The interrelationships between detente and deterrence are often confusing and misinterpreted. For one group of Americans, detente is a no-win policy. The US has acquiesced at every encounter but gained nothing in return from the USSR. As Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey once chastised Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, “I do suggest for the most part the gains that have been made in detente have accrued largely to the Russian side, that is, on specific issues.”1 Others take an even harsher view and argue that the USSR has no genuine interest in detente. Detente is only a guise to weaken American resolve to resist Soviet pressures while the USSR passes the US militarily.2

The latter point very well could be a Soviet objective, but the more important issue is that the USSR cannot obtain it unless the US concedes and allows such an action to occur. There does not seem to be any evidence in either American declarations or actions to support the idea that during either the Kissinger years or the current administration the US was or is willing to negotiate or abdicate American strategic nuclear deterrent powers.3 Kissinger referred to the need to retain American power as “essential equivalence” while the Carter Administration has chosen to use the term “rough equivalence.” Whatever the terminology, the concept remains the same. Even in an era of improved bilateral relations—detente—the US must retain the ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviets in case the detente impulse should fade at some time in the future. This interrelationship and its continuity between Republican and Democratic administrations is the thesis of this paper.

DEFINING DETENTE

The most difficult aspect for any discussion of detente is how the concept should be defined. To what does detente apply? Are such things as Soviet restrictions on Jewish immigration, violations of human rights, propaganda...
**Detente and Deterrence: From Kissinger to Carter**

U.S. Army War College, ATTN: Parameters, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5238

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**Security Classification:**
- Report: Unclassified
- Abstract: Unclassified
- This Page: Unclassified

**Limitation of Report (SAR):**
- Same as Report (SAR)

**Number of Pages:**
- 10
campaigns about the evils of capitalist exploitations of the proletariat, rather harsh restrictions on Soviet dissidents, or continual modernization of Soviet ground forces and strategic weapons indications of detente failures? If one's definition of detente is that all competition and disagreements between the USSR and the West should be eliminated, then the above are indeed failures of detente. However, the Soviets have never accepted such a definition of detente, and, in reality, neither has the US. Kissinger defined detente in 1974 as a "continuing process, not a final condition," in which both superpowers, because of history, conflicting values, opposing ideologies, and divergent national interests, were in constant competition. However, despite competition and disagreements in a variety of areas, Kissinger believed that there were at least two basic principles which the US and USSR could agree upon: First, there was an unacceptable level of competition in the era of nuclear weapons when both superpowers had the means to destroy not only each other but also the world in general; and second, the "challenge of our time is to reconcile the reality of competition with the imperative of coexistence...." The current Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, has similarly defined detente as "a setting down, or arriving at, a set of ground rules which permit competition side by side with the resolution of outstanding questions...." Kissinger's and Vance's definition of detente as a dynamic, constantly changing process that pertains essentially to the two superpowers avoiding a direct military confrontation which could lead to an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons is the definition most accepted by American decisionmakers.

For Kissinger, several fundamental principles guided his definition of detente. First, he rejected the idea that detente should be based upon Soviet good intentions. Detente, Kissinger contended, was an attempt "regardless of Soviet intentions, to serve peace through a systematic resistance to pressure and conciliatory response to moderate behavior." Second, the US should oppose Soviet aggressive action, but we would seek confrontation only when vital American interests were at stake. Third, to support and enforce a viable and continuing detente policy, American policymakers required "a strong national defense while recognizing that in the nuclear age the relationship between military strength and politically useable power is the most complex in all history." Even though the former Secretary of State covered a variety of topics under the rubric of detente, the most consistent theme throughout seems to be the overwhelming relationship of detente to the avoidance of a US-USSR nuclear war. Economic linkage and human rights issues may have been spin-offs, but for Kissinger the basic goal of detente related to nuclear weapons. In order to achieve this goal, Kissinger seemed to leave no doubt that maintaining and increasing American military power was an essential part of his detente policies.

