Steady Security: Consistency in National Security Strategy Ends

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Abstract

STEADY SECURITY: CONSISTENCY IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ENDS by Lt Col Michael A. Wormley, USAF, 45 pages.

This paper’s purpose is very modest. It answers the thesis question, “Have the ends (interests, goals or objectives) specified in the National Security Strategies (NSS) since 1986, been consistent?” For this study, consistent is defined as whether the ends from NSS to NSS have agreed or been basically compatible with each other. The working hypothesis is that there is remarkable consistency in the ends specified in the National Security Strategies published since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

For sake of analysis, this study proposes there are four “enduring” U.S. grand strategy ends: 1) physical security of the U.S., 2) global economy, 3) democracy and human rights, 4) alliances and cooperative security. This paper does not hypothesize as to why there may or may not be consistency among NSS strategy ends. This study is not an analysis of whether implementation of the U.S. security strategy always works towards achieving the ends specified in NSSs. This paper does not attempt to detail the process of how the fourteen NSSs were crafted.

This study concludes that despite the differences in style and format, the ends listed in the fourteen NSSs reviewed show remarkable consistency with each other and the four hypothesized “enduring” ends. Establishing this fact is important, because most scholarship has focused on the output of U.S. foreign policy implementation to deduce consistency. This study focuses on the input of grand strategy ends to establish and propose a possible source of U.S. foreign policy consistency.
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Introduction

The weary U.S. National Security Council staffer stares at the computer in front of him. Just charged with the task of nurturing the next National Security Strategy through to completion, the task ahead seems insurmountable. The staffer knows that the key to producing a complete strategy is determining the goals or ends that one wishes to achieve. Armed with the ends, the ways and means to achieve the ends can naturally flow. The staffer is a bright person and has read the scholarship on the consistency of American foreign policy. Of course, that scholarship has concentrated on the accomplishments or outputs of U.S. foreign policy as the basis for its analysis. The staffer wonders if the claim of foreign policy consistency is related to steady goals at the inception of American grand security strategy.

This study has a very modest purpose. It will establish whether U.S. National Security Strategies have published consistent ends or goals. This study should ease the crafting of future security strategies and the implementation of foreign policy in the absence of recent written guidance. If the ends of U.S. foreign policy have remained consistent, then there is no excuse for inaction due to lack of guidance. Pursuit of enduring ends is easy to defend. If the ends remain consistent, then starting the draft of new National Security Strategies will be easy. Steady security in grand strategy may be as simple as consistent goals.

The definition of grand strategy in the Department of Defense (DoD) dictionary is interesting. The entry says, "see national security strategy." The DoD dictionary defines national security strategy as "the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security." A simple definition of strategy is the identification of ways and means to achieve desired ends. Re-phrased, strategy is the combination of methods and resources

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to achieve goals. It is instructive that the official Defense Department definition of grand strategy is the same as national security strategy. The grand strategy of any nation-state is important because grand strategy is the capstone that establishes the highest ends that all instruments of national power should seek to achieve. In the United States, the National Security Strategy report that presidential administrations produce is the written embodiment of American grand strategy. Ultimately, this paper is about the grand strategy of the United States.

This paper will answer the question, “Have the ends (interests, goals or objectives) specified in the National Security Strategies (NSS) since 1986, been consistent?” For this study, consistent is defined as whether the ends from NSS to NSS have agreed or been basically compatible with each other. The working hypothesis is that there is remarkable consistency in the ends specified in the National Security Strategies published since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. If the hypothesis is true, this paper seeks to influence future security strategy planners and executioners to act in accordance with these enduring ends. For sake of analysis, this study proposes there are four “enduring” U.S. grand strategy ends: 1) physical security of the U.S., 2) global economy, 3) democracy and human rights, 4) alliances and cooperative security.

Physical security of the U.S. is as simple as defending America (people and property) from physical harm or loss. The global economy end is defined as safeguarding and expanding a global free market economy in which the American economy is competitive and vibrant. The democracy and human rights end speaks to an obligation to spread and safeguard basic human

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rights globally, in order to produce stability in the international system. The alliances and cooperative security end refers to a U.S. predilection to work with other nation states to hopefully defuse crisis short of armed conflict. These four hypothesized ends will form the yardstick against which the NSS published ends will be compared against to determine consistency.

The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act legislates that the President submits an annual National Security Strategy to Congress along with the annual budget submission. The rationale behind this timing is to allow Congress the ability to review how well the Presidential budget submission resources the ways and means needed to achieve the ends specified in the NSS. Since 1986, there have been four presidential administrations that have submitted grand strategies or national security strategies to Congress. The administrations of Ronald W. Reagan, George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush combined have produced fourteen National Security Strategy documents. It would be reasonable to assume that four different presidential administrations and fourteen separate documents might specify distinctly different sets of ends they would like to achieve. The evidence presented in this paper will prove if, despite their differences, the ends specified in the National Security Strategies show remarkable agreement or consistency.

This paper does not hypothesize as to why there may be consistency among U.S. grand strategy ends. The paper will present evidence from the source documents of potential reasons for consistency in ends. The scholarship on the influence of strategic culture by strategists like Colin Gray may provide answers as to why there may be congruity. Some pundits bemoan the requirement for a president to produce a National Security Strategy. Harvard University's

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3 See the appendix for the text of section 603 of U.S. Public Law 99-433; (Washington, D.C., 1 Oct 1986); referred to as Goldwater Nichols Act or GNA.

Professor of International Relations, Stephen M. Walt writes, “No government can ever stick to its strategic vision with complete fidelity.” 5 While the execution of an administration’s grand strategy will not always be in accordance with the details spelled out in their grand strategy, the ends specified should always retain their fidelity. Accordingly, this paper is not an analysis of whether implementation of the U.S. security strategy always works towards achieving the ends specified in National Security Strategies.

This paper does not attempt to detail the process of how the fourteen grand strategy documents were crafted. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Director of Political-Military Studies, Dr. Don Snider, produced an excellent review of the processes that interacted to develop the first six National Security Strategies. 6 Building off his experience as the primary National Security Council staffer assigned the task of producing the first Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated National Security Strategy of 1987, Dr. Snider explains the dynamics and tensions surrounding the crafting of a NSS. There is a need for further scholarship on the production process of the eight subsequent National Security Strategies since Dr. Snider’s paper.

