An Examination of the Cultural and Historical Factors That Influence The USA and Her Partners’ Approach to Military Coalitions: Two Sides of the same Dime.

This thesis will look at the variety of cultural and historical factors that influence a country’s attitude to joining and performing within a military coalition. The context is the broad American-led coalition involved in fighting Al Qaeda and other Jihadist organisations. For the purposes of the thesis, America’s coalition partners are divided into two broad camps: her traditional European allies and the newer, but strategically vital Muslim states of the Middle East and Indian sub-continent.

Europeans share a common heritage with the United States. This heritage and a European disposition for collective defence and diplomacy make them natural partners. However, the threat is from Al Qaeda and its Networks (AQN) that have emerged from the Middle East. There is little shared cultural history with this part of the world, but the support of this region’s nation states is key to AQN’s defeat. The thesis will highlight the historical and cultural factors of the very different coalition partners. By understanding their differences and their inherent strengths and weaknesses, the United States can build a stronger and more cohesive coalition. The impetus for success is greater than merely defeating AQN. The advent of the Information Age has empowered non-state players and allowed terrorist organisations to undermine legitimate regimes to an extent not previously possible. Sovereign states must learn to come together in flexible and agile coalitions that utilize not just force, but all the elements of National Power in a synchronised manner to defeat such a threat and protect their citizens.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE USA AND HER PARTNERS APPROACH TO MILITARY COALITIONS: TWO SIDES OF THE SAME DIME

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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ABSTRACT

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The thesis will highlight the historical and cultural factors of the very different coalition partners. By understanding their differences and their inherent strengths and weaknesses, the United States can build a stronger and more cohesive coalition. The impetus for success is greater than merely defeating AQN. The advent of the Information Age has empowered non-state players and allowed terrorist organisations to undermine legitimate regimes to an extent not previously possible. Sovereign states must learn to come together in flexible and agile coalitions that utilize not just force, but all the elements of National Power in a synchronised manner to defeat such a threat and protect their citizens.
# CONTENTS

Introduction. 5

I  A Paradigm Shift.
II  The Importance of DIME.
III  The Importance of Coalition Partners within DIME.
IV  Resistance to Change.

Chapter 1 – What is a Coalition? 11
I  What Constitutes a Coalition.
II  An Introduction to ISAF.

Chapter 2 – The United States’ Historical And Cultural Influences. 16
I  A Distrust of Alliances.
II  A Reluctance to Practise Diplomacy.
III  Who Decides on United States Foreign Policy; A Healthy Debate?
IV  The Impact of Healthy Debate – A Case Study
V  Evolution – The Emergence of Regional Strategy

Chapter 3 - European Historical And Cultural Influences 42
I  A Complex DNA.
II  Alternatives to Conflict.
II  Coalition Diplomacy.
III  The Legacy of Empire.
Chapter 4 - Muslim Historical And Cultural Influences.  63

I  Arab and European Legacies.

II  Challenges of the Information Age

II  Grounds for Western Hypocrisy.

III  The Need for Engagement

Chapter 5 – Gulf War I and Learning the Wrong Lessons.  75

I  America Vindicated.

II  Wrong Lessons Learned.

II  The Cost of War.

Chapter 6 – Conclusions.  79

Bibliography  81

Vita
INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s undeniably signalled the collapse of the recognized bi-polar world of Communism and Capitalism and heralded the emergence of an omni-polar world centred on the United States. An obvious paradigm shift had occurred. However, away from the media glare of the collapse of the Berlin War and the emergence of independent states from the darkness of the Warsaw Pact, an equally significant, but subtle and less easily articulated shift was already in progress, one that continues to take the world from the Industrial into the Information Age.

The consequences of the ongoing shift are complex and the implications still not fully understood. However, the global recession has given an insight into the level of interdependence between the economic linkages that characterise the Information Age. At the time of the fall of the Berlin War, economists would have struggled to predict the present uneasy symbiotic trade relationship between the USA and China. Within the military domain, the portent of change was the unprecedented Al Qaeda (AQ) terrorist attack on the USA’s World Trade Centre’s Twin Towers, the Pentagon and United Flight 93 on September 11, 2001.1 One paradigm shift had left the USA as the only remaining military super power, the other left it stunned, and for a short period, militarily emasculated as 2,981 innocent people lost their lives in an attack mounted by only 19 young men.2

Although there is some debate as when the Information Age began, the final two decades of the last century are an accepted starting point. One defining characteristic of this age is

1 Believed to be headed towards either the White House or Capitol Hill
the ability of an individual to garner, manipulate, and publish data free from authority. The World Wide Web (www), affordable satellite television, and inexpensive mobile telephones are all technologies inextricably linked to the Information Age. These technologies, many of which have a symbiotic relationship with defence applications, have globalized markets, linked dispersed ethnic communities, and allowed individuals to challenge states for control of the ‘hearts and minds’ of their citizens. AQ and earlier Jihadist organizations have proven themselves adept at exploiting these technologies to wage war against the United States and where possible neutralize the conventional advantage enjoyed by America and her coalition partners. In essence, they have trumped America’s omni-polar status by exploiting the technologies of the Information Age.

Information Age technologies have not only empowered the terrorist, but the associated globalisation has reduced the likelihood of conventional war between states. Action in pursuit of National Interests must extend beyond the application of military power to encompass what the British refer to as ‘a Whole of Government Approach’ to the ordered application and synchronisation of all the instruments of National Power, commonly referred to as DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic). This situation presents a challenge for the United States. The nation remains without equal as a modern day military super-power practiced at exerting military power in order to attain its National Interests. The imperative to protect its citizens from further terrorist attacks by defeating AQ and its supporting Networks (AQN) is no exception. However, as the occupation of Iraq has highlighted, the American government has historically been less adept at coordinating the remaining instruments of National Power to achieve its political and strategic ends once the shooting stops. The effort to restore a functioning Iraqi government in the aftermath of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ is a recent example. The American led Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) struggled to co-ordinate any meaningful inter-agency activity in the rebuilding of Iraq and its capital. Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s acclaimed history of the CPA, entitled *Imperial Life In The Emerald City*, illustrates the disconnects, confusion and sometimes out-right hostility that pervaded the inter-agency contribution to the dysfunctional CPA.3

There is no doubt that the United States learnt from the challenges faced by the CPA in Iraq and the wider Bush Administration on the world stage. While there are still occasions when the United States may chose to employ the M in DIME unilaterally, the DIE instruments are more effective when supported by international consensus. Coercive measures, such as sanctions are notably less effective applied unilaterally. The United States’ National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasizes “the need to strengthen alliances” and to “work with others to defuse regional conflicts.”4 These themes reoccur and are expanded in the myriad of supporting documentation that flows from the NSS. Although the NSS dates from the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration has pronounced similar themes making it abundantly clear that this element of strategy transcends administrations.

**Strengthen Our Alliances and Partnerships**

We are committed to strengthening existing alliances and partnerships and building new ones to confront current challenges. Additionally, to boost global partnership capacity, we will support funding to allow the increased training and equipping of foreign militaries to undertake counter terrorism and stability operations. As the threat posed by al-

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3 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life In The Emerald City* (New York; Random House, 2006). He is the National Editor of the Washington Post and previous Bagdad bureau chief.

Qaeda is international in scope; the response should also be international.

**Use All Elements of American Power**

To meet today’s challenges, the United States must harness our military, diplomatic, economic, information, legal, and moral strength in an integrated and balanced fashion. The President is committed to building our civilian national security capacity so that the burden for stability operations is not disproportionately absorbed by our military.\(^5\)

Thus, even in the age of the supposed omni-polar US power, coalitions will continue to play an important role in the shaping and execution of American policy. This thesis will examine the cultural and historical factors that have shaped the American approach to coalitions as well as that of her chosen partners. In order to limit the scope of the thesis, the examination will focus on the major countries engaged in the fight against AQN. An appreciation of these cultural and historic influences is important. Many countries are involved in this fight, representing a multitude of peoples, cultures, and religions. Some, such as the UK are traditional allies of the USA; others such as Pakistan are new, perhaps even reluctant allies. A few, like Saudi Arabia are in the bifurcated position of supplying both coalition troops and the enemy. Clearly, a thorough understanding of each nation’s strengths and weaknesses is essential if America is to generate a meaningful strategy that draws on the DIME capabilities of her coalition partners.

The coordination of DIME between coalition partners is a challenge. In later chapters, the thesis will examine the historical factors that either repel or draw nations to coalitions. Traditionally, America has fallen into the former camp. The United States’ mastery of

Industrial Age warfare has resulted in an American mindset that favours a unilateral military solution. A stunning military success achieved against Iraqi forces during the First Gulf War of February 1991 reinforced this perspective. However, this brief war was unrepresentative of the challenges to come. Recent combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has highlighted the limitations of pre-dominantly kinetic solutions against non-state actors. Moreover, the United States, with its Armed Forces scaled to fight in two nearly simultaneous Major Theatres of War, has struggled to generate the combat power judged by senior Commanders as necessary for success.6

The traditional American reluctance to engage in collective activity, either on or off the battlefield, predates the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As Elizabeth Sherwood-Randal offered in her 2006 work, Alliances and American National Security:

.... alliances have occupied a dubious status in the minds of some strategists and practitioners and, indeed, in a segment of public opinion. Beginning with the Founding Fathers, the preference has been to steer clear of permanent alliances, avoid entangling alliances and only to enter into temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.7

Of course, the words “temporary” and “extraordinary emergencies” are subjective. America’s vital entry into WWII as an Allied Power certainly constituted an “extraordinary emergency.” Her subsequent and ongoing leadership of the highly successful NATO alliance may yet come meet a dictionary definition of temporary, but it has certainly exceeded any practical understanding of the word. One can argue that a similar American commitment exists in Korea. Notwithstanding these ambiguous words, implicit in her

7 Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Alliances and American National Security (Carlisle: US Army War College, 2006), 4. She is a Special Advisor to President Obama and Senior Director for European Affairs within the National Security Staff.
statement is an acknowledgement that the role of history is significant; it shapes a country’s culture and influences its citizens’ perceptions and their decisions. It follows that for any coalition to be successful, it is incumbent on the contributing nations to be able to exploit their inherent cultural strengths and mitigate their weaknesses.

Even if one argues that the current war is an aberration, there are sound economic and diplomatic reasons for seeking a greater understanding of coalition partners. The current USA-centric omni-polar age will pass. There are many indications that China, India and Brazil will be in a position to exercise sufficient economic and military power within one or two generations to signal the end of the USA’s omni-polar status.  Given that strategic and economic reality points to an assured future for coalitions, it would be useful to define the term.

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8For more on the rise of China, India and Brazil, see the UK’s DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007- 2036. http://www.dcdc-strategictrends.org.uk/ (accessed October 19, 2009), especially pages 38 – 42.
CHAPTER 1. WHAT CONSTITUTES A COALITION?

Coalitions are often confused with alliances and indeed an alliance partner may also act a coalition partner for a particular operation. The recently retired British general and former NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR), General Sir Rupert Smith offers a contemporary definition of the two:

An alliance is of a more permanent nature and denotes equality amongst all members; coalitions are usually ad hoc affairs led by one or two powerful members. An alliance is formed in anticipation of the event, in an attempt to deter some course of action, and there is usually some coordination of planning and training to make it more useful. Coalitions are products of a specific event, with the allies joining because they have a shared objective.1

As is often the case, strategic relationships between allies are seldom so neatly defined and the idea of a “shared objective” is likely to be less so. At the operational level, the immediate drawbacks of a coalition are significant. Recent coalition operations in Iraq have highlighted considerable differences in equipment, tactics, authorized Rules and Engagement (ROE) and, not least of all, warfighting ethos. To integrate and employ coalition forces in an expedient fashion is a significant challenge for a military Commander and may limit aspects of its application, particularly for high end war fighting. Moreover, to view a coalition from a purely military perspective is to limit artificially its applicability in the war against AQN. Very few coalition partners can integrate seamlessly with American forces on the battlefield. An appreciation of the cultural strengths of individual partner nations will facilitate a better understanding of where they can and should contribute within the DIME construct.

It is a reflection of the “clock speed” of the Information Age that General Sir Rupert Smith’s recent thoughts do not reflect the emergence of a coalition/alliance hybrid now operating as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.2 Earlier attempts to define a coalition made during the Industrial Age now appear dated and

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irrelevant as well. Harvey Starr’s *Coalitions and Future War: A Dyadic Study of Cooperation and Conflict* (1975) argues statistics and probability can be used to derive a formula for selecting successful coalition partners. As late as the mid-1980s, American political scientists were trying to develop a mathematical model that would “shed some light on the roles that risk attitudes and uncertainty may play in the durability of coalitions.”