SCHLESINGER AND KISSINGER: MORE AGREEMENT THAN CONFLICT

In defense of the former Secretary of State, his rhetoric and actions were fairly consistent with his beliefs that the US must maintain its military muscle for detente to work. As mentioned earlier, the former Secretary never accepted the idea that the desired new relationship between the US and the USSR could be based upon Soviet good intentions. Good intentions had very little place in Kissinger's foreign policy world. Thus, he supported the Defense Department's objective of maintaining "essential equivalence" with the USSR in strategic weapons to demonstrate that the US had not only the resolve but also the means to respond to any attempt to threaten or coerce.

Kissinger may have been more prone
than Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger or Rumsfeld to negotiate a numerical advantage to the USSR in terms of launchers and throw-weight because the US had an advantage in accuracy and numbers of warheads. But the former Secretary of State supported increased defense budgets for strategic weapons because "sufficient political and strategic power" was required if the US wanted to avoid nuclear war in the future. On the issue of how much money and how many strategic weapons, Kissinger and Schlesinger disagreed. But those were disagreements over specific numbers and how the Soviet threat should be quantified. On the principle, however, that the US must never allow the USSR to gain a clear strategic nuclear advantage over the US, Schlesinger and Kissinger agreed, because as the latter once told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "Failure to maintain equivalence could jeopardize not only our freedom but our survival."9

Likewise, Kissinger supported another rather traditional military/Defense Department view: The appearance of military power is important in its own right. He periodically wondered out loud if there were any practical political gains that the US or USSR could achieve by maintaining an unretarded arms race, because he believed that after "each succeeding round of competition is the restoration of strategic equilibrium." Kissinger nevertheless supported the general concept that "The appearance of inferiority...can have serious political consequences" and that for politically important reasons, both the US and Soviets had "a high incentive to achieve not only the reality but the appearance of equality."10

Furthermore, Kissinger, at least rhetorically, maintained that the US would not back down in the face of adversity and would never acquiesce to any Soviet desire to obtain strategic superiority in an era of detente. Personally, he claimed to prefer to avoid a strategic arms race, for the Secretary saw no practical political benefits accruing from such a contest. Nevertheless, he put the USSR on warning during the 1974 detente hearings that, if pushed, "The United States will sustain an arms race" and "would emerge from such competition with an edge over the Soviet Union in most significant categories of strategic arms."11

Finally, Kissinger supported increases in the defense budget as consistent with his detente policies. A strong military budget would be another signal that the US intended to keep its defense commitments and remain active in world affairs. Another signal which demonstrated that Kissinger saw detente not as a condition to eliminate conflict but rather as a process that required sufficient military power to deter conflicts was his support for the Trident submarine, the Trident missile, the B-1 bomber, and the mobile ICBM modernization programs.

KISSINGER'S NEGOTIATIONS FOR EQUIVALENCE IN AN ERA OF DETENTE

The above illustrations should demonstrate that Kissinger viewed detente and sufficient deterrence capabilities as interrelated. If one examines closely the quantitative limitations that Kissinger negotiated for US and USSR strategic weapons systems at the first Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) in 1972 and in

Dr. Keith A. Dunn is a Political Scientist with the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. He received his undergraduate degree from Southeast Missouri State University and his master's and doctoral degrees from the University of Missouri. He served as an Army officer from 1973 to 1977 and held positions as an instructor in the Command and Staff Department at the Army Security Agency Training Center and School, as Aide-de-Camp to the Deputy Commandant of the US Army War College, and as Strategic Research Analyst in the Strategic Studies Institute. One of Dr. Dunn's previous articles appeared in Military Review and another has been published as a Military Issues Research Memorandum by the US Army War College.
the Vladivostok agreements of 1974, it is difficult to argue that during the Kissinger era the US negotiated away its ability to threaten the USSR with immense damage or allowed itself to be put into a position where it could be coerced by the USSR.12