A fundamental assumption of this paper is that National Security Strategy implementation over time is more successful if the ends remain consistent. Put simply, if one knows where they are heading, it is easier to arrive there. If the hypothesis is proven, this study proposes to convince U.S. security actors to always act in accordance with the consistent goals of U.S. grand strategy. In the absence of policy prescriptions, practitioners should execute in accordance with the consistent U.S. security ends. Hopefully for U.S. security implementers, the National Security Strategy ends will appear to have remained consistent.


If the weary staffer reads this study, they will find three analysis sections follow this introduction that establishes what this paper is and is not about. The analysis sections are organized in chronological order and review the ends in the primary source documents. Section one will analyze the goals of the first five National Security Strategies crafted under Presidents Ronald W. Reagan & George H.W. Bush. Section two analyzes the goals of the seven National Security Strategies of President William J. Clinton. The analysis sections conclude with an examination of the goals in the two National Security Strategies produced by the administration of President George W. Bush. The paper’s conclusion section closes out with a review of the facts, findings and prescriptions of the research.

Reagan/Bush National Security Strategies

The five National Security Strategies published after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act by the Reagan and Bush presidential administrations paved the way for future National Security Strategies. The two administrations shared Republican Party roots and the Cold War with the Soviet Union. The two administrations also shared consistent foreign policy goals. The five grand strategy documents that the two administrations produced expressed consistent ends.

It is instructive to quickly review the National Security Strategies that the Reagan administration produced prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. A short review will illustrate a continuity of security ends or goals across the span of that administration. The Reagan administration produced two grand strategy documents prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act. They are both classified National Security Decision Directives published by the National Security Council.

The classified National Security Decision Directive 32, U.S. National Security Strategy, was finished on 20 May 1982. It was declassified in February of 1996. The document is
essentially a decision by President Reagan to use a national security study as the basis of a NSS.\textsuperscript{7}

The document outlines eleven objectives:

1. Deter and defeat threats to the security of the United States.
2. Strengthen alliances and form coalitions.
3. Contain the Soviet threat.
5. Restrain, discourage, and weaken the Soviet alliance system.
7. Ensure U.S. and allies access to foreign markets and resources.
8. Ensure U.S. access to space and the oceans.
9. Discourage proliferation of nuclear weapons.
10. Encourage and promote economic development and humane social orders.
11. Promote a well-functioning international economic system.

A quick review reveals that these eleven objectives boil down to four basic goals. First, ensure the security of the U.S. from all threats, but with specific enumerated objectives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Second, it is essential to U.S. security to build a strong global economy. Third, the stability and security of the world necessitates promoting human rights and the rule of law. Lastly, strengthen the alliance and coalition systems. All of these goals are consistent with the four hypothesized categories of ends that the later Goldwater Nichols Act mandated National Security Strategy ends will be compared against.

In addition to the congruity with the four categories of ends, the threats specified in the 1982 document are fascinating. It is interesting that the list of threats to U.S. security in this May 1982 document, other than the Soviet Union, is also remarkably consistent with any reasonable

lists of threats to the United States in 2010. The following passage which lists the threats of the 1982 document can be pasted into any current list of threats to U.S. security. "Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient economies...growing scarcity of resources, such as oil, increasing terrorism, the dangers of nuclear proliferation, reticence on the part of a number of western countries." 8

The classified National Security Decision Directive 238, Revised National Security Strategy, which was completed on 2 September 1986, is not declassified and thus not available. The Federation of American Scientists state on their website that it, "has not been reviewed for release or release has been denied in full." 9 It is an interesting side note that it was published just one month prior to the Goldwater-Nichols being enacted as law on 1 October 1986. This becomes more intriguing when this fact is combined with Dr. Don M. Snider’s observation that the Reagan administration only had 3-4 months to build a National Security Strategy. 10 The January 1987 National Security Strategy should have been able to build significantly from the September 1986 National Security Strategy.

The January 1987 document built a solid baseline for the thirteen subsequent National Security Strategies. In it, the authors discuss how the goals and objectives "are not intended to be applied mechanically or automatically, but constitute a general guide for policy development in specific situations." 11 In other words, policy crafters and implementers are supposed to use the specified NSS ends to guide their actions.


The 1987 National Security Strategy is organized with a review of five security interests and then provides a detailed discussion of five distinct objectives that support the five security interests. The document states the five key interests of the United States as: survival as a free nation, a healthy and growing economy, growth of freedom and free market economies linked by an open international trading system, a stable and secure world absent major threats, and healthy U.S. alliance relationships. The crafters of the strategy then enumerate five objectives, which this paper identifies as the ends, to guide securing the five interests.

The five ends are:

1. Maintain the security of the U.S. and our allies.
2. Respond to the challenges of the global economy.
3. Defend and advance the cause of democracy, freedom, and human rights globally.
4. Peacefully resolve disputes and regional conflicts which affect U.S. interests.
5. Build effective and favorable relationships with all nations with whom there is a basis of shared concern.

Each of the five major objectives has at least three sub-objectives which policy crafters and implementers should use to guide their efforts. These five specified ends easily fit into the four analysis categories of ends.

In the preface to the 1988 National Security Strategy, President Reagan states, “the fundamentals of our strategy change little from year to year; our interests and objectives are derived from enduring values.” While it is not the purpose of this paper to explain why the ends are consistent, the 1988 National Security Strategy is the first of the fourteen Goldwater-Nichols

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12 Ibid., 4.
13 Ibid., 4-5.
Act security strategies to discuss why this consistency phenomenon exists. Accordingly, a short review of the explanation in the 1988 document is warranted.

The explanation of consistent ends begins by quoting Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Walter Lippman,

The behavior of nations over a long period of time is the most reliable, though not the only index of their national interests. For though their interests are not eternal, they are remarkably persistent...There is no great mystery why this should be: the facts of geography are permanent...thus successive generations of men tend to face the same recurrent problems and to react to them in more or less habitual ways.\textsuperscript{15}

Based on geopolitical theory, the 1988 National Security Strategy continues by explaining how the geography of the United States dictates its enduring interests and goals. This grand strategy paper argues the physical geographic isolation of the United States from much of the world explains its enduring interest in physical security, global economy, and strong alliances. Using the terminology of Sir Halford John Mackinder's geopolitical theory of the Heartland, the 1988 National Security Strategy explains the most basic security interest of America is avoiding a hostile state dominating the Eurasian landmass. Mackinder was an English geographer, credited as one of the founders of the study of geopolitics. Sir Halford John Mackinder summarized his heartland theory as:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
who rules the World-Island controls the world.\textsuperscript{16}

The 1988 NSS concludes that the physical security of the United States is ultimately derived from working to avoid any nation from dominating what Mackinder labels as the

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 1.

