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**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO JOINT VISION 2010?

By

Christopher E. Sund

Commander, United States Navy



A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Signature: _____

April 2, 2010

Thesis Advisor: Dr. Bryon Greenwald

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ABSTRACT

Fourteen years after the publication of the U.S. Armed Forces first long range vision document, *Joint Vision 2010*, it is worthwhile to assess how far we have come and how much further we have to go. In the year of its publication, the nation hoped to leverage the anticipated military-technological revolution to improve military readiness, reduce the size and number of military units, and reap a sizeable peace dividend. This formula provided significant motivation. To examine *Joint Vision 2010* in the year 2010 allows us to assess its goals and desires against the realities of today. While this assessment is significant, it does not add value unless it sharpens our vision today and advances our efforts to improve effectiveness. The introduction to *Joint Vision 2010* states, “*Joint Vision 2010* is the conceptual template for how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.” The reason we strive for unity of effort and improved efficiencies is that the U.S. Armed Forces remains a standard for excellence today just as it did in 1996. Our leaders recognize that the only way to navigate this road to excellence requires a vision. As the nation grapples with unprecedented fiscal deficits, wavering international influence, and the exigencies of ongoing wars, the effectiveness of that vision and the progress made toward attaining it is worth examining.

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*“Capital isn't scarce; vision is.”
-Sam Walton*

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION AND THESIS

Historians, strategists, and military leaders understand that it is impossible to predict with certainty what the future of warfare will look like. Indeed, most efforts to leverage “futurology” and build capability based solely on the experiences of past conflicts have been woefully off base. A comprehensive effort to guide the evolution of the Armed Forces is a bold proposition. No matter the accuracy of predictions or preparations, “... the military threats the United States is – or will be – most capable of defeating are the ones it is least likely to face, since potential adversaries will be deterred and seek other ways of confrontation.”¹ Indeed, French interwar modernization points to a superb Army, deeply engrossed in focusing and developing doctrine, missing the mark entirely in May-June 1940. The Maginot line and reliance on the doctrine of methodical battle proved a poor match against the lightning quick, de-centralized forces of the German blitzkrieg.² Despite a history of misjudging future defense needs, in 1995, the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide a vision document for the Armed Services to guide their force development and to elevate the importance of joint operations.³ General

¹ Michael C. Horowitz and Dan Shalmon, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy,” *Orbis*, (Spring 2009): 302.

² Doughty, Robert Allan, *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939*, (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1985), 4-6.

³ Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces*, (Arlington, VA, U.S. Government, May 95) 2-2,3.

Shalikhvili, while serving as the CJCS, acted on that recommendation and published the first joint, long-range vision document in 1996 – *Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010)*.⁴ As its target date approaches, *JV2010* bears examination as both a conceptual template for the armed forces and a process by which to unify individual Service efforts in order to fight and win the nation’s future conflicts.⁵ Prior to 1996, each Service pursued separate policies and programs largely without interest or attention to joint matters. *JV2010* attempted to bridge the gaps between individual Service efforts and evolve “jointness” beyond the dictates of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. *JV2010* delineated a common set of environmental assumptions about the future for all four Services to use in developing doctrine and force structure. It also outlined four key joint operational concepts and highlighted the need for organizational agility. This approach to doctrine and concept development has changed little in the last fourteen years despite the onset of technical innovations and the ongoing “Global War on Terror.” **Despite the poor record of previous prognostications regarding the future of warfare, an examination of *Joint Vision 2010* reveals that it provided valuable and accurate insights regarding the future joint operating environment, articulated necessary and desired concepts for the evolution of the Joint Force, and presciently foretold the critical value of organizational agility. Today’s guiding vision document should build on the successes and limitations of *Joint Vision 2010*. Indeed, today’s narrative of U.S. Armed Forces vision builds on the original’s successful framework, but future versions need to harness the spirit and inspiration offered by the first iteration of**

⁴ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, 1996).

⁵ *Ibid.*, 34.

the CJCS vision.

Chapter Two of this paper examines the history of *JV2010* and the events that led up to its publication as the first, Joint Staff, long-range vision document for the U.S. Armed Forces. The demise of the Soviet Union had profound impacts on the strategic framework of the U.S. Armed Forces and DOD's first effort at creating a long-range joint vision. The subsequent "Base Force" review of 1989 and "Bottom-Up Review" of 1993 had significant impact on the eventual development of *JV2010* as well as current vision documents. Both the 1989 and 1993 efforts shaped the study done by the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces in 1995, which specifically directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to publish a long-range joint vision document for the U.S. Armed Forces.

Chapters Three and Four examine the necessary elements of every vision document and trace the evolution of concept documents in use today that assist the leaders of the Department of Defense in articulating and implementing vision. A brief overview of *JV2010* reveals the presence of these necessary elements and adds to our understanding of its lasting impact. *JV2010's* successors contained many of the same elements as *JV2010* and are illustrative of the evolution of all the Defense Departments' long-range vision documents. The elements utilized by *JV2010* to establish a conceptual template for the U.S. Armed Forces are present in today's strategic framework narrative - the *Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* and the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)*.⁶

Chapter Five proposes three key components, or elements, useful in examining long-range vision documents: Assumptions about the operating environment, articulation of

⁶ The Joint Operating Environment and the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations make up today's long-range, joint vision, "narrative". *JV2010* profoundly influenced both documents.

operational concepts in order to guide capability acquisition, and a focus on organizational agility across the Department of Defense. A thorough examination of these elements is the key to determining continuity of effort and value. The assumptions made concerning the operating environment introduced by *JV2010* have had a dramatic impact on almost every long-range vision document and were influential on the structure of today's *JOE*. The proposed operational concepts in *JV2010* continue to have a lasting impact throughout the DOD and represent the thrust of the CORM's recommendation. The importance of organizational agility continues to be a major element of today's *CCJO*.

Perhaps the greatest benefit to an examination of *JV2010* and its successors lies in the criticism of the original document. Chapter Six examines *JV2010*'s longest lasting criticism--its over reliance on technology to dominate the battlefield. "This era will be one of accelerating technological change. Critical advances will have enormous impact on all military forces."⁷ In an era seemingly dominated by irregular warfare and unconventional, asymmetric forces, it is worth considering the impact of technology scintillatingly proposed in *JV2010*. While the primary goal of unifying efforts and capabilities among the Services was to assist the warfighter, critics have questioned if this has really taken place.⁸

Lastly, it is important to take stock of the value of *JV2010* today. It was a watershed document in that it attempted to provide a focus for all Services. Do today's successors

⁷ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, 11.

⁸ The CORM considered the Regional CINC or Commander in Chief to be the warfighter. Regional CINCs have since been renamed Geographical Command Commanders or GCCs. Criticism includes Colin S. Gray's *How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?*, Charles J. Dunlap Jr.'s "21st-Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths" and Anthony H. Cordesman's, *The Military Effectiveness of Desert Fox: A Warning About the Limits of The Revolution in Military Affairs and Joint Vision 2010*.

to *JV2010* adequately meet the requirement for vision? Has the DOD followed through on the proposed vision? Perhaps the most valuable element of this document resides in its heritage as both a product and a process.

Fourteen years after the publication of the U.S. Armed Forces first long-range joint vision document it is worthwhile to assess how far we have come and how much further we have to go. In the year of its publication, the nation hoped to leverage the anticipated military-technological revolution to improve military readiness, reduce the size and number of military units, and reap a sizeable peace dividend. This formula provided significant motivation. To examine *JV2010* in the year 2010 allows us to assess its goals and desires against the realities of today. While this assessment is significant, it does not add value unless it sharpens our vision today and advances our efforts to improve effectiveness. The introduction to *JV2010* states, “*Joint Vision 2010* is the conceptual template for how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.”⁹ The reason we strive for unity of effort and improved efficiencies is that the U.S. Armed Forces remains a standard for excellence today just as it did in 1996. Our leaders recognize that the only way to navigate this road to excellence requires a vision. As the nation grapples with unprecedented fiscal deficits, wavering international influence, and the exigencies of ongoing wars, the effectiveness of that vision and the progress made toward attaining it is worth examining.

⁹ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, 1.

The Big Story about U.S. defense policy in recent years, a story that is certain to run on for a long time to come, is of course the drive to 'transform'. The process is unstoppable. It is driven by cultural impulse, by technological opportunity, and by a narrow, but understandable and praiseworthy, determination to perform more efficiently. Whether or not it is inspired by strategic need is another matter.¹

-Colin Gray

Chapter 2

SETTING THE STAGE FOR JOINT VISION

Guidance Prior to 1995 - In order to better understand the development of *JV2010* and understand its utility to today's long-range vision documents it is necessary to examine the historical context that led to its development. In the years immediately preceding the development of *JV2010*, both the Defense Department's civilian and military leadership felt a need to transform the force and an opportunity to tailor it for a "new security environment... capable of employing revolutionary new systems and operational concepts to achieve decisive success."² Military planners were coming to grips with the fall of the Soviet empire, and the Armed Forces were realizing fresh technological opportunities. The 1991 Persian Gulf War demonstrated the potential of technology and highlighted opportunity for improvements in "jointness" between the Services.³ In this age of peace, or at least an "inter-war" period, the government strongly felt the need to use what became known as the military-technical revolution (or military revolution) to improve warfighting efficiency while simultaneously reducing forces and

¹ Colin S. Gray, "How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?" (Paper prepared for the Conference on the "Changing Nature of Warfare", May 2004), 11

² Henry S. Shelton, "Operationalizing Joint Vision 2010*," *Airpower Journal* Vol. 7, No. 3, (Fall 1998) under preface, <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/fal98/shelton.html> (accessed August 18, 2009)

³ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Force Structure; Issues Involving the Base Force*, (Report to Congressional Requesters, Washington, DC, January 1993), 6.

overall defense spending.⁴

Against this backdrop, the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces, recommended the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff draft and issue a singular joint warfighting vision to “help guide Service and force development efforts.”⁵ Prior to this recommendation for a joint “vision” document, DOD provided the Services with limited joint guidance. Moreover, even when provided, each Service tended toward independent development of combat capability. From 1989 to 1992, the concept of a “Base Force” (a term for the force structure first used after the decline of Soviet power), as articulated by then JCS Chairman Colin Powell, guided DoD force structure.⁶ In September 1993, the Clinton administration utilized the “Bottom-Up Review” or BUR to guide force development.⁷ An examination of The Base Force review and the BUR reveals they provided both the foundation and impetus for the development of *JV2010* as a joint long-range vision document.⁸

The Base Force – The first force-sizing construct that bears examination for its influence upon *JV2010* is the Base Force. The Base Force proposal finds its roots in a planning exercise that began in October 1989. General Colin Powell, the newly appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), directed the Joint Staff to

⁴ Mark Gunzinger, “Beyond the Bottom-Up Review,” *National Defense University Essays on Strategy XIV*, (October 2002), under Chapter 4, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%20202000/essa/essabtu.html> (accessed on October 14, 2009).

⁵ Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces, Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces, (Arlington, VA, U.S. Government, May 95) 2-2.

⁶ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Force Structure, Issues Involving the Base Force*, 2.

⁷ Gunzinger, “Beyond the Bottom-Up Review,” 1.

⁸ The Government Accounting Office’s (GAO) examination of the “Base Force” and Dr. Lorna Jaffee’s *The Development of the Base Force, 1989-1992* are superb documents to study the Base Force in further detail. The GAO examination is useful in that it examines the “key policy assumptions underlying the Base Force”. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s “Report on the Bottom-Up Review” accomplishes the same for the BUR.

produce a plan to realign U.S. military strategy and force structure with reduced resources.⁹ Eventually, General Powell proposed this plan to the Defense Planning and Resources Board. General Powell was prescient in his thinking on two key factors that would affect DOD for years to come (and perhaps still affects the way the U.S. Armed Forces looks at force sizing and capabilities). General Powell foresaw the decline of the Soviet Union and an increase in smaller, regional conflicts. General Powell and The Joint Staff concluded that the demise of the Soviet Union would require an entirely new National Security Strategy.

Joint Staff participants in this review argued that, with the substantially reduced risk of a deliberate Soviet attack on Western Europe and increasing non-Soviet threats in the Third World, the United States should shift its focus not only from Europe but also from the Soviet Union's role in the Third World. Instead, it should develop strategies for dealing with regionally based Third World threats. They particularly emphasized the emerging importance of the Pacific Rim and Central and South America to US security interests.¹⁰

The planning effort initiated by General Powell became part of the Budget Enforcement Act signed into law in 1990 and eventually the Base Force was part of the 1992-1997 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).¹¹ It was evident that no overarching “global threat” could take the place of the Soviet Union as a force sizing threat and uncertainty throughout international affairs would dominate the future.¹² In this new environment, the DOD leaders needed to make a new assessment of the factors that would drive tomorrow's force structure. To accomplish this, they proposed four key assumptions to shape the Base Force:

⁹ Lorna S. Jaffee, “The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992”, (Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC, July 1993), 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹¹ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Force Structure, Issues Involving The Base Force*, 15-16.

