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<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
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Intelligence Strategy: New Challenges and Opportunities

NDIC-ODNI Conference Proceedings
26-27 September 2007

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The National Defense Intelligence College supports and encourages research that distills lessons and improves Intelligence Community capabilities for policy-level and operational consumers.

The editor wishes to thank Dr. Solveig E. Brownfeld, research specialist at the National Defense Intelligence College, for her preliminary editing of these proceedings.

William. Spracher@dia.mil, Editor
Center for Strategic Intelligence Research
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National Defense Intelligence College and Office of the Director of National Intelligence Conference

Intelligence Strategy: New Challenges and Opportunities

Wednesday, 26 September 2007

0700-0800  Registration

0800-0805  Introduction  Mr. A. Denis Clift, President, National Defense Intelligence College

0815-0845  Welcome  LTG Michael D. Maples, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

0845-0945  Keynote Address  VADM (Ret) J. Michael McConnell, Director of National Intelligence

Introduced by  Mr. Patrick Gorman, ADDNI for Strategy, Policy, & Plans

0945-1015  Break for Refreshments/View Vendor Exhibits

1015-1145  Panel 1: What Has the Intelligence Community Accomplished Under Intelligence Reform?

Mr. Patrick Gorman, ADDNI for Strategy, Policy, & Plans, Moderator

MajGen Michael E. Ennis, USMC, Deputy Director for Community HUMINT, National Clandestine Service

Dr. R. Carter Morris, Director, Information Sharing and Knowledge Management, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security

Dr. Michael Warner, Chief Historian, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Wednesday (Continued)

1145-1200 Travel to Bolling AFB Officers’ Club (Transportation provided by NDIC)

1200-1330 Luncheon at Bolling AFB Officers’ Club

Luncheon Speaker: Honorable James R. Clapper, Jr.
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

1330-1345 Travel to DIAC (Transportation provided by NDIC)

1400-1530 Panel 2: Global Events that Have Changed the World: Implications for Intelligence

Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski, Department of State Chair, NDIC, Moderator

Dr. Michael C. Desch, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-Making, George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University

Mr. Wayne M. Murphy, Assistant Director, Directorate of Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Dr. David F. Gordon, Director of Policy Planning Staff, U. S. Department of State

Mr. David Ignatius, Associate Editor and Columnist, The Washington Post

1530-1600 Intelligence Education, Transformed, Dr. Teresa J. Domzal, Provost, National Defense Intelligence College

1600-1700 Reception, DIAC Expansion Lobby
### Thursday, 27 September 2007
( Classified Presentations and Discussion )

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Together with my co-host, Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence Pat Gorman, it is my great pleasure to welcome you to this conference on “Intelligence Strategy: New Challenges and Opportunities.”

We are covering important ground today and tomorrow, with expert speakers and panelists addressing this new era of intelligence reform, the accomplishments thus far, the direction we must take, and the specific goals we must meet. These are goals that we are intent on meeting as we provide for the intelligence needs to safeguard the homeland, to enable our commanders in the field to succeed, and to meet the nation’s commitments and advance the nation’s interests around the globe.
We have shaped the conference for give and take with you in the audience. Your participation will further the sharing of ideas and the shaping of findings. In our first conference on intelligence reform two years ago, a member of the audience prefaced a question to the first Director of National Intelligence with the words, “I am a psychiatrist,” and Ambassador Negroponte said, “I could use you. This job is driving me crazy.”

The work of the conference is central to the work of the College I am privileged to lead. This past December, the Department of Defense gave the College a new name, the National Defense Intelligence College, and a new, expanded national intelligence education research and outreach charter.

The National Defense Intelligence College is a powerful change agent in the Intelligence Community. Our students and our researchers come from across the intelligence and homeland security communities and beyond. Our research addresses the process of reform and the needs and the future of these communities. Our graduates become leaders. Our graduates strengthen the intelligence and homeland security communities and our national security.

As a college, we enjoy the good fortune of having a superb College Foundation under the auspices of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, and I thank the Foundation and INSA for all they have done to contribute to the quality and to the goals we have set for today and tomorrow.

That said, it is now my distinct pleasure to introduce our first speaker for this morning’s session, a leader in this era of reform who has served as Vice Director and Director of Management on the Joint Staff, a leader who is shaping the new Defense Intelligence Enterprise, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples.
A. Denis Clift was appointed President of the National Defense Intelligence College in 1994. The College, in the Department of Defense, is the nation's only accredited academic institution awarding the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence degree and the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence degree. In 1999, in his role as President of the College, Mr. Clift was elected to serve as a Commissioner on the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools for the term 2000-2002. In 2002, he was re-elected for the term 2003-2005. Since 1992, he has also served as a U. S. Commissioner on the U. S.-Russia Joint Commission on Prisoners of War/Missing in Action, a commission created by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin with the humanitarian goal of accounting for servicemen still missing from past conflicts.

Mr. Clift was born in New York City, New York. He was educated at Friends Seminary, Phillips Exeter Academy (1954), Stanford University (B.A., 1958), and The London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London (M.Sc., 1967). He began a career of public service as a Naval officer in the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations and has served in military and civilian capacities in ten administrations, including 13 successive years in the Executive Office of the President and the White House. From 1971 to 1976 he served on the National Security Council staff. From 1974 to 1976 he was head of President Ford's National Security Council staff for the Soviet Union and Eastern and Western Europe. From 1977 to 1981 he was Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Vice President of the United States. From 1991 to 1994 he was Chief of Staff, Defense Intelligence Agency, following service as an Assistant Deputy Director and Deputy Director for External Relations of the Agency. He is a veteran of two Antarctic expeditions, including the 1961 Bellingshausen Sea Expedition. From 1963 to 1966 he was Editor, United States Naval Institute Proceedings.

His awards and decorations include the President’s Rank of Distinguished Executive, awarded by President George W. Bush in 2001, the President’s Rank of Meritorious Executive, awarded by President Ronald Reagan in 1986, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal, the Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Medal, the Secretary of the Navy Commendation for Achievement, the Oceanographer of the Navy’s Superior Achievement Award, and the Director of Central Intelligence’s Sherman Kent
Award and Helene L. Boatner Award. He directed the production of the film “Portrait of Antarctica” screened at the Venice Film Festival. His published fiction and nonfiction include the novel *A Death in Geneva* (Ballantine Books of Random House), *Our World in Antarctica* (Rand McNally), *With Presidents to the Summit* (George Mason University Press), *Clift Notes: Intelligence and the Nation’s Security* (NDIC Writing Center Press), and *Intelligence and Accountability* (co-author) (Praeger, 2007).
Denis, thank you very much. I appreciate it, and I thank all of you for being here. I do welcome you, and thank all of you for being here, both today and for those staying through tomorrow as well. What a great opportunity for us to discuss, and to hear from those panel members who are with us and reflect on what has been accomplished as we look at the Intelligence Community, the changes that have been brought about, and what changes need to be brought about to ensure the security of the United States of America—because that’s what it’s all about.

It’s about the United States of America. This is not about DIA or CIA or NGA or NSA or any of the other organizations. It’s about our national security. That’s what’s important to us—the security of the United States of America.
We've got to get it right. These panels are going to talk about the changes that have been made, what we've accomplished, what we still have to do, how the environment has changed for us—and it has. This discussion is good, and it's right for the community to do.

The co-sponsorship of this forum by the National Defense Intelligence College and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is a great combination. President Clift mentioned the National Defense Intelligence College and the change that has come about this last year in the College, and it's not just cosmetic. That change is not just a change in name, but it reflects a change in thinking and a change in action in how we are preparing intelligence professionals for the future and what they've got to do in this era of the changed strategic environment.

Think about that, because just a year ago it was the Joint Military Intelligence College—"joint military." Now it's "national" and "defense." There's significance in that.

When I stand here with President Clift, and we hand out the diplomas from this College, it's not just the military walking across here. It's not just the defense community walking across here. It is the interagency. It's the entire Intelligence Community which is being trained and educated in this National Defense Intelligence College.

And it is about "defense" more than "military." It is about the critical role that defense plays as a part of our national intelligence program. It's not separate. It's not a part. It's not the IC and the Department of Defense. Defense is a critical piece of our national security. That's obvious to you.

Not so obvious all the time is that we have these discussions within the community. We can't provide for the national security if defense isn't there, and a critical player and critical partner in what we're trying to achieve. "Joint military" to "national defense"—that change is really significant.

Along with that change comes a change in the College's role and for its programs. We have our great friends, Brigadier General Georghe Sabu from Romania [Director gestures to the officer in the audience], great friends of the College, great friends of defense intelligence, great friends of our nation present here today. The College, together with our counterparts in Romania, has hosted two conferences looking at security in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, bringing together all of the intelligence chiefs from across that region, many of whom met each other for the first time. They can get the issues out on the table, talk about collaboration, information sharing, a way that we can work through some of those issues so that we can prevent the problems that exist from becoming crises, and those crises from becoming conflicts in the future.

Georghe, your presence here today is significant, but it really represents this change in thinking in terms of the partnership and the collaboration
that we’ve got to have around this world. This is what is being undertaken by the Director of National Intelligence and by this College, as well.

Furthermore, Denis has really put a great effort into revising the curriculum of the College, not because we want change for change’s sake, but because we need to train our intelligence professionals in a different way. The strategic environment demands that, so having a different curriculum, a different focus, and educating our young leaders for the world they face today and what they’re going to be facing in the future is critically important to our nation, critically important to cause them to think in different ways about the strategic environment, and it is a changed strategic environment that we’re facing.

I think most all of you understand, and I think there will be a panel that’s going to talk about how the world has changed, because it is changing very rapidly. It’s changing continuously, and the rate of change is accelerating, and we’ve got to understand that, and we’ve got to know how that is going to affect our national security.

Great competition for resources, new alliances that are being developed, transnational actors that we must understand, networks, emergent nations, this conflict of ideologies and religious beliefs that affect our security interests, and as a result of that, the threat spectrum that from a defense standpoint we have to deal with is wider than ever. It ranges all the way from the asymmetric threats that we face with terrorism to the major issues that we have in terms of global strike and the development of capabilities at the upper end of the scale, ballistic missiles, directed energy weapons, weapons of mass destruction.

It goes from the cyber threats to our networks, to our ability to operate in space and against counterspace threats to our systems there. Even though we are engaged in an era of persistent conflict and ongoing operations, we can’t lose sight of those other threats to our national security.

We’ve got to pay attention. We’ve got to understand the risks that are involved. We cannot allow our nation to be surprised strategically by those developments, by changes in technology, by actors we weren’t aware of. We’ve got to know. We’ve got to see. We’ve got to understand. And we’ve got to make sure that our leadership understands those emerging threats to our national security, as well.

We’ve got to detect them at the earliest point possible so we can build, so we can understand, and that’s not easy. It’s not easy with the way that our adversaries operate in the world today.

They understand also, and they can change faster than we can, and if it worked today, and our countermeasures are put in place, and our countermeasures work today, they’ll figure out a different way to operate, and they’ll communicate it and be operating in a different way tomorrow. It’s that fast. It’s
that rapid. But if we're going to be successful it's going to fall to the intelligence professionals of our nation.

From a defense standpoint, I see two major drivers right now. First is the global war on terrorists, a global threat. All of our combatant commands are involved and engaged in the global war on terrorism, a different way of thinking and preparing our forces, irregular warfare, different tools that we have to have, different ways of operating that we need to employ.

And we're operating often in unfamiliar areas. We may be involved in conflict within the borders of nation states with which we're not in conflict, but that's where the adversary is. That's where the network is operating, that's where we've got to be, and that's what we've got to understand.

We've got to understand cultures, and we've got to understand patterns. We've got to understand thought processes. We need to understand networks, and we need to train our individuals to think that way.

The other big change on the defense side is the mission that the President and Secretary of Defense have given our combatant commanders. That is to conduct continuous global shaping operations, the whole business of theater engagement, of understanding what's happening in these theaters around the world, engaging with nation states, understanding transnational actors, and for the Intelligence Community, for defense intelligence, that places a whole new burden on the community.

This involves developing partner capacity, developing relationships in those areas, oftentimes with nations or partners which may not have been as important to this nation in the past but certainly are today. Our commanders still want to understand the military capabilities that exist within their regions, but if they are to conduct continuous global shaping operations, they need to understand something more.

They need to understand human factors. They need to understand how people think. They need to understand the cultural influences. They need to understand how strategic choices are made, how decisions are made.

Who makes decisions, how are they influenced, and how can we influence those who influence and make decisions? How do we see problems and do something about those problems in a way that makes sense so that those problems don't become crises, and those crises don't become conflicts?

That's what we're looking for around the world. Intelligence is no longer the morning news report, a five- or six-slide briefing that says here's what happened overnight. It's continuous. It's engaging. It's nuanced, and I'll tell you that our commanders are fully engaged in the process, and they are very savvy about the use of intelligence.

From a defense standpoint, if you think about those terms that we use—“find, fix, finish”—“fix” and “finish” follow “find.” Intelligence is driving
operations. That's what's working, and our commanders understand it. They want more, they are very involved in the process and, if there is one thing that our commanders have learned, it is that their missions can only be accomplished in a collaborative environment.

They need the power of this whole community and every form of intelligence brought to bear on the problem set that they’re trying to deal with. That collaborative effort at a lower tactical level is critically important to our military success and to our national success, and it has to be brought to bear continuously, and it has to be responsive to the needs of the commanders.

So that places a great demand on defense intelligence. It places a great demand on the Intelligence Community, because it’s all of us operating together, focused on the priorities of the nation.

So we’ve gone down that road of remodeling defense intelligence and making changes. President Clift talked about the “Defense Intelligence Enterprise,” trying to bring together the power of all of the resources that we have in defense intelligence and ensuring its integration with all of the capabilities across the Intelligence Community.

A couple of years ago the Department published the Quadrennial Defense Review, and there’s a statement in the QDR that I think is really powerful. It talks about how important intelligence is in this strategic environment, and it talks about a change in emphasis from ships and guns and tanks and planes to a focus on information, knowledge, and timely actionable intelligence.

Information, knowledge, timely actionable intelligence—that’s what’s driving operations. That’s what’s driving our ability to employ ships and guns and tanks and planes if we have to employ them in the kinetic sense.

It’s what drives us if we are doing continuous global shaping operations. It’s information, knowledge, and timely actionable intelligence, and timely is critical to that. Information has to move. Data have to move. Content has to move. We have to be knowledge-empowered in our actions.

Horizontal integration has to be achieved. Of all of the commands and the agencies and the centers, integration of our collectors with our analysts is critically important to us. Integration of all the forms of intelligence together, the integration of operations, plans, and intelligence, not working in staff stovepipes or staff cylinders of excellence or however we want to refer to them, but operating together, one team, one fight, really making it happen that way.

That’s what’s important to us, and we’ve moved in that direction with the establishment of our Joint Intelligence Operations Centers, the JIOC enterprise, the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center, and the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance that brings together our ability to focus on the needs of commanders to do planning,
to understand what the priorities are, and to ensure that the resources we have are being applied in a very thoughtful and meaningful way against the priorities. We must develop alternative strategies to deal with those areas and those needs where we may not have the resources to apply. And we’ve got to align our systems, all the way from strategic to tactical, and make sure it flows so that all of the agencies are operating together, so all of that power can be brought to bear where and when our commanders need it, where and when our nation needs it, as well.

And as a part of that, DIA over the last several years has become a deployable agency. Last year we deployed over 1,800 members of this organization around the world. We maintain a continuous presence forward in Iraq and Afghanistan and in other parts of this world. My last count was 137 countries.

It’s not the way it used to be, but that’s the way it is today. That’s where the need is. Push the knowledge and the expertise and the capability forward and link it to the power of this whole enterprise through reachback, through engagement, to ensure that it can be brought to bear where we need it in the world.

That was a little bit of a change for some folks, but I’ll tell you for the majority of the Agency that’s the way it is. That’s what they know. Two-thirds of the Agency has come on board since 9/11. This is their world. This is how they think. This is how they operate. They want more now, and they want more faster.

Networking is a part of life. Working with others in this community is how you do it. Bringing together teams and communities of interest, working with all of the other agencies, working with the commands, working throughout the Intelligence Community, that’s how you do it.

That’s how they think. That’s how they operate, and they don’t understand the barriers that keep us from doing that, and there are still some of those out there. Most of them are in our policies, processes, and procedures. We’ve got to change. And those changes are going on right now as we rewrite the community directives that guide how we operate as a community. We need to attain unity of effort within defense intelligence and bring it together in many ways, including our analytic effort through our defense intelligence analysis program and making sure we’re focused on the right kinds of priorities and applying the analytic effort of the entire community in the right way. It is centrally managed by a functional manager for analysis here in DIA but it touches every one of the services, touches the commands, the combatant commands, and makes sure that the analytic effort is being applied where it needs to be applied and we have the awareness that we need to have around the world.

Intelligence campaign planning and national intelligence support plans—a year ago, we had none. We’ve got a very robust planning effort that is
going on now, focused on those intelligence tasks that have to be performed for us to be successful, and it’s growing.

Intelligence operations through the JIOC enterprise, moving it to the next level, creating the capability that I hope the Director of National Intelligence will talk about. That’s because it’s in his 500-Day Plan to create a national capability to bring about the integration of our collection coordination and tying that together with what we’ve already started to establish in our Joint Intelligence Operations Centers and with our JFCC-ISR so we can tie all of the community together, focus on the priorities and those strategic gaps in intelligence, and apply our resources in the right way against our nation’s priorities.

And we’re bringing together the IT systems across the community, under the CIO for the DNI, working with all of the CIOs in a comprehensive plan to bring IT solutions together. At DIA, our CIO is taking on the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System to link the commands, to link the services so we’re all operating together with common capabilities and standards and governance and systems that allow us to operate with each other and across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Because soon the employees at the commands will join DIA and be managed as DIA personnel. They will still belong to the commands, still under their control and their direction, but from a personnel standpoint creating that enterprise approach to the management of our intelligence professionals.

And then there are our relationships with our international partners, so critically important to us, because that’s who we fight with. That’s what’s important to our nation on missions around the world. We’ve got to make sure that those commanders of formations provided by our friends and our allies engaged in conflict have the intelligence they need to be successful. There are no ifs, ands, or buts about it.

They’re partners. They’re putting their soldiers at risk, and they need to be successful, because their success is our success. It’s the world’s success, and we need to ensure it.

So we’ve got a lot going on, a lot of developments in defense intelligence, but, you know, it’s not making a decision today and just staying with it. It’s continuous change. If we see something that’s not working, we’re going to stop doing it. We’re going to change course, and we’re going to move another way to make it successful, and if we are achieving success then we’re going to take it to the next level, and we’re going to build on that success. It is too important to our nation. It is too important to our national security for us not to do that.

Have we achieved a great deal? Yes, we have. Do we have a lot more to do? Absolutely, we do. The Director of National Intelligence, who will be speaking shortly, has laid out a 500-Day Plan. It’s not his plan. It’s our plan. This is the plan of the Intelligence Community, and the priorities that are laid out in
that 500-Day Plan are the priorities that all of us are trying to achieve in order to bring about the integration and the collaboration that we know need to be achieved and to put our energy into it, to put our efforts into it, to bring this community together.

Are we going to achieve everything? We’re sure going to give it our best shot, but we’ll also be realistic in how we assess and how we grade what we’ve accomplished, and if we aren’t there we’ll put more energy into it, more effort into it, and if it’s not right we’ll change course and do what is right. We’re talking about the security of the United States of America, and there’s nothing more important to us than that.

So this conference is critically important. What the National Defense Intelligence College and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have put together over these two days is critically important to us, and there will be thoughts and ideas generated that will inform us on directions we ought to go, change our thinking, perhaps, confirm things that we already have in motion, identify other areas that we need to address, and that’s okay, because it’s about our nation, and it is a critical time in our nation’s history.

It’s a critical time in the world’s history, and we’ve got to do our very best to be successful, and I’m absolutely convinced that the success of our nation, the security of our nation, rests on the shoulders of our intelligence professionals, and whether it is find, fix, and finish or it is see first, understand first, act first, it’s about information. It’s about knowledge. It’s about timely, actionable intelligence.

So again, welcome. It’s good to have you here. Thank you very much.
BIOGRAPHY

LTG Michael D. Maples, USA

Lieutenant General Mike Maples became Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in November 2005. The Defense Intelligence Agency is a 7,500-person combat support agency with personnel deployed to more than 130 countries worldwide. LTG Maples also commands the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the United States Strategic Command.

Prior to assuming his present duties, LTG Maples served as the Vice Director and Director of Management on the Joint Staff.

LTG Maples’ command assignments include: Commanding General of the United States Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Chief of Field Artillery for the United States Army; Assistant Division Commander, 1st Armored Division, Baumholder, Germany; 41st Field Artillery Brigade, Babenhausen, Germany; 6th Battalion, 27th Field Artillery (MLRS) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM; and B Battery, 6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, 2nd Infantry Division, Republic of Korea. During DESERT STORM, his battalion was the only unit in theater capable of firing the Army Tactical Missile System.

LTG Maples was assigned to Headquarters, Department of the Army, as the Director of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization, and Director of Military Support in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. He served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence, Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), and for the Kosovo Force (KFOR), Operation JOINT GUARDIAN. Other previous assignments include Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for United States Army Europe (FWD), Taszar, Hungary, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

A native of Bonham, Texas, he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant of Field Artillery in 1971 following graduation from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, and holds a master's degree in organizational behavior from Pacific Lutheran University. His military education includes the Field Artillery Office Advanced Course, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the National War College.

LTG Maples’ decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf
Clusters, the Army Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, and the Army Achievement Medal. Foreign decorations include the French Croix du Guerre with Silver Star.
Thank you very much. General Maples, President Clift, Tony Oettinger [chair of the NDIC Board of Visitors], and all the people that I see here who are old friends from times past and distinguished individuals. It’s a pleasure to be here, and I’m delighted to be returning to my alma mater.

I attended the College in the 1970s, and this history that I’m going to talk about I didn’t make. The name of the school has changed three times, I think, since I attended.

I’d also like to introduce the new Assistant Deputy DNI in charge of education and training, Jill Rhodes, who came down with me. Jill, thank you for taking on this role and this work. We’ll be working this issue hard, because in my view we’ve got a lot of transformation to accomplish, and you do that most readily through the education and training process.
If you’ve noticed the papers of late, I am an evil person. I am trying to spy on Americans and intrude in their lives, and some of the accusations point to a vast data mining network which looks at every transaction that Americans engage in. I’d like to try to disabuse you of that idea a bit, but I’ve been consumed by something called FISA of late, and I thought I’d give you just a little bit of flavor of that—what it is we’re trying to do.

Global communications have altered significantly since the late seventies. We had abuses in this country that go all the way back to the thirties—remember J. Edgar Hoover and crime-busters—that came through the forties and the fifties and so on. The big offense for me in the fifties was tapping the telephones of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

So we had our problems on the law enforcement intelligence side, and that all culminated in the abuses of Watergate for which there were hearings, and a series of new oversight processes and rules and regulations came out of that. One of those laws was FISA. America faced the Cold War and an enemy that had stated its national strategy was to bury the United States and dominate the world in Communism.

So we needed to do intelligence, but we also had these abuses to deal with, so FISA was captured in a way that said you can do foreign intelligence, but if it ever involves a U.S. person . . . and it’s interesting using the term “U.S. person.” That does not mean “citizen.” That means “U.S. person,” any person in the United States. If you’re going to conduct surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, and that’s a very important phrase—“foreign intelligence purposes”—this community would have to have a warrant, and so that was the right balance.

Now in that period of time, almost all international communications were wireless, and you can only have two kinds of communications. They’re either wire or wireless. There’s nothing else. It’s either traveling on wire—in the old days it was copper. Today it’s fiberoptics or it’s wireless. So the phrasing in the law because of the communications modes of the time was if it was wireless international, there’s no expectation of privacy, and there’s no problem with the Intelligence Community intercepting that, because the targets were foreign, and you were trying to conduct foreign intelligence.

If there was incidental involvement of an American, or if some foreigner called an American or got some incidental coverage, there were procedures for handling that. It was called “minimize,” or “minimization.” But the wording in the law said if it’s on a wire, you have to have a warrant, and the reason was in 1978 everybody talking on phones with wires on them had the expectation of privacy.

Well, today most of the phones we talk on are wireless, and almost all international communications in terms of volume are on a wire. There’s the
problem. The law said in 1978 if it’s a wire that touched U.S. soil, you are collecting in the United States, and you’ve got to have a warrant, so now all of a sudden our community was required to get a warrant to conduct surveillance of terrorists in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, wherever, and it’s crazy that it would evolve that way. It seems pretty straightforward, easy to fix, right?

We argued for two years. Bills were introduced in the House, in the Senate. Testimony was given, and I got to come back. I’d known a little bit about this from my time in the NSA before, so I said, “Wow, this is a big problem. We’ve got to address it quickly.”

So we worked with the community. After being in draft for a year, a bill was submitted in April. Now if you read the newspapers, what they will tell you is that Mike McConnell single-handedly abused the Congress and forced it to pass this new legislation, and he did it through trickery and deceit.

The trick was I knew they wanted to adjourn, and the deceit was that we published a national intelligence estimate on the threat. So you put the threat pressure on one end and the jet fumes at National Airport at the other end, and Mike McConnell forced these guys to pass this legislation.
Now some got abused significantly by their constituents. Now there are other points of view. I’ve given you my point of view, and others will say, “Well, yes, but we can’t trust you, and you’re spying on Americans,” and so on. They subjected those members to a lot of abuse, so now they’re angry.

So the solution is to say Mike McConnell lied, cheated, stole, is deceitful, and so on. That gives you a little balance, at least, from one person’s point of view who is trying to pay a lot of attention to this.

I want to quote Churchill, because as I think about this process I’m sitting there talking to a member of Congress at an open hearing. We had met three times before the hearing. He or she understands, agrees we’ve got to fix this. So now we’re at the hearing. The lights are on. The cameras are rolling. “Admiral, tell us why you want to spy on Americans.”