\textsuperscript{16}Martin Ira Glassner, Political Geography (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993), 226. This text tells the story of how Mackinder delivered a paper entitled "The Geographical Pivot of History" to the Royal Geographic Society in 1904 which outlined his proposed heartland theory. This text also posits Mackinder as an early advocate of geopolitics.
heartland. In 1988, the Soviet Union represented the chief threat to domination of the heartland. However, the National Security Strategy intimates that U.S. physical security has always been predicated on the avoidance of a dominant nation state in the heartland. The 1988 NSS points to the U.S. entry in both World Wars as proof of consistent attempts to avoid hegemonic control of the heartland. The document continues with an explanation on why the threat of intercontinental nuclear weapons has modified the threat to the physical security of the United States.

The 1988 National Security Strategy explains that the enduring interest of a vibrant global economy flows from the geopolitical reality that the American economy is reliant on global trade due to its physical isolation from much of the world. Most of the U.S. trading partners and many of the resources needed to sustain a vibrant domestic economy can only be reached by leaving the relatively physically isolated nation.

Furthermore, this dynamic of physical isolation also drives the U.S. need to be able to project power. All the instruments of national power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) must be able to project around the globe. National power projection allows the U.S. to advance its interests and goals globally with unity of effort. The authors of the National Security Strategy imply that unlimited power projection is unaffordable and unattainable, so reliance on a strong alliance system is an enduring basic security interest of the U.S. The alliance system dynamic of sharing responsibilities “multiplies the strength of all.”17 Thus the 1988 National Security Strategy concludes that enduring U.S. goals of physical security, global economy, and strong alliances are directly tied to “unchanging geographic considerations.”18

Flowing from the discussion of the historical dimensions of consistent American security strategy, the 1988 document copies the five interests and five objectives of the 1987 NSS. The

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18 Ibid., 2.
five key interests of the U.S. remain survival as a free nation, healthy and growing economy, a stable and secure world absent major threats, growth of freedom and free market economies linked by an open international trading system, and healthy U.S. alliance relationships.\textsuperscript{19} The crafters of the 1988 National Security Strategy also flow the same five objectives, which this paper identifies as the ends, to guide securing the five interests.

The five ends are:

1. Maintain the security of the U.S. and our allies.
2. Respond to the challenges of the global economy.
3. Defend and advance the cause of democracy, freedom, and human rights globally.
4. Peacefully resolve disputes and regional conflicts which affect U.S. interests.
5. Build effective and favorable relationships with all nations with whom there is a basis of shared concern.\textsuperscript{20}

Accordingly, these five ends still easily fit into the four specified categories of ends for analysis. Exactly like the 1987 NSS, each of the five major objectives also have at least three sub-objectives which policy crafters and implementers should use to guide their efforts. The Reagan administration delivered two grand strategy documents which set the course for the incoming Bush administration.

President George H.W. Bush delivered his first National Security Strategy to Congress in March 1990 on the heels of competitive elections in communist Poland and Hungary, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the widespread crumbling of communist control in Eastern Europe. In light

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., 3-4.
of and despite all the “breath-taking” change, President Bush unequivocally states, “our goals and interests remain constant.”

The 1990 National Security Strategy begins by reviewing why four enduring elements (physical security, democracy, global economy, and strong alliances) of American national security exist. Similar to the 1988 NSS, it discusses the geographic reality of the United States as an isolated state separated by two large oceans and the concomitant influence on American security. It also explains why the geostrategic realities of the United States drive it to obtain the ability to project power to secure economic and diplomatic stability. The necessity to avoid domination of the Eurasian land mass is also reviewed.

Notably, the 1990 National Security Strategy puts forth a justification for a strong alliance system that is novel. It asserts that a “common moral vision” committed to democracy and antithetical to totalitarianism animates the U.S. commitment to alliances. The discussion on the enduring emphasis on alliances concludes with the phrase, “The American commitment to an alliance strategy, therefore, has a more enduring basis than simply the perception of a common enemy.” Thus the United States of America enters alliances not just because of a common threat, but also to share fellowship with nations that share a similar vision of democracy.

Building from the review of the enduring elements of U.S. security, the National Security Strategy moves on to enumerating the interests and objectives for the 1990’s. Unlike the Reagan National Security Strategies, the first Bush grand strategy document combines interests and objectives to specify the ends his security strategy is formulated to achieve. The four “ends” are:

1. Survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation.

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22 Ibid., 1.

23 Ibid.
2. Healthy and growing U.S. economy to support national endeavors at home and abroad.

3. Stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.

4. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.²⁴

These four ends or objectives are a near perfect match with the four analysis categories of ends. Similar to the Reagan National Security Strategies, each of the four interests/objectives have at least three sub-objectives to inform the implementation of foreign policy.

The Gulf War against Iraq from August 1990 until March 1991 dominated the National Security Council staff and led to the late publication of the August 1991 National Security Strategy.²⁵ Additionally, the rapidly changing political events in the Soviet Union delayed its submission to Congress. These changing political dynamics in the Soviet Union culminated in the August 1991 coup that ultimately retained Boris Yeltsin as Russian President. Informed by the events in Russia and the success of the coalition in the Gulf War, President Bush begins the 1991 NSS with the discussion of a new world order. The 1991 grand strategy document proclaims the Cold War is over and it is time for the emergence of literally a new world order. The “collapse of the Communist idea” allows the growth of a “new international system in accordance with (democratic) values and ideals.”²⁶ Consistent with the 1990 version, the 1991

²⁴Ibid., 2-3.
National Security Strategy proclaims, “the positive common basis of our alliances—the defense of
democratic values—must be reaffirmed and strengthened.”

Despite the monumental changes in the geopolitical situation, the 1991 National Security
Strategy (the first post-Cold War NSS) retains the same four enduring security strategy ends from
the 1990 version. With minor word and order changes, they are:

1. Survival of the U.S. as a free and independent nation.
2. Healthy and growing U.S. economy to support national endeavors at home and abroad.
3. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.
4. Stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and
democratic institutions flourish.

