorized rifle (infantry) companies start to deploy to Beslan from the North Ossetia capitol of Vladikavkaz.</td>
<td>DS, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:15-10:25</td>
<td>News agencies report that two schools have been seized but revise report 30 minutes later as one school seized.</td>
<td>W, 1 MT, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>Local police and regional military forces start to form a cordon around the Beslan School area.</td>
<td>HDJ, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30-11:10</td>
<td>Government officials announce that between 200 to 400 hostages have been seized by 17 to 20 terrorists.</td>
<td>W, 1 MT, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>Terrorists refuse to negotiate with local policemen and fire shots over their heads.</td>
<td>ACPC, 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00 ca.</td>
<td>Hostages are forced to stand in front of school windows as human shields for the terrorists inside the school.</td>
<td>DS, 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15</td>
<td>Terrorists place children in front of windows as human shields; sporadic shooting from outside school stops.</td>
<td>W, 1 MT, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>Russian army units begin cordoning off the school area. Local police command and control of the initial cordon appears confused.</td>
<td>DS, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>Republic interior ministry closes educational facilities in Beslan; all flights to North Ossetia capitol Vladikavkaz are canceled; public buildings receive additional security; border is closed between North Ossetia and Ingushetia.</td>
<td>HD, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30</td>
<td>North Ossetia President Alexander Dzasokhov arrives at hostage scene.</td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:30-11:50 (11:35?)</td>
<td>Terrorists send note to cordon with a hostage with demands and threaten to kill hostages if electricity or communications are severed; demand to see three individuals: Dzasokhov, Zyazikov, and Roshal.</td>
<td>ACPC, 24 W, 11 W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:15</td>
<td>Terrorists shoot at people attempting to recover three bodies in school yard.</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:30</td>
<td>15 civilians escape to safety of cordon after hiding in a boiler room during the initial terrorist attack.</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:30</td>
<td>Terrorists release some hostages with videotape of school interior and hostages, and a note with demands to Federal Government authorities.</td>
<td>HDJ, 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00</td>
<td>Russian President Putin arrives in Moscow and directs Interior Ministry and FSB leaders to Beslan.</td>
<td>HDJ, 31 MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:25</td>
<td>Terrorists refuse offer to exchange hostage children for adults; terrorists demand withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya.</td>
<td>MT, 2 W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:50</td>
<td>North Ossetia Interior Ministry revises increased count of hostages to 600 with over 130 being children.</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>Senior leaders on the scene do not appear decisive in actions or in command of the situation. Leaders include Regional Intelligence Chief Andreyev, Parliamentary Speaker Mamsurov, Duma Deputies Rogosin and Markelov, and Deputy Prosecutor General Fridinsky. North Ossetia President Dzasokhov is present also.</td>
<td>DS, 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>Terrorists refuse to negotiate with regional leaders, and demand to talk with Dzasokhov (North Ossetia), Zyazikov (Ingushetia), and Roshal (civilian doctor).</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30</td>
<td>Russian Interior Minister and Federal Security Services (FSB) Director arrive in Beslan. FSB Chief Patrushev does not meet with crisis staff and is not observed as present in operations for next two days.</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS, 19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>Bombs strapped to [two] female terrorists detonate by mistake or are detonated by the terrorist leader. One woman terrorist with bomb belt detonates suddenly without warning; other women terrorist with bomb belt is killed by other woman’s bomb belt explosion. At least two hostages die and six hostages are wounded in the explosion.</td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E, 12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS, 20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00 +</td>
<td>Adult male hostages wounded by the women’s bomb belt explosion are brought to a second story room and murdered by terrorists.</td>
<td>E, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30</td>
<td>Terrorists threaten mass killing of hostages for every terrorist killed or wounded; terrorists drop note from school building window and demand Russian forces withdraw from Chechnya.</td>
<td>HDJ, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:40</td>
<td>Around 15 children are [released] from inside the school.</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:30 (?)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00</td>
<td>Seven male hostages are taken to second floor of school and murdered by terrorists with gunshots.</td>
<td>DS, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:30</td>
<td>Terrorists give female hostage note with demands and corrected phone number digits and addition of former President Ruslan Aushev to requested list of people.</td>
<td>W, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:00 +</td>
<td>Male hostages are used to dump previously murdered male hostages out of a second story school window.</td>
<td>E, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:00 ca.</td>
<td>Male hostages are ordered to take two dead bodies and six seriously wounded hostages from the first floor hallway to a first floor classroom. (These wounded hostages are murdered during the night with gunshots.)</td>
<td>DS, 23, 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:25</td>
<td>Russia calls for emergency session of UN Security Council</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:00</td>
<td>North Ossetia official announces that authorities have ‘established contact’ with the terrorists.</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:00</td>
<td>Terrorists tell a correspondent they belong to a militant group called Riyadh al-Salihin and are loyal to the Chechen leader Shamil Basayev.</td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:15</td>
<td>Dr. Leonid Roshal arrives in Beslan to negotiate with terrorists. (Roshal had negotiated at the Moscow theater terrorist-hostage crisis.)</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:30</td>
<td>Terrorists refuse offer of water and medicine to hostages.</td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:50</td>
<td>UN Secretary General demands immediate release of Beslan hostages.</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:10</td>
<td>US newspaper publishes report that terrorists claim to represent terrorist group [Riyadh al-Salihin] associated with Shamil Basayev.</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23:00 (?)</td>
<td>Dr. Leonid Roshal makes contact with terrorists via telephone and attempts to coordinate medicine, food and drinking water for hostages.</td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23:00</td>
<td>Dr. Leonid Roshal offers safe departure to Ingushetia and Chechnya and to replace hostage children with adults.</td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23:59 ca.</td>
<td>Dr. Leonid Roshal makes contact with terrorists via telephone and attempts to coordinate medicine, food and drinking water for hostages.</td>
<td>CDPSP, 56-35, 4, 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**September 2, 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00:15</td>
<td>Chechen leader (mufti) denounces hostage-taking and offers help on behalf of Chechnya’s Muslims.</td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNK</td>
<td>Gutseriev, former Vice Chairman of the State Duma, discusses options with terrorists via telephone. Terrorists request that Ruslan Aushev come to Beslan and that written conditions-demands would be provided to Aushev.</td>
<td>ACPC, 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03:00</td>