Neither this, nor Harvey Starr’s abstract work acknowledges the influences of culture and history as a consideration and are therefore limited in their application.

In a view that has been proven to be far from abstract, Professor Ian Bellany, writing for *The World Today*, argues that the coalition against AQN is simply a shield to be employed by the United States to reduce the odds of a further 9/11 style attack.

But allies do create alternative targets for attack. Since terrorists have a limited capacity to strike, they have to be selective. Simply by existing an ally reduces the probability of a strike on the US; therefore, for Washington allies are worth having. There is literally, safety in numbers. Even if every chance on a roulette does not have exactly the same chance of coming up, the more numbers of the wheel, the less chance of any particular number coming up.

The prophetic analogy to the roulette wheel is useful. Ian Bellany wrote the article in 2002; terrorist bombers struck Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. Both were members of the American led coalition in Iraq. What prompted the Spanish to withdraw from the coalition and the British to stay, relates to their history and culture. Most recently, Pakistan has filled

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5 *The World Today* is the periodical publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, colloquially known as The Chatham House and the origin of the expression Chatham House Rules.

a roulette pocket and has suffered from a wave of terrorist bombings for doing so. The 
emergence of Pakistan as a key coalition partner is a success story that merits deeper 
analysis in a following chapter. However, in brief, her pivotal role in the coalition is a direct 
result of a better American understanding of her cultural strengths and weaknesses. Pakistan 
is not in a position to join the largely western ISAF coalition forces on the battlefield of 
Afghanistan, but her efforts are critical to its success and that of the long-term future of 
Afghanistan.

ISAF is predominantly a NATO-centric coalition authorized by the United Nations 
Security Council to execute a series of United Nations (UN) mandates designed to return to 
peace to Afghanistan. ISAF was requested ISAF under the terms of the Afghan Bonn Agreement of December 2001. Implicit in this mission is the use 
of significant military force to defeat the Taliban and AQN, initially near Kabul, and 
thereafter in the provinces. Although this is an obvious military mission, ISAF is far more 
than just NATO troops in Afghanistan. The NATO civilian Chain of Command and the 
source of its authority, the UN, are synchronising the Diplomatic, Information and Economic 
elements of power at a supranational level. At the lower operational and tactical levels, 
NATO’s well-practised robust Command and Control (C2) structure ensures interoperability 
of equipment and commonality of tactics. As is often the case, NATO member nations will 
attempt to maintain a degree of national veto through differing ROE profiles, but at least 
they will largely originate from a common publication. ISAF has its critics, notably those

7 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1386, 1413, 1444 and 1510.
afgangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm (accessed October 19, 2009)
9 NATO Mc 362/1 (NATO U/C) dated 23 July 2003
within the USA who are frustrated with the reluctance of some NATO members to commit either significant numbers of combat forces, or put them in harm’s way; nevertheless, it represents a step change in coalition operations.

To conclude, the Information Age has changed the nature of relationships between states. As both alliances and coalitions are manifestations of an inter-states relationship, it is understandable that these too, have evolved to meet a state’s need. This evolution has blurred the differences between a coalition and an alliance. The terms remain interchangeable for the purpose of this thesis as the contributing nations’ cultural differences come to the fore in either construct. The key point is that for a coalition to operate effectively in the Information Age, it must operate at the strategic level, supported by all of DIME and cannot rely solely on military activity at the operational level. The present coalition at war against AQN is not simply a roulette board to improve the odds against another domestic terrorist attack against the United States, but the manifestation of “ad hoc modular forces custom-tailored for each mission,” a “para-UN” envisaged by Alvin and Hedi Toffler as early as 1993. To ensure this twenty first century coalition is successful, one must first understand its cultural DNA, the origins of which lie in the eighteenth.

Toffler, War And Anti War, 271-272.
CHAPTER 2. AMERICAN HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES

I – A DISTRUST OF ALLIANCES

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world—so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it.... Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectably defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies. Harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest.¹

George Washington’s famous words penned for his Farewell Address to the People, first published in the Philadelphian newspaper, The Daily American Advertiser in September 1796, are widely quoted as encapsulating an American isolationist foreign policy and particularly its position on alliances with overseas powers.² In reality, he was writing about Great Britain and France; the former already lodged in the American psyche as the natural enemy and the later, the proven coalition partner. Yet the realities of sea power and trade did not support this popular view, and provided the first President with an inconvenient example of the perpetual tension between national values and interests. The same issue confounded the Francophile President Thomas Jefferson:

But in dealing with Britain, Jefferson was checked by the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton’s fiscal system turned on British trade, credit, and power. The treasury coffers were filled with revenue from British trade - revenue that was mortgaged to servicing the huge financial debt.³

These early tensions typify the historic and ongoing American dilemma of balancing a

² Ibid
political perspective that shies away from overseas engagement with the conflicting needs of international commerce and diplomacy. This chapter will examine the historical influences that have led to this dilemma. Some of these influences stem from the construct of the Constitution of the United States of America, while others are born out of contemporary American experiences in the Middle East.

Geography influences history and much of the early American government’s focus was internal, weaving together and later, repairing the fabric of the Union. Certainly, its politicians were well versed with the formation of treaties and alliances. Even a cursory glance of Alan Axelrod’s definitive *American Treaties and Alliances* will highlight a raft of treaties with Indian tribes as well as the Mexicans, the French, the Hawaiians, the Russians and, of course, the Texans. Nevertheless, blessed with massive natural resources and an industrious population buoyed by a healthy influx of skilled immigrants, America could afford to pursue isolationism. Indeed, isolationism is the one “persistent factor in US politics, the origins of which go back to Presidents Washington and Monroe.”

Europeans pondering this issue would do well to reflect on their early imprint on the American conscious. Even before the War of Independence, Great Britain, France, and Spain in concert with their respective colonial militias and allied Indian tribes fought the French and Indian War (1754-1763) on the American continent. Apart from contributing to the onset of the War of Independence, the French and Indian War provided the young

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4 Alan Axelrod, *American Treaties & Alliances*, (Washington DC: The Ian Samuel Group, 2000). For example, on June 23, 1845, the Republic of Texas was formally annexed into the Union in order to safeguard Texas from Mexican invasion.


loyalist Lieutenant Colonel George Washington with an early insight into European alliances and the dangers there within. The ensuing War of Independence (1775 –1783), from which George Washington would emerge as the new nation’s most accomplished general, would only reinforce his perspective. This perspective would later form the foundation of his Farewell Address. As Joseph J Ellis observed in his biography of Washington entitled His Excellency:

(America’s) interests, he was convinced, did not lie across the Atlantic, but across the Alleghenies, in those forests and fields he had explored as a young man. To be sure, Europe was the cockpit of international affairs and the central theatre in the ongoing Anglo-French struggle for global diplomacy. But Washington regarded this as only a sideshow that must not divert attention from the strategic interests of the United States.7

Despite Washington’s isolationist aspirations, within a generation Great Britain and the United States would be at war once more. The War of 1812-15, which many Americans viewed as a “Second War of Independence,” attracted little attention in Great Britain, where it was seen as a displaced operational theatre in the wider war on France. Rightly viewed as a draw by both sides, the war ended soon after Great Britain defeated France.8 In a prophetic glimpse of the future complexity of international trade that characterises the Information Age, the American domestic desire for commemorative pottery decorated with victory scenes was satisfied by the Staffordshire region of England.9

During the American Civil War, the foreign affairs of France and Great Britain gave the Union cause for suspicion. Both European powers, although nominally neutral traded

extensively with the Confederacy. Great Britain actually went as far as building the Confederacy her single most effective warship the CSS Alabama, albeit with a degree of subterfuge to avoid a flagrant breach of neutrality. After a very successful 2 years during which she sank 55 Union merchantmen, her Captain was negotiating to refit in Cherbourg, France where she was surprised and sunk by the USS Kearsarge. Although the Civil war ended in 1865, legal action against the British continued for a further seven years.

After the War, the United States and Great Britain bitterly wrangled over responsibility for damages caused by British built vessels and US claims against Britain were collectively referred to as the Alabama claims……a panel of United States, British, Brazilian, Swiss and Italian arbitrators met in 1872 in Geneva and awarded the United States the sum of $15.5 million in damages, payable by the British government.

American-Spanish relations were equally fraught. There was the legacy of Spanish territorial ambitions that continued half-heartedly after Mexican independence in 1821, and a disastrous war in 1898 that resulted in the loss of not only Spanish Cuba, but also the Philippine Islands, Guam and Puerto Rico. The impact of this and previous European conflicts was both cumulative and considerable. For almost one hundred and fifty years, at intervals of approximately 30 years (once a generation), Europeans had been fighting either, Americans, or each other in America. The only interruption to this pattern occurred when the Americans were, either fighting their close neighbours, the Mexicans, or amongst themselves.

A century and a half of conflict with varying European powers at an impressionable

11 Ibid.
12 Axelrod, American Treaties & Alliances, 79.
13 Ibid, 80.
period in American history left an unflattering legacy. That is, either European powers were untrustworthy and seeking to gain economic advantage at the expense of the United States or, to enter into an alliance with one European power was to court war with another. In 1823, President James Monroe articulated this legacy in a speech to Congress that would later be referred to as the ‘Monroe Doctrine’. This doctrine, albeit modified, continues to temper American Foreign Policy. Given the importance that the rest of America coalition partners (both western and eastern) attach to history in forming their judgments, there is no reason to expect that Americans, with their rich European ancestry (but not allegiance) will be any different. One only has to experience the Thanksgiving and Independence Day celebrations, which originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth century respectively, to appreciate the extent to which Americans are imbued with a sense of their history.

II – AN INABILITY TO PRACTISE DIPLOMACY ON THE WORLD STAGE

George Washington’s influential perceptions of the country’s strategic interests lying within its own borders shaped the size and construct of the United States Department of State. Initially entitled Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of State came into being in July 1789 with Thomas Jefferson as the first Secretary. One could understand his reluctance to return from being America’s ambassador to King Louis XVI in Paris to take up


a department comprising of “several clerks and a part time translator.”16 Naturally, the Department has expanded, but never to the extent viewed as necessary to be, either effective, or well regarded by its employees. Even as recently as the Reagan Administration, the Department’s Under Secretary for Management “was described at the time as being responsible for keeping the Foggy Bottom bureaucracy in paper clips and the embassies stocked with gin and hors d’oeuvres.”17

Another serious and crippling repercussion of the small size of the Department was the fact that Presidents often relied on either their personal contacts with other Heads of State or on close advisers from outside the Department. The US Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (FGR) allegedly resigned in frustration “after continuously hearing second-hand reports from the West German Foreign Ministry of agreements reached independently by Bush and Chancellor Helmut Kohl.”18 This was far from a new phenomenon; Secretary of State Cordell Hull who held office during the critical years of World War II and oversaw quite large increase in staff and budget felt marginalised by President Roosevelt. He wrote, “When I accepted this office, I knew I would be misrepresented, lied about, let down and that there would be humiliations that no man in private life could accept and keep his self-respect. But I made up my mind in advance that I would accept all these things and just do my job.”19 At the risk of portraying too much of a one sided picture, the former US Political Counsellor in the US Embassy Athens, John

16 Ibid
Brady Kiesling, offers a more contemporary insight and one that prompted his resignation in 2003:

When I resigned in protest at the end of February 2003, US diplomacy had lost its role as primary defender of US interests overseas. An ideology of contempt for foreigners had prevailed in Washington and the US military was preparing for bloody regime change in Iraq. The damage to US interests was obvious even before the war began, and not only in the blackening of America’s image overseas. Repairing that damage would take years of brilliant work by every diplomat America had.20

For over two hundred years, its own foundations have handicapped the Department of State. Ironically, the man whose thoughts influenced the Founding Fathers predicted this very danger. In the small library at Monticello, there are portraits of three of Thomas Jefferson’s heroes mounted above the doorway. They are the Englishmen Sir Isaac Newton, Sir Francis Bacon, and the considerably more humble political scientist, Thomas Payne.21 In his seminal work the Rights Of Man, which he dedicated to George Washington, Thomas Payne argues that no type of government has the moral right to dictate the appropriate form of government for future generations.22 Yet, George Washington and the other Founding Fathers, in laying down the landscape of the American political system, could be considered guilty by association with what Thomas Payne referred to as the most “ridiculous and insolent tyrannies” - that of presuming to govern for the next generation.23 Their blueprint for the Department of State is outdated and does not support this generation. In the Information Age, far removed from the paradigm of the Founding Fathers, all the elements

21 The author had the privilege of visiting Monticello during the Christmas Holidays of 2009.
23 Ibid, 9.
of National Power must be synchronised if operational success on the battlefield is to support strategic victory. The present construct and employment of the Department of State does not engender a ‘whole of government approach’.