As John Newhouse has shown in his definitive work on SALT I, the 1972 initial agreements benefitted both nations and thus satisfied another Kissinger prerequisite that detente impulses had to appear mutually beneficial in order to be successful. SALT I enabled the US to limit the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program, which Congress probably would not have funded. In addition, the US had no intentions of building additional ICBMs or SLBMs to add to the inventory. The decision had been made to make qualitative improvements in American strategic forces rather than increasing the total numbers of launchers. The US intended to increase its number of deliverable warheads through MIRV technology while retaining essentially the same number of launchers. Thus, in one way of looking at SALT I, the negotiated offensive ceilings limited the USSR, which was building 250 ICBMs and 128 SLBMs per year, more than it restricted the US. In addition, the agreements placed no restrictions on US modernization programs. Thus, the US could continue with the MIRV, B-1, and Trident programs unabated.13

For the USSR, the 1972 agreements signaled its acceptance as a true military superpower. SALT allowed the USSR to retain its numerical advantage in launchers and throw-weight. The Kremlin could continue its offensive missile modernization programs and replace missiles constructed after 1964 with new ICBMs on a one-for-one basis.14 Like the US, the Soviet Union would not be restricted from gaining MIRV technology and making technological improvements to solve its accuracy problems, which have historically forced Moscow to acquire huge missiles with large throw-weights to offset accuracy limitations.

Essentially, SALT I fulfilled Kissinger's definition of detente interrelating with the maintenance of sufficient military power. On one hand, the agreement demonstrated that the two nuclear superpowers could transcend their historical and ideological differences in an attempt to address a common problem facing them: How could they slow down what apparently was going to become an expensive spiraling quantitative arms race? On the other hand, the agreement did nothing to limit American strategic nuclear power. Although the US would retain fewer ICBMs than the USSR (1056 to 1618), America maintained a significant advantage in actual quantities of deliverable nuclear warheads (nearly 8000 to less than 3000).15 Also, the US retained its advantage in total deliverable megatonnage. Finally, Kissinger negotiated no restrictions upon current or projected levels of American strategic military systems or upon US continuation of its technological modernization programs.

The follow-on agreement to SALT I, the 1974 Vladivostok Accords, likewise continued the process of detente through negotiations, while simultaneously doing very little to reduce American or Soviet military capabilities. The agreements were a "cap on the arms race," as Kissinger once said.16 They were not arms reductions, but neither was SALT I. Vladivostok provided both nations a maximum ceiling to grow toward. In that sense, Vladivostok presented a unique position because it was the first time the arms race participants had ever agreed upon a maximum ceiling. However, in the larger context more germane to this article, Vladivostok meant no significant negotiated limitations upon US strategic military power despite the era of detente.

The idea that detente should not restrict or inhibit what American policymakers perceived as strategic equivalence remained intact. In fact, the US had considerable room to grow in 1974. When President Ford signed the Vladivostok Accords, the US possessed approximately 2100 ICBMs, SLBMs, and long range bombers. Only a fraction over 1200 were MIRVed. The
Soviet Union, on the other hand, had to reduce some antiquated systems to reach the 2400 threshold. Moreover, in 1974 Moscow possessed less than 100 ICBMs which had been tested with MIRV warheads, and none of its SLBMs were MIRVed or even tested with that capability.\(^{17}\)

**THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION**

While it is probably too soon to pass a definitive judgment on how the Carter Administration views the interrelation between detente and deterrence, from the administration's statements and actions it appears that it will pursue a path essentially similar to that undertaken during the Kissinger years. There have been and will undoubtedly continue to be differences in techniques, approach, style, and form. Nevertheless, the similarities are significant enough to warrant applying a remark that Leslie Gelb once made when he tried to evaluate the disagreements separating Kissinger, Schlesinger, and Senator Henry Jackson to a comparison between the Kissinger years and the current administration: “Their differences... have revolved more around negotiations, tactics, philosophy and politics than around substance.”\(^{18}\)