<td>Terrorists stop several hour telephone discussion with Roshal abruptly by turning off telephone; terrorists refuse offer of water, food, and medicine and any exchanges.</td>
<td>CDPSP, 56-35, 4, MT, 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6-51
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>03:00</td>
<td><strong>Terrorists demand that Aslanbek Aslakhanov, Putin’s advisor on Chechnya, enter negotiations.</strong></td>
<td>HDJ, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04:45</td>
<td><strong>UN Security Council condemns Beslan school seizure and demands unconditional release of hostages.</strong></td>
<td>MT, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07:00</td>
<td><strong>North Ossetia authorities announce that seven people have died in hostage crisis and 354 people are hostages.</strong></td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08:55</td>
<td><strong>Federal Security Services announce terrorists are Chechens, Ingush, Russians, and Ossetians.</strong></td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:00</td>
<td><strong>Male hostages are ordered to remove eight hostage bodies from a first floor hallway and move the bodies to a second floor classroom. Six wounded hostages had been murdered during the night with gunshots.</strong></td>
<td>DS, 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morning</td>
<td><strong>Terrorists deny food and water to hostages.</strong></td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00</td>
<td><strong>Roshal resumes negotiations to terrorists with offer of safe passage from North Ossetia and large sum of money, but offer is rejected by terrorists.</strong></td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00</td>
<td><strong>Ruslan Aushev arrives in Beslan to negotiate face-to-face with terrorists.</strong></td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:30</td>
<td><strong>Chechen and Ingush elders offer to help in negotiations and denounce hostage-taking.</strong></td>
<td>MT, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td><strong>Putin addresses Russia for first time since beginning of crisis stating main task is lives and health of hostages.</strong></td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00</td>
<td><strong>Former Ingush President Ruslan Aushev enters school and negotiates with terrorists for release of 26 hostages comprised of mothers and nursing babies.</strong></td>
<td>ACPC, 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30 (?)</td>
<td><strong>President Putin makes public announcement and states all actions will be taken to save the lives of the hostages.</strong></td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:10</td>
<td><strong>Command Center at Beslan states that use of force will not be used to free hostages.</strong></td>
<td>MT, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00-15:30</td>
<td><strong>Terrorists fire two rocket propelled grenades (RPG) at security forces and set one car on fire.</strong></td>
<td>W, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:20</td>
<td>Tanks and armored personnel carriers are directed to Beslan and placed under control of Federal security forces.</td>
<td>ACPC, 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30-16:30</td>
<td>Former Ingush President Ruslan Aushev enters the school and negotiates release of 26 hostages: mothers and infants</td>
<td>HDJ, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:45</td>
<td>Evening</td>
<td>MT, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00 (?)</td>
<td>Former Ingush President Ruslan Aushev enters the school and negotiates release of 26 hostages: mothers and infants</td>
<td>HDJ, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:45</td>
<td>Terrorists send note to government forces with demand that Russian troops withdraw from Chechnya and allow an independent Chechnya.</td>
<td>W, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:30</td>
<td>Special Advisor Aslakhanov to President Putin discusses coming from Moscow to Beslan and agrees to continue negotiation talks the following day.</td>
<td>ACPC, 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:00</td>
<td>Russian officials revise initial estimate on number of hostages from around 350 to more than 1000 hostages.</td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:00 ca.</td>
<td>Terrorists shuffle 35 to 40 adult men and women from the gymnasium to an adjoining athletic room. The hostages believe they are about to be murdered. After a ten hour wait, hostages are moved back into the main gymnasium.</td>
<td>DS, 32-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:15</td>
<td>Roshal holds news conference, talks briefly of discussions with terrorists, and criticizes lack of action by International Committee of the Red Cross.</td>
<td>MT, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:00</td>
<td>Negotiations continue into the night with intention of allowing delivery of food and water to hostages.</td>
<td>W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:15</td>
<td>Chechen rebel envoy tells an interviewer that former Chechen President Maskhadov is willing to assist in negotiation with hostage-takers.</td>
<td>MT, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 3, 2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01:00 (?)</td>
<td>Terrorists fire rocket propelled grenade at government forces causing wounds to one police officer.</td>
<td>MT, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02:00</td>
<td>Throughout the evening and into the wee hours of night, negotiators attempt to develop options with the terrorists to deliver food, water, and medicine to the school.</td>
<td>DS, 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07:30</td>
<td>Discussion resumes with terrorists after having been suspended abruptly the previous night by terrorists.</td>
<td>MT, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morning</td>
<td>The crisis staff orders that the security cordon will be enlarged that will cause an additional two city block separation from the school.</td>
<td>DS, 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>North Ossetia President Aleksandr Dzasokhov states to families of hostages that school will not be stormed and “we” are willing to provide free passage to terrorists… He notes there may be over 900 hostages.</td>
<td>CDPSP 56-36, 1 MT, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:45</td>
<td>Terrorists agree to allow Emergency Ministry members remove corpses of 20 male adults from school courtyard.</td>
<td>HD, 31 W, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00-13:05</td>
<td>Four emergency ministry or medical individuals approach school building with two trucks to recover corpses.</td>
<td>W, 3 HDJ, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:05 ca.</td>
<td>A large explosion occurs in the gymnasium.</td>
<td>HDJ, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:05 (+)</td>
<td>A second large explosion occurs in the gym within several seconds of the first explosion.</td>
<td>E, 18 DS, 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:05 (+)</td>
<td>Hostages start jumping from windows of gymnasium and run toward cordon; police, armed volunteers, and civilians run toward courtyard to assist fleeing hostages; terrorists start shooting at fleeing hostages. Some flee through courtyard; some flee over wall at rear of school.</td>
<td>HDJ, 31-32 MT, 2 DS, 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:20 ca.</td>
<td>A third explosion occurs at the gymnasium.</td>
<td>DS, 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:20 ca.</td>
<td>Some hostages are forced into school basement by a small group of terrorists.</td>
<td>DS, 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:10-13:30</td>
<td>Russian security forces start to a slow approach to the school building from the courtyard area.</td>
<td>W, 3 DS, 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:20&lt;14:00</td>
<td>Terrorists are consolidating at school cafeteria and using collected hostages as human shields.</td>
<td>E, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:30</td>
<td>Portion of gymnasium roof burns and collapses</td>
<td>ACPC, 41 MT, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:30-14:00</td>
<td>Russian tanks and armored vehicles reposition in vicinity of school; tank fires main gun into school.</td>
<td>ACPC, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:30 ca.</td>
<td>Security forces and civilians force their way into the weight lifting and gymnastic room area from the outer wall of the</td>
<td>DS, 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:40</td>