¹² *Ibid.*, 12.

1. The United States would see continued arms reductions and democratic progress in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
2. Security ties among democratic states would continue.
3. Regional tensions, heightened by weapons proliferation, would continue in areas of great concern to the United States.
4. The United States would not have to undertake any significant commitment of forward-deployed forces.¹³

In essence, the architects of the Base Force sought a balance between realizing a peace dividend and maintaining a military that could deter and defend America against a broad range of threats. At the time of its introduction, the Base Force reduced the military budget by about 37 percent from its peak in 1985 to its projection in 1997. The initial goals of the Bush Administration and Defense Secretary Cheney were to reduce the force structure by about 25 percent.¹⁴ The GAO reported in its Introduction to *Issues Involving the Base Force*, that the Base Force plan would reduce the force structure by about 25% from its FY87 post-Vietnam peak of 1,626,000.¹⁵ In August 1992, both the Senate and the House ratified the Defense Authorization Bill, which funded the Base Force.¹⁶ The nation's defense strategy and the fundamental force structuring of the U.S. Armed Forces was on a course that took the country away from containment of the Soviet Union and recognized the uncertainty that resulted from the release of the tension between two superpowers.

¹³ Ibid., 3.

¹⁴ Lorna S. Jaffee, "The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992," 36.

¹⁵ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Force Structure, Issues Involving the Base Force*, 10.

¹⁶ Lorna S. Jaffee, "The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992," 42.

As the Base Force gained ratification by the legislature and President Bush announced the new Defense Strategy, General Powell started to focus on his next objective. It became evident to the Joint Staff that the reduced force structure would need to maintain its industrial base and certain key capabilities for the U.S. Armed Forces to remain effective. In December 1990, General Powell proposed four key requirements, he termed “supporting capabilities” that were vital to the Base Force: Transportation, Space, Re-constitution, and Research and Development.¹⁷ Chairman Powell recognized that DoD needed a fresh look at enabling its fighting forces. In order to reduce defense spending in a time of dramatic change in the strategic operating environment and a shift in global power, the Defense Department needed to change the way it did business. The Base Force was the result of a study performed by the Joint Staff, articulated by the Chairman and adopted by the legislature. This study represented a first effort to meet the new and still changing security environment the US Armed Forces would face in the next century.

The “Bottom –Up Review” (BUR) – The Base Force was not to remain in its original form for long. Critics soon recognized that a “Top-Down” cut of 25 percent was a less than optimal way to reshape the greatest armed force in the world. In January 1993, the newly inaugurated Clinton administration chose Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense. Aspin, like Powell, viewed the post Cold War era as a time for change that required a different framework for the structure of the U.S. Armed Forces. In fact, Aspin believed it required a force created from the “bottom up”. Such an approach entailed defining the future environment, developing a strategy, and determining what forces were

¹⁷ Ibid., 45.

required to secure the “nation’s interests.”¹⁸ It was clear to the new administration that the post-Soviet Union era presented an opportunity for the U.S. government to divert defense-spending resources to the domestic agenda.¹⁹ While the Base Force represented a reduction in the number of forces, its approach to getting to that level was not logical to Secretary Aspin. In fact, he likened the Bush Administration’s attempt to divert resources as a “top down salami slicing effort to realize predetermined fiscal objectives, producing a Base Force that was a smaller version of an outdated Cold War force.”²⁰ Though Secretary Aspin did not agree with the method of the previous administration to determine force structure and strategy, his intentions and goals were similar. He needed to address the changing security climate and continue to seek a peace dividend to reduce the country’s defense spending. To do this, Secretary Aspin selected the Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Frank Wisner, to direct a new review.²¹

Several key events during the collapse of the Soviet Union and the years immediately thereafter bear further examination in order to gain an appreciation for the internal and external factors at play. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin notes in his Report on the “Bottom-Up Review” that in 1989 the fall of the Berlin Wall signaled a shift away from “containment” of the Soviet Empire. In 1990, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait signaled a new regional danger facing America. Iraq’s aggression demonstrated the potential destruction wrought by a hostile leader intent on the acquisition and use (e.g., chemical weapons vs. Iran) of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, this conflict demonstrated the ability

¹⁸ Gunzinger, “Beyond the Bottom-Up Review,” 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

for America to generate a broad base of support for a war against a brutal dictator.

Lastly, the failed 1991 Soviet coup demonstrated that the Russian people maintained a desire for democratic change. This desire certainly led to the demise of the Soviet Union as a military competitor and foe.²²

Besides the BUR, Aspin maintained that further reviews must be from the bottom up and force structure guidance must be “the product of a threat-based methodology.”²³ A threat-based approach to force structure and strategy implies a particular threat or a particular regional threat should shape the development of future U.S. Armed Forces. This focus is useful in a historical perspective because it demonstrates DOD’s desire to link military force structure to elements that threaten U.S interests. This threat-based approach appealed to Secretary Aspin because it offered a way to explain force structure requirements to the American people.²⁴

Essentially, the Aspin BUR was important for its unique approach to shaping the force. The BUR developed and utilized a rigorous, analytical process to guide its study. The key elements were:

1. Identify national objectives and threats in the post-Cold War era.
2. Identify a coherent military strategy and baseline force structure to achieve those objectives.
3. Evaluate modernization issues to determine cost.
4. Assess a number of force packages to meet an array of major regional contingencies

²² Les Aspin, “National Security in the Post-Cold War Era,” Report on the BOTTOM-UP REVIEW, (October 1993) under Section 1, <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/part01.html> (accessed October 14, 2009).

²³ Gunzinger, “Beyond the Bottom-Up Review,” 1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

(MRC) and still accomplish presence, peacekeeping, and lesser contingency missions.²⁵

This approach led Aspin to conclude that the Armed Forces must be able to meet the needs of two MRCs. The two MRC requirement was imperative in that it would deter a potential adversary from aggression towards the US when engaged in an ongoing major regional contingency.²⁶ The BUR considered potential conflict in Korea and Southwest Asia as major regional contingencies. “Fighting and winning a *single* MRC would require four to five Army divisions, four to five Marine Expeditionary Brigades, 10 Air Force fighter wings, 100 deployable heavy bombers, four to five CVBGs, and special operations forces.”²⁷

The BUR achieved its goal of delivering a peace dividend. The Aspin approach delivered a savings of about \$13 billion over the Bush administration’s Base Force structure (over four years), reduced the force structure an additional 35 percent and delivered on President Clinton’s campaign promise of reducing defense spending.²⁸

The BUR was not without its shortfalls. Secretary Aspin’s staff recognized that DOD’s operations tempo was increasing. The Department of Defense reduced its structure, yet essentially maintained the same (two MRC) force-sizing construct that it used during the Cold War. This method was effective in reducing defense spending, but could lead the Armed Forces toward becoming another hollow force like that of the post-Vietnam era. As more numerous, but less intensive operations became the norm, efforts

²⁵ Ibid., 2

²⁶ Ibid., 3.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

to recapitalize and modernize would be more difficult.²⁹

The fall of the Soviet Union and the increase in regional conflicts that followed offered tremendous challenges to civil and military strategists in Washington. The Base Force initiative and the BUR went a long way towards providing the strategy and force structure the nation needed to meet the challenges of this new era. While the Base Force took into account the need to balance a reduced future force structure against new national security needs, the BUR considered two, nearly simultaneous, MRCs to reduce the force structure and gain a further peace dividend.³⁰ Given the increased deployment OPTEMPO across DOD, it was becoming painfully clear that DoD needed to refine its post-Cold War strategy and force structure beyond what the Base Force and BUR provided. Quite simply, the tasks and the forces at hand to achieve them were out of balance. In the fiscally restrained period of the 1990s, the Department of Defense needed to rebalance and become more efficient in applying its resources.

The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM) – In 1995, the CORM released a report on the ability of the Department of Defense to “conduct effective, unified military operations – the overarching goal of America’s National Security Strategy.”³¹ The 1995 Commission, made up of retired military officers, civilian experts, and professional staffers, wrote a tremendously influential report for the

²⁹ Ibid., 5. Gunzinger notes that in the five years after the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. forces deployed in support of thirteen operations including Bosnia, Turkey, Saudi, Haiti and others.

³⁰ Jim Courter and Alvin H. Bernstein, “The QDR Process – An Alternative View,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Summer 1997): 20.

³¹ Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces, Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces, (May 1995), Introduction. -- This Commission was established by Congress in order to “review . . . the appropriateness . . . of the current allocations of roles, missions, and functions among the Armed Forces; evaluate and report on alternative allocations; and make recommendations for changes in the current definition and distribution of those roles, missions, and functions.”

post Goldwater-Nichols environment.³² In Commissioner John P. White's Preface, he introduced four basic assumptions and three overarching findings that provide an overall summary of the CORM's intent and conclusions.

Four basic assumptions of the CORM:

- 1) Assess the ability of America to provide the "right mix" of capabilities to meet every threat.
- 2) The U.S. Armed Forces will need to perform a mix of tasks to include contingency operations and "large-scale regional conflicts."
- 3) Technology will become "increasingly important."
- 4) Defense spending will "remain limited."

Three overarching findings presented by the CORM:

- 1) The United States relies on its "regional commanders in chief (today's Geographic COCOMs) to conduct military operations."
- 2) America's Armed Forces are becoming increasingly joint.
- 3) There are opportunities for "large scale savings from adjustments in the Defense infrastructure."³³

The report is a product of rapid change and a growing sense of urgency. "If America's experience since the end of the Cold War is instructive, America's future will be marked by rapid change, diverse contingencies, limited budgets, and a broad range of missions to support evolving national security policies."³⁴ A further examination of both the

³² The Commission consisted of ten members (five military) assisted by more than 70 professional Staff and Assistants.

³³ Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces*, (May 1995), 1.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, ES-1.

assumptions and the findings of the CORM reinforce the belief that our nation was struggling to define the purpose for America's military in the new post-Soviet era. The Department of Defense was juggling an array of responsibilities in regional conflicts and an explosion of technology with military applications that had been rapid, and to some, unpredictable. The Defense Department recognized that the enemy would enjoy the fruits of a technology explosion as well and this new threat required new capabilities. Improvements in technology and information transfer would not be limited to the US and its allies. It is reasonable to assume that technology advancements such as night-vision devices, precision weapons and more efficient communication devices would be widely available to future adversaries. (Besides the recommendation for a unifying joint vision, the CORM report proposed the implementation of a Quadrennial Strategy Review (today's QDR) explaining "an overarching strategic plan that conveys the essential purposes of the Department in the context of the Administration's agenda is the foundation for guidance to the department."³⁵) The Commission concluded, "It was a mistake to take the traditional view of roles and missions issues - a view that concentrates on the allocation of roles among the military services."³⁶ Traditional roles and missions did not equate to capabilities for the new 21st century security environment. It was clear to the commission that the development of individual Service core competencies was vital, but not enough, to achieve success in the new operational environment. Every new operational concept must equate to capabilities useful in a new national security environment. But given their separate authorities and funding mechanisms and relative autonomy, the Services required a push to further their pursuit of jointness. Moreover,

³⁵ Ibid., 4-9.

³⁶ Ibid., 2.

the Services needed a guide to focus their development of capabilities, and provide a template understanding the future of warfare in the 21st century.

The 1995 report provided dozens of recommendation for almost every DOD staff. This paper focuses on a single CORM recommendation--that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide a unified vision for joint operations.³⁷ *This recommendation, found in chapter two of the 1995 CORM, is the most likely impetus for the birth of Joint Vision 2010.*

The CORM's Recommendation – The CORM faced a dilemma in unifying the efforts of the Armed Forces. At the heart of this problem was the competition between Services for precious resources in order to maintain Service desired competencies. Competition is a good thing to have between the Services – it strengthens organizations and helps them clarify their positions and goals.³⁸ To be sure, defense leaders welcomed the “variety of Service perspectives” that accompanied annual budget requests.³⁹ A dilemma occurred because each Service vision required capabilities according to its own view of what the warfighter required. In the CORM's view, the warfighter opinion that should matter the most was the Regional Commander in Chief (CINC), or today's Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC.), not the Service Chief.⁴⁰ In essence, the CINC's should reasonably understand the menu of capabilities sought by the Services. “... [T]he CINCs and the Services [should] have congruent expectations of the capabilities of forces assigned...by the Military Departments.”⁴¹ A mismatch of

³⁷ Ibid., 2-2.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 2-3.