In spite of campaign rhetoric that the Kissinger approach to foreign policy would be avoided, it appears that the new administration meant that the former Secretary's style, aloofness, and secretive manner of negotiations—not his objectives—were the points of contention. Within a matter of days after his nomination, Carter stressed that, if elected, he would continue the essential equivalence equation for comparing US and USSR strategic weapons systems because, as he said, maintaining “rough equivalence” would be an essential goal of his administration and in general “We need to maintain a strong defense....”\(^{19}\) On another occasion, when again supporting the idea of rough equivalence, the Presidential nominee argued that “the overwhelming capability of both nations to wreak havoc on the other nations is such an overwhelming consideration” that minor quantitative advantages for either superpower had little practical importance.\(^{20}\) In content, Carter sounded very similar to a much earlier Kissinger comment: “What in name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers?”\(^{21}\)

After his election, the new President continued a theme established during the campaign, that detente was a two-way street and, without reciprocal actions from the USSR, the US would continue to maintain and, if necessary, increase its military power. For instance, at Notre Dame, after the Kremlin had rejected the President's initial SALT II proposal, Carter reiterated that a substantial reduction in nuclear arms and a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty remained as administration objectives. However, he warned that such efforts could not be unilateral proposals: “We cannot have accommodation in one part of the world and the aggravation of conflicts in another.”\(^{22}\) Again, in form, Carter's plea sounded very similar to one that Kissinger had made almost two years earlier at the height of the Angolan crisis when he warned the USSR to use restraint in Africa because the US “will never permit detente to turn into a subterfuge of unilateral advantages.”\(^{23}\)

The President also emphasized the requirement to maintain total US military power in an era of detente at his June meeting with the NATO leaders. In the NATO context, Carter reiterated America's traditional goal to achieve conventional mutual balanced force reductions. However, the President left no illusions. Substantive American steps would not be based upon Soviet statements, good intentions, or an acceptance of Soviet claims that its conventional and strategic modernization programs were purely defensive efforts. As
the President commented, "Achieving our political goals depends on a credible defense and deterrent" and on maintaining an "effective strategic deterrent..." Unless the USSR took clear, substantive steps to reduce the threat facing NATO and the US—and the President failed to enumerate any such steps that he had observed—the US would continue to maintain and improve its conventional and strategic forces, and he asked NATO to do likewise.24

In more recent months, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has continued the rhetoric which the President initiated, and, in some cases, has heightened the pitch. The early Carter Administration decisions to stop production of the B-1 bomber and not to build 50 additional Minuteman IIIs, coupled with the appointment of Paul Warnke as chief arms control negotiator, seemed to cause some concern that the new administration was not as interested in maintaining American strategic capabilities as the President had implied during his campaign. Sensitive to such allegations, the Secretary of Defense has stated that the administration’s position is to "do whatever is necessary to keep a stable strategic balance in the years ahead."25

More recently, Brown has taken an even stronger stand, one that closely resembles the rhetorical positions taken by Ford, Schlesinger, and Rumsfeld during the latter months of the Ford Administration. The current Secretary of Defense has strongly chastised the Soviets for their apparent unretarded efforts to develop five new ICBMs. Essentially, like the Kissinger of 1975, Brown put the USSR on warning that detente could not be used as a rubric for unilateral Soviet activities. Reemphasizing that the administration’s strategic objective of "rough equivalence" includes the need to retain the current strategic nuclear equilibrium, Brown declared:

This administration is determined to maintain the US strategic deterrent... No one should have any doubts whatsoever on that score... We will build and improve our forces as necessary. We will not be outgunned. We will not be bullied. We will not be coerced.26

ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS TO MAINTAIN ROUGH EQUIVALENCE

Analyzing declaratory statements of policymakers is essential for conceptually understanding how a specific policy or action has evolved. However, such analysis only provides a partial picture. Declaratory statements can only give a feeling for the sense of direction decisionmakers want some affected group—such as the USSR elites, the American public, the opposition political party, or US allies—to believe the US has adopted. Without specific actions to fulfill the declaratory positions, the statements mean very little.