So it’s theater. It’s political theater. You’re speaking to a constituency, and it’s all about political advantage. Churchill said, “Americans will always do the right thing after they’ve exhausted all other options.”

So that’s where we are. I’m going to go back to my speech now. I had to get that off my chest. I apologize. If there are questions about it, we’ll come back to it, but I want to talk a little bit about this morning’s theme, which as I understand it is “Intelligence Strategy: New Challenges and Opportunities.”

I’m not sure I entirely agree with that title. When you look at the history of our community, we’ve been confronting many of these same challenges since our very early days, and after a while they’re no longer new. The phrase “challenge” is the right one when we’ve been frustrated by them for, you know, more than 60 years.

I’ll give you some examples of this. In 1948—I started to say that was before I was born. It wouldn’t be exactly true, so I won’t say that. In 1948, two years after the post of Director of Central Intelligence was created, its occupant at the time was already saying, “This job does not have enough authority to execute its responsibilities.” Now that was 1948. Now if you ask me later do I have enough authority to execute my responsibilities, I’m going to forecast the answer. You’ve kind of got the picture.

A task force took a look at this community in 1955, and the conclusion was the security procedure is an abomination. It took 15 months to get someone cleared. Well, here it is 2007, and we’ve worked that down to 18 months.

In 1960, a panel of experts looked at us and how we do information technology, and they were worried about compatibility of the computer systems. They were not interoperable. We only had two, so some of these issues about integration and so on have been around for a while.

What is new is that we are finally confronting some of the challenges, and we’re demanding some results. We’re doing this. We’re trying to do it through a 100-Day Plan and a 500-Day Plan for integration and collaboration.
Why did I choose a 100-Day Plan and a 500-Day Plan? Now the truth is because Patrick Gorman told me to, but what he influenced me with was saying, “Look, I’ve been doing this consulting thing and this commercial thing for a long time. Working for the government is hard, and the reason it’s hard is because the government has to sit down and write down what it wants, so there’s an expectation of a deliverable, and there’s a schedule for delivery, and you’re going to review that on a periodic basis. When you get to the end of it, if you didn’t deliver you don’t get paid.”

So my thinking was why not set up the same situation that the government holds us to in the private sector—accountable for delivering something. Why don’t we do the same thing in our own community? So let’s see if we can get agreement on a set of deliverables, set it up on a 100-Day Plan, and see how it works out.

We worked that down to 26 major deliverables, and we got a 70 percent hit rate. Now, I’m told in government that’s a pretty good grade. However, in the high school I went to that’s about a D-minus, C-plus, so we’re going to be very aggressive in trying to hold the process accountable to these deliverables. Now the 500-Day Plan—the 100-Day Plan worked pretty well. We kind of got the major things done. The 500-Day Plan is much the same approach.

Why do we choose to do this? When do you think the first study of this community, about what’s broken and what needs to be corrected, was conducted? It was 1946. And how many times has it been studied since 1946, from 1946 to 2006? The answer is 40 times. Now we’re talking about very senior, high-level, blue ribbon panels. You remember Aspen-Brown. You remember IC-21. These are ones that you’ll remember personally.

If you go back and look at all of those studies, all 40 of them, with every 18 months or so somebody seriously looking at this community, they all said the same thing. You’ve got to go faster in security. You’ve got to have collaboration. You’ve got to have interoperability. All said the same thing, so when we sat down and did our little historical review we said, “Look, let’s don’t study us again. Let’s go do the things that people have been saying for 40 years.”

Now my approach is, look, some smart people did a strategy. It was called the National Security Intelligence Strategy. There’s some phrase that goes with it, but General Mike Hayden and Ambassador Negroponte had a team. They looked at it. They published it. People agreed to it. It’s a good strategy.

So that’s our strategy. We didn’t tamper with it. We’re not going to change it. We’ll reexamine it probably over the next year, make sure we got it right. Do we need to make some adjustments? But our plan was, all right, we’ve got a strategy. Let’s go do it, and there are things we have to do to be effective. Let’s just go try to change them, and that’s where the collaboration comes in.
I’ve had the experience, in government and outside government, that if you have true collaboration, all boats rise. The performance of the organization flies off the chart if there’s willing and strong collaboration. If you’re not worried about who gets credit—let’s just do the mission—magic happens.

Now, on the private sector side, I had a chance to observe that. A group of people who owned a company convinced themselves a collaborative approach was much more effective than an internal competitive approach. It was hard. Significant members of the company left voluntarily or were fired, because they didn’t want to embrace this collaborative model.

Now in the period of the market—and I’m just going to refer to the market I was familiar with—when the available resources declined significantly over a period of eight years, the business unit that I was associated with grew 20 percent per year. And the only difference was a collaborative approach.

As a group of consultants, we often would know more about an issue than the government side, because we talked to each other, and we would have coordination and lots of dialogue, and now you see that replicated to some extent on the government side with teleconferencing events and so on. It became a regular part of our day.

It was an expectation that we would sit and talk. We would coordinate through the day. E-mail made it very, very easy, and we would talk either on the phone or face-to-face on a regular basis, and all of a sudden we achieved competitive advantage. We had better results for our clients, and I became convinced watching it that a collaborative approach is infinitely better than a non-collaborative approach.

So a lot of the things that we’re trying to do, because collaboration has been included in those 40 studies going all the way back to 1946, is how do we make that happen. The first thing, you agree on a set of core values. The second thing, you get an appraisal system that works, and you hold people accountable for living up to the core values they agreed to—collaboration, teamwork, integrity, respect, diversity, whatever those things turn out to be.

So that’s the approach that we’re trying to accomplish in the community, and there are a lot of embedded issues. What I’m learning is that the federal employment system is very different from the private sector. It’s a little bit more of a challenge to get cooperative behavior, but we’re working through all those issues.

Now what I’d like to talk a little bit more about today is the changing strategic environment that the community is facing. It is easy to think about it in terms of we’re at a point in history unlike any other. So much is truly new, the Internet, for a major example. That always comes to mind, but also other things—biometrics; nanotechnology; cheap, encrypted communications; GPS. Just think about GPS. It was an idea that people resisted in the Department of
Defense. Today it's vital for not only defense but for commerce and global trade and so on.

And I extend that a bit: man-portable weapons of mass destruction. It's possible for a single human being to carry weapons or things that can be weaponized in a bag or a suitcase that could cause the death of millions of people. So we have some issues.

That's changed and, in another sense, much of the world is not new. Many compare our current situation in the world to that of President Harry Truman, what he confronted 60 years ago when he signed the National Security Act, creating so many of the national security institutions that we all talk about today.

Secretary of Defense—we didn't have a Secretary of Defense until 1946. We had a Secretary of War, but both the Navy Department and the Army Department were Cabinet members. Huge change. It created the National Security Council, the United States Air Force, the DCI, and the CIA.

One of the most fascinating things I've read is a passionate plea of why we should not have a central intelligence agency, written in 1946 when the discussion about having a centralized agency was being considered. In those days, the three powerhouses for intelligence were Army, Navy, and State Department, and so they were sticking to their position that "We do this better than somebody else, and it shouldn't be centralized."

Perhaps in one sense we're closer today to 1907 than we are to 1947. Now think about that for a second. Like our predecessors in the days of Teddy Roosevelt, we live in a shifting and uncertain geopolitical environment, and we are witnessing rapid and disruptive globalization. We are made wary by the lack of transparency in some of the world's most heavily armed nations.

Then and now, groups and individuals responded violently to global social and economic change. In 1907, there were anarchists and Marxists and a host of other radical actors. Today we have Islamic fundamentalists and nationalist demagogues of several ideologies. Those are the ones who wish to return us to supposedly simpler times.

Our 2007 version of the anarchist who assassinated President McKinley or Archduke Ferdinand are the terrorists who wish to incinerate entire cities. We know differently from the time that I grew up, when it was easy to do capabilities, hard to do intentions.

In today's situation, that's reversed entirely. Intentions are very clear. If you just read the websites or listen to the sermons or pay attention to what's coming out of just Al Qaeda, they intend to conduct attacks that will result in mass casualties inside the United States.

Intentions are clear. Capabilities are another matter. It used to be relatively straightforward as a Cold War warrior to count the tanks or count the
submarines or understand the air forces or the missile forces and so on, while we always struggled with intentions. Today, in a capability sense, we’re talking about a single person or a few people moving in the global system of globalization and free travel.

How do you find one or two or six or twelve or twenty, when they could be carrying instruments of mass destruction, and then stop those few? Think of them as capabilities, because we’ve got a clear understanding of intentions.

The extremist threats of a century ago, like those of today, are explicitly opposed to the modern world. In 1907 the novelist Joseph Conrad published a book. The name of it was *The Secret Agent*. In the book, anarchists sought to blow up the Greenwich Observatory to demonstrate the futility of the new scientific and industrial order. Greenwich Observatory, globalized time, Zulu time—everybody’s familiar with it, an advance that was needed in that era. In the case of art imitating life, Conrad got the idea of an actual plot against the Observatory at the end of the previous century.

We all know what happened as the extremist forces present a century ago metastasized into Fascism and Communism and washed over us with two horrific wars, World War I and World War II. I don’t know the number of people who died, but it’s measured in tens of millions. At one point I came up with 100 million and decided to stop counting. Some have claimed that just in Russia alone the number exceeded 25 million, and just in China alone it exceeded 50 million.

The second of these two wars left the world divided by a bipolar superpower competition that manifested itself in borders like the Iron Curtain and walls like the Wall in Berlin and boundaries like the Korean DMZ. It was a battle between a closed system and an open system in which the huge industrialized states controlled the ultimate power of weapons of mass destruction.

While our strategic thinkers conceived of the doctrines of containment and mutually assured destruction—it’s a horrible term, “mutually assured destruction,” designed to halt Soviet expansion—our intelligence innovators responded with tools and technologies that helped ensure the victory of the United States and the Allies using the right tools and techniques and approach.

I would submit two great things happened from our community in World War II. The first was code breaking, with the cooperation of, first, the Poles. Two brave Polish officers captured an Enigma machine and smuggled it from Poland to Sweden to Norway to the UK. The UK was an ally and in desperate trouble, and the Poles said, “You know, we’ve got to stop spying on those Americans and ask for their help.”

The net effect was Bletchley Park. Churchill made a decision, reached out to the Americans, and on our end of this process, rather than Bletchley Park
we called it Nebraska Avenue. That’s the little place right up here where DHS, the Department of Homeland Security, sits today.

So using mostly women who were gifted in math and had great nimbleness in operating computers of the day—we invented the first big computer—we actually enjoyed reading German codes throughout the war in cooperation with the British. The British took it just so far. They couldn’t go to the next step, and it took American ingenuity inventing computers to actually make that happen.

When you hear about great decisions of World War II, it’s a little easier when you’re reading the other guy’s game plan. You know when your strategic deception is working because you can see what they’re arguing about behind the lines.

The other place we broke code was in the Pacific against the Japanese. When Admiral Nimitz made the decision to put all of his remaining forces at Midway, it turned the battle in the Pacific. And how did he do that? He knew that the Japanese fleet was underway. He did not know what the target would be.

So the dilemma was “What do I do with my remaining force when it could be from San Francisco to the Philippines?” And so they started to cause potential targets to talk about themselves in exploitable means. Somebody came up with the idea that Midway has no fresh water, so Midway was instructed on a cable that nobody could hear, “Report to us that you’re out of fresh water. It’s an emergency, and send a water tanker immediately.”

In less than 24 hours, Japanese code that we read—this is from a message going from Tokyo out to the Japanese fleet at sea—said, “Target X suffering water shortage. Proceed.” Nimitz had his answer. He put his remaining force at Midway, destroyed much of the Japanese naval force, and the battle of the Pacific turned at that time. Code breaking pays off.

The second great innovation was human intelligence, human beings who would risk their lives to go behind the lines to organize resistance. It was more effective in Europe and in China, but from that was born the OSS and what today we call special operations forces. Those are the two big innovations of that time.

During the Cold War, when we needed the coverage of denied territory—think denied area. Think from Vladivostok all the way to Berlin. We couldn’t see in that area, couldn’t visit, so what was the big innovation? I would say it was the national reconnaissance offices and things related. What we took charge of better than anybody else on the globe was the high ground.

We could see. We could listen. We could peer. We could understand, and as a youngster growing up, what I learned as a young naval officer and
analyst against the Soviet Navy was the Soviets could not design, build, employ, deploy any major force that we didn't have some reasonable understanding of.

It was an amazing accomplishment to be able to see and look and listen from a vantage point that allowed us to understand that threat. We took command of the high ground so we could peer into their secret areas.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the growth of globalization, borders are no longer a barrier, and most of the world is one global, open system controlled by a network that we call the Internet, and that's the issue for us today. States no longer have a monopoly on weapons of mass destruction, and most of the technology base is in the private sector, very different from what it was before.

As seen in the growth of the European Union, China, India, Russia, Brazil, and other politically and economically significant actors, the key theme now is global integration, not bifurcation. Some refer to it as globalization. We also see greater political and economic polarity in this process.

So the question now is, when the world is more open, information more abundant, and power more diffuse, what is the right grand strategy for the United States? And perhaps more important for us today is how does the Intelligence Community support this new grand strategy?

What are the equivalent ideas of containment and nuclear deterrence for this era, and how does the Intelligence Community play? What is the thing that we could do that would replicate what was done in World War II, and what was replicated about the advantage that we provided in the Cold War?

This is not the first time Americans have faced a dangerous world and challenges or been asked to develop a long-term strategy that protected a nation. In February 1946, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow, George Kennan, introduced the notion of containing the Soviets in the now infamous “Long Telegram.” He'd been a close observer of Soviet policy and conduct, which he wrote about. His essay galvanized Washington, and the idea of containment was embraced.

Following World War II, the Soviets occupied various areas and worked with brutal efficiency to subvert elections that had been mandated by the wartime agreements. They imposed Communist-dominated regimes while using diplomacy and subterfuge to confuse the West and spur the pace of Western demobilization.

President Truman had a problem. We always want to build up in a crisis and tear down after the crisis is over. In response, Truman's administration developed the basis of the new strategic doctrine to employ against this challenge.

In 1947 President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine in a joint session of Congress. He started out by saying, “I believe it must be the policy of
the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.”

A few months later, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed the famous Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe. That put Europe on a solid path toward recovery, democracy, free markets, and prosperity, and transferred it into the valid ally it is today. That same summer, the National Security Act modernized defense and our foreign policy structure.

I think you can see where I’m going with this brief background. By the time China fell to the Communists, by the time Stalin exploded his own atomic bomb, and by the time the North Koreans invaded their southern neighbor, the United States had taken great strides toward working out its strategic and institutional response to the new threat.

Now just think about that. It took four years between Kennan’s idea and making it the policy of our nation. It took three more years and turnovers both in the White House and the Congress before the idea of containment received adjustments in President Eisenhower’s famous Solarium Project. Solarium set the strategy that we lived by for 40 years—nuclear deterrence, containment. We had bipartisan support, and almost everything we did was framed in those two ideas—contain, deter.

New challenges today: In just a few minutes, from a cyber café in one country you can with the Internet recruit and plan an attack that’s time zones away. Drug sales in Latin America can fund terrorist activity in the Middle East. In the fractions of a second it takes to move money around the world, a terrorist aspiration can grow into a fully funded operation.

We need to do the intellectual heavy lifting now and then think about how our community would support the new strategy. Make no mistake. Portions of our old grand strategy are still in effect and, like 1947, we still need to guard against powerful states that control entire regions and cut off access to allies and resources and so on. The answers that President Truman devised in the late forties remain true today.

We need global military and diplomatic engagement with our friends and engagement with our foes to empower the former and contain the latter. We need open markets and free trade to bring people together and lift people out of poverty and, institutionally, international institutions to promote the rule of law as the fundamental goal.

It would be a waste to invalidate the national strategy principles that we’ve employed since the forties, and we have to adjust our institutions to the new thinking. That’s my message today and to challenge this group. How do we adjust? What is it we do?

Part of that adjustment needs to come in the form of intelligence collection methods. We’ve got to think differently about what it is we collect. My
position is not to keep doing the same old thing. If you’re doing the same old thing, you have an institutionalized, established bureaucracy that has a contractor base, a workforce, and support on the Hill.

During our previous wars, hot and cold, the community’s tools answered many of the requirements to support the nation’s needs. Today we need a capability that will take us to the next level. We need courage, and this is something I’m introducing for the first time. It’s something I’ve been worried about, and some very smart people around me came up with it, not I personally.

If you think about the Cold War, we were denied territory. What’s denied to us today? I would say it’s denied data, denied areas to a lesser extent, but the real issue is denied minds. For human beings to conduct these atrocious acts, unless it’s a lone wolf acting entirely independently, they have to communicate. What is the way they’re communicating today? It is through one global infrastructure.

Technology was born of integration of telecommunications into one structure. If we broke code in World War II, and we took the high ground in the Cold War, what is it we touch today that all these organizations must use? It’s the method for communicating. It’s penetration of that net in a way so that you can take it away or exploit it or attack it to serve the nation’s interest. This is the work that we need to do.

The work of this community turns the wheels of national policy. I get to sit down with the President of the United States six days a week. So I said, “Mr. President, you know, I can stay up all night, and I still won’t have the depth and breadth of a lot of these subjects that you do.” I said, “I’m willing to get up real early, but I’ve got a better idea.” I said, “Rather than me try to stay up all night and guess what you’re going to ask me about, why don’t we propose topics we’re going to talk to you about, and why don’t we bring in somebody that’s studied it for 10 or 15 or 20 years?” The President said, “We’ll give it a try.”

So we do it six days a week. Four of those days, we take in somebody who really knows what he or she is talking about. So if you want to talk, you pick the subject. Could be China. Could be Europe. It could be energy resources. It could be terrorism, whatever it is.

We take somebody who generally speaks the language, lived in the countries of concern, and studied it either academically or in the Intelligence Community. I’ve actually watched United States policy morph and change in about a 20-minute window, because for the first time the President of the United States is talking to somebody who really knows in an intimate way what the details are.

This was actually an idea of Chief of Staff Bolten, because I was struggling with getting up earlier and earlier. I was kind of running out of daytime hours, so the answer was let’s take in a smart person.
That’s worked out for us in a very useful way, and so far the President’s response after we did a couple of these was we really hit it out of the park. A couple of them were not quite out of the park, but on one of the really good days he said, “As long as I’m President of the United States, we’re going to keep doing this.”

The young analysts in the community love doing this. They get to sit down with the President of the United States and tell him what they think, and the answer, “Sir, that’s above my pay grade,” is not the right answer.

The President says, “I want to know what you think. I want you to think about the problem from my point of view. Strategic context. What is it—if you were in my seat, what would you do?” And I would say 90 percent of the analysts step right up. Ten percent melt. I am very sympathetic with the ten percent. I’ve melted a few times myself.

The question for me is where is our George Kennan for today? This brings me to the last thought that I’ll leave with you, and it’s about the men and women who are leading this community.

Director McConnell fields questions from the audience about the role of the DNI, intelligence strategy, long-range planning efforts, and other issues.
How do we produce the equivalent of a containment and deterrence strategy in today's environment? We need to answer questions of how to defeat terrorism when the terrorists can be working among American citizens.

Or another question—how do we confront deadly diseases that can be spread around the world in a matter of hours and do that without walling off this country? And how do we counter an enemy who flies no flag, is not bound by borders, does not fight by conventions of war, and can move at the speed of light?

Those are my prepared remarks. I'd be happy to take a few questions.

UNIDENTIFIED QUESTIONER. Director, I've been curious. I'm trying to understand why I can't find an executive vision of how the Intelligence Community works. I haven't been able to find folks who were interested in thinking that way.

DIRECTOR MCCONNELL. There is a strategy. I made reference to it in my remarks. I told you why I started the approach that I did. Rather than developing a grand vision and studying it one more time, let's actually go do some things. We're on that path. We will examine the strategy, the CONOP, the vision, over the next few months.

Now there's a group that may not be familiar to you—yet another acronym. We call it the ICLC, Intelligence Community Leadership Council, and we found a person who's gifted in transformation. We've had our first two meetings, and we're sitting down to talk through just this very subject.

Now on the one side, I don't want to get us, the community, in an uproar about the fact we're changing everything again, but I want to make sure we get these 500-Day and 100-Day Plan efforts done. We examine the strategy, and if there is an appropriate place that responds to what I tried to tee up in my speech, hopefully the outcome of that would be what you just described. So that's the path we're on.

As I mentioned, we have had two meetings. Our next session is in October, and I'm hopeful, perhaps even optimistic, that something will come out of that which we will galvanize around.

Let me make my point again about collaboration. There are 16 agencies in this community. 15 of them work for another Cabinet officer, so while people often introduce me as the Director of National Intelligence, my view is that a better title would be the Coordinator of National Intelligence, because it is a hard decision to make. I get to introduce the subject and start the negotiation.

Now are we going to change the fundamental law? From 1946 to 1986, the Department of Defense had some issues. The ambiguity and the uncertainty and controls that were introduced in 1946, in my view, were not solved until 1986. It's called Goldwater-Nichols.
There is one chain of command—the President, Secretary of Defense, Operating Commander, Joint Task Force Commander. That's four people. There is one decision point in the Department of Defense for all decisions. Recruitment, personnel policy, education, training, operational doctrine—it all comes to the Secretary of Defense. That's not the way this community works.

Is that a better model? I don't know. We can argue it for a long, long time, but what I hope to do, having lived in the community for so many years, is stimulate the dialogue and the debate and if it was perfect from my standpoint, we would get it right as I walk out the door. Therefore, it has nothing to do with me other than a better model. So that's the way I'm thinking about it.

UNIDENTIFIED QUESTIONER. Is there any thought or idea about mergers and acquisition in the community to streamline the management, to get it more simplified, if not to a single point of decision?

DIRECTOR MCCONNELL. The question you just asked was asked by some of our community leadership not too many years ago, and what happened to them? So I'm trying to walk that line, get us to the right place, and not be on the outside looking in.

As a management consultant, you just described the problem, and there are some answers. We've just got to be delicate. Now you would think that, if the wording in a law passed in 1978 for an intended purpose locked down your community so you're not effective in protecting the country from terrorism, it would be a simple fix.

We've been at this for two years, and I just yesterday finished my 14th hour of testimony in five days, and if you read the press accounts of that, as I opened up, I am an evil person trying to spy on Americans.

So it's a political world you have to deal with. I think many of us in this room could design it, but as a practical matter how can you get it to closure? That's what I'm trying to walk.

UNIDENTIFIED QUESTIONER. Will the global integration and globalization help or hinder technology transfer to the enemy, and is our enemy just a bunch of people, or are they really supported by big corporations that work with them? I have in mind . . . (inaudible) Osama bin Laden. He has the biggest family and the biggest corporation in Saudi Arabia, and I can't imagine that there is no relationship.

DIRECTOR MCCONNELL. First of all, globalization makes the flow of technology basically free flow, so that's the issue. A small group can take globalization and creativity and entrepreneurship that were created for one purpose—higher productivity, increased efficiency, and so on—and flip it on its head.

If you could weaponize SARS out of some process in China, and you could package it in some way and give it to 20 terrorists taking off from Hong
Kong, you could have a global situation. So the first answer to the first question is globalization makes it flow, free flow.

Another point, let me correct just one thing—at least from my understanding, Osama bin Laden is broke. Yes, we knew he had all that money. He had some. Osama bin Laden’s genius was, first of all, to get Zawahiri, who is the real thinker. Notice that most of the leadership positions in Al Qaeda are Egyptian, not Saudi.

The magic was Osama bin Laden was willing to die for his cause, and he was forceful, loves the camera, loves the media. So what they put together was an idea that appealed to a radical element, and radical elements in that part of the world exist from Morocco all the way into India, and it gave them a unifying theme.

So while it was a small group initially—and I don’t want to make this sound like Jiffy Lube—what they started to do was franchise. They have a franchise in Algeria and one in Libya and one in Tunisia, and so on. So they’re stringing it together with this ideology that will tie this group together, a small group.

Let’s talk about numbers. How many Al Qaeda operatives are in the federally administered tribal area of Pakistan today? A very small number, but they can have devastating impact because of globalization and the ability to stand it on its head.

UNIDENTIFIED QUESTIONER. That’s the prevailing view. My view is that the bin Laden group is the biggest group in Saudi Arabia. With family ties, cousins, brothers, and through marriage, they’re strong in this culture, in this tribal culture. I can’t imagine there is no relation between Osama bin Laden and parts of his family. So these are some of bin Laden’s supporters through an infrastructure that stays under the horizon.

DIRECTOR MCCONNELL. That’s where he gets the money, and it’s very simple. Just go look at the fundamental teachings in Saudi Arabia, in the home, in the school, in the mosque. It’s called “wahhabi,” and wahhabism basically says your duty is to convert or kill. When you meet a non-Muslim, your duty is to convert or kill.

That textbook is right here in a mosque in Washington, D.C. Fortunately, over here it’s pretty much preached as freedom of speech and free ideas, but there 25 percent of young Saudi men are unemployed.

They’ve gone to a school to listen to this basic rhetoric for their entire existence. They have no skills, so they get to a point in life where they have no marketable skills, nothing to do. What appeals to them? Those families, incredibly wealthy because of oil, have money to donate. So it flows into this radical thinking, and what worries me is that wahhabi, or the face of wahhabi, is basically Al Qaeda’s philosophy.
UNIDENTIFIED QUESTIONER. Director, could you say a little bit more about your reservations regarding the FISA system? My understanding is that the track record of FISA warrants is pretty high, so it can't be that it constrains you in terms of going after targets worldwide, and the timing issue wouldn't seem to be a huge problem, because you can apply for these things ex post facto. Does it really just come down to the volume of traffic that would fall under this today, and that's what makes it unworkable?

DIRECTOR MCCONNELL. Let's examine it on a variety of levels. Why should we extend Fourth Amendment protection to a terrorist in Pakistan who is planning to kill Americans—a foreigner, a foreigner in a foreign country? That's the fundamental question. In 1978, we didn't extend that protection because of the method, so the only difference is the method.