<td>Russian commandos “Alfa” join the schoolyard fighting</td>
<td>HDJ, 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:45</td>
<td>Report of some terrorists fleeing building; Russian forces pursue terrorists; armed civilians join the pursuit.</td>
<td>W, 3, MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:55 (+)</td>
<td>Security forces fight to secure first floor areas and continue room-by-room assault against terrorists; terrorists firing at hostages from roof as hostages attempt to flee.</td>
<td>MT, 4, DS, 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>Some hostages are being brought to safety as Russian forces continue to search school building and fight terrorists. Terrorists continue to shoot into gymnasium and at people evacuating wounded former hostages.</td>
<td>W, 3, DS, 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:05</td>
<td>Russian forces report that most of the school building is under Russian forces control.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00 (+)</td>
<td>After explosion, less terrorists are in cafeteria. Some hostages run to a classroom area at the end of a hallway opposite the cafeteria. Hostages breach a window to escape but several civilians are wounded or killed by shooting from outside of the school.</td>
<td>DS, 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:25</td>
<td>Security forces control most of school building; some terrorists barricade in basement [with hostages].</td>
<td>MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:25</td>
<td>Some terrorists flee to neighboring buildings near school; some terrorists attempt to evade in civilian clothes.</td>
<td>MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:25</td>
<td>Security forces create a hole in the gym wall with a small demolition; fighting inside the building continues; hostages continue to be evacuated from site.</td>
<td>MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30 (?)</td>
<td>Medical personnel enter gym and triage.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:30</td>
<td>Terrorists concentrate in school cafeteria and use women and children as human shields.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:40</td>
<td>Russian forces use explosives to make entry-egress points in school walls.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:45</td>
<td>Some terrorists have changed into blue jeans and T-shirts with intention of blending with escaping hostages and evading capture. (With most civilians originally dressed in fine clothes for the school ceremony, the blue jeans identify terrorists in the fleeing groups of civilians.)</td>
<td>DS, 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>Russian “Alpha” commandos approach schoolyard in three armored personnel carriers.</td>
<td>CDPSP 56-36, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>Russian tank enters apartment area [and shoots several main gun rounds] near school yard.</td>
<td>CDPSP 56-36, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:10</td>
<td>Heavy fighting continues around the school and on neighboring streets; some terrorists are reported to be surrounded in a nearby apartment building.</td>
<td>MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:15</td>
<td>More than 100 bodies of hostages are found in school with most casualties occurring from explosion in gymnasium.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:25</td>
<td>Group of about 13 terrorists that fled school occupy a house south of school and are destroyed by Russian forces.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:40</td>
<td>A group of 13 terrorists is surrounded in south Beslan.</td>
<td>MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:55</td>
<td>Three terrorists barricade themselves in school basement with some hostages as human shields.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:10</td>
<td>Angry mob attempts to lynch an alleged terrorist; actions are televised.</td>
<td>MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:15</td>
<td>Firefighters, medical, and emergency services members enter the school and remove remaining injured hostages.</td>
<td>MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:00</td>
<td>Russian control of the school now includes the gymnasium, main corridor, assembly hall [on second floor], cafeteria [on first floor], and classrooms in the front part of school.</td>
<td>DS, 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:30</td>
<td>An alleged female terrorist is arrested next to the command center near the school.</td>
<td>MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:35</td>
<td>One terrorist posing as a wounded hostage is identified and lynched by local citizens.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:45 (?)</td>
<td>Three terrorists, including the terrorist leader, and hostages remain barricaded in basement; All terrorists and hostages eventually die in attempt to free hostages.</td>
<td>W, 3 MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:00</td>
<td>Gunfire is still heard from inside the school.</td>
<td>DS, 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:35</td>
<td>Officials announce that 20 terrorists have been killed, and describe some of the terrorists as Arab and one black man.</td>
<td>MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:15</td>
<td>Large explosion occurs at school. Intermittent gunfire continues at the school and in neighboring areas of Beslan.</td>
<td>MT, 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:15</td>
<td>Crisis center reports that all terrorists have been suppressed.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20:50</td>
<td>Officials announce 63 hostage deaths including 12 children.</td>
<td>MT, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:00</td>
<td>One report describes an attack on a building near the school thought to be a refuge for fleeing terrorists; the building was “destroyed by tanks and flamethrowers.”</td>
<td>W, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:00</td>
<td>Casualty count notes 646 people in hospitals with 227 of the casualties as children. A report states 652 hostages are in hospitals, including 228 children. Senior Russian Federal official states more than 150 hostages have been killed.</td>
<td>W, 3 MT, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:20</td>
<td>Federal Security Forces Chief announces that fighting continues inside the school. Gunfire is coming from the large workroom in the rear of the school wing. Explosions occur also.</td>
<td>DS, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:20</td>
<td>Confirmed deaths exceed 200 as bodies continue to be identified.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21:50</td>
<td>Sporadic fighting continues even though some reports state that all terrorists have been killed.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:10</td>
<td>One report states that three terrorists have been captured.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:30 (?)</td>
<td>Federal Security Force teams overwhelm a small group of terrorists who had barricaded themselves in a school basement.</td>
<td>HDJ, 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22:40</td>
<td>Army official announces that all of the terrorists have been killed or captured.</td>
<td>MT, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Source</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23:00</td>
<td>Russian officials report 27 terrorists have been killed.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>September 4, 2004</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02:00</td>
<td>Ten explosions, similar to sound of hand grenades, occur at rear wing of school.</td>
<td>DS, 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03:15</td>
<td>Putin orders Beslan sealed and North Ossetia borders closed as security forces search for any remaining participants in Beslan mass murder</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05:00</td>
<td>Sporadic shooting in school area ceases.</td>
<td>CDPSP 56-36, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:00</td>
<td>Russian officials list hostage death at more than 322 with 155 deaths being children. (By following day, death report would rise to 355 deaths with 207 people identified. 386 hospitalized people include 58 patients in critical medical condition.)</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:30</td>
<td>Putin makes televised speech to nation that discusses terrorism, and issues of security and preparedness.</td>
<td>W, 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source Notes