⁴¹ Ibid.

intentions is likely when the need for the CINCs long term planning is juxtaposed against the Services need to organize, train and equip their forces. In 1996, Major General Charles Link, the assistant deputy chief of staff for plans and operations at Headquarters, Department of the Air Force saw this dilemma as a “bicameral defense process.”⁴² He contended the CINCs required a near-term, regional approach to capabilities, which was in stark contrast to the longer-term, specialized capabilities that drive the Service budgets and acquisition efforts.⁴³ Besides the Service/CINC dilemma, the CORM recognized the value of a unifying vision in creating desired enablers like “joint force headquarters,” “a common base for assessments,” and a framework that could potentially guide “DoD’s long-term planning.”⁴⁴

The time was right for the creation of a Joint Vision and the CORM seized upon it. The CORM outlined twelve recommendations in chapter two of their final report (*Directions for Defense*). The first and foremost is the recommendation for a Joint Vision. Specifically, the CORM recommended, “the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) should propose, for the Secretary of Defense’s approval, a future joint warfighting vision to help guide Service development efforts.”⁴⁵

The years 1989 to 1995 were formative for the development of a vision for the U.S. Armed Forces. It is debatable whether this period was an era of transformation or a precursor of the conflicts of tomorrow, but its significance is immense. The fall of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era for defense leaders and planners alike. Prescient

⁴² Charles D. Link, “21st Century Armed Forces-Joint Vision 2010” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 70.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces*, (May 1995) 2-3.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 2-2.

leaders like General Powell foresaw the requirement to change the force structure of the U.S. Armed Forces and the demand for a peace dividend after the Cold War. The Base Force concept recognized that the future held both uncertainty and the potential for regional conflicts instead of a focus on a single common enemy. In this new era, the Base Force document indicated it would be necessary to change the way the Armed Forces did business and foretold of future force structure and capability changes – both of which would prove exceedingly difficult to execute.

The change of Presidential administrations brought the second major effort to shape the direction of the armed forces – the “Bottom-Up Review”. The BUR determined the nature of the force structure and the capabilities the nation would need to fight and win in a new era. While the Base Force used across the board cuts of the Cold War force, the BUR attempted to tie forces to tasks to national interests.⁴⁶ Events in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and the rapid development of new technologies foretold of new opportunities for efficiencies in the Armed Forces. Secretary Aspin was able to leverage that information to honor a Clinton campaign promise and further reduce the force structure. His thorough review of the Armed Forces was a watershed event for the nation and laid the groundwork for the focused and rigorous analysis required to get the right capabilities.⁴⁷ By the time the CORM recommended a unifying Joint Vision document in 1995, the nation had indeed found itself embroiled in a number of regional conflicts.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Gunzinger, “Beyond the Bottom-Up Review,” 1.

⁴⁷ The members of the CORM dedicated the report to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin who passed away in May 1995. His ideas are evident throughout the work.

⁴⁸ Les Aspin, “National Security in the Post-Cold War Era,” 7. (e.g., Panama, Iraq, Somalia).

“Vision is the art of seeing what is invisible to others.”

-Jonathan Swift (1667-1745)

Chapter 3

WHAT MAKES “VISION”?

The events that led the Commission of Roles and Missions (CORM) to conclude the Armed Forces needed to develop a unified vision are clear; however, it is worth considering the choice of the word “vision.” The CORM report could have used the terms template, guide or instruction - but it did not, it specifically used the word vision.¹ In this context, the word vision implies a sort of prescience or foresight that is not otherwise obvious. It also implies a sense of direction that is concrete, easy to follow, and directed by leadership. In each of these qualifiers, there is an embedded sense of the future. The term vision pulls the reader towards something that is fresh, new and important. In this sense, the term vision may have been the wrong term. Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, noted leadership scholars, define vision as a “realistic, credible, attractive future for an organization.”² This characterization is what the CORM had in mind and this is certainly a noble goal, but an examination of the evolution of the US Armed Forces vision documents proves that this ideal is very difficult to achieve. The CORM did not directly recommend the construction of unifying vision documents to any other office except that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).³ The CORM recognized that in order to maintain a vital, robust competition between the Services, yet

¹ Roles and Missions Commission of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces*, (Arlington, VA, U.S. Government, May 95). 2-2. “...a future joint warfighting vision to help guide Service force development efforts.”

² Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders* (New York: Harper and Rows Publishers, 1985), 89.

³ The Secretary of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review Report attempts to frame national security issues, very similar to a vision document. The QDR was not directed until the National Defense Act for FY 1996 Subtitle B—Force Structure Review. In 1997, the DOD published the first QDR.

unify DOD's efforts, the appropriate level for direction was the CJCS.⁴

In evaluating *JV2010*, it is important to recognize and understand a common framework for the development of vision documents. Vision occurs in many disciplines, from the fine arts to the hard sciences. In order to understand what constitutes a good vision statement, it is important to establish common terms and look at accepted characteristics. This effort is especially useful to trace continuity and value of *JV2010* across the evolution of DOD's long-range vision documents.

What is a Vision? – Good vision is an essential part of every successful organization. In fact, unifying the efforts of an entire organization is a “universal principle of leadership.”⁵ In a very broad sense, vision is not a luxury it is an essential part of a leaders responsibility to direct that organization. By producing *Joint Vision 2010*, General Shalikashvili demonstrated that he knew the value of a purposeful vision for the US Armed Forces. The CORM also recognized a gap between the existing Service vision statements and their own desire to unify the Service efforts in pursuing capabilities. Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines vision as “... a thought, concept, or object formed by the imagination.” This definition reflects the intent of the CORM. James Collins and Jerry Porras make a clear distinction between a vision and a mission statement. While both the mission statement and vision communicate a sense of purpose and may even include a tangible image, a vision requires something more. A vision should include shared values and a vivid description in order to inspire the entire

⁴ The NSS and the NDS deserve consideration as vision documents. The NSS articulates the President's grand strategy and policy. The NDS should articulate DOD's position within the overall effort of the NSS.

⁵ Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders*, 89.

organization.⁶ Essentially, these added elements are what distinguish a vision from a mission statement. *JV2010* sought to achieve this standard on a very large scale for a very large organization - the Department of Defense.

Beyond understanding the difference between a vision and a mission statement, it is important to identify the key elements of a vision that every leader must shape and include in an organizational vision statement. According to the National Defense University's Instructional paper, *Strategic Leadership and Decision Making*, an organization's vision must contain elements of realism, credibility, and an attractive future.⁷ The reason to communicate a vision that contains a sense of realism and credibility is obvious enough. In the case of Joint Vision, it was to unify the Services efforts at creating capabilities in order to provide the warfighter (GCCs) the resources to fight and win the nation's wars. The nation's threats are *real* enough and the fact that the nation's senior officer authors this document infers *credibility* beyond a shadow of a doubt.

The required element of an *attractive future* is more interesting and bears further examination. Bennis and Nanus offer several reasons strategic leaders should ensure an attractive future is a key descriptive element of an organizational vision. The primary reason is that of a motivating effect. If all members of an organization can feel that they are part of a "worthwhile enterprise" and are pursuing a "...shared and empowering vision of the future," this can add enormous value and an impetus to an organization's

⁶ James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, "Organizational Vision and Visionary Organizations," *California Management Review* (Fall 1991): 31-32.

⁷ National Defense University, *Strategic Leadership and Decision Making*, (Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1997), 330.

efficiency.⁸ In addition, it can provide a bridging effect. “The right vision takes the organization out of the present, and focuses it on the future. It’s easy to get caught up...and to lose sight of where you were heading.”⁹ The CORM recognized competing (Service) visions either led to inefficiencies or were slaves to a Cold War era that would not prove useful.

How to make a Vision – Understanding the elements of a vision and understanding how to create a vision are two entirely different problems. General Shalikashvili, as the CJCS, had the advantage of understanding the U.S. Armed Forces strengths and weaknesses. Arguably, the Joint Staff is the finest staff of military professionals in the DOD, with an in-depth knowledge of the warfighter (GCCs) and Service organizations and programs readily available. With an understanding of the critical elements of a vision along with an understanding of an organizations’ strength and weaknesses, we can make some assumptions of the tasks facing General Shalikashvili in trying to develop *JV2010*. *Strategic Leadership and Decision Making* offers sound advice on developing vision that applies to every large organization. In order to form and develop a vision, General Shalikashvili, like any strategic leader, needed to accomplish three primary tasks: Focus the overall vision, choose a direction to set vision context, and develop future scenarios.¹⁰

Every vision needs to focus all efforts or be narrow enough to be useful. It is the responsibility of the leader to determine the constraints for a problem and identify the logical limits and boundaries. This action is especially important in an organization as

⁸ Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders*, 91-92.

⁹ National Defense University, *Strategic Leadership and Decision Making*, 332.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 341-342.

large as the Department of Defense. The vision needs to supply a context for its users. This task may be the most difficult part of creating and implementing a vision. A context supplies the reader with assumptions, a statement of the environment, a specific purpose and an end state. Additionally, a vision should contain likely scenarios because the adoptions of multiple futures or vignettes prove useful in forming a meaningful vision. The ability to link the vision with the most likely outcome must be tempered with the inability to predict the future. The development of future scenarios must not be an exercise in fortune-telling, but must be able to provide the reader with a useful direction in order to orient and advance the organization and apply the focus and the context of a leader's vision.

Implementing Vision – Perhaps the most difficult task for the commander or leader who creates a vision is its implementation and one of the keys to implementation is articulate communication.¹¹ When a vision can be clearly communicated it is then a credible means to link the desired future with the present. It is not enough to distribute the written vision or describe it in presentation form. A leader must be able to act and reinforce the elements of the vision or risk losing credibility. Losing credibility is the biggest danger for any vision, if a leader cannot communicate and implement a vision it is of little value.¹² In the case of *JV2010*, the risk to credibility is to the document itself.

As mentioned earlier, shared values play an important part of any vision in order to tie together the elements of vision and the reality of implementation. Author Don DeYoung in *Strategic Vision Can Be Powerful* postulates that every leader must weave the organization's desired *values* into any successful mission statement and offers two

¹¹ Ibid., 343.

¹² Ibid., 343-344.

excellent examples of enduring vision.¹³ The strategic vision that led to the creation of the United States, as articulated in our two founding documents, the *Declaration of Independence* and the *Constitution*, offers a great example of a vision that contains all the required elements of a successful vision. These documents offer a *credible future, clarity* for ease of communication, and *implementation* that espouse the nation's *values* in order to *inspire* the readers – its citizens. The *Declaration of Independence*, a one-page document "...expresses values that placed man in a revolutionary position with respect to his government."¹⁴ This emphasis on values, complimented the *Constitution's* clear course of implementation. The *Constitution* and its 27 amendments are a great example of leadership focusing efforts on attainable implementation. Together these two documents provide an enduring example of a successful vision statement and utilize many of the elements of a successful vision proposed earlier by Bennis and Nanus.

DeYoung offers another example of vision that endured for more than 40 years, the vision or strategy the US followed during the Cold War. This vision, embodied by George Kennan's "X" article delivered in 1947, articulated the strategy of containment.¹⁵ It proposed using all elements of national power to defeat communism.¹⁶ This proposal provided the reader with a *focus* for his vision and outlined the concepts required to meet a threat that possessed the capability to threaten the "world outside its borders."¹⁷ Much of Kennan's "X" article provided a *credible, future scenario*, through a detailed

¹³ Don DeYoung, "Strategic Vision Can be Powerful," National Defense University, (November 2000) Under introductory paragraph, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/StratVision.pdf> (accessed October 14, 2009).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 1-2.

¹⁶ George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", *The History Guide, Lectures on Twentieth Century Europe*, under part 3, "George Kennan, The Sources of Soviet Conduct" (1947), <http://www.historyguide.org/europe/kennan.html> (accessed January 9, 2010)

¹⁷ Ibid., Part 1

discussion of Stalin's rise to power and a discussion of communism. Nevertheless, the greatest virtue of Kennan's article was his eloquent contrast of America's *values* to those of the communist Soviet Union to elicit an *inspirational* response throughout the country. "They (the Communist Party) insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power...There were to be no forms of collective human activity or association which would not be dominated by the Party."¹⁸ When viewed as a vision, the containment strategy articulated by Kennan possessed all the necessary elements of strong vision and not only convinced the reader, it endured throughout the length of the Cold War.

In order to gain a broad understanding of organizational vision, it is useful to keep in mind those elements that contribute to successful vision. It is exceedingly difficult for any single vision document to contain the projection of a tangible image, clarity of communication, and a direct path to implementation that both inspires the reader and emphasizes the values of the entire reader population. Fulfilling the CORMs direction for a unifying joint vision was an immense task. This task was both a leadership tool for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a means to articulate the direction for the largest organization in the US government.