When superimposed over the four analysis categories of ends, these 1991 National Security Strategy ends are a near perfect match. Each of these four enduring interests/objectives also enumerates at least four sub-objectives to guide the efforts of U.S. security actors.

The 1993 National Security Strategy went to Congress along with the presidential budget proposal, in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, on 19 January 1993 (the last day of the Bush administration). Notably, the 1993 version is the first National Security Strategy to list the “values that define us as a nation—freedom, compassion, justice, opportunity, the rule of law, and hope.” It also proclaims that the forty-five year old grand strategy bumper sticker of

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27Ibid., 1.
28Ibid., 3-4.
containment is dead and heralds the birth of a new bumper sticker of democratic peace. "Our policy has one overriding goal: real peace...an enduring democratic peace based on shared values."\textsuperscript{31} It goes on to announce a peace dividend that releases the United States from the burden of the military requirements for containment. This peace dividend births the "unprecedented opportunity to promote our interests rather than simply defend them."\textsuperscript{32}

With this document, President Bush lays the foundation for a fundamental change in the tone of American grand strategy from the inherently defensive posture of containment to the offensive posture of democratic peace. However, the security strategy ends do not change appreciably. The four hypothesized types of ends including physical security of the U.S., democracy and human rights, alliances and cooperative security, and the global economy remain.

With new verbiage, the 1993 National Security Strategy outlines the five national interests and objectives that serve as the security strategy ends. They are listed as:

1. Security of the U.S. as a free and independent nation.
2. Global and regional stability which encourages peace.
3. Open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide.
4. An open international trading and economic system which benefits all participants.
5. Enduring global faith that America can and will lead collective response to world crises.\textsuperscript{33}

Even with a declaration of a fundamental shift in the focus of U.S. grand strategy, the 1993 National Security Strategy still claims the same four basic goals of physical security of the U.S., democracy and human rights, alliances and cooperative security, and the global economy as the ends towards which U.S. policy should work. The 1993 document concludes with a

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., ii.
\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., 3.
confirmation of this analysis. "The fundamental values that have guided this Nation for over two centuries have not changed. Our basic national interests and objectives and the requirement for American leadership are still the same. But our strategy has changed..."34 The strategy changes fundamentally because the ways and means specified to achieve the ends have changed.

The five Goldwater-Nichols Act-mandated National Security Strategies of the Reagan and Bush administrations were written during large, dynamic changes in the global geopolitical situation. A grand strategy defined by containment was discarded after more than forty-five plus years of operation. In light of the evidence and despite a fundamental change in U.S. security strategy, the ends specified in all six NSSs reviewed in this section show remarkable consistency. The consistency of the ends could logically be explained by the consistency in Republican Party Presidents. However, the 1988 National Security Strategy convincingly postulates a geostrategic theory of "unchanging geographic considerations" as the reason for consistent ends.35 The physical security of the U.S., democracy and human rights, alliances and cooperative security, and the global economy hold as congruent ends throughout all six National Security Strategies analyzed in this section.

The following table captures how the ends specified in the five Reagan/Bush Goldwater-Nichols Act-mandated National Security Strategies are logically arrayed under the four categories of ends this scholarship uses for comparison.

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34Ibid., 21.
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<td>Global economy</td>
<td>Foster political freedom, human rights &amp; democratic institutions</td>
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**Clinton National Security Strategies**

The seven National Security Strategies produced during President William J. Clinton’s two-term presidency reflect a different writing style than his predecessors. Published on the heels of the Cold War’s conclusion, they grapple with what the coming security narrative should become. Despite the change from Republican to Democrat political party dominance in the White House, the ends specified in the Clinton National Security Strategies remain consistent with each other and the preceding administrations.
On 21 July 1994, President William J. Clinton sends his first of seven National Security Strategies to Congress late.\textsuperscript{36} The inaugural grand strategy document is delivered almost six months after his first federal budget proposal and after it underwent twenty-one drafts.\textsuperscript{37} The 1994 National Security Strategy is notable for two reasons. The change in the grand strategy meta-narrative or ‘bumper sticker’ and the methodology used to derive the ends in the strategy.

As discussed in the last section, the Bush administration delivered the 1993 version to Congress on its last day in power. That security strategy was notable for its pronouncement that the U.S. grand strategy meta-narrative of containment was dead. Democratic peace was proclaimed as the replacement and expected to guide the Clinton administration’s national security policy. However, the inaugural Clinton National Security Strategy dismisses Bush’s democratic peace and announces engagement and enlargement as the replacement. The new grand strategy meta-narrative is defined by engagement with the global community and enlargement of the community of free-market democracies.\textsuperscript{38}

The other interesting aspect of the first Clinton grand strategy paper is the explicit use of the United States Constitution to derive the security strategy ends. The administration believes that the preamble of the Constitution sets the basic, fundamental goals of all U.S. security strategy.\textsuperscript{39}

To provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.


\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., 2.
Armed with this constitutional basis, the 1994 National Security Strategy outlines three mutually supportive central goals/components:

1. Security by maintaining a strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security measures.
2. Open foreign markets and spur global economic growth.
3. Promotion of democracy abroad.\textsuperscript{40}

While proclaiming these three ends, this document clearly ties the source of the security goals to the foundational U.S. Constitution. This NSS starts a Clinton administration trend of combining the ends of physical security with alliances and cooperative security. The Clinton administration also explicitly combines democracy and human rights into a meta-goal of promote democracy. This NSS also explicitly declares freedom as the core value of the United States.\textsuperscript{41}

Separated by only seven months, the February 1995 National Security Strategy is, not surprisingly, almost a verbatim carbon copy of the 1994 version. At the end of his preface to the document, President Clinton inserts the only substantial change from his previous National Security Strategy preface. The president posits an American cherished goal stated as, “a more secure world where democracy and free markets know no borders.”\textsuperscript{42}

Still uniting the ends to the preamble of the Constitution, the 1995 National Security Strategy specifies the same three central goals/components as the 1994 version:

1. Security by maintaining a strong defense capability and promoting cooperative security measures.
2. Open foreign markets and spur global economic growth.

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 2, 19. In the amplification section on the democracy goal, the authors explain the goal as promoting democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., 1.