The following source notes support illustrations used in Chapter 6, “Beslan: Hostage Crisis and Mass Murder.” to TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.01.

Figure 6-1. Beslan Hostage Crisis and Mass Murder by Terrorists  A photomontage of Beslan: (Above, Upper Left) Grieving Woman, (Source: http://sineal.dgleeson.com/blog/wp-images/beslan.jpg); (Above, Upper Middle) Beslan Boy After the Explosion, (Source: http://www.salvator.net/salami.net/salami/chronik/2004/beslan.jpg); (Above, Upper Right) Basayev the Terrorist, (Source: http://forum.zgeek.com/_gallery/files/1/0/8/baseyev_thumb.jpg); (Above, Mid-Upper Right) Khochbarov the Terrorist; (Source: kavkazneo.com/art/khochbarov-1.jpg); (Right, Lower-Right) Adult After the Final Assault, (Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/media/images/40606000/jpg/_40606571_09_beslan_ap.jpg); (Right, Bottom) Security Force Soldier and Baby, (Source: http://emergency-management.net/school_/siege_imag.htm); (Above, Center) Security Forces and Civilians at Beslan, (Source: http://www.afp.com/english/afpwhatsnew/picture/ims/Tutov2.jpg).

Figure 6-2. Russian President Putin (Source: http://www.businessinnovationinsider.com/images/2006/04/Vladimir%20Putin.jpg).