Therefore, I would turn the question on its head. Why would you even think about Fourth Amendment protection for a foreigner? That's my starting point.

The second point is because of the wording in the law—it required a warrant. If you're in the position of getting a warrant, this is a pretty dynamic world. Remember, there are billions of things going on, so first you've got to know something. You've got to know how to target. If you're in that business, you're falling behind. We couldn't keep up. The system just can't turn.

Why would you do it that way? It wasn't intended that way in 1978, so why should it be the system today? We're falling behind. We have a mission called foreign intelligence. It's to protect the nation and our allies against things like terrorism. To extend Fourth Amendment protection and rights to a foreign terrorist in a foreign country is just fundamentally wrong.
Mike McConnell was sworn in as the nation’s second Director of National Intelligence on February 13, 2007. Before his nomination as DNI, McConnell had served as a Senior Vice President with the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, focusing on Intelligence and National Security areas.

From 1992 to 1996, McConnell served as Director of the National Security Agency (NSA). He led NSA as it adapted to the multi-polar threats brought about by the end of the Cold War. Under his leadership, NSA routinely provided global intelligence and information security services to the White House, Cabinet officials, and the Congress, in addition to a broad array of military and civil intelligence customers. He also served as a member of the Director of Central Intelligence senior leadership team to address major intelligence programmatic and substantive issues from 1992 until 1996.

Prior to his service at NSA and during Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, McConnell worked as the Intel-
Intelligence Officer (J2) for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.

In 1996 McConnell retired as a Vice Admiral in the U.S. Navy after 29 years of service—26 as a career Intelligence Officer. He holds an M.P.A. from The George Washington University, is a graduate of the National Defense University (Global Telecom), the National Defense Intelligence College (Strategic Intelligence), and holds a B.A. in Economics from Furman University. In addition to many of the nation's highest military awards for meritorious service, he holds the nation's highest award for service in the Intelligence Community. He also served as the Chairman and CEO of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance.

McConnell was born on July 26, 1943, in Greenville, South Carolina, where he lived, grew up, and first attended college. He is married to Terry McConnell and together they have four children and six grandchildren.
PANEL 1

What Has the Intelligence Community Accomplished Under Intelligence Reform?
Conference attendees have the opportunity to visit defense industry exhibits during a break to check out the latest intelligence technology.
I’d like to go over the format of our panel sessions that we'll use for today and tomorrow. We'll open up the panels with each panelist having ten minutes to present opening remarks, and after each panelist has made his or her remarks I’ll turn it over to the moderator, who will open up the floor for questions and answers.

For the Q&A session, unlike for our keynote speakers, I'd like you all to use the question cards located in your conference packets. If you could please write your questions neatly on those question cards anytime during the panel session and hold them up, I’ll have our staff come around and collect them throughout the panel session, and then we'll give them to the moderator to give him a chance to prepare for the questions.

I’d like to introduce the members of our first panel, which will address what the Intelligence Community has accomplished under intelligence reform.

Serving as our moderator will be Mr. Patrick Gorman, Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Strategy, Policy, and Plans. Next to him is Major General Michael E. Ennis, United States Marine Corps, Deputy Director for Community HUMINT with the National Clandestine Service. Next to General Ennis is Dr. Carter Morris. He's Director for Information Sharing and Knowledge Management, Department of Homeland Security. Finally, we have Dr. Michael Warner, Chief Historian, Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Panel Moderator

Patrick Gorman
Assistant DDNI (Strategy, Policy, and Plans)

I'd like to give some context to this. One is the theme of opportunities and challenges. As we look at this going forward, it’s not just what’s working and has been successful, but what hasn’t worked in the past. What are the impediments? What do we need to address going forward?

I’d like to begin the discussion with Dr. Warner to get the historical context. He just completed a study over the summer looking at the history of intelligence reform and has a lot of great insights. Then we’ll go through each of the speakers and discuss what they’re running into in terms of what they’ve found is working, lessons learned, and then also where they think impediments are going forward on intelligence reform.
Patrick Gorman serves as the Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Strategy, Policy, and Plans and as a Senior Advisor for the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). In his role as ADDNI for Strategy, Policy, and Plans, he focuses on scenario planning and strategic analysis for the Intelligence Community, developing community-wide policies and coordinating implementation planning to meet the Director’s agenda and execute the National Intelligence Strategy. As a Senior Advisor, he focuses on strategic integration and transformation issues for the Director of National Intelligence.

Prior to his appointment as Senior Advisor, Mr. Gorman was a principal with the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, where he focused on strategy, integration, and technology planning in support of clients in the Intelligence, Homeland Security, Defense, Health, Energy, and Financial Services sectors. His major areas of expertise are scenario planning and global futures development, policy and strategy analysis, strategic integration, and architecture and technology evaluation. Mr. Gorman spent ten years in the U.S. Air Force in strategic airborne reconnaissance and intelligence analysis and served in DESERT STORM.

He led many of the initial efforts in the mid-1990s to develop Network-Centric Warfare concepts and architectures as a consultant on the Joint Staff, where he developed novel techniques for using modeling and simulation to support budgetary decisions for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Mr. Gorman led the development of the Network Operations efforts and established the Theater C4ISR Coordination Center (TCCC) at Pacific Command. He spent several years working strategic integration issues for commercial clients in North America and Europe until the events of 11 September, when Mr. Gorman led the implementation team to stand up the Transportation Security Administration and the larger integration of the border and transportation security agencies.

Mr. Gorman has a B.A. degree from the University of Maryland and an M.A. from George Washington University.
Thank you very much, Patrick. It’s good to be here to talk to you. The title of our panel is “What Has Intelligence Reform Accomplished?” and, being a historian, I have to flip that on its head or turn it around.

After all, a historian is someone who goes to the National Gallery of Art and stands in front of a beautiful Rubens or Rembrandt and says, “That’s a really neat frame on the front of that painting. I wonder how old that frame is. I wonder if Rembrandt put that frame there.” So our perspectives are sometimes a little bit skewed.

Perhaps the best example—we just talked last week about the National Security Act of 1947. Last week was the 60th anniversary of the passage of the National Security Act—the Magna Carta, the great charter for our national security institutions here in the United States.

The DNI in his talk went down a list of the accomplishments of the National Security Act. It’s easy to make that list, but it’s perhaps harder to express in a nutshell what that act was trying to do, and I think perhaps the person who explained that best was George Marshall. He was Chief of Staff of the United States Army in October 1945. He had four stars on his shoulders. He was speaking right after V-J Day to a session of the Senate, and he told them we almost lost World War II.

Indeed, in 1942, after Pearl Harbor, we were fighting the Japanese in the Pacific, and it took the threat of imminent defeat at the hands of the Japanese to get the Army and the Navy to stop fighting each other and fight the Japanese instead. Now this is George Marshall talking in front of the Senate. This was on the front page of The New York Times the next morning.

Here is the idea behind the National Security Act. Get them working as a team. One team, one fight. Get the Army and the Navy, all the departments of the United States government, get them talking together, working together, collaborating as a team to accomplish national policy goals. Have a reformed and modernized intelligence structure to defend the United States and to inform national policy. As it’s meeting these goals, it’s making these goals and trying to achieve these goals. The National Security Act took great strides to do that 60 years ago last week when it was first implemented.

The National Security Act is becoming better understood now as historians look at it more. A nice book by Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design, describes
the National Security Act as a real set of compromises. It took a lot of political and institutional compromises to bring this act into being.

Because of those compromises, that sort of artful trading back and forth among the President, the Congress, and the institutions of the federal government, several improvements were made, but you can by no means say that the job was finished. The foundation was laid. Perhaps the skeleton of the building was put in place, but by no means was that building finished in the National Security Act, and work was left for other people to do.

And so I asked at the beginning what needed to be accomplished. Well, the National Security Act left us three huge pieces of unfinished business in intelligence in this country. The National Security Act created a Director of Central Intelligence who had the responsibility, or maybe the accountability, for fixing intelligence in the United States but with only a piece of the authority that he needed to do that.

For several decades after this, Presidents and Congresses—later on Congresses would get involved in this—would insist that the Director of Central Intelligence actually manage the Intelligence Community, and from Allen Dulles on in the 1950s they came back and said, “We don’t really have the power to do that, sir.” So a big piece of unfinished business remained from the National Security Act in 1947.

Regarding another large piece of unfinished business, the Act was passed by a Congress that in some ways echoed the concerns that Director McConnell talked about in his talk a few minutes ago. There was a great deal of concern in Congress in 1947 about civil liberties, about privacy, about defending the rights of Americans from the government as much as from their enemies.

The internal security intelligence aspects of the Act were very tightly limited. There was a rigid line drawn between intelligence and law enforcement. The new Central Intelligence Agency that was created was banned from any police subpoena or law enforcement powers. It was a foreign intelligence agency. There was a domestic intelligence agency already. That was the FBI. Its domestic intelligence mission went back to World War I. It had accomplished it fairly well and, with some problems, operated fairly well in World War II.

J. Edgar Hoover was perhaps at the height of his popularity and his fame and certainly his institutional prestige. He was able to convince Congress and the President that the FBI could do the internal security mission on its own, that it did not need interference from foreign intelligence.

That approach worked when our domestic threat—I should say here the threat from foreign espionage—was based in foreign embassies in Washington, D.C., which could be monitored. It did not work so well when that threat metastasized in the 1990s into something very different, a very different cast of characters and motivations.
Moving to the third big piece of unfinished business, as the Act was being discussed, long before a draft had even been produced, the armed services went to President Truman in the fall of 1945 and said, “Please, President Truman, do not make us beholden to a civilian intelligence czar. Do not make us go to a civilian agency or department for the intelligence we need to win on the battlefield. Americans will die. We will lose on the battlefield, because we will not be able to get the intelligence we need when we need it. Allow us to provide our own intelligence. Let us preserve our own organic intelligence capabilities. Don’t take them away from us.”

President Truman saw this as a small price to pay for military support for the intelligence aspects of the National Security Act. He readily granted the concession, and so it is written in the Act that the services will maintain their own intelligence capabilities, and the DCI, this new Director of Central Intelligence, will not take them over.

Frankly, this is good for the services in that it preserves those organic intelligence capabilities. However, in the Korean War, in the Vietnam War, and in many subsequent conflicts this proved problematic.

We created a new Secretary of Defense. Who provides intelligence for him? That isn’t written down in the National Security Act. That has to be worked out. It takes until 1961 and the creation of DIA before that is finally settled, but, of course, does that settle the matter? No, it doesn’t, and the Department of Defense is still wrestling with the problem of making sure that intelligence flows freely and in a timely manner, up and down, up to the Secretary of Defense and down to the battlefield commanders.

So the National Security Act leaves three large problems. It is not that these problems go unrecognized. Indeed, as we heard earlier, people were working on these problems almost immediately. From 1948 on, some of these problems were seen and even addressed. A good deal of reform was put in place.

The Director of Central Intelligence gets a fair amount of power to lead the Intelligence Community. This begins under the reforms put in place by James Schlesinger in the early 1970s. It extends even more broadly in the 1990s as the DCI begins to get some modest but real budgetary power and begins to get a professional staff working for him.

The FBI, as I mentioned, basically kept a lid on the Soviet threat during the Cold War, which doesn’t mean we didn’t have spies. We did have spies. We had some fairly damaging ones, but never, never again were the Soviets able to do what they had done in World War II, where they penetrated us backward and forward, up and down, every important agency of the government, many of them with multiple penetrations, up to and including the White House. That was not accomplished by the Soviets in the Cold War.
In the 1990s, we created national intelligence agencies like NSA, NRO, NPIC, which turned into NIMA, which turned into NGA, to provide imagery. We figured out a way to provide intelligence that answers to the Secretary of Defense and answers to the Director of Central Intelligence, so it helps both Presidential needs and the battlefield commanders’ needs.

So a lot was accomplished by the end of the Cold War and over the course of the 1990s. In each of these areas, a good deal more was accomplished between 9/11 and passage of the Intelligence Reform Act in 2004.

The DCI got several more increments of power. A Department of Homeland Security was created in 2002 with its own intelligence element, which helped relieve the FBI of some of the internal security burden. The Defense Department created its Joint Intelligence Centers to provide synthesized intelligence to the combatant commanders. It also finally created a USD(I).

An Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence was created by act of Congress in April 2003 to be a significant player in intelligence. I hate to say “intelligence czar,” but an intelligence official to draw together the entire defense intelligence effort at the behest of the Secretary of Defense.

Intelligence reform accomplished a lot before 2001 and after 2001. But how much is enough? That may be the problem. After all, the French Army in 1939 was undoubtedly the best French army ever. It had changed a lot since 1918. It had developed all sorts of new capabilities. Was it good enough in 1940? I think not.

Obviously, we have changed a lot since 2004. The Intelligence Reform Act in December 2004 created a Director of National Intelligence, its most visible change, with much greater budgetary powers, much greater personnel powers, much more power to look over the information environment to ensure that information is being shared in a national role as opposed to simply a central role. The Director of Central Intelligence only did foreign intelligence. The Director of National Intelligence has a national role, which means he looks at internal intelligence as well.

So a great deal of reform has been accomplished. A great deal remains to be accomplished, and is it enough? That really is not a question for me to answer. As a historian, I look backward, not forward. That’s a question for the gentlemen to my right to answer, and so I’ll turn the microphone back over to them.
Dr. Michael Warner is the Chief Historian for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. He earned his Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago and served as an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency before joining the CIA History Staff. Dr. Warner now runs the ODNI’s History Staff, located in the Integrated Concepts Development Office. He also writes and lectures extensively on intelligence history, theory, and reform.

MR. GORMAN. Thank you, Michael. Thanks for setting the context as we go forward. General Ennis, you’re in charge of putting together this national HUMINT capability with the National Clandestine Service within the Intelligence Community. It would be interesting to get your perspectives on what you’ve seen that’s working and where you think the impediments still are in the system.
The National Clandestine Service came about on the basis of recommendations from the 9/11 and WMD Commissions in 2004. The WMD Commission’s recommendation was for the CIA to create a National Clandestine Service which would do for the world of human intelligence (HUMINT) what NGA does for geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) or what NSA does for signals intelligence (SIGINT). NSA and NGA have separate standing committees which perform this function. We have created the National Clandestine Service.

When they created the National Clandestine Service, the Director of Operations became the new Director of the NCS. The Deputy Director for Operations became the Deputy Director of the NCS, but then they created a second Deputy Director position—this one for community HUMINT—and that’s how my job was formed.

The first thing we were intended to do was to deconflict and coordinate HUMINT activities performed by U.S. government organizations around the world. This is a relatively recent phenomenon. From 1947 to 1997 the CIA had a pretty clear field overseas. The threats were few, they were well defined, and there wasn’t a lot of competition from other government organizations. Beginning in 1997, with the bombing of Khobar Towers, followed by the bombings of the USS Cole and the embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and finally 9/11, there was an increase in U.S. government organizations conducting HUMINT or engaging in activities using clandestine methodologies.

What is the difference? There are a number of U.S. agencies, bureaus, or departments that are not intelligence organizations but engage in information-gathering activities using clandestine methodology/tradecraft under law enforcement or military authorities. They work in alias using commercial cover. They recruit informants and run networks of informants. In other words, in the eyes of a foreign intelligence service, they appear to be conducting HUMINT. Unfortunately, if they get arrested by a foreign intelligence service overseas the first question people are going to ask is not, “Are you conducting this activity under intelligence, law enforcement, or military authorities?” They’re not going to care. They’re simply going to arrest them, because it looks a lot like human intelligence.

So, to scope the challenge, there are about a dozen U.S. government organizations that conduct HUMINT or utilize HUMINT methodologies overseas. Each one has its own authorities, its own budget, its own requirements, and its own
priorities. Moreover, the only coordination mechanism that we had for coordinat-
ing and deconflicting HUMINT activities was a DCI directive that was written
back in the early ’80s during the Cold War and primarily between DoD and CIA.
So there are challenges out there in terms of coordination and deconfliction, and
that's one of the things that my office does.

The second thing my office does, or tries to do, is to integrate the
HUMINT capabilities of these various organizations and synchronize them
against high-priority targets of mutual interest. This work is ongoing.

The last thing that we were expected to do was to establish standards and
procedures for the HUMINT enterprise. We have established a number of working
groups comprised of representatives of the enterprise with each one being focused
on a particular aspect of HUMINT. When the group identifies a standard they
think is good for the whole community, they go forward up through the leadership
chains of their respective organizations. Once the National HUMINT Manager,
General Hayden, has the concurrence of all the other participants, he issues the
standard as a National HUMINT Manager Directive that will be executed under
the authorities of each of the respective agencies, bureaus, or departments.

Let's do a report card. First of all, coordination and deconfliction. Much
of what you read about in the press simply is not true. I have not found, except
with rare exception, and believe me, this is the exception rather than the rule, any
organization that willfully goes out and conducts a HUMINT operation without
doing the necessary coordination. Moreover, if it does occur, it's usually because of
a miscommunication or a misunderstanding. These organizations, and especially
DoD, understand the importance of coordinating activities, whether it's in a com-
bat area or on the battlefield of the global war on terrorism. Everyone understands
the reason for it, and they understand why it needs to be done. 90-plus percent of
the time, the activities are fully coordinated. Unfortunately, it's those very few, that
ten percent or less, that seem to get all of the attention. I really think that's unfair.

The coordination with DoD, the Bureau, and Homeland Security is
very good. Yes, there are the occasional mistakes. We still are trying to get the
procedures and the coordinating instructions in place, but that will come.

In terms of the integration of the capabilities and the synchroniza-
tion of operations, you've got to remember that each of these organizations
has been used to doing things on its own for many years. It is difficult to
change people's attitudes.

Even with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, sometimes there are still
problems within DoD alone of coordinating, and it's 21 years later. Things like this
do take time. It takes time for attitudes and ways of doing business to change.

I am very much encouraged, however, when we have held meetings and
brought people to the table and say, “This is what we want to do against a particular
target,” and people are coming, they're laying their cards on the table, and they're
actually beginning to work together. However, this is something that’s going to take a little time to accomplish, not only because of certain practices, but there’s a lot of trust that has to be built when you’re working with the various partners.

We’ve had absolute acceptance across the board as we’ve brought representatives from all of the organizations together to begin developing standards for the entire community. There has been a willingness and a recognition of the absolute imperative for doing this in the community or in the enterprise. So this, I think, is probably the best example of what the reform has brought about.

What are some of the challenges? One of the challenges is, while everybody wants to cooperate and get along, nobody wants his or her authorities trampled on, and the idea is to find a way, a mechanism for bringing people to the table to begin operating together but without undermining the authorities of any particular department, agency, or bureau. This is going to take some time.

We have various cultures to deal with. I’ll use the FBI as an example. The FBI has been primarily a law enforcement organization. It had this foreign intelligence mission thrust upon it, and it’s not something that you just turn a switch and do overnight. There are people who still have the law enforcement way of doing business, and what we have to do is adapt that for a certain percentage of them to handle this new FI mission. It’s going to take time.

Regarding solutions, one of the things that the Goldwater-Nichols Act did was to direct the military services to come together and cough up representatives to form a Joint Staff. The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and SOCOM all could maintain their own ways of doing business, their own cultures, their own budgeting, etc., the way they’ve always done business. That was never changed. But at the joint level they brought together representatives from each component organization to plan the operation based on the capabilities of each organization, and pre-coordinated so that when the actual operation took place, it would go off with relatively few problems. I think we need something like that in the Intelligence Community as well—a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the interagency that would enable us to more effectively integrate HUMINT capabilities and synchronize HUMINT operations.

The DCI directive that I referred to was issued in 1982. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is working on a replacement. This will really help reduce the number of coordination and deconfliction issues.

Finally, if nothing else, the Intelligence Reform Act has raised the awareness of the need to collaborate and coordinate human activities across the board, and that’s what we’re doing.
Major General Michael E. Ennis assumed the position of Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service for Community Human Intelligence on 6 May 2006. He previously served as the Director for Human Intelligence at the Defense Intelligence Agency.

MajGen Ennis is a native of Minnesota and a graduate of Concordia College with B.A. degrees in French and International Relations. He also holds an M.A. degree in Government/National Security from Georgetown University. MajGen Ennis was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps on 1 January 1972 as a graduate of the Officer Candidates Class (OCC) program.

In 1978 Captain Ennis entered the Foreign Area Officer program and spent two years studying Russian at both the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, and the U.S. Army’s Russian Institute in Garmisch, Germany. In 1980 he returned to Okinawa for one year as the Deputy G-2 of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade and as the S-2 of the 9th Marine Regiment before returning to the United States, where he spent three years as a translator on the Washington-Moscow Hotline (MOLINK).

In 1986 Major Ennis returned to Europe where he spent over three years in Potsdam, East Germany, as the Naval Representative to the CINC, Group of Soviet Forces Germany. He returned to the United States in 1989 and was assigned as the Operations Officer, 2nd Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group. In 1991 LtCol Ennis completed a Military Fellowship at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He was then assigned to Moscow, Russia, where he served as the Assistant Naval Attaché and U.S. Military representative to Azerbaijan.

Upon selection for Colonel in 1993, he was returned to the United States where he served two years as the Director of the Intelligence Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Colonel Ennis served as the AC/S G-2 of the III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa from 1995 to 1998 when he was named Commander of the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Upon selection to Brigadier General in 2000, he became the Commandant’s Director of Marine Corps Intelligence, where he remained until January 2004. He was promoted to Major General on 1 October 2005.

MajGen Ennis’ decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star, the Army Commendation Medal, and the Army Achievement Medal.
MR. GORMAN. Thank you, sir. What I'd like to do now is turn it over to Dr. Morris to perhaps follow up the idea Dr. Warner broached about the long-time division between foreign and domestic intelligence.

The Intelligence Reform Act was supposed to deal with that. DHS was created in part as another mechanism to deal with that. I'd be curious to have a discussion of how well we're doing with that effort, what's working, and where we still have work to do.
First of all, let me apologize that my boss, Charlie Allen, couldn’t be here today. He’s actually working some of those issues of how we in DHS interact with the state and local communities, which is a big part of what I would classify into this intelligence reform business.

I want to talk a little bit about DHS and about information sharing, which is a big part of what is formally in the Intelligence Reform Act, as well as behind a lot of what went into it. When I go down and look at the Act and I define the areas that I think are particularly relevant to DHS and our role in this world, I come up with several—one, a change from the Cold War. I think Michael mentioned that earlier.

The Intelligence Community responds to a lot of different problems. Terrorism is an example. Counternarcotics is another example, various things that are different than what we’ve done before. Border security, getting into my world, is another one. So we’re being asked to change, and the changes that were there were dictated for that reason.

We have been accused of creating problems due to lack of information sharing. I’m not sure whether I agree with that, but that’s certainly a big part of what was in the Act.

It changed the title from “foreign intelligence” to “national intelligence.” Now if you’re doing that, and you take away the word “foreign,” you’re adding in there with foreign something that might be called “domestic intelligence,” except nobody wants to use that term. That’s a no-no.

A big part of at least the structural aspect that was added into the Act was accountability, the feeling that the community was not properly accountable. That led to establishing the DNI. Establishing the structure that goes with that was part of it.

Creating the DNI imposed a bureaucratic political layer on top of an operational community. Now, having said that, if you ask me whether the structural parts of intelligence reform as defined in the law are working, I can tell you I don’t know. I think actually it’s too early to tell.

Information sharing, more flexibility, and even accountability are there. How much of that derives from the formal structure and how much of it derives simply from people trying to do the right thing are different questions.
Now I want to talk specifically about DHS. Why has it taken so long for us to get started from this formal structure? Why can’t I stand up here and tell you that the DNI’s office and the structure associated with it have had this effect and this effect and this effect?

We’re still struggling with what it is we want to do. “The intelligence which we provide to the President, to military operations, to stopping terrorism would be better if ____________.” You fill in the blank.

I said “intelligence.” I didn’t say doing it “cheaper.” I didn’t say doing it “more efficiently.” I said “better,” and I think to some extent we have struggled with what that means. This is a big enterprise, and if you’re going to change a big enterprise, it takes time. It takes direction. It takes very definite decisions on where you want to go. I’m not criticizing anybody. I just think it’s hard. Ask General Motors.

So this is big business. I’m so tired of going around the community and hearing the terms “quick wins” or “low-hanging fruit.” Those things are usually done not necessarily to accomplish something. They’re to show people we’ve accomplished something, which is a little bit different.

One of the issues that we’re struggling with, and this was brought up earlier, is what “national intelligence” means. This is a big issue for DHS. We are in that domain where we have to answer that question, because we are faced with a major responsibility for the interface among national intelligence, state, local, tribal, and private sector. That is one of our jobs. Not only is it taking intelligence to a domain that is, to some extent, foreign to them, but it is crossing that line between intelligence and law enforcement or that line between intelligence and information.

We are establishing an intelligence enterprise within DHS. My office, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, is an official member of the Intelligence Community. So is the intelligence component of the Coast Guard, which is a part of DHS. They are both part of the Intelligence Community, but there are intelligence activities within Immigration and Customs Enforcement, within the Transportation Security Administration, within even the Secret Service, and we’re trying to form that into an intelligence enterprise.

We’re trying to organize intelligence to support other things, particularly border security. We are bringing traditional intelligence assets to bear on that, to bear on the problems that ICE and CBP deal with on the borders. Hence, this is a real pushing of intelligence into a different domain.

Our outreach to state and locals is another area. We are deploying people from DHS intelligence into state and local fusion centers. Those centers to a large extent are a product of post-9/11 where states are setting up organizations that do various things.
You may have seen that referred to in the press. The fusion centers were originally set up to focus on counterterrorism, but now they monitor all threats, all crimes, and some people are worried about that.

So we are putting people out there, and their job is to coordinate the activities between the state and the federal government in these areas that we deal with, which very much reflects outreach. We are also putting networks out there. We're moving our classified secret-level network into these facilities, and we're giving state people access to that network. I have a meeting this afternoon with DoD to determine how much SIPRNet we will give these state and local people access to.