3. Promotion of democracy abroad.\textsuperscript{43}

The 1995 National Security Strategy is different than all the preceding six grand strategy documents in its discussion of a taxonomy or model of national interests. In the section discussing when and how to use the United States military, this grand strategy epistle presents a model of national interests.\textsuperscript{44} The model consists of three basic categories of national interests: vital, important, and humanitarian. The Clinton administration defines vital interests as being of "broad, overriding importance to the survival, security and vitality of our national entity – the defense of U.S. territory, citizens, allies and economic well-being."\textsuperscript{45} Important interests are those in which American national survival is not at stake. However, the "national well-being and the character of the world in which we live" are affected.\textsuperscript{46} Humanitarian interests are comprised of all disaster or catastrophic incidents in which the U.S. armed forces may respond. The inclusion of this model is remarkable because it is implicitly only to be applied to the military instrument of national power.

The February 1996 National Security Strategy is also essentially a copy of the previous two Clinton versions. The only substantial difference in the ends specified is the explicit inclusion of diplomacy in the first security strategy goal. As listed in this version of the Clinton grand strategy, the three central goals/components are:

1. Security by maintaining a strong defense capability and employing effective diplomacy to promote cooperative security measures.

2. Open foreign markets and spur global economic growth.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., 2-3 and 22. In the amplification section on the democracy goal, the authors explain the goal as promoting democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid., 12.

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid.
3. Promotion of democracy abroad

The first three Clinton administration National Security Strategies are essentially the same. They are notable for their connection of the preamble to the United States Constitution to contemporary American security ends. The adoption of engagement and enlargement as the U.S. grand strategy meta-narrative is also noteworthy. Lastly, the establishment of a national interests model for application in informing whether or not to use the United States military is remarkable. However, they all specify three ends that are entirely consistent with the previous five Reagan/Bush National Security Strategies and the four types of ends of the hypothesis.

The May 1997 National Security Strategy is delivered to Congress after President Clinton secures and starts his second term in office. This grand strategy document is notable for the dismissal of engagement and enlargement as the grand strategy bumper sticker. The text of this report retains discussion of the concepts of U.S. leadership and engagement with the world’s nations and enlargement of the community of free market democracies. However, the explicit statement of engagement and enlargement is omitted from this grand strategy.

"A National Security Strategy for a New Century" is the title of the 1997 version. In the preface, President Clinton modifies the cherished goal of the 1995 and 1996 versions with a more American-centric flavor. The President writes, "Our cherished goal--a more secure and prosperous America in a more peaceful and prosperous world where democracy and free markets know no limits." Despite relinquishing engagement and enlargement and modifying the cherished goal, the NSS for a New Century retains the same three ends focused on the physical

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47 William J. Clinton, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," (Washington, DC: The White House, February 1996), 3 and 32. In the amplification section on the democracy goal, the authors explain the goal as promoting democracies committed to free markets and respect for human rights.

security of the U.S., alliances and cooperative security, a global economy, and democracy plus human rights.

The 1997 National Security Strategy lists three core objectives:

1. Enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win.
2. Bolster America’s economic prosperity.
3. Promote democracy abroad.\(^49\)

The first two objectives taken literally by themselves may read a little U.S.-centric, however the text explaining the ways and means to accomplish these ends are consistent with previous National Security Strategies. In other words, later in the 1997 version, the authors step away from the U.S.-centric verbiage and back to concepts like cooperative security and strengthening the global economy.\(^50\) The most remarkable aspect of the 1997 version is the implied expansion of the 1995 National Security Strategy national interests model to include the diplomatic and economic instruments of power.\(^51\)

The ends specified in the October 1998 National Security Strategy are the most Spartan of all the sets of grand strategies ends examined thus far. President Clinton removes discussion of a cherished goal, in his previous versions, from the preface altogether. This 1998 version enumerates three simple core objectives or ends:

1. Enhance our security.
2. Bolster America’s economic prosperity.

\(^{49}\)Ibid., I and 19. In the amplification section on this democracy goal, the authors explain the goal as promoting democracy and human rights.

\(^{50}\)Ibid., 9 and 15.

\(^{51}\)Ibid., 9.
3. Promote democracy abroad.\textsuperscript{52}

Similar to the three ends from the 1997 National Security Strategy, these ends are consistent with previous strategies in pursuing the physical security of the U.S., democracy and human rights, alliances and cooperative security, and strengthening the global economy. Just like the 1997 version, cooperative security is not a specified end, but the body of the 1998 version promotes concepts like cooperative security and strengthening the global economy.

The noteworthy aspect of the 1998 National Security Strategy is the explicit application of the national interests model to all the instruments of national power. While the 1997 strategy implies the expansion of applicability, the 1998 version clearly intends for the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power to be applied in accordance with the three-category interests model.\textsuperscript{53} Vital, important, and humanitarian are categories of interests that will lead the level of any national response to threats and opportunities.

The December 1999 edition is the last of the three National Security Strategies “For a New Century.” For the purposes of this paper, there is only one change between this NSS and the preceding version. The inclusion of human rights in the three objectives from the beginning of the document is the only substantial change. In the preface, the 1999 National Security Strategy lists three simple core objectives:

1. Enhance America’s security.
2. Bolster America’s economic prosperity.
3. Promote democracy and human rights abroad.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52}William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” (Washington, DC: The White House, October 1998), iii and 33. In the amplification section on this democracy goal, the authors explain the goal as promoting democracy and human rights.

\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., 5.

Of course, these three ends are still congruent with the ends specified in the previous ten grand strategy documents and the four types of ends proposed in the hypothesis.

The international relations phenomenon of globalization or the increasing interconnectedness of the world’s people and processes was well established by December 2000. However, the Clinton administration waited until December 2000 to produce the “National Security Strategy for a Global Age.” This National Security Strategy reestablishes a grand strategy meta-narrative of a global age ostensibly in place of engagement and enlargement. Similar to the previous three Clinton security strategies, the December 2000 version liberally uses the terms engagement and enlargement to explain the strategy. However, from the beginning, this edition is about how “more than ever, prosperity and security in America depend on prosperity and security around the globe.” This strategy is about the United States leading the effort to “assure global security, shared prosperity and freedom” and in seizing “the opportunities and meet[ing] the challenges of a global age.”