¹⁸ Ibid.

“It's easy to see, hard to foresee.”

-Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790)

Chapter 4

THE GROWTH AND EVOLUTION OF U.S. ARMED FORCES VISION

The primary subject of this paper, *Joint Vision 2010*, written by the Shalikashvili-led Joint Staff in 1996 is historically significant. Indeed, its implications are still with us today. Though relatively short in total length, it introduced a focus on full spectrum dominance that reflected the Defense Department’s desire to rely on technology and information superiority to meet the challenges of the changing operating environment. These elements are worth examining for their applicability throughout the evolution of US Armed Forces vision documents. Since the introduction of *JV2010*, there have been countless documents that contribute to the “joint vision” of the U.S. Armed Forces. In order to gain an assessment or an understanding of the continuity of effort, it is best to view the evolution of joint vision in four distinct phases. The first phase is the introduction of *JV2010* and its successor, *Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020)*. In this phase, Generals Shalikashvili and Shelton introduced the modern joint vision document that emphasized full spectrum dominance through four specific operational concepts. *Joint Vision 2020* builds on *JV2010* and was significant for its reinforcement of *JV2010*’s assumptions, emphasis on the four original concepts and doctrine, organizations, and leadership. In the second phase, the Department of Defense recognized the difficulty of implementing *JV2010* and *JV2020* and focused on processes to achieve implementation. The *Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (JIMP)* and the *Joint Operations Concepts*

(*JOpsC*) represent this phase of vision documents. Secretary Rumsfeld and General Meyers' efforts at transformation and a move away from the (relative) simplicity of *JV2010* and *JV2020* highlighted the third phase of this evolution. This phase was significant as it recognized the challenges of operationalizing desired capabilities and because it began to separate the operating environment from the catalog of capabilities required in the U.S. Armed Forces. The last phase examines today's joint narrative consisting of the *Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* and the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)*.¹ (See Appendix A)

Enter Joint Vision 2010 – In July of 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili unveiled the first long-range, joint, vision document.² The 34-page *JV2010* was a seminal document. In Shalikashvili's preface to *JV2010*, he stated, "The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow. *Joint Vision 2010* provides an operationally based template for the evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future. It must become a benchmark for Service and Unified Command visions."³ Right from the start his emphasis for this innovative document was operationally focused, future oriented, and designed for both Service and Unified Commands (Geographic and Functional Combatant Commanders).

JV2010's approach to communicating the Chairman's vision was to promote "Full

¹ John M. Richardson, "The Joint Narrative," *Joint Force Quarterly* Issue 54, (3rd Quarter 2009): 81-86; While the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) aims to provide unifying direction and vision, it does so on a strategic level. *JV2010* and the other classes of vision documents examined in this paper are operational-level conceptual guidance. The Secretary of Defense utilizes the QDR and other mid-course updates to provide strategic-level vision.

² Jim Garamone, "Chairman Unveils Blueprint for Joint Forces in 2010," *DefenseLink News*, July 26, 1996.

³ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, 1996): inside cover.

Comment [CS1]: Page: 28
Need an explanation here – why was it seminal?

Spectrum Dominance” (FSD) by the U.S. Armed Forces. ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ is “the application of these four concepts [dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics] by robust high quality forces [to] provide America with the capability to dominate an opponent across the range of military operations.”⁴ In order to bolster this vision, the Chairman presented his argument in three primary parts, or elements. In the first element, the Chairman examined a variety of continuities and changes in the operating environment in order to form assumptions about the warfighting requirements in the future (2010). These included assumptions about our own forces and likely threats, as well as the implications of technology, which was a primary driver throughout *JV2010*. The second element of *JV2010* proposed overarching operational concepts. Clearly, the Chairman faced great difficulty in presenting a single conceptual template to guide all Service resource needs and capability acquisition. In order to gain Full Spectrum Dominance, *JV2010* introduced four primary operational concepts: Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection and Focused Logistics.⁵ Many early readers of *JV2010* viewed the articulation of these four operational concepts as the first effort to influence resource decisions. In fact, then Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), U.S. Air Force General Joseph W. Ralston, stated that *JV2010* would be “...the yardstick by which all services will be measured.”⁶ At that time, and still today, the VCJCS serves as the Chairperson of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), an influential body that validates capability requirements for all Services and is influential in the funding and ratification of

⁴ Ibid., 2.

⁵ Ibid., 1.

⁶ Jim Garamone, “Chairman Unveils Blueprint for Joint Forces in 2010.”

Service defense budgets. General Ralston clearly viewed the new vision document as a prism for all future JROC decisions.⁷ Besides its value as a resource guidance prism, *JV2010*'s operational concepts form the basis for today's six joint functions – Command and Control, Intelligence, Fires, Movement and Maneuver, Sustainment and Protection.⁸ The third element of *JV2010*'s argument in support of full spectrum dominance required the Joint Force be agile enough to adapt to *JV2010*'s vision. This would require organizational flexibility, leadership, doctrinal changes and innovation.

These three proposed elements are useful in gaining a broad understanding of the framework developed in *JV2010*, but do not adequately address all of the factors it sought to influence. Beyond the value of its three-element framework, *JV2010* relied on technology and information superiority to serve as key enablers in pursuit of full spectrum dominance.⁹ Both the Base Force and Bottom-Up Review Assessments that took place prior to *JV2010* had a tremendous influence on the downsizing of the Armed Forces. Faced with a smaller force structure and a growing array of lesser, regional commitments and conflicts, technology offered an attractive opportunity for the warfighter. As discussed in Chapter Two, events in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 had shown the potential of advanced technology. Advances in long-range precision weapons, a new range of weapons effects, and low observables presented opportunities for “order of magnitude improvement in lethality.”¹⁰ Just as important as the technological implications, the information systems improvements were sure to make a lasting impact

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Joint Staff, *Joint Publication, 3-0 Joint Operations*, Joint Doctrine, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, September 17, 2003), Chapter 3.

⁹ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, 18.

¹⁰ Ibid., 13.

on all future operations.¹¹ Information superiority offered the warfighter “the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”¹² Information Superiority was heady stuff in 1996. This was just the technological advantage that could lead to full spectrum dominance. In 1996, Major General Charles Link, USAF, summed up the potential value of *JV2010*. “*JV 2010* provides 21st century forces guided by 21st century thinking. The payoff will be 21st century security.”¹³ Whether or not the combination of technology and information systems superiority combined to form a revolution remains a question. There can be no doubt though that *JV2010* viewed these two enablers as new to the warfighter and integral to every capability.

Absorbing JV2010 – In 1997, General Henry Shelton, U.S.A. replaced General Shalikashvili as the CJCS. His first effort aimed to provide a means to implement *JV2010*. In his words, he needed “to operationalize *JV 2010* – transforming its concepts of joint warfighting into reality.”¹⁴ In this statement, it is obvious that General Shelton was a strong supporter of the newly minted ideas proposed in *JV 2010*. He viewed his challenge as one of implementation. Before he published the update to *JV2010*, Shelton and the Joint Staff outlined the future of Joint Vision in a white paper titled *Concept for Future Joint Operations, Expanding Joint Vision 2010 (CFJO)*. It was remarkably similar to *JV2010* in overall structure in that it presented strategic environmental

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 16.

¹³ Charles D. Link, “21st Century Armed Forces – Joint Vision 2010,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn 1996): 70.

¹⁴ Henry H. Shelton, (CJCS), “A Word from the New Chairman,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 1997-98): 6-8.

assumptions, recognized that its usefulness was at the operational level and reinforced the importance of technology and the four proposed operational concepts.¹⁵ Most importantly, Shelton recognized the way to go forward with the concepts proposed in *JV2010* was to build a robust structure for experimentation. Indeed, he recognized that “this *CFJO* is the first step toward implementing *JV2010*. It is intended to be a marketplace of ideas – a tool to help us think about future operations.”¹⁶ The *CFJO* would implement *JV2010* using two primary efforts: It would provide a common direction for the defense community and guide the assessment process for future joint warfighting concepts.¹⁷ At first blush, this relatively modest goal gets to the heart of operationalizing or implementing *JV2010*. In fact, it gets to the heart of the purpose of *JV2010* -- unifying Service concepts and capabilities for the warfighter. As the designated implementation device of *JV2010*, the *CFJO* provided broad guidance and introduced a series of CJCS vision implementation instructions that further expanded on how DOD was to implement *JV2010*. It recognized the need for integrated experimentation and development through Service and COCOM experiments, battle labs and joint assessment vehicles. Shelton envisioned a new era of activities designed to examine what it would take to gain full implementation of the *JV2010* vision.¹⁸

The First Update – Joint Vision 2020 – While Shelton had provided the outline for operationalization and implementation of *JV2010* through experimentation, he recognized the need to update it as well. In June 2000, Chairman Shelton and the Joint

¹⁵ CJCS, *Concept for Future Joint Operations-Expanding Joint Vision 2010*, Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, May 97): 1-3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Henry H. Shelton, (CJCS), “A Word from the New Chairman.” 6.

Staff published *Joint Vision 2020*. *JV2020* was not a departure from the ideas of *JV2010*; it “...builds on the foundation and maintains the momentum established with *Joint Vision 2010*.”¹⁹ In structure, it is remarkably similar to *JV2010* and its mid-course update, the *CFJO*. It outlines a brief strategic context or set of environmental assumptions and then launches into the framework to support full spectrum dominance (FSD). It embraces the primacy of technology and information superiority and advocates for the necessity of Joint operations. The basis of the vision proposed in *JV2020* was four-fold:

1. The existence of a wide range of threats continue to threaten the United States’ vital interests
2. Information Technology is central to the evolution of its Armed Forces
3. All military operations will rely on successful integration of multi-national and interagency partners
4. The Joint Force will be the foundation for all military operations.²⁰

Shelton’s 2020 vision is not at odds with the 2010 vision. The foundations required to maintain full spectrum dominance remained the same. Besides reinforcing the four powerful operational concepts proposed in *JV2010*, *JV2020* recognized the value of the people and the organizations they formed. This is not to say that *JV2010* discounted the importance of the people. Rather *JV2020* recognized from the beginning that “...full spectrum dominance and the transformation of operational capabilities has significant implications for the training and education of our people.”²¹ This was a clear nod to the need for experimentation and assessment for future implementation. The issue, four

¹⁹ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2020, America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, June 2000): 36.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 13.

years after *JV2010*, was implementation. Throughout any examination of U.S. Armed Forces long-range vision, implementation or operationalization (the two are synonymous) remained a key obstacle. Clearly, Shelton recognized that vision without implementation would jeopardize credibility. As stated earlier, both communication and implementation are imperative for successful vision. Both Shalikashvili and Shelton needed to be great communicators, and in the U.S. Armed Forces, the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have remarkable credibility by virtue of their position. This individual credibility is not in question; the difficulty was reconciling the credibility of the vision statements themselves. When speaking of the value of experimentation to lead to implementation, Lt. Gen. Joseph Redden, USAF, a former commander of the Joint Warfighting Center remarked “If *JV2010* remains just an idea, it may well go the way of many other “good ideas” and die a slow death from misuse and ambiguity.”²² While it was easy to embrace the conceptual framework proposed in *JV2010* and reinforced in *JV2020*, it was increasingly apparent that implementation was the key issue and without implementation, the vision became foggy, and difficult to see. In fact, unless the Chairman could implement a means for the Services to embrace the concept of full spectrum dominance, aligning Service concepts and capabilities would be very difficult to achieve.

The Problem of Implementation - In order to pursue effective implementation, the CJCS needed a new tool. For this job, the Joint Staff needed to shift gears to bring the focus towards policy and guidance that would bring to life the existing vision. Interestingly, *JV2020* marked the end of any operationally focused documents that utilized the word “vision” in the title. From 1996 to 2001, *JV2010* and *JV2020* served as

²² Joseph J. Redden, “Joint Doctrine: The Way Ahead,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Winter 1996-97): 11-12.

Comment [CS2]: Page: 34
Need a citation here- why was it increasingly apparent?

focusing instruments and utilized separate instructions for more specific implementation guidance. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff opted against further revision of *JV2020* instead emphasizing policy and implementation. Though in existence in one form or another since 1996, the Chairman's updated *Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (JIMP)*, a CJCS 3010 series instruction, served as the tool for that implementation.