Figure 6-3. Above, Left Russian Caucasus and Area of Interest (box added) (Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/chechnya_re101.pdf).

Figure 6-4. Above, Right North Ossetia and Beslan (outline added) (Source: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/images/beslan-map2-s.jpg).

Figure 6-5. Above, Left Beslan Map (Out of Date) (box added) (Source: organizational files ).


Figure 6-7. Basayev (Source: http://forum.zgeek.com/gallery/files/1/0/8/baseyev_thumb.jpg).

Figure 6-8. Khochbarov (Source: kavkazneo.com/art/khochbarov-1.jpg).

Figure 6-13. Hostage Crisis and Murder at Beslan (Source: Above, Left http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,11905007821,00.html; (Source: Above, Center http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,12805007821,00.html); (Source: Above, Right http://content.answers.com/main/content/wp/en/0/0b/Beslan_School_Terror_-terrorist_4_-_Sept_1_2004.jpg); (Source: Above, Lower Left http://www.intelmessages.org/images/beslandrugs.jpg); (Source: Lower Right http://www.spiegel.de/img/0,1020,387898,00.jpg).

Figure 6-15. Hostages Escape as the Fight Continues (Source: Above, Left http://img154.imageshack.us/img154/5844/5844/screenac8.jpg); (Source: Above, Center http://www.sullivan-county.com/images/beslan/beslan.html); (Source: Above, Right http://www.russned.ru/i/beslan.jpg).

Figure 6-16. The Fighting Concludes and Aftermath (Source: Above, Left http://www.faithfreedom.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=13967); (Source: Above, Center http://transformation.ru/nastka/files/beslan_0742.jpg); (Source: Above, Right english.chosun.com/.../200409070043_01.jpg); (Source: Above, Low Left
Figure 6-17. Recovery Efforts After the Fight (Source: Above, Center

Figure 6-18. Local Police Take Cover (Source: http://www.foxnews.com/photoessay/0,4644,141,00.html#13_0)

Figure 6-19. Firefighters at Beslan (Source: http://www.crisisresponsejournal.com/images/beslan.jpg)

Figure 6-20. Ad Hoc Casualty Evacuation (Source: http://www.emergency-management.net/school_siege_imag.htm)

Figure 6-21. Domestic Terror Response (Source: Above, Right http://www.cityofconroe/police/Objects/swat-stack-med.jpg); (Source: Above, Center www.newcriminologist.co.uk/.../untitled(8).bmp); (Source: Bottom http://www.emergency.com/1999/co-anlys.htm).