In Dr. Snider’s analysis of the first six Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated National Security Strategies, he asserts that President George H. W. Bush’s National Security Strategy delivered on January 19, 1993 was published in part to guide the foreign policy of the incoming President Clinton. It is a fair analysis to echo his observation with regards to the December 2000 Clinton strategy. When it was delivered to Congress, the 2000 presidential election had been decided in favor of George W. Bush instead of President Clinton’s Vice President Albert

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57 Ibid., iii.

Gore. It is probable that this grand strategy was intended to guide the security strategy of the incoming President Bush.

The ends specified certainly remain consistent with the previous six Clinton versions. They are listed as:

1. Enhancing security at home and abroad.
2. Promoting global prosperity.
3. Promoting democracy and human rights. 59

These are also consistent with the hypothesized enduring ends of physical security of the U.S., alliances and cooperative security, strengthening the global economy, and democracy and human rights.

The 2000 National Security Strategy is remarkable in its definitive statements such as “Both our goals, and the policies we pursue to achieve these goals, must reflect two guiding principles that influence both our national character and legacy: protecting our national interests and advancing our values.” 60 It is this bold assertion of advancing American values that is entirely remarkable. While previous editions implied that the United States would work to advance its values, this National Security Strategy explicitly states that American security strategy is virtually predicated on this necessity. Furthermore, like the Bush 1993 version, this National Security Strategy specifies what the American core values are: political and economic freedom, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. 61 It goes on to further state that there are times when national interests meet national values in a nexus; when that happens, then America will act to “reinforce the positive aspects of globalization.” 62

60 Ibid., 4.
61 Ibid., 5.
62 Ibid., 5-6.
In summary, the Clinton administration produced seven national strategy documents to guide the formulation of security policies. There are six items of interest in these documents that this section highlights and analyzes. First, the Clinton administration wrestled with the 'big idea' that would carry the banner of United States grand strategy. The first Clinton administration National Security Strategy published the idea of engagement and enlargement as a replacement for the long serving concept of containment. By the last NSS, the administration had settled on a global age or globalization as the meta-narrative. Second, the Clinton administration consistently used a phrase in the preamble to the U.S. Constitution as the source of enduring security strategy goals. Third, in a few of the versions, President Clinton introduced the concept of one cherished goal that America would always pursue. Fourth, the Clinton administration added a national interests model or taxonomy that included vital, important and humanitarian interests. By the last National Security Strategy, this national interests model was explicitly inclusive of all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic).

Fifth, the last Clinton security strategy proclaimed that the United States would not just formulate security policies that pursued its national interests. The grand strategy of the United States overtly proclaims it will protect American interests and advance American values. The sixth and last item of interest in this section and the most important for this paper, all seven of the Clinton National Security Strategies promulgated essentially the same three security strategy ends. Sometimes the literal words read as very U.S. centric, however inevitably the descriptions of the ways and means to achieve these ends were broadened to include concepts like alliances, cooperative security and strong global economic structures. These ends are consistent with the ends in the preceding five Goldwater-Nichols mandated National Security Strategies of Presidents Reagan and Bush. These ends are also consistent with the four types of hypothesized ends.

The following table captures how the Clinton grand strategy ends fit neatly under the four categories of ends this scholarship uses for comparison.
Table 2. Clinton NSS and Ends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSS</th>
<th>Physical Security</th>
<th>Global Economy</th>
<th>Democracy/Human Rights</th>
<th>Alliances/Cooperative Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (2000)</td>
<td>Enhance security at home &amp; abroad</td>
<td>Promote Global prosperity</td>
<td>Promote democracy &amp; human rights abroad</td>
<td>Enhance security at home &amp; abroad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. These ends are listed under both the physical security and cooperative security columns.
2. Discussion of this end in the body of the NSS includes the concept of cooperative security.

**Bush National Security Strategies**

The last Clinton administration National Security Strategy, delivered to Congress a month before President Bush took his oath of office, left two important legacies. First, a global age or globalization should be the U.S. grand strategy meta-narrative. Second, the grand strategy of the U.S. should both protect American interests and advance American values. The first Bush NSS, delivered to Congress on 17 September 2002, rejects the first and overwhelmingly accepts the second legacy.

The terrorist attacks against America on September 11, 2001 were a significant emotional event in the history of the United States and the world. The lens through which all Americans saw the world and their security was significantly modified by these attacks. The Bush
administration’s response to the attacks consumed much of the time available for governance. As a result, the first Bush administration National Security Strategy did not reach Congress with its first budget submission in Feb 2002. In the aftermath of the attacks, the United States definitely had a government at war against terrorists with global reach.

The 2002 National Security Strategy accepts the impact of globalization on the international security scene, by stating, “the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing” and “events beyond America’s borders have a greater impact inside them.” However, it rejects the last Clinton grand strategy meta-narrative of a global age. In its place, the inaugural Bush National Security Strategy inserts, creating a balance of power that favors human freedom or in other words promoting freedom. The Bush administration draws the picture of a balance of power that tips between freedom and fear. Gone are the Cold War days dominated by a balance of power between communist totalitarianism and democratic freedom. The new war is drawn as a balance of power between terrorist fear and democratic freedom.

The 2002 National Security Strategy was pilloried by many analysts for its assertion and defense of the concept of preemptive strikes against potential enemies. However, most analysts concede that the discussion of preemption in the document is not the contentious issue. It is how the Bush administration implemented preemption in regards to the 2003 invasion of Iraq that deserves the scorn. After citing the international legal justification for preemption and reviewing

64 Ibid., Preface.
65 Ibid., 7.
the nature of the terrorist threat, this security strategy concludes, "to forestall or prevent such
hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."\(^{67}\)

The 2002 version is the first Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated security strategy to assert
the concept of preemption. However, this is not the only noteworthy aspect of this document. As
alluded to earlier, the Bush team adoption of the Clinton legacy of protecting national interests
and advancing values is significant. The significance arises not from the reality that nations,
including the United States, practice their security strategy with these guiding principles. The
significance derives from the boldness to publicly state, "U.S. national security strategy will be
based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our
national interests."\(^{68}\)

The willingness to predicate grand strategy in part on national core values reflects the
characterization of 'idealistic' that many analysts applied to the first Bush grand strategy.\(^{69}\) With
no pejorative meaning implied, the characterization of idealistic is appropriate. The 2002
National Security Strategy contains statements like, "in pursuit of our goals, our first imperative
is to clarify what we stand for: the United States must defend liberty and justice because these
principles are right and true for all people everywhere."\(^{70}\) This strategy paper lists core beliefs
such as the rule of law, free speech, freedom of worship, equal worship, respect for women,
religious and ethnic toleration, and respect for private property.\(^{71}\) It asserts that the National

White House, September 2002), 15.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., 1.