The analytical world is another area where we're very much in tune with the DNI's office and the restructuring of the support that he's trying to provide for analytical domains, because we come in with basically a cadre of people that I believe are less experienced in doing analysis than many of the organizations that are more traditional long-term intelligence entities. So we are really trying to drive that, and we want to play off of the DNI's activities to get such things done and the support to those areas in play.

I want to bring to your attention a few real-world things that you might have read about in the press. One is a program called ADVISE. It's gotten a lot of publicity. If you haven't read the articles, ADVISE is a technology development effort that was done out of the S&T part of DHS and actually attempted to do beta testing within I&A, Intelligence and Analysis. Basically, it is a search tool that can search large amounts of data and do link analysis, tying together things that would help us identify bad activities.

Well, when that got to the press, all of a sudden DHS was accused of doing total information awareness, TIA, which everybody thinks we killed once. They did not criticize us for doing TIA; they criticized us for having the tools to do TIA. So now we've killed that project.

What did that accomplish? There are many tools I can go buy off the shelf that will do similar jobs. This one will do it a little bit better, we thought, in the end, but this gets us into the whole domain of what we do in domestic intelligence, and how do we, in a sense, do or not do data mining? Data mining is a no-no.

And we are faced with having to deal with that issue, because there is tremendous interest, and the new Congress, being of a different party, has certainly raised the issues of privacy and civil liberties and has made them far more visible than before. Will that affect our performance? I hope not, because I think we were doing what we needed to do legally before that. Will it affect how we report and what we have to do? Absolutely, but this whole issue of privacy and civil liberties has taken on a new dimension.
The National Applications Office also made the press. We are trying to set up an organization that takes a broader look at how we take nontraditional requirements like civil homeland security law enforcement requirements and basically get the national technical means, mainly satellites, to help us work these problems. This has been done for many years in the community. The tasking was done through the Civil Applications Committee run by the U.S. Geological Survey.

So we said we wanted to make this better and we wanted to make it more comprehensive. “Oh, you want to spy on Americans” was the response. That’s been an issue that we must tackle. Personally, I don’t think it’s an issue.

A recent study conducted for the DNI’s office came up with a recommendation for the Intelligence Community to task collection to law enforcement. There are a lot of legal questions there, but some people thought we needed to do that.

We are all conscious of privacy and civil liberties, but let me assure you that if there is an incident in which information was not shared because somebody was protecting privacy or civil liberties, nobody will give us credit for that. So it puts us in a very difficult position on to how to handle that, and unfortunately DHS is caught right in the middle.
BIOGRAPHY
Dr. R. Carter Morris

Dr. Morris is currently Director, Information Sharing and Knowledge Management, for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). He is a CIA careerist detailed to DHS from the Directorate of Science and Technology.

Most recently Dr. Morris served as the Deputy Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection, where he helped coordinate all Intelligence Community collection activities.

Dr. Morris received a B.S. in Physics from Hampden-Sydney College in 1966 and a Ph.D. in Physics from the University of Virginia in 1970 in the area of experimental solid-state physics. After receiving his doctorate, Dr. Morris spent two years at the University of Virginia as an Assistant Professor of Physics before moving to the faculty of the Physics Department at Florida State University. Dr. Morris spent 11 years as a professor at Florida State teaching and conducting a research program concentrating on exploring the electrical and magnetic properties of materials at low temperatures.

In 1984 Dr. Morris took a leave of absence from the University to work with the Office of Research and Development (ORD) at the CIA and a year later officially joined the Agency. In ORD he held both senior scientist and management positions concentrating on the development of technology to support human and signals intelligence operations. When he left ORD he was chief of the Signals Exploitation Division.

From 1993 to 1995, Dr. Morris served in the DCI’s Nonproliferation Center (NPC) as Special Assistant for R&D to the NPC Director, where he headed a group whose responsibility was to coordinate government-wide R&D to support the needs of the nonproliferation program.

In 1995 Dr. Morris joined what became the Clandestine MASINT Operations Center (CMOC) in the Office of Technical Collection as Chief of the Systems Analysis Staff. In 1998 he became Deputy Director of CMOC. In 2000 Dr. Morris became Deputy Director of the Central MASINT Organization in the Defense Intelligence Agency—where he served until he became the Deputy Assistant DCI for Collection in late 2001.

Dr. Morris lives in Arlington, Virginia, and has one daughter and two grandsons.
MR. GORMAN: Thanks. I have a couple of questions, and then we'll open it up to the audience. There's a theme that I think everybody touched upon, and that is we have a lot of activities. We have stood up a lot of organizations. There are a lot of things going on. Is that a measure of success? One question I would have for the group is how do we actually measure success? Despite a lot of inputs, a lot of activities, how do we measure success in terms of outputs and outcomes? Given that, how do you think we're doing?

MAJGEN ENNIS: I'll take a stab at it. If it's how will we determine success or performance in terms of HUMINT reform, I can't answer that one. Only time will tell. As I said, these new procedures that we're putting into place are not that old, maybe a year or so, but one of the things that my office has been tasked with doing is determining how well human intelligence is doing. We've been putting together some pretty sophisticated measures for not just measuring output, that is, how many reports were written or how many good evaluations were received, but actually answering the question of "So what?" for the community.

DR. MORRIS: Well, that's an interesting question. We can certainly measure how effective we are in doing things like getting more DHS people deployed to fusion centers, and I can measure my ability to deploy the homeland security data network, our secret network, into various fusion centers, and I can count how many people are on it and how much time they spend on it.

I cannot tell you how much effect that had on intelligence or homeland security or law enforcement, and I personally have not been able to figure out how to do that. I can measure implementation of things, but measuring the effect of that has been very difficult.

DR. WARNER: Just very quickly, I wouldn't dare to suggest how you can measure success now, but I would add a note of caution and say that sometimes success is not apparent for a very long time. Sometimes success is not apparent for years or decades.

How many times during the Cold War did we think we were losing the struggle? Most recently, in 1987, when we had an old, feeble, distracted President mired in a big scandal, the Soviets had this dynamic, young, forward-looking fellow named Gorbachev, who was going to fix socialism and get the world put in a different shape.

It was very clear that Cold War success was a very long way off. I sat in an audience, and I heard Newt Gingrich in 1987 say, "Maybe we'll win it in 50 years. Maybe it'll be over in 50 years, but there's no end in sight." So take the long view, I guess, is what I would say on that one.

MR. GORMAN: What I'm going to do now is walk through the questions. General Ennis, you were called out on this one: "I've learned more about technology since this person retired from the government in three months than
I did in 30 years in the DO [Directorate for Operations]. What are we doing to change the situation?"

MAJGEN ENNIS: Well, I’m not really an expert regarding the internal workings of the DO, but I will say one thing. I can see, having been out there at the Agency now for a year and a half, how it would be easy for someone in a position of leadership, and I assume this was an individual in a position of leadership, focused on operations, not to be totally aware of all the technological advances that are out there. Someone in a position of leadership may have been a bit less aware of the actual technical workings down below. The S&T element works hand in glove with the DO to employ the technological advances and capabilities that we have.

MR. GORMAN: Dr. Morris, would you like to comment on that?

DR. MORRIS: In the information business, which is my business at the moment, there are lots of technologies to do lots of things, whether it be communications around the country or maintaining databases on large numbers of things. The difficulty, I think, in our world has been not technology but the issue of deciding what it is you really want to do and then putting the process and the information into the systems appropriately to get done what you need to get done.
DHS has been criticized because it has an information-sharing program called the Homeland Security Information Network, an unclassified network which is the basis for our sharing with everybody outside of DHS, including state and locals, the private sector, etc., and it’s been criticized for various things. It may not be the best technology in the world, but the problem is there’s no process behind it historically. I really think that the challenge for us in bringing in technology is to focus on the things that need to be done and then really start solving them from the technology.

MAJGEN ENNIS: I think I now see the intent of that question after having just a moment or two to reflect upon it. The CIA, in particular the DO and the S&T, have been criticized in the past for being very reluctant to accept or recognize the capabilities of others or to look outside the organization. One of the working groups that I chair is on operational technologies. We bring in all of the government organizations. We lay out a problem, and we say, “Okay, how would you address this problem? What capabilities can you bring to the table?” What that does is expand the horizon significantly beyond just that of the CIA.

DR. MORRIS: One of the driving themes in intelligence reform is information sharing, and there are lots of efforts in the community to improve information sharing, as we’re trying to do today. One of the other themes is providing information security, another driver, because we’re finding out that personally identifiable information and other information on our networks is not as secure as some people would have said.

Well, those are two competing things. I had a discussion with OMB recently and we started out with an effort to get some decisions in the community on putting in a system that was intended to enhance information sharing. All of a sudden it became an information security issue. That’s driving it in the other direction, and so they are competing things. As we move ahead on technology and information technology in particular, we need to keep in mind both problems have to be solved.

MR. GORMAN: This next question is to the entire group. “The unfinished business of intelligence reform has been mentioned several times. The DNI mentioned that only one of the 16 elements works directly for him, so since unity of command is a core principle for transformation, which IC agencies would you directly subordinate to the DNI?”

DR. WARNER: The subordination really means subordination to the President and the National Security Council. Those are the customers. Those are the people whose goals intelligence is trying to serve, and as long as the lines of subordination go in that direction I’m not sure it’s really all that important which agencies get directly subordinated to a DNI. As long as the DNI can reach out over all of them and bring about effective collaboration and teamwork across all of them, it is not so important if they’re subordinate to him or not.
MAJGEN ENNIS: I concur with that 100 percent.

DR. MORRIS: Well, my only comment would be, again, what is it you’re trying to fix and whether the fix is better than the problems it would create.

MR. GORMAN: If you take an agency out of one department, you’ve basically disintegrated the relationship that you had with that department. Hence, in some ways you’re undermining an operational effectiveness. So it’s a delicate balance in trying to figure out where you’re going to get economies of scale and scope with some integration and where you’re really going to undermine close customer relationships in support of those departments.

DR. MORRIS: Certainly you could say that an implied goal of intelligence reform is to make us all one in the Intelligence Community, and that certainly has some merit, but if you look across all the agencies every one of them has a different culture. I’m not so sure that’s bad, but I think you certainly have to look at it whenever you talk about centralizing.

MR. GORMAN: I would suggest looking at the private sector, which is going in the opposite direction. It uses alliances, partnerships, and networks to make things happen.

Organizational consolidation is not the answer to this. A lot of times it sends us spinning for two or three years, trying to figure out the organizational charts versus actually getting operational work done. Therefore, I don’t know if further consolidation is the answer.

Next question: “Under what basis is the National Clandestine Service, which recruits and trains its intelligence analysts, taking into account that the war against terrorism is no longer a war based on military power but on deep religious feelings?”

MAJGEN ENNIS: We are trying very hard to hire people with a better understanding of cultural differences in order to become a far more diversified force. I know that there is a huge effort to recruit people with languages and different backgrounds.

MR. GORMAN: Next question: “The DNI mentioned the community’s 100- and 500-Day Plans. Can the panelists speak to the specific priorities that are on the DNI list and indicate how their organization performed against objectives? So, in other words, how does this cascade down to where you’re operating?”

MAJGEN ENNIS: We have taken a very close look at both the 100-Day Plan and the 500-Day Plan, and every single one of the things that my office has been chartered to do is either directly related to or a subset of one of the requirements of the 100-Day or 500-Day Plan.

I meet with Mary Margaret Graham [Deputy DNI for Collection] once every three weeks. I have a DNI person on my staff full-time. I have a counterpart within the DIA with whom I meet on a weekly basis, and my deputy has
just come from spending a year as the deputy to Mary Margaret Graham at ODNI, so we are very closely tied with them in many of those initiatives.

DR. MORRIS: Well, they certainly are our guidance, and we're trying to follow them. We're tracking our activities against them, so they play a big part in what we're trying to do. I sometimes get worried that we're more bureaucratically tracking them than we are operationally tracking them, because operational changes take time, so that's difficult, but they are a part of our planning processes that we try to implement.

MR. GORMAN: Next question is for General Ennis: “The conflicts between the Pentagon and the CIA were legendary in recent years. What's the most effective way to harmonize the two groups? How do you bring those people into the fold?”

MAJGEN ENNIS: I think when the global war on terrorism started out there were some missteps and miscues along the way, but I have been extremely impressed with the professionalism, with the way that the organizations which are conducting these activities have not only coordinated with their Chiefs of Station and others but how they have professionally put together their concepts of operation, how well thought out they are, and how closely aligned they are with the mission that they are trying to do.

It's not just DIA. It's the CIA and others recognizing that the other agencies have a mission, that they have a capability, and that mission and capability need to be folded into the overall collection strategy.

Frankly, I would disagree with the notion that there are those who simply do not want to integrate or coordinate. I think they do. They understand the basic reason for it.

One of the things the military understands very well is the concept of fratricide. Whether it's the Global War on Terrorism or in Iraq or Afghanistan, there is an absolute need to coordinate, because things can go terribly wrong if they don't.

And they understand the operational imperative there. So it's a question of taking their plans and intent and getting the Chiefs of Station on board with that and the Ambassador so that it can have every opportunity for success, recognizing the authorities, the capabilities, and the missions of other organizations.

MR. GORMAN: Next question is for Dr. Morris: “Is your team looking at the domain issues of SIPRNet when it goes to state-level fusion centers where a lot of the personnel don't have clearances?”

DR. MORRIS: Implied in the question is that SECRET-level people at the state and local levels do not have the same discipline that federal SECRET-level people have. I would question that.

It is something that, in a sense, intelligence reform said, “Get over.” Frankly, we make sure these people are trained, they understand the rules, they
understand how to protect secret information, and they, in my opinion, should be given all the considerations that any federal employee with the same clearance has.

MR. GORMAN: Next question: “How are you going to reconcile the Congressional mandates in HR1 to share more intelligence with local and tribal, state and local, fusion centers with the Congressional concerns about privacy? What are the mechanisms to deal with that?”

DR. MORRIS: I think that’s an issue. In fact, I was just in a discussion yesterday where we were talking about who has the responsibility for privacy relative to the fusion centers. The fusion centers are state entities, so the state does, but we have to help them, and certainly we have to educate them on the federal rules. Sometimes the state rules are actually more stringent than the federal rules, and we have to make sure that any people we deploy there are well educated in what the rules are and what can and cannot be done. We have to make sure that the exchange of information between the federal government and state and locals is in compliance with all of those rules.

Now if it has to do with law enforcement specifically, that is a well-established long-term relationship that the FBI has been the lead on, and the rules are pretty clear. If it is an intelligence exchange where you are sharing personal information about somebody because you have a radical Islamist, for example, but there’s no criminal activity, now you’re getting into an area that becomes more tricky. The states are very conscious of what the law enforcement rules are. So this is something that we’ve got to work out and ensure we do according to the rules.

I have responsibility for IT developments. One of the rules that I passed down when I first went there was we will build all of our systems to be compliant with privacy and civil liberties, and they will be built with all the necessary bells and whistles that will allow the individuals who have this responsibility to exercise their responsibilities as easily as possible.

The problem is, when I go to the lawyers and say, “What are the rules?” I don’t get a real clear answer. Their answer is, “What do you want to do? “No, tell me the rules, and I’ll figure out what I want to do.” Well, now we’re still involved in that debate.

So there are challenges here, but the one thing we are trying very hard to do is to go by the law, by the rules, and, in my opinion, by the culture of what this country dictates.

MR. GORMAN: Next question: “How can you connect the dots before the event occurs?”

DR. MORRIS. That’s another one of those phrases I don’t like. Certainly, the idea here is in connecting the dots, and you have to talk about what you’re trying to do. You’re trying to identify a bad person, a bad organization, or
something like that before the system would normally know they’re bad, before they’ve broken a law, before they’ve done anything that would otherwise bring them to attention.

Most of the people that we’ve rolled up in this country for terrorism have been there because they broke some law, and that’s what got them the attention. The question is, can we connect dots by relationships, by interests, in a way that allows us to identify something bad as early as possible in their badness?

Now you get into the issue of data mining and link analysis and ADVISE and all these rules about domestic intelligence. Frankly, we as a society have not decided what that is, and I think it’s a big question for all of us. We’re doing the best we can to interpret and live by all the rules as they apply, but there are major questions out there that simply haven’t been answered. Frankly, connecting the dots is real hard.

One of the examples we’ve had in the community is what we call suspicious activity reports. We bring together all the suspicious activity reports that get reported back to police departments in the private sector—people running around at night in cars, close by dams, all those sorts of things. We’re going to put all that information together. We’re going to analyze it, and we’re going to be able to identify people, bad people, before they’re bad.

A lot of the community, when it looks at that, says, “Not likely, not likely.” And a lot of people in the community have come to me and said, “I’m not putting my resources against that, because I just think that in the scope of the things we have to do this is highly unlikely to turn up anything.”

On the other hand, you have others, such as in Congress, saying, “You have to do that. We expect it. We believe in it.” So we’re kind of caught in trying to do that, and right now suspicious activities are one of those areas that we are trying to figure out. It’s a tough business.

MR. GORMAN: Next question: “Is there a push to do pattern-based versus subject-based data mining tools?”

DR. MORRIS: I will say we don’t do data mining. I’ve gone into privacy meetings with privacy people, people who are really paying attention to this, and they want us to make data anonymous. We want them to take out the personal identifiable information, and we’ll put together these patterns that people practice. But we’re hunting individuals, and to do that in an anonymous way is very difficult, and I’m not sure what the value is, frankly.

My office does a lot of intelligence on radicalization in this country, looking at trends in demographics and how they affect things. If you’re really hunting terrorists, you’ve got to use those names somehow, those identifications.

MR. GORMAN: The next question is for Dr. Warner and deals with one of the factors that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Bloc—information, the soft power component. The problem is we’ve been dismantling that
capability since the Cold War. How do we start winning the hearts and minds again and stem the tide of anti-Americanism in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa?

DR. WARNER: I have somewhat of a contrarian point of view on this. The idea of winning hearts and minds is one we have kicked around in this country since World War II, and there have been countless interagency steering groups, committees, working groups, panels, studies, papers, non-papers, and memos on this topic beginning about 1946.

We've never been good at public diplomacy. We've never got it right or figured it out. There are some very hard-working, spirited, bright, intelligent, patriotic Americans, people I'd love to have as my neighbors working on this, who have tried very hard but never figured it out.

We're doing something right if one of our biggest problems as a country is how to get control of our immigration problem because so many people want to come here. So there is some message about America that is getting out to the larger world which somehow millions of people find appealing.

MR. GORMAN: We have time for one more question—basically a question and a statement. The question was brought up, "Intelligence would be better if ________," and the answer is, "All relevant data, information, knowledge, expertise are built around some type of all-source intelligence in the IC."

I think the question should be, "What's the organizing principle?" General Ennis, you said the Joint Staff is very effective, but it is organized around the Joint Staff we have at the national level, around combatant commanders or functional component commanders. What's the equivalent with the Intelligence Community?

MAJGEN ENNIS: The equivalent for the Intelligence Community is where you have pockets of people who have backgrounds in signals intelligence and imagery intelligence and order of battle databases and cultural awareness.

When I was the Commander of the Joint Intelligence Center in the Pacific, that's exactly the way we did business. Instead of having four separate shops in the building, one for each of the disciplines, we actually had the SIGINT rep, the imagery rep, the order of battle rep, and the cultural background subject matter experts sitting in the same cubicle.

That's the way DIA does business, and we have a similar situation out at CIA. All-source is absolutely the way to go. There is a great effort to make it even more widespread.

DR. MORRIS: All information is controlled to some domain, and the question is what are those domains, and where is the overlap of those domains, and how to we ensure that each of those domains gets the information to everybody that needs it. That's the challenge.
I know that Congress, at least on paper, would like us to declassify more information and make it available to everybody. I don't see that happening in most of our world here. It's going to be controlled to some environment.

So as we do our missions, we have to look at how to share the information that's appropriate to the commissions. One of the things we're doing within the DHS information-sharing system is to build the sharing communities around missions that would overlap organizational structures, that is, their common mission goals in law enforcement in various places in DHS. We are creating organizations which overlap those to determine how they need to move information among themselves and with people outside of DHS to accomplish that, things having to do more with transportation or things having to do with border screening.

All of those are mission areas that overlap different parts of DHS. We are trying to create information-sharing communities within those areas that allow us to share information more effectively across organizational boundaries.

That's a challenge. In the information-sharing business the information does not go with organizational boundaries. We're trying to figure out how to do both. I've got to have an organization. I've got to have boundaries to the organization, but I have information that crosses those, and that's a separate organization. That's a big challenge for us as we move forward in this area.

You can't talk information sharing until you also talk information control, because they go hand in hand. Sometimes in the information-sharing business you aren't allowed to say information control, because that's a no-no. Well, unfortunately, every piece that we deal with in our business is controlled to something, and we haven't figured out how to do that.

MR. GORMAN: Well, let me thank you for your time and your insights and also to the audience for the great questions. Thank you.
The luncheon speaker, Jim Clapper, clarifies how his work as USD(I) at the Pentagon differs from his previous roles in heading DIA and NGA.
BIOGRAPHY

The Honorable James R. Clapper, Jr.
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

James R. Clapper was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence on April 11, 2007. He is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, and security matters.

Mr. Clapper previously served as Chief Operating Officer for Detica DFI. Prior to his position at DFI International, he served as Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency from September 2001 to June 2006. He was the first civilian director of NGA. He retired as a lieutenant general from the U.S. Air Force in 1995, after a 32-year career. Mr. Clapper’s last military assignment was as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. His earlier assignments included a variety of intelligence-related positions such as Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, during Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and as Director of Intelligence for three warfighting commands: U.S. Forces, Korea; Pacific Command; and Strategic Air Command.
Mr. Clapper has served as a consultant and advisor to Congress and the Departments of Defense and Energy, and as a member of a wide variety of government panels, boards, commissions, and advisory groups. He was a member of the Downing Assessment Task Force that investigated the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996, and was vice chairman of a commission chaired by former Governor Jim Gilmore of Virginia on the subject of homeland security.

He earned a bachelor’s degree in government and politics from the University of Maryland, a master’s degree in political science from St. Mary’s University, San Antonio, Texas, and an honorary doctorate in strategic intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College.

His awards include three National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medals, the Defense Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Air Force Distinguished Service Medal, the Coast Guard’s Distinguished Public Service Award, the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award, and a host of other U.S. military and foreign government awards and decorations. He served two combat tours during the Southeast Asia conflict and flew 73 combat support missions in EC-47s over Laos and Cambodia.

He was named as one of the Top 100 Information Technology Executives by Federal Computer Week in 2001. He received the NAACP National Distinguished Service Award and the Presidentially-conferred National Security Medal.
LTG Maples chats with intelligence scholar Dr. Loch Johnson of the University of Georgia during the luncheon.

Former DIA Chief of Staff Louis Andre (R, now in the private sector) listens attentively to a defense contractor colleague participating in the conference.
PANEL 2

Global Events that Have Changed the World: Implications for Intelligence
OPENING REMARKS

Mr. Hiponia

Our moderator is Ambassador Michael Malinowski, National Defense Intelligence College Department of State Chair, and I’ll let him introduce the remaining panel members.

Panel Moderator

Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski
Department of State Chair, NDIC

We’ve got a great panel, and they come from various areas of our society—government, academia, journalism. They’re seasoned practitioners of intelligence, and they’re experienced observers. I think they will all add, from their own perspectives, to our deliberations today on where the Intelligence Community is going.

The moderator for Panel 2, Ambassador Mike Malinowski, discusses the conference with BG Georghe Savu of Romania and Mr. Clift. The Romanians have been key players in a series of Black Sea and Caspian Sea Symposia organized by NDIC, hosting the second iteration in Constanta, Romania, in May 2007.
Our lead-off man is Dr. Michael Desch. He's Professor and Robert M. Gates—I think we've all heard that name—Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision Making at Texas A&M University. He's been associated with several universities and various important think tanks. He is an author, and he served in government and on Capitol Hill.

Wayne Murphy comes to us from the FBI, where he's the Assistant Director of Intelligence. He's had over a 20-year career in the National Security Agency and has served in Washington and in the field, looking particularly at the Middle East, counterterrorism, and global issues.

David F. Gordon is Director of Policy and Planning at the Department of State. The Bureau of Policy and Planning at State is basically State's think tank. They are the people at State who think, and that can be a scarce commodity in a busy bureaucracy, but they're responsible for our long-range planning. David told me he's having fun in the job, so let's hope he's there for a while.

And our last hitter, our clean-up hitter, will be David Ignatius, Associate Editor and columnist for The Washington Post. I'm sure you all are very familiar with his work. He's had a great variety of jobs in journalism—senior editor, foreign correspondent, and journalist. He's worked the Hill. He's worked the CIA and the Middle East.

He has also written six novels—very good works of fiction. However, I think it's an indication of his mastery of the basic facts on the ground coupled with his imagination, and imagination is what we're going to need as we look at the new challenges, the new state of the world, and how it affects our work in intelligence.

With that, I'll turn it over to Dr. Desch.
Thanks very much, Ambassador. I want to talk about one aspect of the emerging security environment, the changing nature of existential threats.

There is a widespread consensus that the world today is a far more dangerous place than it was at any time in the past. The former editor of Commentary, Norman Podhoretz, has just published a widely reviewed book about us being in the midst of World War IV. Even people on the left end of the spectrum, the principals, for example, at the liberal Princeton Project on National Security, also agree that the world seems more menacing than ever before. And when she was National Security Advisor, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice characterized the nature of the threat that we face today as being an existential threat, a threat basically to the existence of the United States.

Now, what is an existential threat? What are the components of this existential threat? Well, it seems to me, at least in the short term, we’re talking about two key sources of threat. One is rogue nations and particularly the potential for those rogue nations to develop weapons of mass destruction and, secondly, the rise of non-state actors, particularly international terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. The perfect storm, or the double whammy of these developments, was the possibility that these two groups might be in cahoots and operate together.