Figure 6-22. First Responders to Crisis: Police-Emergency Services-FBI (Source: Above, Top DOD Photo; 060608-F-1644L-015.jpg); (Source: Center, Left https://hseep.dhs.gov/HSEEP_Vols/HSEEP_Vol4%5…); (Source: Center http://www.army.mil/soldiers/sep2001/pentattack/images/emt.jpg); (Source: Center, Right http://www.sacrop.org/images/square%20emt.jpg; (Source: Bottom, Center denver.rockymountainnews.com/.../1212swat.jpg).
Glossary

Aleph: name of former cult Aum Shinrikyo; cult renamed itself in January 2000.

Ammonium nitrate fertilizer: chemical mixture that can be used in manufacture of improvised explosive.

anarchism: A political theory holding all forms of governmental authority to be unnecessary and undesirable and advocating a society based on voluntary cooperation and free association of individuals and groups. (Webster’s)

anti-terrorism: (AT) (JP 1-02) Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces.

AOR: Area of responsibility


Aum Shinrikyo: Cult responsible for the 1995 sarin attack on population in the Tokyo subway system.

biological agent: (JP 1-02) A microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals or causes the deterioration of materiel.

biological weapon: (JP 1-02) An item of materiel, which projects, disperses, or disseminates a biological agent including arthropod vectors.

bioregulators: (CBRN Handbook) Biochemicals that regulate bodily functions. Bioregulators that are produced by the body are termed "endogenous." Some of these same bioregulators can be chemically synthesized.

blister agents: (CBRN Handbook) Substances that cause blistering of the skin. Exposure is through liquid or vapor contact with any exposed tissue (eyes, skin, lungs).

blood agents: (CBRN Handbook) Substances that injure a person by interfering with cell respiration (the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide between blood and tissues).

CBRNE: Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive categories normally associated with weapons of mass destruction.

chemical weapon: (JP 1-02) Together or separately, (a) a toxic chemical and its precursors, except when intended for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention; (b) a munition or device, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through toxic properties of those chemicals specified in (a), above, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munition or device; (c) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions or devices specified in (b) above.

chemical agent: (CBRN Handbook) A chemical substance that is intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through its physiological effects. Excluded from consideration are riot control agents, and smoke and flame materials. The agent may appear as a vapor, aerosol, or liquid; it can be either a casualty/toxic agent or an incapacitating agent.

choking agents: (CBRN Handbook) Substances that cause physical injury to the lungs. Exposure is through inhalation. In extreme cases, membranes swell and lungs become filled with liquid. Death results from lack of oxygen; hence, the victim is "choked."
Conflict: (Army) A political-military situation between peace and war, distinguished from peace by the introduction of organized political violence and from war by its reliance on political methods. It shares many of the goals and characteristics of war, including the destruction of governments and the control of territory. See FM 100-20.

COCOM: Combatant command, that is, command authority. See page 247 footnote of handbook. (JP 1-02)

Consequence management: Traditionally, consequence management has been predominantly an emergency management function and included measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The requirements of consequence management and crisis management are combined in the NRP.

CONUS: Continental United States

Counter-terrorism: (CT) (JP 1-02) Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Crisis management: Traditionally, crisis management was predominantly a law enforcement function and included measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The requirements of consequence management and crisis management are combined in the NRP.

Cult: A quasi-religious group, often living in a colony, with a charismatic leader who indoctrinates members with unorthodox or extremist views. (Webster’s New World Dictionary of American English)

cyber-terrorism: (FBI) — A criminal act perpetrated by the use of computers and telecommunications capabilities, resulting in violence, destruction and/or disruption of services to create fear by causing confusion and uncertainty within a given population, with the goal of influencing a government or population to conform to a particular political, social, or ideological agenda.

DSWA: Defense Special Weapons Agency

Defense Support of Civil Authorities: (DSCA) An emergent term under consideration for inclusion to the 2004 National Response Plan that incorporates the Department of Defense support to domestic emergencies, law enforcement, and other activities. A traditional overarching term is Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) which includes Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) and Military Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies (MACLEA). See NRP.

Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization: (DFTO) A political designation determined by the U.S. Department of State. Listing as a DFTO imposes legal penalties for membership, prevents travel into the U.S., and proscribes assistance and funding activities within the U.S. or by U.S. citizens.

DIRLAUTH: Direct liaison authorized

DHS: Department of Homeland Security

dysfunctional state: A nation or state whose declared government cannot fulfill one or more of the core functions of governance, such as defense, internal security, revenue collection, resource allocation, etc.

failed state: A dysfunctional state which also has multiple competing political factions in conflict within its borders, or has no functioning governance above the local level. This does not imply that a central government facing an insurgency is automatically a failed state. If essential functions of government continue in areas controlled by the central authority, it has not “failed.”

force protection: Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and
integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.

