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Regional Issues

Global Implications

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Conference attendees
Preface

The 5th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference featured a wide variety of presenters who captured the complexity of the global security environment, the challenges posed to national sovereignty, and the necessity for a shared and coordinated international effort to ensure stability and to protect national prerogatives to act. Hosted jointly by the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the United States Southern Command (USOUTHCOM), the program pursued the theme, Regional Issues—Global Implications.

This booklet highlights the presentations and captures the essence of the candid and animated discussions carried out by senior military officials and civilian diplomats representing 66 countries. The number and diversity of attendees, to include law enforcement representatives, resulted in the best-attended conference in the brief but extremely productive history of the event.

The individual presentations, subsequent discussion sessions, and group reports generated an intriguing agenda of threats, issues, and possible solutions for future consideration and action. Included among these are:

a. Importance of understanding culture and acting on that understanding
b. Role of education in generating understanding, independent thought, progress, and stability
c. Need for collective effort as seen in the internationalization of the battlefield and the development of whole-of-government approaches
d. Threats posed by extremism and the roles of cultural understanding, education, and collective effort in confronting extremism
e. Importance of judicial and law enforcement approaches and solutions
f. Requirement for harmonized strategic communication strategies that are credible and effective in achieving desired outcomes.

Sovereign Challenge is a unique approach to discussing, understanding, and solving the most important issues of our times. The report of proceedings captured in the following pages, and the continuing Sovereign Challenge initiative in all its forms, bring us closer to the elusive goal of confronting effectively those who would threaten us both individually and collectively. A recurring theme of the Sovereign Challenge Conferences
has been the shared recognition of the necessity for the development of a comprehensive strategy that empowers the community of sovereign nations as they work together to confront security threats.

The 5th Sovereign Challenge Conference continued the tradition of such gatherings to summarize progress to date, encourage analysis, and propose ideas and recommendations to chart even more clearly an effective way forward.
Conference Agenda

Monday, 8 March

1400-1600 Joint Interagency Task Force—South Presentation
1830-1930 Opening Event at the Casa Marina Center
   Mr. Greg Mortenson, humanitarian and author—“The Role of Education in Countering Violent Extremism”

Tuesday, 9 March

0815-0900 Mr. Stan Schrager, Center for Special Operations, USSOCOM (SCSO-J55-SEG)—Sovereign Challenge Update
   Major General Salvatore F. Cambria, Director of Interagency Task Force, USSOCOM—Welcome Remarks
0900-0930 Rear Admiral Robert C. Parker, USSOUTHCOM—Welcome Remarks
1000-1100 Mr. Maziar Bahari, Iranian-Canadian journalist, playwright, and filmmaker—“Iran from the Inside”
1100-1230 Discussion Groups
1400-1500 Dr. Richard A. Falkenrath, Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism, New York Police Department—“Transnational Crime and International Collaboration”
1500-1630 Discussion Groups
1900-2100 Hosted Dinner and Keynote Address
   Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander of USSOCOM

Wednesday, 10 March

0815-0830 Sovereign Challenge Web-Site Presentation
0830-0930 Ambassador Dell L. Dailey, former Department of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism—“The Diplomat and Soldier”
1000-1100 Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere, Vice President of Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris—“International Justice”
1100-1230 Discussion Groups
1400-1500  Dr. Walid Phares, Director of Future Terrorism Project—“The Internationalization of the Campaign Against Al Qaeda”
1500-1700  Discussion Groups
1900-2100  Dinner at the Harry S. Truman Little White House

**Thursday, 11 March**

0800-0930  Discussion Group Report Preparation
0930-1045  Mr. Thomas Howes, former FARC hostage—“The Captivity Experience”
1115-1230  Breakout Group Reports
1230-1245  Major General Salvatore F. Cambria, Director of Interagency Task Force, USSOCOM
            Rear Admiral Robert C. Parker, USSOUTHCOM—Closing Remarks
1245-1300  Mr. Stan Schrager, Center for Special Operations, USSOCOM
            (SCSO-J55-SEG)—Conclusion and Follow-on Scenarios
Introduction

Everything is related; nothing stands alone.

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) hosted 83 Foreign Military Attachés (FMAs) representing 66 countries at the 5th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference from 8-11 March 2010. This gathering included more attendees than ever before and was notable for the increased participation of national law enforcement officials and legal attachés. This year’s conference theme was Regional Issues—Global Implications.

Sovereign Challenge is a USSOCOM international engagement action project that focuses on the sovereignty of independent nations and how terrorism and related activities violate that sovereignty. The project is based on the premise that each nation’s sovereign responsibility to act in its own self-interest and maintain faith with its citizens, cultures, and national interests conveys the specific responsibility to develop national programs to prevent and counter terrorism. The Sovereign Challenge Web site is at http://www.sovereignchallenge.org/.

This year’s Sovereign Challenge Conference began with a tour and briefing at the headquarters of the Joint Interagency Task Force—South. Later, in his opening comments, Admiral Eric T. Olson, USSOCOM commander, reminded the attendees that “we provide the forum; you provide the content” as the discussion and exchange of ideas moved forward during the 2.5-day conference.

Seven speakers explored a wide variety of issues that were later amplified within the discussions of five breakout groups. Prompted by the comments of the formal presentations and the breakout group exchanges, attendees engaged in lively discussions of relevant issues. On the final day, each breakout group presented a summary of its deliberations and offered specific ideas and recommendations to guide future Sovereign Challenge initiatives. These are reported in the sections entitled Themes and Thoughts and Breakout Group Reports.

Admiral Olson’s keynote address and periodic interventions by Major General Salvatore Cambria, USSOCOM, and Rear Admiral Robert Parker, USSOUTHCOM, provided additional context for the program.
Mr. Stan Schrager of USSOCOM emphasized that the concept of sovereignty serves as the international norm for the age of terrorism, a touchstone for nations seeking to live their lives free of external intimidation. Admiral Parker noted that existing threats are indifferent to borders, resulting in the requirement for a shared international response as reflected in the structure, participation, and functioning of the Sovereign Challenge Program. Major General Cambria summarized the process by asserting that all of us are friends, and friends help friends.
Themes and Thoughts

The breakout groups covered a wide variety of topics, issues, and concerns. Facilitators collected the content of these discussions on a nonattribution basis to capture a sense of the thoughts and recommendations of the participants. These are clustered below by their assessed relevance to the general category and in no particular order of precedence.

Culture

- Fundamentally people are the same and should be addressed with that understanding.
- Interaction amongst people of different nations is important to better understand the world.
- Listening, understanding, and a sincere respect for people serve as a basis for relationship building.
- Population-centric strategies for combating terrorism are essential.
- When assisting other countries, it is more important to empower the host nation to make their own efforts. As one attendee suggested, “plan with them; don’t plan for them.”
- Safe havens take on different forms and enjoy different levels of protection based on cultural traditions.

Education

- Education represents a key “battleground” for the hearts and minds of a population, but too frequently states are not sufficiently positioned to participate in the competition.
- Education is an important tool for empowering populations and ensuring a high quality of life, but the structure and content of education programs must be a sovereign concern addressing the traditions and challenges of individual cultures.
- Education helps individuals to understand facts and to draw their own conclusions, thus countering efforts to mandate what they should think and do.
- Effective education programs assist both sovereign and collective efforts to counter extremist recruitment. Narratives in support of
education are critical to supporting socialization on terms consistent with traditional cultural values and practices.

- The need for education is not just about building schools or upgrading the education process. Education initiatives should have a broad focus that includes the cultural traditions and values of the entire population, to include decision makers.
- Education is a long-term and complex process closely linked to the sovereign interests of individual countries.
- Education is about identities and values as well as knowledge and skills; it concerns the entire society.
- It is important to know about who develops the educational narrative and writes the educational curriculum; the process must be credible and trustworthy, not subject to subversion by extremist groups such as Al Qaeda.
- Ensuring access to education is a critical sovereign responsibility.

Extremism

- Extremism in all its forms lies at the center of the counterterrorism challenge.
- Respect culture and religion in all cases; do not automatically link extremism with Islam.
- It is essential to understand why people are susceptible to extremist ideology.
- Factors that make people inclined to adopt terrorist ways are poverty, lack of education, and the absence of a sense of belonging.
- Some people have no choice and are forcibly recruited into terrorist organizations, often making it difficult to escape those situations because of threats and coercion.

Internationalization of the Counterterrorism Battlefield (CB)