First, I want to ask is it really the case that the world is now as dangerous as it was during the Cold War or even more dangerous than it was in the past? And secondly, if not, what is the nature of the existential threat that we face today and that a lot of people agree we’re facing?

I want to leave you with three points. First, the idea that the world is more dangerous now compared to the Cold War or other periods in American history I think is hard to sustain, and I have some illustrative data that I’ll use to try to make that point.

In other words, I don’t think the existential threat that National Security Advisor Rice was talking about was literally the physical existence of the United States. Rather, and this is my second point, when we talk about existential threats today and in the near term, it’s not so much the physical existence of our country that we’re worried about but rather our conceptions of how the world ought to operate. That’s the existential threat. A world in which we face these sorts of existential threats will be quite challenging. I want to make the argument that the
challenge is as much from the threats themselves as it is from how we might react to those threats and specifically the danger of overreaction to threats.

There are two ways of thinking about how dangerous the world is. Let’s compare the global war on terrorism with previous wars and use as a metric the percentage of the population that has died in the course of those wars.

I have the Civil War, World War II, Vietnam, and the percentage of the American population that’s died as a result of Al Qaeda operations over the period since the first World Trade Center attack. By historical standards this has not been a very costly war.

The single biggest killer of Americans every year is Labor Day weekend trying to get to the eastern shore of Maryland and other places like that. Car accidents, more than anything else, result in unnatural death, and again, when you look at the results of terrorism as a mortality factor, they’re very low.

So this leads me to say that the physical existential threat far outstrips the reality of what it has been thus far. Now there are two obvious objections I’m just going to raise, and I could deal with these in more detail in the Q&A.

I think Admiral McConnell talked a little bit about this in his address this morning. The intentions of our adversaries in the global war on terrorism are fully clear. They want to kill us and kill us any way they can, whereas during the Cold War that was far less certain. So you could say, “Okay, the Cold War,
the threat of actual war between the United States and the Soviet Union, could have been catastrophic, but maybe it was the case that the Soviet Union never thought that it would go to war with the United States, whereas today it's pretty clear Al Qaeda wants to go to war with us.

That's a reasonable objection. You have to assume some pretty interesting things in order to make those threats equivalent. You have to assume that the intentions of our adversaries today are literally 100 percent and that the likelihood of war during the Cold War was infinitesimally small in order to make these even equivalent threats.

The second objection, and the more serious one, is, "Well, what about weapons of mass destruction? What if Al Qaeda or some other anti-U.S. terrorist group got a weapon of mass destruction and was able to wreak damage of a truly catastrophic nature on the United States?"

The argument has to be qualified, because there is always the theoretical possibility that this might happen, but again I would ask you, especially those of you who are experts in this area, what is the likelihood of a non-state actor acquiring and being able to maintain a nuclear weapon, for example, or developing, maintaining, and disseminating a biological agent that could result in mass casualties?

It's certainly not 100 percent certain that those groups could do those sorts of things. So, in any case, the bottom line here is that the physical threat that we face is not the existential threat. Rather, the threat that we face in the current environment, and the Bush administration has been very clear about this, is a threat to our way of life. This is a different sort of existentialism. Al Qaeda in his view, Saddam Hussein in his view, the Iranian regime, and the North Korean regime all in different sorts of ways want to destroy what we stand for and how we live. That's the existence we're really talking about in at least the immediate term.

Now what's the problem with thinking about the world in this fashion?

First of all, these sorts of threats appear really dire. When you've got somebody who's unalterably committed to undermining our way of life, that literally for many people is existential, but it has some implications.

One is the implication that we can't rely on deterrence any longer. There's a negative strategy of preemption or prevention, which this administration has basically conflated, and then there's also a positive side of the strategy, the strategy of political transformation, nation building, or democratization. In other words, the only way to deal with existential threats to our way of life is not deterrence but rather preemption or prevention and regime change and democratization.
Now what are the problems with this? It seems to me there are four classes of problems you want to think about when you characterize existential threats in the way we have over the past seven years.

First of all, I don’t think it’s a radical statement to say that the preemptive war we’ve actually waged in Iraq has not turned out the way we hoped it would. Whether that will be history’s final verdict on it, the preemption of Iraq has not been very successful.

Another problem with this view of the threats is that it tends to conflate what are analytically separate threats. Is the threat, the existential threat to us, a threat of terrorism? Now in the rhetoric of the current administration, and this is broadly shared across the political spectrum, the answer is “yes,” but my view is that terrorism is a tool.

It’s a strategy. It’s sort of like saying that, combined, we’re going to wage a war against combined armed operations or what the left said during the anti-nuclear period at the end of the Cold War, i.e., that we’re going to eliminate nuclear weapons. Well, the problem isn’t nuclear weapons, and the problem isn’t terrorism. The problem is certain groups like Al Qaeda that will use terrorism against the United States.

The third problem is that this existential view of the threat conflates or causes us to miss opportunities and to fail to divide enemies. I actually think that the Bush administration understood this in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when we worked with the Syrians to roll up some Al Qaeda networks in their neck of the woods and where we also cooperated with the Iranians in Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban.

Now in neither case were the Syrians or the Iranians operating out of any goodwill toward us or altruism. They were doing it out of their own selfish interests, but sometimes, often in international politics, selfish interests can work to our advantage.

Finally, ask yourself if you were a man from Mars or a woman from Mars, and you were given the criteria of what poses the most serious threat to the existence of the United States, what country would you have picked? If that question were asked of me, I would not have identified any of the three members of the “Axis of Evil.”

The country I would have been most worried about in terms of a serious threat to the physical security of the United States would have been a country in the short term like Pakistan, because it has nuclear weapons and because of the political instability in that country. Why we don’t define Pakistan as an existential threat in the way we do a lot of these other countries is beyond me.

With that I’ll stop and turn it over to my colleagues.
BIOGRAPHY

Dr. Michael C. Desch

Michael Desch was named the first holder of the Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security Decision-Making at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University in 2004. Prior to that, he was Professor and Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky. From 1993 through 1998, he was Assistant Director and Senior Research Associate at the Olin Institute.


He has published opinion pieces in *The Christian Science Monitor* and *The American Conservative* and appears frequently on radio and television. He has worked on the staff of a U.S. senator, in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State, and in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service. He teaches courses in national security policy, political theory and international relations, and democracy and American foreign policy.
Panelist

Wayne M. Murphy
Assistant Director, Directorate of Intelligence, FBI

The first issue really is globalization itself—that word “globalization” and the thousand and one concerns that cascade from it. You know, poor Christopher Columbus, he went to all that trouble to prove that the world was round, and then we spent centuries hammering it flat and are living with the consequences of that choice.

Then we have the digital revolution that just cascades into so many different environments of discussion. The dual nature of that is the potential to make us stronger, and at the same time make us vulnerable.

There's the specter of a nuclear North Korea and, of course, the proliferation issues that flow from that. I was going to say that there is the specter of a nuclear Iran, but as we all learned this week there's been a terrible misunderstanding about the Iranian nuclear program. It's really peaceful and transparent, and I certainly feel relieved to take that off my list of worries while driving home at night.

Seriously, we do have the issue of Iran as a presence and as an influence in the Gulf region on a level that, frankly, may be different than what we expected—certainly, at least, what we hoped for.

In view of the borderless threat posed by things like the avian flu pandemic, migrating flocks of birds are really no longer just a concern of the Audubon Society. It's now a global national security issue that we worry about, and we think about the implications of that.

There are the implications of the rise of a large middle class in China. Who would have thought the rise of a large middle class in China and the growing gap between the haves and have-nots in that hemispheric country would have been a concern?

There is the ever-present issue of finite natural resources and a changing geopolitical orientation of the supplier market, all compounded by global warming, which is now pretty much a mainstream issue that we all think about and worry about.

There are the continued reverberations from the fall of the Iron Curtain. Ironically, now we have the potential reemergence of a Russian autocracy.

And then there is the debate about shifting centers of economic power with Asia and, surprisingly, European financial markets having much more to say about how the world thinks and feels about money.
Now I have to tell you that just making this list left me very nostalgic for the relative simplicity of my early career as an intelligence analyst, and it reminded me of a scene from the 1970s fictional spy thriller *Three Days of the Condor*. I don't know if you saw it, with Robert Redford. It's just sort of a classic seventies film, with everyone doing crazy things.

The scene that in particular captivated me was one in which John Houseman, who plays the crusty, reserved CIA Director, is talking to the actor Cliff Robertson, who is portraying the Deputy Director of the New York office, and they're both waiting for word about the status of a rogue officer who's on the run. Houseman turns to Robertson and asks, “Were you recruited out of school?” “No,” Robertson replies. “The company interviewed a few of us in Korea.” I love that talk. Isn't that just so seventies?

Then he asked Houseman, “You were with Mr. Donovan's OSS, weren't you, sir?” to which Houseman muses, “I sailed the Adriatic with a movie star at the helm. It doesn't seem like much of a war now, but it was. I go even further back than that, ten years after the Great War, as we used to call it, before we knew enough to number them.”

In taking all this in, Robertson asked, “Do you miss that kind of action, sir?” “No,” says Houseman. “I miss that kind of clarity.” That sums it up for me in terms of thinking about global events that have changed the world and their implications for intelligence.

Any one or all of the events that I enumerated above represent global events that have an impact for intelligence. However, we have to ask ourselves, have we adapted intelligence for dealing with the emerging lack of clarity and the complexity associated with so many of the events? Have we truly adapted intelligence?

The relationship between diplomacy, economics, culture, energy, and military strength have always been part of intelligence’s effort to understand complex issues, but in the past we had the relative luxury of specialization and the time, frankly, to deliberate about these topics at a much more digestible pace.

Moreover, intelligence provided a broadly unique window on these events. Now think about that, because it's an important point. Intelligence was a tool by which we sought to know what could not otherwise be known.

It gave us insight into that which was locked up in paper files in some foreign land. It gave us access to communications that were flowing through indigenously developed dedicated command and control systems. It allowed us to detect activity discernible to us only by marvelous technology that floated on the edge of space.

Today, issues and their interdependencies fly at us literally at the speed of light, with photons shooting through fiberoptic cable. We have innovated and adapted to address this challenge in extraordinary ways, in the use of our
human talent, in our actions to provide what we know to one another more fully, and in technology that makes it all more manageable. But have we really taken a step back to consider whether we should continue to view understanding this complex set of global events as the exclusive domain of intelligence, or have we just kept layering these issues into the list of unanswered questions for the Intelligence Community to answer?

Is intelligence, as a unique and specialized instrument for our national security, still the supplier of choice for all of the challenges we face and the decisions that we have to make? Are we acquiring information through a classified regime that might be equally knowable and perhaps more fully explored out in the open?

Even with the brightest minds and the biggest machines, can an intelligence community grow large enough to answer today’s challenges, or is it time to circle back and think about where and how the investment that makes up our Intelligence Community can be optimized for the greatest possible impact?

Can we push exploration of some of these global events I described into that environment which might be better suited to fleshing out a lot of the details, and then turn our attention to the gaps—that which cannot otherwise be known?

Now don’t get me wrong. I don’t want to see the truly amazing power and the value of intelligence, real intelligence, diminished by asking it to be all things to all people for all issues.

A friend used to tell me, “Why make something when you can buy it already made?” Now you could say he’s lazy and not particularly creative, or you could say that he was saving his energy and his creativity for something far more specialized.

The implications for how we confront the challenges of our time are enormous. They deserve a serious, sober look at how we got from there to here.
Mr. Wayne M. Murphy

Mr. Murphy joined the FBI with more than 22 years of service at the National Security Agency (NSA) in a variety of analytic, staff, and leadership positions. A graduate of Johns Hopkins University with a bachelor’s degree in political science, he was hired, trained, and certified as a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) analyst.

The bulk of his career assignments have involved direct responsibility for SIGINT analysis and reporting, encompassing a broad range of targets. Mr. Murphy led NSA’s analysis and reporting effort for the Middle East and North Africa, counterterrorism, and the largest intelligence analysis and reporting activity in the Analysis and Production Directorate spanning all geopolitical and military targets.

He has served in assignments focused on support to military operations along with time-sensitive foreign intelligence support to law enforcement, diplomatic activity, and the CIA Operations Directorate. He completed two field assignments, one at a major overseas collection site and the other as a member of the Cryptologic Support Group, Hawaii, that at the time provided dedicated SIGINT support in furtherance of requirements of the U.S. Pacific Command. Mr. Murphy was certified as an adjunct faculty member for the National Cryptologic School and taught field courses in the intelligence analysis curriculum.

Mr. Murphy served for two years as executive assistant to the NSA Executive Director and was a Senior Operations Officer, directing one of NSA’s five round-the-clock watch teams in the National Security Operations Center—NSA’s global command and control facility.

Mr. Murphy has twice received the Meritorious Civilian Service Award, NSA’s second highest civilian honor, and was the recipient of a Presidential Meritorious Rank Award in 2005. He is a native of Baltimore, Maryland.
Panelist

Dr. David F. Gordon
Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State

Thank you, Mike. I’m going to pick up on a number of the points that both of the previous speakers addressed and present a slightly different twist.

When I look at how the world has changed and what makes a difference for intelligence, I broadly see two things. One is target proliferation, and the second is technological change. So let me cover both of those.

In target proliferation, quite simply we had a very stable target during the Cold War. It was a very challenging target. It was a target that had enormous intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities of its own. It was a target that did provide very much of an existential threat to our country and our way of life, but it was a fairly stable target. We knew where to go to look and what to look for.

We now have a combination of a proliferation of country targets, and I put those targets into three broad classes—one I’ll call “rising states,” a second “tipping states,” and a third “rogue states.” There is some overlap possibly among the three.

Rising states include the big Asian powers, China and India, which are integrating willy-nilly through the globalization process and are shifting the balance of power toward Asia. We have the rise of medium-sized powers in much of the world, such as Brazil in our hemisphere. We ride on Brazilian jets all the time, those lovely Embraer jets that do the short-haul commuter routes. However, we also have states that have been empowered by changes in oil and energy and other markets, and pose further challenges to us.

I’ll highlight two. They are Russia, a real emerging state, and Iran, both of which have drunk powerfully from the oil revenue spigot and are articulating a vision of their own foreign policies and their own aspirations that are increasingly at odds with the set of norms which we represent and with our interests abroad.

Moving to rogue states, particularly nuclear and potentially nuclear states, Iran obviously is the large risk in that category. Tipping states are states that are very important to the international system and the international order and are at risk. Two that I can think of now that are particularly of concern are Pakistan, as Mike Desch discussed, and Nigeria, the largest state in Africa, an increasingly important energy producer and a state that borders on much of the rest of Central and West Africa. Nigeria is also a very important source of the narcotics trade internationally.
Hence, you have more country targets at the same time you have the emergence of non-state actors, be they terrorist organizations, drug and criminal cartels, or simply the growing power of very, very, very wealthy individuals and small groups, be they connected to or not connected to national powers themselves. This is a huge challenge for both coverage and prioritization by the Intelligence Community.

Knowing how to prioritize country coverage and creating country coverage is not something that’s easily fungible. You make very long-term investments in your people and the training that they have. As we saw at the end of the Cold War, it was possible to retrain Soviet analysts to do something else, but it doesn’t happen overnight. Therefore, we have a big challenge of coverage and prioritization due from this proliferation and one that will be very challenging for the community.

At the same time, we have more topics, and Mr. Murphy talked about a lot of those topics. We have the traditional topics—proliferation, traditional political-military issues, but we also have new topics—changes in global markets, as you mentioned, energy, pandemics, climate change, youth radicalization.

Now I come at this somewhat differently than my colleague does. It seems to me that all of these are legitimate and significant intelligence topics, because they really relate to what are fundamental national security issues for the United States. Nevertheless, I think he’s right that, for many of these, the way to get one’s arms around them isn’t through clandestine collection and the kinds of means that we generate normally or have generated in the Intelligence Community, but my answer is a little bit different.

I would actually keep these issues as important intelligence priorities, particularly at the analytic level, but I would shift toward a whole new way of engaging them that has much more to do with utilization of open sources, with outreach to academia, to the business community, to the think tank world, to our partners overseas, and therefore enables us to focus our clandestine collection on the set of targets that is truly amenable to that.

These are very important issues for coverage by the Intelligence Community, and there may in fact be in all of these important and narrow clandestine targets to be attacked. However, I’m absolutely convinced that the main thrust of getting our arms around this isn’t going to be through the traditional search for hidden secrets that has been the focal point of both intelligence collection and analysis.

Moving to the second issue, technological change is just changing the business of intelligence, the operations of intelligence, willy-nilly. As Mr. Murphy observed, everything is speeded up. Every process globally is speeded up. Our own political and policy process is constantly catching up. The demands for intelligence collection and analysis on very rapid turnaround are
increasing and will continue to increase. The speeding up of almost everything is going to be a huge challenge for the Intelligence Community over the next several years.

Equal to it, but receiving somewhat less focus, is a set of phenomena that I call lowering of barriers to entry, and I’m going to give five examples in which barriers have come way down. The first is access to technology for weapons of mass destruction. With all due respect to Professor Desch, I actually take very, very seriously the possibility of a terrorist organization or a rogue state gaining access to, and being able to make and use, either a nuclear or a bio weapon in particular. Those are real, very real, threats and ones that will challenge us dramatically as we look out over the years.

Looking at things that we in the Intelligence Community used to have a monopoly on, imagery is now ubiquitous. It gives all sorts of actors access to information that used to be a virtual monopoly of intelligence organizations, and it’s not just foreign intelligence organizations that are doing this. It’s commercial organizations—all sorts of people.

In general, information flows globally in split-second real time. The privileged access to specialized information and information flows that the Intelligence Community used to have—that the governments used to have—is no more.

I remember in an earlier career, when I was working as a regional analyst in our embassy in Nairobi, I used to get more information on what was happening in Africa from reading diplomatic reporting than from all other sources of information that I could read on a daily basis combined. Today, reading diplomatic reporting is a tiny increment of what I can get from all sorts of open sources, and that’s true across the board.

Third, and connected to this, is that many, many more people have the capability to run information operations, and information operations become a focal point for conflict. We have not been nearly nimble enough in that field. One only has to look at the Afghan theater for a very, very dramatic example of the use of information operations, let alone those of Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremist organizations.

Moreover, and finally, there’s a barrier to entry on what is an intelligence analyst. What is an intelligence provider? Now that the private sector has huge capabilities to tap into this information flow, we are being competed with, essentially, by all sorts of organizations that are outside of the realm of traditional intelligence organizations.

David Ignatius knows all about this, because in his field, journalism, exactly the same thing is happening. “What is a journalist?” has sort of lost its meaning in a way not dissimilar and for very similar reasons to “What is an
intelligence provider?" So this lowering of barriers of entry reshapes the situation of intelligence.

Just one more point here that I think is going to be a real challenge for intelligence, one that we need to pay more attention to, and that has to do with science and technology development around the world. It used to be if we paid attention to what was happening in weapons development, we could basically cover the technology issues of major concern as threats to the country. But the relationship between technical innovation in the military and on the civil side has largely been flipped, and now it's just as often a technological innovation from completely civil sources will come and have a huge national security impact on the military side. We won't see it coming, because we can't cover the range of what's possible to cover.

At the same time, we have the rise of a whole wide range of dual-use technologies that have both the ability to help promote better societies and to kill us. We need to put a lot of investment into getting a better handle on the science and technology that is outside working on the edges, and part of that is through getting at what's being financed. There are lots of different ways to do this, but this is an important priority that we have yet to fully take up.

Thanks very, very much.
BIOGRAPHY
Dr. David F. Gordon

On June 26, 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the selection of Dr. David F. Gordon as the new Director of Policy Planning. Dr. Gordon comes to the Department from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), where he served as Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) since June 2004. Previously, he served as the Director of CIA’s Office of Transnational Issues (OTI), an office that covers a broad range of national security and foreign policy issues, and as National Intelligence Officer for Economic and Global Issues on the NIC. He is a member of the Senior Intelligence Service of the United States.

Dr. Gordon’s background includes service as a Senior Fellow and Director at the Overseas Development Council, a senior staff member on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, and as the regional economic policy and democracy/governance advisor for the U.S. Agency for International Development based in Nairobi, Kenya.

In the 1980s, Dr. Gordon pursued an academic career with a joint appointment at the University of Michigan and Michigan State University. He has also taught at the College of William and Mary, Princeton University, Georgetown University, and the University of Nairobi. Dr. Gordon’s latest book, Managing Strategic Surprise, co-edited with Ian Bremmer and Paul Bracken, will be published later this year by Cambridge University Press.

Dr. Gordon is a graduate of Bowdoin College and undertook graduate studies in both political science and economics at the University of Michigan, where he received his Ph.D. in 1981.
I should probably start by responding to David Gordon’s comment, “What is a journalist?” by saying a journalist is someone who’s worried about being unemployed. These are not easy times for our business.

I come from a business where we spend a lot of our time worrying about questions like, “Is Fred Thompson’s wife an asset or a liability to his campaign?” or, “Did fill-in-the-blank flip-flop today in his speech about fill-in-the-blank?”

These are not long-term questions. When I saw the topic that we were asked to speak about—global events that have changed the world—it was an irresistible invitation to take out the shovel and, as we used to say in college, sling it. So this is a little bit of an eccentric presentation, but you have to realize that someone coming from my line of work rarely gets this opportunity.

I really want to pull my lens way, way back and talk about events that changed the world, and ways that the world has then restabilized after those events, with a historical perspective. I want to start with two guideposts, if you will.

The first is John Abizaid, who I’m sure many of you know recently retired as CENTCOM Commander. He said one of the wisest things I’ve heard in the post-9/11 world in a speech he gave at the Council on Foreign Relations in 2004. “Try to imagine this period in the Middle East as if it’s Europe in 1848.” In other words, try to imagine a world that’s just coming apart, in which there is conflict coming from every direction. The effort to modernize is wrapped up in a lot of destabilizing forces, but the fundamental trends may not be apparent as you’re living through them.

And then Abizaid said, “Or imagine it’s 1910, and you’re trying to do something about the Bolsheviks,” metaphorically before Lenin gets on that train to the Finland station, as the famous phrase has it, and then the events really are impossible to stop. So that’s the first historical starting point.

The second is when I set out in 1980 to cover the Middle East for The Wall Street Journal. I had lunch with Richard Helms, who had not long before retired as Director of Central Intelligence, had been our Ambassador in Iran, and obviously is a figure of great consequence for people in this room. He gave me some advice that I’ve never forgotten.

Helms said, “When you cover the Middle East, I don’t want to read any stories from you about what the cabinet of these countries in the Middle East did or, you know, presidential announcements or new legislation that’s passed, because it’s all baloney. You know, none of it is real. “I’d like to see you
focus, as you get started, thinking on what happened 1,300 years ago in the world of Islam or 300 years ago in the Ottoman Empire or 150 years ago in Lebanon, because unless you get your mind around those things, you won’t really get at what’s driving reality.” In other words, he was saying that historical factors are at work in the Middle East—history is in the present. There is no cutoff between historical events and what drives the present. That was the best advice I ever got.

So jump forward to Easter Day, 2003, in April, about ten days before the statue of Saddam Hussein fell in that famous image in Firdos Square. I’m going around Baghdad looking for and finding images of resurrection, of liberation. I mean, anybody who doesn’t think that there was a feeling of liberation wasn’t there.

And I’m doing this, going from office of political party to church to this to that when I see a cloud of black dust coming toward me, thousands and thousands—I want to say tens of thousands—of young Shiite men dressed in black, carrying black and green banners. I ask, “What the heck is going on?” and somebody says, “Oh, didn’t you know? This is Abayine. This is the day 40 days after the death of Hussein, the martyrdom of Hussein in Karbala.” These young men are marching to Karbala barefoot, for the first time ever in their lives for most of them, and it was just an incredible scene.
They filled the streets, spread out from the sidewalks. It was an exhilarating sense of freedom and in a way terrifying, because it was taking us from this present, these events we thought we were driving, collapsing them into a past and something that happened 1,300 years ago in Karbala.

The most powerful description of what the martyrdom of Hussein means in this eternal present for Shiite Muslims, especially in Iran, is in a marvelous book that I commend to you called *In the Rose Garden of the Martyrs* by Christopher de Bellaigue, who’s been living in Tehran with his Iranian wife for many years. He says, “I once asked an elderly Iranian woman to describe Hussein’s death. She spoke as if she had been an eyewitness to it, effortlessly recalling every expression, every word, every doom-laden action. She listed the women and children in Hussein’s entourage as if they were members of her own family. She wept her way through half a dozen Kleenexes.”

He then describes a visit he made to Hussein’s tomb at Karbala. “Suddenly the peace was shattered by moans and pounding of chests, splintered sounds of distress and emotion. Five or six distraught men had approached the sarcophagus. One of them half collapsed, his hands stretched toward the Imam. The others shoved and slipped like landlubbers on a pitching deck. My Iraqi companion curled his lip in distaste at the melodrama. ‘Iranian pilgrims,’ he said.”

There are parts of the world in which history is an open wound, and we just have to try, you know, in our work as interpreters, journalists, intelligence officers to get out of our way of thinking about history and try to see it as the people we’re focused on see it. You don’t have to be talking about the Muslim world to focus on religious fanatics who overturn the social order, who set loose convulsive social change that has enormously unpredictable consequences.

I’m going to give you a very unusual example of this by talking for a moment about the English Reformation of the 16th Century and leading toward the civil war in England of Oliver Cromwell in the 17th Century in the 1640s, and a book that I read in college and just took down off the shelves thinking about these topics yesterday called *The Revolution of the Saints* by Michael Walzer. It’s a very brilliant book, and he’s talking about Calvinism and this new idea of an unmediated relationship between the individual and the Almighty without the priests, without the traditional sacraments, just the individual alone in this elemental anguishing relationship with God.