It would appear from the Department of State’s FY 2010 budget that the Obama Administration has taken the first steps to repair the department. The FY 2010 “budget totals $16.389 billion, an increase of $1.885 billion over the FY2009 estimate.”\textsuperscript{24} The supporting budget summary is both refreshing and pragmatic as much of this additional funding is going to the ‘front line’, creating “1,181 direct funded American positions, of which 517 would be overseas.”\textsuperscript{25} Out of the remaining posts, the Department has allocated significant percentages to providing training in critical languages and increasing Department representation with Defence and inter-agency staffs. However, judging the effectiveness of such an investment is difficult at best. It will take time for these new Foreign Service Officers to learn their languages and trades, and earn trust within their respective communities. If one returns to John Brady Kiesling words, “Repairing that damage would take years of brilliant work by every diplomat America had.”\textsuperscript{26}

The Obama’s Administration efforts to improve the effectiveness of the Department of States must attract bi-partisan support if it is to succeed in the long term. Yet, how does one measure the cost effectiveness of a diplomat, particularly against the backdrop of a necessity for financial constraint? How does one design a metric that captures the effect of a seed planted during a discreet conversation over a coffee that may not come to bear fruit for a decade or more? The answer is simple, one cannot. As Lord Salisbury, the famous British

\textsuperscript{24} United States Department of State, \textit{The Budget In Brief, Fiscal Year 2010}
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid
\textsuperscript{26} Kiesling, \textit{Diplomacy Lessons. Realism for an Unloved Superpower}, 1.
Prime Minister and statesman noted in 1888, “There is nothing dramatic in the success of a diplomatist. His victories are made up of a series of microscopic advantages: of concession one moment and a far sighted persistence at another; of sleepless tact, immovable calmness, and patience that no folly, no provocation, no blunder can shake.” Such nuance does not sit easily with a government whose legislative and tax raising apparatus is focused on domestic priorities and reducing the astronomical US Federal Deficit. The relatively benign form of ‘anti-statism’ that pervades all administrations, but notably Republican ones, means that all but the most enlightened ones struggle to come to terms with the need to create more jobs for ‘bureaucrats’ in Washington DC (and by implication not in their districts).

While leery of large standing forces, historically, the American political system’s default condition is to strengthen the military, rather than diplomatic arm of National Power. As Assistant Secretary to the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt said during an address to the Navy War College in June 1897, “Diplomacy is utterly useless where there is no force behind it; the diplomat is the servant, not the master, of the soldier. The prosperity of peace, commercial and material prosperity, gives no weight whatever when the clash of arms comes.” A disposition to strengthen the military (and his own anti-statism) is captured in his earlier thoughts, which although naval in their thrust, pre-date his appointment as Assistant Secretary:

Our ships should be the best of their kind—this is the first desideratum; but in addition, there should be plenty of them. We need a large navy, composed not merely of cruisers, but containing also a full proportion of powerful battleships, able to meet those of any other nation. It is not

28 Aaron L Friedburg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State, (Princeton; Princtown University Press, 2000), 11. Anti-statism is the body of ideas and arguments used by those who have opposed efforts to increase the size and strength of the executive branch of the government.
economy—it is niggardly and foolish short-sightedness—to cramp our naval expenditures, while squandering money right and left on everything else, from pensions to public buildings.\textsuperscript{30}

A strong Department of Defense, particularly the Navy and Air Force with their inherently capital intensive procurement processes, offers Congressmen a more attractive investment prospect than a strong Department of State. Defence spending is spread throughout the United States and creates job and investment opportunities for a buoyant domestic as well as foreign market and the opportunity for re-election enhancing ‘earmarks.’\textsuperscript{31} While such a construct is still relevant in the Information Age, the need to balance spending across all the arms of government that execute National Power, is greater than that of the preceding Industrial Age. The vested interest within the ‘military-industrial complex,’ an expression first articulated by President Eisenhower in his Presidential Farewell Address of 1961, has the potential to upset this balance.\textsuperscript{32}

The future holds some grounds for optimism. The relationship between Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Clinton is reportedly very good. An account of their joint discussions hosted by CNN’s accomplished chief international correspondent, Christiane Amanpour, at the George Washington University in October 2009, attracted the media headline, “Gates and Clinton Love-fest; an eyewitness report.”\textsuperscript{33} However, the

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{31} OMB defines ‘earmarks’ as funds provided by Congress for projects, programs or grants where the purported congressional direction circumvents otherwise applicable merit-based or competitive allocation processes, or specifies the location or recipient, or otherwise curtails the ability of the executive branch to manage its statutory and constitutional responsibilities pertaining to the funds allocation process.

\textsuperscript{32} The Military-Industrial Complex, The Farewell Address of President Eisenhower, ed Jesse Smith (Basementia Publications, 2006), 5.

grounds for optimism stretch further than good personal relationship between two key Secretaries. Drawing on her experiences with the Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) when a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Clinton has instigated the Department’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). It acknowledges the need for a comprehensive approach to the application of American power and will outline the ends, ways and means, supported by metrics, by which the department will develop strategy. If successful, it will support the harmonisation of the Military and Diplomatic elements of National Power that are essential for any successful coalition. An optimist may view this as a long overdue inching out of the shadow of George Washington’s grave. Thomas Payne would have approved, “When a man ceases to be, his power and his wants cease with him; and having no longer any participation in the concerns of this world, he has no longer any authority in directing who shall be its governors, or how its government shall be organized, or how administered.”

Resistance to the improving the standing of the diplomatic arm of American National Power is not limited to institutional inertia and vested interest. The current dismal financial climate will limit government spending for generations to come. The Congressional Budget Office Analysis monthly review for October 2009 makes sombre reading. It states that, “the 2009 deficit was equal to 9.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), up from 3.2 percent in 2008, and was the highest shortfall – relative to the

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35 Payne, Rights Of Man, 9.
size of the economy- since 1945."37 Although the jump from 3.2 to 9.9 percent is due to a number of one off programmes such as the Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), its legacy will be considerable.

III - WHO DECIDES AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY – A HEALTHY DEBATE?

Notwithstanding the battle for funding, the Department of State’s quest for primacy in all matters of foreign affairs is complicated by the existence of the National Security Council (NSC) and its supporting apparatus. The National Security Act of 1947 established the NSC with the intention that it:

shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies related to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.38

Its laudable aim was to ensure that the USA avoided another ‘Pearl Harbor’ style surprise. The Executive initially view the NSC with a degree of suspicion as another layer of bureaucracy imposed by Congress; however, it first proved its worth as a forum for coordination during the Korean War.39

The President’s perspective on the utility of the NSC is critical and its authority has ebbed and flowed with Administrations, depending on the personality of the President, the Secretary of State, and the National Security Advisor. Partisan politics can also play a part.

37 Ibid.
39 Ibid
Traditionally, career employees and diplomats at the Department of State are seen as having a Democrat bias and therefore a NSC with its handpicked Presidential advisors can be a useful foil for a Republican President. As an organisation, it was at its most powerful under the helm of National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. With the approval of President Nixon, Henry Kissinger was the lead for a number of key strategic foreign policy issues including the rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China and the Vietnam Peace Talks.40

The history of the NSC is peppered with examples of where the Council and its supporting apparatus have acted as Congress intended, but equally, the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Iran Contra affair are two key events in history where the NSC failed to either advise or support the President. Although one could easily criticize the NSC for not preventing al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks, this would reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of its past role. Interestingly, the 9/11 Commission Report’s Executive Summary only refers to the NSC twice and then in the most passing of terms.41 The failures existed in the agencies designed to feed into and inform the NSC; the Council is impotent if its Principals are ill informed. Nevertheless, for all its chequered past, the NSC is well placed to co-ordinate the whole of government approach necessary to support military coalitions in the Information Age.

The aftermath of 9/11 and the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission have significantly affected the NSC. The formation of the Department of Homeland Security (with its Homeland Security Council (HSC)) and the Director of National Intelligence have brought changes in both composition and focus. In addition, the present National Security Advisor, James Jones, has declared, “the Obama NSC will be dramatically different from its predecessors,

40 Ibid
with broader substantive scope.\textsuperscript{42} This is a reference to the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), which is funded by Congress with a broad mandate to ensure that as the NSC evolves in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, it still meets the intent of the 1947 National Security Act.\textsuperscript{43}

Two of the key PNSR recommendations are the creation of a President’s Security Council (PSC), which will take responsibility for “subjects currently addressed by the NSC and HSC, but with economic and energy policy fully integrated as well” and the creation of a Director of National Security.\textsuperscript{44} The intent is laudable, but it is difficult to say whether reorganization and the introduction of further bureaucracy will make the United States any safer or capable of synchronising the elements of National Power any more effectively. The worst possible outcome would be a new organisation that effectively becomes a larger HSC with an inward focus rather than a powerful arm of the Executive that coordinates and synchronizes all the elements of National Power in support of coalition activity. The very public three-month debate as to whether President Obama should accede to Gen McChrystal’s request to increase troop levels highlighted the lack of such coordination within the American government. It also provides a useful case study.

\textbf{IV – THE IMPACT OF HEALTHY DEBATE - A CASE STUDY}

The very fact that the debate focused on troop numbers and not the real issue of a coherent Afghanistan Strategy in itself reflects a failure of strategic communications and thus a wider failure of the United States government to apply the Information (DI\textsubscript{ME})


element of National Power to support the ISAF coalition. In the context of the Information Age, this failure caused confusion within the coalition and worse, gave the enemy an opportunity to exploit the failure as sign of weakness. All this took place in the period between President Obama receiving General McChrystal’s COMISAF’s Initial Assessment Report (dated August 30, 2009), and the public announcing of a strategy based on its finding during a speech at West Point on December 1, 2009.45

At a meeting of NATO Defence Ministers and other key officials in Bratislava, Slovakia on 22 – 23 October 2009, General McChrystal felt empowered to brief the key findings of his report. He spoke in the broad terms and received a similarly broad endorsement from the majority his audience.46 It is notable that Secretary Gates, who was present, declined to comment, other than to make it clear that this would not constrain President Obama’s options.47 In addition, present at the conference was the Afghanistan Defence Minister, the UN’s Secretary General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, and the EU’s Special Representative.

As any policy in Afghanistan must be endorsed and largely funded by the US, such debate amongst such a wide and influential audience, was at best, premature and at worst, “an implicit rejection of the alternative plan proposed by US Vice President Joe Biden.”48

He had argued against the proposed strategy by suggesting that the “US campaign should

move away from full-fledged counterinsurgency and draw down troops, placing further emphasis on drone fired missiles and other remote weaponry.” The US Ambassador to Kabul, retired Army Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry’s view was that any further troop increase was unwise, as it would undermine the already tenuous authority of President Karzai.

It would be wrong to portray General McChrystal as something of a maverick. His immediate superior, General Patraeus and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen had publically supported General McChrystal’s recommendations. In essence, the military, but not the civilian chain of command had endorsed a plan that was also at odds with the strategy proposed by the Vice President. In addition, key officials within NATO, ‘fighting’ coalition partner nations such as the UK, and the UN had all supported it. Finally, the Afghan Defense Minister endorsed the plan, but the US Ambassador to Afghanistan disagreed. Clearly, this is not a good example of exploiting the Information element of National Power to support a military coalition. American domestic politics only made matters worse.

An unknown source leaked a copy of a CONFIDENTIAL version of General McChrystal’s Initial Assessment Report to the Washington Post. This action prompted the Department Of Defense to release an UNCLASSIFIED version on September 20, 2009.