The JIMP's purpose is to

...provide[s] the policy and guidance implementation of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS's] long range vision document, *Joint Vision 2020*, and subsequent CJCS *Joint Vision* documents. The purpose of the *JIMP* is to define a process that will translate emerging joint operational concepts into joint warfighting capabilities as a result of joint experimentation and assessment recommendations."²³

The *JIMP* itself was not a departure from the vision stated in *JV2010* and *JV2020*; it was recognition of the need for implementation in order to maintain the focus on the lofty goals proposed in that vision and attain full spectrum dominance. It was the tool designed to transform the operational concepts into operational capabilities.²⁴ The instruction does not represent in theme or content the spirit of a vision document. It inferred no tangible images, yet communicated the Chairman's process for transformation. Of note, it recognized the need for the synchronization of ongoing Service and COCOM experimentation, the assignment of specific duties and responsibilities within the Defense Department and the importance of integrating Joint Vision into the entire DOTMLPF spectrum (Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities).²⁵ While the *JIMP* provided no

²³ CJCS, *Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (JIMP)*, CJCS Instruction, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, April 2001): 1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, A-1.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

strategic assumptions for the operating environment, it focused heavily on the resourcing, planning and programming required to attain new capabilities as well as the organizational responsibility required to achieve joint vision. General Shelton recognized the importance, and the difficulty of implementation. Regarding the publication of the *CFJO* and the *JIMP*, Shelton said, “The exciting part and perhaps the most challenging milestone is still ahead: transforming key *JV 2010* concepts into capabilities through joint experimentation by warfighters in the field and in the fleet.”²⁶

The Rumsfeld/Meyers Administration takes a New Approach to Vision –

Despite Secretary Rumsfelds’ desires to transform the military, the events of 9/11 and the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq occupied the Joint Staffs’ collective efforts. This was evident as it was not until 2003 that another vision-like document came to the forefront. *An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century (EJP)* written by the Joint Staff J-7 Directorate in January 2003 contained all the trappings of a joint vision document. The *EJP* outlined similar elements found in *JV2010* and *JV2020*. It provided assumptions about the operating environment, desired operational concepts and capabilities, and organizational implications. Its focus was “to provide the missing joint perspective for the JROC (Joint Requirements Oversight Council) and address the Chairman’s future joint vision in actionable detail...”²⁷ In summary, the *EJP* was “...focused on achieving the effect of full spectrum dominance through unified action and the conduct of joint decisive operations across the range of

²⁶ Henry H. Shelton, “A Word from the New Chairman,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Autumn/Winter 1997-98): 8.

²⁷ VCJCS, *An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Revolution in the 21st Century*, Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, January 2003): 1.

military operations.”²⁸ The *EJP* was noteworthy because the Vice Chairman in his role as Chairman of the JROC endorsed it as a “common frame of reference for future joint concept development.”²⁹ It remains only “vision like” though because its primary purpose was to inform the JROC. It achieved this purpose by exploring the evolving characteristics of the conduct of warfare in a manner that juxtaposed the capabilities required in the twentieth century with those required in the twenty-first century. This confusing and not all together easily applied exercise was included in a 28-page enclosure to the 15 page *EJP*.³⁰ Nevertheless, the *EJP* proposed useful environmental assumptions and proposed capabilities that sought to advance the attainment of full spectrum dominance as outlined in the original *JV2010*.

From Vision to Transformation - While the *JIMP* attempted to map a course for the attainment of Joint Vision, and the *EJP* attempted to provide a useful framework for the JROC to attain capabilities, Secretary Rumsfeld and Chairman Meyers seemed committed to outline a useful path to transformation along the lines of *JV2010* and *JV2020*. It was also apparent that the implementation of that transformation - or the process of how the organization was to get there, remained the primary challenge. In 2003, the Joint Staff published the white paper *Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC)* that would become the leading edge of a new class of documents that sought to outline the path to full spectrum dominance and transformation. The stated purpose of the *JOpsC*,
...describes how the Joint Force intends to operate in the next 15 to 20 years. It provides the operational context for the transformation of the Armed Forces of

²⁸ Ibid., 15.

²⁹ VCJCS (Pace), *Memorandum for The Joint Requirements Oversight Council*, JROCM 022-03, 28 Jan 03.

³⁰ VCJCS, *An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Revolution in the 21st Century*, 6, 17-45.

the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities...provides the conceptual framework to guide future joint operations and joint, Service, combatant command and combat support defense agency concept development and experimentation.³¹

This wordy purpose statement portends the utility of this 29-page document. In this rambling and easily misunderstood white paper, its easy to lose sight of its primary utility. In fact Lt. Gen Paul K. Van Riper, USMC (Retired) remarked that the *JOpsC* was “...a document fatally flawed by the absence of a central idea, poor writing and the mixing of ideas and administrative instructions.”³² The chief value of the *JOpsC* was the introduction of the ideas of JOCs, JICs and JFCs, which dominate discussion and experimentation even today.

By 2004, General Richard Meyers eschewed the term “Joint Vision” and focused on the attainment of new capabilities. Instead, the *JOpsC* series represented a broad family of documents that consisted of Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs), Joint Integrating Concepts (JICs), and Joint Functional Concepts (JFCs). These three concepts represented a new approach to turning operational concepts into capabilities. Briefly described, a JOC is the way the warfighter will operate in order to achieve strategic goals, a JIC is how a warfighter will generate effects in order to achieve an objective and a JFC is how the future Joint Force will perform a particular military function. The Joint Staff white paper titled *Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan (JCDRP)* defines all three of these terms.³³ Rather than updating *JV2020* or referencing vision, General Meyers’ staff

³¹ Joint Staff (J-7), *Joint Operations Concepts*, Concept paper, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, November 2003): 3.

³² Paul K. Van Riper, “Thinking About Future Military Operations,” (Symposium paper, 2008 Joint Operations Symposium, National Defense University, Washington, DC, June 2008).

³³ CJCS, *Joint Concept Development and Revision Plan*, Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, July 2004): 4-5.

utilized the *JOpsC* family to define a process or means to attain transformation.

Interestingly enough, the JOCs presented for examination and illustration of the new concept development process were remarkably similar to the transformational operational concepts put forth in General Shalikashvili's *JV2010*.³⁴

The *Joint Operations Concepts Development Process (JOpsC-DP)* series of Instructions were to succeed the *JIMP* and act as a specific companion to the *JOpsC*. From 2001 to 2006, the Chairman and the Joint Staff turned away from the word 'vision' to anchor long-range planning documents and instead favored a path of transformation. In fact, the object of the current *JOpC-DP* is to "guide the joint force so that it is prepared to operate successfully 8-20 years in the future."³⁵ With the publication of the *JOpsC* and the *JOpsC-DP*, the term vision and reference to any long-range vision document no longer existed. The *JOpsC* family and the *JCDRP* were as valuable as implementing instructions as *JV2010* and *JV2020* were as vision documents. The latter family represented a future driven by technology and information superiority in order to gain full spectrum dominance; the former realized that vision without implementation was empty. Chairman Meyers understood the real problem with the seminal vision documents *JV2010* and *JV2020* was that the Defense Department had to stop envisioning the future and start marching to attain it. The *JOpsC* family of documents represented the tools with which the Services and the DOD architects would use to transform capabilities from concepts to reality.

The Current Narrative of Today's Vision – While the *JOpsC* family of

³⁴ Ibid., 5.

³⁵ CJCS, *Joint Operations Concepts Development Process*, CJCS Instruction, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, January 2006): 1. (Force Application, Protection, Battlespace Awareness, Command and Control, Focused Logistics, Network-Centric Operations).

documents served to lay the groundwork for the complicated processes of capability transformation, the Department of Defense required the broad conceptual guidance provided by long-range vision. The *JIMP*, *JOpsC* and the newer *JCDRP* outlined the process, but did little to update the actual vision. In August 2005, Chairman Meyers' Joint Staff provided the first mature version of conceptual guidance in the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 2.0 (CCJO V2)*. It is useful to view the *CCJO* as an evolution of the conceptual vision initiated in *JV2010* and the *JOpsC* family as a roadmap for the processes for implementation of that conceptual vision.

It is equally useful to recognize a key shift within the DOD towards transformation. In the white paper *An Evolving Joint Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution in the 21st Century (EJP)*, the authors codified the existing problem of the evolution, or transformation, by defining two frames of reference. "The existing frames of reference are joint doctrine and Joint Vision. Joint doctrine provides a common frame of reference for the current Joint Force...Joint Vision provides a broad future vision and construct for military transformation. However, it [joint vision] contains little actionable detail for Joint Force...development."³⁶ These two frames of reference attempt to reconcile the difficulties of implementing vision. The *CCJO* adopted this structure and assumed the role of an integrator for both vision and *JOpsC* introduced processes. Besides embracing the organizational intricacies of JOCs, JICs and JFCs, the *CCJO* expanded on the need for transformation with vision. The *CCJO* was not a replacement for the *JOpsC* or Joint Vision; rather, it attempted to bring together the disparate transformation documents that proliferated in DOD at the time. Additionally,

³⁶ VCJCS, *An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Revolution in the 21st Century*, 1.

the *CCJO* adopted a more rigorous examination of the future operating environment first introduced in *JV2010* and *JV2020*, expanded in the *EJP*, but entirely absent in the *JCDRP* and the *JIMP*. The *CCJO* re-introduced assumptions, threats and adversarial challenges and served as a single source of guidance to the Services and other DOD agencies. “The *CCJO* provides broad guidance to Service concepts and other joint concepts outside of the *JOpsC* family. Those concepts must be compatible with and supportive of the *CCJO*.”³⁷ This particularly explicit language refers directly to operational concepts, but seems equally applicable to assumptions of the operating environment. Its initial attempt at describing the operational environment was useful and necessary, but incomplete.

As the *CCJO* went to print in 2005, further refinement was already in the works at U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in Norfolk, Virginia. The Joint Staff delegated articulation of the operating environment outside of the Pentagon. General James Mattis, USMC, as Commander of US Joint Forces Command published the *Joint Operating Environment, Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force (JOE)* in order to “...inform joint concept development and experimentation throughout the Department of Defense.”³⁸ This explicit purpose dovetails precisely with the stated goal of *JV2010* to provide a template for “...common direction for our Services in developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework of doctrine and programs as they prepare to meet an uncertain and challenging future.”³⁹ The 51 page *JOE* is an in-depth look into the

³⁷ CJCS, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 2.0*, Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, August 2005): 3.

³⁸ JFCOM, *The JOE: The Joint Operating Environment 2008*, Informs Concept Development and Experimentation, (USFJCOM, Norfolk, VA, November 2008): ii.

³⁹ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, 1.

operating environment of the future and far exceeds the limited scope first presented in *JV2010*, but serves the same purpose.

The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0 (CCJOV3)* has the advantage of relying on the *JOE* for a common framework of environmental assumptions and serves as a treatise on the fundamental purpose of military power.⁴⁰ Both *CCJO* documents represent a departure from the desired full spectrum dominance proposed in *JV2010* and re-emphasized in *JV2020*. Rather, as the name asserts, this family of documents attempts to outline how the Joint Force will operate to meet the range of national security challenges today and tomorrow. *CCJOV3* focuses on basic categories of military activities and common operating precepts while challenging the military leader to ensure military efforts remain integrated with all the elements of national power. A key passage on page one of this document illustrates this point.

Military action tends to be the most visible and hazardous expression of national policy, and any employment of U.S. military forces, even for benign purposes, tends to have significant domestic and international repercussions. Hence, whenever possible and appropriate, joint operations should be augmented or even supplanted by other, less threatening manifestations of national power.⁴¹

CCJOV3 makes no mention of full spectrum dominance nor does it espouse the four operational concepts championed in *JV2010*. In this sense, it represents a departure away from General Shalikashvili's original 1996 vision.

Today's vision narrative has come a long way from the relatively simple and straightforward vision of 1996 but continues to serve a similar purpose. In 1996, *JV2010* outlined new innovative operational concepts based on new technological capabilities,

⁴⁰ CJCS, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0*, Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, January 2009): 1.

⁴¹ Ibid.

but it fell short of articulating a credible means or process for the Joint Force to acquire those capabilities. In 2000, General Shelton's *JV2020* reaffirmed a desire for the capabilities proposed in *JV2010*. The prolific Joint Operations Concepts family and the *JCDRP* documents continue to provide a roadmap for the Services and combatant commands to acquire desired capabilities, but remain complicated and unwieldy. A brief examination of the *JOE* and *CCJO* narrative reveals that today's leaders remain committed to offering a joint vision for the U.S. Armed Forces, but shy away from the narrowly focused, technological capabilities that led to full spectrum dominance as proposed in *JV2010*. As appropriate in an era of warfare, today's vision recognizes the difficulty of integrating joint operations to meet the needs of national policy.

The evolution of joint vision over the last fourteen years shows the difficulty of determining continuity of effort and assessing value. Each phase is linked to both its predecessor and its successor, but it is difficult to show continuity of effort. When examining vision documents from *JV2010* to *CCJOV3*, one must consider the operating environment, the concepts and capabilities espoused, and agility of the organization. These three elements offer the best prism for assessing continuity of effort and value.

“The obscure we see eventually, the completely apparent takes longer.”

