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From The Staff

The JCLL seeks to identify trends, issues, and lessons that impact our Joint Force capability. We rely on the inputs from you in the field. You are in the best position to know and report what may improve Joint Force capability. You work the issue every day, so let us know:
- What was supposed to happen?
- What happened?
- What went right?
- What went wrong?

If you or your unit have an input that could help others do it right the first time, send it to us. Don’t wait until you have a polished article. The JCLL can take care of the editing, format, and layout. Do provide a short, one paragraph biography on yourself. We will acknowledge receipt and then work with you to put your article in a publishable form with you as the author.

We want your e-mail address! We will soon have the capability to electronically disseminate the Bulletin to you when it is published. You can sign up for this service in the Bulletin section of our website listed below.

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<tr>
<td>Director, JCLL</td>
<td>Mike Barker, GS 12</td>
<td>7270</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Bill Gustafson</td>
<td>7570</td>
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<td>Jim Waldeck</td>
<td>7101</td>
<td>waldeckj</td>
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You may contact us at the above number, e-mail account, at our office e-mail address which is jcll@jwfc.jfcom.mil, or through our www page at: http://www.jwfc.jfcom.mil/dodnato/jcll/

Our address is: COMMANDER
USJFCOM JWFC JW4000
116 Lake View Pkwy
Suffolk, VA 23435-2697

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Cover design by Mr. Wade Tooley and courtesy of the JWFC Graphics Department
As the Director of the Homeland Security Directorate, US Joint Forces Command, I was given the opportunity to write the introductory letter for this JCLL Bulletin, which focuses on the area of Homeland Security (HLS). The desire is to provide an overview of the efforts being taken in this arena by the different agencies, and to capture some of the lessons that are being identified. This Bulletin includes articles written from personal interviews with various governmental agencies and DOD headquarters actively engaged in the HLS effort, including the HLSD, Coast Guard, and JTF Civil Support. Articles on the FBI and FEMA will appear in the March Bulletin.

Since the events of September 11th, homeland security has become our number one priority in USJFCOM. Within days of the attacks, the Homeland Security Directorate (HLSD) was created and began to flesh out the new requirements with people from within the USJFCOM staff and tenant units. By the end of the month, CINC JFCOM had sent the campaign plan to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval and the HLSD was declared “mission ready.”

In establishing the HLSD, we used the experimental Standing JTF Headquarters concept from USJFCOM J9 Joint Experimentation Directorate as the guide for the design. In addition, an Inter-Agency Division based upon the JX Concept was created to handle the coordination needed between the HLSD and the numerous other agencies. All of this was accomplished while fighting the antiterrorism war both at home and abroad. This was truly a monumental effort by everyone involved.

Many challenges arose that will be discussed in the articles. One of the major issues was the identification of liaison officer requirements within and between agencies and DOD headquarters. Another key issue revolves around establishing a Common Relevant Operations Picture with those that have a need to know but lack access to the information. Further, questions of legal restrictions and jurisdictions needed to be identified and responsibilities established between the inter-agencies and DOD units. These are but a few of the tasks that needed to be worked at all levels.

There have been many positive steps taken to create a team atmosphere from all involved in HLS. The inter-agency coordination is at an all-time high as people recognize the urgency and seriousness of the task at hand. These steps will prove invaluable in the future in forging patterns of cooperation to prevent another tragedy of this magnitude from ever occurring again.

In closing, I would like to extend my thanks to all those whose sacrifices have helped to provide for our national safety and disaster recovery. Homeland security, with its sub-areas of homeland defense and civil support are critical to ensuring our way of life and our personal freedoms.
Not being a natural writer, it usually takes me several days of thought and multiple attempts to finally have a draft presentable enough to forward to the editor. This one is even harder in light of the terrorists’ events of 9/11/2001. As with many of you who will be reading this intro, we at JCLL were also affected by those events. The moment the aircraft struck the Pentagon, two of my staff were sitting in the cafeteria waiting for a meeting. We didn’t know where they were at the time of the crash. It took over two hours to make contact to learn that both were safe. About two weeks prior to the attack on the Pentagon, I was given a tour of the new Navy Command Center (NCC) by a good friend and old squadron mate who was assigned to the N5 shop that occupied some office space in the NCC. Even met several of his co-workers. By sheer coincidence, luck, or the grace of God, he was out of the office that day thus becoming one of the only Navy survivors.

Several weeks after these events, several of us sat down to discuss the focus of this Bulletin. With the establishment of the Homeland Security Directorate (HLSD) inside Joint Forces Command, the role of JTF Civil Support, and the important relationship between DOD and several non-DOD federal agencies such as FEMA, the FBI, and the Coast Guard, it was easy to decide the focus of the Bulletin would be on homeland security. The hard part was bringing it all together. Under normal circumstances, we rely on direct submission of articles to be published. In order to get articles written in a somewhat timely manner, we took it upon ourselves to conduct interviews and write the articles. This is something we haven’t done before. For this Bulletin we decided to focus on the Homeland Security Directorate, JTF Civil Support, and the Coast Guard. Articles on FEMA and the FBI will appear in our March issue of the Bulletin. Our thesis for the interviews centered on how the events of 9/11 have changed each of these agencies’ focus or approach to homeland security. We also wanted to address the major successes achieved by and challenges faced by each agency or organization. With the exception of HLSD, the other four agencies/organizations were already involved in various respects with consequence management and crisis response.

Finally, the last article in this Bulletin is the fourth section of the series on Joint Operations Beyond the FSCL. This section will complete the series.

A fair number of you who will read this Bulletin are intimately involved with homeland security and related matters. Regardless of how large or how small your agency or organization is, you are still playing a significant role in homeland security. We need to hear from you how the events of 9/11 have affected your mission; what were your successes; and what are your challenges as they affect both the joint community and interagency.

Continue to remember in your own way through thought or prayer not only those who lost their lives as a result of 9/11, but the survivors who lost family or friends from the Pentagon, from New York City, and the farmer’s field in Pennsylvania. Let us not forget the men and women of all services who are currently in harms way fighting both on the ground and in the air over Afghanistan to help preserve our freedom.
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Homeland Security: The Joint Forces Perspective

Alan D. Preisser
Editor, JCLL Bulletin

“In one horrible moment, the need for homeland defense has gone from being a theoretical risk to a grim reality. Not one of us in government or counterterrorist experts outside the government believed that anyone was capable of launching an attack with this degree of lethality and coordination.”

Anthony Cordesman
Former Defense Department Official

The mission of the Homeland Security Directorate of the Joint Forces Command is to “conduct sustained maritime and land operations within the designated joint operational area (JOA) and support CINCNORAD in air defense operations to deter, prevent, and, if necessary, defeat aggression aimed at U.S. territory, its citizens, and designated infrastructure; provide military assistance to Civil Authorities within the JOA in support of National Homeland Security efforts; and provide combat ready forces in support of Combatant CINCs—all of which allow the Nation to maintain freedom of action to defeat the threat of terrorism worldwide.” Its task is to plan and integrate the full spectrum of JFCOM Civil Support and Homeland Defense support to Lead Federal Agencies from prevention through crisis response and consequence management.

Background

Prior to September 11, 2001, the focus of the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) was primarily on the efforts involved in transformation of the military and joint experimentation. However, following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, that focus rapidly shifted to homeland security. General Kernan, CINC USJFCOM, tasked several members of his staff, headed by MG Casey, USJFCOM J7, to “stand up a Homeland Security Directorate.” The initial meeting took place on September 13, 2001 with nine colonels selected from the JFCOM staff and tenant agencies such as the Joint Forces Staff College. Using the JFCOM J9 Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) Headquarters experimental concept as a guide, this group designed a basic construct, complete with roles, missions, and architecture within the first four days. This construct was presented to MG Casey and approved for implementation on September 19. Thus, the Homeland Security Directorate (HLSD) was formalized. By September 30, the HLSD was declared “Mission Ready” and the Campaign Plan was presented for approval by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. On October 26, MG Casey was promoted to Lieutenant General and moved to his new position as the Joint Staff J5. MG Soriano, the current Director HLSD, replaced him.