Among the things that Walzer says—where the secular order could only replace nature, religion could transform it. It’s this transformative sense that was in Puritanism. “Radical Puritanism,” says Walzer, “was emancipation from nostalgia. The power of an ideology lies in its capacity to activate its adherents to change the world.”
Walzer talks, obviously, about the feudal order that preceded the English Reformation, this world in which everything was fixed, as my college professors told me, in which there was a great chain of being with all of God's creatures aligned very precisely. Walzer says, “The Puritan demand for continuous, organized, methodical activity to banish idleness was a reaction to the breakdown of country stability and the sudden appearance of the mobile urban man.

“Inevitably,” he says, “Puritans found themselves caught up in sharp attacks on the leisure class and their traditional ideas of service, honor, and recreation. The industrious saints tended to set themselves apart, both from the idle rich and the men whom the rich supported—servants, ex-soldiers, actors, beggars, and the multitude of the urban poor.”

I'm sure many of you have read the founding work of modern sociology by Max Weber, which is looking at this question. In his famous book, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, he says this religious revolution, these ideas, let loose shock waves that transformed the modern world, created capitalism, and created the spirit of capitalism. The ethos of the modern world was a product of these religious changes.

I was in Iran a year ago, and this is a conversation I actually had with Iranians. I think about the French Revolution. When I think about an event that had cataclysmic effects internally and throughout the region, an event that took decades to accommodate, again, internally and externally, the analog I think of for the Iranian Revolution is the French Revolution.

I want to read you something I found in the famous book by the disgruntled aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Order, the Ancien Regime and the French Revolution*.

“The attitude of the outside world toward it gradually changed as it revealed its aspect as a grim, terrific force of nature, a newfangled monster, red of tooth and claw when after destroying political institutions, it abolished civil institutions, when after changing laws, it tampered with age old customs and even the French language.

“When not content with wrecking the whole structure of government of France, it proceeded to undermine the social order and seemed even to aim at dethroning God Himself when, worse still, it began operating beyond the frontiers of its place of origin, employing methods hitherto unknown, new tactics, murderous slogans, opinions in arms,” as Pitt described them, referring to Pitt's history of Wallace.

“Not only were the barriers of kingdoms swept away and thrones laid low, but the masses were trampled underfoot, and yet, amazingly enough, these masses rallied to the cause of the new order.” I wish there was a Tocqueville around to write something like that about the Iranian revolution, but that’s what we’ve been
watching since 1979—something with that immense destabilizing power spreading beyond its borders, upsetting every aspect of the established order.

I do think of John Abizaid’s wonderful comment, because really how long did it take for Europe, for bourgeois Europe, to contain the energy that had been let loose by the French Revolution? Fifty years? Sixty years? 1848 was nearly 60 years after the French Revolution. We’re now, what, 28 years after the Iranian Revolution? We’re just beginning the process of assimilation, accommodation, understanding.

A final historical point, and then I’ll wrap it up: that is, in some ways the most interesting, arguably the most apposite example of destabilization and then restabilization and rebalancing, and that’s the Chinese Revolution of 1949.

What’s interesting when you think about China and think about Iran in the context of historical examples is that it took the extremism, the completely crazy moment that the Chinese Revolution spun into in the 1960s with the Cultural Revolution, and the Gang of Four, to create the reaction that now has made China such a dynamic force for free market economics, and I think for a more stable world, but China was created by extremism. I’ve traveled a lot in China, and people from that generation practically bleed as they describe what it was like to be led off in dunce caps to the reeducation camps.

Jonathan Spence, who wrote the great book *The Search for Modern China*, talks about the four “no’s” of the Cultural Revolution, back when the people were wearing the dunce caps, and the four forbidden no’s were old customs, habits, culture, and thinking, which basically take up everything about civilized life. We now get to the eight “big’s,” which are television, refrigerator, stereo, camera, motorcycle, furniture set, washing machine, and electric fan—it’s crucial to have the eight big’s. For anybody who wants to pursue this further, there’s a marvelous professor at George Mason named Jack Goldstone, who has worked this analogy in some detail. He briefed Secretary of State Rice on it in 2005.

So let me just conclude with a couple of thoughts about what this little exercise with the shovel teaches me. First, these are really long cycles. When we talk about cataclysmic change, destabilizing change, the process of working through it takes a lot longer than we imagined. I’d say that’s as true for 9/11, a cataclysmic event, as it is for any of the ones that I described.

We tend to think that there are natural equilibrating processes at work that bring the gyroscope back toward center, and I’m not sure that’s true. The more I look at events, certainly as I look at the United States since 9/11, I begin to doubt that.

A second obvious point, when you think in particular about Europe in the decades after the French Revolution, is that it’s important for great powers to act like great powers. It’s important for them to be decisive but also careful in their use of force. It’s fascinating to examine how England used and did not use
force in its attempt to contain the explosion of revolutionary France. Certainly one lesson to beware of is the use of expeditionary power that comes through in all the examples that I look at.

In the transitions that follow these catastrophic events, dialogue is a crucial aspect. Kissinger's opening to China came in the midst of the craziness that I'm describing, and it also came in the midst of China's emergence as a nuclear power, when China's nuclear doctrine was basically, "We're prepared to lose 200,000,000 people. We're prepared to lose hundreds of millions of people in a nuclear war, because that's our strategic depth." Despite that, we proceeded with engagement, with dialogue, confident that the process itself had inherent benefits for us.

A gloomy last thought is that even very strong nations and empires don't always bounce back from the kinds of reversals that we're discussing. We all know about Rome. There's a new book called *Are We Rome?* Putting that aside, though, Spence reminds us that in 1600 China was unmatched as a global empire. There was no society as sophisticated, as widespread, as China, and yet it sort of collapsed upon itself for mysterious reasons in a surprisingly quick time.

We all know what happened to the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I. We all know what happened to the British Empire after World War II. We all know and rejoice at what happened to the Soviet Empire after Afghanistan, but those are warnings for all of us.

To conclude, I think about these great big issues, and there are three things you obviously want to have. One is good leaders. Second is good intelligence. Third is good luck, and this audience is very fortunate that it gets to work on one of those.
Washington Post columnist David Ignatius has had a distinguished and wide-ranging career in the news business, serving at various times as a reporter, foreign correspondent, editor, and columnist.


In addition to writing his column, Ignatius is co-moderator, with Fareed Zakaria of Newsweek, of PostGlobal, a new experiment in online global journalism. PostGlobal links more than 50 of the top journalists and commentators around the world in a continuous online discussion of important issues.

Prior to becoming a columnist, Ignatius was the Post’s assistant managing editor in charge of business news, a position he assumed in 1993. During his tenure, the paper significantly expanded its business coverage, and the Post was cited as one of the “Best in Business” among large newspapers by the Society of American Business Editors and Writers in 1995 and 1996.

Ignatius served as the Post’s foreign editor from 1990 to 1992, supervising the paper’s Pulitzer Prize-winning coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. From 1986 to 1990, he was editor of the Post’s Outlook section, a Sunday opinion section that covers politics, economics, foreign policy, and intellectual trends.

Before joining the Post in 1986, Ignatius spent 10 years as a reporter for The Wall Street Journal. He covered the steel industry in Pittsburgh, then moved to Washington to cover the Justice Department, the CIA, and the U.S. Senate. He transferred overseas to become the paper’s Middle East correspondent from 1980 to 1983, covering wars in Lebanon and Iraq. He returned to Washington in 1984 as the Journal’s chief diplomatic correspondent and he received the Edward Weintal Prize for Diplomatic Reporting in 1985. Before joining The Wall Street Journal, he was an editor at The Washington Monthly.

published in 1997 by Random House; *The Sun King*, published in 1999 by Random House; and *Body of Lies*, published in April 2007 by W.W. Norton. Ignatius is married to Dr. Eve Ignatius and has three daughters.
AMBASSADOR MALINOWSKI: Thank you very much, David. Our questions are coming in. Here’s one for the whole panel. “How do you think the U.S. Intelligence Community should address the global issue of the merger and acquisition of U.S. defense communications and information technology companies with, or by, foreign-owned companies?”

DR. GORDON: This is part of a larger set of categories having to do with foreign investment in areas of the U.S. economy that have national security implications. Therefore, I think this is a very, very challenging issue.

What are the principles here to address this? I think the first principle is that we need to be very cognizant of who’s buying. Who’s buying? So we know who’s buying in, but do we know the extent to which they’re clean or not? That’s one issue.

The second issue is what is that small category of must-haves that you can’t let others get? What is the small category of the must-haves that you can’t let others get in order to protect?

And third, balancing it is that this is an issue where being overly protective has enormous downside risks on the broader investment climate at a time when that climate and confidence in that climate are very shaky. So I don’t think there’s a general answer to this, but there are a set of principles that we need to be asking about in some situations.

DR. DESCH: There’s also another dynamic factor, which is the changing nature of warfare. The idea that you’d be dependent on foreign sources for critical materials in wartime, or critical technologies, has been a staple of strategic thinking for millennia, but that was also at a time when wars went on for a relatively long period of time.

The key thing is that globalization has changed a lot in the world. It may also have changed the nature of warfare in ways I don’t think we’ve fully thought through.

AMBASSADOR MALINOWSKI: The next question for you, Michael, implies that you don’t think deterrence will work but that we should concentrate on prevention. The question is, if we’re not going to use military power working against terrorism, what ways would you propose prevention?

DR. DESCH: I actually think deterrence does work when you’re dealing with state actors. I have no doubt, despite Ahmadinejad’s reassuring words in New York earlier this week, that Iran is pursuing a nuclear option, that North Korea is doing everything that it can on that score, and that there are other bad states out there.

I don’t worry too much about it, because in the context of the current strategic nuclear balance and military balance overall I think the United States has a pretty robust deterrent capability against any rogue state.
Now the response to that is to say, “Well, Ahmadinejad and Iran are not states that can be thought of in the rational deterrence framework,” but as David Ignatius pointed out, there was no crazier state on nuclear issues than Mao’s China in the 1950s and early 1960s. What Mao said about nuclear weapons was far more hair-raising than anything Ahmadinejad has said at any point, and yet once China became a nuclear power, it behaved basically the way other nuclear powers have behaved.

Now the area where the deterrence problem could be problematic is non-state actors. I have no doubt that if Osama bin Laden got a suitcase nuclear bomb we’d be in deep trouble.

I also think that we really ought to ask ourselves how likely it is that non-state actors are going to get this sort of catastrophic WMD capability. Who’s going to give them nuclear weapons? And when you think that through, it’s not impossible, but I think it’s highly unlikely, including the most radical state that we’ve got out there that would proliferate to a non-state actor it couldn’t control. And there’s no way that a non-state actor is going to have the capability of developing by itself the significant weapons of mass destruction capability.

Now I’m going to get on my soap box, because in the late 1990s there was a real flurry of interest in WMD terrorism, and most of this was expressed by some former colleagues of mine at the Kennedy School, not Tony Oettinger’s shop but in the Belfer Center, where there was a lot of worrying about WMD terrorism.

Well, what happened to us on September 11, 2001? We were hit with a relatively medium-technology type attack, and all this worrying about suitcase bombs and other things like that may have blinded us to the more obvious way the terrorists were going to operate.

The ultimate trump card against my argument is to say that, even if there is a one-one millionth chance if it happens it’s going to be really catastrophic, again, you’ve got to balance the low probability of this event with the cost of the steps that you take to prevent it, and that’s why I keep going back to Iraq, which was supposed to be the poster child for preventive war to eliminate these problems. As General Petraeus said in his testimony and as Secretary Gates said, I think, in his confirmation hearings when they were asked, “Has Iraq made us safer?” neither of them could answer “Yes.”

AMBASSADOR MALINOWSKI: Thank you. This question goes to David Ignatius. “Why was there no debate about the decision to invade Iraq?” I’d like to broaden it a little bit into: “What is the public discourse over the subject that we’re looking at today, that is, the new global reality and how the Intelligence Community reacts to it?”

MR. IGNATIUS: Let me answer the first question, the more focused question, first, because I think it’s an important one, and it’s one that deserves
an answer. The first thing to ask—by “debate” I assume you mean debate in the press?

The first reason there wasn’t much of a debate in the press is because there wasn’t much of a debate in the country. We like to say in the news business, “We don’t make the news. We cover it.” There weren’t a lot of people who were speaking out publicly, raising the kind of questions that it’s now obvious we needed to think about in much more detail as a country.

I wrote a column that appeared last Sunday in *The Washington Post* talking about the intelligence estimates, the ICAs that were commissioned by David’s predecessor at Policy Planning at State at the request of David’s former colleague on the National Intelligence Council, Paul Pillar, who knew we were going to war and knew the dangers of it. He felt compelled, felt a duty, to prepare intelligence that would be helpful for policymakers and so he wrote it. You can now read those estimates. I can now read them.

Many of you probably could read them at the time, and they’re haunting, because they were just so precisely focused on what turned out to be the issues, but they weren’t public, and I think that raises a very interesting question. Had they been public, they would have been in *The Washington Post, The New York Times*, on TV every night, and we would have talked about these issues more.

Another factor that’s obvious here is that people who might have spoken out didn’t because they were afraid of losing their position at the foreign policy table. A rare counter-example to that is Zbigniew Brzezinski, who spoke out and did pay a price.

He suddenly was an un-person in this world of former senior officials. People didn’t want to talk to him. The White House cut him off. That may not sound like a terrible punishment but, if you’re a former National Security Advisor, it is. It feels like it, and there are a lot of other people who had misgivings who didn’t speak out, because they didn’t want to lose that access.

Although those are arguments I can give you for why we didn’t talk more about it in the press, they’re not really adequate. As I look back at this, we needed to break through our normal professional limits—“We don’t make the news. We just cover it”—to get in and independently examine the issues that Paul Pillar was examining.

You didn’t have to be an intelligence officer to think carefully and do reporting about what would happen to the different ethnic sectarian groups in Iraq following an invasion. We didn’t do that. One reason that we didn’t do it is that we knew war was coming. It wasn’t an open question. We knew that it was coming. By December we were already sending our people to be trained as embedded reporters with that army that was even then assembling in the desert in Kuwait. It wasn’t an open question, and we were buying our chem bio suits.
I still have one of those crazy chem bio suits in my basement. We were as convinced that was an issue as the military. We bought the suits. We trained. We got ready. And we just allowed that essential step of examining “Should we do this? What are the consequences?” to get insufficient attention because we assumed it was already a done deal. It was a decision that was made and couldn’t be reversed, and no politician was speaking up very loudly to oppose it. I’m just going to stick to that, because I think it really is an important question, and leave the broader rephrasing behind.

DR. GORDON: Just let me raise one point here, and it’s an important point, because I think that hindsight can be 20/20 here. Not only were U.S. forces preparing their chem bio suits, but Iraqi forces were preparing their chem bio suits. Many in the Iraqi high command—and we debriefed them—believed that they had these weapons and indeed were going to use them. The belief was very widespread. It was wrong, and we now know it was wrong, but the belief was very widespread that there were weapons of mass destruction.

The debate internationally was more about time. Should we give it more time? How do we play? Should we create a coalition? But we shouldn’t forget through the lens of hindsight that there really was an analytic consensus on the part of some, not all, and there were important failures having to do with what’s in aluminum tubes and all of that. But people generally, not just in the United States government, believed that there were weapons of mass destruction. The fact that there weren’t is an important fact, but I think that was one element out there shaping the debate.

MR. IGNATIUS: I don’t mean to rehash the WMD debate. I think that’s a mistake that was made by virtually every intelligence service, including our own. It was a very consequential mistake. I think unwinding the damage done to our country and to the region from what has happened is going to be the work of much of the rest of my lifetime in terms of years. Therefore, it is worth thinking carefully about it.

DR. GORDON: What we were trying to do in the Intelligence Community was both to communicate that judgment but also to communicate judgments about what might happen, what were the broader implications of a set of actions on this.

MR. IGNATIUS: This will be, I promise, my last word, but there is a really powerful lesson here. It’s just overwhelming. We depend on our intelligence officers and analysts to get this right.

You know, a lot fell on Paul Pillar’s head for trying to do his job, and it takes the strength of character to do that. We all see the difference it makes, and people in this room are the ones who are going to make that difference. I just want to say, as somebody outside of your world, wow, do we depend on you to do your jobs, and that’s the last word on that.
AMBASSADOR MALINOWSKI: And this will be the last question. “Very little has been said about the adverse impact of colonialism on post-World War I dissolutions of the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the effect it had at the time on the societal revolutions that might have taken place at that time had colonial powers not been present.”

“As a veteran of Bosnia and Iraq, it seems that we, America and the Allies, are the only ones who have forgotten that there are old conflicts. How should we deal with our collective colonial culpability?”

MR. MURPHY: Well, I don't know about the culpability part, but I think there's a strong lesson, and I think David Ignatius spoke very eloquently about the lessons of history and that our nation has been a nation, and the environment that we live in now is one of instantaneous gratification.

The history of the U.S. on a laminated card that you can buy in the bookstore will pretty much get you through four years, as opposed to going back four or five hundred years and thinking about the implications of change over time. I think we saw some of that in the Balkans, as well, with those who took the time to do the research and to do the up-front work that said, “What's going on between these elements of society? What are the things that motivate them? What is their end state?”

It's often tied to events that occurred hundreds and hundreds of years ago, memories that are passed down generation to generation like some kind of a cherished family treasure. While we have elements of that in our own society, we don't take that pause, that intellectual pause, often enough to contemplate the implications of that when we go into somebody else's backyard.

And so I think that the main issue and the main lesson that comes out of it is what we can learn as a nation, what we can learn as an intelligence community, as policymakers, as journalists, as academics about turning toward the next generation and saying it may not be about instant gratification. It may not be, “Well, I'm not really worried about getting too deep into that, because I can just click and get it when I need to.”

I think Admiral McConnell talked a lot about this issue of reestablishing a measure of depth in our analytic community that we kind of skirted by when we made the transition post-Cold War and found that we can actually convert people really quickly to be analysts for another problem, and we just have this tremendously fungible workforce. But I think what we lost is some of the continuity, some of the history, some of the depth, and I think trying to bring some of that back is really a generational challenge for us as a nation. I know, having a 13-year-old daughter, she thinks, moves, and acts in ways that I never conceived of, and I'm still trying to play catch-up with her in that regard.

DR. DESCH: Thinking of the United States as a colonial power is descriptively accurate, but for me the more important thing to keep in mind
about the United States is our view of the world and our view of political philosophy, which is Big-“L” Liberalism, a faith in the universality of the markets and democracy, and also a belief that what we’ve got here would be good for the rest of the world. In one respect, that’s a pretty laudable point of view but, on the other hand, it presupposes the universality of things that we hold particularly dear.

And so globalization, which is really the spread of the American way of doing business, we see as an unalloyed good. It’s good for us and for our economy. Why wouldn’t the rest of the world like it?

When you think about it, when people look back to the late 20th century and ask, “What are the great revolutions that swept the world?” will they say political Islam? I think not. I think political Islam is too fractious and too limited. The great revolution of the end of the 20th century was globalization and the spread of basically American and European modes of politics and economics around the world and the associated response to that. Karl Polanyi wrote the famous book, *The Great Transformation*. The book that somebody’s going to write in ten years is going to be *The Great Transformation 2* about the impact of globalization.

So the problem we have—our blind spot as Americans—is Big-“L” Liberalism, that we think it’s good for us, and it is, and we think it’s good for the rest of the world, maybe. But we think that the rest of the world wants this, and that I’m really skeptical about.

**MR. IGNATIUS:** If I could just briefly offer a thought on colonialism. One great advantage we have is that we have not been a colonial power. We are becoming one or, to put it better, we are perceived as becoming one, and we need to get out of that business.

When you walk through the gates of the American University of Beirut, which is as close as we came to colonialism in that part of the world, and you see the mottos of the evangelical Protestants from New England who founded the place carved in stone, you think of . . . .

It was hard for a long time to find any leader in the Middle East in an Arab country who hadn’t gone to AUB, who didn’t have that in his intellectual DNA. That’s the business we’ve got to get back into, but we’ve got to get out of the business that really is infuriating the world. That’s the first thing I’d say.

The second thing is I used to be a globalization enthusiast. I’m less so for a reason I’ll try to describe very simply. When you travel the world, you see the global elites meeting at conferences. Maybe this room is an example. They stay in the same hotels together. They go to the same world economic forums. Their children are going to Harvard and then working for Goldman Sachs, and you think, “Wow, you know, we’re one big world. This is so great,” and at the
level of elites we are becoming one world with a seamless, highly efficient network of decision making.

The problem that I see more and more is that as we plug elites from around the world into this global grid, we unplug them from their own local grid, leaving a vacuum, country by country, that is being filled with a sort of pre-modern, dangerous people. I see this in Egypt. I see it everywhere I go, to be honest, and I think it’s really scary, and it’s sort of an obverse side of globalization that’s not recognized enough, and somehow we’ve got to encourage these local elites to stay anchored in their countries and continue to provide leadership. Otherwise, the more modern and progressive the world gets, the more of a mess it’s going to get into, I fear.

AMBASSADOR MALINOWSKI: Gentlemen, thank you very much for sharing your time and your thoughts with our group today.

MR. HIPONIA, Director, Center for International Engagement, NDIC: Our final speaker is Dr. Teresa Domzal. She’s Provost of the National Defense Intelligence College, and she’ll be talking about intelligence education transformation.
Good afternoon. I was asked to make some concluding remarks, and I will make concluding remarks, but this could also be considered a word from your sponsor. I couldn’t use the time and opportunity to not talk about the College and how we track all of the trends and try to be a major resource for the Intelligence Community, in education, in research, and in outreach to the community. Just a little bit about the College and how we have taken on intelligence transformation and used a lot of the concepts talked about today to shape the future of intelligence education.

For those of you not familiar with the College, we are authorized by Congress to award both a Bachelor of Science in Intelligence and a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence. We conduct and disseminate intelligence research, and we do this at the TOP SECRET level.

We engage in outreach and engagement activities, and we are accredited by Middle States Commission on Higher Education, so our degrees are accredited. We are also a member of the Consortium of Universities of the Washington Area, so our students can take courses at other colleges and universities within the Consortium. We also have two graduate centers, one at the National Security Agency and one at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

Moving to our educational philosophy, everything we talked about today in the conference concerns collaboration, cooperation, and integration. The College is really a change agent for the Intelligence Community, and you can see it in the accomplishments of our students and the transformative nature of the work that they do for both intelligence and for national security.

Our student body comes from throughout the Intelligence Community, all of the Services, and most recently from Homeland Security and FBI. Our students work together in a classroom, and so the natural cooperation and integration are already there. That is really a hallmark of the College. We are the one place where everyone comes together to learn and to discuss—and argue sometimes—about intelligence topics.

I want to talk a little bit about growth, because this has a real impact on the community. Since 2001-02, when we had 398 students enrolled in the College, over the last five years we have grown to 645 students. Therefore, we are a product and a service in great demand. Also the composition of our student body is changing. As you can see, five years ago the split was about 60/40 mili-
tary to civilian, and now it’s almost 50/50 between civilians and military, which makes a nice mix for the student body.

The secret to our success is two things. We have an amazing and dedicated faculty, both civilian and military. The faculty is a mixture of the military Services that rotate in, who come here for three years and teach our students. We have students who are committed to careers in intelligence and national security, and with that combination, the students push the faculty, and the faculty push the students, and this is what keeps us current. It’s what keeps the curriculum on the cutting edge, and it also keeps all of the research that is going on in the College hard-hitting and consequential within the Intelligence Community.

I took the four topics on the program and thought, “Well, okay, if the College is a microcosm of the Intelligence Community, how can we be an example to the need for integration and collaboration?” And so, with the global events that have changed the world—we just heard about that—and as I listened to the panels today, I was going through a mental checklist thinking, “Did we get it all?” It’s a reality check for our direction and where we’re going.

I’m going to take you through a little bit of the transformation that we went through since 2005 when we had our first conference right here on intelligence reform. Where did we start? We started with a plan, and we looked at the external environment and the internal environment. The external domain is what is going on in the world. What are the world events? Who are the Intelligence Community stakeholders and what is the landscape? What are they expecting from the Intelligence Community and from the College, given the strategic landscape, the competitors, and allies? Everything we can control is our internal domain.

In order to coalesce and get our curriculum and our instructional design on target, we really had to understand what was going on in the world and what was going on in the community and how we can contribute to that, how we can help drive that, and how we can in some ways lead the way in that area. Everybody in the College had a visual on what we were doing and how we were going to go about transforming.

We looked at world events and what was driving change, and we wanted to make sure that we could capture all of the nuances. In 2005 we were called the Joint Military Intelligence College, and in December of 2006, as part of intelligence reform in broadening the Intelligence Community, our name was changed to the National Defense Intelligence College, and so the mission broadened.

The student body was broadening, and we wanted to stay with our heritage of defense intelligence, but we also had to recognize the need to
integrate and to cooperate with all of the other components of the Intelligence Community.

We had a lot of guidance. We examined all of the books so that we understood the customer, starting with the national security strategy, looking at the national intelligence strategy, terrorism, homeland security, and all of the organizations that were standing up their missions. In an effort to coordinate and integrate within the community, all of the agencies were asked, “How are you contributing to the National Intelligence Strategy? How are you contributing to the strategic plan of your agency?” And so that exercise alone was a coalescing opportunity.

We next looked at the curriculum and asked, “What are the threats?” We considered threat assessment everywhere in the world and the interconnectedness of things that can happen. So we looked at globalization, because it drives the world condition.

Then we looked at transnational issues such as extremism, disease, human trafficking, all of the things that permeate and cross borders and are enabled by globalization. We looked at state and non-state actors, because there are a lot of crazy people entering the scene. Asymmetric and irregular warfare was on the rise, along with ideology in cyberspace and more uncertainty and complexity in the world.

We identified these as a starting point. I want to emphasize that, although the program says “Intelligence Education, Transformed,” it is really “transforming,” because throughout this process every quarter, after every course, we do an evaluation to make sure that we keep it current and keep it moving. So we identified these areas as a starting point for the curricular structure.