Differences in tactics and disagreements over the deployment of specific weapons systems did exist between the Kissinger era and the Carter Administration. But the new administration’s actions clearly support its declaratory position that detente necessitates sufficient American military strength and that the US has no intentions of negotiating away what military power it feels is necessary for rough (essential) equivalence in its desire to retain detente as a working relationship between the US and USSR.

The Carter Administration’s position on the MX (third generation ICBM) missile has undergone some rather significant alterations within the last year. Originally, the administration reduced funding for the ongoing modernization program of the MX. Whereas the Ford Administration had requested approximately 295 million dollars to continue research and development for the MX, the Carter Administration in the amended February budget asked for only 134.4 million dollars.27 However, it now appears that Secretary of Defense Brown will ask for higher funding for the MX in his FY 79 budget requests. Reports indicate that
Brown would like to earmark approximately 245 million dollars for the MX. Again, this would be less than the projected Ford proposals, for under the Republican timetable the Air Force would have received 930 million dollars for the MX.28

Nevertheless, the new administration has continued to fund, albeit at a lower level than the previous administration, the research and development of the MX. Moreover, despite the President’s announced desire through SALT to discard the mobile ICBM, the administration continues to support the mobile basing mode for the MX until some agreement between the US and USSR is attained. According to current plans, the Air Force will begin full-scale development of the MX in fiscal year 1979.29

The Carter Administration’s amended FY 78 budget made no changes in the Ford recommendations for the new Minuteman III MK12A warhead. Similarly, there were no changes made in the FY 78 Ford budget to question either the need or projected deployment dates for the Trident submarine or missile.

The President’s cancellation of the B-1 was probably the most controversial decision made thus far during his term in office. While the B-1 issue and related questions—such as the US requirement for a manned bomber and the relative penetration capabilities of the B-1 and the B-52—are all important, what seems to be more important here is the effect the Presidential decision had upon Soviet perceptions of the US commitment to retain its military capabilities in an era of detente. On this issue, Soviet views are clear and vocal.

Immediately after the B-1 decision, Soviet spokesmen condemned it as another American attempt to achieve “unilateral military advantages harmful to the interests of the USSR’s security.”30 The Soviets viewed the proposal to scrap B-1 production, maintain its research and development funding, and accelerate cruise missile production as an attempt to continue the “arms race at a new level” and to ignore past successes “which took the realities of the present world into account.”31

The B-1 decision—in conjunction with the administration’s commitment to continue MX, the MK12A warhead, and the Trident missile and submarine—seems to be definite indication that, despite the desire for detente, the Carter Administration has no intentions of standing still on qualitative improvements in American strategic forces. One can question the practicality of basing America’s manned bomber future on an aircraft which will be 30 years old in the 1980’s, but the increased emphasis on the cruise missile will definitely improve American military potential in the practical as well as the all-important perceptual sense. The decision to build strategic cruise missiles will, in effect, add another highly accurate, difficult-to-counter “fourth leg” to the traditional Triad. Also, it will probably save between 10 and 15 billion dollars, while retaining the current B-52 as an effective manned penetration bomber until the 1990’s.32

THE PRESIDENT’S SALT II PROPOSAL

The March proposal to replace the 1972 SALT I agreements is probably the clearest indicator that while the Carter Administration may differ from the Kissinger era in tactics and form, on the all-important issue of retaining American strategic nuclear equivalence there is little difference. As Secretary of State Vance proposed the new SALT treaty, there was virtually no way the USSR could accept it. Major quantitative reductions would have preserved and in some cases increased American qualitative advantages over the USSR.

The preferred administration proposal evidently called for major reductions (2400 to 1800) in ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. MIRVed missiles would have been cut to approximately 1100, of which only 550 could be MIRVed ICBMs. Mobile ICBMs would have been banned and the ranges of the Soviet Backfire bomber and the American cruise missile limited to such a degree that it would have been impossible to use them as intercontinental weapons systems. Finally, both the US and USSR would have agreed to limit ICBM test firings to no more than six
per year. A backup, least-preferred solution would have been merely an agreement to continue the Vladivostok agreements and to defer discussions on the Backfire bomber and cruise missile until a later date.33

The Kremlin's rejection of the backup proposal should have been no surprise. In 1976, Kissinger had made a similar proposal, and Soviet leaders had found it unacceptable then. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union is obviously concerned about the cruise missile, and it has made its feelings clearly known. There was nothing new in the proposal and thus no reason for the USSR to accept something they had rejected a year earlier.