- As terrorists are engaged in a geopolitical struggle, the internationalization of the CB seeks to close the seams that provide terrorists with their freedom of movement and enable their actions.
- The challenges we face are interrelated, and a unity of purpose/effort is very important for synchronizing national strategies in pursuit of the internationalization of the CB.
• We need an international consensus of approaches to terrorism to include legal structures and other responses. Perhaps a supra-organization or conference is appropriate to create a combating-terrorism strategy.
• Consider convening a global conference on counterterrorism to harmonize international efforts against the threat.
• Without an international and interagency/whole-of-government approach, foes are unlikely to surrender, success may not last, and threats may reemerge.
• Know your enemies and your friends. However, if you do not first understand yourself, knowing your friends and enemies is useless. Knowing your enemy helps to understand what your enemy will do and ultimately how to fight the roots of his power.
• Nations may have to relinquish/trade off some sovereignty to work with neighbors, gain cooperation, and implement international agreements.
• Internationalization of the battlefield requires more than military options; a whole-of-government approach is essential.
• The internationalization of the counterterrorism battlefield to close vulnerable seams requires a proper balance to ensure that we do not lose the sovereign order and international cooperation we seek.
• Organizational agility is a key enabler to respond to new and evolving threats.
• A focus on how to operationalize information and intelligence is necessary to make it useful to all parties. There are valid sovereign concerns in sharing information that affect both the timeliness of the exchanges and the parameters placed on content. Easily identified points of contact for information sharing must be established for both national and international agencies. Conduct cooperative efforts and expand information sharing at the regional level. In many cases, there is a willingness to share information, but there remains a need for greater “professionalism” in identifying which information is the most important and establishing priorities for its exploitation.
• Need to identify essential common denominators, operationalize them within states, and harmonize them among international partners.
• The exercise of strategic patience by the international community is essential for the conduct of successful counterterrorism efforts against both state and nonstate actors.
• Each nation is justifiably concerned about guarding its own sovereignty, but each must recognize that there is no single way to protect national sovereignty.
• Each country’s willingness or ability to cooperate in counterterrorism initiatives will be affected by individual perceptions of their own sovereign interests.
• Sovereignty must guide the functioning of a nation internally within the context of traditional culture, history, and values. However, a willingness to work with and accommodate other nations is necessary to combat terrorism successfully.
• Leaders must be willing to take charge and pay the high price to counter threats to sovereignty.
• It is generally preferable to make existing counterterrorism programs work more efficiently rather than creating new initiatives that may introduce unexpected and unwanted new problems.
• It may be too difficult to arrive at an international consensus on how to react to terrorism, thus perhaps a regional focus may be the most practical.
• Failed and failing governments require particular international attention as a preemptive measure.
• Sovereignty is sustained by security, economy, and education and is supported by good governance and judicial/legal systems.
• Drawing on international interventions in Haiti and other areas, the following eight lessons apply. First, such responses should, to the extent possible, reflect international coordination. Second, integrating international assistance is essential to avoid overwhelming the host nation’s capacity to accept and manage the aid provided by well-meaning state and nonstate actors acting unilaterally. Third, uncoordinated international assistance can make the host nation look inept and undermine perceptions of competence and legitimacy both at home and abroad. Fourth, do not react to pure emotion. The news media will emphasize those needs they feel are the most compelling, but the host nation must validate the nature and scope of requirements because resources are always limited and must be funneled to those areas of greatest assessed need. Fifth, consider developing regional crisis response agencies to provide immediate and short-term structure, planning, and resources as a bridge to the deployment of the
United Nations (UN) and other organizations with greater long-term capacity. Sixth, relationships among crisis first responders must be established in advance to establish trust, develop shared competence, and integrate the various capabilities present within responding organizations to ensure maximum positive effects. Seventh, international cooperation should be characterized by the smallest possible external footprint. And last, get ahead of security threats to weakened nations as President Harry S. Truman displayed with the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine.

Iran

- Iran represents a complex system of interests affected by internal changes and empowered by disagreements among the United States, Russia, and China about how to proceed.
- Within the Middle East, Iranian behavior is seen as reflecting an enduring pursuit of expansionism in the tradition of the Persian Empire.
- Isolation is not an answer to paranoia in Iran or elsewhere.
- Time is not on their [Iranian] side because their ambitions ill serve the interests of the major powers, and the current Iranian elites will eventually fail their own populations and suffer the inevitable consequences.
- Progressive interaction/engagement with Iran is a workable solution, tempered by the awareness that some sort of metric must be developed to determine when more decisive action may become necessary.
- Efforts in the past to modernize Iran have created a gap between the elites and the illiterate, religious, and traditional masses. This gap has contributed to many of the tensions/conflict found within Iran today.
- The Iranian regime has a skewed/biased view of the West due to state-sponsored misinformation and propaganda. It is entirely possible that a similar gap exists between the rest of the world and Iran.
- The combination of education and access to more information has influenced the thinking of the masses and has led many of the Iranian people after the June 2009 elections to ask, “Where are my rights as citizens of this country?”
- The international community should assist in closing the gap between Iranian elites and the masses by enabling a freer flow of information between the external world and Iran.
Judicial Approaches

- New domestic legislation and international frameworks are necessary for dealing with violent extremists and criminals. Such individuals seek out and exploit seams in existing legal structures. As Judge Bruguiere asserted, “There is no crime without a law.”
- Given the expanding relationships between criminals and extremists at various levels, it is necessary to distinguish between the traditional criminal and the extremist who is committing a crime. For instance, criminal behavior is an immutable component of human behavior; extremism is a political choice.
- Laws are needed against the practice of providing terrorists the material support they require—for example, funding, weapons, explosives, shelter, and safe passage.
- The demands of sovereignty can impact the ability and political will of states to establish necessary laws and to enforce them.
- It is essential to create a link between intelligence resources and the judiciary that is similar to the linkage between evidence resources and the judiciary.
- The rule of law is a sovereign responsibility, and it may be far too complex to internationalize.
- The lack of a cohesive international framework creates complex challenges for dealing with both captured and released terrorists.
- Definite linkages exist between criminal and terrorist activities; it is essential to understand the individual aspects of each.
- Radicalization within jails and prisons is a shared problem among states.
- Though sovereignty is complicated by the existence of the Internet, certain technology-based law enforcement practices—such as the targeting and tracking of child pornography suspects—can have important counterterrorism applications.

Strategic Communications

- There is a compelling need for an enlightened, carefully prepared, comprehensive, well-coordinated, and precisely monitored strategic communication strategy that seeks to harmonize the efforts of the
international community to address the ideological threats posed by extremist organizations and their surrogates.

- Many voices and agendas populate the domestic and international communication environments; they must be monitored and—as necessary—engaged.
- Successful national and international strategic communications programs are complex endeavors that require more understanding, planning, effort, and resources than have been committed in the recent past.
- Effective strategic communications programs can create synergies that can challenge and defeat extremist ideology and actions.
- Al Qaeda and other extremist organizations are skilled at practicing strategic communications *judo* through which they exploit the strengths of our communication systems and the weaknesses of our communication practices against us.
- Al Qaeda has lost considerable capability, but until its ideology has lost its appeal, it retains a high degree of capacity. Credible narratives, advanced by credible strategic communications programs, play important roles in undercutting that ideology.
- In general, most state governments fail to understand how information flows within the 21st century. The multiplicity of news media outlets ensures that one or more narratives will surely gain public exposure; state governments are too unresponsive, too cautious, and too slow to meet news media information needs or win the information battle for credibility.
- Make sure the good intentions and positive efforts of government are clearly presented to and understood by the public.
- As Al Qaeda appears to be more effective than its adversaries in using the news media in all its manifestations, it is important for the international community to arrive at an understanding of contemporary news media practices and to emphasize education as a central tool for enabling populations to manage information to which they are exposed.
- Education is the foundation for strategic communications. It allows people to interpret, understand, and draw their own conclusions about messages and propaganda.
Whole of Government/Law Enforcement

- A whole-of-government approach is fundamental to countering threats to a nation’s sovereignty.
- Whole-of-government approaches must include law enforcement, other interagency partners, and relevant think tanks.
- It is sometimes difficult to determine if the correct/appropriate response is military or law enforcement. Terrorist links to organized crime further complicate the distinctions.
- Military skill is not enough; civil and military actions must be blended into a synchronized effort to produce a unity of effort.
- Law enforcement is seen by many as the primary option in conducting counterterrorism efforts.
- The New York Police Department has developed a successful model to counter terrorist threats by leveraging the necessary capabilities and appropriate authorities while stressing the cooperation of local and federal law enforcement, the interagency, international business, and industry.
- At the local level, employ educational, law enforcement, and security resources to protect the populace and improve the quality of life.
Speaker Presentations

The Role of Education in Countering Violent Extremism

Mr. Greg Mortenson, humanitarian and author of *Three Cups of Tea* and *Stones into Schools*

At the beginning of his presentation, Mr. Mortenson stressed the need to respect and empower elders (shura) if anything is to be accomplished or done in rural Afghanistan. He also said it is just as important to be *friendly-centric* as it is *enemy-centric* in deciding overall military strategy. Building relationships and then local communities become a force multiplier in pursuing the enemy.

Mr. Mortenson focused first on summarizing the meaning of the title of his best-selling book, *Three Cups of Tea*: one drinks the first cup as a stranger, the second as a friend, and the third as family. He then shared Admiral Olson’s adaptation of that structure, saying it is essential to “listen more, act with respect, and build relationships.” An important, overarching principle is that one should interact with unfamiliar cultures with a strong tone of civility, even when not in complete agreement.

Throughout his presentation, Mr. Mortenson spoke of the need to understand as completely as possible the culture in which you are working. While international assistance is valued in places like Afghanistan, the practice of rotating both military and civilian personnel in and out of the country for relatively short tours of duty is particularly disruptive to the essential process of relationship building. Sometimes, Mr. Mortenson lamented, “there’s no time for even one cup of tea.”

Mr. Mortenson reminded the audience that Afghanistan practices a warrior culture and has done so “since Alexander the Great came in over 2,000 years ago; … every outsider that has come in has never prevailed in
that country.” Yet he also argued that as “a warrior, you can also be a warrior for peace. You can be a warrior for your people.”

Recognition of the importance of that warrior ethos to the fabric of Afghan society is essential. For instance, he reported that members of the various Shura councils “feel very humiliated because their weapons have been taken from them,” which occurred during the well-intentioned, internationally managed Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs that began 7 years ago. “It’s very humiliating for an elder to have to call the Afghan Army or the U.S. and say, ‘Please help us; we’re being, you know, attacked.’” That is just one of the important lessons to be learned when working within such an unfamiliar cultural environment.

Mr. Mortenson said establishing education is one of our top, not only national but international, global priorities in every single country of the world. He noted that 120 million children today around the world are deprived of an education. More than 78 million of those are female. He recalled an African proverb he learned as a child that says, “If you educate a boy, you educate an individual; but if you educate a girl, you educate a community.” He added that if we do not educate girls, nothing will change in a society. More specifically, Mr. Mortenson emphasized the criticality of educating girls up to just a fifth grade level in order to achieve the desirable cultural changes. This factor is important to recognize as it delimits both the needed capacity and educational level of attainment to be supported initially.

He clearly wanted his listeners to understand that it is essential to encourage people to determine their own destiny. Too often, he said, we try to help people instead of empower them. He drew a clear distinction between helping and empowering, candidly admitting that empowering takes risk; it takes trust. In addition, the effort is complex. He spoke of arriving back in Afghanistan to build his first school and the villagers saying, “You know, if you really want to build a school, you have to build a bridge first.” He had not calculated that into the task.