What about skills? You hear a lot about critical thinking. You hear a lot about writing and being able to present and brief. We drew from the skills and competencies that were being developed by the ODNI and USDI and incorporated those into our curriculum, because as the faculty got together to talk about what students should know, it was almost all about skill, and we have this other requirement called content. If you have great analytic skills, you have to have a subject matter to wrap it around, and so we look at two separate but equal skills and competencies.

The core skills concern engagement, collaboration, effective communication, critical thinking, and leadership, and on the other side, the purple side, are our intelligence-related competencies such as mission awareness and future-focused analysis. I’m going to drill down into the core skills to give you an idea of what we’re doing with our students.

Under integration and engagement, we look at interpersonal skills. We look at engaging and collaborating, and our students get this experience by doing presentations, by doing briefings. We look at effective communication.
Obviously, there are a lot of briefing skills, oral and written, in being an intelligence analyst.

Critical thinking includes situational awareness; that is, they need to take the global and the geostrategic and understand the context of what they are analyzing. They get the content side from the curricular courses.

They come to understand the Intelligence Enterprise perspective, to understand the Intelligence Community and its missions, which are different, but they have to work together. They look at creative thinking. We measure the students’ critical thinking skills as they come in this fall, and we’re going to measure them at the end of the winter quarter to see how far they’ve moved in these skills and competencies.

The ability to synthesize and explore alternatives is also part of critical thinking. Leadership clearly includes integrity and ethics, a strategic community view, and adaptability.

The intelligence-related competencies were pulled out of the curriculum in terms of content, because every time there seemed to be an issue the answer was, “Well, let’s create a course,” and the feedback from students was, “I don’t need ten weeks of it. Just give me a four-day seminar, or give me a one-day thing here, and I can pick up the rest.”

So we took a lot of what was in here and incorporated it into the skills. The mission awareness part requires students to take everything they learn and relate it back to targets, intelligence gaps, customer operations, and requirements—Why are you doing this? Why are you collecting? Why are you analyzing?—and understanding policy and doctrine for intelligence collection, for how intelligence might inform national security policy.

And then the last grouping is a future-focused analysis. Part of our goal and our curricular drumbeat is future-focused. It doesn't mean we don't look at history, but it means that we have to look at where the threats are and project into the future.

Analytic rigor involves investigating capabilities using all open-source capabilities, understanding intelligence source disciplines—What will SIGINT get you? What will HUMINT get you?—and understanding the collection systems and operations, processing and exploitation, and then all of the analytical tools.

These are the competencies and skills [Provost points to slide]. If you envision these skills and competencies in a matrix, this being the left-hand side, across the top we put all of the course content. So we map all of the skills and competencies that are being taught and developed within each course.

Part of being an accredited college means that you have to look at yourself in the mirror periodically and say, “What are we doing well, and what
are we not doing well?” And what we're not doing well is always a hard thing to say, but we had to ask, “Where could we improve?”

The curriculum was focused on military intelligence but, after all, that was our mission. We were the Joint Military Intelligence College, but layered on top now is a larger, expanding community with a different population of students, and we had to look at that consideration.

Collection focused on individual INTs but didn't bring them together enough to say, “Well, how do you do collection planning for a hard target?” That's something we're working very hard on. It was a very state actor focus. It was a lot of policy. It was a lot of Cold War. There were a lot of things where you would say, “Oh, well, okay, but so what?” There was more policy and process than content, and the underlying curricular goals were unclear. So when you looked at it, the faculty took all of the syllabi that we had, and we had 96 courses on the books, and we did a huge mapping and said, “Where are the gaps? Where are the duplications?”

The process was very participative and collaborative. It was looking at something and trying not to be threatening with, “Well, it's your course.” We asked, how do we now broaden? How do we come to a curricular structure for the core?

The post-transformation core curriculum starts with globalization, but it's the context for intelligence. The students look at financial networks, climate change, all of the things that the panels talked about, extremism, religion, identity, all of the things associated with globalization, with a focus on what it means for intelligence.

The curriculum includes social analysis and the spectrum of conflict within a small locality, something that's going on in Myanmar, formerly known as Burma. It's a small uprising in a very small country, but it has a global stage. How is this a warning to us? What does it mean for intelligence? Does it mean anything at all? To understand why social conflict occurs and how it can spread into insurgency, how it can spread into full-blown war, our students look at the spectrum of conflict.

They also learn about culture and identity in an age of globalization, to understand how people see themselves, how they define themselves in this new world of globalization. Do they define themselves by their country, by their religion, by their ethnicity? And understanding that social fabric helps us to understand the world condition better.

Analyzing Operational Capabilities transformed from a simple military capabilities analysis to understanding all adversarial capabilities—not just North Korea and China but what's Al Qaeda got up its sleeve, and understanding what our enemies can do to us and what their capabilities are.
Deconstructing Strategy was another nut to crack, and we're still working on it. It used to be military strategy, order of battle, but we also want to incorporate how our adversary understands us and our strategy. We look at Sun-Tzu.

We look at the typical kinds of strategic thoughts and models and ask—How do they understand us? How do we understand them? We get strategic thinking into the curriculum and wrap it around an intelligence problem. Regarding intelligence and national security, again—How does the whole machinery of intelligence work and relate to national security policy?

The next two courses are Analysis and Collection. Argumentation, logic, and reasoning is a way that our students learn to develop an argument, develop hypotheses, show evidence, and show the trail of logic and thought throughout the intelligence process.

We named our Collection course “The Compound Eye,” because we wanted to get away from teaching individual INTs by saying, “Here is an intelligence problem. How would you collect against it?” That way the students have a holistic viewpoint. We have also added Science and Technology Intelligence, because it is an important part of the Intelligence Community.

We took the electives, and we grouped them into four areas depending on what our students’ interests are, and again this is a work in progress. The first grouping goes back to what General Maples was speaking of this morning, and that is military strategy and defense intelligence and intelligence in both combat and peacetime.

Our students have electives in information operations and the ideology of war, asymmetric warfare and the future of conflict, intelligence campaign planning—How do you put it all together?—influence operations and the art of persuasion, peacekeeping and stability operations, intelligence and international engagement, and a strategic crisis exercise where students actually go to the war colleges. They play the role of intelligence officers during a strategic crisis, and they do very well.

With the core curriculum starting with globalization and understanding the social condition, what are the threats that cross borders, and how can they be connected both globally and locally? Obviously, transnational problems include terrorism, the international environment, Islam in the modern world, homeland security issues, counterintelligence, WMD, the biological threat, missiles in space, and the nuclear, radiological, and explosive issues.

Regarding the geostrategic environment and closing intelligence gaps, we visited seven of nine combatant commands in the last few weeks and talked to the actual people in the field. We asked them, “What do you need in these regions?” They have very specific geostrategic needs. You can’t really study Afghanistan without understanding Pakistan. So we’re looking at ways
of putting courses together that look at countries and their interaction effects. We’ll be developing more country-specific and region-specific courses as the year goes along.

And finally, not the least of which is managing the whole enterprise, looking at the Intelligence Community, the mission and enterprise, looking at the collector-analyst interface, because that is really a key to success in integrating the community. Looking at spending and advancing both collection analysis and a little bit of covert action.

And so that is the overview of the curriculum and how we put it together. I know it’s a very fast approach, but we’ve launched it this fall. It took us 18 months, start to finish. Well, start to where we are now. We’re not finished, but so far, so good.

The key to making all of this happen was pulling together research. There was a college that had a slogan, “If you’re not researching, you have nothing to teach,” and so research is a very important part of our College.

All of our master’s students must do a thesis. It is required because, if we are the National Defense Intelligence College, we need to be contributing to the body of literature on intelligence. Our students have access to all of the classified databases, all of the intelligence coming in, and so they can conduct really hard-hitting research.

Every year we have a Research Fair where representatives from the entire community and the combatant commands come together. They meet with the students face-to-face and talk about the issues to make sure that the research we’re doing is really helpful and hard-hitting within the community.

As part of our research mission, we have a Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, and under that we have the National Defense Intelligence College Press. I just wanted to show you a few of the books and papers that we’ve published in the past year.

Shortly, as we introduce our new Website, these will be available to the community, to the public, to academe in PDF format, and we also do some hard copies. This research is carried out by Research Fellows who spend a year here at the College working on a particular topic. It’s also done by faculty and students, and includes Intelligence Community projects that come our way.

_A Muslim Archipelago_ was written by one of our former faculty members and Dean of the School of Intelligence Studies. It deals with Islam in Southeast Asia. We published for the Intelligence Science Board the unclassified version of _Educing Information_ and distributed it to interested audiences.

In our homeland security and law enforcement communities, _Out of Bounds_ was written by Deborah Osborne, who is from the Buffalo Police Department. She does intelligence analysis and was a virtual Fellow. Her work concerns how we integrate state, local, and federal intelligence sources. Just out
is *Improving the Law Enforcement-Intelligence Community Relationship: Why Can't We All Just Get Along?*

The Coast Guard is another growing segment of our student body, and those students produce phenomenal work in intelligence for homeland security. They really do link and cross the borders between the national Intelligence Community and law enforcement.

Regarding skill development, *Critical Thinking and Intelligence Analysis* was written by one of our adjunct faculty. This book is used in many of our classes and distributed to many colleges and universities which are doing some analytical coursework.

*Managing the Private Spies: The Use of Commercial Augmentation for Intelligence Operations* was an important piece of work, done because we have so many contractors involved in the Intelligence Community.

Our Research Fellows and students also produce many publishable works that are classified, which the NDIC Press can disseminate to a select audience. They may not be widely distributed, but they are often influential within the community.

*The Mission of Outreach and International Engagement* is from the folks who brought you this conference. In addition to this annual conference, we have an International Intelligence Fellows Program every year to which we invite intelligence officers from other countries to come to the College and talk about regional issues and security matters. Last year we had the Latin Americans in the College. The year before that we had the Africans, and coming in 2008 the program will focus not on a region but on intelligence in support of peacekeeping operations, so that will be here at the College too.

We recently started on a journey with the Romanians. The Black Sea and Caspian Sea Conference was hosted here at the College in 2006. This was an assembly of all of the intelligence services from the littoral nations around the Black and Caspian Seas. It was truly a sight to behold, because many of these countries don’t speak to each other, and these individuals had never met each other. Yet, we got them all in a room together, and by the end of the first day they were talking to each other. They found it so useful that the Romanians picked up the flag, and in 2007, just this past May, we did the conference again in Constanta, Romania, and in 2008 I believe it will be in Tbilisi in the Republic of Georgia. This is another ongoing effort that our little College managed to pull together with the help of a lot of people, but it is a way that we can reach out to the international community as an academic institution which provides a venue for open discussion of security and intelligence issues.

Coming soon, in January of 2008, we are opening a Center for Science and Technology. This has been on the drawing board for a while but, again, we’re not going to be teaching physics and chemistry. What we wanted was a center
that would provide a venue for science and technology, including the behavioral sciences, intelligence, the private sector, and academe, to come together and network, to talk about science and technology and their role in intelligence, but also to keep a very close eye on adversarial capabilities of S&T.

Again, it’s a global phenomenon, and our new Director is in the audience. May I identify him? Dr. Brian Shaw will be our new Director. We are pleased to have him join us, and he will take on the role of running that Center.

In conclusion, we are pushing through barriers to collaboration. I brought my pointer [points to slide]. Do you see these four things right here? They’re called stovepipes, and they were departments, and then here you see faculty, four little circles of faculty. So in our own little microcosm of a college, we didn’t have enough collaboration and integration going on.

When you take away those four circles, and you put the faculty together, you now have integrated faculty experience. When you have someone who comes in who is a WMD expert or an energy expert, and you have a faculty member who’s teaching globalization, they actually come and talk in each other’s classes, and the phenomenon just grows. So organization is really a key to pulling the trigger, but the important thing is to make sure that you know what you want to do first. What’s the goal? What do you want to accomplish? And then organize, not the other way around, because this is something that really, really facilitated the change, and it facilitated it quickly.

I hope the lessons that we learned have some broader application for this conference in pushing through the barriers. To analyze and understand the external environment—I think we saw that in talking about the world condition and global events. Question everything about your organization. Look at your processes. Look at your procedures. Say, “What are we doing well, and what needs fixing?”

To have participative collaborative processes, I said, “We’re not doing committees. We’re going to have working groups where everybody in the College is on a working group, and every working group is open to every other member of the College.”

I know you can’t do this at the University of Texas, for instance, because it’s huge, but the beauty of our place is that we’re small enough to do this, to have absolute collaboration. I think it got us a lot further a lot more quickly.

Consider all viewpoints, but eventually decide on a course of action. So as Chief Academic Officer, there was a point where I had to say, “We need to go here. It’s never going to be perfect. It’s never going to be one hundred percent.” Is everybody completely happy? No, but it is an on-track curriculum, and it is now under assessment. So everything we do, we improve as we go.
Set goals with strategies and some contingencies and time frames. Don’t wait forever. If you see something going off the rails, have a meeting, try to fix it, and have your contingency plans ready.

Always keep an eye on the mission. If and when things go wrong, and they inevitably do, you can’t let it get you down. You have to keep your eye on the horizon and say, “This is where we’re going. This is where we want to be, and let’s not be shaken by a few setbacks.”

Assess progress against the goals. Always look at “How are we doing? We wanted this done by May. It’s now June. What happened? Well, you know, we’re still okay.” So you have that constant dialogue about getting things done, and you take corrective action.

And finally, have the courage to steer a new course. If something isn’t working, just say, “You know, this isn’t working. Let’s look at it from another vantage point.” That’s because what we thought might happen in the winter of 2006 when we started this process, to when we actually launched in the summer of 2007, a lot of things changed, including our name.

So we had to stay agile, and we had to stay up with everybody else’s issues. So we do have a wonderful College, with collaborative processes, and we hope to grow and continue to grow and contribute to the Intelligence Community. Thank you for staying until the end.
BIOGRAPHY

Dr. Teresa J. Domzal

Dr. Teresa J. Domzal was appointed Provost of the National Defense Intelligence College in September 2005. She is responsible for overseeing all education, research, and outreach programs.

In 2003 Dr. Domzal joined the staff of the Central Intelligence Agency where she served in the Office of the Chief Financial Officer. Subsequent to that, she was assigned to the Directorate of Operations.

Dr. Domzal was Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic Affairs, and Dean of the School of Business, at Richmond, the American International University in London, with Study Centers in Florence and Rome. She was responsible for providing leadership in developing the University’s curricula to focus on the impact of globalization on the social sciences, international relations, the arts, and business.

Prior to London, she was Professor and Dean of the School of Management at George Mason University. She was a guest lecturer at the University of Odense; Gallup Research in Copenhagen; Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University, The Netherlands; and a Visiting Professor at Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia. Her academic publications focused on globalization and postmodern culture.

Dr. Domzal was a consultant in planning and marketing strategy for Marriott International, and a core faculty member for Eastman Kodak’s International Management Consulting Service for the Africa/Asia/Australia region. She was an independent contractor to the Central Intelligence Agency, conducting research in Europe and Asia.

Earlier in her career, Dr. Domzal worked for Lintas/Worldwide, and Ted Bates/Worldwide Advertising in New York, providing multinational clients with appropriate context for strategic planning, tracking, and interpreting the effects of globalization on competitive market dynamics and consumer behavior.

Dr. Domzal holds a B.S. degree in Business from Niagara University, and an MBA and Ph.D. from the University of Cincinnati.
UNIDENTIFIED QUESTIONER. [Question dealt with teaching foreign languages, such as Arabic, Urdu, Korean, and Chinese.]

DR. DOMZAL. That is not in our mission. We have the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, and we have the DNI Language Initiative, and that’s handled by an entirely different operation, because we don’t have the capacity to hire linguists and language people. We do have a language lab opening up in the John D. Hughes Library where speakers of the language can practice their craft.

The other thing that we are doing that I did not mention before is a DI Scholars Program. It brings that talent into the community by recruiting from colleges and universities. They’re undergraduate students or graduate students, and they are hired by DIA. The first year they spend getting their degree here. We’re trying to bring more of those folks in, and I think one of the DI Scholars from our last group spoke Urdu. Another spoke Russian, and yet another Chinese. So we are bringing those capabilities into the community, as well. Thank you.
PANEL 3

Collaboration: Are We There Yet?
[EDITOR’S NOTE: The second day of the conference was held at the TS//SCI level, primarily to promote frank and open discussion among a smaller, more selective audience and to facilitate candor during the Q&A period. A decision was made by NDIC officials not to transcribe in detail all the specific comments of each of the members of the two panels, but instead to summarize some of the presentations in an unclassified, sanitized manner so that the entire conference proceedings could be published in a single, unclassified volume. For that reason, the first panel’s proceedings are more summary in nature than the second panel’s.]

Panel Moderator
Dr. Bowman Miller
NDIC Faculty

BIOGRAPHY
Dr. Bowman Miller

Dr. Bowman (Bo) Miller is a senior faculty member at the National Defense Intelligence College where he teaches graduate courses in globalization, conflict, and European regional studies.

His 36 years of federal service encompass counterintelligence/counterterrorism in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, terrorist threat analysis in Diplomatic Security at the U. S. State Department, and 25 years of all-source analysis on Europe in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at State, an office he headed for 18 years until retiring in 2005.
Panel 3 Participants (L to R): Bowman “Bo” Miller, NDIC Faculty, Moderator; Thomas Fingar, DDNI for Analysis; Bill Crumm, SIGINT Director, NSA; and Larry Kindsvater, President and CEO, Kindsvater Consulting.
Collaboration is a means, not a goal. My office provides comprehensive analytical support to the Intelligence Community. Collaboration falls into the must-do category, and not just the nice-to-do one.

The requisites for collaboration include: First, you must know where you want to go, and we now know. The second requisite is speed. Customers want and need fast response. Next, we need to be adept and knowledgeable. There has to be a single integrated enterprise, but it must not be bounded rigidly. Another requisite is expertise, and we must know where to find it. We are establishing contact with reservoirs of expertise in the various agencies and creating communities of analysts. The final requisite is knowledge and specialization.

I have been an analyst for 42 years. In developing analysts, I have come to realize that mentoring is key. There must be intensive training, and not just of the OJT variety. Tradecraft must be taught. Trust must be fostered with the analyst communities, and there must be broad access to information. We must use all the information-sharing tools at our disposal, and we need to focus on outreach to our consumer base.

A Library of National Intelligence is coming soon, through which analysts and managers will be able to tap into all levels and categories of intelligence reporting to which they have access. We are seeing the creation of Intellipedia, which in essence is a set of living documents, and ODNI has given its seal of approval to this development.
Dr. Thomas Fingar was Assistant Secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) from July 2004 until May 2005, when he was named Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman, National Intelligence Council. While at the State Department, he served as Acting Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research (2003-04 and 2000-01), Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (2001-03), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis (1994-2000), Director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and Chief of the China Division (1986-89).

His intelligence career began in 1970 as the senior German linguist in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, USAREUR & 7th Army, in Heidelberg, Germany. Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including Senior Research Associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control, and Director of the University’s U.S.-China Relations Program. Other previous positions include assignment to the National Academy of Sciences as Co-Director of the U.S.-China Education Clearinghouse, advisor to the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, and consultant to numerous U.S. Government agencies and private sector organizations.

Dr. Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (B.A. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969, and Ph.D., 1977, both in Political Science). He is a career member of the Senior Executive Service. His principal foreign languages are Chinese and German. Dr. Fingar has published dozens of books and articles, mostly on aspects of Chinese politics and policymaking.
Panelist

Mr. Bill Crumm
SIGINT Director, National Security Agency

NSA's performance in the area of collaboration is uneven, but on a generally positive trend line. Shortfalls that are being addressed include: (1) extending collaboration from only supporting specific tactical operations to status quo for all analysts; (2) creating a holistic, cohesive approach for collaboration; (3) finding the right balance between protection of sources and methods and transparency; and (4) getting beyond needing personal relationships to get things done.

Steps that NSA is taking to overcome these shortfalls include: (1) actively engaging to be a more strategic partner with other IC agencies; (2) creating a culture where personnel view themselves as Community assets, not just as NSA analysts and collectors; (3) creating more rigorous training and competency assessment of analytic skills; (4) deploying more analysts outside of NSA Headquarters to support military operations and the interagency community; (5) encouraging more tours with strategic partners in the IC and with customers; (6) working on broader dissemination of SIGINT, especially in relation to material planning to Iraq; and (7) working more closely with CIA.
Panelist

Mr. Larry C. Kindsvater
President and CEO, Kindsvater Consulting

I have spent a considerable portion of my career as a private consultant, so I’ve seen a lot and have some suggestions that should be able to be applied across the entire community. Collaboration is more than just sharing technology and tools. It’s more of a cultural thing. Improving collaboration is certainly not a new issue, but now there is more of a top-down effort being promoted by the DNI.

The model we’re using organizationally does not foster a culture of collaboration. Collection and analysis aren’t missions; they’re things being done to support the mission. The IC is not organized operationally the right way. Agencies see themselves much like the individual services in the military. There are no comparable mission-oriented units like the COCOMs [combatant commands]. To do this we should organize by mission. We don’t have combatant commanders in the IC. The DNI doesn’t have an individual charged with command and control across the entire IC to work on an issue. The IC operates by way of capabilities, not missions.

We need to make collaboration a cultural norm. We can’t get there solely via Executive Branch directives. Instead, a law is needed along the lines of Goldwater-Nichols for the armed forces.
BIOGRAPHY

Mr. Larry C. Kindsvater

Mr. Kindsvater is president and CEO of Kindsvater Consulting, which provides strategic advice and guidance to companies seeking to support the U.S. Intelligence Community. Kindsvater Consulting was established in September 2005 after Mr. Kindsvater retired from an extensive career in the Intelligence Community.

Mr. Kindsvater is the former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management (DDCI/CM), appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. As the DDCI/CM, he was the number three officer in the Intelligence Community and the primary officer, under the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), responsible for developing and integrating the strategic, programmatic, budget, personnel, security, and information technology policies of the Intelligence Community.

During his almost 34-year career as a CIA officer, Mr. Kindsvater also held other important positions within the IC and the CIA, including Acting DDCI (the number two position in the IC), Executive Director/Intelligence Community Affairs, and Executive Assistant to the DCI. Mr. Kindsvater served a tour overseas as a CIA officer and began his Agency career as an analyst in

Panel 3 participants listen to remarks made by Larry Kindsvater.
the Directorate of Intelligence in 1971. He has received numerous intelligence awards, including the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal and the CIA Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal.

Mr. Kindsvater has written about the need to reorganize the Intelligence Community (in *Studies in Intelligence*, the journal of the American intelligence professional) and spoken before numerous groups regarding critical intelligence issues. He also testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee that drafted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

Mr. Kindsvater has an M.A. in economics from Bowling Green State University and a B.S. in business administration from Susquehanna University.
Q&A PERIOD: The following are random responses given to specific questions that were not recorded or were not sufficiently audible:

Dr. Fingar said he does not see the destination quite the same as does Mr. Kindsvater. We cannot afford to break things while in the process of transforming. The missions of the people we support are varied. What is needed is a bottom-up emphasis to complement the top-down one. The COCOMs are all within DoD, while mission units for intelligence would be multi-departmental. The existing authorities of the DNI would have to be changed, something along the lines of making the DNI a Cabinet department head. We did this with the Department of Homeland Security, and it was a wrenching experience. Goldwater-Nichols wasn’t an overnight success. To do something along those lines will require a tremendous effort.

Dr. Fingar stated that the budget process is presently done by individual agencies. The IRTPA did give DNI budget authority. Congress told the DNI and DoD to tighten up the MIP [Military Intelligence Program] and the NIP [National Intelligence Program]. Lots of outrage has resulted.

Dr. Miller asked the panel how we get beyond an “Analysis 101” approach and ensure courses taught do not train or instill a particular agency culture. Dr. Fingar replied that we need to develop mid-level training that is truly joint. Soon mid-level managers will be individuals who have only 6-7 years of service.

To a question about the effectiveness of the ODNI Mission Manager construct, Mr. Kindsvater insisted that the law has not given these officials sufficient authority. He felt it was better than not having a manager at all, however. Dr. Fingar said these offices are a work in progress. There are six of them in all, in addition to the three interagency centers.
PANEL 4
Transformation: Pushing Through the Barriers
Panel Moderator

Dr. Donald J. Hanle
NDIC Faculty

MR. DAVID SHEDD, Deputy DNI for Policy, Plans, and Requirements
MR. STEVE SLICK, Special Assistant to the President and NSC Senior Director for Intelligence Programs and Reform

DR. HANLE: As a professor here at NDIC, I have chaired a lot of master’s theses over the last few years. One of the things I tell my thesis students every year is that it’s not enough simply to define the problem, look at and understand the problem, come up with a hypothesis, and test the hypothesis. When you’ve done all that, you’re still not done. Because you have to look forward, you have to figure out what the implications are of what you just discovered.

We’ve spent two days looking at the problem set of transforming the Intelligence Community, looking at the challenges of transformation, and so forth. One of those challenges, obviously, is determining what the barriers are to moving forward. Fortunately, we have an outstanding panel of experts here today who will be able to discuss just that.
Dr. Donald J. Hanle

Dr. Hanle earned his Ph.D. in Military History from The George Washington University in May 2004, and he has been a faculty member of the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC) since 1997. During his tenure at NDIC, Dr. Hanle has taught Intelligence Analysis, Military Capabilities Analysis, and Counterterrorism courses.

His other academic degrees include an M.A. in National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School (1987) and a B.A. in History from the University of South Carolina (1975). He also attended the Defense Language Institute where he studied introductory Russian and intermediate German.

Dr. Hanle’s master’s thesis was published in 1989 by Pergamon Brassey under the title *Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare*. His doctoral dissertation was published in early 2007 and is titled *Near Miss: The Story of the Army Air Forces Guided Bomb Program in World War II*. 
In 2002 I had an extraordinary opportunity for a year-long fellowship in which I could do some serious research into how to bring about significant systemic change in large organizations. I looked at a variety of experiences, many of them in the business world where this is a constant reality. But I also examined the government world; the Army after Vietnam and the military at large after Goldwater-Nichols had to go through things like this. After that year of research, I came to the conclusion that there are a number of impediments common to anyone trying to go through this transformational change. I hope to touch upon eight of those major barriers, tell you what we are doing to overcome them, and then talk a little bit about what challenges remain.