-Edward R. Murrow (1908-1965)

Chapter 5

ELEMENTS OF A JOINT VISION DOCUMENT THAT DETERMINE CONTINUITY OF EFFORT AND VALUE

The year 2010 is here and it is time to ask the question, what is the value of *JV2010* in 2010? This question is rife with problems, not the least of which is defining value. *JV2010*'s readership is vast and its utility often depends on how the reader intends to use the vision document. Military strategists seek a different utility than Service planners, who seek something entirely different from a geographic COCOM charged with fighting a war. Perhaps the best measure of value is in continuity itself. The vision of the Armed Forces must be transcendent, yet malleable, and capable of useful adaptation over time. Whether or not *JV2010* is applicable in 2010 is less important than understanding how it affected the evolution of future vision documents over the course of the last fourteen years. Essentially, the seminal 1996 vision document is a “template to guide transformation of ...concepts into joint operational capabilities.”¹ To gain an understanding of *JV2010*'s utility to future vision documents, it is necessary to view vision documents in the terms of the three elements proposed earlier. Those three elements offered by General Shalikashvili in *JV2010* provide a framework for the examination of continuity across the evolution of the U.S. Armed Forces vision documents. Those three elements in broad terms are:

¹ CJCS, “*Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*,” Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, 1996): 34.

1. Efforts to define assumptions of the operating environment
2. Articulation of desired concepts for the Joint Force
3. Implications for the organizations of the Joint Force

Each of these three elements can be found across the four distinct phases of evolution described in Chapter Four. The degree of emphasis of each element varies but does not lessen the value of the structure.²

The Operating Environment – Even a cursory examination of *JV2010* reveals the author devoted a large amount of effort to forming baselines for the reader when considering the Joint Force operating environment. The introduction in the *Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* provides the best explanation of the requirement for operating environment assumptions. The *JOE* asserts that only by examining “trends, contexts and implications” can the reader gain a “basis for thinking about the world over the next quarter century. Its purpose is not to predict, but to suggest ways leaders might think about the future.”³ *JV2010* articulated assumptions for both the current operating environment as well as the likely future. *JV2010* made considerable effort to stress the importance of maintaining the quality of the existing force. This included continuing to recruit high quality enlistees, paying competitive benefits, and maintaining a successful quality of life and quality of work balance.⁴ It also made key assumptions about the operating environment of the future, stating “our most vexing future adversary may be

² Four distinct phases represent this evolution: Phase 1- *Joint Vision 2010* and *Joint Vision 2020*; Phase 2-The implementation of *JV2010* and *JV2020*; Phase 3-The transformation efforts of the Rumsfeld/Meyers’ era and Phase 4-The narrative formed by *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* and the *Joint Operating Environment*.

³ JFCOM, *The JOE: The Joint Operating Environment 2008*, Informs Concept Development and Experimentation, (USFJCOM, Norfolk, VA, November 2008): 4.

⁴ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, 6.

one who can use technology to make rapid improvements in its military capabilities that provide asymmetrical counters to US military strengths, including information technologies.”⁵ Though these two examples are modest in scope, they are an important part of a successful vision statement in that they remain both credible and realistic and they provide a baseline of assumptions for the reader.

In the second phase of the evolution of the vision document, assumptions of the operating environment are largely absent as the *Joint Vision Implementation Plan* concentrated on implementing the vision of *JV2010* and *JV2020*. Operating assumptions again come to the forefront in the third phase of evolution. In both the *Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC)* and the *Evolving Joint Perspective (EJP)* white papers, operational environment assumptions were a major part of the overall message. In fact, the *EJP* devoted nearly half of its fifteen pages to articulation of the operating environment and nearly all of its enclosures to assumptions of the twenty-first century.⁶

The most recent acts of terror against the US homeland exemplify the dangerous and uncertain strategic environment that will likely confront the United States in the future. Increasing political, economic, ethnic and religious divisions...the scarcity of natural resources and the proliferations of dangerous technologies and weaponry are dramatically increasing the range of threats to the US homeland and the nation’s global interests.⁷

Today’s joint vision narrative, or the fourth phase of the evolution, utilizes the *JOE* as a companion document to its operational concepts guide, the *CCJO*. The *JOE* essentially asks the reader to consider three key questions.

1. What future trends will likely affect the Joint Force?

⁵ Ibid., 10-11.

⁶ VCJCS, *An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis Revolution in the 21st Century*, Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, January 2003): 17-43.

⁷ Ibid., 2.

2. What will these trends mean to the Joint Force?

3. What are the implications of those trends?⁸

To answer these questions, the 51 page *JOE* provides a great deal of detail on the environmental constants, trends, and the contextual world. The *JOE* challenges the reader to seek out a broader understanding of the operating environment through deep intellectual study of history and an open mind.⁹ The *JOE* remains a living document and continues to change and adapt to new realities over time.¹⁰

This very mature approach to studying the operating environment as a part of a ‘vision’ has its roots in *JV2010*. The modest assumptions about the environment proposed in *JV2010* are not as important for their accuracy as they are for their additive structure to the success of a vision document. A credible, realistic ‘vision’ cannot be communicated without assumptions and the operating environment is the best place to start. Today’s *JOE* is certainly the most detailed and useful. While not as detailed as today’s *JOE*, the assumptions and the articulation of the operating environment made in *JV2010* links directly with those of its successors and to that end demonstrates both continuity of purpose and of content.

Articulating Desired Concepts for the Joint Force – The second element of *JV2010* worth examining is its articulation of desired concepts. While the value of assumptions of the operating environment introduced in *JV2010* can be seen in today’s *JOE*, assessing the articulation of desired concepts has proven to be more troublesome. Due of the sheer difficulty of the task and the ever-changing business of Pentagon

⁸ JFCOM, *The JOE: The Joint Operating Environment 2008*, 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹⁰ Interview with Col Bob Fawcett, USMC, (Ret), a former JFCOM Planner, revealed the *JOE* is intended to be updated frequently, perhaps annually by JFCOM, Center for Joint Futures (J59).

acquisition, leaders have shifted away from a useful, narrow articulation of concepts and instead espouse the adoption of a broader, more generalized description.

It is important to understand the terms of reference when discussing this element – *military capabilities* and *joint concepts*.¹¹ In this paper, concepts lead to capabilities. Indeed, the purpose of *JV2010* and subsequent joint vision documents is to “provide a common direction for our Services in developing their unique *capabilities*.”¹² *JV2010* proved especially valuable in providing a framework for the Services to harness their full effort at synchronizing capabilities toward four stated operational *concepts* - dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics.¹³ General Charles Link captured this idea extremely well in his 1996 *Joint Force Quarterly* article,

Each service is responsible for developing competencies to prevail in its medium, training to common standards, and presenting its role to the nation. The joint force commander fits these assets into a cohesive warfighting team, fueled by professional pride, operating with joint doctrine and trained for a common purpose. *JV 2010* provides a conceptual underpinning for assembling service core competencies to conduct fully joint military operations.¹⁴

Link recognized that without a unifying joint vision the Services would expend valuable resources in chasing the acquisition of capabilities that may not serve the interests of the warfighter. In essence, this constitutes the full importance of articulating desired

¹¹ DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms – *Military Capability* - The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set) *Joint Concept* - Links strategic guidance to the development and employment of future *Joint Force* capabilities and serve as "engines for transformation" that may ultimately lead to doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) and policy changes.

¹² CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, 1.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Charles D. Link, “21st Century Armed Forces-Joint Vision 2010” *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 70.

concepts.¹⁵

While Link and many other readers recognized the value of *JV2010*'s operational concepts, a dramatic change in the way the Defense Department looked at acquisition was in the works. Capabilities based planning and acquisition gained strong support and recognition in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and has been a fixture ever since.¹⁶ In 2003, the CJCS instituted the Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System (JCIDS) process as a capabilities-based approach to inform acquisition. This process replaced the 30-year-old Requirements Generation System (RGS), which was a threat based planning system.¹⁷ This shift marked a significant change in the way joint vision documents would articulate desired concepts. Presumably, the institution of a capabilities-based approach to planning through the formal JCIDS process (unlike the old RGS) would ensure all future capabilities were interoperable. Essentially, this process served the same purpose as *JV2010* in that it provided a "...common direction for our Services in developing their unique capabilities within a joint framework..."¹⁸ The JCIDS process had a dramatic influence on the articulation of concepts in successive joint vision documents. Though a detailed examination of JCIDS and acquisition is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to recognize that the adoption of JCIDS has served to force the Services to consider each other's capabilities and acts as a joint capability implementer in and of itself. This shift is readily apparent in today's *CCJOV3*. Beyond

¹⁵ In examining this element for continuity, it must be understood that any CJCS vision document lacks authority to directly impact Service capability acquisition. JCIDS, PPBES and the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) drive Service acquisition within DOD.

¹⁶ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Congressional Requirement, (Washington, DC, September 30, 2001), Chapter 2.

¹⁷ Stephen Howard Chadwick, "Defense Acquisition: Overview, Issues, and Options for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress* (June 4, 2007): CRS-4.

¹⁸ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, 1.

its name, which excludes the word vision and instead adds “concept”, the *CCJOV3*’s fundamental thrust is guidance on how the Joint Force will operate in the future to meet the nation’s security challenges.¹⁹ Though fundamentally organized in the same three-element structure as *JV2010*, *CCJOV3* focuses on common operating *precepts* vice *concepts*. (It still contains assumptions on the operating environment and implications for organizations.) These operational precepts supplement subordinate joint operating concepts and are (necessarily) very broad. Instead of offering dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics as operational concepts, the *CCJOV3* offers four types of military activity to provide a basis for concept development – combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction.²⁰

As an articulation of desired concepts, these four types of military activities are not particularly novel or useful to the Service planner. To be sure, neither these activities nor any broad precepts provide the same sort of “conceptual underpinning for assembling service core competencies” that General Link spoke of when referring to *JV2010*. While the utility of four operational concepts that led to full spectrum dominance was a novel idea at the time, it was difficult to implement. Today, the matching of capabilities and concepts remain a challenge.

Implications for the Organizations that Constitute the Joint Force – The third and final element of a joint vision document ties together the operating environment and the desired capabilities to create a better Joint Force. General Shalikashvili stated this very simply and very elegantly in *JV2010*. “We need organizations and processes that

¹⁹ CJCS, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0*, Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, January 2009): 12.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 36.

are agile enough to exploit emerging technologies and respond to diverse threats and enemy capabilities.”²¹ While assumptions about the operating environment remain necessary, they are subject to the reader’s interpretation and do indeed change over time. The same can be said of desired capabilities and concepts. The ability of an organization to be agile enough to respond to “diverse threats and enemy capabilities” is an enduring reality for the Armed Forces. The ability of an organization to link together environmental assumptions and capabilities and concepts should remain a part of every vision document.

JV2010 emphasized a small number of key features that lead to organizational agility. Evolution of command structure, increased pace and scope of operations, refinement of force structure, knowledgeable leadership, and maintenance of core Service competencies remain desirable attributes for both Services and COCOMs and are present in each of the joint vision documents.²² General Shalikashvili intended these features (of organizational agility) to lead specifically to full spectrum dominance, but other joint vision documents use them to focus a number of desired capabilities and concepts. As mentioned in Chapter Four, *JV2010* leans heavily on technology and information superiority to achieve full spectrum dominance. General Shalikashvili recognized that this would require increased education, professionalism and very high quality people. Implicit in this recognition is the ability of an organization to change. Organizational agility was the first step in this change.

Though the second phase of the evolution of a vision document is a process for implementation, the *Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (JIMP)* provides an

²¹ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, 31.

²² *Ibid.*, 29.

excellent example of the emphasis on organizational agility. A key element of the *JIMP* was recognition that transformation towards the Joint Vision goal of full spectrum dominance would require “adaptation” across the “range of joint DOTMLPF to meet high tempo and high technology demands posed by these new concepts.”²³ This adaptation within the DOTMLPF framework provides one broad example, which seems especially useful in the ‘organize, train and equip’ role of the Services. In a sense, the *JIMP* viewed organizational agility and the ability to adapt as the means to link *JV2010s*’ concepts to Joint Force capabilities.

The 2003 *Joint Operations Concept (JOpsC)* provides an example better suited for the warfighter (Geographic Combatant Commander). The *JOpsC* recognized that organizational agility was the only way to “accomplish assigned missions” and be “capable of conducting rapidly executable, globally and operationally distributed, simultaneous and sequential operations.” The *JOpsC* recognized the warfighter would need to “develop and exploit opportunities faster than an adversary can adapt.”²⁴ This desirable ability is both a great example of organizational agility and a necessary by-product of the new technologically superior Joint Force touted in *JV2010*.