As the school project took shape, he found himself at odds with his hosts over what he admitted was his micro-managing habit. He quoted the admonition of a village elder: “sit down, be quiet, and let us do the work.” He came to learn such an approach ensures local investment in the project at hand and a sense of ownership; the result was villagers taking steps to prevent insurgents from destroying schools and harming the students and their teachers.
Since that first school, Mr. Mortenson’s efforts have expanded in support of educational initiatives in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, with particular emphasis on the creation of opportunities for girls to attend school and the construction of some 131 schools over the past 15 years.

In places like Afghanistan where traditional social structures are threatened by decades of violence and war, education reduces the sense of alienation within the youth by building and reinforcing bonds with the history, folklore, and heritage of their cultural traditions. Such outcomes reinforce a sense of belonging that reduces the vulnerability of the young to the narratives of violent extremists.

The resulting stability then allows for the communication of the knowledge and skills necessary for each person, male or female, to develop the capacity to identify, understand, and solve problems. The consequence, of course, is the opportunity for each individual to participate in providing a better quality of life for themselves, their families, villages, districts, provinces, and country.

Returning to his theme of creating educational opportunities for both males and females, Mr. Mortenson outlined several concrete consequences that emerge from educating girls: a reduction in the infant mortality rate, a slowing of the population explosion, the general improvement in the quality of life, and the sharing of the education with mothers and others.

He noted a huge Taliban fear of educated girls and that since early 2007 (according to UNICEF), the Taliban have bombed, burned, or destroyed over 2,000 schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan (and about 80 percent or more are girls’ schools). Some of that is because educated females are less likely to encourage their sons and brothers to involve themselves in extremism and violence. At least two dozen of the teachers in his education programs—some of the strongest advocates for education—are former members of the Taliban. Most of them reintegrated into society because their mother said, “What you are doing is not a good thing.”

On the backdrop of the significant Taliban attacks on girls’ schools, Mr. Mortenson noted that Afghanistan has had one of the largest increases in school enrollment of any country in the last decade. According to UNESCO, in 2000 (before 9/11) about 800,000 (mostly boys) were in school in Afghanistan, and a decade later, 9 million children are in school there, including 2.8 million females. He said that very few people—including the media, political
leadership, the U.S. military, or the public—are aware of this increase, which he feels is the greatest achievement in Afghanistan over the last decade.

However, the stability that comes with education is fragile. After the Pakistani earthquake of 2005, some of the youth who were being educated entered refugee camps where they were quickly indoctrinated with extremist values. Much of that took place in camps that provided food and shelter, but were run by recognized terrorist organizations. Many of the young men and women involved in the Red Mosque Crisis of 2007 had come from the refugee camps where their ongoing education had been turned by radicalization.

He argued that continuity of individual presence is essential for establishing the kinds of stable relationships symbolized by the three cups of tea. Building on that principle, he outlined his father’s view of leadership that included the need to think and live outside the box, a willingness to take risks and not to be slowed by a fear of failure, the ability to act with respect and humility even while acknowledging inevitable differences, and the willingness to exercise patience in the pursuit of hard work toward a shared goal.

Mr. Mortenson concluded with the assertion, “I am convinced that the long-term solution to terrorism is education.”

Iran from the Inside

Mr. Maziar Bahari, Iranian-Canadian journalist, playwright, and filmmaker

Mr. Bahari opened his remarks by stating that Iran is confusing and confused at the same time. He presented two overarching and interrelated themes: a) Iran is shifting from a theocracy to a military dictatorship and b) a large gap between the elites and the masses, which has occurred over time, has led to tension and conflict.

To better understand how these themes have happened, Mr. Bahari retraced Iranian politics from 1920 through the 1979 revolution, then to the present day. He explained how Iranians view the U.S. and West and provided some suggestions on what these areas should do in regards to Iran. He also drew upon his personal experiences of having been in Iran during the 1979 revolution, the 12 June 2009 elections, the subsequent demonstrations, his arrest 9 days later, and the interrogation and torture he experienced while in prison for 118 days.
Beginning with the theme that Iran is shifting from a theocracy to a military dictatorship, Mr. Bahari stated that Iran is no longer a theocracy. Iran is in a transition period from a theocracy, but the transition period is the operative concept. He asserts that the Revolutionary Guard and the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, are trying to move Iran from a theocracy, in the form of a pseudo democracy, into a totalitarian state in which the Revolutionary Guard is in charge.

The Revolutionary Guard is led spiritually and practically by Ayatollah Khamenei, whose position in the Iranian constitution is described as the *supreme jurisprudence*, meaning that he is Allah’s representative on Earth. The Revolutionary Guard’s job is to deify him, listen to him, and basically empower him. Mr. Bahari stated that his own arrest and imprisonment also signified the shift from a pseudo democracy/theocracy into a military dictatorship.

To explain the transition into a military dictatorship, Mr. Bahari retraced Iranian political history starting with 1920. At that time Iran was in chaos, with little or no security. Reza Shah came to power with the backing of the Iranian military, promising the people security and rule of law. He became the King within 5 years and established a kind of military dictatorship. He started to modernize Iran, but in terms of a very elite group of society—that is, he sent some young people from the middle classes to the West and began creating an elite sector of the society without regard for the demands of the illiterate, religious, and traditional masses. In 1941, the allies occupied Iran and forced Reza Shah to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. He continued his father’s mission to modernize Iran, but only in very superficial ways within the upper layers of society. Consequently, the gap between the elites and the masses remained.

In 1953, with the backing of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a coup occurred in Iran and the Shah’s power was reinstated. The Shah began to establish a military dictatorship again, moved Iran towards a totalitarian state, and continued with his attempts to modernize Iran. However, the modernization accomplished from 1920 to 1979 was only to widen the gap between the elites and masses. In 1979 the religious and traditional masses erupted, resulting in the Iranian revolution and the establishment of the revolutionary government.

The new leadership characterized earlier attempts to modernize Iran as the decadent westernization of Iran, the de-Islamization of Iran. Thus
they started to Islamize Iran. Mr. Bahari asserts that the revolutionaries committed a misstep for their agenda by empowering women. During the Shah’s time, many women from traditional and religious families could not take part in society because their families considered the society non-Islamic. Consequently they did not dare to send the women in their families to be educated. After the revolution, however, the government opened free universities all over Iran, and women began their education.

Women also began to participate in different sectors of society, to include employment within the government. Mr. Bahari noted that Iran now has female entrepreneurs, and 65 percent of the university students in Iran are women. However, only 15 percent of the workforce is female.

This grassroots modernization happened since the Iranian revolution, but the gap between the elites and masses remained until 10 years ago when the Internet and satellite television were introduced and started to narrow the gap. The combination of education and access to greater information started to influence the thinking of the masses.

Leading up to the June 2009 elections, it was apparent to all that Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader, favored Ahmadinejad for president. Supporters of Ahmadinejad predicted a 25 million vote margin of victory. In spite of such obstacles, however, reformist candidates, mainly Mir-Hossein and Mehdi Karrubi, entered the electoral process.

During Mr. Bahari’s travel throughout Iran in advance of the elections, he saw that the presence of different candidates created a euphoric and vibrant atmosphere in Iran. A clear desire for change emerged from the educated people of the middle and upper classes in urban areas. People had grown tired of the Ahmadinejad government, of suffering economically in spite of rising oil prices, and of being regarded as pariahs by the international community. Ahmadinejad still had his supporters among the less educated, more traditional, and more religious sectors of society. However, the gap was narrowing, and the Revolutionary Guard and security apparatus were scared.

The election took place on 12 June 2009. Not surprisingly, Ahmadinejad won by the predicted 25 million votes. Millions of people took to the streets almost immediately. Recalling his 1979 experiences when millions of people took to the streets demanding the removal of the Shah, Mr. Bahari noted the contrast this time when the people were asking, “Where is my vote?” Millions were asking, “Where are my rights as citizens of this country?”
As a consequence of this public outcry, many people were arrested. On 21 June, Mr. Bahari found himself among the incarcerated. In his first interrogation, the Revolutionary Guards said that they “knew” he was working for four intelligence agencies. When he asked them which ones, they replied: MI-6, Mossad, CIA, and Newsweek. When Mr. Bahari challenged them to produce the evidence, they said they were going to show it to the judge, and “we are going to sentence you too.” The sentence for espionage in Iran is death.

When Mr. Bahari went to prison, he was not aware of any scenario that the Revolutionary Guard may have prepared prior to the elections. However, it became quickly apparent to him that the Revolutionary Guard was following some sort of script that Ahmadinejad would win reelection, the Revolutionary Guard would consolidate power, and reformist opposition (which could be connected to outside interference) would emerge.

As an unwitting participant and obvious victim of this scenario, Mr. Bahari was pressured through interrogation and torture to “admit” that he was the media connection between the intrusive West, the “great Satan,” and the reformists. While in prison, Mr. Bahari realized how evil the Revolutionary Guard can be; how ignorant they are; and, at the same time, how in touch they are with the masses in Iran, including the traditional and religious sectors. As an example, the Revolutionary Guard went through his Facebook page and mobile phone; they asked him if he had sexual relations with each female contact they were able to find. Mr. Bahari noted that, in hindsight, it was funny—that is, talking with an interrogator who was so ignorant.

It was clear that the interrogator and his colleagues had no knowledge beyond that taught by their teachers and those around them. The Revolutionary Guard’s treatment of Mr. Bahari reflected the very narrow and misinformed image that the interrogator, and by extension, the regime have of the West and the rest of the world. The interrogator was also part of an establishment that is currently in charge of Iran. That establishment, the Revolutionary Guard, is not only the largest military force in Iran but also functions as the country’s most influential industrialists, acts as major smugglers, and manages Iran’s nuclear program.

Mr. Bahari was eventually released from prison after 118 days as a result of an international campaign of support. His prison guards called him “Mr. Hillary Clinton” because she had mentioned his name as she and others applied pressure for his release. In retrospect, Mr. Bahari views the Revolutionary Guard as attempting to consolidate power and bring all strategic
sectors within Iran under their control, to include the nuclear program, telecommunications, and foreign policy.