Conversely, the "preferred solution" was different, and the probable reasons for the Soviet rejection of the proposal require more explanation. In general, however, postmortems on the proposal seem to agree that it would have created too many advantages for the US, and thus made it unacceptable for the USSR.

First, a major reduction in missiles and bombers would affect the USSR more than the US. To meet the proposed 1800 ceiling, Moscow would have had to scrap nearly 600 of its bombers, ICBMs, or SLBMs, whereas the US would have lost approximately 350. For the USSR, a greater proportion of this reduction would have had to come from the landbased systems on which Moscow has historically placed greater significance than has the US. The USSR has more than 80 percent of its deliverable megatonnage located in its ICBM systems, while the US has no more than 20 percent in its ICBMs.34 Thus, a cut in ICBMs would have had a centrifugal effect upon the Kremlin. Accepting the American proposal would have meant accepting not only a reduction in numbers of missiles, but also a significant cut in Soviet megatonnage, which would limit Moscow's ability to kill hard targets. The US would have been comparatively less affected by this problem, since American advances in miniaturization have allowed the US to achieve extremely accurate missiles while continuing to deploy relatively small ICBMs.

Second, the proposal limiting MIRVed ICBMs to 550 again would have presented significant asymmetries in America's favor. The MIRVed Minuteman IIIIs, 550 in total, entered the American inventory in 1970. The guidance system and the warheads have been tested, and American officials are quite confident of the Minuteman III's ability. The USSR, however, entered MIRV technology and deployed its first MIRVed ICBM in 1975. It has not yet deployed a MIRVed SLBM and only began testing the SS-NX-18 last year.35 Thus, the US MIRV proposal, if accepted by the USSR, meant that Kremlin leaders would have had to accept a very low MIRV base at just the time that their first generation MIRV missiles (SS-17s, 18s, and 19s) were entering the inventory and when not all the problems with the missiles and warhead accuracy had yet been overcome. Moreover, specifying that no more than 550 ICBMs of the total launchers could be MIRVed would have meant forcing the USSR toward a majority of MIRVed systems in SLBMs. In this area the US possessed not only a quantitative but also a qualitative superiority. The Vladivostok agreement had been better for the USSR because it limited MIRV launchers in aggregate numbers, but allowed the type and mix to be determined by each of the superpowers.

Third, as a number of critics have pointed out, the call for a total ban on mobile ICBMs asked the USSR to abolish a system which it was ready to deploy in full scale, but only required the US to eliminate a system that was just in the research stage.

Finally, limiting test firings to no more than six a year would have retarded Soviet attempts to overcome accuracy deficiencies. In addition, limiting the test firings so drastically would have restricted the USSR from overcoming design and function problems which historically it has experienced with its new ICBMs, to say nothing about trying to improve the new ICBMs' accuracy. As a result, the USSR could have been put into a position in which the lack of test firing could have caused it to question the usability and reliability of its most modern MIRVed ICBMs. The US, on the other hand, has a tested MIRV and, as a result of past
experience, would have had a reasonable level of confidence in its accuracy and reliability. Then, too, with a maximum of six test firings per year, the USSR could not with confidence have moved toward MIRVed SLBMs, a direction that the MIRV ICBM quota would have forced on it if it wanted to retain essential or rough equivalence with the US.

Since the March failure, both Washington and Moscow have expressed considerable interest in getting SALT back on course. However, the trend of current negotiations would not seem to indicate significant arms reductions for the United States. As now envisioned, both nations would accept a total limit of 2200 ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. No more than roughly 1200 ICBMs and SLBMs could be MIRVed. (Currently, the US has 1206 MIRVed SLBMs and ICBMs.) Neither nation could have more than 820 MIRVed ICBMs, which would mean that the US could actually build 270 additional MIRVed ICBMs if it reduced its SLBMs accordingly.