**force protection condition (FPCON):** There is a graduated series of Force Protection Conditions ranging from Force Protection Conditions Normal to Force Protection Conditions Delta. There is a process by which commanders at all levels can raise or lower the Force Protection Conditions based on local conditions, specific threat information and/or guidance from higher headquarters. The four Force Protection Conditions above normal are:

**Force Protection Condition ALPHA**--This condition applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of Force Protection Conditions BRAVO measures. The measures in this Force Protection Conditions must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

**Force Protection Condition BRAVO**--This condition applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this Force Protection Conditions must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.

**Force Protection Condition CHARLIE**--This condition applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this Force Protection Conditions for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

**Force Protection Condition DELTA**--This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this Force Protection Conditions is declared as a localized condition.

**guerrilla warfare:** (JP 1-02, NATO) Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

**WOT:** Global War on Terrorism

**Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS):** The advisory system provides measures to remain vigilant, prepared, and ready to deter terrorist attacks. The following Threat Conditions each represent an increasing risk of terrorist attacks. Beneath each Threat Condition are suggested protective measures, recognizing that the heads of Federal departments and agencies are responsible for developing and implementing appropriate agency-specific protective measures:

- **Low Condition (Green).** This condition is declared when there is a low risk of terrorist attacks. Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures they develop and implement: refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned Protective Measures; ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland Security Advisory System and specific preplanned department or agency Protective Measures; and institutionalizing a process to assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are regularly assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all reasonable measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

- **Guarded Condition (Blue).** This condition is declared when there is a general risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Condition, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement: checking communications with designated emergency response or command locations; reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and providing the public with any information that would strengthen its ability to act appropriately.
- **Elevated Condition (Yellow).** An Elevated Condition is declared when there is a significant risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the Protective Measures that they will develop and implement: increasing surveillance of critical locations; coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby jurisdictions; assessing whether the precise characteristics of the threat require the further refinement of preplanned Protective Measures; and implementing, as appropriate, contingency and emergency response plans.

- **High Condition (Orange).** A High Condition is declared when there is a high risk of terrorist attacks. In addition to the Protective Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement: coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other appropriate armed forces organizations; taking additional precautions at public events and possibly considering alternative venues or even cancellation; preparing to execute contingency procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing their workforce; and restricting threatened facility access to essential personnel only.

- **Severe Condition (Red).** A Severe Condition reflects a severe risk of terrorist attacks. Under most circumstances, the Protective Measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for substantial periods of time. In addition to the Protective Measures in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies also should consider the following general measures in addition to the agency-specific Protective Measures that they will develop and implement: increasing or redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs; signing emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially trained teams or resources; monitoring, redirecting, or constraining transportation systems; and closing public and government facilities.

**HUMINT:** Human intelligence

**IED:** Improvised Explosive Device. Devices that have been fabricated in an improvised manner and that incorporate explosives or destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals in their design.

**incapacitating agent:** (CBRN Handbook) Produce temporary physiological and/or mental effects via action on the central nervous system. Effects may persist for hours or days, but victims usually do not require medical treatment. However, such treatment speeds recovery.

**Incident Command System (ICS):** A standardized on-scene emergency management concept specifically designed to allow its user(s) to adopt an integrated organizational structure equal to the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. The national standard for ICS is provided by NIMS.

**industrial agent:** (CBRN Handbook) Chemicals developed or manufactured for use in industrial operations or research by industry, government, or academia. These chemicals are not primarily manufactured for the specific purpose of producing human casualties or rendering equipment, facilities, or areas dangerous for use by man. Hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, phosgene, chloropicrin and many herbicides and pesticides are industrial chemicals that also can be chemical agents.

**insurgency:** (JP 1-02, NATO) — An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.
international: of, relating to, or affecting two or more nations (Webster’s). For our purposes, affecting two or more nations.

JSDF: Japanese Self Defense Force [military forces].

Khobar Towers: Site of 1996 terrorist bombing attack on U.S. and coalition forces in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia by the terrorist group Saudi Hizballah, a la Hizballah Al-Hijaz.

LFA: Lead Federal Agency. See NRP.

Matsumoto: site in Japan of 1994 sarin attack by the Aum Shinrikyo cult.