Mr. Bahari warned that the West, especially the U.S., needs to know they are dealing with a mighty power—savvy and quite ambitious. The Iranian leadership contains intelligent people, but as an organization they are quite ignorant and paranoid about the rest of the world. Part of the paranoia is real because, as one Iranian Intelligence officer told him, “Wouldn’t the United States be paranoid if Iran had put 200,000 troops in Canada and Mexico, as is the case with American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan?”

Mr. Bahari asserted that paranoia and anti-Americanism are part and parcel of the Iranian revolutionaries’ existence. He noted that the Bush administration’s rhetoric and tone fit precisely into the Iranian paradigm of the United States, and the Iranians could relate to it. However, Mr. Bahari noted that one of his interrogators told him no one has done more damage to the Revolutionary Guard than President Barack Obama when he delivered a message extending his “blessing on the occasion of the Iranian New Year” to both the people and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Further, President Obama’s act of extending his hand to Iran and asking for cooperation dumbfounded the Revolutionary Guard because they did not know how to deal with such initiatives that do not fit the traditional anti-Western paradigm. Mr. Bahari believes that, in general, the United States is on the right track in dealing with Iran.

When Mr. Bahari returned to the West (Canadian citizen) he was asked by many people, including Hillary Clinton, “What should we do about Iran?” His answer to everyone is that the West has to invest in closing the gap between the elites and the masses. He believes that narrowing the gap would result in better relations between Iran and the rest of the world; he added, “do it out of the goodness of your heart because it is a real pragmatic investment in Iran.”

The follow-on question is, How should we do that? According to Mr. Bahari, the answer is simple: Invest in the free flow of information between Iran and the rest of the world through satellite Internet connections, satellite television, and the digital subscriber line (DSL) connection between Iran, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In regards to pursuing sanctions against Iran, Mr. Bahari cautioned that sanctions should be avoided because they can hurt ordinary Iranians and shrink the middle class. These
people form the bridge between the elites and masses and also provide the leadership for the opposition.

**Transnational Crime and International Collaboration**

Dr. Richard A. Falkenrath, Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism, New York Police Department

Dr. Falkenrath’s presentation provided a comprehensive overview of a local law enforcement agency’s efforts, in this case the New York Police Department (NYPD), to protect the city from terrorist attacks. He began by describing the New York operating environment to include the city, the NYPD, and the threat they face. He then presented a comprehensive overview of the programs that New York and the NYPD have in place to counter the threat and protect the city.

Throughout his remarks, Dr. Falkenrath incorporated several overarching themes: the focus on the mission to protect the city, New York City’s continuing status as a terrorist target, the NYPD’s organizational agility to respond to new and evolving threats, the ongoing cooperation among local and federal law enforcement agencies, extended relationships with the interagency and international communities, and outreach programs to the business and industrial sectors.

New York City is the largest metropolitan area in the United States with 8.3 million residents in the city itself and 18 million more in the surrounding areas. It has by far the largest mass transit system in North America, with 8 million people who ride the rail lines and another 5 million who ride buses or ferries every day. Two thirds of the nation’s total amount of mass transit track and four fifths of the total number of stations are located in New York City.

The transit system is viewed as one of the major targets within the extensive metropolitan area. The NYPD employs about 54,000 people, of whom 35,000 are sworn personnel, mostly in the rank of police officer and detective. The NYPD is a very hierarchical and somewhat bureaucratic organization led by a five-star police commissioner. However, it is a nimble organization. The police commissioner has executive authority by which he can literally create and destroy, reorganize, promote, demote, and transfer instantaneously when he needs to. This autonomy allows the commissioner to set and adjust the course of the NYPD’s functioning in ways that are usually not possible...
in other public and private organizations. This flexibility was essential for creating the structures that New York City has put in place since the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center.

The NYPD is organized by precincts, specifically 76 in eight boroughs. The smallest precinct is bigger than the average police department, about 200 sworn personnel, in the United States. A problem, Dr. Falkenrath said, is the fragmented nature of American police departments that makes it very difficult to scale, aggregate the force swiftly, and protect the people. As an example, the United States has 18,000 law enforcement agencies, and Miami alone has 32 different police departments.

With the size and structure of the NYPD, they are able to scale and amass resources in a way that is basically impossible for others. The NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau has 350 personnel, but on a daily basis it takes control of about 1,000 police officers for use in a counterterrorism capacity. The NYPD also possesses exceptional language capabilities. They have more than 400 sworn personnel who are fluent in key languages—Pashtu, Urdu, Farsi, Dari, and Arabic—in addition to several thousand police officers who speak Spanish.

Turning to the threat, Dr. Falkenrath stated that New York City, unlike most of the country, still feels itself to be under threat of terrorist attack. No city in America has been attacked with more devastating effect than New York City, and no city in America has been targeted as frequently. New York is concerned with many threats. These range from remnants of core Al Qaeda operating out of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region in Pakistan, to Al Qaeda affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa, to regional groups that export their activities abroad to the U.S., and finally to homegrown terrorists who spring up with no real international connection.

The threat to New York City, however, is not new. Prior to the September 2001 attacks, in fact as early as 1990, seven major plots were directed against the city that, in retrospect, were all in some way connected. These plots included the 1993 World Trade Center attack to bring down the towers with a truck bomb, the Landmark Plot led by the Blind Sheikh, an attack on Hassidic Jews, the shooting at the Empire State Building, and the Atlantic Subway Plot in 1997 when the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team kicked down the door and literally caught extremists in the act of building and assembling weapons.
Dr. Falkenrath estimates that about 12 significant plots have occurred against New York City since 9/11. These plots include the following:

a. Khalid Sheik Mohammed targeting the Brooklyn Bridge using an operative out of Ohio
b. Mubtakkar Plot using an improvised cyanide chemical weapons device
c. Eissa al-Hindi casing the financial sector in 2004
d. Plot to blow up the Herald Square Subway prior to the Republican National Convention
e. Operation Pathway that targeted one of the subway tunnels under the Hudson River
f. Plot out of the United Kingdom to attack the JFK Airport pipeline system using liquid explosives (Operation Overt)
g. Plot to attack two synagogues in Riverdale
h. Plot by Najibullah Zazi to bring explosive material into New York City from Denver, create three suicide vests, and use them to attack the subway.

Dr. Falkenrath concluded his remarks regarding the threat by stating that New Yorkers think they are continually under attack, and the people of New York assume they are going to remain at the top of the terrorist targeting list. And even as the rest of the country—and even some in New York City—begin to relax and feel themselves more secure, the NYPD believe it is their responsibility to be vigilant and extremely aggressive in countering these efforts.

Before continuing with the programs that the NYPD has to counter terrorist threats, Dr. Falkenrath explained an important differentiation between American local and federal law enforcement. In America, the federal government has only those powers expressly given to it by law or the Constitution and are, in fact, quite limited when it comes to internal security. By contrast, in matters of external security, foreign affairs, and military operations, the federal government is supreme.

Law enforcement operates under plenary police power, which means at the local level all the other powers that are not assigned to the federal government reside at the local level, thus providing law enforcement with a wide breadth of action. Dr. Falkenrath described a system by which police can “work across many different fronts, take action directly with the community,
with individuals, with business, with the streets, with the subway system that our federal authorities/partners cannot do.”

Conversely, the federal partners can do very specific things, thus it is important to work together. The dilemma is that most local governments in America are very small, very fragmented, and not highly focused on extreme threats. So what you have with the NYPD is a very unusual circumstance where you combine an agency on the scale of a federal department with substantial legal authority to act inside its own borders, making for a powerful combination.

Dr. Falkenrath then explained the programs that the NYPD has in place to deal with all stages of the terrorist attack cycle: the preoperational, operational, and post attack. These programs fall under one of two bureaus—that is, either the Counterterrorism Bureau or the Intelligence Division, which is his close counterpart. The Intelligence Division also has a deputy commissioner in-charge.

He discussed the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) that serves as the venue through which the federal government investigates, coordinates, and deconflicts its most important domestic and international terrorism cases. The JTTF has approximately 130 NYPD officers who are all deputy U.S. Marshalls and who investigate terrorism under federal authority. Of the 130, about 110 are in a New York City field office. Other officers are assigned to Newark, Albany, New Haven, and four different units of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). An additional five NYPD officers serve on the 9/11 prosecutorial task force. They also routinely deploy abroad, particularly to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and East Africa to support forensics, apprehensions, and extraditions.

Dr. Falkenrath also discussed the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative. This program relies on a network of surveillance systems within the city using closed-circuit television, automated license plate readers, and radiation sensors. It is linked together through a half-billion dollar wireless network and a $100 million wired fiber-optic network into a data center with an analytic engine that drives it into a single-view geographic information system. Those monitoring the system can operate and trigger patrol responses whenever they get alerts. Interestingly, they operate the system jointly, in certain respects, with components of the public and private sectors to include coordination centers with all the major banks, the UN, the Metropolitan Transit Authority, and the Port Authority.
Also under Dr. Falkenrath’s command is the Counterterrorism Deployment Initiative. Through this program, the Counterterrorism Bureau can temporarily deploy additional police officers to areas that terrorists may be interested in attacking such as subway stations, banks, theaters, iconic landmarks, and religious institutions. Its purpose is to be very visible, using large quantities of cars, sirens, lights, heavy weapons, dogs, checkpoints, and radiation sensors. They know that the terrorists are not afraid of being captured or killed, but what they do not want to do is to fail. Thus the Counterterrorism Deployment Initiative seeks to influence the terrorists in their targeting selections by affecting and reinforcing their perceptions of New York City as a difficult and high-risk target for them.

The Counterterrorism Bureau also has training programs for both the NYPD and the private sector. They run a training unit for the NYPD that provides advanced courses in counterterrorism operations and some basic courses, like how to run a vehicle checkpoint. On the private sector side, they run an outreach program to provide information to enhance corporate security. They hold conferences and maintain a Web site for sharing information. Additionally, NYPD officers regularly visit businesses that sell dual-use products and encourage them to report suspicious individuals who come along and attempt to buy something seemingly innocent that could be dangerous in other uses.