Overview

The original construct for the Directorate called for five divisions in the HLSD. These divisions include the Plans Division, the Operations Division, the Information Management Division, the Intelligence and Information Division, and a new division—the Inter-Agency Division—based upon the J9 “JX concept,” whose responsibility it is to integrate and coordinate between the JFCOM staff and the myriad of agencies involved in the homeland security effort. According to MG Soriano, “Inter-agency is absolutely critical to our success—that is why we established an Inter-Agency Division.” Under the Joint Staff Execution Order, CINC JFCOM has been designated the Supported Command for both Maritime and Land operations in support of homeland security, and is a Supporting Command for CINC NORAD in the Air Defense operation and CINC SPACE in the Computer Network Operations (CNO). The 2001 Unified Command Plan (UCP) will designate the lead Command CINC for Homeland Security between JFCOM and NORAD, but JFCOM is already working on a transition plan to
migrate from the HLS Directorate to a Standing JTF HLS. A move in this direction was recently completed with a message directing both JTF Civil Support (JTF CS) and JTF 6 (counter drug operations) to report directly to the HLSD. This Standing JTF HLS will plan, order, and task the two subordinate JTFs, along with future JTFs.

**Lessons**

The major challenges facing the HLSD are the vast number of agencies and headquarters involved in the homeland security effort. There are over 50 separate states and agencies involved, each with a vital interest in the efforts being undertaken. How do we regionalize these various “cindoms” to maximize our efforts? How do we set policy and procedures to leverage those in the field? And, how do we define clearly where DOD interface is located with our inter-agency partners (how many liaison officers, where do we send them, at what levels should they be assigned)? Inherent in these questions is fusing all the various intelligence sources into a common relevant operations picture (CROP) for threat awareness and command and control. Once this is achieved then we can begin to plan and resource to meet our prevention and deterrence goals. As Secretary Ridge stated at his swearing-in ceremony, “The size and scope of the challenge are immense. … The task before us is difficult but not impossible.” The QDR 2001 Working Group stated before the attacks on September 11, “…the nation cannot take the security of the homeland for granted. Indeed, homeland security has moved from the wings of the defense debate to center stage in recent years. Yet the U.S. Government response to this highly complex challenge remains a work in progress. Homeland security involves a multiplicity of missions, agencies, levels of government, non-governmental actors, and legal authorities and constraints.”

“Homeland security is the number one priority in the USJFCOM. It is a cottage industry right now—and we need to capture who our contacts are within the overall HLS structure.”

According to Colonel Hinger, Chief of the Inter-Agency Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) are the two key agencies the JFCOM must liaison with, but there are over 40 other agencies with an interest in the HLS effort. Since the events of September 11th, the pieces of the puzzle have been coming together but the problem still is getting agreement between the agencies on the definitions, terms, policies, and solutions. The National Security Council is the top agency to coordinate national security decisions between the State Department, Department of Justice, and others, and the JFCOM HLSD must work through them. From the Joint perspective, there is no single source document identifying where DOD personnel are plugged into the inter-agency structure, and there is no detailed inter-agency guidance on IA coordination below the national policy level. JP 3-08, “Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations” is a great starting point, but it is insufficient with respect to the Homeland Security mission. Presidential Directives and Executive Orders have established the “Federal Response Plan” and the Interagency Domestic Terrorism CONOPS, but these also don’t provide sufficient detail to conduct coherent HLS operations inside the USG. Therefore, the IA Division, according to their mission statement, functions to “Provide integration

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**Inter-Agency Division (IA)**

“The good news is that there are many agencies working on all these issues. The bad news is that there are many federal agencies working on all these issues.”

*Senator Fred Thompson*
and coordination among JFCOM staff and IA offices with a role in HLS. Is the Directorate’s focal point for collection and dissemination of information within IA offices and provides senior level review of NSC/HSC Working Groups and other IA HLS committees. Coordinates deployable liaison officer (LNO) teams to maintain connectivity with the Lead Federal Agency and other key lead agencies during crisis management and consequence management operations.”

What is needed in Colonel Hinger’s view is National level guidance and policy from the HLS Office of Governor Ridge. This guidance should define what critical infrastructure requires protection, and then solidify the Tier One list and DOD requirements in protecting this critical infrastructure. Then DOD can determine the level and type of protection needed and the IA requirements involved with that support. Another problem is there is no IA common operations picture (COP). The IA Division is working on a conceptual National Inter-Agency Task Force (NIATF) with standing interface among the agencies.

**Issues:**

2. Working in parallel with the stand up of the Office of HLS under Gov Ridge. No overarching guidance or policy yet developed.
3. OSD/Joint Staff were not organized for response to HLS crisis. They had started to develop doctrine and are currently reorganizing for more effective oversight in this area.
4. Defining “What is the real mission?” “What is different between pre and post 9-11?” (I.e., we have forces on call but no specific mission for them yet).

**Successes:**

1. Developing a concept for IA and how the military should view IA—conceptual NIATF and principles for IA.
2. Incorporating the JX concept to make it operational in a matter of weeks.
3. Developing an LNO plan to go beyond the FBI and FEMA—incorporating agencies not normally considered (A challenge is that most inter-agencies only want one DOD POC).

**Operations Division (OD)**

“You cannot defend at every place, at every time, against every conceivable, imaginable—even unimaginable—terrorist attack”

Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

The mission of the Operations Division is to “direct, integrate, and plan current and future homeland security operations for the USCINCFJFCOM Homeland Security Directorate.” This includes leading the crisis action planning effort for the HLSD and working closely with the Intelligence and Information Division to maintain situational awareness, with a focus for the next 24 hours. The OD is responsible for the coordination of all HLS operations within the HLS Joint Operations Area, and for being the focal point for information exchange within the HLSD, USJFCOM, DOD Agencies, other CINCs, Services, components, and governmental agencies concerning HLS. “The most disturbing phenomenon is still the preventive role due to legal and other restrictions. From an operations planner’s perspective, not only are we not sure what the bad guys (red) look like, but there is much confusion over what the good guys (blue) can do.”

“Our biggest challenge is that we did not have time to evolve through the normal forming process. We went immediately to the execution and crisis mode,” according to Colonel Gross, Chief Operations Division. He further stated that while structured well for consequence management, the second piece is much more difficult. How do we take actionable intelligence that something is going to happen and integrate law enforcement, govern-
Another problem has been receiving tasking from both the Director of Military Support and the Joint Staff simultaneously. With no tasking authority of its own, some of the subordinate units wait until the Joint Staff apportionment is made before reacting. Both of these C2 issues should be cleared up after the JTF HLS is established.

**Issues:**

1. Transitioning and sustaining the organization.
2. Information flow to and from inter-agencies.
3. Developing and maintaining a fused intelligence picture.
4. Getting the UCP signed and getting agreement from the Joint Community.
5. Acting on Intelligence – what does it take for us to start reacting. What is our trigger point?

**Successes:**

1. Standing up the HLSD and having it function as designed.
2. Integration with other USJFCOM J-codes, although sometimes difficult, is working well.

**Intelligence and Information Division (I&I)**

“The reality is that the threats of additional terrorist acts are there. …They are credible, they are real, and they offer the prospects of still thousands of more people being killed”¹⁶

Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

“The big question is how do we posture correct forces to meet threats?”¹⁷ The Intelligence and Information Division is key to identifying where the threat is located and, in coordination with the Operations Division, determining where and when to position forces needed to counter that threat in a timely manner. The Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP) is working toward melding the threat assessment effort to the posturing of forces.