\(^{69}\) For analysis of the 2002 NSS as idealistic, see available online at http://www.megaessays.com/
viewpaper/27641.html (accessed on 20 Jan 2010); available online at http://www.nixoncenter.org/
publications/articles/Kemp/090302realists_and_idealists.htm; accessed on 20 Jan 2010; and also see
available online at http://www.answers.com/topic/national-security-strategy-united-states; accessed on 22
July 2009.


\(^{71}\) Ibid., 3.
Security Strategy “must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty.” While these concepts are not new in U.S. foreign policy application, their aggressive and definitive proclamation in the grand strategy document is noteworthy.

The 2002 National Security Strategy also refers to specific issues as moral issues. “The concept of ‘free trade’ arose as a moral principle even before it became a pillar of economics.” Including all of the world’s poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of U.S. international policy. None of the previous security strategy versions speak of specific moral issues that the security strategy and policies of the United States must address. The first Bush National Security Strategy is unique in its emphasis on moral imperatives and core beliefs that must be advanced.

The first Bush grand strategy document is also unique in its structure. The previous twelve Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated security strategies list all the goals or ends in one place near the beginning and then spend the remainder of the document expounding on either ways or means to achieve the goals. In the preface of the 2002 version, President Bush posits that “defending the U.S. against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment.” However, the other three ends are not presented until the first chapter. Additionally, this is the first version to list the ways necessary to achieve the ends as a discreet list at the beginning of the document. The rest of this publication is organized with eight sections dedicated to explaining the eight ways of achieving the four ends.

A review of the document reveals the ends specified in the 2002 National Security Strategy are:

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72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 18.
74 Ibid., 21.
75 Ibid., Preface.
1. Defend our nation against its enemies.
2. Political and economic freedom.
3. Peaceful relations with other states.
4. Respect for human dignity.\textsuperscript{76}

These ends are consistent with the four hypothesis ends of physical security of the U.S., strengthening the global economy, alliances and cooperative security, and democracy and human rights.

The eight ways listed to achieve the ends of the new national security strategy are:

2. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.
3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.
4. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction.
5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.
6. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.
7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.
8. Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{77}

Clearly cognizant of its first grand strategy being characterized as being idealistic, the Bush administration’s second and last National Security Strategy of March 2006 embraces the

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid., Preface and 1.

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., 1-2.
description. “Our approach is idealistic about our national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them.”

The 2006 version retains the emphasis on values and interests. It states that America “has long championed freedom because doing so reflects our values and advances our interests. It reflects our values because we believe the desire for freedom lives in every human heart and the imperative of human dignity transcends all nations and cultures.” Furthermore, it asserts, “championing freedom advances our interests because the survival of liberty at home increasingly depends on the success of liberty abroad.”

Like the 2002 edition, this National Security Strategy talks in terms of moral imperatives and certitudes. The 2006 edition contains sentences about the moral dimensions of American national security throughout the document. “It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish genocide.” On the subject of the global economy, it states, “Economic freedom is a moral imperative.” In regards to expanding democracy it says, “America’s national interests and moral values drive us in the same direction: to assist the world’s poor citizens and least developed nations and help integrate them into the global economy.” One last quote succinctly captures the influence of morality and values on the Bush administration approach to security strategy, “we have a responsibility to promote human freedom.”

In the 2006 National Security Strategy, the Bush administration removes the discussion of balance of power that was present in the 2002 version. However, promoting freedom remains

79 Ibid., 3.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., 17.
82 Ibid., 27.
83 Ibid., 32.
84 Ibid., 5.
as the meta-narrative or ‘bumper sticker’ to guide American grand strategy. In the preface to this edition, President Bush writes that the War on Terror and promoting freedom have been the guiding factors in American security policy since the 2002 National Security Strategy.

The structure for laying out the goals or ends of this security strategy is slightly disjointed like the 2002 version. However, it is possible to cull out three specified ends in the preface to the 2006 National Security Strategy.

1. Protect the security of the American people
2. Promote freedom, justice, and human dignity
3. Lead a growing community of democracies

These ends remain congruent with the four hypothesis types of ends that are present in all the National Security Strategies since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The novel concept, introduced in the 2002 version, of basing the bulk of the text around the ways to achieve the ends remains the organizing outline of the 2006 version. It retains the eight ways introduced in the 2002 version. Additionally, this National Security Strategy adds a ninth way of “engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.” It sees the phenomenon of globalization as providing opportunities and challenges that have commensurate implications for American national security.

The Bush administration only produced two all-inclusive grand strategy documents to guide the formulation of its security policies. In addition to the ends, there are five items of interest in the National Security Strategies that this section highlights and analyzes. First, the ‘big idea’ concept of promoting freedom or a balance of power favoring freedom over fear becomes the banner that the Bush team displays to rally support for its idealistic foreign policy. Second, the establishment of what is known as the Bush doctrine, which includes preemptive action

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85Ibid., Preface. The words describing this pillar or end include free and fair trade policies.
86Ibid., 49.
against threats to American security, is codified in the 2002 version. Third, the Bush administration retains the emphasis on advancing U.S. values and interests, which was first written down in the Clinton 2000 National Security Strategy. The Bush administration goes a step further by referring to values before interests almost exclusively. The Bush NSSs also highlights the national moral imperatives that America has in its security strategy. Fourth, the discrete specifying of ways to achieve security strategy ends and using them to organize the entire document is very novel and helpful. The last item of interest is the adoption and proclamation of ends that are congruent with the twelve National Security Strategies that precede them. The specified ends also remain consistent with the four types of hypothesized enduring ends of physical security of the U.S., alliances and cooperative security, strengthening the global economy, and democracy and human rights.