As an example, Najibullah Zazi was buying lots of concentrated hydrogen peroxide in Denver, but nobody called the authorities. Dr. Falkenrath surmised that, had this behavior occurred in New York, someone would have reported it. However, he maintained that the odds are substantially higher it would have been reported in New York because everyone there who sells such dual-use material is repeatedly visited by members of the NYPD who advise them what to look out for and whom to call to report the unusual purchase.

The NYPD also runs an International Liaison Program that attracts a lot of attention. NYPD detectives are assigned in 11 cities around the world in nine different countries. These countries include Abu Dhabi, Canada, the Dominican Republic, the United Kingdom, France, Singapore, Jordan, Israel, and Spain. They also have an initiative where engineers assess buildings and determine structural vulnerabilities. From this information they can develop corrective actions to address assessed vulnerabilities and issue guidelines to the builders of new facilities on how to construct them more
securely. They have become so proficient that they wrote a book entitled *Engineering Security*.

The last two programs Dr. Falkenrath discussed concern biological and radiological weapons. These programs address the most extreme scenario New York City could face. On the biological side, the NYPD runs Bio-Watch. This program is part of a federal initiative and operates as a network of atmospheric sensors that sample the air every day and look for evidence of a number of different pathogens of concern. In conjunction with Bio-Watch, NYPD has also developed response and contingency plans should such an attack develop.

On the radiological side, Dr. Falkenrath believes that if terrorists obtain a nuclear weapon, nuclear material, or a “dirty” bomb, New York City would be a likely target. Even a low-grade dirty bomb would be devastating, not so much because of immediate casualties but because of area denial. Again working with the federal government, NYPD has procured numerous sensors and on any given day has literally thousands of very sophisticated radiation sensors out on patrol, on the hips of police officers, and mounted on cars, trucks, boats, and aircraft. The readings are linked through the NYPD wireless network and are closely monitored in the coordination center.

In concluding his remarks, Dr. Falkenrath returned to the over-arching threat facing New York City, the threat upon which each of these programs is focused. The NYPD’s counterterrorism efforts would not be possible if the department was not so large, thus allowing them to specialize through a variety of programs. They would also not be successful if the NYPD had not been so proficient in its main line of business, which is crime reduction.

Dr. Falkenrath believes that New York City is, by far, the safest big city in America and that the city’s counterterrorism efforts are possible because the people of the city and the region still feel like they are under the threat of attack. As a result, the mayor and the police commissioner decided they were going to conduct major counterterrorism operations and to pay the inevitably high price for building this sort of comprehensive program to secure the city and the people who live, work, and visit there.
Keynote Address

Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander of USSOCOM

Admiral Olson is the senior special operations commander and the eighth USSOCOM commander. He began his address by identifying the value and purpose of the Sovereign Challenge Program, then provided his insights on extremist threats and challenges to nations’ sovereignty and, in conclusion, returned to how the Sovereign Challenge Program can counter those threats and challenges.

In Admiral Olson’s opening remarks, he stated that most of the value from Sovereign Challenge is from the interaction amongst participants that leads to a better understanding of the world and assists in identifying the problems we face. This understanding of each others’ perspectives leads to an increased potential for solutions in future engagements.

He also emphasized that Sovereign Challenge is more about international challenges that affect everyone and less about U.S. challenges. Discussions are not limited to a traditional view of territorial sovereignty; they also address other aspects of sovereignty such as economic and cultural concerns. He pointed out that Sovereign Challenge is not simply an annual event; it is happening year round and represents a unique approach to military cooperation.

In addressing threats, Admiral Olson reported that USSOCOM has developed a way of thinking about and forecasting future world conditions that looks at trends, linkages, migrations, and the effects they have on globalism, crime, violent extremism, and resource competition. Today cultures are increasingly intertwined by technologies. As an example, he stated that this year marks the sixth anniversary of Facebook and encouraged the attendees to consider the effects that this social networking tool has had beyond the unpredictable impacts of emerging technologies, particularly in regards to a nation’s sovereignty.

Admiral Olson listed a few examples where the repercussions and effects are not necessarily limited by borders: the Haiti earthquake, current events in Iran and Afghanistan, and drug users in the world who provide sustenance to crime. All these are sovereignty issues. Admiral Olson stressed the importance of an international and interagency approach because foes are unlikely to surrender. Building upon this principle, he noted that governments and militaries have fought good fights, but the successes made may
not last. He cited the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), African Standby Force (ASF), and Tamil Tigers as examples of threats that could reemerge like the Taliban have without international and interagency approaches to sustaining success.

Looking to the future and the role of Sovereign Challenge, Admiral Olson drew on the past, using President Harry S. Truman as an example. President Truman was an unassuming man who emerged from the shadow of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Upon assuming the presidency, he could have withdrawn the United States from the international arena after World War II. Instead he developed the Truman Doctrine and implemented the Marshall Plan, both of which contributed to the preemption of potential security threats to nations devastated by conflict.

Admiral Olson asked the audience whether we need a new Marshall Plan today, but acknowledged that there may not be another. So what can we do in the absence of such an initiative today? What can we do to optimize leadership and fight oppression, transnational crime, poverty, and violence?

In the end, it comes down to people of courage and vision, perhaps unassuming people, the people who are in the room. We will be challenged by emerging nonstate actors, especially in weak and failed states, who have the capacity to provide some level of services to the people to include courts, schools, and security. With multiple players competing for the allegiance of populations, the people will be forced to make choices. Again drawing upon the past, the admiral noted what President John F. Kennedy stated: pure military skill is not enough; civil and military action must be blended to achieve success.

Admiral Olson concluded by saying one thing is certain: the nature of the battlefield—characterized by terms such as counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and irregular warfare—and pure military skills will be essential, but never enough. It is the indirect approaches that have the greatest effects.

**The Diplomat and Soldier**

Ambassador Dell Dailey, former Department of State Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Ambassador Dailey began his comments by reminding the audience of numerous active threats to traditional notions of sovereignty as understood within the familiar nation-state structure. Given the ongoing battle
of ideas being waged globally, nations frequently find themselves in a fight for the allegiance of their own people. Within what has become an ongoing battle of ideas, the success of both extremist and criminal organizations is dependent on the willingness of people to forsake their national identities and allegiance to their own governments.

In a world where various parties are competing for strategic influence over populations, the ambassador identified three requirements for governments to maintain credibility in the eyes of their citizens: provide credible security, stimulate economic development, and focus on the needs of individual citizens. If governments fail to meet one or more of these responsibilities, individuals now have access to alternatives who stand ready to step in and fill any gaps.

He said that the new global individual is more likely to be influenced by economic rather than the political or security components of governance. Thus organizations like Hezbollah, who practice violence and align themselves with narcoterrorists and arms traffickers, have a strong reputation for taking care of the population at home. In fact, in Lebanon, Hezbollah is viewed as a legitimate political party with a powerful local militia.

Within this complexity, the ambassador acknowledged that “your ability as professional soldiers to advise your national leadership has grown far more difficult.” Interestingly, Ambassador Dailey argued that extremist and criminal organizations seek the continuation of the nation state, but in a weakened condition for gaining freedom of action. Such groups “don’t want to run countries, just to influence populations decisively.” Such a population-centric approach confirms the role of the people as key terrain within the contemporary security environment.

Transnational criminal organizations seek to destabilize governments through bribery, intimidation, and murder. Such initiatives create doubts and mistrust among the populations and undermine the credibility of the legitimate government. To create the necessary instability, the ambassador warned that both extremists and criminals seek to eliminate moderate voices who pose the greatest threats to their political and economic agendas. By using all means to eliminate those voices, the extremists are then free to gain more influence and create more followers through a general radicalization of the population.

He said that the perfect storm involves the melding of both extremist and criminal organizations. Citing several national and international examples,
the ambassador argued that cooperation among nations is essential to stem the influence of those extremists and criminals. A common trait among successful efforts he addressed is “their willingness to reach out to neighbors and friends across the region and the globe for help.” This means that nations find themselves taking an increasing interest in the success or failure of other countries facing similar threats.

This assertion is consistent with the observation of Mr. Schrager at the opening session: “Everything is related; nothing stands alone.” Countries must be willing to understand and to assist in the solving of other countries’ problems. The ambassador went on to suggest that intelligence sharing can be the most powerful connector between nations. Ways must be developed to maximize the quality of the intelligence structure to address issues of content and sharing.

Ambassador Dailey also addressed the issue of what to call the current counterterrorism effort. He acknowledged that the phrase, war on terror, does not translate well into international understanding. However, he argued that the reference to war is consistent both with American culture and past campaigns against conditions such as poverty and drugs, an emotional appeal for citizens to work together against shared threats. Warfare terminology is useful for communicating the involvement with all instruments of national power to include the economic, diplomatic, informational, and military components directed, in this case, against the threats of extremism.

He extended the concept of a full intergovernmental, integrated effort into the international arena by asserting that the UN has taken an aggressive and successful stance with regards to counterterrorism. He noted an implementation committee is active in ensuring compliance with relevant UN resolutions that have few enforcement provisions included. He cited several examples of when UN efforts have addressed important concerns and said, “I am kind of a proponent of the UN.”

The ambassador noted that frequently regional organizations have launched important initiatives in areas of counterterrorism training, especially financial controls, “kinetic stuff,” intelligence collection, and law enforcement. He welcomed these efforts because they take ownership of their international relationships in cross-border situations.

In a response to a question from the audience, Ambassador Dailey recognized the complexity of deciding whether to focus on the prevention of terrorism or the destruction of the terrorists themselves after the fact. He
acknowledged that prevention buys us a small bit of time. He listed several relevant tasks such as finance, international travel, communications, and the disruption of logistics, training, and recruiting.

The ambassador then noted that kinetic action takes out some of the leadership and also buys time. But he argued that real prevention comes on the ideological side. The voice of moderation must be clear and strong. Success requires a coordinated international effort to address the needs of the people and their educational and information requirements.