According to CAPT Reiske, Chief I & I Division, he believes a second TOPOFF exercise might have helped improve our crisis response by highlighting the critical issues identified in the TOPOFF 2000 exercise. Some of these issues involved intelligence oversight issues and when, where, and how many liaison officers are needed between the agencies and DOD to accomplish the mission. He further stated there is still a cultural divide to be resolved with the FBI on the lack of law enforcement (LE) information sharing with DOD forces that have a need to know for HLS purposes. Specifically, there is no COP between them, and there is a reluctance to share information due to legal implications involved, such as Posse Comitatus and military oversight of American citizens. He sees a need for a nationwide database of critical information that would be available for JTF use in HLS. This database would provide critical information without compromising the integrity of the legal process requirements.

As defined in their mission statement, “The mission of the Intelligence and Information Division is as the lead agent for threat assessments, Operations Net Assessment [ONA], information operations, collections, foreign disclosure, and counter-intelligence, in support of the USJFCOM HLSD.”¹⁸ In this regard they are tasked to manage the ONA process, a process that has gained added importance and acceptance recently.

**Issues:**

1. Law Enforcement issues (posse comitatus, intelligence gathering, and information sharing within the US).
2. Placement of HLS intelligence LNOs within the inter-agency intelligence community.
3. Intelligence fusion and sharing – a “pull” vs. “push” concept.

Successes:

1. The paradigm shift in how the intelligence mission is perceived—there is a more robust intelligence integration, as well as an understanding that CONUS threat requires a close intel/LE partnership.
2. Establishing criteria and displays for Critical Infrastructure vulnerabilities and threat assessment efforts.
3. Recognition that ONA is a valuable tool for analyzing red and blue capabilities in HLS for predicting 2nd and 3rd order effects and vulnerabilities.
4. Collaboration with all unified CINCs in CONUS, Components, Service and DoD intelligence entities, which allows for a faster response to a crisis.
   a. The Integrated Weapons System (IWS) is a “Godsend.” We used well-established collaborative processes developed in the Precision Engagement Collaboration Process to accelerate threat, red cell, and Antiterrorism/Force Protection analysis.

Information Management Division (IM)

“By being the single focal point [for all current and future HLS Information Technology requirements] we sometimes get too much help and sometimes not enough help”

Colonel Henkel, Chief IM Division

The charter of the Information Management Division, as stated in their mission statement is to be the “Lead agent to facilitate, enable, and enforce best information transfer and knowledge management processes, policies, and practices within the USJFCOM HLSD.” This is a combination of C4I “Command and Control, Communications and Computers, and Intelligence,” as well as Information Management and Knowledge Management efforts integrated within the division. The C4I effort leverages the support of the JFCOM’s J6 to provide Network Management, Telecommunications support, C4I planning for HLS events, and Information Assurance. Other tasks involve participating in the JFCOM’s Joint Information Management Board, producing and maintaining the HLS input into the JFCOM Information Management Plan, and developing information management tactics techniques and procedures. They have been working with the other HLSD divisions for web page design and management.

Originally focused on the HLSD stand-up, they are quickly moving to a DOD and Inter-Agency focus to develop a Common Relevant Operational Picture (CROP) to provide Homeland Security leadership with overall situational awareness for high quality decision-making information. They are also managing the HLS Command and Control (C2) Advanced Concept Technology Development (ACTD) Project to identify and insert innovative technical solutions into the HLS Concept of Operations. Another support effort is the development of the Homeland Security Operational Architecture—capturing the information exchange between HLS command and control nodes and the technical systems needed to support those information flows. This effort involves contractors going to each directorate to capture their specific IM requirements in order to develop an operational IM architecture. The goal is to ensure the IM plan allows the decision makers in the battle staff to have the most current and accurate information.

Issues:

1. Finalizing the IM plan, web page, and CROP capability within the HLSD.
2. Expand C4I capabilities within HLS subordinate units, extend this capability to the Supported and Supporting CINCs, and to the Federal, State and Local-level.
Successes:

1. Coming together as a team in a short timeframe.
2. Standing up the HLSD—providing hardware, software, and connectivity to meet the mission.
3. Developing a good working relationship with other HLSD divisions.
4. Establishing Best Business Rules to help information documentation and management.
5. Developing and supporting the CROP and Web pages—drafting the IM Plan.
6. Leveraging the reach back capability to JFCOM J6—could not have achieved successes without their support.

Plans Division (PD)

“The 2001 QDR says, ‘The new construct explicitly calls for the force to be sized for defending the homeland, forward deterrence, warfighting missions, and the conduct of Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations.’”

The Plans Division oversees the doctrinally-based Joint Planning Group to produce a USJFCOM Campaign Plan for the tasked missions, and plans those measures necessary to rehearse and prepare for execution of the plan. They also identify liaison officer requirements for external agencies and headquarters, develop strategy and policy options, and author papers related to the HLS mission in concert with the JFCOM J5. Specifically, the mission of the PD is to “develop USJFCOM strategy, plans, and policy options in support of the Command’s Homeland Security Campaign.”

Colonel Bolger, Chief Plans Division, stated the events of September 11 were reactive in nature but that now we could give the CINC immediate options due to having a system in place with the subordinate units wired-in. He says there is a great relationship between the military and civilians in DOD and in the IA community. Everyone at the Federal, State, and Local levels are focused and this wartime attitude helps to ease the coordination and mission accomplishment challenges. One challenge is that an IA COP does not exist but everyone agrees we need it. In the DOD the GCCS system is available, but how do we integrate the non-DOD IA piece with the classified network? Additionally, how do we integrate our foreign partners in the HLS effort into this network information (e.g. Canada or Mexico)?

From a team building perspective in designing a new directorate, based upon this experience, Colonel Bolger feels you need to decide early who the key players are and then ensure you keep them for continuity purposes. Borrowing staff from other agencies and then losing them within a few months dilutes the corporate knowledge base. In addition, establish the J-code structure early in the design process to assist in the mission planning. All the J-codes should be represented from the start including the J1 and Logistics. Then, if the decision is made to transition into a separate JTF structure, the pieces are already in place and involved in the decision process.

Issues:

1. Establish a regional C2 Headquarters structure—CINCs and 50 plus entities including the National Guard, States, and Agencies.
2. Red threat picture intelligence information and fusing.

Successes:

1. Production of the HLS Campaign Plan draft in only two weeks.
2. Integration with components (esp. Coast Guard) and good communication.
3. Integration with inter-agencies—due to the positive attitude and the existence of the IA cell.

Conclusion

According to the QDR 2001 Working Group, there are a number of challenges to be faced in the homeland security arena. “The first challenge is to define homeland security and the associated military missions. Currently, no agreed DOD or inter-agency definition exists. … The second challenge is to determine the relative priority of each of these missions within the strategy. … The third challenge will be to develop planning factors to address the number and types of concurrent homeland security missions the Armed Forces should be prepared to undertake and then to assess the capabilities and forces required to meet this standard. … The last challenge will be to use these planning factors to assess the combined requirements of homeland security and other priority operations and to address any capability shortfalls in the current defense program.”

Based upon these imperatives, the USJFCOM HLSD has taken big steps in defining and organizing to meet the HLS needs. Currently, there are 36 Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETS) that have been identified and are in final coordination for approval. Much still remains to be done, but the attitude and initiative of the staff ensures these issues will be addressed and eventually resolved for the benefit of the U.S. and its allies. The inter-agency relationships being developed here will continue to pay big dividends not only in the HLS effort but also in the area of humanitarian assistance for disaster relief.