49 Should President Listen to Vice President Biden on Foreign Policy http://www.gop.gov/policy-news/print/09/10/05/should-president-obama-listen-to (accessed December 20, 2009).
Even before this leak, the respected and well-informed Republican Senator John McCain issued a statement clearly designed to shape public and Congressional opinion. The wording of the statement, released shortly after a fact-finding visit to Afghanistan, was such that the Senator clearly knew of and supported General McChrystal’s findings and recommendations:

We have an exceptional new commander on the ground, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who has begun a top-to-bottom overhaul of all aspects of our war policy and put forward a dramatically new civil-military strategy that clearly identifies failed policies and prioritizes the proven principles of counterinsurgency, including protecting civilians, creating legitimate and effective governance, and boosting economic development. With Gen. McChrystal, together with a new ambassador and a new deputy commander, we believe we now have the team on the ground that can win this war......The American people also need to hear directly from their commander on the ground. Gen. McChrystal should be called back to Washington to testify before Congress about his new strategy and the resources it will require. 53

The House Republican Leader, John Boehner was quick to release a statement exalting the President to endorse the recommendations within the leaked report. 54 The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Democrat Ike Skelton, sent a four-page letter to the President on September 22, 2009 both endorsing the plan, and outlining the Committee’s view on any future strategy. 55 To make sure that the message was widely received, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the National Security Advisor and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all received

copies. Shortly after President Obama made his decision, the Committee embarked on a series of Congressional hearings designed to ensure that the Committee was satisfied with the strategy.\footnote{http://armedservices.house.gov/apps/list/press/armedsvc_dem/SkeltonPR120809.shtml (accessed December 22, 2009).}

Such a complex process of constitutional checks and controls may appear normal, if not necessary to a domestic audience. However, one must remember that the origins of the mechanics of American government originate from the Founding Fathers’ strong desire to avoid the ‘weaknesses’ a European style parliamentary democracy. It should therefore not be surprising that close European coalition partners, all of whom have a Head of State that is constitutionally separated from the Head of the Executive, and limit the role of the ‘opposition party,’ occasionally struggle to understand such a collegiate approach to government. The historical and cultural factors that influence the European perspective on coalition partners will be examined in the forthcoming chapter. However, it is useful to look at the impact that this particular failure to employ Information as an element of National Power had on the UK, its most reliable coalition partner.

During the autumn of 2009, the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, faced a significant political dilemma. As the second largest contributor of troops to ISAF and with a mounting casualty total that was to exceed 200 fatalities by the end of the year, the Prime Minister was under significant pressure to clarify Her Majesty’s Government’s strategy. The war was increasing unpopular in the UK as a poll conducted for the UK’s respected \textit{Independent} newspaper revealed:
More than half of voters (52 per cent) want troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan straight away, with 43 per cent disagreeing. Opposition to the military action is even stronger among women. By a margin of nearly two-to-one, the public believes that the Taliban cannot be defeated militarily. Fifty-eight per cent view the war as "unwinnable", with 31 per cent disagreeing. There is overwhelming agreement – by 75 per cent to 16 per cent – that British troops in Afghanistan lack the equipment they require to perform their role safely.57

The war was equally unpopular with the UK’s European NATO allies who regarded the UK as “isolated” in her desire to generate more NATO combat troops for ISAF.58 However, without a clear indication of how the US strategy was going to develop, Prime Minister Brown, was operating in a vacuum. He could neither convince other European countries to commit troops in time for a UK Royal Marines general to assume the responsibility of the Deputy Commander of ISAF, nor wrestle the political initiative from the Conservative opposition when William Hague, the shadow Foreign Secretary, called for a ‘comprehensive strategy’ for stabilizing Afghanistan. He said: "It must include clear, tightly drawn, realistic objectives that are regularly reviewed, more rapid development of Afghan security forces and ensuring battlefield gains are swiftly followed by reconstruction."59 While this can be dismissed as a statement of the obvious made for political capital, it should have come from the Prime Minister with the confidence that it reflected American strategy.

Prime Minister Brown’s precarious position over the UK’s military contribution to the ISAF coalition was further weakened by the British public’s negative perception of aftermath of Gulf War II (Operation Iraqi Freedom – OIF). Despite the loss of 179 UK

57http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/voters-turn-against-war-in-afghanistan-1763227.html
59Ibid.
Servicemen and women, the British public sensed ingratitude for the UK military contribution to the American led coalition. In this instance, the Iraqi Government, the American military and even its Commander in Chief were all accused by respected British media sources of not recognising and appreciating the UK’s contribution. The refusal of the Iraqi Government to extend the Statement of Forces Agreement (SOFA) past July 1, 2009 to the British, while doing so for American forces, prompted a very unceremonious and rapid departure from key coalition posts in Baghdad and, more importantly, the training teams based in Umm Qasar. Earlier, British newspapers published rumours of mistrust between UK and US senior officers on how the British Forces controlled Multi National Division South East (MND(SE)), centred on the city of Basra, until its handover to US forces on March 31. Finally, reports of President Obama removing a bust of Sir Winston Churchill (presented after 9/11 to indicate British solidarity) from the Oval Office gave a splendid opportunity for the press to create a transatlantic storm in a teacup.

There are perfectly good reasons why each of the three events took place. Firstly, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was facing fierce internal political opposition to renewing the American SOFA, a process that obviously had to take place. Not renewing the British SOFA was a sop to the opposition and a perfectly rational political move given his strained circumstances. Secondly, some of the US military’s criticism of the British forces in MND(SE) was justified. Several British Senior Officers privately commented that the UK

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61 The SOFA governs the treatment of UK forces in Iraq and in particularly their immunity from the Iraqi Justice system and their rights and responsibilities under British domestic law. In essence, British forces could not be charged or held by the Iraqi security forces.

government, concerned with spiralling costs of the war, allocated insufficient forces and resources to control Basra and the remainder of the area effectively or safely. Inevitably, this led to an inability to hold ground and thus protect all of the civilian population. The British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) coverage of the British governments inquiry into the 2003 Iraq War posted the following summary of the evidence given on 11 January 2010:

Lt Gen Sir Richard Shirreff said the British Army was effectively providing "no security at all" in the southern Iraqi city of Basra by mid-2006. The former commanding officer of the multi-national division in south-east Iraq told the inquiry that 200 troops were attempting to control a city of 1.3 million people, with militias "filling the gap". He also said troops had not been employed effectively and criticised equipment levels provided for the mission in southern Iraq.

It is equally true that British experience in counter insurgency, including the very recent (some would argue ongoing) ‘Troubles’ in Northern Island, had equipped the British Army with an understanding of this type of warfare simply not present in the US Army or Marine Corps. Finally, the bust of an American President took Sir Winston Churchill’s place in the Oval Office; an entirely reasonable move for an incoming President to make. In summary, the perceived lack of American leadership over a future Afghan strategy, combined with the perception generated by the events outlined above, undermined the UK government’s ability to generate support for the war both within its NATO partners and at home. Yet, this harmful perception is even more galling when one appreciates that behind the political rhetoric, progress, in the form of the hugely important Afghanistan and Pakistan (AfPac) regional strategy was taking shape.

IV – MATURING DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS – THE BEGINNINGS OF AN AFPAC POLICY

Examination of the strategy in greater depth will take place in Chapter Six and in particular, the ISAF coalition’s role in its execution. However, the strategic implications of the Obama Administration convincing the Pakistani Government to undertake offensive operations against the Pakistan Taliban and AQN are significant and warrant an historic analogy.

Consider for a moment the early nineteenth century. It is 1807 and the UK government, its hands far from clean, has abolished slavery. Thereafter, as the world’s pre-eminent military superpower, it undertakes a worldwide campaign to eradicate slavery by means of diplomatic treaties and coercive military action. The centre of the axis of this particular evil was the United States. While the call to end slavery here too was growing, there was not yet the political will to confront this particular evil within the United States. One cannot image any British Prime Minister persuading, cajoling, or threatening any President from Thomas Jefferson through to Abraham Lincoln to precipitate a civil war to end the slave trade within America. All were keenly aware that the nation was too young and its political and economic fabric too thin to stomach such a move; the devastation of the subsequent Civil War proved this to be the case. Yet, to the perpetual credit of President Obama and his AfPac strategy, this is exactly what the USA has persuaded Pakistan to do against the current evil – that of AQN sponsored terrorism. In a country where meaningful democracy has yet to take root and there is much public and government support for the Taliban; yet the USA, demonised by Islamic extremists as a crusading Christian power, has
convinced the government of Pakistan to start a limited civil war. As late as February 2009, the Congress Research Service’s Report on Pakistan – US Relations stated:

Top U.S. officials have praised Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although long-held doubts exist about Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests. Pakistan is identified as a base for terrorist groups and their supporters operating in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s army has conducted unprecedented and largely ineffectual counterterrorism operations in the country’s western tribal areas, where Al Qaeda operatives and pro-Taliban militants are said to enjoy “safe haven.” U.S. officials increasingly are concerned that the cross-border infiltration of Islamist militants from Pakistan into Afghanistan is a key obstacle to defeating the Taliban insurgency.  

Yet by May 2009, the Pakistani Army was conducting large-scale search and destroy operations against Pakistani Taliban and AQNs within the semi autonomous regions of the Swat Valley. To have convinced the Pakistani Government to undertake such a campaign is a diplomatic victory of staggering proportions. In time and with the benefit of hindsight, this may be regarded as the tipping point in the campaign against the Taliban and AQN in Pakistan. This perspective does not seem to have gained much media traction. There could be several reasons for this. Firstly, to advertise this diplomatic coup does not support the strategic interests of either the Pakistani or US governments and secondly, the country and in particular the military’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) has so long been perceived as part of the problem, that the magnitude of this volte-face has yet to be appreciated.

To conclude, this chapter has examined the geographical and historical factors that have shaped American’s perceptions of coalitions. In turn, these have shaped the United

States’ political institutions and their capability to orchestrate all the elements of National Power in support of American led coalitions, as in the words of Winston Churchill, “We shape our dwellings, and afterwards our dwellings shape us.” The findings suggest that these “dwellings,” which consist of competing as well as complementing parts, do not properly serve the USA in her role as a global superpower or prepare her for a return to a multi-polar world. As Orrin Schwab has noted in his recent book, *The Gulf Wars and the United States*, written and published on behalf of the respected Praegar Security International Institute:

> All modern US presidents preside over powers and decisions that are orders of magnitude greater than world leaders of the past. Yet while the technological elements of power, physical and intellectual were changed radically, the men themselves and the laws governing their powers were largely the same. In the late twentieth century, the leaders of the great powers had to make decisions with virtually the same emotional and intellectual skills as their predecessors in early eras.66

Yet, despite the limitations, many of which will be difficult to overcome, there are grounds for optimism. The need to work within the framework of a coalition is recognised in American policy and manifest in the underpinning strategy. Against the backdrop of a tough economic and political climate, the Obama Administration is seeking to make both the Department of State and NSC relevant to face the challenges of the Information Age. There are clear indications that the Secretary of Defense is comfortable with reducing defence spending to reduce the imbalance in funding between the arms of government. Finally, the development of ISAF and the AfPac Strategy reflect a growing maturity in the US

65[http://openlibrary.org/b/OL4480422M/We_shape_our_dwellings_and_afterwards_our_dwellings_shape_us](http://openlibrary.org/b/OL4480422M/We_shape_our_dwellings_and_afterwards_our_dwellings_shape_us) (accessed February 26, 2010)

government’s ability to synchronize the elements of National Power.
CHAPTER 3. EUROPEAN HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES

In the previous chapter, brief mention was made of one of the United States’ most steadfast coalition partners, the United Kingdom. The “special relationship” between the two countries is well documented and in his recent book, *How Enemies Becomes Friends*, Charles A. Kupchan argues that this relationship dates back to the turn of the nineteenth century.\(^1\) By this time, America and the United Kingdom shared so many common interests and values, (drawn from their Anglo-Saxon heritage) including a “compatible social order” that traditional American Anglophobia no longer had any rational basis.\(^2\) One will remember from the first chapter, that as even as late as the American Civil War, there were sound grounds not to regard the British as natural allies.