Finally, no more than 1320 MIRVed and cruise missile systems could exist. This would mean that the US could still deploy 120 bombers with air launched cruise missiles. In many ways, the current proposals resemble the 1974 Vladivostok Accords. If both parties should agree to the proposals, it would not be an arms reduction agreement, but rather, like Vladivostok, another cap to grow toward.

**ON BALANCE: CONSENSUS AND CONTINUITY**

From the foregoing, the conclusion that consensus and continuity are major characteristics of US strategic policies in both the Kissinger years and the new Carter Administration is not too difficult to reach, nor should this be particularly surprising. Indeed, continuity has generally characterized our American history. Contrary to what may be found in many other nations, a study of America is more often than not a study of consensus generation rather than revolutionary change. The number of major turning points—watersheds—in American society or foreign relations is low. Therefore, to assume that there should be significant differences in how succeeding administrations view the world would be to go against the course of over 200 years of American history. Nevertheless, there are very important ramifications behind the statement that Carter and Kissinger differ more in form than in substance. The significance lies particularly in the mutual definition that detente depends upon retaining essential or rough equivalence in order to maintain American deterrent capabilities.

If the impulse of detente is to continue, and if that impulse continues to be defined as an effort to improve US-Soviet bilateral relations while at the same time allowing competition between the superpowers that does not culminate in nuclear war, then the criterion of essential/rough equivalence probably needs to be reexamined. As has been demonstrated, this criterion has done little to limit the arms race. In the future, this problem will become even more difficult because technology is currently growing faster than the ability to control it. In a technological arms race, it is extremely difficult to apply the test of rough or essential equivalence given the subjective decisions that must be made.

Continuity between the Kissinger years and the Carter Administration is further underscored by the basic dilemma facing the US during both periods. On one hand, an essential agreement exists that the two superpowers need to improve bilateral relations and terminate competition over the means of ultimate destruction, because there is a finite point when additional nuclear weapons cease to hold much political or military value. On the other hand, there continues to exist a classic balance of power syndrome, which holds that improvements made by one adversary must be balanced by the other. The test for the future will be not only how well the US can solve this dilemma but also whether essential/rough equivalence is the proper measure in an era when technological improvements in weapons systems are more important than quantitative expansion.
Agreements: Text and History of Negotiations

Substance there were few differences among Kissinger, Schlesinger, and Jackson on the issue of maintaining strategic superiority, which the Kissinger Administration rather than comparing administrations. Since Kissinger was the paramount foreign policy figure under both Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and the chief architect of detente, it seems fair to make the comparison in this manner.

For example, see the following quote from Izvestia reprinted in "Soviet Denounces the US on Angols," The New York Times, 2 December 1975, p. 7:

Some would like to convince us that the process of detente in the world and support of the national liberation struggle are incompatible things. Similar things have been maintained before, but in vain. The process of detente does not mean freezing of the social-political status quo in the world and the cessation of anti-imperialist struggles of the people for a better and just fate, and against foreign interference and oppression.

8. See Ibid., pp. 247-60 for Kissinger's views on the need to retain military power. See also Leslie Gelb, "Debate on U.S. Nuclear Policy: Just What is Strategic Superiority," The New York Times, 30 July 1974, p. 8, for another view that in substance there were few differences among Kissinger, Schlesinger, and Jackson on the issue of maintaining US military power.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
32. The 10 to 15 billion dollar figure was a projection made in a study by Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Frye, Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976). However, it should be recognized that Quanbeck and Frye's calculations did not take into account the cost of building a new stand-off aircraft with the similar rapid takeoff and safe escape capabilities which the B-1 incorporated. Robert Kennedy, "The Cruise Missile and the Strategic Balance," Military Issues Research Memorandum, US Army War College (Pending Publication) discusses this latter point in much more depth and sophistication than is attempted in this essay.