Supplemental Information

This information is provided to give the reader an overarching definition of homeland security and its relationship to homeland defense and civil support.

![Homeland Security Diagram]

Homeland Security

Homeland Defense

Civil Support

Homeland Security (HLS); The preparation for, prevention, preemption, and deterrence of, and defense against aggression targeted at U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and infrastructure, as well as the management of the consequences of such aggression and other domestic civil support.

Homeland Defense (HLD); The protection of U.S. territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against military and terrorist attacks emanating from outside the U.S.

Civil Support (CS); DOD support to U.S. civil authorities for natural and manmade domestic emergencies, civil disturbances, and designated law enforcement efforts.
About the Author:

Alan Preisser is a retired US Air Force officer, employed by Cubic Applications Inc., currently working as a military analyst in the Analysis Support Branch of the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) Support Team (JST), in Suffolk, Virginia. He has extensive tactical level experience flying the F-4D/E, F-15A, OV-10, and CT-39 aircraft. As a ground forward air controller (FAC) and airborne FAC, he has worked with many US Army infantry, airborne, and mechanized units, and was the functional manager for Army support programs while at HQ Tactical Air Command (TAC). His staff assignments include working at the Wing, HQ 5th Air Force, HQ TAC, and NATO 4th Allied Tactical Air Force levels, with overseas assignments in South Korea, Japan, and Germany. A former Joint Specialty Officer, Mr. Preisser has been employed at the JWFC since June 1998, working in the Joint Center for Lessons Learned support section, and has been the Editor for the JCLL Bulletin since August 1999.
Joint Task Force – Civil Support
“The Fulcrum to Leverage DOD Support”

Robert Murphy
Military Analyst

Introduction

In the last 10 years there have been at least five major terrorist attacks within the continental United States and over twenty involving Americans worldwide. As the popularity of terrorism grows and terrorists become more sophisticated, we can only expect these attacks to increase. The continental United States is no longer immune from these attacks. In response to this increasing threat, Secretary of Defense, William Cohen directed United States Joint Forces Command to establish Joint Task Force - Civil Support.

DOD Response – JTF Civil Support

Joint Task Force - Civil Support (JTF-CS) was activated by Commander in Chief, US Joint Forces Command (CINCUSJFCOM) on 23 September 1999 to provide a national capability to perform the critical emerging mission of domestic Consequence Management (CM). JTF-CS was the necessary evolutionary step to provide a rapid and effective Department of Defense (DOD) Command and Control (C2) capability to support civil authorities as they helped the American victims of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosives (CBRNE) disaster. JTF-CS provides a faster, more efficient, and more organized support to civilian authorities. It is the fulcrum to leverage DOD’s contribution to local, state, and federal agencies in their efforts to mitigate the effects of a CBRNE incident.

Sharing Authority – Local, State, and Federal Responses

Using federal military forces to help state and local officials is not a new concept. Federal assistance in times of crises has frequently been provided by the military. The establishment of JTF-CS is a major step in strengthening DOD’s overall capability for responding to CBRNE consequence management incidents. CBRNE consequence management requires a coordinated response at three levels - local, state, and federal - and the Department of Defense strategy includes support at each level.

Figure 1 – CBRNE Training
In the event of a CBRNE incident, the first people on the scene will be local responders. Local emergency management directors will bring the assets of their community to bear and to integrate the assets of nearby communities. While this is happening, local authorities will also coordinate with state officials to provide information and to alert them that additional assistance may be needed.

If the size of the incident is beyond the scope of local responders, the state responds with the next level of support. States provide a significant amount of manpower and bring a broad array of services to support the incident response effort. States’ authorities include transportation, police, and health and welfare matters. A multitude of state agencies that perform these functions can be expected to provide additional help to local emergency management directors. The state can also respond by alerting the National Guard and sending it to the scene. The National Guard can support the effort with transportation, medical, mess, security, supply and services, communications, administrative and provide other units that would be trained to varying levels of proficiency in CBRNE operations.

To request federal help, the state governor would send a request to the President requesting federal assistance. If the President felt national assistance was warranted, he would issue a presidential disaster declaration. The disaster declaration energizes the Federal Response Plan (FRP) and activates the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA approves requests for support. If an approved request for assistance cannot be met by FEMA’s primary agencies, the request is forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. If permissible by law, the Secretary of Defense issues an execute order instructing the appropriate commander-in-chief to provide the requested support. If the crisis involves CBRNE and the size of DOD’s participation in the response is significant, JTF-CS will deploy to provide command and control of DOD forces.

**JTF-Civil Support: Mission and Capabilities**

The mission of JTF-CS is:

> On order, JTF-CS deploys to the vicinity of a CBRNE incident or accident, establishes command and control of designated DOD forces and conducts CBRNE CM operations in support of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA), within the designated Joint Operational Area (JOA), in order to save lives, prevent further injury, and provide temporary critical life support. Be prepared to (BPT) provide a planning augmentation cell as directed. On order, transition operation and redeploy.

JTF-CS’s specified tasks are to establish command and control, conduct CBRNE consequence management operations, save lives, prevent injury, and establish temporary critical life support. Its implied tasks include a wide variety of nuclear, biological, chemical, radiological, medical, transportation, and other logistics requirements.

Within the context of what JTF-CS has been tasked to do, a CBRNE incident is defined as “a deliberate or unintentional event involving a chemical, biological, radiological weapon or device, nuclear, or large conventional explosive, that produces catastrophic loss of life or property.” It is important to note that this definition permits JTF-CS to respond to accidental as well as intentional CBRNE detonations and/or releases. Equally important is its incorporation of high yield conventional explosives allowing response to such incidents as the Oklahoma City bombing.

JTF-CS’s specified tasks allow DOD forces to help restore local water and power systems, provide emergency medical care, and create temporary transportation fixes such as short term bridging that will aid in the efficient distribution of life saving supplies and services. DOD units possess unique knowledge and experience concerning nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons. The ability to survive such weapons and operate in a contaminated environment is a training requirement for all uniformed services. Exploiting DOD’s expertise and experience to provide assistance to civil authorities when requested in times of need is part of JTF-CS’s purpose. DOD forces are very good at responding quickly and at organizing and moving large numbers of people, equipment, and supplies. This capability will be critical to an early and effective response in the event of a CBRNE incident.
USJFCOM developed Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 0500 to support civil support consequence management operations. JTF-CS developed its own supporting CONPLAN 0500 as the lead USJFCOM organization. Their CONPLAN was arranged in five phases [see editor’s note at end]. Those phases were:

- Phase I: Situation Assessment and Preparation (Pre-deployment)
- Phase II: Deployment
- Phase III: Assistance to Civil Authorities (Employment)
- Phase IV: Transition to Civilian Agencies (Transition)
- Phase V: Redeployment

The terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center (WTC) and Pentagon were essentially contained in two distinct areas. Local, state, and federal civil resources in New York and Washington D.C were essentially sufficient to provide an adequate consequence management capability. It was determined that the few DOD resources needed to support the operation could be controlled by the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). For the most part, JTF-CS only accomplished tasks associated with Phase I of its CONPLAN. Therefore, this article will only concentrate on the JTF-CS actions accomplished during the first phase.

**Phase I: Situation Assessment and Preparation (Pre-deployment)**

JTF-CS was having a staff meeting when notified about the first plane striking the WTC and began to monitor the situation. Once the second plane hit, JTF-CS sprang into action. The JTF-CS commander adjourned the meeting and ordered the JTF-CS joint operations center (JOC) be activated. He also directed the staff to begin Crisis Action Planning (CAP). The staff organized their Joint Planning Group (JPG) and began executing its CONPLAN. The JTF Commander decided to begin executing the CONPLAN because the FBI had determined that a credible threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) existed.