First, and perhaps most significant, there are ambiguous authorities that we have to deal with in the Intelligence Community, but this is often the case in other organizations as well. Regarding the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act, it may come as a surprise to you that all three of us here on the panel in some way had roles as advisors during the formulation of the
IRTPA. So everyone here probably has a different take on that law and how successful it’s been in terms of what it’s done to provide an impetus for change in the IC. The one thing the IRTPA did do was deliberately leave tensions in the system, ambiguity in terms of who really is in charge, because while the DNI has the mandate to carry out the reforms, the law left very strong authorities within each of the departments.

The second barrier, which is also very important to talk about, is cultural misunderstanding and distrust. It affects everything in our business from policies on information sharing to security to personnel—and it’s not just a DoD/IC thing. We see it across the law enforcement and Intelligence Community divide, we see it in homeland security and law enforcement, we see it in many different areas, and it is something we are going to have to grapple with.

Third is a lack of consensus on the way forward. I don’t think there is any lack of vision in the IC about new ideas, innovations, ways of doing business, but there are a lot of competing visions about how to do that. We haven’t entirely rallied around one common vision and we haven’t rallied around a lead sled dog who is going to pull in the direction of a system-wide change.

The fourth barrier is difficulty in communicating the vision. We have to get the message down to the cubicle. It’s not enough simply to publish documents or push things to the Websites. We have to figure out a way to make it real to the people who do the work.

The fifth barrier is a lack of incentives for embracing new ways of doing business. I think this is particularly difficult in the government, where we are somewhat constrained. We do not have the same kind of incentives that the business world has, for example. At the management level, there is a perception, if not a reality, that you will be punished for doing things that go wrong but not necessarily rewarded for taking significant risks and trying things that are a radical departure from the way we have done business before.

The sixth barrier is no guarantees of sustained funding for new initiatives. I think people are simply afraid that, if they try to start new things, they are not going to get the sustained funding and be able to count on keeping that initiative going as they have to encounter significant budget challenges at every level. So it is safer to go after what you know than what you don’t know.

The seventh barrier is the “not invented here” reaction to outsiders’ ideas. I think that is a fairly common reaction to things imposed upon us by Congress, by commissions, and even by other organizations in the IC. We tend to be happiest with things that we thought of ourselves and don’t like it when other people try to impose their ideas on us.

And then eighth, I think we have to deal with the barrier of reform fatigue. Since our creation—and Dr. Warner wrote a nice piece on the numbers of reforms the IC has undergone since its creation—many of us who have been in
the business a long time have seen the same ideas circulate over and over again. A number of people begin to get cynical and jaded about transformation activities. So those are the barriers I’m going to talk about today. We have made concerted efforts to try to deal with each of these but that doesn’t mean we don’t still have a ways to go. Let me just tell you the things that we have done.

Regarding the ambiguous authorities, you’ve probably heard a lot of talk about the “Dream Team,” about Gates, Hayden, McConnell, and Clapper, long-time veterans of the IC who really know the business. All are in positions of authority right now and a window of opportunity exists for bringing about systemic change. I think the assumption is that there is not serious likelihood of new legislation anytime soon, so we have to live within the parameters of the current legislation.

So how do we do that? One of the things that General Clapper, the USD(I), and Mike McConnell, the DNI, have done is create a concept called the Director of Defense Intelligence, which dual-hats USD(I) as the DDI working for both the Secretary of Defense in that chain of command as the USD(I) and also as the principal senior advisor to the DNI. What this allows is the DDI actually to leverage the authorities of SECDEF while being cognizant of the intent of the DNI.

Granted, this is a grand experiment. As we work through it, the jury is still out on how well it will work. But both the ODNI and the OUSD(I) are really making a concerted effort to make it work. I’d also note that OUSD(I) was reorganized along the lines of the ODNI. This was to promote, at senior levels, one-on-one conversations about large areas of responsibility. The EXCOMs that the DNI created also now include General Clapper as the USD. That is a new development. He did not have a seat at the table before.

Finally, I would point out that policy is one of those areas where we have to take the law and translate it into the things we want people in the IC to do. We have much closer collaboration now in the policy area. OUSD(I) has a representative on the Intelligence Policy Advisory Group and likewise ODNI has a representative on the Defense Intelligence Policy Advisory Group. We are doing a lot more joint reviews, working very hard to involve each other in the development of new policy.

In the area of cultural misunderstanding and distrust, the most important thing we can do to overcome that hurdle is to help our people walk a mile in the other guy’s shoes. By that I mean we need to really get behind things like joint duty assignments. We have new classes to develop IC officers. The National Intelligence University will do more of that in the future, hopefully. I believe mission centers provide a very good opportunity for people from different organizations to come and work together and learn about each other and their different ways of doing business. I think in DoD we have also made a concerted effort to send more
civilians out into the field, to see what it’s like to actually work in the field. There, because you’re a smaller group from many different organizations, you are forced to work together. Often we find those are the best places to learn how working together can actually be accomplished.

On the point about consensus on the way forward, recently there was a leadership off-site hosted by ODNI, but General Clapper, as well as many other folks in the leadership across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, was also invited. The idea there was to come together to talk about how we want to move forward, not just in the next year or year and a half but in the next 10-20 years—a long-term, far-ranging vision. I believe all of the leadership in the IC was there. Another way we are trying to forge a consensus is developing the first-ever intelligence strategy. The intent is to align to the National Intelligence Strategy as well as the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. This is going to be quite a trick—to align all of these higher-level strategies—but I think that is what we need to do. We need to help our people understand what their priorities are across the full spectrum of national, operational, departmental, and tactical intelligence.

We are also working with Pat Gorman and his folks on the DNI’s 500-Day Plan as well as a new construct called the Strategic Enterprise Management Model. We also have cross-representation on senior boards like the JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council]. I believe ODNI now has a seat on the JROC and likewise the OUSD(I) has a seat on the MRB [Military Requirements Board].

On the topic of communicating vision, this is a challenge because we have such a far-flung community. But we do have electronic tools now, things we did not have in the past. We are making greater use of the Internet and Websites and social network tools like blogs and wikis. And I think conferences like this are helpful as well for staying on message. I hear the leadership doing this all the time. We are really trying to work like a team; we’re making every effort to do so. I think that if the people in the IC hear their leaders saying this it will affect them sooner or later and they’ll begin to believe it.

Regarding incentives, we now have leadership bonuses tied to the strategic vision, to strategies, and to the ability to implement strategy. This is an important development. The Defense Intelligence Strategy will be the USD(I)’s organizational strategy and all of the OUSD(I) leadership will be held accountable for ensuring that we move forward on that strategy. We also are instituting something called DCIPS, the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System. The whole idea is to reward performance rather than longevity, and that is another important incentive.

With regard to sustained funding, again, this is a tough one. We’re making concerted efforts to align the National Intelligence Program with the activities
of the Military Intelligence Program to make sure we don't have any gaps, and to the extent possible to reduce unnecessary overlap. We did try very hard this year to jointly identify lower-priority items, hoping to make a better case to both the Hill and to OMB that the things we have funded, or are seeking funding for, we really do need.

Regarding the “not invented here” syndrome, I think that the Defense Science Board, the Intelligence Science Board, and other study groups are now inviting more outsiders who are knowledgeable about our business. We realize how important it is to cultivate a network of folks from industry, academia, etc., to be part of the conversation on how to move forward. General Clapper is a firm believer in this approach. We have seen many of our studies pulling in people from the outside to help inform our views.

Finally, on reform fatigue, I think we are trying mightily to move away from the mentality that says “you need to constantly look backward at your mistakes to determine how to correct errors and move forward.” We're trying hard to think more “transformatively” than “reformatively” and develop things like the strategies in order to provide a framework for new initiatives. We expect to see new thinking in areas ranging from HUMINT to CI to human capital to the JIOCs and how they are structured and operate in the future.

So that's what we're doing; we have a lot of efforts underway. I think we're making progress, but there's still work to be done in a number of these areas. New policies which are really important to making changes in the way we do business often take months to get through the system—not because people aren't working hard, but because change is hard. It's hard to get agreement; it's hard to get sufficient consensus behind them to make the policies stick.

Regarding agency charters, in DoD we've been going through the process of revising the charters because DIA, NSA, NGA, and NRO all come under the authority, direction, and control of DoD but also have responsibilities to the DNI for national intelligence. We are working through in a very deliberate way how we can make these charters make sense for these agencies.

In terms of cultural misunderstanding and distrust, this is going to be a tough one. I still see it every day in the things I work on. Despite leadership efforts to overcome it, it's going to take a generation of “purple” officers to get over some of these barriers.

Regarding communications, I will just speak to DoD. Now I think we need to do a better job of communicating across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, not just within the Beltway but also with the folks outside the Beltway. We need to leverage the tools and reach out to our Generation Y personnel, many of whom are in the field. We need to fix the policies and systems that are getting in the way of sharing information with our partners and allies.
Moving to incentives, we need to find incentives for middle managers so that they are willing to send their best talent on rotational assignments. This is difficult, because while the officers benefit from going on the assignments, their managers are often left with a hole in terms of their talent pool. That makes it very difficult when you have limited resources to give up your most talented officers even if you know it is in their best interest. The other thing we have to do in the area of incentives is figure out a way of overcoming what one of my friends calls the “reflexive rejection of new ideas and approaches.” I talked a little about why that reaction exists, to include no confidence that we will be able to sustain the funding for these new initiatives.

Finally, in the funding area, I think we are going to have big challenges ahead with Congress if the economy contracts. We are eventually going to have to wean ourselves off supplementals. We’re going to have to identify the lowest priorities with the community in a way that’s rational and defensible and that everyone can sign up to. Where we can, we must make a convincing case from the DNI to the SECDEF to OMB to Congress.

Wrapping it up here, I would like to suggest that, in addition to simply asking us questions, if you with your personal experiences can come with ideas or have encountered impediments like this and have been able to overcome them, I would really like to hear some examples. We certainly don’t have all the good ideas up here.
BIOGRAPHY

Ms. Deborah G. Barger

Ms. Barger serves as the senior official within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) responsible for the DoD intelligence policy, strategy, and doctrine development, strategic management, and planning guidance to ensure conformance with the policy and priorities of the Secretary of Defense and the DNI.

Ms. Barger has 28 years of experience in the national security arena, including 21 years in intelligence. In 2002, she was selected to be the first Intelligence Community Fellow at RAND, where she completed a monograph titled, “Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs.” Upon completing her fellowship in September 2003, she was asked by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management to build upon that research and establish the Strategic Management Issues Office to examine global issues with strategic implications for intelligence, and provide senior IC leadership with alternatives to current management practices. In September 2004 she was detailed to the Senate Government Affairs Committee to advise Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME) and the SGAC staff in the crafting of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. In 2005, Ms. Barger became the first Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, where she spearheaded the effort to publish the first IC-wide National Intelligence Strategy.

Ms. Barger served on the Intelligence Community Management Staff from October 1995 to April 2005. While on the staff, she served in senior management positions in several offices, with responsibilities for intelligence strategy, requirements, planning, policy, collection management, foreign language, program evaluation, and analysis. She was project manager for the DCI’s Strategic Intent for the Intelligence Community in 1998 and the Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (QICR) in 2001 and 2005. She led several major studies that covered personnel issues, support to arms control treaties, and nonproliferation efforts, as well as a year-long interagency study of MASINT that examined future investment as well as organizational structure and business processes.

From 1986 to 1995 Ms. Barger worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency. She served as Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for External Relations, as speechwriter for two former DIA Directors, and as an editor for Soviet Military Power. In 1990 she was selected to participate in the American Political Science Association’s Congressional Fellowship program and worked for Sen. Arlen Specter (R-PA) and Rep. John Spratt (D-SC). Following her tour
on Capitol Hill, Ms. Barger became DIA’s senior Congressional Liaison Officer representing the General Defense Intelligence Program.

Prior to joining the government, Ms. Barger was the managing editor of the *Armed Forces Journal International*, a magazine that has served as a forum for debate on national security issues for over a century. She has a B.A. in Communications from the State University College at Buffalo, a Masters in Public Administration from American University, and has completed post-graduate coursework in public policy at Harvard University and the University of Maryland.
It is a great privilege to be here today. Deborah has done a very good job outlining the challenges as well as some of the responses within the community to those challenges. Let me be perhaps a little provocative regarding where I think we are and what the fundamental challenges are as we look at the Intelligence Community in 2010-2020, the out-years.

I learned very early in my career with the CIA that if you don't have a strong underpinning of intelligence policy governed by law, ultimately the Constitution, you were really facing challenges that would handicap you in a major way. In my portfolio, Director McConnell has asked me to serve as Deputy Director for Policy; that's first among equals to, of course, Plans and Requirements. However, no policy is well connected if you don't have the requirements piece of it right. You have to connect those two pieces and those to policy and, as Deborah has mentioned, the challenges are huge in getting those policies in the right place.

Currently, we have somewhere on the order of around 150 documents in the starting stages over the next 15 months that we want to address in taking on the policy challenges. Preeminent is the underlining document that I’m sure many of you are familiar with—it has been known as the IC’s “bible” since 1981—and that’s EO 12333. Steve [Slick] can speak more to that since it belongs in his domain as a document from the President. To me it is probably the most fundamental document that we will address in the remaining 15 months, with hopefully a conclusion that is acceptable to all in terms of helping define the roles and responsibilities not of the DNI inside the four corners of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 but also for intelligence agencies’ seniors.

As an Intelligence Community with a large number of people and a large budget, and in Washington in particular, we often lose sight of the mission. We get caught up in issues, and this isn’t to minimize the importance of 100-Day Plans and 500-Day Plans, but we lose the clear objective toward which we all need to be working. That is toward something Deborah referred to as the “vision” or the “end-state.”

I have asked a number of people whether integration and collaboration represent an end in and of itself. Alarmingly, the vast majority said that is what the DNI Office is all about. I’m sorry, but I’m here to correct the record. That is not what we are about. That is a means to an end. I understand that RFK
Stadium is now available. We could do collaboration and integration really fast and just rent it out and put everyone out there. Then everyone can be in one gigantic bullpen. That is not what we are talking about. Instead, it's collaboration and integration toward the greater defense of the nation, the integration of foreign and domestic intelligence as it applies to what the FBI and other elements are collecting domestically. To me that is something that has to have a strong policy underpinning it in order to get it right.

What do we have by way of instruments to do this? I am very pleased that in my time as Steve's predecessor at the National Security Council we produced NSPD 26, which I encourage all of you to re-read. It's very short, took over for PDD 35, but is a critical document which begets the National Intelligence Priorities Framework [NIPF]. That represents the national policymaker, the statutory NSC, providing direction to the IC in the form of 33 or so priorities. Collaboration and integration, then, are a means to fulfilling that. I think that is our single biggest challenge, because that Framework is agile and flexible as a document signed out by the President twice annually. This provides the challenges that the policymakers are giving us to go forth, collect, and analyze in a collaborative, integrated way.

What are the challenges over the horizon? Foreign and domestic integration remains the single biggest challenge that the 9/11 Commission gave to us, the single biggest part of the failure associated with the 9/11 events. The elements that then led to the identification of the failures in the “no-find” of WMD in Iraq are related to that as well. Your core capabilities of what a policy customer expects is that you will deliver an integrated, all-source analytic piece on that problem set that has an underpinning of the best possible collection to support that analytic capability. The warfighter and the combatant commands expect exactly the same thing. There really is no distinction in what that customer, regardless of how you define the customer, expects by way of that product that you and I are producing.

That is the essence of what we are about. Deborah has given you a good long list of where those challenges are in the execution to getting to that end-state. What we are about, though, is how do we serve that customer base with the best possible collection tools informed by analysis? Analysis is at the center. Not having been an analyst, I am actually giving this charge to them to inform the collector of what needs to be collected, where those gaps are, where there is over-coverage, and where you can move some of the resources around to put them onto other things.

I think we have a great opportunity in our professional kits. The youngsters who are coming in are going to drive this reform process beyond our wildest imagination. What I want to leave you with today is the fact that we are all playing on the margins of intelligence reform. It has an engine of its own.
I would say this to the DNI. I would say this to any program manager. I would say it to any mission manager working a specific area. They are playing on the margins of what history is driving forward. We are never going back. The next generation and the generation after that will be much more tech-savvy and will have more available tools which will drive them to make decisions that will be faster, and more integrated, because of technology. I am the one who is behind. They are going to drive reform in their own way. They are going to demand the equivalent of MySpace for analysis. I'm not worried about that. What I am concerned about is: (1) We are actually the source of resistance to it, and (2) we don't have the policies in place to manage things as complex as the tension between the responsibility to share information and the protection of sources and methods. It is a natural tension that you have to manage. And you have to manage it through policies. You have to create the capabilities, communities of interest, identity-based access, and all the rest; that's what you have to put in place. But that's what the youngsters are expecting us to do. I think a lot of that will be driven by the 45% of the IC workforce who have come into the IC since 9/11. I find that not just exciting, but exhilarating. It is our job to keep them in the community making careers as well-rounded officers with areas of expertise. That is what we are about, but let's not lose sight of the mission. Thank you.
Mr. David R. Shedd was named the inaugural Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, and Requirements in May 2007. From June 2005 until assuming his current post, Mr. Shedd served as Chief of Staff and, later, Acting Director of the Intelligence Staff to the Director of National Intelligence. Prior to the creation of the ODNI, Mr. Shedd held intelligence policy positions at the National Security Council from February 2001 to May 2005. He served most recently as the NSC’s Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Intelligence Programs and Reform. Mr. Shedd has been directly involved in the implementation of intelligence reform stemming from the 9/11 Commission report in July 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and the WMD Commission’s report to the President in March 2005.

From 1984 to 1993, Mr. Shedd was posted overseas in the U.S. Embassies in Costa Rica and Mexico. Mr. Shedd has also held a variety of senior management assignments in the U.S., including Chief of Congressional Liaison at CIA.

Mr. Shedd holds a B.A. degree from Geneva College and an M.A. degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Latin American Studies.
I appreciate the invitation. It is great to see a number of old friends in the audience. It is great to be back with my colleagues on the panel. David and I do business about five or six times a day. Deborah, I haven’t seen you or talked about any of these issues since you were on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue on the Congressional team negotiating with us on the IRTPA. So it was great to hear your scene-setter.

I want to add to one of them that Deborah hit and David amplified on and then I will make a very short statement. Deborah described a number of the challenges we face and some of the steps we are taking to ensure greater integration and collaboration. David narrowed that by saying that it is not about doing all of those things. It is actually about securing accurate intelligence on all the issues we have identified through the intelligence priorities process approved by the President, the things on the NIPF that confuse all of us when we break it out. It is actually not a lot more complicated than getting the right answer to the next hard question on time and in a form that people find useful in making decisions. It is just that simple.

A lot of what brings us here today and what animated the intelligence reform, the 9/11 Commission, the WMD Commission, and the subsequent law signed by the President is in reality, if you accept their conclusions, performed poorly and got some really hard and important questions wrong. Not all intelligence topics are created equal, which is why we have an intelligence priority process. As a result of all of these technologies, all of these new processes, and all of these important relationships people describe, our community has to get the next couple of hard questions right. The right answer, on time, and in a form that people who matter can use.

I actually thought this might be an unclassified session and there would be media in attendance, so this is an opening statement cleared by the White House Press Office. I will be much more candid after we get to the questions. This is a very important subject for the President of the United States. He has got a lot on his plate, but this is right up there. He spends a lot of time on this. It mattered in 2002 and 2003 when he took the first steps on his own authority. It mattered in 2004 when he signed this landmark piece of legislation and it matters as recently as yesterday or last week when he asked questions and wanted to check on follow-ups. So this is a high priority for the administration. We are committed to seeing that we advance and implement the reforms that
the President has set in motion. We have a tremendous amount of confidence in
the team of people that the President relies on to implement that. We are going
to spend a lot of time thinking about it and watching it for the next 16 months,
and leave it in the best possible place when a lot of us move on to other jobs. So
that is the short version.

To take you back to the beginning, it didn’t start with the IRTPA. The
President’s National Security Strategy that was released in September 2002,
a year after the attacks, said the major institutions of national security were
designed in a different era to meet different challenges and all of them must be
transformed. That is the broad charge from the President. His strategy contin-
ues to describe intelligence as America’s first line of defense against terrorism
and the actions against hostile states. And so the successful transformation of
our Intelligence Community was then, and remains today, a tremendously high
priority for those of us who serve on the President’s staff, the National Security

I would confess our role has changed dramatically since 2002, principally
because of the appointment of the first Director of National Intelligence and now
the second. It is no longer primarily our ball to carry up the field. We have good
people doing that, but we are watching closely. The topic assigned to this panel
was “Pushing Through the Barriers to Achieve Transformation.” The transforma-
tion in the IC didn’t start in 2003 or in the fall of 2004 when the President signed
this legislation. There was tremendous leadership, courage, and energy displayed
by the people in the IC. They began instantly to share essential information, to
collaborate and cooperate not only on getting the threats accurately reported to
people who mattered, but also on countering those threats, denying Al Qaeda
safe havens in Afghanistan and a number of other serious issues. The point I want
to leave you with, and many of you already know this, is that nobody was waiting
for new legislation, new direction, and new executive orders. The IC got to work
right away and started doing important things that kept us safe.

You know the brief history of how we got here: the structural reforms,
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 and the Terror-
rist Threat Integration Center in 2003, later to become the National Counter-
terrorism Center. These were the first significant structural reforms. The next
year we received the 9/11 Commission recommendations after what I can
politely call extensive interagency discussions. The President issued a series of
orders that David spent a long weekend drafting, clearing, and printing on the
right size paper to implement intelligence reforms to the extent that he had the
power to do, and you will recall those. They concern information sharing, the
establishment of the NCTC, and enhancing the authorities of the then-DCI to
allow him to act like the NID or the DNI or the guy we were yet to create.
Finally, the President stood up a board to make sure nothing we did was going to impinge on American civil liberties. He did all of that in the fall of 2004. Of course, we all did cooperate extensively with Congress in drafting the IRTPA. It was, as all legislation, a compromise. The President signed it on December 17, 2004, and it is important, particularly where I work, to stay pretty close to the President's own words. Those are the ones that get cleared when you are speaking in public. What he said that day is important to remember, though. He said, “My goal is to ensure that the people in government responsible for defending America have the best possible information to make the best possible decisions. My expectation is with the law I am signing today our intelligence enterprise will be more unified, coordinated and effective.” That's guidance from the Commander in Chief and that is what we are trying to do.

Next chapter in all of this was in June 2005 when we received the report from the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission. Once again, after internal deliberations we accepted the overwhelming majority of these recommendations, 74 of them if I recall correctly. I think we accepted about 70 of them. These included significant changes to the FBI that led to its National Security Branch and to the CIA that started the process leading to the creation of the National Clandestine Service. That was an important step as well. At about that time, we handed over responsibility from the White House to the first Director of National Intelligence, who agreed to implement these recommendations. So that is where the role of the National Security Council changed dramatically. We stepped into a support role and off the front lines.

As the DNI said in his remarks, you know that Admiral McConnell is the prime force in driving intelligence reform today. That's the way we want it and that's the way the President wants it. The DNI enjoys the full support of the President and his colleagues on the Principals Committee of the National Security Council. Our focus is, as I said, supporting the DNI through the things that we can control. That's the much-vaunted, often-criticized interagency process—all those committees that we chair and to the extent possible ensuring that the laws, the executive orders, the policies, the regulations, all of that framework are consistent and reinforce the DNI's authorities and also align with his priorities to help him get along to where he wants to go with this.

We are under no illusions that the community which took five decades to evolve is going to be reformed in one year, two years, or even five years, but we think it is a necessary objective, one that is achievable. We are going to leave it in the best possible place in 16 months when this President leaves office. As David said, we are likely not to recognize it in 15-20 years when we come back and look at what these folks are doing with it.

With that, I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
BIOGRAPHY

Stephen B. Slick

Stephen B. Slick was appointed to his current position in September 2005 having served previously as a Director for Intelligence Programs at the NSC. Before joining the NSC staff in March 2004, he served as an Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

From 1986 until 2000, Mr. Slick was a member of the State Department’s Foreign Service. He was assigned overseas to U.S. Embassies in the German Democratic Republic (1989-91), India (1991-93), Ukraine (1994-96), and Hungary (1998-2000). Prior to entering government service, Mr. Slick was a litigation attorney with the law firm of Rawle and Henderson in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (1983-86).

Mr. Slick holds a B.A. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University, an M.P.P. from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and a J.D. from the University of California, Los Angeles.

Mr. Slick was born and raised in Berks County, Pennsylvania, and currently resides in Great Falls, Virginia. He is married to Laurie (Capewell) Slick and has one daughter and one son.
[Editor’s note: There was time for only one question, and both Mr. Shedd and Mr. Slick addressed it. As the question and the resulting discussion dealt with ODNI Mission Managers, their targeting priorities, and the relationship of this functional role to the National Issues Priorities Framework, which is a SECRET//NOFORN document approved by the President, they are considered too sensitive to be included in this unclassified version of the Conference Proceedings.]

CLOSING REMARKS

Dr. Teresa J. Domzal  
Provost, National Defense Intelligence College

[Summary: We in the Intelligence Community are not into reform and transformation all by ourselves. Many international businesses and global brands are going through the same thing. For example, Ford lacks “Focus.” Google is relatively new and doesn’t have a lot of legacy baggage like the older companies. Then there is the Starbucks phenomenon. By looking at the business world, there are a lot of lessons learned which are applicable to the Intelligence Community. [The Provost then thanked all the panelists and attendees for participating on behalf of the DNI and the President of NDIC, and the conference was adjourned.]