Today’s *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* provides the most salient commentary on the need for organizational agility. The *CCJOV3* is in itself an expression of the need for an organization to be agile enough to meet the needs of a nation facing a vast array of national security challenges. As stated earlier in this chapter, the *CCJOV3* turns its focus away from specific capabilities and towards a variety of

²³ CJCS, *Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan (JIMP)*, CJCS Instruction, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, April 2001): A-1. (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities).

²⁴ Joint Staff (J-7), *Joint Operations Concepts*, Concept paper, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, November 2003): 9.

operating precepts that are useful to accomplish a range of military operations. The *CCJOV3* utilizes three “broad ideas” to articulate this need for organizational agility. It cautions commanders to:

1. Address each situation on its own terms, in unique political and strategic context, rather than attempting to fit the situation into a preferred template.
2. Conduct and integrate a combination of combat, security, engagement and relief and reconstruction activities according to a concept of operations designed to meet the unique circumstances of that situation.
3. Conduct operations subject to a continuous assessment of results in a relation to expectations, modifying both the understanding of the situation and subsequent operations accordingly.²⁵

CCJOV3 clearly does not have the same intention for organizational agility as the relatively straightforward *JV2010*. While Shalikashvili needed organizational agility for the attainment of full spectrum dominance, Chairman Mullen’s *CCJOV3* regards organizational agility as a far higher order of necessity required for the entire Joint Force. It views organizational agility as a prerequisite to meet the nation’s national security demands. As an element of joint vision, the need for organizational agility remains an enduring, desirable trait.

Today, the value of *JV2010* lies in its continuity, which is a direct result of its novel, three-element framework. In the fourteen years since its publication, these three themes are evident in every vision document effort. This framework, consisting of the assumptions of the operating environment, the articulation of desired concepts for the

²⁵ CJCS, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Version 3.0*, 12.

joint force, and the implications for each defense organization, remain the framework for the modern *JOE/CCJO* narrative that guides today's joint force. The detail in which these documents focus on these three elements has changed and will probably continue to change over time, but that does not lessen the impact or value of *JV2010*. The architects of the next version of a joint vision document, whether it is an update of today's *JOE/CCJO* or a completely new document should continue this three-element theme and build on the theme's proven success.

“It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”

-Yogi Berra

Chapter 6

SHORTFALLS AND CRITICISM

The introduction of almost every new concept invites criticism and *JV2010* was no different. At the heart of *JV2010* was the ability to make full spectrum dominance (FSD) a key characteristic of “our Armed Forces in the 21st century.”¹ This characteristic grew from the adoption of the operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics through rapid advances in technology and information superiority.² The assertion that technology and information superiority will make FSD possible lies at the heart of much of the criticism of *JV2010*. In order to form an acceptable examination of the criticism of *JV2010*, it is useful to view the first two elements of *JV2010*’s organizational structure introduced and examined throughout this paper. In an examination of these elements, one can see the implications of technology and information superiority in a different light. First, the assumptions of the operating environment invite well-argued criticism by a number of respected military theorists. Colin Gray, Charles Dunlap, and Anthony Cordesman provide weight to the idea that technology and information superiority will prove less useful than the authors of *JV2010* suggest. Lastly, the forward thinking military leaders General James Mattis and Retired Lt. General Paul K. Van Riper, USMC, provide useful amplification of the problems of *articulating and implementing operational concepts* - problems that still vex

¹ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, Vision Document, (The Joint Staff, Washington, DC, 1996): 2.

² *Ibid.*, 1.

the Armed Forces today.

Has the Operating Environment Really Changed? – Renowned strategist Colin Gray’s white paper *How Has War Changed since the End of the Cold War* provides useful clarification on the assumption that a transformation in technology and information superiority will yield the results articulated in *JV2010*.³ “We can predict that although the transformation push may well succeed and be highly impressive in its military –technical accomplishments, it is likely to miss the most vital marks.”⁴ The vital marks to which Gray refers, lead one to perhaps the most profound element of criticism of *JV2010*. It infers that technology will lead to battle efficiency, but will not necessarily win wars. Gray offers amplification. “The military potential of this transformation, as with all past transformations, is being undercut by the unstoppable process of diffusion which spread technology and ideas.”⁵ The thrust of this criticism is that technology and information superiority are not nearly as useful as *JV2010* predicts. *JV2010* rightly assumes that technology on the battlefield will grow rapidly, but perhaps fails to recognize the enemy will realize the fruits of technological advances as well.

As we consider the potential to achieve full spectrum dominance (FSD) on the battlefield, military scholar Col Charles R. Dunlap, USAF, provides a prescient example of the duality of military technology and raises concerns about the proliferation of technology that threatens *JV2010*’s march toward FSD. In a direct counterpoint to *JV2010*, Dunlap asserts, “the information explosion engendered by new technologies may

³ Gray does not specifically direct his comment at *JV2010*, it is a comment on the drive towards transformation.

⁴ Colin S. Gray, *How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?* (Paper prepared for the Conference on the “Changing Nature of Warfare”, May 2004), 12.

⁵ Ibid.

not let any combatant achieve superiority, much less dominance.”⁶ The influence of a modern, self-sustaining news organization provides a great example of the overestimation of the advantage obtained by information dominance. The reach of today’s news organizations is not limited to friendly forces. “With immense quantities of information available from the global media, what need will there be for our future enemies to spend money building extensive intelligence capabilities?”⁷ The implication is the enemy will enjoy the same advantage of real time battlefield surveillance as the technologically superior, and much more heavily invested, friend or ally. Besides this cheap form of intelligence, tomorrow’s enemies will have access to an extensive array of commercial satellites that are a product of newer, cheaper technology.⁸ In both cases, the advantage of information superiority is not nearly as useful today as originally thought in *JV2010*. In another example of the future operating environment, Dunlap correctly predicts that precision, high tech weapons will not be as effective as envisioned in *JV2010*. The problems brought on by burying critical nodes of communication and leadership and by “playing on the legal and moral conundrums” brought on by precision attacks would all diminish the characteristic of FSD.⁹ This criticism of precision strike and FSD are especially poignant in light of today’s conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan where the consequences of mis-directed kinetic strikes have lasting impacts. Though irregular warfare was an important part of the operating environment described in *JV2010*, the

⁶ Charles J. Dunlap Jr. “21st-Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths,” *Parameters*, (Autumn 1997), under “Future Land Warfare,” <http://www.usamhi.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/97autumn/dunlap.htm> (accessed August 18, 2009).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

implications of FSD in such a conflict are open to criticism.¹⁰

Writing in 2000, Anthony Cordesman challenged a different set of assumptions in *JV2010* – those that lead to the *attainment* of these desired technology advances. In *The Military Effectiveness of Desert Fox: A Warning About the Limits of the Revolution in Military Affairs and Joint Vision 2010*, Cordesman directly responds to the assertion that the Armed Forces have the resources and ability to attain the desired technology advances. Cordesman’s criticism actually involves all three-elements of *JV2010*. Cordesman’s chief criticism asserts that the desired technological advances and increased human costs of *JV2010* are unobtainable. In an example of the former, Cordesman argues,

Joint Vision 2010 ignores the real world problems of money and all of the historical uncertainties inherent in actually deploying advanced military technology in the field at the proper time with the estimated effectiveness. The U.S. is, after all, a country that has never developed a single major combat system to the troops in combat effective form in the last quarter century.¹¹

This scathing criticism assumes that the U.S. Armed Forces do not possess the wherewithal to attain FSD. Indeed, this criticism questions the ability to turn concepts into capabilities as well as the organizational agility to bring them to the battlefield. In addressing the latter, Cordesman states, “We are not facing up to the human costs of the RMA (Revolutionary Military Affair) and *Joint Vision 2010*. Our military...are grossly underpaid by comparable standards...we are not funding proper levels of readiness, and we are grossly over-deploying them outside of the United States...”¹² Again, Cordesman

¹⁰ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, 10-11.

¹¹ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Military Effectiveness of Desert Fox: A Warning About the Limits of the Revolution in Military Affairs and Joint Vision 2010*, (Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2000), 5-6.

¹² *Ibid.*, 6.

is directly challenging the assertions of investment in human capital and the focus on high quality people assumed in *JV2010*.¹³

All three of these critics present sound arguments that point to weaknesses in the assumptions of the operating environment that are critical to the argument espoused in Shalikhvili's *JV2010*. To be fair, *JV2010* addressed much of this criticism in 1996, but the scope and depth of the vision probably did not provide the sufficiency or context necessitated by today's conflicts in the GWOT. As important as technology and information superiority are to FSD, all three of these critics argue they are difficult to attain, may not be achievable, and may not even apply.

Today, one must consider the lengthy war on terrorism and ask if the Department of Defense relied too heavily on the power of FSD? Or has the DOD simply failed to attain the original vision? The answer probably lies somewhere in the middle. *JV2010*'s vision of FSD is powerful and well suited to conventional, existential threats to the nation stemming from a peer power that potentially seeks its own version of FSD. Unfortunately, the difficulties stemming from today's conflicts in the Middle East do not offer an opportunity for the Armed Forces to shape the battlefield with FSD. Today's engagements are, in fact, irregular. Irregular meaning that conventional power and conflict resolution, or the ability to wage and win a conflict, require a different skill set than the "regular" skills forecasted in *JV2010*. The concepts introduced in *JV2010* were very difficult to implement and FSD is a capability that, in the best case, remains elusive, and in the worst case, may not be particularly useful to today's warfighter.

Integrating Concepts into Useful Doctrine - Understanding how new concepts fit

¹³ CJCS, *Joint Vision 2010 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, 5.

in a military organization is just as important as technology. The *JV2010* element, “articulation of concepts,” leads to a subtler, but no less important criticism. *JV2010*’s espousal of four operational concepts to lead to the achievement of FSD brings to light an important problem not anticipated by General Shalikashvili – the difficult relationship between concepts and doctrine.¹⁴ General James Mattis, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, articulates this difficulty very well in a 2009 Memorandum for U.S. Joint Forces Command - *Joint Concept Development Vision*. General Mattis argues concepts “propose alternatives to existing doctrine,” “are not authoritative” and “are not restrained by existing policy, treaties, laws-or even the physical limits of existing technology.”¹⁵ In contrast, doctrine “provides authoritative guidance on how the organization ought to operate within current capabilities. It therefore provides the basis for current education and training. Doctrine is subject to existing policy and legal constraints.”¹⁶ General Mattis does not eschew concepts, rather he warns of the danger of a proliferation of concepts, or even worse, disingenuous concepts. “Under the current system, concepts have proliferated to the point that their sheer number confounds meaningful analysis.”¹⁷ He goes on to say, “New concepts often are initiated by bureaucratic fiat vice conceptual need –to fill a predetermined hierarchy, lend weight to a new office, or justify a new assessment.”¹⁸ It is important to note these comments were not a response to the concepts proposed in *JV2010*, but a refutation of DOD’s implementation of these and

¹⁴ *DoD, Dictionary of Military Terms*, s.v. “Joint Doctrine” - Fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective.

¹⁵ JFCOM, *Joint Concept Development Vision*, (Memorandum for US Joint Forces Command, JFCOM, Norfolk, VA, May 2009): 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

other concepts. Nonetheless, his commentary on the relationship between concepts and doctrine is relevant.

General Mattis' overarching concern is that a military organization needs to focus its development of concepts on those matters that truly deserve attention. The DOD is too heavily engaged to expend resources needlessly on concept testing and experimentation if there is no requirement or there is already an existing doctrinal solution.¹⁹ This recent Memorandum (May 2009) applies to *JV2010* as much as it applies to concept development today. Indeed, General Shelton recognized the link between *JV2010* and doctrine. In a commentary on the need to operationalize *JV2010*, Shelton remarked, "As new systems come on-line, as new operational concepts evolve, our joint doctrine will evolve as well. To turn joint doctrine into reality, we plan to conduct an extensive series of joint war-fighting experiments."²⁰ Given both Shelton's thoughts about the relationships of concepts to doctrine and General Mattis' views on the necessity of doctrine, the precepts proposed in *CCJOV3* are better understood. A precept infers an axiom or an idea that is thought to be true, a concept simply infers or articulates an idea. In this light, the *CCJOV3* is a natural progression of a vision once comprised only of concepts. Generals Shalikashvili and Shelton must have certainly thought that their supported concepts would eventually form into precepts or doctrine. I think General Mattis would agree.

A Persistent Problem with New Concepts – The noted military theorist and historian Michael Howard provides another framework for development of operational

¹⁹ Ibid., 5-10.