Simultaneously, CINCUSJFCOM was designating the Joint Operations Area (JOA), nominating Base Support Installations (BSIs), and alerting forces. Additionally, both organizations were undertaking actions to conduct a timely and accurate assessment of the CM situation. A timely and accurate assessment was required to determine the required DOD support to the operation and the appropriate command and control headquarters.

JTF-CS continued its mission analysis by reviewing an existing contingency plan that was developed to support the Millennium celebration in New York City. The basis of the plan was a high-yield explosion centered in the Times Square area. Staff members felt this plan most closely paralleled the incidents that were currently occurring. Over the next several days, this plan was modified and adjusted as necessary to meet projected force requirements.

While the JPG was continuing its mission analysis, CJTF-CS requested authorization from USCINCJFCOM to send a Liaison Coordination Element to the crisis site prior to the issuance of an Execute Order (EXORD) or Deployment Order (DEPORD). The purpose of this element was to:

- Gain situational awareness.
- Establish communications with the incident site.
- Establish liaison with the Lead Federal Agency in order to facilitate planning.
- Provide the core element at the incident site in the event the decision was made to deploy JTF-CS.
- Manage all deployed LNO teams.

The JTF-CS Liaison Coordination Element deployed to NYC approximately 70 hours after the incident. The team
was prepared to deploy at the 36-hour point but the final decision was delayed because local, state, and federal requests for assistance were still being reviewed. Once the Liaison Coordination Element arrived in NYC, it gained situational awareness, established communications at the incident site, and established liaison with the Lead Federal Agency. Once it was determined that only a few DOD resources were required to support the incident, the commander of JTF-CS decided the regional DCO could handle the civil support mission. This essentially concluded JTF-CS participation in the incident. However, JTF-CS continued to monitor the situation to maintain situational awareness in case additional DOD resources were required.

The CONPLAN defined success for Phase I as:

- Situational awareness has been gained to the degree that CJTF-CS can make informed decisions about further deployments.
- JTF-CS pre-deployment preparations are complete.
- Communications with the incident site are established.
- Forces are prepared for deployment.

By using the success criteria defined in the JTF-CS CONPLAN, it is clear to see that JTF-CS accomplished all tasks satisfactorily.

Even though JTF-CS had a limited role supporting consequence management operations as a result of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 Sep 2001, several valuable lessons and issues have been documented. These lessons and issues are listed below to help future military forces avoid past mistakes and ensure success in the future.

- Problems still exist with sharing indications and warning information. JTF-CS is still not receiving specific threat data. This makes it difficult to provide predictive intelligence, anticipate missions, and plan accordingly. Much like urban infrastructure data, some federal agency, again possibly the newly created Homeland Security Directorate, needs to create an information sharing system to support homeland security operations.

- JTF-CS maintains a good working relationship with FEMA due to previous experiences in military exercises.
However, FEMA is very regional and works with the DCO and local officials at the state and local levels. The FEMA–DCO relationship has been practiced many times. JTF-CS has had very limited exposure in working with DCOs. There must be a well-understood, exercised, and trained relationship between the DCO and JTF-CS because the DCO will always be the first military representative at the incident site for any civil support operation.

There was some confusion on how requests for support were passed to military forces. In some cases, support requests were sent directly to the services without coordination. This created an unexpected influx of resources at bases and ports, and clogged lines of communication. Many of the committed resources were not warranted or wanted at the time they arrived. This emphasizes the need for a validated response. Additionally, it appeared there might have been a military resource dual management problem. Confusion existed between the authority of the Director of Military Support (DOMS) and United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Consideration should be given to relooking at existing guidance and providing clarification to establish one organization with the responsibility for the civil support mission. Clearer guidance should help foster the relationship with DCOs.

JTF-CS usually operates in the unclassified communications realm due to its relationship with interagency (IA) organizations. However, because the incidents of 11 Sep 2001 were tied to a foreign terrorist threat, they quickly had to move to the classified side. By moving to the classified side, JTF-CS was able to maintain secure communications with its headquarters and receive classified threat information. Because JTF-CS established Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) connectivity they created a challenge in maintaining liaison with inter-agency organizations. There was no easy solution to getting IA liaison officers quickly read-on to US Secret information. There needs to be a mechanism to allow IA players access points to Secret information they normally do not have. Additionally, JTF-CS did not have secure liaison communication suites with their LNOs. Since the incident, JTF-CS has acquired six liaison communication suites with a secure voice/digital capability.

JTF-CS found that some of their communications plans and systems were not interoperable with all IA players. Many of these deficiencies could be identified and fixed using an aggressive exercise–training program that incorporated IA play. An added benefit to a strong exercise–training program would be creating established relationships with coordinated information sharing techniques. Additionally, no national agency is ensuring consequence management communication interoperability.

Active US military forces must have a paradigm shift in the way they view their relationship with Title 32 forces. For domestic civil support operations, National Guard forces are the home team and consequence management events happen in their back yard. National Guard forces understand the command and control relationships within their state. For these events, there is no need to federalize National Guard forces but allow them to be in the lead working for the state Adjutant General. Active forces could augment for reserve gaps, when needed.

JTF-CS and other organizations used web pages to hang or post information. These web pages were great for distributing information. However, posting or hanging directive information does not replace official message traffic. If you only post information to a web page, there is no way to guarantee the intended recipient received the information. Directive information or guidance, such as orders or taskings, must be pushed to the appropriate organization. The best way to do this is through official channels.
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About the Author:
Robert Murphy has been employed by Cubic Applications since January 1999, working as a military analyst in the Analysis Support Branch of the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) Support Team (JST), in Suffolk, Virginia. He is a USAR intelligence officer with extensive experience from the tactical to strategic theater level. Mr. Murphy’s experience includes diverse real-world operational experience with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), and the 7th Infantry Division (Light), as well as over 25 Joint, combined, coalition, and service specific training exercises. Mr. Murphy has published over 40 articles and studies.

Editor’s Note: The new JP 3-0, dated 10 Sep 01, discusses the 4 phases of planning.
U.S. Coast Guard’s Role in Homeland Defense

Colin D. Claus
Military Analyst

Author’s Note: On December 4, 2001, I met with Captains Egan and Regalbuto, USCG, for the purpose of discussing the Coast Guard’s shift in emphasis and planning for Homeland Defense. My compliments to the Captains for their time, hospitality, and candor in this trying time of meeting new potential threats with fixed resources.

Like so many other articles written of late, this one will discuss the impact the September 11, 2001, attack by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network had on the United States. Specifically how it affected the Coast Guard’s overall operations to respond to the new threat. In a testament to their motto “Semper Paratus,” numerous vessels including the USCGC Hawser and Katherine Walker which are both from Bayonne, NJ, were on scene in the New York Harbor shortly after the incident. They provided critical medical evacuation support over to Liberty State Park in New Jersey to alleviate the burden on the Manhattan facilities as well as a general evacuation to other sites. But there is much more that went on behind the scenes to prepare, anticipate, and deter whatever additional threats the terrorists had planned.

This emergent response immediately posed the question as to what other potential attacks were awaiting and how the Coast Guard was to continue handling its other missions while dealing with the uncertainty of what would happen next. Fortunately, to the best of my knowledge, the terrorists had not planned on attacking on numerous fronts at the same time but that does not mean that using a shipping vessel in the same manner as a hijacked airplane was not under their consideration. This weighed heavily as the Coast Guard immediately pulled vessels from other missions to patrol and intercept high interest and other vessels for inspection. The purpose for this increased effort was reaffirmed in late October when an Egyptian, Rizik Amid Farid, was discovered in Gioia Tauro, Italy, in a shipping container complete with a bed, makeshift toilet, laptop computer, and documents indicative of a potential for terrorism. A rather weak “cover story” culminated in his arrest and detention. Apparently Mr. Farid was in the process of drilling new air holes while the ship was being inspected in the port, which led to his discovery.