He sounded a theme heard from others during the conference that strategic communication is probably not going as well as it should. Because of the complexities we encounter, our messages are not as nuanced as is necessary. Additionally, our actions do not always appear consistent with our rhetoric, thus undermining our credibility.

In conclusion, the ambassador said he believes the future of our world community will rest on the ability of individual nation states to find the willingness to cooperate with one another for their common good.

**International Justice**

Judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere, Vice President of Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris

Judge Bruguiere sounded a recurring conference theme by saying that because the threat to nations is scattered and globalized, international cooperation is essential to counterterrorism efforts. He went on to argue that counterterrorism requires real political will and ethical legal means.

He made it clear that both domestic and international cooperation must incorporate the capabilities of all government agencies to include, among others, the military, intelligence organizations, law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary. As part of this shared effort, it is important that the various publics are informed about what is being done on their behalf to guard against terrorism and what they can do to assist authorities in the common effort.

He asserted that the effort against terrorism is everybody’s fight, and effective counterterrorism strategies must reflect a clear understanding of the workings of contemporary terrorist organizations. Central to this understanding is an active awareness that Al Qaeda pursues a constantly evolving strategy against the U.S. and other countries, which is supported by both individuals and cells that share the same conception of global jihad.
Such individuals, cells, and even networks are scattered about and generally function in the absence of any central command direction. It is a virus phenomenon that is very difficult to grasp.

Drawing on his own extensive background, including the reminder that “I arrested Carlos the Jackal,” he reported that the French response to terrorism has been judicial in nature and intended to promote a proactive strategy aiming at disrupting in advance any attempt at terrorist attacks. The judge described a system that is primarily focused on legal issues and closely connected with the various intelligence services that play central roles. He cites the fact that no major terrorist attack has taken place in France since 1996 as evidence that rule of law and order strategies have proven effective in combating terrorism. A French White Paper established a specific doctrine for addressing domestic security threats from terrorism.

The French doctrine establishes a three-fold goal:

a. Understand the workings of terrorist groups, to include an awareness of how such organizations rely on networks already in place in European countries to increase operational effectiveness.

b. Define a counterterrorism strategy that is adapted to the current threat, focusing on the communication and other technologies they employ to increase the efficiency of their networks.

c. Clearly explain to the population about the nature of the threat and what measures are in place to protect them. Credibility and public confidence are important components of the counterterrorism doctrine.

The judge presented a detailed survey of various terrorist incidents and suggested that Al Qaeda presents itself like a jigsaw puzzle—that is, challenges counterterrorism professionals to put pieces together in order to gain a clear understanding of what is going on. He reminded the attendees that often it is the small, apparently trivial sign lost in the avalanche of data that forewarns of a coming threat. He emphasized repeatedly the importance of human resources as a means of getting “inside the mind of a terrorist,” a capability not provided by satellites and other forms of remote technology.

He traced extremist activities in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, the Arabian Gulf, the Maghreb, the Russian Caucasus, and Central Asia. “In fact,” he said, “no region in the world today is spared the Islamic threat.” He reported ominously that new recruits are much more radical than their
elders, meaning that many of them are excellent candidates to act as suicide bombers. He warned that the prospects of suicide bombers in Western Europe are not mere speculation.

Speaking broadly about the importance of judicial solutions, Judge Bruguiere said that it is essential to provide the judiciary with sufficient legal tools. He argued strongly that carrying out the task of counterterrorism within the framework of the law is an adamant requirement. There is neither actual opposition nor any discrepancy between seeking efficiency and following the law.

The judge warned the international community to beware of falling into Osama bin Laden’s trap by overreacting to escalating terrorist violence by behaving in ways counter to our basic values and/or violating existing law.

He spoke of the need for proactive policies based on the prosecutor’s ability to anticipate all aspects of terrorist activity. More specifically, he identified the creation of self-contained structures that allow for centralized investigation, prosecution, and resolution of terrorist cases as important to a credible legal system. Strong linkages among law enforcement, intelligence resources, and the judiciary are also essential. During breakout group discussions, participants cited examples of their experiences with such centralized structures.

In response to questions from attendees, the judge noted that proper legislation must be extensively researched and carefully crafted to meet the unique requirements of terrorism prosecutions. After all, “there is no crime without a law” in place.

During a discussion of the viability of relying on international legal structures to address terrorism, the judge expressed concern, saying it would be difficult in the absence of definitions, legal standards for evidence and proof, and appropriate frameworks for moving forward. Such an unknowable environment leads to a lack of certainty that would inevitably cripple an international judiciary system. There are also sovereignty issues embedded in the decisions of nations to yield prosecutorial authority over terrorist cases to an international body.
The Internationalization of the Campaign Against Al Qaeda

Dr. Walid Phares, Director of Future Terrorism Project

Dr. Phares launched his spirited presentation by identifying the need to be able to detect the long-range evolution of movements beyond 6 months. In doing so, it is important to pay attention to the cultural nuances of what is going on to detect signs that might indicate the initiation or reemergence of terrorist activities. He identified the central challenge as follows: “How can we construct an international platform, the widest international platform, against the narrowest enemy, which is Al Qaeda?”

Dr. Phares spoke of the importance of understanding how terrorists threaten national governments, civil society, national territorial unity, and the political system of a country. Given the complexity of the environment and the challenge, he sounded the familiar call for a well-coordinated international effort. He spoke candidly, however, on how nations who understandably look out for their own interests limit the effectiveness of international efforts. In many cases, the “terrorist against my friend is not my terrorist.” He then surveyed a variety of examples that reflect the following forms of these limitations:

a. When Country A is not threatened by the terrorist organization threatening Country B, why should I consider it as a threat if it does not threaten me.

b. Country A recognizes an organization as a legitimate political group, while Country B considers it to be a terrorist organization.

c. Country A sympathizes with the cause of the terrorist group of another country.

Despite that complexity and the normal process of looking out for one’s own interests, Dr. Phares noted that nations occasionally arrive at a consensus to act against a threat. These exceptional cases are rare, however.

With specific regard to Al Qaeda, Dr. Phares said that its global goal is nebulous. However, he offered several specific objectives the organization seeks:

a. Bring down 21 Arab governments.

b. End outside support to Arab or Muslim countries to undermine their stability and increase their vulnerability to Al Qaeda initiatives.
c. Establish Taliban-like radical emirates.
d. Create a federation of these emirates.
e. Acquire and control nuclear power.
f. Engage in subversion against the rest of the international community.

What is going on, argues Dr. Phares, is not a clash of civilizations, though Al Qaeda as a movement is designed to spark such a conflict. While identifying the goals of Al Qaeda’s global strategy, he echoed the comments of Judge Bruguiere by warning that the rest of the world should not rush to help Al Qaeda either through our rhetoric, over-reaction, or insufficient response.

Dr. Phares also spoke of the powerful propaganda capabilities available to Al Qaeda and the organization’s ability to build narratives for supporting their activities in a specific country or region and then to shift those narratives and employ them elsewhere. He noted that a careful observer could identify similarities in the attacks against various existing governments, employing similar words, slogans, and terminology.

He was clear in stating that Al Qaeda is “not a reaction to” anything, but rather has developed a clear agenda and is about the business of imposing that agenda upon various areas of the world. What emerges is a pattern whereby Al Qaeda strikes at soft or vulnerable targets in the hopes of creating instability and regional collapse. Consequently, Dr. Phares argued that Al Qaeda’s strategic goals must be matched by regional and international cooperation to present a united front. He cited as an example the inability of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India to arrive at a regional approach for countering Al Qaeda and its surrogates as major threats to regional stability.

Dr. Phares shared his view of the scenarios for potential Al Qaeda successes in various regions of the world. For instance, he outlined a program of urban warfare in Western Europe, drawing support from those affected by preexisting social problems to force political change. He also identified the Tri-Border Area of South America as a region of major concern. He was particularly adamant in asserting that Saudi Arabia cannot be allowed to fall because the effects of such an outcome would be felt around the world.

As he concluded, Dr. Phares highlighted four imperatives (the third being the most difficult):

a. Need to develop a consensus on an international network—no consensus, no advances.
b. Need to ensure international support for national efforts against terrorism—no country fighting terrorism should be fighting it alone.
c. Need to unify efforts against terrorism in regional conflicts.
d. Need to support moderates and coordinate strategic communication efforts.

He then outlined the components of a global campaign against terrorism:

a. Conduct cooperation and joint exercises among the major powers.
b. Increase the internationalization of the counterterrorism battlefield.
c. Increase legal and policy coordination worldwide.
d. Develop and execute a comprehensive strategic communication plan.

During the question-and-answer period, Dr. Phares returned to the education themes first raised by Mr. Mortenson and revisited throughout the conference. While acknowledging a war of ideas, he became more specific by describing a battle of education with the goal of affecting young children. He emphasized the fact that mothers have the greatest influence upon the next generation, followed by their teachers. Thus it is essential that education strategies be developed and implemented to support the entire international counterterrorism campaign.

**The Captivity Experience**

Mr. Thomas Howes, former FARC hostage

Mr. Howes presented a narrative of the compelling and extraordinary experiences of his captivity and victimization at the hands of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) terrorist organization in the jungles and mountains of Colombia. He was their captive for 1,967 days, until his liberation in a daring rescue mission. Additionally, his accounts of his long ordeal and sustained close contact with FARC members provided unique insight into FARC recruitment, motivation, organization, and operating procedures.

The presentation began with Mr. Howes expressing gratitude to a few special groups. He first thanked the U.S. military for their effort over the years in trying to locate and rescue him and for a reintegration program that assisted him in rejoining society. Mr. Howes noted that he thought it would take him about 3 weeks to adjust when in actuality it took him 1.5
years. He then thanked the Colombians and the Colombian military for the rescue mission, without which he felt confident he would be sitting right now with a chain around his neck in the jungles of Colombia. The last group he recognized was the FARC kidnap victims who are still being held hostage today. These are people who had already been held hostage for 5 years when he was captured and today are approaching their twelfth year as hostages.