²⁰ Shelton, Henry H. "Operationalizing Joint Vision 2010," *Air University-Airpower Website*, (Fall 1998), <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/fal98/shelton.htm> (accessed August 18, 2009).

concepts that critics readily apply to *JV2010*. More than 20 years before *JV2010*, Howard stated that the progress of military science within a military bureaucracy is the result of interplay between operational requirement, technological feasibility and financial capability.²¹ Howard proposed that operational requirement was the element that most concerned the military scientists and strategists, the latter two elements being largely outside the control of the military.²² Operational requirements required the most intellectual thinking because, “with inadequate thinking about operational requirements, the best technology and the biggest budget in the world will only produce vast quantities of obsolete equipment...”²³ This observation remains central to criticism of the proposed operational concepts in *JV2010*. Howard observes that without the highest order of intellectual thinking one can miss the truly vital question – “what do we really need, and why?”²⁴ Indeed, General Van Riper argues that operational concepts, especially those espoused by the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff in the wake of the astounding victory of Desert Storm in 2001, “...focused on technical developments at the expense of the well-founded ideas drawn from the U.S. military’s intellectual renaissance of the 1980s.”²⁵ Like many of the other noted theorists and strategists mentioned in this chapter, General Van Riper did not direct his criticism specifically at *JV2010*. His criticism is an extension of Howard’s assessment that truly useful development of operational concepts suffers from a lack of intellectual rigor and “realize[d] that the U.S.

²¹ Michael Howard, “Military Science in an Age of Peace,” *Royal United Services Institute Journal* (March 1974): 3-11.

²² *Ibid.*, 5.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁵ Paul K. Van Riper, “Thinking About Future Military Operations,” (Symposium paper, 2008 Joint Operations Symposium, National Defense University, Washington, DC, June 2008). 2.

military's operational concept for wars of insurgency is deficient."²⁶ Clearly, Van Riper does not believe that *JV2010*'s efforts to obtain FSD are as valuable to the warfighter as General Shalikashvili proposed they would be in the year 2010. Van Riper directs his most stinging criticism at today's force development processes that transform operational concepts into realities, or capabilities for the warfighter. Of the complex JCIDS process discussed earlier in Chapter Five, Van Riper says, "...sending the confusing products it produces through a dysfunctional staff process, a process that wastes vast resources while turning the little that is good into a pap that won't threaten service equities...this system serves only to keep contractors and bureaucrats occupied filling reams of paper with material of little use to the warfighters."²⁷

This poignant criticism of the process the Department of Defense uses to turn concepts into capabilities leads one to understand the difficulties faced by General Shalikashvili in implementing and transforming his vision into reality. The criticism of both the impacts of technology and operating concepts is fair. To be sure, predicting how technology will affect the battlefield and how to fight the conflicts of tomorrow are difficult, but reasonable questions. In all cases, open and direct criticism will aid the development of future vision, concepts, and doctrine. In the words of General Van Riper "The U.S. military is exceptionally proficient at employing its military decision-making process to solve military problems, especially when those problems are well structured."²⁸ At best, further criticism of vision documents and concepts will aid military planners as they re-assess and restructure views towards the future.

²⁶ Ibid., 6.

²⁷ Ibid., 3.

²⁸ Ibid., 7.

“It is a terrible thing to see, and have no vision.”

-Helen Keller (1880-1968)

Chapter 7

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Brief Summary - *Joint Vision 2010* and its long line of successors have had a tremendous impact on today’s vision narrative. Both the *JOE* and the *CCJOV3* continue to communicate the overall vision of how tomorrow’s armed forces will face the nation’s defense challenges. The challenges examined by the Base Force study and the Bottom-Up Review had a direct impact on the purpose of the 1995 CORM and it, in turn, led to the 1996 publication of General Shalikashvili’s *Joint Vision 2010*. The Shalikashvili-led Joint Staff recognized the need to incorporate the classic elements of vision and the tremendous challenge of implementation. The elements of a tangible image, effective communication, shared values, a path towards implementation and inspiration are integral to effective vision and the prolonged evolution of operational vision documents defines this difficult task. This evolution, when examined through the four phases presented here tracks this difficult process. *JV2010* and *JV2020* set the course towards full spectrum dominance; the *CFJO* and the *JOpsC* series of documents attempted to provide the means of implementation; the Rumsfeld/Meyers administration elected a path that focused on transformation; while the subsequent publication and adoption of the narrative of the *JOE* and the *CCJO* is a mix of all three previous phases. Though distinct in their approach to vision, each phase continued to focus on the establishment of a common, forecasted operational environment in which the Joint Force would operate, an articulation of the

operational concepts in order to produce the capabilities that tomorrow's Joint Force commander would need, and an emphasis on the need for organizational agility across the vast spectrum of organizations that constitute the Department of Defense. This tremendous task is exceedingly difficult and proves to be a lasting problem. If history is any judge, the template that the architects of *JV2010* chose to construct their vision remains sound. This template introduced by *JV2010* continues to provide a sound means for conveying vision. The common operational environment has matured into today's *JOE* and the operational concepts (or today's precepts) and implications for organizational agility are the focus of today's *CCJOV3*. The means by which DOD converts concepts into capabilities remain a challenge; moreover, the authors of *JV2010* underestimated the cumbersome JCIDS process, the new capability development processes, and the resistant pull of Service equities. Additionally, the apparent reliance on technology and innovation to achieve full-spectrum dominance is open for a great deal of criticism. Indeed, today's conflicts seem to prove that the four operational concepts proposed by *JV2010* do not necessarily add to the Geographic Combatant Commander's ability to meet the irregular, often asymmetric challenges faced in the GWOT.

Product or Process? It is a fair question to consider whether *JV2010* is useful as a product or as a process. As a product, *JV2010* provided two extremely valuable elements that remain with us today. An examination of today's *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations* reveals the legacy of Chairman Shalikashvili's four operational concepts. The concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics combined with the existing core competencies of command and control and intelligence to makeup up the six basic groups of joint functions utilized by

today's Joint Force commanders.¹ Indeed, these joint functions still make up six of the eight joint functional concepts in today's portfolio of joint operating concepts in *JOpsC*.² Prior to *JV2010*, one could argue that there was no concise, articulation of joint operational concepts to guide the Services. Early versions of *Joint Publication 3-0* merely captured similar operational concepts under the guise of "Principles of War" or "Contributions to Operations," primarily describing their functional domains, e.g., air operations, land operations, maritime operations, space operations and special forces operations.³ Clearly, the codification of today's joint functions is more than just coincidence. *JV2010* articulated key operational concepts that transcended older, domain-oriented "contributions" and created concepts that remain valuable to the Joint Force commander today.

The second valuable element of *JV2010* is the adoption of the three-element architecture that continues to provide the bedrock for today's joint vision. The successor documents to *JV2010* vary widely in their approach to the articulation and implementation of a common vision as a "conceptual template," but a thread of continuity remains. DOD leaders remain committed to a forecast of the operating environment, an articulation of concepts, and the importance of organizational agility. The approach to today's narrative is the correct approach. Indeed, today's narrative of the *JOE* and the *CCJO* represent this very architecture. As a process, it is useful to take a more retrospective look at *JV2010*.

¹ According to *JP 3-0, Joint Operations*, the six basic joint functions available to the **Joint Force** commander are command and control, intelligence, joint fires, maneuver and movement, protection and sustainment. (Chapter 3).

² Intelligence has been replaced by "Net-Centric", the other two being force management and training. This portfolio of JFCs is maintained in the *JOpC* by the Joint Staff, J-7.

³ *Joint Publication 3-0*, September 9, 1993, A-1, B-1.

A Retrospective Look at the Utility of JV2010 –The passage of time and the examination of the evolution of joint vision documents provide an alternative opinion on the utility of *JV2010*. The combination of the successful prosecution of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the subsequent “downsizing” of the U.S. Armed Forces by the Base Force and BUR actions provided the opportunity for a CJCS joint vision. The CORM and the Chairman both realized the potency and relevance of the U.S. Armed Forces could suffer from inadequate public support and a lack of resources. By 1995, the Defense Department had realized a budget decrease of approximately 38 percent over the previous decade.⁴ It is likely that the CORM and Chairman Shalikashvili realized an innovative joint vision document was necessary to provide a template to guide the armed forces for the efficient use of increasingly austere budget resources *and* to maintain the health and potency of the all-volunteer force in the eyes of the American public and the world. The development of a joint vision offered a way in which the Chairman could focus Service efforts at capability development through the articulation of common operating concepts. The adoption of technology to achieve information superiority and full spectrum dominance provided an avenue for all the Services to maintain existing resources yet continue to seek funds for new capabilities. The astounding array of technological weaponry unleashed against Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf War and the in-depth media coverage of that event gave impetus to this approach. These technological advantages highlighted by CNN and others provided a tangible image for the American people to grasp, and more importantly, to fund. *JV2010* provided a way in which each Service could pursue these new technologies to continue to maintain its

⁴ William S. Cohen, “Quadrennial Defense Review: The Secretary’s Message,” *DISAM Journal* (Summer 1997): 22.

battlefield advantage. Today's narrative of the *JOE* and the *CCJO* provides less opportunity for leveraging concepts into capabilities and more focus on common operational precepts over a vast spectrum of military operations. It is fair to argue that today's DOD budget environment remains austere, but the relevancy and need for a potent all-volunteer force is not in question. Our nation's Armed Forces are often the first response to a variety of security, humanitarian, and disaster relief crises. In today's uncertain global environment, the American people and the civilian leadership of the armed forces need no further convincing to fund a potent, all-volunteer force.

Following through on Joint Vision 2010 – When will the Armed Forces require another long-range vision document? *JV2010*'s operating concepts remain with us today in the *JOpsC* and *Joint Publication 3-0*. Its innovative three-element approach continues on in the narrative of the *JOE* and the *CCJO* and has proven to be successful. Perhaps the next iteration will come at a time when the armed forces look to reset after the GWOT. Right now, it is difficult to predict that time. It is fair to say that, like with the publication of *JV2010*, the next iteration of a vision document will come at a time when the internal and external factors influencing our armed forces demand DOD articulate a new direction. *JV2010* was less about seeking change than it was about influencing a large bureaucratic organization towards a better, more productive future. The leadership scholars Bennis and Nanus capture this sentiment very well in their book *Leaders*.


When the organization has a clear sense of its purpose, direction, and desired future state and when this image is widely shared, individuals are able to find their own roles both in the organization and in the larger society of which they are a part. This empowers individuals and confers status upon them because they can see themselves as part of a worthwhile enterprise.⁵

⁵ Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1985), 90-91.

In this sense, vision is not just a tool it is a responsibility of the leader. Empowering individuals to make an organization better is precisely why General Shalikashvili and the CORM used the word vision. It is a powerful word and when used properly, provides powerful results. Whenever our nation calls for the next iteration of a joint vision, it will serve its author well to keep in mind the basic elements of vision. A future vision must convey a tangible image, effectively communicate that image, leverage shared values, provide a path for implementation, and, above all, serve to inspire the reader. *JV2010* attempted to provide all those elements and its immediate success and lasting heritage is a result of those efforts. Unfortunately, while elements of *JV2010*'s structure and operational concepts endure, today's narrative suffers from a gradual diminishment of the original documents elements of vision. Where *JV2010* tantalized the reader with the image of a technological superior force capable of achieving full spectrum dominance, it is doubtful anyone can conjure up a similar image from the *CCJO*. *JV2010*'s value lies in its structure, its proven elements of vision, and its longevity. The long line of successor documents is a tribute to its value to jointness. Above all else, for a brief period of time, *Joint Vision 2010* inspired an entire Defense Department to look forward and grasp the future.

Appendix A

Evolution of Joint Vision



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CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Name: Christopher E. Sund, Virginia Beach, VA

Current Position: Student, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College,
Norfolk, VA

Professional Affiliations / Memberships:

Member, University of Wisconsin – La Crosse Alumni Association

Member, Tailhook Association; Member, Society of Military History

ACADEMIC BACKGROUND

In-Progress **Masters of Science in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy**, Joint Advanced
Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA

2005 **Air Command and Staff College**

1987 **Bachelor of Arts in Political Science**, University of Wisconsin-La Crosse

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

Commander, United States Navy:

1989 Completed Aviation Officers Candidate School, Pensacola, FL

1989 Student, Naval Flight Officer, VT-10, Pensacola, FL

1991-1994 Naval Flight Officer, VAW-117, NAS Miramar, CA

1995-1996 Student, U.S. Navy Pilot training, Corpus Christi, TX/Pensacola, FL

1997-2000 Pilot, VAW-112, NAS PT. Mugu, CA

2001 Assistant Operations Officer, N35, Commander Airborne Early Warning Wing
Pacific, Pt. Mugu, CA

2001-2003 Operations Officer, VAW-117, Pt. Mugu, CA

2003-2006 Action Officer, The Joint Staff, Pentagon, Arlington, VA

2006-2009 Commanding Officer, VAW-123, NAS Norfolk, VA