Although the stowaway incident may appear comical in retrospect, it demonstrates the resolve and determination of terrorists to interrupt, interfere, damage, and destroy our infrastructure while inflicting as many casualties as possible. Regardless of their motivation, there is no underestimating their resolve. However, the resolve of the Coast Guard is more than equal to the task and they have bolstered their security and planning sections to report to the Commandant on new measures and proposals to counter and detect the threat long before it arrives. Among the proposals is a way to track the vessels and personnel embarked before they leave to sail to the United States. This would significantly enhance the Captain of the Port’s (COTP) ability to track and anticipate the arrivals in his port. Heretofore all that was required was a 24-hour advance notice of their intent to arrive. However in light of the attack, a temporary regulation was issued in October extending the advance notice of arrival to 96 hours and also required the submission of crew lists and passenger manifests. This extension affords the COTP a much better operational picture (albeit not perfect) with which to manage the port as well as
to review the cargo manifest for potential terrorist intrusion and screen the crew and passengers. As with air travel, the more information provided, the easier it is to track and anticipate movement and to develop anomalies in the information, which may warrant further investigation.

Captain Egan emphasized that another challenge in screening arriving vessels is the balancing of large lists of passengers and crewmembers from several uncoordinated security agencies within the government. This is extremely difficult for several reasons. First is the fact that our security agencies must improve their coordination and develop more consistent criteria for including a name on the “Look-out” list—currently each security agency maintains different criteria and different lists. Second, correlation of names against a list is a hit-and-miss process. This is because Mid Eastern names have several spellings and common usages, and coupled with the fact that given false documentation, an alias can be easily substituted on the crew or passenger manifest without the knowledge or complicity of the ship’s Master (given current procedures). Finally, the sheer volume of names, particularly on cruise line passenger vessels, saturates the ability to clear the vessel and passengers in a reasonable amount of time. Some of these problems are being resolved through greater attention on the part of the cruise-line security forces themselves, and through enhanced communication between federal and private security organizations. Technology using biometric techniques may provide part of the answer but for success, cooperation among international transportation organizations and international security organizations will have to mature substantially. Obviously ship’s manifests can be altered so as to not reveal the true identity of who is onboard (I doubt Osama bin Laden’s name would appear) so it would be further necessary to have bonded loading and inspecting personnel at international ports clearing those vessels bound for the United States.

Almost prophetically the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 (S. 1214), in work for more than two years and passed the Senate by voice vote on December 20, 2001, addresses the vulnerability of our ports and proposes measures to enhance security through coordination of efforts. Comparing our seaports to our land borders and airport security it was conceded that our ports are the weak link security wise. Granted, it’s not a judgmental observation since land borders are relatively easily patrolled and there are only certain airports that accommodate international flights. “It’s difficult to imagine that our seaports have no federal security programs in place, especially given the level of security that we have all witnessed at our airports and land borders,” said Senator Hollings, Chairman of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee. “Our nation’s seaports are international borders serving major population centers, and consequently, we need to be mindful that our ports could be vulnerable to attack.” Economic ramifications play a major role in motivating this legislation as well since, “Businesses sending cargo on ships deserve at least as much security for their products as they would expect if they sent them on a plane,” Senator Graham said. “If businesses lose faith in our ports, the result will be a major blow for our economy.” There is no doubt that the immediate downturn of the economy after September 11 would be repeated if an incident were to occur at one of the ports.

The analogy that perhaps best captures the mission of the Coast Guard regarding thwarting the use of a vessel for a terrorist act is that of plugging holes in a dike—just because you fix one doesn’t guarantee that others won’t spring up. The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 will significantly help standardize and tighten security measures that will tremendously help the Coast Guard meet its mission through some of the following provisions:

**FEDERAL SAFETY AND SECURITY GUIDANCE**

- Creates a national task force to coordinate programs to enhance the security and safety of U.S. seaports and provide long-term solutions for seaport safety issues.
- Requires the U.S. Coast Guard to:
  - Establish local port-security committees to help facilitate and coordinate law enforcement at U.S. seaports in cooperation with private-sector businesses engaged in port operations.
  - Develop standards and procedures for conducting seaport security assessments.
  - Complete no fewer than 10 seaport security assessments annually until it has completed assessments for the 50 ports that it deems the most strategically and economically essential. These 50
ports will develop a security plan that will be submitted to the Coast Guard for approval, one year after the completion of the assessment.

- Requires the U.S. Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration to develop security guidance principles that will serve as a benchmark for the review of security plans.

FUNDING FOR TECHNOLOGY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
- Provides the U.S. Customs Service with $68 million to purchase non-intrusive, screening equipment to help combat illegal cargo trafficking.
- Authorizes the Department of Transportation to provide loan guarantees and direct grants to cover the costs of port security infrastructure improvements and makes available $80 million for fiscal years 2003 through 2006.
- Reauthorizes an extension of tonnage duties through 2006 and designates the revenues specifically for port security infrastructure. This provides $55 million in fiscal year 2003, $56 million in 2004 and $57 million in 2006. Funding for this Act would be direct and would not be subject to appropriations. In addition, the bill would authorize $10 million for each of the fiscal years 2003 through 2006.

COORDINATED EFFORTS, TRAINING, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
- Establishes a training program to certify and train public and private sector seaport security personnel on security, crime, and threats in the maritime environment.
- Requires the U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Treasury and Transportation, and the Attorney General, to work with the states to establish shared dockside inspection facilities at seaports.
- Requires the U.S. Coast Guard to pursue the internal adoption of similar security standards.
- Requires the Department of Transportation, to the extent feasible, to ensure the collection and availability of data relating to crime at or affecting U.S. seaports. Enhances federal sentencing guidelines for any offense related to the theft of goods that are a part of or constitute an interstate or foreign shipment.
- Requires the U.S. Customs Service to improve the reporting of imports at seaports by promulgating regulation to require all ocean manifests to be transmitted in electronic form to Customs in a timely fashion. 

One of the concerns over the upgrading in security of ports is that unlike airports, ports are privately owned and operated and legislating changes will impact on the “bottom line” of the owners. But “the bill authorizes more than $1.1 billion over six years, including grants to local port authorities, plus another $3.3 billion in loan guarantees for local port authorities to finance security improvements. Part of the cost is offset by an extension of the existing tonnage tax on cargo.” This is a quantum leap in securing imports as “the United States has 361 coastal and inland ports that handle 95 percent of the nation’s cargo coming from countries other than Canada or Mexico.” And “currently, the United States has no centralized port authority. Federal, state, and local authorities all share jurisdiction.”

USCGC Morgenthau (WHEC 722) departs homeport in Alameda, California, enroute to a Western Pacific Patrol.
This last point demonstrates an increasingly frustrating aspect of technology outpacing tactics or procedures—that of computer information being plentiful, but isn’t always shared. That is not to suggest information is deliberately withheld from other departments or agencies, rather that individual databases of information are not always connected via the net to be accessible to other agencies. For example, “In April 1999, President Clinton established the Interagency Commission on Crime and security in U.S. Seaports at the urging of Senator Bob Graham (D-Fla.). The Commission was directed to report on four areas: 1) analysis and extent of serious crime; 2) an overview of the specific missions and authorities relevant to federal, state, and local government agencies, as well as the private sector; 3) an assessment of the nature and effectiveness of ongoing coordination among the federal agencies; and 4) recommendations for improving the response of federal, state, and local governments to seaport crime. In August 2000, the Commission concluded it was unable to determine the full extent of serious crime at U.S. seaports due to the lack of a coordinated database.”