On the day of Mr. Howes’s capture, he was the copilot of a single-engine, light aircraft flying over the mountains of Colombia on a beautiful blue-sky day. In the aircraft with him were four other people: the pilot, Tommy Janis (retired Army Special Forces); a former Marine, Keith Stansell; former U.S. Air Force airman Marc Gonsalves; and a Colombian host rider, Sergeant Luis Alcides Cruz. The aircraft engine failed, and they began going through their emergency procedures with the looming prospect of dying in a crash.

Realizing they could not make it over the ridge to their destination, they located a postage-stamp-sized clearing on a mountain side and crash-landed the aircraft. During the crash-landing, Mr. Howes hit his head and lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness, he was standing and looking down the barrel of a gun—now a captive of the FARC. He soon learned that he had been strip-searched (before regaining consciousness) and his memory returned. Given the circumstances—that is, surviving the crash—Mr. Howes felt pretty good.

His experience as a FARC captive began with a 24-day march. Shortly after beginning the march, Tommy Janis, who was not injured in the crash and had his wits about him, and the Colombian host rider attempted to escape. Sadly, they were shot to death by their captors. The 24-day ordeal was brutal for Mr. Howes, but it was even worse for Keith Stansell, who had suffered a couple of broken ribs in the crash. They were not sure what type of terrorist unit they were dealing with, and since they had just shot two of their group, they expected they would shoot them if they could not keep up.

After days on the march, Mr. Stansell finally got to the point where he could no longer move. His digestive system was paralyzed, he was vomiting, had diarrhea, and could not eat. Mr. Stansell then said, “Okay, the game is over for me.” Mr. Howes noticed that a lot of the lower-level FARC members appeared to idolize Mr. Stansell, a big rugged former Marine. To demonstrate their macho styles and abilities, the FARC put him in a hammock and carried him, apparently not willing to let him die under any conditions.
At this point in the presentation, Mr. Howes momentarily shifted his focus away from the initial march to his opinions about the FARC, based upon his 5.5 years of living with them. He first clarified that, overall, the FARC is a terrorist organization; it acts like a cancer on Colombia and the region, and their narcotics activity reaches around the world. As with a cancer, Howes argued, “you don’t just cut out part of it. You cut it all out.”

It is his understanding that the organization started in the 1940s and 1950s, was a communist-inspired movement, and became the FARC in 1964. They started with some philosophy, some of which you can understand given the huge amount of poverty in the country and realizing that some activists begin looking to share the wealth and move people out of poverty. However, over time, the FARC became contaminated with criminal activity, including the murder of civilians, extortion, theft, and kidnapping. Eventually they realized they were the biggest illegal army in Colombia, sitting on top of a gold mine in the form of the biggest cocaine-production area in the world.

Mr. Howes said that he views the FARC not as an organization, but as individuals; it is an impression he developed from observations of and conversations with his FARC captors. His first observation was that we are all the same in our humanity. If you had taken a FARC member when he was a child and raised him in your own family (or a family from any of the nations represented at Sovereign Challenge), that person would be just like your son or daughter. As he identified, however, several ingredients transform those individuals into people susceptible to FARC recruitment:

a. First, most of the children come from poverty. He would see them play with things you would find beside any muddy river.

b. They also lack education. The children knew a lot about the jungle, but going to school was a second thought. One day Mr. Howes spent a frustrating afternoon trying to teach a bright street-smart child what the .6 was in 1.6, and that surprised him. It gave him a different vision of being ignorant.

c. Camaraderie and hunger, a daily hunger in the countryside, are two other ingredients. Mr. Howes juxtaposed this experience against a young FARC column patrolling through this child’s village. They possessed the ingredients that the other young man lacked. They were equipped with guns, rubber boots, backpacks, and bags of beans and rice.
Returning to the education ingredient, the FARC maintained a line of propaganda they fed their fighters. Combine the equipment, ideology, and prestige—available nowhere else—with the camaraderie and sense of adventure, and you can understand how young people could be drawn into the group.

If such recruiting methods did not work for the FARC, however, they could just say “We want you.” Because you are in a guerilla zone and they have the guns, what do you do? And then when this young man is in the group and is ordered to go out with his comrades and shoot somebody, he is not going to say “No, I would rather not.” He is going to do what the group does, and at this point he is a terrorist, a threat to the region and the world.

Returning to the initial march, Mr. Howes stated that when they left the aircraft, they dropped into another world. It was not long after crossing the creeks that the sand and water got into their tennis shoes and the skin started coming off the bottom of their feet. They marched day and night. It got to the point they were so exhausted, they could barely get one foot in front of the other. To Mr. Howes, it always seemed funny to be so worn out while being chased by the good guys; it was a good feeling, though, to know that at least the good guys were out there.

When they reached the first fixed camp, the captives soon realized the place was very sad. The FARC would put 30 or more people in a grim, tiny, and disgusting box with a roof on it. It was called board and a half in Spanish because each pair of people had a board and a half width to share. They shared the width with a hammock; one guy slept on the floor, the other in the hammock. Pigs were underneath the building, rats’ nests on top, and army ants, armored crickets, and various jungle insects passing through. Outside in the camp with the FARC was mud and rotting wood. It was a mucky, dead vegetation-type appearance with drainage ditches cut through the mud.

Mr. Howes noted that in some respects the marches were not that bad because you were too tired to think. When you got to the camps—in addition to the primitive conditions and questionable food—there was not a lot to do. He realized that mentally it could be more painful because your brain began to eat itself with, “Oh, my God, this does not look good.”

To pass time in camp, they would search for something to do, anything to pass the time. They would take a toothbrush and clean the tread of their boots, knowing full well that when they put them back on they would have to cross the mud to get to wherever they were going. The mundane activity
occupied their time. Mr. Howes also reflected upon how strong his sense of family became and how it kept him going. How would his family regard him—how would his son look at his behavior in captivity?

Over time the hostages developed a rapport with some of their guards. Mr. Howes recounts that at one point, one of the FARC commanders was furious because he appeared to sense that his men began to respect the prisoners more than they did their leader. He was furious, and you could die getting into a situation like that. While many of the guards had thought a good thing about their captives, they had to show the opposite. Knowing this was a great aid to the hostages—that is, in how they were treated and also brought an interest in collaboration from the guards.

Turning to the topic of escape, Mr. Howes stated that you obviously want to get out of the situation, but how do you get away when you are in the most remote, desolate part of the Colombian jungle? The jungle can be a bigger factor than the actual guards. There is not a lot to eat in the jungle, and navigation is difficult. Interestingly, many of the FARC members found themselves in a similar predicament. Mr. Howes thinks that a lot of the FARC members want to get out. However, when you are a member of the FARC, you sign up for life.

If a FARC member runs away and the FARC catch him, he is shot. If he gets to a village and it happens to be owned by the FARC, he is shot. If he gets lost in the jungle, they say tigers or whatever is out there will eat you. Even if you are able to run away, avoid getting run down and caught by the FARC, able to navigate and find your way to a village not owned by the terrorists, what does the FARC do? They spread the word that they will kill your family members and suddenly you are a slave for life. That is what the majority of the FARC are, kids who started out like anyone else’s kids, who are suddenly slaves for life in a terrorist organization because there is no place to go.

Concurrently with Mr. Howes’s captivity, the Colombian government was trying to sell reinsertion to the terrorists whereby terrorists would give themselves up and be reintegrated into society. The government offered incentives—for example, a reward for bringing in the hand for a FARC commander. However, every FARC commander was telling his men, “They’re going to kill you. When you reinsert, you’re dead. You can see they don’t go by their word.” Mr. Howes thinks that reinsertion has great potential, but
on top of all the fears and concerns they have about breaking away from the FARC, they have a fear of the government because of the propaganda that is pumped into them.

After numerous tales of adaptation and survival, Mr. Howes turned to the drama of the rescue. First of all, he had no idea of a rescue; it took him completely by surprise. It was mostly because his sense of normality involved being a prisoner. As events unfolded for him, the word was that the hostages would be moved and brought to a cocoa leaf picker’s brothel on the side of a river. The hostages were grouped together and heard helicopters overhead.

Up to that point, helicopters had meant good guys, thus that is what the hostages thought, which meant a risk to them—that is, the order was to massacre/kill the prisoners if there was no time to disappear into the jungle with them. The prisoners were then brought up to a barbed-wire fence near the helicopter, and they saw what they believed were humanitarian aid workers/nongovernmental organization (NGO) representatives coming out of the helicopters. Confusion occurred, however, because the newcomers were wearing leftist t-shirts featuring the image of Ché Guevara.

The hostages were unsure of the situation because part of their existence was receiving lies from the FARC. Fifteen hostages eventually boarded the helicopter along with two of their guards. The newcomers had convinced those guards to leave their rifles behind and turn over their one pistol for the duration of the flight.

Once the wheels of the helicopter left the ground, a blur of bodies flew through the air and in the middle of the turmoil, Mr. Howes heard someone shout “Colombian Army!” He reported that those were two of the sweetest words he had heard in 5.5 years of captivity. It took a split second to realize they had come, that it was done. That realization put them into a state of euphoria.

Following Mr. Howes’s presentation Major General Cambria, currently serving at USSOCOM as the director of the Joint Interagency Task Force, gave his perspective and insights based on his role in the drawn-out hostage situation. In 2003, Major General Cambria was selected to take over command of Special Operations Command South. The first thing he did after assuming command was to ask his Intelligence staff for an update on the situation for Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Tom Janis. On a couple of occasions they had good intelligence where they were and actually deployed forces
with the Colombians. However, the missions resulted in dry holes. It was a horrible feeling.

Major General Cambria spoke about spending a lot of time and effort working with their counterparts from the Colombian military in an effort to locate and rescue the captives. It was a top priority. Given the eventual success of the effort, Major General Cambria noted, “That is what it’s all about. It’s about us working with our host nations, you, and our friends.”

During Rear Admiral Parker’s closing remarks for the Sovereign Challenge Conference, he declared the rescue mission to be “over the top, audacious and bold.” It caused him to respond with “you’ve got to be kidding” when first briefed about the operation.
Breakout Group Reports

The five breakout groups met several times during the conference to discuss the issues raised by the speakers both during their comments and in response to questions asked by attendees in the plenary sessions. Additionally, each breakout group was challenged to produce three big ideas as well as suggestions for advancing the Sovereign Challenge Program.