The degree of the Anglo-American rapprochement is underscored by the almost courteous handover of military superpower status from the United Kingdom to America. This is an important point as it highlights a European perspective; that is, historically war is a short-term aberration in the relationship between often neighbouring states. This chapter will show how a desire to avoid war and maintain peace has shaped a European culture and political system that has developed an over-reliance on diplomacy to the extent that its ability to defend itself is questionable. However, such a culture can still bring strength to a military coalition. If one accepts that all elements of National Power must be synchronised and deployed in the international arena to support coalition military activity at the operational level, European diplomatic and economic power complements

\(^{2}\)Ibid, 7.
American hegemony on the battlefield. As Winston Churchill noted, “Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace and those who could make a good peace would never have won the war.”³

There is, of course, a danger in developing any argument that implies Europe is a single entity. Although such organisations such as NATO and the European Union encourage, at least mentally, the furtherance of such generalisations, there are 27 countries and over 499 million people within Europe.⁴ NATO has a membership of 28 countries with partner countries as far east as Kazakhstan and in 2008, a budget of $131,666 million.⁵ Despite this panoply of peoples, religions and states, there are elements of a shared culture rooted in a long violent history that permits some broad observations to be drawn. The reasons for a collective European approach to both diplomacy and warfare draw heavily upon these roots.

I – EUROPEAN HISTORICAL DNA

In the first half of the twentieth century, there were solid grounds for the government of the USA not sharing the European faith in either collective diplomacy or defence. For all the best efforts of Europe’s most able diplomats and politicians, the very mechanisms that were supposed to keep the peace collapsed with the Serbian assignation of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo in June 1914. Within two weeks Austria declared war on Serbia and their respective alliances, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, were at war.

By the end of the war in 1918, these alliances had mobilized approximately sixty five million men. Military and civilian Killed In Action (KIA) exceeded eight and a half million people. Wounded, captured and missing took the total number of casualties to over thirty seven million people. Having witnessed such bloodshed and loss on both sides, it is little wonder that the USA’s “entry into the First World War saw Washington proclaiming America’s status as an associated power, free of the obligations and commitments that presumably tied allied powers to one another.” Both the USA and the European powers fully understood the horrors and loss of a generation incurred by this war, yet the experience would be repeated within a lifetime.

The two World Wars were the ultimate expression of inter-European warfare that has a heritage stretching back to at least Julius Caesar’s first invasion of Britain in 55 BC, some two thousand years earlier. One could go back even further and cite the Peloponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta from 430 – 404 BC. The point is moot; two millennia of fighting is more than enough to leave an imprint on the European collective conscious that the USA cannot replicate and with which it struggles to empathise. The upshot of such continued conflict was a continental appreciation that most of these wars solved little. The history of conflict between the neighbouring European powers of France and Great Britain provides a useful microcosm. Since the Norman Conquest of Britain in 1066, the destinies of these neighbouring countries have been linked through Royal dynasties, alliances, trade and for over eight hundred years, open conflict. One such conflict, the ‘One Hundred Years

7 Ibid
War started in 1337 and lasted for 116 years. Ultimately and despite the famous victories of Crecy and Agincourt, both of which are still celebrated as triumphs of the British fighting spirit, the war was futile. The King of England’s territories in France were destined to slip back to French control; how could they not, surrounded by, dependent on, and indeed populated by people who considered themselves French? Despite this war and many others culminating with the Napoleonic Wars and the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, France and Britain have always had to make peace and repair the damage inflicted on the extensive trade and social linkages between the two countries. In this context, there are no end states in intra-European relationships, merely phases.

Even before the rise of the nation state, defeated city states, provinces and dukedoms could descend into chaos and anarchy with exactly the same implications as one now associates with ‘failing’ and ‘failed’ states. Thus, this is not a new concept and many European rulers during the Dark Ages were well versed in the need to compromise to avoid bloodshed. In an era when mankind’s grip on life was far less secure than today, war brought with it the risk of death or crippling ransoms for the ruling classes and significant loss of life, trade and livelihood for the working classes, particularly for the those still tied to the land. Such an understanding was not limited to the West. In the late sixth century BC, the Chinese philosopher Sun-tzu wrote:

In general, the method for employing the military is this: Preserving the enemy’s state capital is best, destroying their state capital is second best. Preserving their army is best, destroying their army is second best.......For this reason attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.9

In the Fifth Century, the Hun and Vandal barbarians from the east, and the Goths from the northeast were quick to expand into any weakened western principedom or state. It is indicative of the fear that these warring nomads created that the words Goth, Vandal, and Hun (especially preceded by Attila) connote barbaric actions and wanton destruction. Their combined legacy is to herd Europeans, especially those from smaller nation states to default instinctively to a policy of collective defence, or worse, acquiescence. There are no such ‘bogeymen’ latent within the American psyche. This is because since coming together as a nation, Americans have never faced a war that threatened their very survival. Geography and industrial might have blessed America with a luxury that historically has been denied to Europeans, that of choosing when and where to fight.

When given no option but to fight, European success on the continental battlefield often relied on coalitions. Most of these owed their existence to a shared purpose and sound diplomacy. In the Eighth Century, the Umayyad Caliphate (the Moors) conquered modern day Spain and Portugal before expanding across the Pyrenees into France. The Franks and their coalition partners checked this northward expansion at the historic battle of Tours/Potiers in 732. However, Muslim influence persisted in France until 975 and the Iberian Peninsula was not fully free of Muslim controlled territory until 1238. One must remember that France, Spain and Portugal did not exist as sovereign states. A coalition of European armies under the command of various kings, princes and dukes achieved victory at Poitiers and later during the slow expulsion of the Moors from the Iberian Peninsula.

The European coalition under the command of Charles Martel achieved a bloody, but emphatic victory at Poitiers. Exact casualty figures from a battle that took place almost
1,300 years ago are difficult to ascertain. A contemporary Frankish source puts Muslim casualties at over 300,000 and Christian at 1,500.\textsuperscript{10} While these are undoubtedly grossly exaggerated, they do highlight the bloody nature of Middle Age warfare. While Charles’ army had no compunction with slaughtering large numbers of Moslems (and vice versa), in the context of intra-European warfare, such bloodshed could be avoided. In a development that can trace its origins to ancient Greece, states or cities in conflict could settle disputes with the minimum of bloodshed and destruction by the use of champion knights and other skilled men at arms fighting within the confines of a tournament.

The use of champions was not the only European strategy to avoid costly open conflict. Through the Middle Ages and thereafter, the nobility viewed marriage as a method for sealing alliances and preventing conflict between principalities. While one would now consider such a move as ‘Machiavellian’, the author did not even consider the practice worthy of mention in his classic book, \textit{The Prince}.\textsuperscript{11} However, he did give guidance on the governing of ‘Composite’ principalities, those states that have been incorporated by whatever means into larger ones.\textsuperscript{12} In a wider context, this work is viewed as the Renaissance textbook for Princes, and other on how to maintain and extend power by diplomacy rather than warfare. When there is no alternative to warfare, Machiavelli repeatedly makes the point that violence should be surgically targeted at the ruling elite to ensure that there is no chance of revenge, but the people, their institutions, and laws should be left untouched.

If the ruler wants to keep hold of his new possession, he must bear two

\textsuperscript{10}http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/732tours.html, (accessed March 1, 2010).
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid, 6.
things in mind; first, that the family of the old prince must be destroyed; next, that he must change neither their laws nor their taxes. In this way, in a very short space of time the new principality will be rolled into one with the old.\textsuperscript{13}

When Machiavelli started writing \textit{The Prince} in 1513, as well as drawing on the old empires of Greece and Rome for examples, he could tap into an altogether more recent vein of treachery and intrigue; that resulting from the fall of Constantinople. Located at the very tip of the south-eastern corner of Europe, the city was the capital of the Byzantium or Eastern Roman Empire. It straddled the strategically important Bosporus Straits and its empire was long recognized by the western nations as a bulwark to further invasion from the east. For complex reasons in an area famed for its internecine warfare and religious and ethnic inspired treachery, the rest of Europe failed to help the Byzantines in their year of need and Constantinople fell to the Ottomans in 1453. It took a European military coalition a further two hundred and fifty years to stop the Muslim empire’s expansion westward with a decisive victory outside of a besieged Vienna.

Subsidies from the Pope, a rush of volunteers from the young nobility of northern Italy and Franconian Germany, and the mustering of armies by the Electors of Bavaria and Saxony, held hope of relief for Vienna. There remained too, the prospect of substantial backing from the crack Polish troops of King John Sobieski (of Poland) once they could complete a long march southwards from beyond the Carpathians.\textsuperscript{14}

It would transpire that the Ottoman’s failed siege of Vienna in 1683 was its ‘high water mark’ and thereafter the empire’s influence in Europe was in decline. By the start of

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid, 8.
\textsuperscript{14}Alan Palmer, \textit{The Decline And Fall Of The Ottoman Empire}, (New York, Barnes And Noble, 2009), 12.
the eighteenth century, a tipping point had been reached.\textsuperscript{15} The Austrian-Hungarian Empire (whose role was later subsumed by Prussia and finally, Germany), France, Britain, Russia and Italy stopped regarding the existence of the Ottoman Empire as a threat to western security, and started recognizing its collapse as one. From this point forth, a disjointed and often uneasy diplomatic coalition existed that worked with sympathetic Ottoman Sultans and politicians to prevent the empire from imploding. European diplomacy and a desire to avoid war with its ensuing chaos had developed to a point where the European powers would rather cushion the crumbling Muslim empire lodged on its eastern frontier than destroy it. Such European ‘unity of purpose’ did nothing to dissuade countries from exploiting the situation for the sake of national interest. The French, as ever, where keen to exploit any opportunity to thwart the advance of British interests.

In April 1798 it was agreed (by the French government) that Bonaparte would embark an army for Egypt, consolidate French control over the Levant to the discomfiture of the English and, while destroying the corrupt power of the Mamelukes in Cairo, impose good and proper government in the name of the Sultan, whose treasury would thereafter be able to rely on the arrival of the annual tribute.\textsuperscript{16}

The European reliance on diplomacy to prevent the Ottoman Empire from collapsing through either war with Russia, or internal conflict with the Egyptian forces all conspired to keep Constantinople at the heart of European diplomatic affairs. Both western and eastern European countries had valid concerns over the treatment of Roman and Eastern Orthodox Christian minorities within the empire. There was mutual suspicion between Russia and Great Britain over each other’s territorial ambitions, both locally and further east. France and Germany had invested heavily in the empire’s public and private sectors; all with an eye

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid, 34. 
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid, 62.
to favourable trade, and oil exploration within the Sultan’s eastern territories.17 Greece and other occupied provinces were gradually fighting their way back to independence. Finally, within the Sultan’s government (known as the Porte), the perennial ebb and flow of anti-western sentiment and the growing feeling of a separate Turkish nationality ensured that the possibilities of coups and reprisals were always present.

The Machiavellian picture of European diplomatic manoeuvring was clarified by the onset of World War One and the decision by Sultan Mehmed V in November 1914 to call for a jihad against the British, French and Russians.18 Defeat four years later was more than ‘the sick man of Europe’ could bear and it left to the victorious Allied powers to execute fairly the last will and testament.19 The Sultan and his increasingly isolated government on one hand, and the feelings of the Turkish people, represented through a shadow Republican government headed by the increasingly popular Mustafa Kemel on the other, contested the will. The wrangling lasted four years before the last Sultan - Caliph, Mehmed VI embarked in HMS MALAYA and sailed into exile.20

On one level, the rise of Turkey out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire under international auspices represents a successful example of a European diplomatic coalition operating at the grand strategic level. The French had invested in Constantinople’s schooling and civil service as well as constructing the Orient Express, a move that connected the city to Paris, the diplomatic heart of Europe. Notwithstanding an alliance with Germany that had brought defeat, Germany had revolutionized Ottoman banking services as well as

17 Ibid, 212.
18 Ibid, 252.
20 Palmer, The Decline And Fall Of The Ottoman Empire, 290.
her military. In doing she forged a link with the Turks that exists today. The British, as is their want, oversaw their interpretation of fair play and provided governance and stability to Constantinople and the Sultan in the dangerous years between 1918 and the declaration of the secular Turkish Republic in 1922.\(^{21}\)

A more considered view, especially given the benefit of hindsight, is that the relatively peaceful emergence of Turkey is cold comfort when set in the context of aftermath of World War I. A collective diplomatic failure to address sufficiently ethnic tensions in a former Ottoman province provided the catalyst for war. The future ruler of the Austro-Hungary Empire, Archduke Ferdinand was visiting Sarajevo, the capital of the Austrian administered province of the predominantly Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^{22}\) In the peace treaty following the 1877 Russian-Turkish War, the province remained under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan, but was administered by and paid taxes to Austria.