Fortunately, these problems are being addressed, with information sharing being at the top of the list.

Admiral Loy, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, stated, “Much has been written on the issue of Homeland Security over the past few years. Much of it has been rather narrow in scope, focusing mainly on ‘Homeland Defense’ as a function of the military.” He recounted an incident that indeed demonstrates it is a communal frame of mind that will prevent the unchallenged attacks against our country. Every citizen has an inherent responsibility to report anything out of the ordinary. As I once saw on a detective series on television, the star said that how to be alert was to observe, “People, places, the things they do, the time that they do them.” The case Admiral Loy recounted was of a river pilot onboard a ship inbound to the port of New Orleans who noticed a man videotaping the Crescent City Bridge. He reported his observation to the Captain of the Port, who arranged a pier-side boarding to investigate. A crewmember jumped overboard and when the New Orleans Police Department apprehended him, he had a large amount of money and a list of telephone numbers, one of which belonged to a person on the FBI’s most wanted list of terrorists. Even though there is no law specifically prohibiting the videotaping of a bridge, there was something concerning the circumstances under which it was being done that alerted the pilot to report it to the COTP. We live in a free society, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be aware and report suspicious events going on around us.

The same principle applies to the high seas. Maritime Domain Awareness is the overarching concept that will tie in every available asset—“International and domestic cooperation, both civil and military is essential in this regard, because we can’t hope to ensure our security by working alone or by waiting until the threats have already crossed the thresholds of our ports. Awareness is the key to preventing the potential threats from being realized and becoming a consequence to manage.” Admiral Loy also noted that, “The biggest challenge facing our marine transportation system is how to ensure legitimate cargo is not unnecessarily delayed as we and other nations introduce enhanced security procedures.” As in any venture, the percent of success goes up with the amount of time and resources devoted to it. The down side is that the more stringent the controls, typically the cost in dollars and time increase as well. This has the trickle down effect of dramatically slowing the importation process as well as driving up the cost of goods throughout the distribution system. Along with some of the aforementioned strategies, the use of new non-invasive technologies to detect illegal cargo will allow for quicker inspections and more accurate detection of illicit cargo, thereby having a minimal impact on the ship’s schedule.

As Admiral Loy stated in his speech on October 31, “Our present challenge is to find the ‘new normal’ port security posture, while returning to our [Coast Guard’s] other missions.” This is because of the drain on resources to meet the initial crisis response by diverting assets from the other areas of responsibility such as counter-drug, fisheries, and migrant interdiction patrols—and this does not even address the inland navigable waterways. Even the call up of the reservists is a surge effort that was never intentioned to be sustained. Therefore even with the passage of the Port and Maritime Security act, the Coast Guard is straining to maintain the security necessary to preclude another attack. Despite the press’s emphasis on airline safety, the vulnerability from the sea remains a challenge and without additional resources and improved detection devices for the Coast Guard, one of the “holes” in the dike may go unnoticed until it’s too late.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
12 “NYPD Blue,” Steven Bochco and David Milch, circa 1998.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.

About the author:
Colin Claus has been with the Joint Center for Lessons Learned since March 1997 and has been extensively involved in exercise data collection. His is employed by Cubic Applications Inc., as a military analyst in the Analysis Support Branch of the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) Support Team (JST), in Suffolk, Virginia. He has directly supported nine exercises from planning through execution and post-exercise report drafting. A retired Naval aviator, he flew executive transport, mountain search and rescue, and carrier battle group supply. This is his third article for the Bulletin.
INTEGRATING JOINT OPERATIONS BEYOND THE FSCL:
IS CURRENT DOCTRINE ADEQUATE? (Section 4)

By Dwayne P. Hall, LTC, USA

Initiatives And Recommendations

Air and ground commanders must be constantly on the alert to devise, and use, new methods of cooperation...There can never be too many projectiles in a battle.
—General George S. Patton, Jr., 1945.

The issues of who establishes the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL); who controls fires short and beyond it; what separates the subordinate and higher commander’s deep battles, and; what separates Army and Air Force responsibilities, have been studied in detail for the last 10-20 years. There are literally hundreds of books and monographs that reveal very innovative solutions. Most solutions fall in the category of new organizations, increased training, improved doctrine and TTP, or new systems.

This study finds that several of these solutions are applicable and needed. However, needed above all is a set of guidelines that clearly designate roles and responsibilities for the Services, and provide directives on how Services will operate in a joint environment.

Joint Pub 3-09 [See editor’s note at end.]

JP 3-09 is the joint initiative currently underway to resolve the deep battle integration issue. The main focus is the integration of operations that occur between joint forces under the umbrella of “Joint Fire Support.” Joint fire support may include the lethal effects of close air support (by fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft), air interdiction (AI) within component boundaries, naval surface fire support, artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal effects such as electronic warfare (EW).

A review of JP 3-09 reveals that, like most joint doctrine, it is very general and non-descriptive. This allows joint TTP, Services, and combatant commanders the flexibility to fill in needed details at the appropriate levels. However, when contrasted specifically with the FSCL issue, several areas are not adequately addressed.

First, the interface and overlaps between joint fire support, interdiction, deep operations, and maneuver, are not clearly defined. Vague statements such as—“detailed integration with the fire and maneuver of the supported force may be required.” The term “fire support” connotes a concept of supporting maneuver. This suggests integration with maneuver will be required. These type phrases foster the same type controversy that now clouds the definition and requirements for coordinating, implementing, and moving the FSCL.

Secondly, Europe, Korea, and ARCENT identified a requirement for a line other than the FSCL (RIPL, DBSL) for use at the theater or operational level. Specifically, a line is needed as a separator for deep battle responsibilities, interdiction and air-ground efforts. This was a key issue in ARCENT and Corps AARs from
Operation Desert Storm (ODS). JP 3-09 does not directly address this military-wide, joint issue.

Finally, this Pub has been in draft form for at least six years [Published May 98 -ed.]. The first indication that the controversy may be coming to an end occurred 4-5 December 1996, at the Army-Air Force Warfighter Conference at Fort Bliss, Texas. During the conference, the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff discussed this very issue. The two service chiefs made the following agreements on joint fires, fire support, and JP 3-09: 1) Deleting the notional graphic depicting joint fires and related language from JP 3-09; 2) Changing the name of the Joint Forces Fires Coordinator (JFFC) so it does not connote any command function and would be an option primarily for JTFs; 3) Defining Elements of the fires hierarchy in terms of “effects” rather than specific platforms; 4) Identifying the surface component commander as the supported commander for joint fires throughout his area of operations. Beyond the surface component commander’s (SCC) boundaries, the air component commander (ACC) is the supported commander. In the deliberate planning process, all targets for joint fires will be coordinated to the maximum extent possible, and; 5) Specifying all targets beyond the FSCL and inside the SCC’s area of operations will be coordinated with all affected commanders to the maximum extent possible. If not practical because of time, sensitivity, emergency or exceptional circumstances, then all affected commanders will be informed with the commander executing the mission accepting the operational risk.

Although these agreements are a first step, they will probably not resolve the issues. When examined in detail, these agreements simply bring JP 3-09 in line with other often contradictory joint publications. Still to be resolved are: 1) Marine Corps views on the FSCL agreements; 2) The control mechanism for integrating, coordinating, and separating interdiction and deep battle, and; 3) The agency responsible for implementing and updating the FSCL. These open issues and the five or so year delay in updating other affected publication, regulations, and TTP, indicate that it may still be some time before a comprehensive solution is in place.

**Recommendations**

The results of this study indicate three actions are required to resolve the issues surrounding the FSCL and deep battle operations: 1) Publish JP 3-09 including proper control measures for separating roles and responsibilities, while integrating functions and effects; 2) Update JP 1-02 to reflect preciseness in definitions, and eliminate proliferation in terminology; 3) Implement the Joint Force Fires Coordinator (JFFC) concept to orchestrate the integration of fires and maneuver at the joint operational level.