As each breakout group functioned independently, the structures of their final presentations varied. These differences are reflected in the summaries that follow. The bulk of the discussions are captured in the earlier section, Themes and Comments.

Breakout Group 1

Group 1 identified a variety of different issues including nuclear proliferation, the need for education, the distinction between military and law enforcement responses to terrorist threats, and the appropriateness of each option in a given situation.

Regarding terrorism, the group had a complicated discussion on the definition of terrorism. They all agreed that they can recognize not only the trademarks of terrorism—ideologically driven, the use of violence and fear—but also “one man’s terrorist may be another’s freedom fighter.” However, terrorism itself is a tactic. Group 1 suggested the Vikings as an example. They were not ideologically driven, but could be considered terrorists because of their behavior.

Group 1 drew upon Dr. Phares’s presentation to provide some clarity and focus. They reported consensus on the proposition that Al Qaeda and its franchises pose significant challenges to all nation states by seriously undermining their sovereignty. They also recognized that a terrorist organization’s ties to organized crime also complicate the response.

The group developed a two-tiered approach, at the global/strategic level and at the operational level, to address Al Qaeda and the global threat faced by similar organizations. At the global/strategic level, they identified a need for a Global Summit on terrorism/violent extremism. At the operational level, the group recommended the continuation of the Sovereign Challenge Program but to expand participation for a whole-of-government approach that would add law enforcement, interagency, and think tank representatives.
They also judged the Sovereign Challenge Web site to be very useful and welcome and a tool for inclusion in any strategic communication strategy.

Group 1 made two additional recommendations that underpin their approach. The first was the concept of strategic patience (also mentioned by Group 2). The international community needs to think beyond democratic election cycles, more than 3 to 4 years, to identify solutions that are effective and comprehensive.

The second was the need for education. Education concerns should not be limited to the construction of schools and the process of educating children; it should be broader in its focus on the entire population to include decision makers because education is the foundation for strategic communications.

**Breakout Group 2**

Group 2 organized its discussion sessions into categories of focus to include causes, problems, implications, and solutions. It characterized itself as a diverse group in which awareness of what works in one area can apply elsewhere in wrestling with the various issues raised by the conference. Some of the general conclusions reached by the group follow:

a. Every form of extremism is dangerous.
b. Islamic extremism poses a greater threat to the Moslem countries than to those outside the region. Thus Moslem countries must take the lead and serve as the principal actors in the effort.

c. Ideology is the main contributing factor to extremism with various grievances contributing to the narratives employed.

d. Need better strategic communications efforts at national, regional, and global levels.

e. Practice listening and exercise greater respect when interacting with different cultures and countries.

f. Comprehensive solutions are essential, not short-term fixes.

g. Need an international framework for dealing with terrorists and violent extremist networks. Elements include a common legal framework that contains usable definitions and legal authorities, a protocol for the extradition and prosecution that supports the security concerns of the affected nations, and a consistent treatment of nations that fight terrorists by their own means and are subsequently charged with human rights abuses.

h. Employ whole-of-government approaches for addressing the challenges to national sovereignty.

i. While links between terrorist and criminals clearly exist, care is needed to understand the individual aspects of each and of their interaction.

**Breakout Group 3**

Group 3 proposed a model of sovereignty as living within a delimited territory sustained by security, economy, and education. Good governance and judicial systems were the main blocks that bind them together. The economic and educational aspects were further amplified. A poor economy may lead to poverty and a susceptible or vulnerable population. Education should comprise vocational education and an awareness of the responsibilities and obligations of citizens. Figure 1 is a graphic representation of this model.

The model depicts the main components of sovereignty; the interrelationships at the global/international, regional, and local levels; and the threats to sovereignty. The group proposed three ideas to support sovereignty and counter the external threat:

a. At the international level, obtain diplomatic consensus on approaches to terrorism to include legal structures and other responses to terrorism.
It was noted that the U.S. is currently leading counterterrorism efforts and that we should explore supra-organizations—such as the UN, regional organizations, and Joint Interagency Task Forces—to create a strategy for combating terrorism.

b. At the regional level, conduct cooperative efforts and expand information sharing.

c. At the local level, employ educational, law enforcement, and security resources to protect the populace and improve the quality of life.

The group emphasized the interrelated nature of the challenges and asserted that unity of effort is very important. In some instances, a nation may have to trade off its sovereignty to work with its neighbors to implement international agreements.

The presentation concluded with recommendations for future Sovereign Challenge Conferences:

a. Include law enforcement personnel from the U.S. and international organizations such as the FBI, DEA, and INTERPOL.

b. Include someone from the international legal community to discuss specific terrorism cases.

c. Include speakers on employing educational resources as a counter-radicalization tool.

Figure 1. Model of Sovereignty
Breakout Group 4

Group 4 presented the following observations and proposals:

a. The strong connections between organized crime and terrorism jeopardize the sovereignty of various states.
b. Consequently, comprehensive and global solutions are required that employ both kinetic and soft power techniques.
c. To achieve success, it is essential to be respectful of the cultures of other peoples, regions, and the international community.
d. It is also important to understand the organizational structures and operational approaches of NGOs and intergovernmental organizations like the UN.
e. Solutions must take the form of a whole-of-government approach that features consensual strategic communications supported by effective educational, political, and economic initiatives to bring stability and a higher quality of life.

Additional discussion and themes pursued by the group included:

a. Take the time for dialogue in the spirit of Mr. Mortenson’s comments about the need for enough time to share three cups of tea as practiced within the culture.
b. To improve the sharing of information concerning counterterrorism and counternarcotics, nations need a high level of management coordination, an agreed classification system for the sharing of information, and a push system to exchange information.
c. Extensive exchanges on issues involving Iran.

Breakout Group 5

The categories and their lists comprise the summary developed on the last morning of the conference for presentation at the briefing. While titles are similar to those in the section Themes and Thoughts, these summary points were developed and organized as a separate process.

Know Yourself

a. The starting point for knowing the enemy is to know your friends: their national identity, culture, sovereign interests, and interests in common with yours.
b. It is not enough to just know your enemy: you have to know what your enemy will choose to do.
c. Knowing your enemy allows you to fight the roots of his power.
d. Knowing your friends and enemies is useless if you do not know yourself.

**Internationalization of the Battlefield**

a. A sovereign challenge is to figure out how to be part of an evolving international order and the systems that support it.
b. Need a shared unity of purpose that constitutes an *international* strategy, which would synchronize national strategies.
c. Need to identify *essential* common denominators and operationalize them within states. Develop a common international group of these that can be used to achieve integration into a comprehensive approach with each state contributing a share of needed capabilities.
d. There is a common challenge of how to integrate existing institutions into a new security architecture.
e. Internationalization of the battlefield is bigger than the military alone.

**Information/Intelligence Sharing**

a. States have internal and external challenges for information and intelligence sharing.
b. Need clear points of contact and mutual awareness of parameters in sharing information and intelligence whether internal or external.
c. There are valid sovereign concerns in sharing (information and intelligence) that affect timeliness and parameters. Look at ways to limit obstacles.
d. Focus should be on operationalizing intelligence and information.
e. Information and intelligence are the same, yet have different problems. Most media information issues might be resolved by an open system. Yet it shares the issue of control—what is done with the information—that intelligence has: you essentially empower others—media, adversaries of all types, supporters, and allies—when you share (unable to control how they use or shape it). On the other hand, when you constrain either, you shape the perspective both in good and bad ways and preclude the opportunity for others to see new and potentially
more valuable truths. In the 21st century, information and intelligence interact differently in time and context from the 20th century.

**Education**

a. Education is inherently a sovereign challenge. It is a long-term and complex problem (whether internal or external).

b. Who writes the curriculum is important. Cannot allow Al Qaeda to do it. The author must be credible and trustworthy as he is constructing a national narrative.

c. Education is about identity and values as well as knowledge and skills—it is about society and citizenship as well as the individual.

d. Education counters terrorist recruitment.

e. Access to education is a sovereign challenge.
Conclusion

As documented within this report, the 5th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference generated a great deal of animated discussion and idea exchanges within both the plenary sessions and during the multiple breakout group sessions.

Each breakout group produced a daily list of themes, ideas, and conclusions or recommendations that reflected the unique perspectives of the attendees. Those have been summarized in the sections Themes and Thoughts and Breakout Group Reports. There was a great deal of interest expressed in culture, education, internationalization of the counterterrorism battlefield, and strategic communications. Discussions frequently made connections among these and other general themes.

Each group also submitted suggestions for charting a way ahead for the Sovereign Challenge Program as it enters its sixth year. Many of these emphasized the need for the broader inclusion of other organizations to strengthen the whole-of-government approach and increase the number of tools available to policy makers, strategists, and operators. More specifically, attendees welcomed the inclusion of law enforcement and legal attachés and suggested considering invitations to representatives of foreign ministries and relevant think tanks.

These recommendations are consistent with other views that call for moving the Sovereign Challenge process forward to the next level of interaction and cooperation both domestically and internationally.

The Sovereign Challenge Web site received considerable support, with many attendees suggesting that it could play an important role in the fielding of a comprehensive strategic communications strategy designed to challenge extremist narratives and undermine their supporting ideologies.

In his closing comments, Admiral Parker spoke of the need for a whole-of-government approach and the role of relationship building as the international community faces the complex challenges of counterterrorism. He also spoke of the need for strong leadership in energizing and guiding the various counterterrorism mechanisms in play.

Admiral Parker reminded the audience that a lot of people could have said no to the audacious mission of rescuing the Colombian hostages. It was the investment of time over the years by senior leaders and the relationships
that were built that gave them a collective level of trust and confidence to proceed with the rescue mission.

Major General Cambria applied a similar theme to the future of the Sovereign Challenge Program. He described the dynamics of the conference as “friends working together and making things happen.” He then challenged the gathering to continue the information exchange and relationship building as an important way ahead toward building a collective front against challenges of violent extremism in all its forms.