The complex diplomatic compromises of the peace treaty angered Serbian Slavs. They had gained their independence through the same treaty, but regarded Austrian administered Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of greater Serbia. Peaceful political attempts by Slav nationalists to reunify Bosnia-Herzegovina under Serbian control were not successful and there was a Serbian concern that the Austro-Hungary Empire would continue to thwart further unification. Thus, the assassination carried out by a previously insignificant Serbian terrorist group was an attempt to bring pressure to bear on a regional issue. However, it undermined all the checks and balances of power that Europe’s finest political leaders had put in place. As is often the case with Europeans, the date of the assignation was significant;

\(^{21}\)Ibid, 272

the well-meaning Archduke sealed his fate by visiting Sarajevo on the very anniversary of
the battle in which the Ottomans were decisively defeated by Slavs in 1389. One can learn
two key lessons from this tragic episode: history is of significant importance to the identity
of ethnic groups and diplomacy has its limitations. Although it falls short of a lesson in its
own right, the episode reinforced the truism that all empires eventually fall. In this instance
the Ottoman, Austrian-Hungarian and the Russian Romanov empires all collapsed because
of the resulting war.

Before examining the consequences and legacies of European empires further, it is
useful to take stock of the historical influences on European DNA covered this far. Firstly, a
number of small European states, many of whom coalesced out of an amalgamation of
princedoms and city-states, have always sought sanctuary through coalitions and alliances.
Collective diplomatic action, which maintained power and prosperity, was infinitely
preferable to collective military action. Ergo, the diplomatic and economic elements of
national power are as established in the European psyche as the use of military force. Two
thousand years of internecine European warfare has highlighted the limitation of war unless
fighting for national survival. Finally, as highlighted by the events leading up to World War
I, one must not confuse a European propensity for diplomacy with a European success at
diplomacy.

III – THE LEGACY OF EUROPEAN EMPIRES

It is important to consider the very different American and European perspectives on
the word empire before proceeding with the remainder of this chapter. The chapter does not
seek to make a case to whether empires by any definition are either intrinsically good or bad;
it seeks to illustrate two major points. The first is to show the dangers of an empire acting in
defiance of world opinion to pursue military action by way of a coalition. The second is to highlight the economic and diplomatic linkages left after the tide of empire has receded. Before returning to these two points in detail, it is worth examining why the word has such a different meaning on either side of the Atlantic.

The debate as to whether the United States is an ‘empire’ in the same sense as the former European based empires will continue to polarise American opinion. In their Op-Ed article for the Council on Foreign Relations entitled “American Imperialism? No need to Run Away From Label,” Max Boot and Jeane J Kirkpatrick argue, “the United States has been an empire since at least 1803.” 23 The authors draw parallels between activities undertaken by the United States that readily fit the historical template of empire building such as nation building, acquiring territories, occupying defeated enemies’ territories and spreading its own form of government.

Despite the reality as defined by Max Boot and Jeane J Kirkpatrick, the word itself has unpleasant connotations in America for exactly the same reason as ‘Hun,’ ‘Vandal’ and ‘Goth’ does in Europe. Chapter 2 highlighted the American military and diplomatic struggles against the British, Spanish and to a lesser extent, the French empires. More recently, “It has defeated the monstrous evils of communism and Nazism,” both of which were the worst possible manifestations of empire.24 Notwithstanding the past, there is another reason for not accepting the title of empire and that relates back to the truism that all empires eventually fall away. If America is an empire now, where will she fit in the

24 Ibid.
emerging multi-polar world? As Paul Kennedy wrote almost 14 years ago in his classic book, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*:

> Although the United States is at present still in a class of its own economically and perhaps militarily, it cannot avoid confronting the two great tests which challenge the longevity of every major power that occupies the “number one” position in world affairs; whether in the military/strategical realm, it can preserve a reasonable balance between the nation’s perceived defence requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those requirements; and whether, as an intimately related point, it can preserve the technological and economic bases of its power from relative erosion in the face of the ever-shifting patterns of global production.25

Many of the USA’s European coalition partners feel well placed to guide the United States through Kennedy’s “two great tests.”26 The continent is home to the largest concentration of former empires in the world. The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, France, Great Britain, and in classical times, Italy and Greece have all occupied “the number one position in world affairs.”27 The leadership of each of these nations understands that Kennedy’s tests are unlike any other, that is the “major power” is obliged to repeat the tests until such time that it fails.

The USA’s oldest coalition partner, France and her most enduring, Great Britain failed the test in 1956 after a combined military assault to secure the Suez Canal and reverse by force Egyptian President Nasser’s decision to nationalise it. The canal opened in 1869, and although largely financed and built by the French, de-facto control of the Suez Canal had rested in the hands of the British since the 1882 Convention of Constantinople. This arrangement remained in force after Egyptian independence in 1922 and at the end of World

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26Ibid.
27Ibid.
War II in 1945. From a British perspective, with good reason:

The Middle East was now Britain’s primary source of oil as well as a key communications node for its still considerable empire and vital maritime trade routes. The Suez Canal in particular was vital because it was by far and away the shortest route for oil travelling from the Persian Gulf to the UK. More than 20 million tons – two thirds of Britain’s entire oil supply- was transported annually by this route during the 1950s.  

Against a backdrop of increasing strained Anglo-Egyptian relations and a confused Anglo-American strategy for dealing with pan-Arab nationalism and the region as a whole, the UK government withdrew military forces guarding the canal in 1956. Soon after the withdrawal was complete, in July 1956 President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, in part to finance the Aswan Dam project and in part to punish the United States and the UK for withdrawing their offer to help finance the project.  

The following three months was a disgraceful merry go round of British and French subterfuge that involved lying to President Eisenhower, circumventing UN diplomatic initiatives for a peaceful resolution of the mounting crisis and colluding with the Israelis for a synchronised attack on Egypt. As late as the eve of the attack on October 31, 1956 even the UK and French appeared to have different agendas. Although Operation MUSKETEER, the military operation to secure the canal was a success, “having thoroughly alienated the United States and antagonized the entire international community, Britain and France found themselves on the receiving end of a wholly predictable diplomatic barrage.” The UN passed a resolution calling for the Anglo-French military activity to cease and for UN

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29 Ibid, 92.
30 Ibid, 94-95.
31 Ibid, 100.
Peacekeepers to deploy between the Egyptian and the invading forces. Faced with hostile domestic opinion, the threat of UN sanctions, an absence of diplomatic support from America and a mounting self-inflicted energy crisis arising from its efforts to close down the Suez Canal, the British government complied with the UN resolution. Great Britain and France had failed the test. The diplomatic, economic and information instruments of National Power were, or could not be marshalled to support a powerful coalition military effort at the operational level. Viewed from this lens, the operation was bound to end in strategic failure. Despite the military success of Operation MUSKETEER, the episode occupies an uneasy position in British military history. Official accounts often refer to the operation as a crisis or fiasco and successive British governments’ resisted attempts to issue a campaign medal until 2003.

Quite clearly, the Suez Fiasco represents a nadir in post-colonial relationships between former empire and now independent state. While commenting on the benefits of empire to either the former power or its former subjects flung over the four corners of the globe is always going to be contentious, one cannot dispute the legacy of the parent tongue. According to the Nations Online website, English is the official language in eighty-three countries and spoken in a further one hundred and five. For Spanish, the figures are twenty-one and forty-four respectively. Portuguese is the official language in nine countries and spoken in thirty-four others. Finally, French, which has always been viewed as the language of diplomats, is the official language of forty countries and spoken in another fifty-four.

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It is not just language that links former European powers and their past colonies. Within the Commonwealth of Nations, which grew out of the British Empire, there is now common ground on a more equal footing. The Commonwealth consists of fifty-four nations with over two billion people. Members include states of strategic importance to the United States, such as Pakistan and India, influential regional states such Malaysia in the Far East and South Africa and Nigeria in Africa and the remainder of the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence community.

The Commonwealth of Nations has an interlinked family of programmes that support the furtherance of peace and democracy, pro-poor growth and sustainable development programmes that resonate with the USA’s Department of State and USAID’s policy statements. France, Spain and Portugal have similar, but less formal, linkages with their former colonies. Collectively these European powers are well positioned to exercise the diplomatic, economic and information elements of National Power in its softest and noblest guise over a significant portion of the developing world. The geographical linkages between the developing world and the ‘failing’ or ‘failed states’ underline the importance of this relationship.

IV – THE IMPACT OF WW II AND THE RISE OF THE END OF MILITARISM

One cannot examine the cultural DNA of Europe without making reference to World War II and the subsequent rise of international organisations to oversee both diplomatic and trade relations. The impact of World War I on the European consciousness has already been

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36 Ibid
examined and it is for exactly these reasons that the British and other European
governments, individually and collectively through the League of Nations (the forerunner to
the UN) sought to appease, rather than confront a resurgent Germany.37 Yet European
diplomacy could not contain Hitler and the subsequent World War remains the deadliest
conflict that the world has ever experienced.

The total fatalities, not including injured, for WWII are approximately 61 million
people.38 If one can put aside the 13 million Chinese and Japanese fatalities and the almost
inconceivable figure of nearly 26 million Russian casualties, the figures for European
nations offer some useful insights.39 Notwithstanding the horrors of the Holocaust skewing
the figures of Polish civilian casualties compared to military, Belgium, Holland, and France
also suffered significantly more civilian fatalities than military. France lost 470,000
civilians and Holland 236,000. One only has to read Antony Beevor’s graphic description of
the allied bombardment of Caen in his latest book, D-Day, to appreciate that allied forces
inflicted a notable number of these casualties.40 These civilian casualty figures are
significant especially when compared with America’s total loss of 295,000, all of whom
were military.41 The UK suffered 326,000 military casualties and 62,000 civilian.42 Even
these figures mask the destruction of the very fabric of many of these countries, but
combined they leave a tremendous impact of the European conscious.43

39 Ibid.
41 Ibid
42 Ibid
43 The author’s influences are typical. Both grandfathers fought in WWII and spent most of the war outside
of the UK, one in the Far East and the other in Africa and then Europe. Both his parents, the father from
London and the mother from Plymouth were evacuated as children to avoid the Blitz. The author’s Plymouth
Yet for all of Europe’s sacrifice, it was American industrial horsepower and military might that secured victory. According to Kennedy, “the United States was the only country which became much richer – in fact much richer - rather than poorer because of the war. At is conclusion possessed gold reserves of $20 billion, almost two thirds of the world’s total of $33 billion.”44 Europe was economically shattered and was only rebuilt with significant American aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. This plan and the supporting mechanisms such as the International Monetary Fund and the later General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allowed Europe to repair sufficient damage to their industry to allow them to function as a middle order powers. However, the bi-polar world had arrived and “only the United States and the USSR counted, so it seemed. Of these two, the American ‘superpower’ was vastly superior.”45

From 1945 to the present day, a weakened Europe has once again placed its faith in a collective approach. It entrusted its defence to the WWII Allied Powers, later replaced by NATO, as the Soviet Union replaced Germany as the major threat to European peace. European diplomacy remains at its most effective when operating in concert at the United Nations, particularly at the Security Council level. The European Economic Union, now more commonly referred to as simply the EU, oversees economic growth. The EU also provides an increasing powerful umbrella for collective European diplomacy and defence. Yet, history has shown that collective European diplomacy has a mixed record of accomplishment. The dealing of the European powers in the final years of the Ottoman

44 Kennedy, The Rise And Fall Of The Great Powers, 358.
Empire provided the spark for WWI and the inability to deal with its aftermath lead to
WWII.

Despite European diplomatic failures, America must consider an increasing federated
and inherently democratic Europe as her most significant coalition partner, or source of
partners as the world returns to a multi-polar order. Indeed, in some aspects of democracy,
Europe may still set the lead. Mark Osiel wrote about this particular issue, particularly as it
relates to ‘soft power’ in his latest book, ‘The End of Reciprocity.’

Effective public diplomacy is indeed possible and can be quite valuable,
as several Western European states have found shown in their
intraregional relations. But it requires an openness to unscripted
dialogue and taking calculated risks, the immediate results of which
will sometimes be embarrassing. It requires not merely eloquent speech
but what we have called here deliberate reciprocity: evidence that one is
willing to take the time to listen respectfully to painful criticism and
reply with something more empathetic and compelling than a battery of
pat, bullet-point retorts, however accurate.