McVeigh: First name Timothy; convicted and executed U.S. domestic terrorist/bomber of Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, OK.

millenarian: Apocalyptic; forecasting the ultimate destiny of the world; foreboding imminent disaster or final doom; wildly unrestrained; ultimately decisive. (Merriam –Webster’s)


narco-terrorism: (JP 3-07.4) Terrorism conducted to further the aims of drug traffickers. It may include assassinations, extortion, hijackings, bombings, and kidnappings directed against judges, prosecutors, elected officials, or law enforcement agents, and general disruption of a legitimate government to divert attention from drug operations.

nation: A community of people composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a more or less defined territory and government or a territorial division containing a body of people of one or more nationalities and usually characterized by relatively large size and independent status.

nation-state: A form of political organization under which a relatively homogeneous people inhabits a sovereign state; especially a state containing one as opposed to several nationalities.

nerve agents: (CBRN Handbook) Substances that interfere with the central nervous system. Exposure is primarily through contact with the liquid (skin and eyes) and secondarily through inhalation of the vapor. Three distinct symptoms associated with nerve agents are: pin-point pupils, an extreme headache, and severe tightness in the chest.


National Response Plan: (NRP) The National Response Plan (December 2004) is an all-discipline, all-hazards plan that establishes a single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents. It provides the structure and mechanisms for the coordination of Federal support to State, local, and tribal incident managers and for exercising direct Federal authorities and responsibilities.

Nichols: First name Terry; convicted for involvement with Timothy McVeigh in 1995 bombing of Murrah Federal Building.

nuclear weapon: (JP 1-02) — A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear type), in its intended ultimate configuration which, upon completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy.
OPCON: Operational control, that is, transferable command authority. See Appendix H of terrorism handbook. (JP 1-02).

operations security: (OPSEC) A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems. b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Pathogen: (CBRN Handbook) Any organism (usually living) capable of producing serious disease or death, such as bacteria, fungi, and viruses

physical security: That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (Joint Pub1-02)

Radiological Dispersal Device: (RDD) (CBRN Handbook) A device (weapon or equipment), other than a nuclear explosive device, designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material.

Radiological Emitting Device: (RED) A device designed to disseminate radioactive material in order to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material. RED dissemination techniques can include intense, short duration exposure or progressive, long term exposure to radiation.

radiological operation: (JP 1-02) — The employment of radioactive materials or radiation producing devices to cause casualties or restrict the use of terrain. It includes the intentional employment of fallout from nuclear weapons.


setback: Distance between outer perimeter and nearest point of buildings or structures within. Generally referred to in terms of explosive blast mitigation.

Shoko Asahara: Self-named leader of the cult Aum Shinrikyo; convicted of ordering the 1995 sarín attack on the population in the Tokyo subway system.

state: A politically organized body of people usually occupying a definite territory; especially one that is sovereign.

TACON: Tactical control, that is, command authority with detailed limitations and responsibilities inherent to operational control. See Appendix H of terrorism handbook. (JP 1-02).

terror tactics: Given that the Army defines tactics as “the art and science of employing available means to win battles and engagements,” then terror tactics should be considered “the art and science of employing violence, terror and intimidation to inculcate fear in the pursuit of political, religious, or ideological goals.”

terrorism: (JP 1-02) — The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

terrorist: (JP 1-02) — An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.
terrorist goals: The term goals will refer to the strategic end or end state that the terrorist objectives are intended to obtain.

terrorist group: Any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism (U.S. Dept of State)

terrorist objectives: The standard definition of objective is – “The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable aims which every military operation should be directed towards” (JP 1-02). For the purposes of this work, terrorist objectives will refer to the intended outcome or result of one or a series of terrorist operations or actions.

toxic chemical agent: (CBRN Handbook) Produce incapacitation, serious injury, or death. They can be used to incapacitate or kill victims. These agents are the choking, blister, nerve, and blood agents.

toxin agent: (JP 1-02) A poison formed as a specific secretion product in the metabolism of a vegetable or animal organism, as distinguished from inorganic poisons. Such poisons can also be manufactured by synthetic processes.

transnational: Extending or going beyond national boundaries (Webster’s). In this context, not limited to or centered within a single nation.

underground: A covert unconventional warfare organization established to operate in areas denied to the guerrilla forces or conduct operations not suitable for guerrilla forces.

unified command: As a term in the Federal application of the Incident Command System (ICS), defines agencies working together through their designated Incident Commanders at a single Incident Command Post (ICP) to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan. This is NOT “unified command” as defined by the Department of Defense.

UXO: Unexploded ordnance

VBIED: Vehicle borne improvised explosive device


WOT: War on Terrorism

WMD: (JP 1-02) Weapons of Mass Destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon.

WMD: Weapons of mass destruction or effect is an emergent term referenced in the 2004 U.S. National Military Strategy to address a broader range of adversary capabilities with potentially devastating results.
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