A search of the Center For Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and the Joint Universal Lessons Learn System (JULLS) databases yield over fifty-five (55) AAR or lessons learned comments from the field on fire support coordination. Most deal directly with the FSCL or a related fire support coordination measure. The need is apparent. Operation Desert Storm provided an opportunity to test the new JFACC concept and the fire support system. The operation provided the feedback necessary to correct several deficiencies in our joint fire support doctrine. These lessons learned should be incorporated into joint doctrine and published soonest.

**Joint Pub 3-09**

Prior to publishing JP 3-09, three corrections are required. First, the definition of FSCL needs to be clarified. A recommended definition would read as follows:

A fire support coordination measure established by the Corps level commander or Commander Amphibious Task Force within their boundaries after consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, tactical air, and affected commanders. The FSCL is used to prevent fratricide, deconflict efforts of the close and deep battle, and coordinate fires of all weapon systems using any type munitions against surface targets. Supporting elements, operating within the geographical boundaries of the establishing unit, to include tactical air, may attack targets forward of the FSCL without prior coordination with the establishing unit provided the attack will not produce adverse surface or air effects (from ground level up to the coordinating altitude) on or to the rear of
the line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must be coordinated with establishing unit commander. This definition and purpose applies to all US military forces.

This definition clarifies several issues identified in ODS. First, it labels the FSCL as a corps tactical measure so that all will recognize that it applies to a particular corps’ sector. Additionally, subordinate, supporting, adjacent, and tactical air units will know exactly with whom coordination is required. Second, it requires coordination with the tactical air commander prior to implementation or change. Third, it eliminates the guess work of who can attack beyond it and with whom coordination is required. Fourth, it adds the old coordinating altitude back to protect aircraft either supporting the corps or transiting the corps sector to attack deep. It requires the Air and Artillery to coordinate if they are going to transit the others attack space. Finally, it removes the ambiguity of application—it applies to the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines.

The next correction to JP 3-09 is that it must add additional fire support coordination measures that are applicable at the operational level. This can be a RIPL, DBSL, or as proposed by the Institute for Defense, a Joint Fire Support Coordination Line (JFSCL). The name of the measure is not important. What is important is that some type measure is entrenched in doctrine, that can be added to joint and service curriculums doctrines, and TTPs. Additionally, this will eliminate the theater specific operational measures that were “implemented on the fly” during ODS.

Lastly, JP 3-09 needs to clearly address the distinction between joint fire support and interdiction. The two concepts are used interchangeably as is air interdiction and interdiction. This is part of the current problem with fires, deep battle and interdiction. Additionally, the JFACC’s role requires clear articulation to ensure cooperation and integration beginning at the planning process.

**Joint Pub 1-02**

JP 1-02 is the bible for joint doctrinal terminology. Yet, this document does not define newer concepts such as joint fire support and joint precision interdiction. Additionally, there are concepts used at the tactical levels (BAI, Deep Battle) that are joint operations, and warrant a universal joint definition. This would help resolve proliferation of terms and concepts within the Services and theaters that causes confusion. A case in point is the concept of interdiction. There are currently four different interdiction concepts, of which only two are defined in JP 1-02, interdiction and air interdiction. Overall, there is Interdiction, Air Interdiction, Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI—NATO and Korea), and Joint Precision Interdiction.

Additionally, deep battle or deep operations are universally used terms, at the joint operational level, yet not defined in the joint dictionary. Definitions would help eliminate the individual Service and theater interpretations of their meanings. Manuals of this type (JP 1-02) require updating at least biannually, if not in hard copy, on-line through the Joint Electronic Library.

**Joint Force Fires Coordinator (JFFC)**

Synonymous with the concept of fire support is a fire support element (FSE) to integrate and synchronize fire support assets and their effects with the maneuver concept. From company through corps levels, this concept has proven to be indispensable. The only land maneuver level that does not include a Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) or Fire Support Officer (FSO), and FSE, is the joint land/surface component level. The Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD), formerly known as the Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) was proposed as the solution. However, the BCD is colocated with the JFACC and serves a vital function there. The JFFC is needed with the LCC headquarters to perform the synchronization and integration function, full-time, as at the corps level. He would then pass the air portions of the process directly to the BCD for translation to the JFACC. This solution, also identified numerous times in ODS lessons learned and issues, would help deconflict several coordination problems between the services.
Conclusions

Current joint doctrine does not provide clear, concise terminology, graphical control measures, and a battlefield framework necessary to integrate assets in deep battle operations. Conflicts between the Services resulted in units and staffs improvising by implementing non-doctrinal control measures in the midst of preparing for combat in the combat zone. Non-doctrinal use of established terminology and concepts resulted in confusion and contributed to missed opportunity to further de-militarize the Iraqi Army.

The intent of joint doctrine is to provide a set of fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward a common objective. Although ODS was a resounding success, this may have been due more to the ingenuity of the leaders, soldiers, airman, sailors, and marines, than a well-refined doctrine. Also contributing to the success was the strategy of fighting a sequential war instead of a simultaneous ground-air war. This minimized the impact of the doctrinal shortfalls.

The FSCL issue has gone unresolved since prior to ODS. A control measure of this importance—coordinating the efforts of multiple Services, assisting in fratricide prevention, and facilitating ground-soldier preparation for going face-to-face with an enemy, is too important to be debated. This measure requires universal use and understanding by all Services. There should be no individual Service interpretations and applications. This is the role of joint doctrine—if the Services cannot resolve the issue, joint doctrine should. This will provide three benefits.

First, a joint directed definition with specific rules for the FSCL and other control measures would facilitate training in Service schools. Less time is lost debating whether a particular measure is right for a particular situation, or whether one service or the other has the correct interpretation. Second, it would facilitate service member transfer from one theater to another. As of today, when service members transfer from Europe to Korea, they have to forget the RIPL, and learn the DBSL. When this same service member transfer stateside to III Corps, the service member has to forget both, and become familiar with the BSL. This causes confusion and detracts from learning, transfer of knowledge, and cooperation.

Finally, it allows leaders and service members to deploy into a theater of combat with a complete understanding of what measures are applicable in what situation. Time spent in ODS re-learning the use of an FSCL; what an RIPL or DBSL means since there are no doctrinal definitions, and; the rules for using them, could have been used for rehearsing combat operations. Standardization would not tie the CINC’s hands or deny him the flexibility to organize his forces for his theater. What it would do is establish a basic understanding and start point from which to deviate for a particular situation or theater. That does not exist with the lack of specificity contained in joint doctrine on control and coordination measures.

Most of the current doctrinal manuals were updated after ODS. However, problems identified by field commanders were not adequately addressed. The next ODS may not provide the luxury of training after entering the theater of operation. Peacetime understanding will enhance wartime execution.

Notes.
3. Maj Michael J. Bradley, Operational Fires: Do They Require a TheaterFSCOORD? (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2d Term AY 88-89).
Bibliography.
Bradley, Maj Michael J. *Operational Fires: Do They Require a Theater FSCOORD?* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2d Term).

Editor’s Note: Though some improvements and clarifications were made to JP 3-09 [May 98] and JP 1-02 April 01 since the publication of this article, many of the points made by this article still exist within joint doctrine. Efforts to clarify the mystique surrounding the issue of integrating joint operations beyond the FSCL still remain.

About the Author
LtCol Dewayne P. Hall, US Army, is an artillery officer with previous assignments as a fire support observer and controller, operations officer, and commander. He has worked closely as a battlefield coordinator of issues between Army and Air Force elements in the field. Colonel Hall is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1997.

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