To conclude, one must always caveat any statement pertaining to a European DNA
with the warning that a long and bloody history has generated many exceptions.
Although the European conscious is clearly influenced by a series of past conflicts and
political upheavals, it is also changing. The European propensity for collective action in
applying any element of National Power continues to grow with the expansion of the EU.
There is a strong liberal, almost pacifist, thread within many of the EU nations and the
expanding EU government that seeks compromise and consensus. Such a perspective
supports the application of soft power as exercised through the application of the diplomatic,

46Mark Osiel, The End of Reciprocity. Terror, Torture and the Law of War. (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009) 302. Mark Osiel is a well respected lawyer and author . He has lectured at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and advised on the prosecution of General Pinochet.
He is a Visiting Fellow at Cambridge, Harvard and the LSE.
economic and information elements of National Power. The difference between ‘an overreliance on’ and ‘a disposition for’ can only be made on a case by case basis and the ultimate test is that of success.
Defining the cultural values of Muslim coalition partners is as challenging as it is with Europeans. However, given the absence of a shared cultural heritage, the risks associated with making generalisations are even greater. Broadly speaking, the coalition partners with Islam as the primary faith fall into two major groupings. First, there are the predominantly Arab nations, which is already a dangerous simplification as many Arabs would regard themselves as one people (and hence one nation) with arbitrary states imposed on them by western powers. The dismantling of the Muslim Ottoman Empire into areas of British and French influence is but one example. The fact that Tunisia and its capital, Tunis, are words of French origin and have no Arabic connotation highlights the extent of this unwelcome colonial legacy.¹

The second grouping is comprised of the races and former empires conquered and subsequently converted to Islam by the Arab Muslims during the expansion of the Arabian Empire out of the Arabian Peninsula from the seventh century onwards. The Persians, (Iranians) and the many hundreds of tribes that we now oversimplify into Afghani and Pakistani make up the bulk of these.

No matter how contentious the issue, one cannot attempt to understand the cultural DNA of Muslim coalition partners without a basic understanding of the Islamic religion and the Sunni-Shia divide. To avoid any discussion on theology, a simple comparison between

Jesus and Mohamed will illustrate the fundamental differences between the two religions.

Jesus was a simple carpenter who spread the word of God. Mohamed began as a successful trader spreading the word of God in Mecca. As the popularity of his message increased, the pagan leaders of Mecca viewed him as a threat and he moved to Medina. Here he acted firstly, as a judge and mediator, arbitrating local disputes, and thereafter its elected ruler. Finally, he became a successful general as he first defended Medina from Meccan attacks and then expanded his power base and religion throughout Arabia. Thus, Mohamed was a prophet, a warrior, a leader and an expert in the interpretation and application of law; the Islamic religion blends these roles into tenets of faith that make state and church indivisible.2

There are no such parallels within Christianity.

The Sunni- Shia divide did not originate out of significant theological differences in the same manner as the split between the Catholic and Protestant churches. It was over the issue of the inheritance of Mohamed’s spiritual and terrestrial empire. On his death in 632 C.E. his successor and the first Caliph was Abu Bakr, his father-in law.3 This succession was disputed by Mohamed’s cousin Ali, who through murder and intrigue that pervades the Sunni-Shia relationship today, became the fourth Caliph in 656 C.E..4 The power struggle between Ali’s supporters – the Shia, and the original Sunni supporters of Abu Bakr continued even as the Arab empire expanded west, conquering Byzantine Egypt, and north east to the Persian Empire.

Broadly speaking the arm of the Arab empire that expanded west across North Africa and ultimately across the Gibraltar Straights into Spain was predominantly Sunni. The

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2Ibid, 6.
3Ibid, 7.
European coalition army of Charles Martel at Poitiers stopped their descendants in 732. The arm that moved north and east into solidly Christian Byzantine and Persian territory has a stronger Shia component. For example, Saud-Arabia is 95% Sunni, but travel northeast and one finds that Iraq is 63% Sunni and 34% Shia. Further north Azerbaijan is 67% Shia and 29% Sunni. Finally, Iran is 90% Shia and 9% Sunni. An understanding of these percentages and the thirteen centuries of Islamic sectarian violence helps one understand the threat of civil war that faces Iraq and the broader difficulties of building a wider Muslim coalition.

Both western and Muslim countries have a strong appreciation of their history, which has often been interlinked. The European perspective outlined in Chapter 3 that regards classical Greece and Rome as being of the heart of civilisation is only half-true. Western civilisation is as much indebted to the civilisations that originated from Mesopotamia as it is to Greece. By 800 AD, the Arabs had made Bagdad the centre of their empire with a population of 1 million people. It had a reputation as the most influential city for the advancement of humanity’s knowledge of the arts and sciences. The Dark Ages were not universal and their timing is a matter of perspective.

There are many areas where European and Arab legacies and DNA overlap. The Holy Lands are an obvious example, but there are others where the legacy is not one of conflict and hatred. The old Greek city of Alexandria in Egypt, formed by Alexander the Great has a rich culture of Greek, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim influences. Even under the terms of the Arab Conquest of the seventh century, Islam and Christianity co-existed.

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6 Ibid.
Doctrinally, this conquest gave non-Muslims access to Islam and therefore the opportunity to convert; it was not mandated. Conquered non-Muslims were accorded some form of second-class citizenship, similar to Christian treatment of Jewish minorities.\(^8\) With the exception of key holy cities such as Mecca and Medina, the teaching of Islam permitted freedom of worship.

The ideas of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence resonates with the values that the West today associates with ‘moderate’ Muslims, although the very term ‘moderate’ reflects a lack of understanding of the Quran. It certainly does not encompass the views of AQN. In order to understand this divergence in beliefs, one needs to understand the concept of abrogation as applied to the Quran.\(^9\) In essence, the application of abrogation allows seemingly conflicting verses of the Quran to be given a weighting, or priority when placed one another. This apparent conflict arose in part because the Prophet Mohamed wrote the Quran over an extended period that encompassed all facets of his life, from his origins as a persecuted prophet in Mecca through to warrior leader of an expanding empire. As these changing experiences influenced his teachings and thoughts, so there is scope for misinterpretation between his earlier and later writings. Abrogation seeks to clarify and misunderstanding, but in doing so provides opportunity for both extremist and ‘moderate’ Muslim to find guidance within the Quran to validate their beliefs and ensuing actions.

Notwithstanding the historical subtleties of abrogation, it is clear that the history of Islam and its empires is as rich, if not as long, as that of its European neighbours. If one then overlays the Sunni and Shia split and appreciates the role of the decentralised and

\(^9\)For a fuller definition of the concept of abrogation see [http://www.answering-islam.org/Authors/Farooq_Ibrahim/abrogation.htm](http://www.answering-islam.org/Authors/Farooq_Ibrahim/abrogation.htm) (accessed March 20, 2010).
theologically independent Muslim scholars and clerics, one can begin to understand the complexity of the Islamic faith. Such understanding is important for two distinct reasons. Firstly, the current foe, AQN exploits the western lack of understanding of the complexities of Islam to support its Information Campaign and any counter to this must be from a position of enlightened understanding. Without such understanding, Bin Laden’s comparison of President Bush to a Pharaoh seems mild, even amusing. Secondly, any western centric coalition must understand the constraints and restraints of its Muslim coalition partners. A lack of empathy will undermine not only cohesion on the battlefield, but also the application of the Diplomatic and Information elements of National Power. This is particularly important given that within the Information Age, audiences are likely to be both Muslim and Christian.

II – Challenges of the Information Age

The Information Age presents challenges for Arab Muslim governments of a repressive or undemocratic nature. The technologies of the Information Age, particularly the Internet allow disenfranchised and repressed sectors of Muslim society to communicate and express their views that are not possible through either a free press or elections. In addition, the same technologies provide a window into the liberal democratic western world, thus enhancing any feeling of frustration. The Internet statistics for the Middle East are enlightening. While only 28% of the population presently have Internet access, the

percentage growth in the period 2000 – 2009 is 1,648.2%.\textsuperscript{11} When compared to a North America growth rate of 134% (where 74% of the population already have access) and a world average of 380%, the figure is all the more extraordinary.\textsuperscript{12} Cellular phone and satellite television growth rates are expanding at similar levels.

Entertainment has been a force driving demand not just for PCs and Internet, but also for Satellite television and cellular telephones. Over 150 satellite channels are already in use in the Middle East, and 200 additional channels are currently or soon to be available. Satellite broadcasting, initially fostered by state organizations, is now being pushed rapidly by commercial operators within the region and outside it. The 1991 Gulf war brought about a tremendous demand for satellite dishes to pick up CNN coverage, and this large-scale introduction has led to widespread acceptance and popularity of the medium.\textsuperscript{13}

The reference to CNN is comforting, but more so is the rise of a quality Arabic television broadcasting station that carries both gravitas and respect in the form of \textit{Al Jazeera}. Based in Doha, Qatar and broadcasting in both English and Arabic, the station has recruited heavily from established Canadian, American and British producers and broadcasters.\textsuperscript{14} Yet even before the rise of AQN, Muslim terrorist organisations have proved adept at exploiting media to support their Information Campaign. One could postulate that a lack of a meaningful political voice and, as in the case in Palestine, lack of military success has led Muslim terrorist organisations to become expert at the one element of ‘National’ Power open to them, that of Information.

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13}IPR, \url{http://www.infoprod.co.il/ittel.htm}, (accessed March 15, 2010).
\textsuperscript{14}For detailed CVs of Al Jazeera’s Board of Directors and main news broadcasters see \url{http://english.aljazeera.net/aboutus/2007/12/200861501043226986.html}, (accessed March 15, 2010). While writing this thesis the author routinely compared Al Jazeera online reports of events with those posted by the UK’s Times and Telegraph newspapers as well as the Washington Post. The content and editorial perspectives were remarkably similar.
Notwithstanding Palestinian and more recent AQN successes, the Information Age offers coalitions the opportunity to employ Information to an extent previously not possible. To appreciate this new opportunity, one has to look back to an era when the written world was the most effective form of mass communication. If one looks at the UNESCO literacy rates for Arab nations, the findings are shocking. According to the 2006 *Illiteracy in the Arab World Report*, adult illiteracy rates in Iraq are 40%, Yemen 49%, Sudan 59% and Egypt 55%.\(^{15}\) Jordan is the highest with 90%, Saudi Arabia 78% and the Gulf States bracketed somewhere between these last two figures. If one then factors in the percentage of those who read English (which as discussed in chapter 2, is the official language of 85 countries), an image of isolation appear. In his 2003 book, *The Crisis of Islam*, Bernard Lewis established,

> The Arab world translates about 330 books annually, one fifth of the number that Greece translates. The accumulative total of translated books since the Caliph Maa’moun’s time (the ninth century) is about 100,000, almost the average that Spain translates in one year.\(^{16}\)

Overlay this picture of illiteracy and cultural isolation with a traditional form of governance that concentrates power and knowledge in the hands of relatively few tribal elders, clerics and political leaders and one begins appreciates how closed the Muslim world was to the West. The advent of the Information Age has changed this paradigm. The Arab/Muslim population has far greater access to knowledge and a generally accepted truth as opposed to AQN propaganda now than at any time in its history. Clearly, the case for the present coalition to be able to synchronise the Information instrument of National Power to

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\(^{16}\) Lewis, *The Crisis Of Islam*, 115.
counter AQN has never been more pressing. There has been an assumption that AQN is winning the Information War, or as Secretary Gates put it, “we're being out-communicated by a guy in a cave.” Yet, as the figures above illustrate, there has never been a more appropriate time to wrestle the initiative away from AQN and start to ‘inform’ the sea in which the terrorists swim.

III – Grounds For Western Hypocrisy

Clearly the golden era of an Islamic empire has long passed. Western civilisation and culture, appears, to the chagrin of many Muslims, to have eclipsed Islam. One could argue that without the discovery of oil, the western dominance of the Middle East characterised by the dismembering of the Ottoman Empire would have continued unabated. Naturally, such a feeling is a cause for resentment amongst Arab peoples. Such feelings are compounded by the lack of transparent democratic governments amongst Middle East countries. Poor Human Rights, corruption, incompetence, and inability to address the crippling levels of poverty, disease, and illiteracy that shackle too many Arab people highlight the difference between European and Middle Eastern countries.18

The significance of the disconnect between Europeans and impoverished Muslims is considerable. It alienates significant numbers of disenfranchised young men who are unable to achieve change through peaceful political means. America and Europe are targets for much of this anger, largely because they hold the United States and Europe responsible for

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18 As defined under the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proclaimed on December 10, 1948 rather than the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI) proclaimed on August 5, 1990. The latter was signed by Muslim nations and draws on Sharia Law.
propping up unpopular and corrupt governments. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Afghanistan are all cases in point.\textsuperscript{19} America’s unflinching support for Israel only serves to push the point beyond debate in the eyes of many Muslims. The result of this situation is a severe disconnect between the governments and the people of Muslim nations who contribute to American coalitions.