The following table captures how the Bush National Security Strategy ends are logically arrayed under the four hypothesized enduring ends this scholarship uses for comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSS</th>
<th>Physical Security</th>
<th>Global Economy</th>
<th>Democracy/Human Rights</th>
<th>Alliances/Cooperative Security</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bush (2002)</td>
<td>Defend our nation against its enemies</td>
<td>Political &amp; economic freedom</td>
<td>Respect for human dignity</td>
<td>Peaceful relations with other nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ This end includes discussion of free and fair trade policies (global economy).
Conclusion

The Goldwater Nichols Act mandated National Security Strategies identify the ways and means to achieve the desired national grand strategy ends. The writing styles and formats of the fourteen National Security Strategies expectantly vary between administrations and documents. Many of the versions address the concept of a meta-narrative or ‘bumper sticker’ to explain the grand strategy of the United States. They are in chronological order: containment, democratic peace, engagement and enlargement, globalization, and finally democratic freedom. Many of the versions discuss core values, in addition to interests, that animate American foreign policy.

Yet despite the differences, the ends listed in the fourteen grand strategy documents reviewed in this paper show remarkable consistency. The following table logically lists all the National Security Strategy specified ends under four discrete “enduring” ends and shows the administration versions by year. This table is inclusive of the tables shown in the analysis sections. An examination of the table unequivocally shows the consistency of ends, objectives and goals over the last twenty-three years and four Presidents.

As noted in the Clinton NSS section, while the Clinton administration does not always explicitly list alliances or cooperative security as an end to achieve, in the discussion of ways and means, the documents invariably refer to alliances and collective security as a goal. Similarly, the 2006 Bush version does not explicitly refer to the global economy freedom as a specified end; however, the text does include discussion of free and fair trade policies under its goal of promote freedom, justice and human dignity.
Table 4.  Presidential NSS and Ends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSS</th>
<th>Physical Security</th>
<th>Global Economy</th>
<th>Democracy/Human Rights</th>
<th>Alliances/Cooperative Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinton (2000)</td>
<td>Enhance security at home &amp; abroad</td>
<td>Promote Global prosperity</td>
<td>Promote democracy &amp; human rights abroad</td>
<td>Enhance security at home &amp; abroad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This review of the fourteen Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated National Security Strategies establish a clear consistency of grand strategy ends for the United States. Establishing this fact is the first step in scholarship on recent American security strategy. There is a need for further research on why consistent ends exist. This paper has introduced a few plausible reasons. The Reagan and Bush documents present the geopolitical reality of America as the source. The Clinton administration versions highlight the preamble of the Constitution as the source of stable ends.

Beyond research on the rationale for consistent ends, there is a demand for an examination of whether or not the implementation of U.S. security strategy has been consistent. If the goals and objectives of American foreign policy are consistent, why does it appear that the execution of U.S. security strategy varies from moment to moment and issue to issue? There is some explanatory value in recognizing that the consistent ends are broad. These broad ends leave a lot of room for action and can lead to a perception of shifting interests.

On the other hand, the Goldwater-Nichols Act directs the President to produce grand strategy that specifies how the instruments of national power are to be used to achieve the ends.

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1 These ends are listed under both the physical security and cooperative security columns.
2 Discussion of this end in the body of the NSS includes the concept of cooperative security.
3 This end includes discussion of free and fair trade policies (global economy).

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bush (2002)</th>
<th>Defend our nation against its enemies</th>
<th>Political &amp; economic freedom</th>
<th>Respect for human dignity</th>
<th>Peaceful relations with other nations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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87 There are excellent books that review this phenomenon. However, they survey a time period much larger than the GNA NSSs (1987-2010) scope of this paper. See writings like Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006) and Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997).
Many of the National Security Strategies list specific ways to achieve the consistent ends. Further scholarship could concentrate on the level of fidelity with which administrations use the means (economic, diplomatic and military instruments) to execute the administrations’ National Security Strategy specified ways to achieve the ends.

This paper did not attempt to detail the process of how the fourteen security strategy documents were crafted. There is also a need for examination on the production process of the eight National Security Strategies since Dr Snider’s paper. An examination of the dynamics and tensions surrounding the crafting of the Clinton and George W. Bush administration security strategies would be a helpful addition to the body of scholarship on U.S. grand strategy.

Most importantly, beyond the author’s curiosity, why do consistent ends matter? One of the fundamental assumptions presented at the beginning of this paper, asserts that National Security Strategy implementation over time is more successful if the ends remain consistent. With the daunting numbers of federal government actors involved in security strategy formulation and implementation, how does a nation keep them focused on delivering meaningful and helpful results? Logically, if the ends remain stable, then the results of foreign policy should remain stable. The ways and means of accomplishing the ends specified in the grand strategy documents should and will vary with different security actors’ capability. However, successful security strategy implementation should be eased with consistent ends. Future grand strategy crafters would do well to remember this lesson. Accordingly, the intended audience of this paper is all crafters and implementers of American security strategy. Armed with the knowledge that to date all the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated National Security Strategies have proclaimed consistent ends, future American foreign policy actors can avoid confusion and in good faith pursue initiatives that will support the grand strategy of the United States.

Significantly, the just-released February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report perhaps foreshadows the ends that will be in the Obama administration’s first National Security Strategy. The QDR report lists four “chief” interests of the United States: security, prosperity, broad respect for universal values, and an international order that promotes cooperative action.89 These four interests easily and logically fall under the four types of ends this study uses for comparison. The QDR report also states that these chief interests are, “consistent with the President’s vision.”90 While it remains to be seen what ends will be enumerated in President Obama’s 2010 National Security Strategy, if they mirror the ends in the QDR, they will be almost word for word exactly like the enduring U.S. grand strategy ends that this paper proves exist.

If the weary National Security Council staffer accepts this paper’s conclusion, then they can start work on producing a consistent National Security Strategy. Armed with the enduring American grand strategy ends, all that remains is to specify the ways and means or methods and resources that the administration requires. Consistent American grand strategy ends will once again ease the work of a tired staffer. As a result, steady security will be certain.

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90Ibid., iv and 9.
APPENDIX

Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act:

ANNUAL PRESIDENTIAL REPORT - (1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

SEC. 104. (a)(1) The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as a 'national security strategy report').

(2) The national security strategy report for any year shall be transmitted on the date on which the President submits to Congress the budget for the next fiscal year under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.

(b) Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:

(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.

(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.

(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.
(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.

(c) Each national security strategy report shall be transmitted in both a classified and unclassified form.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