The divergence of views between ‘Western’ and Muslim understanding of Human Rights will always be a contentious issue. The recent case of the former ‘Guantanamo Detainee’ Ethiopian born British national, Binyam Mohamed, highlights what many Muslims regard as the hypocrisy of the ‘Western’ position. The British government secured Binyam Mohamed’s release from Guantanamo and he returned to the UK in February 2009, having been in American custody since his arrest in Pakistan 2002.\textsuperscript{20} In February 2010, the UK’s Court of Appeal ruled that all information received by the British authorities pertaining to the case should be in the public domain.\textsuperscript{21} Previously, the British government had redacted seven paragraphs from a report on Binyam Mohamed because they contained classified information obtained from the USA.

While the release of classified material has strained relations between the UK and USA, the real damage is to relations between the USA and a wider Muslim audience. The detail contained within the previously redacted paragraphs is damning. Five of these give

\textsuperscript{19} These 3 countries as well as Israel and Occupied Territories are listed in the US DoS International Freedom Report 2008 Executive Summary as either countries of ‘concern’ or ‘interest’ because of their lack of religious tolerance. \url{http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108351.htm} (Accessed November 13, 2009). All are key USA alliance or coalition partners.


details of sleep deprivation, playing on Binyam Mohamed fears that he may either, disappear or, be pushed towards a path of self-harm and the fact that he was shackled during interviews. Repeated below are the other two with their original numbering and author’s expansion in parenthesis:

ix) We (the UK Court of Appeal) regret to have to conclude that the reports provide to the SyS (Security Service – MI5) made clear to anyone reading them that BM was being subjected to the treatment that we have described and the effect upon him of that intentional treatment.

x) The treatment reported, if had been administered on behalf of the United Kingdom, would clearly have been in breach of the undertakings given by the United Kingdom in 1972. Although it is not necessary for us to categorise the treatment reported, it could readily be contended to be at the very least cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by the United States authorities.

The last sentence is the most harmful and likely to undermine any American (and by association British) attempts to secure Muslim nations as coalition partners. President Obama’s administration is trying to regain the moral high ground by both closing Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and advocating the use of the very symbolic and open civilian judicial system, vice military tribunals. The role of the latter may be understood by Muslim population long denied access to a free and fair legal system, but it is no advert for ‘western democracy.’ While the President’s initiatives are admirable and worthy of bi-

22 Ibid
partisan support, they are also vital if the USA wishes to have meaningful Muslim coalition partners.

IV – The Need For Engagement

The Obama Administration appears more attuned to the Muslim sense of injustice than earlier regimes. In his keynote ‘New Beginning’ speech made at the prestigious Cairo University on June 4, 2009, President Obama stated:

I've come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect, and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles -- principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings.25

More recently, during his address to the US-Islamic World Forum in Doha, Qatar in February 2010, President Obama appointed the trusted White House Official and Yale Law School graduate Rashad Hussain as the second Special Envoy to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC is the organisation whose definition of Human Rights is at odds with many American and European politicians, yet such a move is essential to garner meaningful Islamic support for American led coalitions.26

As was highlighted in earlier paragraphs, the Information Age offers both the medium to improve engagement and the necessity to do so. The image of the President of the United States of America addressing a Muslim organisation broadcast by Al Jazeera into

the homes of millions of Arabs, many of whom (especially the women) are illiterate is a
powerful message that is hard to counter. However, equally powerful, but sadly less
constructive was Al Jazeera’s impartial coverage of Binyam Mohamed’s torture. The
Information window that has opened into the Muslim world works both ways. The need for
coopulations to develop a cohesive and transparent approach to the application of Information
cannot be overstated.
CHAPTER 5. THE MEETING OF USA AND COALITION CULTURAL DIFFERENCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD – GULF WAR ONE

I – America Vindicated

The stunning American military victory of Gulf War One (Operation DESERT STORM) designed to liberate Kuwait from occupying Iraqi forces in 1991 confirmed America’s position as the sole military superpower. While one cannot dispute the success on the battlefield, the war was an anachronism, an Industrial Age conflict teleported forward into the Information Age. This juxtaposition was unfortunate as it encouraged America to learn false lessons and not appreciate the paradigm shift that had taken the world into the Information Age.

Colloquially, the war is often referred to as the ‘One Hundred Hours War’ because of the short duration of the land combat phase (Operation DESERT SABRE).\(^1\) An American-led coalition of some 680,000\(^2\) troops rapidly liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. America contributed 73% of this force, which had been equipped and trained to face a Soviet threat in Western Europe. The timing of the conflict was serendipitous; America had won the Cold War and hence the threat in Europe had receded. Yet the forces were equipped with a number of ground and air systems which included the Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT), the Bradley Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle (AIFV), the Apache Attack Helicopter (AH 64A), the Black Hawk Utility Helicopter (UH-60A) and the Patriot Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system. Known collectively as the “Big Five,”\(^3\) America had

\(^1\) Dilip Hiro, Desert Shield To Desert Storm; The Second Gulf War (London: HarperCollins, 1992), 380.
\(^2\) Ibid, 308.
designed these systems specifically to neutralize the Warsaw Pact’s (WP) numerical advantage. Although operating within the desert would bring with it the need for both technical and tactical modifications, they were far more capable than anything the Soviet equipped Iraqi forces could bring to battle.

As well as re-equipping, the United States Army had undergone a radical overhaul since withdrawing from Vietnam with its reputation in tatters and refocusing on Europe. As Frank N Shubert and Theresa L Kraus wrote in the Army’s official history of the conflict:

By 1990 those problems were either well in the past or on their way to resolution. Not only were new weapons in place, but military theorists and planners had also broadened the range of possible conflicts to include from small tactical deployments of short duration to a major war over a broad front. Meanwhile, the Army had addressed its internal problems. High standards of recruitment, training, and discipline were in place. In the intervening two decades, the service rebuilt itself around the concept of an all-volunteer force designed to integrate the Army Reserve and Army National Guard into its wartime organization. Army leaders evolved new doctrine for ready forces, focused on the acquisition of new equipment to support that doctrine, tied both together with rigorous training programs, and concentrated on leader development initiatives that increased officer and non-commissioned officer professionalism. By the summer of 1990 the U.S. Army was a technologically sophisticated, highly trained, well-led, and confident force.4

The American military and their coalition partners acquitted themselves superbly in the field and President Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces displayed all the weakness of a WP equipped and trained force and none of the strengths.

II – Wrong Lessons Learned

Although Operation DESERT STORM consisted of a coalition of both European and

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4 Ibid.

Arab nations, it was largely unnecessary. Blatant Iraqi aggression had presented the United Nations with a clear legal and moral imperative to eject occupying Iraqi forces. Diplomacy was limited to ensuring a good turn out to endorse UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 678, which mandated the use of all necessary means by the American-led military coalition to evict Iraqi forces. Arab support, particularly Saudi, was in part a manifestation of sensible self-interest.

Muslim forces took no part in the limited meaningful combat and despite their presence, Arab domestic audiences were far from supportive of any action against Saddam Hussein. He was viewed as the one of the few Arab leaders who could stand up to American and European pressure. That quality alone made him a hero in many Muslim countries. Furthermore, even the Sunni governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait did not want to see Saddam Hussein removed. His regime, however tyrannical, kept the majority Shia population in check and was a very effective barrier between a potentially hostile Shia Iran and the Sunni Saudi Arabia. Such religious factors, which proved to be significant in the later Gulf War II and the wider campaign against AQN were overlooked in the speediness of victory. Battle fatalities were 147, the lowest number of any recorded American conflict by a significant margin. Thus, the conflict left America and her Western coalition partners with unrealistic view of the nature of conflict in the Middle East and in particular, the Arab public view of Western forces stationed on the Arabian Peninsula.

III – The Cost Of War

The cost of victory in Operation DESERT STORM was seductively misleading.

According to American figures, the cost of the war was $61 billion. However, “$54 billion was offset by contributions of other members in the Coalition. Two-thirds of the $54 billion was provided by the Gulf States ($36 billion) with the remaining one-third mostly provided by Japan and Germany ($16 billion).” This has not proved to be the case with the subsequent conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the Congressional Research Services report on The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11:

With enactment of the FY2009 Supplemental on June 24, 2009, Congress has approved a total of about $944 billion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). If the Administration’s FY 2010 war request is enacted, total war-related funding would reach $1.08 trillion, including $748 billion for Iraq, $300 billion for Afghanistan, $29 billion for enhanced security and $5 billion that cannot be allocated.

The financial costs are but one measurement, the toll on human life makes an equally depressing read. Notwithstanding civilian casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are both contentious and emotive, 4698 coalition servicemen and women lost their lives in Iraq. Of these 4380 were American and 179 British. In Afghanistan, there have been 1015 Americans and 270 British fatalities to date out of 1683 deaths.

Ibid.
CONCLUSION

America recognizes the inevitability of the return to a multi-polar world; it is signalled in American policy, strategy, and keynote speeches. As recently as March 2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen stated;

Defence and diplomacy are simply no longer discrete choices, one to be applied when the other one fails...they must complement one another throughout the messy process of international relations. We cannot count on military might alone. We have to invest in our homeland security; we have to improve and better coordinate our intelligence; and we will have to use diplomacy because no one nation can meet the challenges of an interconnected world alone.¹

Europe, whose collective memory is shaped by previous multi-polar eras, agrees. Her tacit acceptance that America will remain a significant force for good within this world is reflected in award of the Nobel Peace Prize to President Obama “for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples.”² Tension in the form of an interconnected global recession and a spreading conflict against AQN that has to be fought at home and abroad has highlighted the impotency of unilateral action, especially of a military nature. The use of force at the operational level must be supported by the remaining elements of National Power orchestrated in concert with coalition partners if nimble opponents such as AQN are to be decisively defeated.

Furthermore, the contribution of the Muslim nations in defeating AQN is critical. As with most wars with a terrorist element, the support of the people is the key to long-term victory and a subsequent lasting peace. The coordination of all the elements of National

Power from all coalition partners will remain a complex challenge that demands the ability to understand perspectives that can compete or conflict with as well as complement any strategy. Yet when empowered through understanding and mutual trust, the whole (of a coalition) is greater than the sum of the parts. This thesis has examined the cultural DNA of America and its coalition partners, both old and new, in the hope that the findings will contribute to that a greater level of understanding and trust.
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Paddy Dowsett was born and educated in Plymouth. He joined the Royal Navy as an Artificer and reached the rate of LMEA before joining Britannia Royal Navy College, Dartmouth as a Warfare Officer in 1989. His first two complement appointments were in frigates and he deployed extensively to the South Atlantic, the Caribbean and the North Atlantic.

Thereafter he specialized as a Navigating Officer and had the privilege of serving as the last navigator of HMS STARLING, a Hong Kong Patrol Craft. He spent two years in the Far East, culminating in the withdrawal from Hong Kong in 1997. On return to the UK, he navigated HMS SHEFFIELD and deployed to the Caribbean where he was involved in Disaster Relief Operations in the wake of Hurricane Mitch.

Post warfare training, Paddy Dowsett returned to sea as the Principal Warfare Officer (Communications and Electronic Warfare (PWO(CEW))) and later, Operations Officer of HMS CHATHAM. During this appointment the ship twice deployed as the Flagship of NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (SNFM) in support of Operation ENDEAVOUR. Two staff appointments followed, first as the Staff PWO(CEW) to Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) and then as SO2 N6 to Commodore Amphibious Task Group (COMATG). During the latter appointment, he oversaw the introduction of BOWMAN into the Amphibious Task Group and the first tranche of escorts.

In 2006, he returned to HMS CHATHAM for an all too brief spell as the Executive Officer, deploying once again to the South Atlantic and returning via the west coast of South America. He took up his first non-seagoing appointment as the Career Manger for half of the PWO specialisation and the Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR) community in 2007. Selected for promotion to Commander and Sea Command in 2008, he completed a short appointment as the Warfare Commanders Career Manager (Commander X).

Commander Dowsett is due to assume Command of HMS CHATHAM in Dec 2010.